The trade dependence between the two countries - greater in the case of Brazil, but the Chinese also need certain Brazilian products, such as soybeans - ensures the understanding between the two countries.

The relationship between Brazil and China has proven to be particularly pragmatic: neither Jair Bolsonaro has reviewed the link with the Asian country as he promised before becoming president (in his first year in office he has not only kept Brazil in the BRICS but even made a highly publicized official trip to Beijing), nor has Xi Jinping punished his partner for having accused him of mismanaging the coronavirus pandemic, as has happened with other countries. The convenience of mutual trade relations, revalued by the trade war between China and the US and by the present world crisis, has prevailed.

▲ Jair Bolsonaro and Xi Jinping in Beijing in October 2019 [Planalto Palace].

article / Túlio Dias de Assis

After years of criticizing the "perverse communist government of Beijing", Jair Bolsonaro surprised at the end of last October with a state visit to the Forbidden City, which he himself specially publicized on social networks. On that trip he gave Xi Jinping the jersey of the Club de Regatas do Flamengo (the soccer team that at that time represented Brazil in the Libertadores Cup, which he would end up winning) and expressed his total conviction of being in a capitalist country. In November he hosted a BRICS summit in Brasilia.

Bolsonaro's policy toward China had already begun to change since shortly after acceding to the presidency in January 2019, in contrast to his anti-China messages during the election campaign.

In fact, diplomatic relations between the two countries date back to the time of the military board of which Bolsonaro sample so proud. In 1974, Brazil recognized the People's Republic of China as the only China, thus allowing, despite being unaware of it at the time, the creation of a huge trade link between the two nations of continental proportions. Since then, as China's openness to China progressed, relations between China and Brazil have been increasing, so that for almost a decade now China has been Brazil's main trading partner . China's dependence on Brazil is also remarkable in relation to some products, such as soybeans, although for the Chinese Brazil is the twentieth trading partner , since logically they are economies of very different sizes.

When in 1978 Deng Xiaoping decided to open up Chinese Economics to the rest of the world, Chinese GDP was close to $150 billion, 75% of Brazil's, which was already over $200 billion. Four decades later, in 2018, Brazilian GDP was $1.8 trillion and Chinese GDP was $13.6 trillion.

Soybeans and swine

Brazil's greatest commercial and even political rapprochement with China occurred during the presidency of Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva, during which the BRICS was formed, a club that helped create a greater level of economic and diplomatic proximity between member countries. This rapprochement led China to become Brazil's leading trading partner in terms of exports and imports. Brazil's sales to China almost double exports to the US.

Although trade with Brazil represents less than 4% of the total value of goods imported by China annually, the South American country continues to be an important trading partner for the People's Republic, due to the fact that the main product imported from Brazil is soybeans, one of the usual per diem expenses instructions for a large part of the Chinese population. More than half of the soybeans imported by China come from Brazil and the trend is to increase, mainly due to the trade war with the USA - the second main exporter of soybeans to China -, thus making Brazil practically the breadbasket of the Middle Kingdom. China is the destination of more than 70% of Brazilian soybean production.

Dependence on China, from the Brazilian consumer's perspective, was accentuated at the end of 2019 due to an exorbitant rise in the price of meat. The average between the different Brazilian states hovered between 30% and 40% compared to previous months. Producers were able to substantially increase their profits in the short term, but the popular classes openly protested the uncontrolled price of a product very present in the usual per diem expenses of the average Brazilian. The rise in prices was due to a combination of factors, among them an outbreak of swine fever that devastated a large part of Chinese production. Faced with a shortage of supply in its domestic market, China was forced to diversify its suppliers, and being in the midst of a trade war with the USA, China had no choice but to turn to the Brazilian agricultural potential, one of the few capable of meeting the great Chinese demand for meat. During this period - a brief one, as it gradually returned to the previous status - Brazil obtained a certain coercive power over the Asian giant.

Huawei and credits

Brazil is in a status of extreme dependence on China in technological subject : more than 40% of Brazil's purchases from China are machinery, electronic devices or parts thereof. Already in the last decade, with the arrival of the smartphone and fiber optics revolution in Latin America, Brazil decided to bet more on Chinese technology, thus becoming one of the main international markets for the now controversial Huawei brand, which has come to dominate 35% of the Brazilian cell phone market. While the US and Europe were suspicious of Huawei and from the beginning placed limits on its markets, Brazil saw Chinese technology as a cheaper way to develop and never let itself be swayed by suspicions of Chinese government interference in privacy subject . Even several deputies of the PSL (former party to which Bolsonaro belonged) visited China in early 2020 to evaluate the possibility of acquiring Chinese facial recognition equipment to help state security forces in the fight against organized crime, a proposal that was ultimately rejected by the Parliament.

With the rise of the controversy about the risks of espionage that the use of the Chinese multinational's technology may pose, some voices have warned of the threat that Huawei's contracting may pose to many government agencies and offices: a couple of embassies and consulates, part of the infrastructure of the Chamber of Deputies, and even the headquarters of the Federal Prosecutor's Office and the Federal Justice in some federal states. Although given the lack of accusatory evidence against Huawei, little has been done by the government about it; only the cancellation of some purchases of Huawei devices has been given.

Brazil is the country that has received the second most public loans from China in Latin America: $28.9 billion (Venezuela is the first with $62.2 billion), spread over eleven loans between 2007 and 2017, of which nine come from the Chinese development Bank and two others from the Export-Import Bank of China. Despite being a high value, it represents a very small percentage of the Brazilian public debt, which already exceeds one trillion dollars. Most of the loans granted by Beijing have been earmarked for the construction of infrastructure for resource extraction. In addition, Chinese companies have invested in the construction of two ports in Brazil, one in São Luís (Maranhão State) and the other in Paranaguá (Paraná State).

Coronavirus rhetoric

Bolsonaro soon realized his dependence on China and opted for a policy of accommodation towards Beijing, far from his election campaign messages. Once again, then, Brazil was betting on pragmatism and moderation, as opposed to ideology and radicalism, in terms of Itamaraty (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) policy. Likewise, in the face of the instability caused by the US-China trade war and Trump's current weak position, Bolsonaro was demonstrating pragmatism by not closing himself off to high-potential trade partners because of his ideology, as was seen last November at the BRICS summit in Brasilia.

