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# What has been the most successful government building in Africa?

## UN led vs. non-UN led post-conflict government building

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### ABSTRACT

Government building in Africa has been an important issue to deal with after post-independence internal conflicts. Some African states have had the support of UN peacekeeping missions to rebuild their government, while others have built their government on their own without external help. The question this article looks to answer is what method of government building has been more effective. This is done through the analysis of four important overall government building indicators: rule of law, participation, human rights and accountability and transparency. Based on these indicators, states with non-UN indicators have had a more efficient government building especially due to the flexibility and freedom they've had to do it in comparison with states with UN intervention due to the UN's neo-liberal view and their lack of contact with locals.

## **Introduction**

The African continent was struck with colonization at the end of the 19th century, which lasted until the independence wave that started in the decade of the 1960s. However, when the imperial powers left during that period, most African countries were forgotten and unprotected fighting their state's deficiencies; more specifically, their unstable governments. This governmental structure generally possessed both an authoritarian ruler and a strong opposition that sought to commit a coup d'état to rule the way they wanted, while civilians dealt with the war conflicts and economic problems (Young, 2016).

These struggles led to important internal post-independence conflicts, some of which were treated so that an internal transition to a stronger and more stable government could be built without the need for an external intermediary (such as the United Nations). Thanks to the measures taken by some governments during these conflicts, many countries managed to adopt an important and stable international role in the region. However, there were many African countries that weren't able to successfully transition into a stable government and peace by themselves (Young, 2016). External actors, especially the United Nations, got involved in the so-called peacekeeping missions defined as "to help countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace" (United Nations, n.d.).

Regarding the peacekeeping and government building United Nations missions, even though they are not mentioned in the UN Charter, the Security Council is responsible for them. The goal of peacekeeping missions is to "help the hostilities to stop war or conflict and ensure permanent peace in these areas" (Erendor, 2017). After the success of the ceasefire and peace agreement, these peacekeeping operations turn into a mission for reconstruction and government building operations. There are three main post-conflict objectives for these missions: reconciliation, reconstruction, and economic development and poverty reduction (Panic, 2005). The last aim of achieving these objectives is to attain sustainable peace in these states through the creation of stable governments, via the UN dominant ideology of neoliberalism (Navarro, 2007). The UN usually becomes involved in the government building process when there is not a clear victor after the conflict, which means that states that end conflicts with a clear victor are unlikely to have UN involvement.

Between these two clear divisions of government building in African states, it is crucial to ask : what factors have led to democratic transition the most when one compares inner government building with government building through UN intervention? Rwanda and Uganda are the two cases that were analyzed for states that didn't have UN intervention, because they went through tough conflicts and managed to build up their state without much interference from other organisations like the United Nations. While Sierra Leone and Liberia were the cases used to explain UN interventions because due to the conflicts they dealt with, they were considered worse by the international community, so the UN deployed peacekeeping missions.

The timeframe used to analyze these cases was from 2000 to 2017 because most countries were about to finish or had already finished their civil wars. The period of 18 years usually a time to create stability, so there was a need to measure countries in this light on their way towards rebuilding and stabilization. At the beginning of 2000, Uganda and Rwanda had just invaded the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997 to stabilize their borders. Meanwhile, the conflict in Liberia ended in 2003 while the one in Sierra Leone ended in 2002. These states were stabilized by 2003, so there were three years before proper stabilization to see the general trend towards government building, to be able to compare between trends before and after the start of stabilization efforts.

Progress of certain national indicators such as level of participation, human rights, transparency and rule of law are important to analyze to balance out the two government building models. These elements change over time especially when democratic stability increases. With the analysis of this data through the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, it could be put into evidence whether these factors have been affected by conflict and international intervention in national governments or on the other hand, affected by purely internal mechanisms of states.

