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The trade dependence between the two countries - greater in the case of Brazil, but the Chinese also need certain Brazilian products, such as soybeans - ensures understanding between the two countries.

The relationship between Brazil and China has proved to be particularly pragmatic: neither Jair Bolsonaro has revised his ties with the Asian country as he promised before becoming president (in his first year in office he has not only kept Brazil in the BRICS but even made a highly publicised official trip to Beijing), nor has Xi Jinping punished partner for accusing him of mismanaging the coronavirus pandemic, as has happened with other countries. The convenience of mutual trade relations, revalued by the trade war between China and the US and the current global crisis, has prevailed.

Jair Bolsonaro and Xi Jinping in Beijing in October 2019 [Planalto Palace].

Jair Bolsonaro and Xi Jinping in Beijing in October 2019 [Planalto Palace].

article / Túlio Dias de Assis

visit After years of criticising the "perverse communist government in Beijing", Jair Bolsonaro surprised people at the end of October with a state visit to the Forbidden City, which he himself specially publicised on social networks. On that trip he gave Xi Jinping the shirt of the Club de Regatas do Flamengo (the football team that at the time represented Brazil in the Copa Libertadores, which he would end up winning) and expressed his total conviction that he was in a capitalist country. In November he hosted a BRICS summit in Brasilia.

Bolsonaro's policy towards China had already begun to change shortly after he became president in January 2019, in contrast to his anti-China messages during the election campaign.

In fact, diplomatic relations between the two countries date back to the time of the board Military sample of which Bolsonaro is so proud. In 1974 Brazil recognised the People's Republic of China as the only China, thus allowing, despite being unaware of it at the time, the creation of a huge trade link between the two nations of continental proportions. Since then, as China's openness to China progressed, relations between China and Brazil have increased, so that for almost a decade now China has been Brazil's main trading partner, partner . China's dependence on Brazil is also notable in relation to certain products, such as soya, although for the Chinese, Brazil is the twentieth largest trader partner , since logically they are economies of very different sizes.

When in 1978 Deng Xiaoping decided to open China's Economics to the rest of the world, China's GDP was close to $150 billion, 75% of Brazil's, which was already over $200 billion. Four decades later, in 2018, Brazil's GDP was $1.8 trillion and China's was $13.6 trillion.

Soybeans and pigs

Brazil's greatest commercial and even political rapprochement with China occurred during the presidency of Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva, during which the BRICS was formed, a club that helped create a greater level of economic and diplomatic proximity between member countries. This rapprochement led China to become Brazil's leading trade partner in exports and imports. Brazil's sales to China almost double exports to the US.

Although trade with Brazil represents less than 4% of the total value of goods that China imports annually, the South American country continues to be an important commercial partner for the People's Republic, due to the fact that the main product imported from Brazil is soya, one of the instructions of the per diem expenses habitual of a large part of the Chinese population. More than half of the soya imported by China comes from Brazil and the tendency is for this to increase, mainly due to the trade war with the US - the second main exporter of soya to China -, making Brazil practically the breadbasket of the Middle Kingdom. China is the destination for more than 70% of Brazilian soybean production.

Dependence on China, from the Brazilian consumer's perspective, was accentuated at the end of 2019 due to an exorbitant rise in meat prices. The average between the different Brazilian states hovered between 30% and 40% compared to previous months. Producers were able to substantially increase their profits in the short term deadline, but the popular classes openly protested against the uncontrolled price of a product that is very present on the average Brazilian's regular per diem expenses . The rise in prices was due to a combination of factors, including an outbreak of swine fever that devastated much of China's production. Faced with a shortage of supply in its domestic market, China was forced to diversify its suppliers, and in the midst of a trade war with the US, China had no choice but to turn to Brazil's agricultural potential, one of the few countries capable of meeting China's huge demand for meat. During this period - a brief one, as it gradually returned to the previous status - Brazil managed to obtain a certain coercive power over the Asian giant.

Huawei and credits

Brazil is extremely dependent on China at status subject technology: more than 40 per cent of Brazil's purchases from China are machinery, electronic devices or parts thereof. In the last decade, with the arrival of the smartphone and fibre-optic revolution in Latin America, Brazil decided to make a greater commitment to Chinese technology, thus becoming one of the main international markets for the now controversial Huawei brand, which has come to dominate 35% of the Brazilian mobile phone market. While the US and Europe were wary of Huawei and from the outset placed limits on its markets, Brazil saw Chinese technology as a cheaper way to develop and never let itself be swayed by suspicions of Chinese government interference in subject of privacy. Several deputies of the PSL (Bolsonaro's former party) even visited China in early 2020 to evaluate the possibility of acquiring Chinese facial recognition equipment to help state security forces fight organised crime, proposal which was ultimately rejected by parliament.

With the rise of the controversy over the risks of espionage that the use of the Chinese multinational's technology could pose, some voices have warned of the threat that Huawei's contracting could pose to quite a few government agencies and offices: a couple of embassies and consulates, part of the infrastructure of the Chamber of Deputies, and even the headquarters of the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Federal Justice in some federal states. Although given the lack of accusatory evidence against Huawei, little has been done by the government about it; only the cancellation of some purchases of Huawei devices.

Brazil is the country that has received the second largest amount of public loans from China in Latin America: 28.9 billion dollars (Venezuela is the first with 62.2 billion dollars), distributed in eleven loans between 2007 and 2017, nine of which come from the Bank of China development and another two from the Export-Import Bank of China. Although this is a large amount, it represents a very small percentage of Brazil's public debt, which now exceeds one trillion dollars. Most of the loans granted by Beijing have been earmarked for the construction of infrastructure for resource extraction. In addition, Chinese companies have invested in the construction of two ports in Brazil, one in São Luís (Maranhão State) and the other in Paranaguá (Paraná State).

The rhetoric of the coronavirus

Bolsonaro soon realised his dependence on China and opted for a policy of accommodation towards Beijing, far from his campaign messages. Once again, Brazil opted for pragmatism and moderation, as opposed to ideology and radicalism, in terms of Itamaraty (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) policy. Likewise, in the face of the instability caused by the US-China trade war and Trump's current weak position, Bolsonaro demonstrated pragmatism by not closing himself off to high-potential trade partners because of his ideology, as was seen last November at the BRICS summit in Brasilia.

But at times, rhetoric emerges that is in keeping with the original thinking. In the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, Bolsonaro has in some messages copied Trump's anti-China narrative. A good example is the exchange tweet exchange between Eduardo Bolsonaro, a federal deputy and the president's eldest son, and the Chinese ambassador, Yang Wanming. The former compared the coronavirus to the Chernobyl accident, insinuating total irresponsibility, negligence and concealed information on the part of the Chinese Communist Party. The ambassador responded that the president's son "on his last trip to the US did not contract the coronavirus, but a mental virus", referring to his ideological proximity to Trump.

However, all this status seems to have calmed down after a phone call between the presidents of both countries, in which both reaffirmed their commitments, especially those of a commercial and financial nature. Moreover, once again Bolsonaro seems to be following the Itamaraty's traditional line of neutrality, despite the constant insistence of his instructions in blaming China for the current tragedy. It is clear that economic dependence on China remains much stronger than the ideological principles of Bolsonaro's political base, however Trumpist it may be.

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