But sometimes a rhetoric emerges that is in line with the original thinking. In the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, Bolsonaro has copied Trump's anti-China narrative in some messages. A good example is the exchange of tweets that took place between Eduardo Bolsonaro, federal deputy and eldest son of the president, and the Chinese ambassador, Yang Wanming. The former compared the coronavirus to the Chernobyl accident, insinuating total irresponsibility, negligence and concealed information on the part of the Chinese Communist Party. The ambassador responded that the president's son "on his last trip to the US did not contract the coronavirus, but a mental virus", referring to his ideological proximity to Trump.

However, all this status seems to have calmed down after a call between the presidents of both countries, in which both reaffirmed their commitments, especially those of a commercial and financial nature. Also, once again Bolsonaro seems to follow Itamaraty's traditional line of neutrality, despite the constant insistence of his instructions to blame China for the current tragedy. It is clear that the economic dependence on China is still much stronger than the ideological principles of Bolsonaro's political base, however Trumpist it may be.

▲ VCR 8x8 programframework Romero/MDE].

COMMENTARY / Salvador Sánchez Tapia

After a gap of eight years since the publication of the last one in 2012, last June 11, the President of the Government signed a new National Defense Directive (DDN), thus marking the beginning of a new Defense Planning cycle which, in agreement with the provisions of Defense Order 60/2015, must be valid for six years.

The DDN 20 essay is a praiseworthy effort to bring National Defense up to date in order to adapt to the challenges of a complex strategic environment in continuous transformation. Your essay also offers an excellent opportunity to build along the way an intellectual community on such a relevant issue, which will be fundamental throughout the cycle.

This article provides a preliminary analysis of the DDN 20 focusing on its most relevant aspects. In a first approach, the official document follows the line, already enshrined in other Directives, of subsuming the essentially military concept of Defense within the broader concept of Security, which affects all the capabilities of the State. In this sense, the first difficulty that the DDN 20 has had to overcome is precisely the lack of a statutory document similar to the DDN, drafted at the level of National Security, to illuminate and guide it. To tell the truth, the void has not been total, since, as stated by the DDN 20 in its introduction, there is a National Security Strategy (ESN) which, although published in 2017, has served as a reference letter in its elaboration, despite the evident lack of consistency that can be seen between the strategic scenarios described in both documents.

In this regard, it is worth noting the lack of specificity with which the new DDN defines the strategic scenario, in comparison with the somewhat greater specificity of the ESN. The DDN 20 draws a vague, almost generic scenario, applicable almost unchanged to any nation in the world, without reference to specific geographical areas; an accumulation of threats and risks to security with an impact on defense, none of which appears to be more likely or more dangerous, and to which is added the recognition of changes in the international order that once again bring the possibility of major armed conflicts closer.

Such an approach makes it difficult to subsequently define defense objectives and guidelines for action and, perhaps for this reason, certain inconsistencies can be observed among the three parts of the document. It is striking that, although the document raises the somewhat hasty certificate of the emergence of COVID-19, the possibility of a pandemic not being triggered is not considered in the description of the strategic scenario, something that, on the other hand, is included in ESN 17.

Along with the description of this scenario, the DDN 20 is interspersed with a set of considerations of a programmatic nature, in themselves positive and relevant, but which have little to do with what is to be expected in a document of this nature, designed to guide the planning of National Defense. In some cases, such as the promotion of the gender perspective, or the improvement of the quality of life of the staff in its dimensions of improving living facilities, reconciliation of professional and family life, and reintegration into civilian life once the link with the Armed Forces has ended, the considerations are more typical of the department 's staff Policy than of a DDN. In others, such as the obligation to respect local cultures in military operations, they seem to be more the subject of the Royal Ordinances or another subject of a code of ethics.

Undoubtedly motivated by the COVID-19 emergency, and in view of the role that the Armed Forces have assumed during it, the DDN emphasizes the importance of partnership missions with and support to civilian authorities, something, moreover, consubstantial to the Armed Forces, and establishes the specific goal of acquiring capabilities that enable partnership and support to such authorities in crisis and emergency situations.

The management the pandemic may have highlighted gaps in response capabilities, shortcomings in coordination tools, etc., thus opening a window of opportunity to make progress in this area and produce a more effective response in the future. However, it is advisable to guard against the possibility, open in this DDN, of losing sight of the central tasks of the Armed Forces, to prevent an excessive focus on missions in support of the civilian population from ending up distorting their organization, manning and training, thereby impairing the deterrence capacity of the armies and their combat operability.

The DDN also contains the usual reference letter, obligatory and necessary, to the promotion among Spaniards of a true Defense Culture. The accredited specialization is justified by the role that the Ministry of Defense must play in this effort. However, it is not the field of defense that needs to be reminded of the importance of this issue. The impact of any effort to promote the Culture of Defense will be limited if it is not assumed as its own by other ministerial Departments , as well as by all the administrations of the State, being also aware that it is not possible to generate a Culture of Defense without a prior consensus at the national level on such essential issues as the objectives or values shared by all. It is, perhaps, on this aspect that the emphasis should be placed.

Perhaps the most controversial point of the DDN 20 is that of financing. Achieving the objectives set out in the document requires a sustained financial investment over time that breaks the current ceiling on defense expense . Maintaining the Armed Forces among the technological elite, substantially improving the quality of life of the professional staff -which begins by providing them with the equipment that best guarantees their survival and superiority on the battlefield-, reinforcing the capacity to support civilian authorities in emergency situations, strengthening intelligence and cyberspace capabilities, or meeting with guarantees the operational obligations derived from our active participation in international organizations which, moreover, are committed to be reinforced by up to 50% for a period of one year, is as necessary as it is costly.

The final paragraph of DDN 20 recognizes this when it states that the development the document's guidelines will require the necessary funding. This statement, however, is little more than an acknowledgement of the obvious, and is not accompanied by any commitment or guarantee of funding. Taking into account the important commitments already subscribed by the Ministry with the pending Special Armament Programs, and in view of the economic-financial panorama that is on the horizon due to the effects of COVID-19, which has led the JEME to announce to the Army the arrival of a period of austerity, and which would deserve to be included among the main threats to national security, it seems difficult that the objectives of the DDN 20 can be covered in the terms that it proposes. This is the real Achilles' heel of the document, which may turn it into little more than a dead letter.

In conclusion, the issuance of a new DDN is to be welcomed as an effort to update the National Defense policy, even in the absence of a similar instrument that periodically articulates the level of the Security Policy, in which the Defense Policy should be subsumed.