The main question is to be explored through secondary data and quantitative studies, especially from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, and data from other researches and authors on topics related to African government building and UN government building missions. The indicators applied from the IAG are rule of law, accountability and transparency, participation and rights. Herewith, the analysis will focus examining whether external intervention for post-independence and post-conflict government building did have a great impact for the improvement of overall governance of these African states. And if states that had no external intervention had a better improvement trend.

### **UN-led government building**

The United Nations decided to heavily intervene in African post-independence conflicts because it was mandated to maintain peace and stability throughout the world. The UN missions aimed at these African states had the main objective of obtaining a peace agreement and helping in the democratic transition of the country to lay the foundations for a stable government (Young, 2016). After these peacekeeping missions succeeded, many United Nations missions merely changed names and refocused on other objectives to be able to stabilize governance in a now peaceful environment. These post-conflict missions included elements such as civilian protection and development aid (Murithi, 2014). In many cases where the UN decided to intervene with a peacekeeping mission was because beyond the ongoing post-independence conflicts, there was also a humanitarian crisis developing such as the cases in Sierra Leone and Liberia.


UN missions aren't only focused on peacekeeping, but they also require the growth of a stable government, considering it the key for a long-term peace. Elements the United Nations focus on are such as administering justice inside the state after a conflict, strengthening forces, preparing citizens for democratic transition, party-sharing eventually leading to multiparty elections which are overseen by the local UN mission. For the UN to reach this final step, it "is not possible without the creation of a secure environment for the holding of credible elections" (Wiharta, 2005). This is followed by

the belief that if there is a number of successful election cycles and the country has been operating within them, it means the state has stabilized. This belief ends up being the incorrect one, as a stable government doesn't depend only on successful elections.

### The case of Liberia

Liberia is an almost unique case in African history, given that it wasn't colonized (together with Ethiopia) as the rest of African countries. It became significant during World War II because it was the only source of latex rubber for the Allies, which led Liberia to sign in exchange a defense agreement with the United States. When it became a member of the UN Security Council in 1960, Liberia had an active part in African international relations. Due to decline in world prices for Liberia's exports, corruption and political tensions, the Liberian civil war started in 1989. The war caused neighboring countries to get involved and it had a great toll on civilians. In 1993, the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was created to support the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in their fight for peace (United Nations, n.d.). A deal was achieved between the Liberian parties in 1996 and elections followed.

Peace was shaky for a few months, and later attacks restarted. In 1997 given the end of UNOMIL mandate, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) was created. Given that the conflict continued, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established in 2003 to supersede UNOL (United Nations, n.d.). It started to help maintain stability in the country and keep the peace after the 2003 ceasefire agreement after President Charles Taylor was exiled. That year a government supported by the UN was democratically elected. There was only a true victory after Charles Taylor left power, given that he was not only a perpetrator of war crimes inside Liberia but also in other neighboring countries such as Sierra Leone. After the war, the job of UNMIL was to "consolidate peace, address insecurity and catalyze the broader development of Liberia". The mandate was officially completed in 2018 (Holsoe, Jones, Petterson, 2019.)




Note: Data obtained from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance

Figure 1 shows the government building trends in Liberia between 2000 and 2017. It is evident that rule of law and participation have been increasing throughout these years, which could be related to the regular elections in the country. However, human rights and transparency and accountability have had a more negative fluctuation, with levels constantly increasing and decreasing. This shows that improvements in rule of law and participation, doesn't mean there are also improvements in human rights and accountability. Taking into account these indicators analyzed from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance together with other indicators, the overall governance of Liberia reached a 51.6 out of 100.0 in overall governance, ranking 23rd out of 54 in Africa (IIAG, 2017).

### **The case of Sierra Leone**

Sierra Leone was given independence by Britain after nationalists demands in 1961, which led the British to leave them with democratic institutions that were very quickly instituted. In 1971 it became a republic. Corruption and civilian discontent were widespread, increased by the introduction of one-party rule. The conflict started in 1991 by influence of the conflict in neighboring Liberia. During the civil war, there were reported atrocities against civilian population together with forced conscription. In 1996 there was an attempt for a peace agreement, but it wasn't implemented. The United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on Sierra Leone. In October 1999, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to cooperate with the government and the other parties to implement the Lomé Peace Agreement and later to implement the disarmament, demobilization and the reintegration plan (United Nations, n.d.).

Throughout 2001, UNAMSIL was successful in disarming many rebels and militias and the peacekeeping mission managed to secure more areas of the country. That is why in 2002, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who had fought the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) with help of Charles Taylor, was elected president after helping bring peace to Sierra Leone. The dismantling of RUF and the Charles Taylor influence marked the victory and end in the conflict. The end of the civil war was declared in 2002, but UNAMSIL remained in the territory (Fyfe, Sesay, Nicol, 2019.). That year the UN sponsored the Special Court for Sierra Leone as a war-crimes tribunal. UNAMSIL withdrew from Sierra Leone in 2005, while The United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) was established as a follow-up to UNAMSIL's work to help reduce poverty and help maintain peace by the implementation of good governance. In 2008 UNIOSIL ended and was replaced by the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) with similar objectives. UNIPSIL was withdrawn in 2014. Formal UN mission in Sierra Leone has finished, although a UN country office to support certain processes still remains (United Nations, n.d.).



Note: Data obtained from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance

Figure 2 shows the trends in Sierra Leone about government building. These trends are quite similar to those shown in Liberia. Rule of law and participation are the indicators that have improved the most. Nevertheless, human rights have remained stable and even has shown a very slight increase. Transparency and accountability has stayed almost the same, without any relevant improvement. The overall trends in Sierra Leone are mostly steady, but at the same time there is no improvement which isn't a good sign. Sierra Leone reached as of 2017 a score of 50.9 out of 100.00 in overall governance in the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, ranking 26th out of 54 in Africa (IIAG, 2017).

Comparing the tendencies of the overall government indicators of both Liberia and Sierra Leone, it is evident that despite crises and certain falls, they have improved throughout the years. In the case of Sierra Leone, where the UN left a few years ago in 2014, the withdrawal of the missions didn't affect these levels. The increase in both countries shows that the presence of UN missions was positive for the transition periods after conflict and their government building. Also, that the UN missions left a mark that was strong enough to not cause a fall out after withdrawal. The main trend between both countries is that participation is their most improved and increasing trend. The fact that both in Liberia and Sierra Leone there are improvements in rule of law and participation means that the UN is achieving its goal of creating a governmental structure. There is a direct correlation between rule of law and participation, without institutions there is no confidence to participate. Nevertheless, without respect for human rights and accountability and transparency there can't be a successful long-lasting government.

### **Government building without UN intervention**


During the post-independence transition era in the African continent, a lot of states dealt with conflicts as to who would govern and how. In cases such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, the United Nations decided to intervene in the conflicts in the form of peacekeeping missions. On the other hand, there were African states with major conflicts where the UN didn't send any peacekeeping missions. These conflicts were mostly during

the Cold War, and at that time the Security Council usually wouldn't approve intervention without an invitation to avoid direct struggles between the two powers; although there is also an opinion saying that the UN didn't intervene in all African territories because it wasn't as relevant for UN and US interests (Binder, 2017). These states that received no UN intervention to maintain peace and rebuilding their government, went through an internal government building on their own, without any external support.

### **The case of Uganda**

Uganda is an example of an African state that went through transition internally without any external intervention. After crisis it managed to become a presidential republic that continues up to this day. Uganda gained its independence in 1962, although it was divided politically in geography and on ethnicity groups. It was initially led by Obote from the UPC party. Despite successful moves, tensions grew between certain political and ethnical groups. Even the UPC had internal divisions due to different ethnical supporters. Due to movements of outrage from certain ethnical leaders, Obote started moving troops towards certain areas of the country. Tensions increased, even leading to assassination attempts against Obote. In 1971 he was overthrown and his former ally and now enemy, Idi Amin, took power.