The emergence of COVID-19 seems to have overtaken the document, causing it to lose some of its validity and calling into question not only the will, but also the real capacity to achieve the ambitious objectives it proposes. At least it is possible that the document may act, even in a limited way, as a sort of shield to protect the defense sector against the scenario of scarce resources that Spain will undoubtedly experience in the coming years.

[John West, Asian Century on A Knife Edge: A 360 Degree Analysis of Asia's Recent Economic Development.. Palgrave Macmillan. Singapore, 2018. 329 p.]

REVIEW / Gabriela Pajuelo

The degree scroll of this book seems to contribute to the generalized chorus that the 21st century is the century of Asia. In reality, the book's thesis is the opposite, or at least it puts that statement "on the razor's edge": Asia is a continent of great economic complexity and conflicting geopolitical interests, which poses a series of challenges whose resolution will determine the region's place in the world in the coming decades. For the time being, according to John West, a university professor in Tokyo, nothing is certain.

The book begins with a preamble on the recent history of Asia, from World War II to the present. Already at the beginning of that period, economic liberalism was established as the standard doctrine in much of the world, including most Asian countries, in a process driven by the establishment of international institutions.

China joined this system, without renouncing its internal doctrines, when it joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. Since then, there have been some shocks such as the financial crisis of 2007-2008, which severely affected the U.S. economy and had repercussions in the rest of the world, or the recent tariff tensions between Washington and Beijing, in addition to the current global crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic.

The principles of protectionism and nationalism deployed by Donald Trump and an increased U.S. resource to the hard power in the region, as well as a more assertive policy of Xi Jinping's China in its geographical environment, also resorting to positions of force, as in the South China Sea, have damaged the multilateralism that had been built up in that part of the world.

The author provides some thought-provoking ideas on the challenges that Asia will face, given that the core topic factors that favored its development have now deteriorated (mainly due to the stability provided by international economic interdependence).

West examines seven challenges. The first is to obtain a better position in global value chains, since since the 1980s the manufacture of components and the production of final products has taken place in different parts of the world. Asia is heavily involved in these supply chains, in fields such as technology and apparel production, but is subject to the business decisions of multinationals whose practices are sometimes not socially responsible and allow the abuse of labor rights, which are important for middle-class development .

The second challenge is to maximize the potential of urbanization, which has grown from 27% of the population in 1980 to 48% in 2015. The region is known for densely populated megacities. This brings with it some difficulties: the population migrating to industrial centers generally moves from leave to high-productivity jobs, and health care capacity is put to the test . But it is also an opportunity to improve environmental practices or encourage innovation through green technologies, even though much of Asia today still faces high levels of pollution.

Another challenge is to give all Asians equal opportunities in their respective societies, from LGBT people to women and indigenous communities, as well as ethnic and religious minorities. The region also faces a major demographic challenge , as many populations either age (such as China's, despite the correction of the "two-child policy") or continue to expand with presumed future supply problems (as in the case of India).

West also reference letter to the barriers to democratization that exist in the region, with China's notable immobility, and to the spread of economic crime and corruption (counterfeiting, piracy, drug trafficking, human trafficking, cybercrime and money laundering).

Finally, the author speaks of the challenge for Asian countries to live together in peace and harmony, while China consolidates its position as a regional leader: if there is a Chinese commitment to thesoft powerThrough the Belt and Road initiative, there is also a more confrontational attitude on the part of Beijing towards Taiwan, Hong Kong and the South China Sea, while players such as India, Japan and North Korea want a greater role.

Overall, the book offers a comprehensive analysis of Asia's economic and social development and the challenges ahead. In addition, the author offers some thought-provoking ideas, arguing that a so-called "Asian century" is unlikely due to the region's lagging economic development , as most countries have not caught up with their Western counterparts in terms of GDP per capita and technological sophistication. Nevertheless, it leaves the future open: if the challenges are successfully met, the time may indeed come for an Asian Century.

▲ Flood rescue in the Afghan village of Jalalabad, in 2010 [NATO].

June 16, 2020

ESSAY / Alejandro J. Alfonso

In December of 2019, Madrid hosted the United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP25, in an effort to raise awareness and induce action to combat the effects of climate change and global warming. COP25 is another conference in a long line of efforts to combat climate change, including the Kyoto Protocol of 2005 and the Paris Agreement in 2016. However, what the International Community has failed to do in these conferences and agreements is address the issue of those displaced by the adverse effects of Climate Change, what some call "Climate Refugees".

Introduction

In 1951, six years after the conclusion of the Second World War and three years after the creation of the State of Israel, a young organization called the United Nations held an international convention on the status of refugees. According to Article 1 section A of this convention, the status of refugee would be given to those already recognized as refugees by earlier conventions, dating back to the League of Nations, and those who were affected "as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion...". However, as this is such a narrow definition of a refugee, the UN reconvened in 1967 to remove the geographical and time restrictions found in the 1951 convention[1], thus creating the 1967 Protocol.

Since then, the United Nations General Assembly and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have worked together to promote the rights of refugees and to continue the fight against the root causes of refugee movements.[2] In 2016, the General Assembly made the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, followed by the Global Compact on Refugees in 2018, in which four objectives were established: "(i) ease pressures on host countries; (ii) enhance refugee self-reliance; (iii) expand access to third country solutions; and (iv) support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity".[3] Defined as 'interlinked and interdependent objectives', the Global Compact aims to unite the political will of the International Community and other major stakeholders in order to have 'equitalized, sustained and predictable contributions' towards refugee relief efforts. Taking a holistic approach, the Compact recognizes that various factors may affect refugee movements, and that several interlinked solutions are needed to combat these root causes.

While the UN and its supporting bodies have made an effort to expand international protection of refugees, the definition on the status of refugees remains largely untouched since its initial applications in 1951 and 1967. "While not in themselves causes of refugee movements, climate, environmental degradation and natural disasters increasingly interact with the drivers of refugee movements".3 The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has found that the increase of the average temperature of the planet, commonly known as Global Warming, can lead to an increase in the intensity and occurrence of natural disasters[4]. Furthermore, this is reinforced by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, which has found that the number of those displaced by natural disasters is higher than the number of those displaced by violence or conflict on a yearly basis[5], as shown in Table 1. In an era in which there is great preoccupation and worry concerning the adverse effects of climate change and global warming, the UN has not expanded its definition of refugee to encapsulate those who are displaced due to natural disasters caused by, allegedly, climate change.