Amin gave the country hope that unification was possible. However, there were problems given that he chose violence to maintain his position. Amin invaded Tanzania to divert attention from the political and economic problems in Uganda. Amin had to flee in 1979 and UNLF, a coalition government, took power. It was overthrown and Obote returned to power in 1980. The army was split amongst ethnic groups, and that led Obote to be exiled in 1985 and a general from the Acholi group, Okello, took power but by 1986 Museveni, the opposition, became president. There was a constitutional amendment in 1993 to restore monarchies in Uganda, in 1995 a new constitution was promulgated with new elections in 1996 and Museveni's reelection in 2001. Museveni's regime showed more stability due to the longevity of his government and improvement in the economy. However, in the 90s and 2000s, there was an increase in rebel activity. In 2005, Ugandans voted in a referendum endorsing a multiparty democratic government and in 2006 it held its first multiparty election since 1980 where Museveni was reelected. Museveni is still in power, with the last elections having been in 2016. (Kiwauka, Kokole Lyons, Ingham, 2019.). Despite being considered a multiparty democracy, there is criticism as to how this is a mask to Museveni's dictatorship.



Note: Data obtained from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance


In Figure 3, Uganda’s government building hasn’t been improving. Rule of law has significantly decreased, while participation has also decreased given the correlation both have. Without a trustworthy structure, there is no successful level of participation. Transparency and accountability has decreased slightly, but still has maintained certain stability. The human rights indicator in Uganda is the exception, given that it has increased throughout the years. Something external to the governmental stability must be driving the improvement in Uganda’s human rights. One element could be that there are still media outlets where people can express themselves. Despite this improvement, the human rights indicator is still not performing well. Uganda, as of 2017, has reached a score of 55.0 out of 100.0 in overall governance and it is ranking 20th out of 54 in Africa (IIAG, 2017).

### The case of Rwanda

Rwanda is another African state that didn’t receive any external support regarding peacekeeping and governmental transition post 1994 genocide. It has to be noted that the UN did briefly send a United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1993 but it faced a lot of challenges and could not stop the genocide in 1994. That is why it isn’t considered as external support or intervention, because it didn’t influence the outcome of the conflict and it was just the Rwanda government that was effective on ending the conflict and rebuilding the country (Kabunduguru, 1999). However, Rwanda did go through a major conflict. Despite the severity of it, it managed to transition into its current presidential constitutional republic. Rwanda became independent in 1962 after struggles between Tutsi and Hutu. Tutsi elements were considered eliminated from competition and Hutu rose in government. Later, tensions between north and south in Rwanda caused a confrontation in 1973 which led to a coup and installed Habyarimana in power.

North-south tensions continued, and factions in the North appeared. The Bugoyi faction tried to create a coup against Habyarimana but failed. He was reelected in 1983 and 1988, being the sole candidate but with incredibly high number of supporters. Tensions between Hutu and Tutsi reappeared in 1990 when the Tutsi-led Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded. A ceasefire was negotiated in 1991 and the same year, a new constitution allowing multiparty participation was promulgated. An agreement between RPF and the government was signed in 1993 that allowed the participation of RPF in government. On 1994, a plane carrying Habyarimana was shot down and he was killed. First it was thought Hutu extremists were responsible, later there were allegations against RPF. Then, a moderate Hutu minister was killed. There was a campaign to eliminate moderate Hutu or Tutsi politicians leading to the formation a government of Hutu extremists (Clay, Lemarchand, 2019).

The killings continued with the leading role of Hutu militia groups. The RPF continued the fighting and tried to secure the country. At the end of 1994, a transitional government was established with a Hutu president and Tutsi vice president. These months of killing are now seen as a genocide that killed more than 800,000 civilians, especially Tutsi. More than 2 million Rwandans fled. The only support the United Nations gave was the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to try those that committed acts of genocide. Still, it wasn't a peacekeeping intervention, nor can it be viewed as part of the rebuilding process as it was marred in delays and Rwanda had to use traditional Gacaca courts to try prisoners accused of committing atrocities. A new constitution was promulgated in 2003 to prevent future ethnic confrontation. That same year the first multiparty democratic elections since independence were held. In 2010, the second multiparty elections were held in a climate of repression and violence, including banning media outlets and arrest of opposition members; this led to Kagame's reelection. Kagame is still the current president of Rwanda, with the same allegations as in Uganda of masking a dictatorship with the name of a democracy (Britannica, n.d.).



Note: Data obtained from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance

In Figure 4, it can be seen that the overall government building trends in Rwanda have been slightly more stable than in Uganda. Rule of law is going down and participation has continued at almost the same level. Human rights are in the same case showing stability without improvements. Transparency and accountability is the exception, given that it has shown the most improvement inside Rwanda, the same way human rights has shown an exception in Uganda by significantly improving. By 2017, Rwanda scored a 64.3 out of 100.0 in overall governance, ranking 8th out of 54 in Africa (IIAG, 2017).

It could be said that governors both in Rwanda and Uganda are autocrats, masking themselves with certain actions to make their citizens believe they are living in a democratic state. This shows that autocratic rulers can chose high transparency but low participation, which is an anomaly. Pushing for transparency but not respecting human rights won't create a stable government, as it eventually will lead to a decay of rule of law. This might explain why trends in these states haven't been stable and have even decreased. Moreover in states with non-UN intervention, there is a lack of civil education and that is why citizens take comfort in having a government structure regardless of how it operates as long as it doesn't end up in a conflict. "One of the ways of enhancing the respect for human rights and freedom in Africa is to recognize the symbiotic relationship between the two subjects" (Obioha, 2017). Civil education is the key for citizens in these states to learn the meaning of democracy. The UN in states it has intervened in invests in providing civil education to prevent cases such as the ones seen in Rwanda and Uganda.

The examples of Uganda and Rwanda show how despite crises and conflicts, the United Nations wasn't always a key to achieve peace and stability. Although they are not considered to have a completely stable government, they did build one. However, in the indicators of the overall government they have been slowly decaying. Both Uganda and Rwanda established a multiparty democratic government at around the same time with constitutional changes after different conflicts. The decrease of the indicators is a sign that the governmental structure in these states aren't operating as democracies but actual dictatorships also with evidence that the current presidents have been in power for more than 10 years. Both countries are performing badly on rule of law and participation which means citizens are losing trust in the governments while the inner structure is also decaying. Yet inspite of that in both countries there is one trend that is showing improvement independently from the deterioration of other trends. In Uganda human rights have improved while in Rwanda transparency and accountability has improved.

### **Government building: external intervention vs. internal**

Government building after conflicts depended on how governments dealt with them. In all cases of post-conflict government reconstruction, the governments were involved, but some had external help, especially from the United Nations. An external presence inside an unstable country inevitably influences the path it is going in. The question is as to how much these interventions really impacted the government building on these states, as compared to states that haven't built themselves up without external presence.

In the government building process through external support, the examples of Sierra Leone and Liberia show how throughout the years the overall governance has improved. The end of the conflicts in these indicators impacted positively its yearly improvement. This indicates that the end of the conflict wasn't only beneficial to the improvement of the state, but that it was also necessary to reach new understandings about the state and its people. It also shows that the UN peacekeeping missions were key to achieving the improvements in governance, given that their presence was key to maintaining the peace deals to end the conflicts. Without having these missions as mediators for the peace agreements, it is hard to know if the government building would have been as successful, or even if peace would have been possible. Given that they had a presence for more than 10 years after the conflicts were finalized, they were the main influence during the transition period of post-conflict towards creating a stable government.