Table 1 / Global Internal Displacement Database, from IDMC

Methodology

This present paper will be focused on the study of Central America and Southeast Asia as my study subjects. The first reason for which these two regions have been selected is that both are the first and second most disaster prone areas in the world[6], respectively. Secondly, the countries found within these areas can be considered as developing states, with infrastructural, economic, and political issues that can be aggravating factors. Finally, both have been selected due to the hegemonic powers within those hemispheres: the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. Both of these powers have an interest in how a 'refugee' is defined due to concerns over these two regions, and worries over becoming receiving countries to refugee flows.

Central America

As aforementioned, the intensity and frequency of natural disasters are expected to increase due to irregularities brought upon by an increase in the average temperature of the ocean. Figure 1 shows that climate driven disasters in Latin America and the Caribbean have slowly been increasing since the 1970s, along with the world average, and are expected to increase further in the years to come. In a study by Omar D. Bello, the rate of climate related disasters in Central America increased by 326% from the year 1970 to 1999, while from 2000 to 2009 the total number of climate disasters were 143 and 148 in Central America and the Caribbean respectively[7]. On the other hand, while research conducted by Holland and Bruyère has not concluded an increase in the number of hurricanes in the North Atlantic, there has been an upward trend in the proportion of Category 4-5 hurricanes in the area[8].

This increase in natural disasters, and their intensity, can have a hard effect on those countries which have a reliance on agriculture. Agriculture as a percentage of GDP has been declining within the region in recent years due to policies of diversification of economies. However, in the countries of Honduras and Nicaragua the percentage share of agriculture is still slightly higher than 10%, while in Guatemala and Belize agriculture is slightly below 10% of GDP share[9]. Therefore, we can expect high levels of emigration from the agricultural sectors of these countries, heading toward higher elevations, such as the Central Plateau of Mexico, and the highlands of Guatemala. Furthermore, we can expect mass migration movements from Belize, which is projected to be partially submerged by 2100 due to rising sea levels[10].

Figure 2 / Climate Risk Index 2020, from German Watch

Southeast Asia

The second region of concern is Southeast Asia, the region most affected by natural disasters, according to the research by Bello, mentioned previously. The countries of Southeast Asia are ranked in the top ten countries projected to be at most risk due to climate change, shown in Figure 2 above[11]. Southeast Asia is home to over 650 million people, about 8% of total world population, with 50% living in urban areas[12]. Recently, the OECD concluded that while the share in GDP of agriculture and fisheries has declined in recent years, there is still a heavy reliance on these sectors to push economy in the future[13]. In 2014, the Asian Development Bank carried out a study analyzing the possible cost of climate change on several countries in the region. It concluded that a possible loss of 1.8% in the GDP of six countries could occur by 2050[14]. These six countries had a high reliance on agriculture as part of the GDP, for example Bangladesh with around 20% of GDP and 48% of the workforce being dedicated to agricultural goods. Therefore, those countries with a high reliance on agricultural goods or fisheries as a proportion of GDP can be expected to be the sources of large climate migration in the future, more so than in the countries of Central America.

One possible factor is the vast river system within the area, which is susceptible to yearly flooding. With an increase in average water levels, we can expect this flooding to worsen gradually throughout the years. In the case of Bangladesh, 28% of the population lives on a coastline which sits below sea level[15]. With trends of submerged areas, Bangladesh is expected to lose 11% of its territory due to rising sea levels by 2050, affecting approximately 15 million inhabitants[16][17]. Scientists have reason to believe that warmer ocean temperatures will not only lead to rising sea levels, but also an intensification and increase of frequency in typhoons and monsoons[18], such as is the case with hurricanes in the North Atlantic.

Expected Destinations

Taking into account the analysis provided above, there are two possible migration movements: internal or external. In respect to internal migration, climate migrants will begin to move towards higher elevations and temperate climates to avoid the extreme weather that forced their exodus. The World Bank report, cited above, marked two locations within Central America that fulfill these criteria: the Central Plateau of Mexico, and the highlands of Guatemala. Meanwhile, in Southeast Asia, climate migrants will move inwards in an attempt to flee the rising waters, floods, and storms.

However, it is within reason to believe that there will be significant climate migration flows towards the USA and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Both the United States and China are global powers, and as such have a political stability and economic prowess that already attracts normal migration flows. For those fleeing the effects of climate change, this stability will become even more so attractive as a future home. For those in Southeast Asia, China becomes a very desired destination. With the second largest land area of any country, and with a large central zone far from coastal waters, China provides a territorial sound destination. As the hegemon in Asia, China could easily acclimate these climate migrants, sending them to regions that could use a larger agricultural workforce, if such a place exists within China.

In the case of Central America, the United States is already a sought-after destination for migrant movements, being the first migrant destination for all Central American countries except Nicaragua, whose citizens migrate in greater numbers to Costa Rica[19]. With the world's largest economy, and with the oldest democracy in the Western hemisphere, the United States is a stable destination for any refugee. In regard to relocation plans for areas affected by natural disasters, the United States also has shown it is capable of effectively moving at-risk populations, such as the Isle de Jean Charles resettlement program in the state of Louisiana[20].

Problems

While some would opine that 'climate migrants' and 'climate refugees' are interchangeable terms, they are unfortunately not. Under international law, there does not exist 'climate refugees'. The problem with 'climate refugees' is that there is currently no political will to change the definition of refugee to include this new category among them. In the case of the United States, section 101(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the definition of a refugee follows that of the aforementioned 1951 Geneva convention[21], once again leaving out the supposed 'climate refugees'. The Trump administration has an interest in maintaining this status quo, especially in regard to its hard stance in stopping the flow of illegal immigrants coming from Central America. If a resolution should pass the United Nations Security Council, the Trump administration would have no choice but to change section 101(42) of the INA, thus risking an increased number of asylum applicants to the US. Therefore, it can confidently be projected that the current administration, and possibly future administrations, would utilize the veto power, given to permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, on such a resolution.

China, the strongest regional actor in Asia, does not have to worry about displeasing the voter. Rather, they would not allow a redefinition of refugee to pass the UN Security Council for reasons concerning the stability and homogeneity of the country. While China does accept refugees, according to the UNHCR, the number of refugees is fairly low, especially those from the Middle East. This is mostly likely due to the animosity that the Chinese government has for the Muslim population. In fact, the Chinese government has a tense relationship with organized religion in and of itself, but mostly with Islam and Buddhism. Therefore, it is very easy to believe that China would veto a redefinition of refugee to include 'climate refugees', in that that would open its borders to a larger number of asylum seekers from its neighboring countries. This is especially unlikely when said neighbors have a high concentration of Muslims and Buddhists: Bangladesh is 90% Muslim, and Burma (Myanmar) is 87% Buddhist[22]. Furthermore, both countries have known religious extremist groups that cause instability in civil society, a problem the Chinese government neither needs nor wants.