Regardless of the real level of influence they had, it is important to consider what was the kind of influence they had. The UN peacekeeping missions were based on the UN Charter values, which meant the Western values. One of the main pillars would be democracy and all elements of Western government such as checks and balances, multiparty elections and free participation of citizens. Nonetheless, the Western values are not always as easy to implement in societies that were built so radically different as those Western societies, starting by the diversity of ethnic groups in each African state. That is why the Western influence through the UN missions might not have been as successful as they thought it would be. Still and all, the UN missions were key to maintaining peace and stability while the governments built themselves up. That is why, in the cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia, they managed to create presidential republics that are presently running.

Conversely Rwanda and Uganda had a greater freedom to build the government as they saw fit to their situation and their historical background. But it also meant that abuse of power and weak government building was more possible, as they weren't under direct vigilance by a third party and they didn't have the experience of building a successful and strong government, as the West had in their own territory and helping others outside their Western hemisphere. The citizens of those African countries were more willing to support any kind of stable government, because the states had been devastated after years of constant conflict. Despite the fact that no successful UN missions were ever established in these countries, the Western influence has still struck them. That is why countries as Rwanda and Uganda had constitutional changes in the last decade to implement a multiparty election system and determine presidential terms. Despite these amendments being written in the constitutions, in daily activity the governments are dictatorships due to the longevity, the constant reelection tendency and different levels of oppression. All of the instability that has been dragged down in the transition period after the end of conflicts, might explain the slow decay on the overall governance indicators as shown in both Figures 3 and 4.


The trends shown by the Ibrahim Index of African Governance support the idea that the countries that have had UN peacekeeping missions in their territory during transition periods have had a high improvement compared to those that had an internal

government building. Regarding rule of law, states with UN intervention as Sierra Leone and Liberia have showed a slight improvement, while states with non-UN intervention as Uganda and Rwanda have been deteriorating. Regarding transparency and accountability, states with UN intervention have not managed achieved a good improvement. This means that they might have a strong sense of the authority of law, but the government might still be going through corrupt ways and aren't being accountable to the people. While states with non-UN intervention they have improved, despite criticisms of their problem with lack of certain democratic elements.

Participation is trending more positively towards countries that have had the support of UN missions. This shows the successful focus of the UN in government building, and the important correlation with rule of law that has also improved. The countries with no-UN intervention are on the negative side. Human rights have improved in both categories of state building. States with UN intervention are bouncing back and improving after slight deteriorations. Countries without non-UN intervention are also both improving. For example, Liberia and Uganda have the same human rights classification, which means that not all trends are greatly influenced by how their government has been built and growing. UN intervention brings up participation and rule of law but doesn't translate as much to human rights and transparency. States with non-intervention are down in participation and rule of law but these countries have risen in human rights and transparency.

By observing the data of the indicators in the four countries that are being used as examples, in most cases Sierra Leone and Liberia have improved in a greater and more stable way than Uganda and Rwanda. This would lead to conclude that countries that have had UN intervention and support have been able to succeed more in building a successful government after their post-independence conflicts. At the same time, the difference in the numbers of the indicators between both categories isn't extreme. Actually, the four countries that are being used as a comparison have all trended between 20 and 35 at their lowest point, and have reached a maximum of between 50 and 65, with some exceptions.

The improvements in the numbers of the trends aren't the only sign to take into consideration when declaring the success of government building. It is true given the data that IIAG has provided that Liberia and Sierra Leone have improved more than Rwanda and Uganda since 2000. However, Uganda and Rwanda still have a higher measure of overall governance in Africa compared to Sierra Leone and Liberia. This is shown in Figure 5, with Uganda having a measure of 55.0 (IIAG, 2017), Rwanda at 64.3 (IIAG, 2017), Sierra Leone at 50.9 (IIAG, 2017), and Liberia at 51.6 (IIAG, 2017). The difference is evident.



Note: Data obtained from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance

The stability of the process of government building in Africa has been impacted by the presence, or lack of, UN missions in these states. Countries with presence have managed to slowly improve without many alterations that could negatively impact their growth after conflicts. While countries without presence of missions, have been decaying or maintain their levels without major improvements. But the levels of overall governance are still higher on these later category, despite their minor improvements. So, UN missions helped improve the countries more than what the countries without intervention did. But they still have a lower level of overall governance, as seen in Liberia and Sierra Leone, than countries with internal government building, as Rwanda and Uganda.