On the other hand, there is also the theory that the causes of climate migration simply cannot be measured. Natural disasters have always been a part of human history and have been a cause of migration since time immemorial. Therefore, how can we know if migrations are taking place due to climate factors, or due to other aggravating factors, such as political or economic instability? According to a report by the French think tank 'Population and Societies', when a natural disaster occurs, the consequences remain localized, and the people will migrate only temporarily, if they leave the affected zone at all[23]. This is due to the fact that usually that society will bind together, working with familial relations to surpass the event. The report also brings to light an important issue touched upon in the studies mentioned above: there are other factors that play in a migration due to a natural disaster. Véron and Golaz in their report cite that the migration caused by the Ethiopian drought of 1984 was also due in part to bad policies by the Ethiopian government, such as tax measures or non-farming policies.

The lack of diversification of the economies of these countries, and the reliance on agriculture could be such an aggravating factor. Agriculture is very susceptible to changes in climate patterns and are affected when these climate patterns become irregular. This can relate to a change of expected rainfall, whether it be delayed, not the quantity needed, or no rainfall at all. Concerning the rising sea levels and an increase in floods, the soil of agricultural areas can be contaminated with excess salt levels, which would remain even after the flooding recedes. For example, the Sula Valley in Honduras generates 62% of GDP, and about 68% of the exports, but with its rivers and proximity to the ocean, also suffers from occasional flooding. Likewise, Bangladesh's heavy reliance on agriculture, being below sea level, could see salt contamination in its soil in the near future, damaging agricultural property.

Reliance on agriculture alone does not answer why natural disasters could cause large emigration in the region. Bello and Professor Patricia Weiss Fagen[24] find that issues concerning the funding of local relief projects, corruption in local institutions, and general mismanagement of crisis response is another aggravating factor. Usually, forced migration flows finish with a return to the country or area of origin, once the crisis has been resolved. However, when the crisis has continuing effects, such as what happened in Chernobyl, for example, or when the crisis has not been correctly dealt with, this return flow does not occur. For example, in the countries composing the Northern Triangle, there are problems of organized crime which is already a factor for migration flows from the area[25]. Likewise, the failure of Bangladesh and Myanmar to deal with extremist Buddhist movements, or the specific case of the Rohinga Muslims, could inhibit return flows and even encourage leaving the region entirely.

Recommendations and Conclusions

The definition of refugee will not be changed or modified in order to protect climate migrants. That is a political decision by countries who sit at a privileged position of not having to worry about such a crisis occurring in their own countries, nor want to be burdened by those countries who will be affected. Facing this simple reality should help to find a better alternative solution, which is the continuing efforts of the development of nations, in order that they may be self-sufficient, for their sake and the population's sake. This fight does not have to be taken alone, but can be fought together through regional organizations who have a better understanding and grasp of the gravity of the situation, and can create holistic approaches to resolve and prevent these crises.

We should not expect the United Nations to resolve the problem of displacement due to natural disasters. The United Nations focuses on generalized and universal issues, such as that of global warming and climate change, but in my opinion is weak in resolving localized problems. Regional organizations are the correct forum to resolve this grave problem. For Central America, the Organization of American States (OAS) provides a stable forum where these countries may express their concerns with states of North and Latin America. With the re-election of Secretary General Luis Almagro, a strong and outspoken authority on issues concerning the protection of Human Rights, the OAS is the perfect forum to protect those displaced by natural disasters in the region. Furthermore, the OAS could work closely with the Inter-American Development Bank, which has the financial support of international actors who are not part of the OAS, such as Japan, Israel, Spain, and China, to establish the necessary political and structural reforms to better implement crisis management responses. This does not exclude the collusion with other international organizations, such as the UN. Interestingly, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has a project in the aforementioned Sula Valley to improve infrastructure to deal with the yearly floods[26]. 

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is another example of an apt regional organization to deal with the localized issues. Mostly dealing with economic issues, this forum of ten countries could carry out mutual programs in order to protect agricultural territory, or further integrate to allow a diversification of their economies to ease this reliance on agricultural goods. ASEAN could also call forth the ASEAN +3 mechanism, which incorporates China, Japan, and South Korea, to help with the management of these projects, or for financial aid. China should be interested in the latter option, seeing as it can increase its good image in the region, as well as protecting its interest of preventing possible migration flows to its territory. The Asian Development Bank, on the other hand, offers a good alternative financial source if the ASEAN countries so choose, in order to not have heavy reliance on one country or the other.

▲ Rice field terraces in Vietnam [Pixabay].

COMMENT / Eduardo Arbizu

The combination of a market Economics and an authoritarian regime dominated by the Communist Party of Vietnam (VCP) has led Vietnam, a country of more than 90 million people, to become a key player in the future of Southeast Asia.

The current Vietnam is the consequence of a confusing and contradictory process of change that has transformed not only the country's Economics , but has also had a profound impact on social life, urban configuration, environment, domestic and foreign policies and whose final effects will be seen in the long term.

An impressive economic turnaround

The transformation of the economic model in Vietnam derives formally from the decision adopted at the sixth VCP congress in December 1986 to open the country to market Economics , but its roots lie earlier, in the economic crisis that followed the war, in the collapse of agricultural production that the radical implementation of a communist model provoked in 1979. This debacle forced to allow the private trade of any production surplus that exceeded the targets set by the State for enterprises or public lands. This sort of state capitalism paved the way for the liberalization that followed the death of the Stalinist leader, Le Duan, in 1986. The approval of the do-moi or renovation policy meant the withdrawal of planning and the option for the free market. It was not an ideological decision but an instrumental one. If the CP wanted to maintain control of the country, it needed to generate one million work a year, guarantee food for 90 million inhabitants and reduce poverty.

It has been an economic and social success: per capita income has increased dramatically and the population below the poverty line has been reduced from 60% to 20%. The US embargo ended in 1993 and in 1997 the two countries signed a new trade agreement . In 2007, Vietnam was admitted to the WTO. In this context of openness, more than 150,000 new enterprises were created under the new enterprise law and large international companies such as Clarks, Canon, Samsung and Intel set up production centers in Vietnam.

The achievements of the process, however, should not hide its weaknesses: an Economics controlled by the State through joint ventures and state-owned companies, a fragile rule of law, massive corruption, a network of families loyal to the PCV that accumulate wealth and own most of the private businesses, growing inequality and a deep ecological deterioration.

Agriculture has evolved from the sudden drop in production that followed communist collectivization to the current status where Vietnam is the second largest exporter of rice in the world, a crop that accounts for 20% of its exports. The industrialization of Economics has meant that agriculture, which used to account for 40% of GDP, is now only 20%. Life continues to depend on rice cultivation, still the main source of income for rural households, where half of the population lives. Rice exports are managed by a combination of free market and corrupt officialdom, with the negative consequences experienced in the speculative crisis of 2008. There has been an intense migration from the countryside to the big cities where wages are five times higher. The pressure in search of wealth is converting agricultural land into residential or industrial plots. Every year, 10,000 new hectares are requalified. The transformation of the rural world is pushing away the old Structures that provided security, meaning and purpose and it remains to be seen how it affects future stability.

Social and environmental change

The construction of proletarian cities after the war, under the communist housing program, has not prevented overpopulation or the continuation of communal life. Migrants continue to arrive in search of work, money and protection. Tons of industrial waste remains untreated; the rivers around Ho Chi Min City are biologically dead and pollution in Hanoi is well above internationally accepted levels. Problems such as prostitution, with more than 1% of women working in illicit sex trafficking, or abandoned children on the streets are a reality. However, while doubling or tripling its urban population, Vietnam has managed these problems better than its neighboring countries, avoiding to a greater extent the ghost cities and their problems of crime, extreme poverty and drug addiction so common in the rest of Asia.

Commercial and urban dynamism is reflected in thousands of illegal street food businesses and small enterprises, pioneers of small-scale capitalism, which today constitute a tourist symbol of Vietnam. In cities full of young people who identify freedom with a polluting motorcycle, youth rebels against years of communist austerity but not against family traditions.

Vietnam is a country where a natural wonder like Ha Long Bay, one of the country's iconic images, is simultaneously a tourist attraction and an environmental disaster. It is also one of the areas most exposed to the effects of climate change, due to its low altitude and reliance on agricultural production in the Mekong Delta and tourism. Respect for wildlife and the environment are issues of leave priority for the authorities.

PCV remains in control

There are issues that have not changed with the same intensity. Vietnam still lives under a "natural system of control", the deep surveillance system put in place by the communist regime to control the values and behavior of its people. A system in which one out of six Vietnamese ended up working in the security forces and which resulted in a control of "cultivated families", those who behave in agreement with the values set by the party. Although it has proven its effectiveness in crises such as the avian flu and now partly in the Covid-19 crisis, the system is now controversial due to the spread of the Internet and social networks and radical social changes that call for more freedom. Despite this control, corruption is widespread and is damaging the country's future.

The VCP is still in power. Maintaining its Leninist roots, it is now an elitist and intelligent organization in search of its own survival. A new mandarinate that has evolved from a centralized power present in all aspects of public and social life to a fragile and partial control; from a "meaningless legal system", where decisions were taken directly by the VCP and their compliance with the law was irrelevant, to a "State based on the Law", where the rules are the tool to supervise entrepreneurs and investors, allowing them to create wealth and employment but simultaneously comply with the expectations of the VCP. Similarly, the party controls the legislature, the courts and indirectly the press, media and news coverage, which prevents Vietnam from being considered a truly free country.

Life has been difficult and lonely for those few who tried to oppose the regime and promote real democracy. The name of the Catholic priest Father Ly and his followers, brutally repressed, tried and convicted in March 2007, once the country was admitted to the WTO, overshadows the hope for a transition to effective political freedom.

Foreign policy and future

Vietnam's foreign policy seeks to strike a balance in its relations with two major players: the United States and China, counterbalanced by a set of alliances with third countries. Overcoming war wounds and establishing trusting cooperation on security subject is the goal of the policy of rapprochement with the United States, which is already a significant investor in the country. The special relationship with China, the largest importer of Vietnamese products, an industrial giant and the largest army in Asia, is the other axis of its policy despite old territorial conflicts.

The overexploited environment, inequality, the entrenchment of the elites and, above all, uncertainty about the evolution of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the political system are aspects that are weighing on the outlook. However, a young and well-educated population, as well as the inflow of foreign investment, are reasons for optimism about further liberalization of the country, including political liberalization.

▲ Minneapolis street crossing where George Floyd was stopped by local police [Fibonacci Blue].

COMMENTARY / Salvador Sánchez Tapia [Brigadier General (Res.)].

In a controversial public statement made on June 2, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to deploy units of the Armed Forces to contain riots sparked by the death of African-American George Floyd at the hands of a police officer in Minnesota, and to maintain public order if they escalate in the level of violence.

Regardless of the seriousness of the event, and beyond the fact that the incident has been politicized and is being employee as a platform for expressing rejection of Trump's presidency, the possibility raised by the president poses an almost unprecedented challenge to civil-military relations in the United States.

For reasons rooted in its pre-independence past, the United States maintains a certain caution against the possibility that the Armed Forces can be employed domestically against citizens by whoever holds power. For this reason, when the Founding Fathers drafted the Constitution, while authorizing congress to organize and maintain armies, they explicitly limited their funding to a maximum of two years.

Against this background, and against the background of the tension between the Federation and the states, U.S. legislation has tried to limit the employment the Armed Forces in domestic tasks. Thus, since 1878, the Posse Comitatus limits the possibility of employing them in the fulfillment of missions for the maintenance of public order which it is the responsibility of the states to carry out with their own means, including the National Guard.

One of the exceptions to this rule is the Insurrection Act of 1807, invoked precisely by President Trump as an argument in favor of the legality of an eventual employment decision. This, despite the fact that this law has a restrictive spirit, since it requires the cooperation of the states in its application, and because it is designed for extreme cases in which they are unable, or unwilling, to maintain order, circumstances that do not seem applicable to the case at hand.

The controversial nature of the advertisement is attested to by the fact that voices as authoritative and so little inclined to publicly break its neutrality as that of Lieutenant General (ret.) James Mattis, Secretary of Defense of the Trump Administration until his premature relief in December 2018, or that of Lieutenant General (ret.) Martin Dempsey, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Board between 2011 and 2015, have spoken out against this advertisement , thus joining the statements made by former presidents as diverse as George W. Bush and George W. Bush, who have spoken out against it. ) Martin Dempsey, head of the board Chiefs of Staff between 2011 and 2015, have spoken out against this employment, joining the statements made by former presidents as diverse as George W. Bush and Barak Obama, or those of the Secretary of Defense himself, Mark Esper, whose position against the possibility of using the Armed Forces in this status has recently been made clear.