Non-UN intervention have more freedom to build their own governmental structure over time, that is why they are doing better as shown in Figure 5. The fact that UN intervention states are doing worse means that the UN neo-liberal angle isn't being effective. It isn't working because rule of law and participation aren't helping transparency, so when the UN leaves the territories rule of law is probably going to decay and human rights and transparency aren't going to be respected. This leads to stating that the UN needs to question itself on how a state should be built. It needs operations that are longer and to take into account more elements that just structural stability to ensure that their missions were successful. It has to take into account social situations, talking to civilians and not just focus on the government. This will lead to stability over time and provide growth for people to improve their livelihood. It would mean that there is going to be more freedom in government building for the particularities of each state, as states with non-UN intervention.

#### **The need for local influence**

Having explored the 4 case studies it is clear that to reach a long-term stability it is necessary to have local influence involved in the peacebuilding and government

building process. With the UN's neo-liberal approach, they have created the so-called new "liberal states", but "the new "liberal" states have remained subjects and objects rather than becoming agential, liberal citizens" (Richmond, 2012). Much of the issues that the UN has had, could be fixed by creating a balanced dialogue with locals. However, as Andrea Súilleabháin has mentioned, defining what "local" means is very difficult but it should be used as "marker for being as close as possible to the problems and solutions, inclusive of varied voices and interests" (Súilleabháin, 2015).

The challenge for the UN is that many times its efforts have been ideologically motivated with Western values at the top, instead of accepting a more open-minded evolution of the world that focuses on ensuring elements such as security and rule of law. The UN peacekeeping missions have to understand that to create a successful and stable state, the government structure needs to be built based on the local culture and traditions. That is why it's key to establish a dialogue with the locals. Not only with ordinary citizens, but also with cultural leaders, local NGOs, prominent religious groups, etc. "Peacebuilding ... requires local ownership and cannot rely merely on the knowledge and governmentality of the developed North/West, its experience, culture and resultant institutions" (Richmond, 2012). This is what differentiates the improvements in states where there has been no UN intervention from the states that have had UN intervention: states without UN influence such as Rwanda and Uganda have been allowed to grow and develop as they desire based on the needs they find locally, not based on what the Western international system expects them to become. If the UN continues imposing systems without consulting locally, it looks imposed as a new way of colonialism and that way, the UN won't be able to bridge the gap with states that haven't had UN interventions

### **Conclusion**

This study focused on comparing the success of government building with external intervention vs. through the state's own internal means. When analyzing the data to conclude on the level of success of both categories of government building, different conclusions appeared. At first glance, states with UN intervention had a better improvement in rule of law, accountability and transparency, participation and rights, compared to those states without interventions. However, when comparing the data of both groups, it is clear that regardless of the high or low amount of improvement, African states that went through their own internal government building have a better level of overall governance. The states that had no UN intervention are the proof that the African governments alone could be capable of having improvements without the help of an external actor.

There also has to be a consideration that in this analysis, there were only four states used to compare both types of government building in Africa: Sierra Leone and Liberia vs. Uganda and Rwanda. The history of post-conflict government building in every African country is quite different, so the results and the conclusion might have been different if other countries were used for the comparison.

Yet from all the case studies it is evident that over time regardless of whether they had external support or not, they have a long way to go to reach a stable and successful governance. The UN missions did help improve the stability of governance, but it wasn't the only factor that affected the overall governance improvement. Also, states with no

intervention showed some kind of improvement and stability, but the question as to whether they might have had a greater improvement with UN support remains. The most important element to consider is that there is a crucial need for the UN to improve its government building strategies to include local voices in the process for it to be more adequate for the situation of each particular state and assure long-term stability.

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