The presidential advertisement has opened a crisis in the usually stable US civil-military relations (CMR). Beyond the scope of the United States, the question, of deep significance and affecting the core of CMR in a democratic state, is none other than whether or not to use the Armed Forces in public order or, in a broader sense, domestic tasks, and the risks associated with such a decision.

In the 1990s, Michael C. Desch, one of the leading authorities in the field of CMR, identified the correlation between the missions entrusted to the Armed Forces by a state and the quality of its civil-military relations, concluding that externally oriented military missions are the most conducive to healthy CMRs, while internal missions that are not purely military are likely to generate various pathologies in such relations.

In general, the existence of the Armed Forces in any state is primarily due to the need to protect it against any threat from outside. In order to carry out such a high task with guarantees, armies are equipped and trained for the lethal employment force, unlike police forces, which are equipped for a minimal and gradual use of force, which only becomes lethal in the most extreme, exceptional cases. In the first case, it is a matter of confronting an armed enemy that is trying to destroy one's own forces. In the second, force is used to confront citizens who may, in some cases, use violence, but who remain, after all, compatriots.

When military forces are employed in tasks of this nature, there is always a risk that they will produce a response in accordance with their training, which may be excessive in a law and order scenario. The consequences, in such a case, can be very negative. In the worst case scenario, and above all other considerations, the employment may result in a perhaps avoidable loss of life. Moreover, from the point of view of CMR, the soldiers that the nation submission for its external defense could become, in the eyes of the citizenry, the enemies of those they are supposed to defend.

The damage this can produce for civil-military relations, for national defense and for the quality of a state's democracy is difficult to measure, but it can be intuited if one considers that, in a democratic system, the Armed Forces cannot live without the support of their fellow citizens, who see them as a beneficial force for the nation and to whose members they extend their recognition as its loyal and disinterested servants.

Abuse in the employment the Armed Forces in domestic tasks may, in addition, deteriorate their already complex preparation, weakening them for the execution of the missions for which they were conceived. It may also end up conditioning their organization and equipment to the detriment, once again, of their essential tasks.

On the other hand, and although today we are far away and safe from such a scenario, this employment may gradually lead to a progressive expansion of the tasks of the Armed Forces, which would extend their control over purely civilian activities, and which would see their range of tasks increasingly broadened, displacing other agencies in their execution, which could, undesirably, atrophy.

In such a scenario, the military institution could cease to be perceived as a disinterested actor and come to be seen as another competitor with particular interests, and with a control capacity that it could use for its own benefit, even if this were opposed to the nation's interest. Such a status, in time, would lead hand in hand to the politicization of the Armed Forces, from which would follow another damage to the CMR that would be difficult to quantify.

Decisions such as the one targeted by President Trump may ultimately place members of the Armed Forces in the grave moral dilemma of using force against their fellow citizens, or disobeying the President's orders. Because of its gravity, therefore, the decision to commit the Armed Forces to such tasks should be made on an exceptional basis and after careful consideration.

It is difficult to determine whether the advertisement made by President Trump was just a product of his temperament or whether, on the contrary, it contained a real intention to use the Armed Forces in the disturbances that are dotting the country, in a decision that has not occurred since 1992. In any case, the president, and those advising him, must assess the damage that can be inferred from it for civil-military relations and, therefore, for the American democratic system. This without forgetting, moreover, the responsibility that falls on America's shoulders in the face of the reality that a part of humanity looks to the country as a reference letter and a model to imitate.

Bolivia has consolidated its role in distributing Peruvian cocaine and its own cocaine for consumption in South America and export to Europe.

• In 2019, the government of Martin Vizcarra eradicated 25,526 hectares of coca cultivation, half of the estimated total extension of plantations.

• Peru had a record potential cocaine production of 509 tons in 2018; Bolivia's was 254, one of the historically highest, according to US

• The US accused Morales towards the end of his term of office of having "manifestly failed" to fulfill his international obligations with his 2016-2020 counter-narcotics plan.

​

▲ Coca eradication operation in Alto Huallaga, Peruproject CORAH].

report SRA 2020 / Eduardo Villa Corta [PDF version] [PDF version].

MAY 2020-Since Peru's national plans against coca cultivation began in the 1980s, eradication campaigns have never reached what is known as the VRAEM (Valley of the Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro Rivers), a difficult-to-access area in the center of the southern half of the country. Organized crime operates in this area, especially the remnants of the old Shining Path guerrillas, now dedicated to drug trafficking and other illicit businesses. The area is the source of 64% of the country's potential cocaine production. Peru is the second largest producer in the world, after Colombia.

The government of President Martin Vizcarra carried out in 2019 a determined policy of suppression of illicit crops. The eradication planproject Especial de Control y Reducción del Cultivo de Coca en el Alto Huallaga or CORAH) was applied last year to 25,526 hectares of coca crops (half of the existing ones), of which 750 would have corresponded to the VRAEM (operations took place in the areas of Satipo, Tambo River and Alto Anapati, in the Junín region).

These actions should translate, when the figures for 2019 are presented, into a reduction in total coca cultivation and potential cocaine production, thus breaking the increase experienced in recent years. According to the latest International Narcotics Control Strategyreport (INCSR) of the US State department , which closely follows this illicit activity in the countries of the region, in 2018 there were 52,100 hectares of coca in Peru (compared to 44,000 in 2016 and 49,800 in 2017), whose extension and quality of cultivation could generate a record production of 509 tons of cocaine (compared to 409 in 2016 and 486 in 2017). Although in 2013 there was a larger cultivated area (59,500 hectares), then the cocaine potential stood at 359 tons.

From Peru to Bolivia

This increase in recent years in the generation of cocaine in Peru has consolidated Bolivia's role in the trafficking of that drug, since in addition to being the third largest producer country in the world (in 2018 there were 32,900 hectares cultivated, with a potential production of 254 tons of narcotic substance, according to the US), it is a transit zone for cocaine of Peruvian origin.

The fact that only about 6% of the cocaine reaching the United States comes from Peru (the rest comes from Colombia), indicates that most of the Peruvian production goes to the growing market in Brazil and Argentina and to Europe, and therefore its natural exit point is through Bolivia. Thus, Bolivia is considered a major "distributor".

Some of the drugs arrive in paste form and are refined in Bolivian laboratories. The goods are smuggled into Bolivia using small planes, which sometimes fly at less than 15 meters above the ground and drop the cocaine packages in uninhabited rural areas; they are then picked up by elements of the organization. The movement is also carried out by road, with the drugs camouflaged on cargo roads, and to a lesser extent using Lake Titicaca and other waterways connecting the two countries.

Once across the border, the drugs from Peru, along with those produced in Bolivia, travel to Argentina and Chile, especially through the Bolivian city of Santa Cruz and the Chilean border crossing of Colchane, or enter Brazil -- directly or through Paraguay, using for example the crossing between the Paraguayan town of Pedro Juan Caballero and the Brazilian town of Ponta Pora -- for consumption in South America's largest country, whose Issue has climbed to second place in the world, or to reach international ports such as Santos. This port, which is Sao Paulo's outlet to the sea, has become the new hub of the global narcotics trade, from which almost 80% of Latin America's drugs leave for Europe (sometimes via Africa).

Production in Bolivia has been growing again since the middle of the last decade, although in the Bolivian case there is a notorious difference between the often divergent figures offered by the United States and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Both estimates agree that there was a previous decline, attributed by the La Paz government to the so-called "rationalization of coca production", which reduced production by 35% and adjusted cultivation areas to those permitted by law, in a country where traditional uses of coca are allowed.

However, the Coca Law promoted in 2017 by President Evo Morales (his political degree program originated in the coca growers' unions, whose interests he later continued to defend) protected an extension of production, raising the permitted hectares from 12,000 to 22,000. The new law covered an increase that was already occurring and encouraged greater excesses that have far exceeded the Issue required for traditional uses, which programs of study by the European Union put at less than 14,700 hectares. In fact, the UNODC estimated in its 2019 report that between 27% and 42% of the coca leaf grown in 2018 was not sold in the only two local markets authorized for it, indicating that at least the rest was destined for cocaine production.

For 2018, the UNODC determined a production of 23,100 hectares, in any case above what is allowed by law. US data speak of 32,900 hectares, which was an increase of 6% over the previous year, and a potential cocaine production of 254 tons (up 2%).

Sixty-five percent of Bolivian production takes place in the Yungas area, near La Paz, and the remaining 35% in Chapare, near Cochabamba. In the latter area, crops are expanding, encroaching on the Tipnis natural reservation . The park, which goes deep into the Amazon, suffered in 2019 important fires: intentional or not, the annihilated tropical vegetation could give way to clandestine coca plantations.

After Morales

The 2020 US State department report highlights the increased anti-drug commitment of the Bolivian authorities who in November 2019 succeeded the Morales government, which had maintained "inadequate controls" over coca cultivation. The US considers that Morales' 2016-2020 anti-drug plan "prioritized" actions against criminal organizations rather than combating coca growers' production that exceeded the permitted Issue . Shortly before leaving office in September, Morales was singled out by the US for having "manifestly failed" to comply with international obligations subject drug control.

According to the US, the transitional government "has made important strides in drug interdiction and extradition of drug traffickers". This increased control by the new Bolivian authorities, together with the determined action of the Vizcarra government in Peru, should lead to a reduction in coca cultivation and cocaine production in both countries, and therefore in its export.

Uruguay contributes 45.5% of the Latin American workforce and El Salvador is second with 12%, both ahead of the regional powers.

• Of the total 82,480 troops in the fourteen UN peacekeeping missions at the beginning of 2020, 2,473 came from Latin American countries, most of them military and police.

• Nearly all troops from the region serve in missions in Africa; 45.4% serve in the DRC stabilization plan.

• After Uruguay and then El Salvador come Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Guatemala; Mexico, on the other hand, is one of the lowest contributors (only 13 experts and employees, not troops).

▲ Bolivian soldier in training exercises for UN peacekeeping missions, 2002 [Wikipedia].

report SRA 2020 / Jaime Azpiri[PDF version].

MAY 2020-Latin America's contribution to international peacekeeping missions sponsored by the United Nations is below the weight of its population and Economics in the world (around 8% and 7%, respectively). Of the total of 82,480 people participating in the various UN missions as of January 31, 2020, only 2,473 were from Latin American countries, representing 2.9% of the total. A similar percentage (3%) was recorded when considering only the military or police staff of the missions (about 2,150 uniformed personnel, out of a total of 70,738; the rest corresponded to employees and experts).

This is a smaller external presence than might be expected, given the insistence of many countries in the region on multilateralism and the desirability of strong international institutions to limit the expansionary impulses of the great powers. A special exception is Uruguay, precisely the most coherent nation in its defense of international arbitration, which, despite its small population, is by far the largest contributor of staff to peacekeeping missions. Its 1,125 envoys make up 45.5% of the total Latin American contingent.

While Uruguay's strong contribution is not surprising, it is surprising that the second country with the highest participation is El Salvador, with 293 people (12% of Latin America's contribution). This is followed by two very important countries, Argentina and Brazil, (272 and 252 envoys, respectively); then Peru (231) and Guatemala (176). On the other hand, Mexico, despite all its economic and human potential, is particularly absent from these international missions (only 13 people, moreover as employees or experts, not troops), both due to constitutional restrictions and political doctrine. In the case of Colombia (only 2 experts), this may be due to the need to devote its military force entirely to the pacification of the country itself, although one would expect greater capacity and availability from a NATO global partner , the only designation in Latin America that it achieved in 2018.

The most attended international assignment, which brings together 45.4% of the total contingent in the region, is that of the UN mission statement for the stabilization of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, from whose name in French comes the acronym MONUSCO. It involves 1,123 Latin Americans, the majority of whom are Uruguayan envoys (934), with the greatest participation also of Guatemalans on military missions abroad (153).

Previous outstanding missions

Although Latin American countries generally do not participate much in military missions abroad, the sending of troops abroad is not alien to the history of the American republics after their independence. A first intervention was the so-called "ABC", a coalition formed by Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the context of the Mexican Revolution, at the beginning of the last century, to prevent civil war in the North American country. Another conflict that required mediation was the Chaco War in the 1930s. In this confrontation between Paraguay and Bolivia, the interventions of Chile and Argentina were crucial to subsequently define the reaffirmation of the nationality of the Chaco region.

At the end of the 20th century, the most important mission statement was the one aimed at pacifying the former Yugoslav republics, called UNPROFOR by the UN. Argentina was the Latin American country with the largest presence of troops in that scenario. Shortly afterwards, in the 1990s, two international missions were implemented, this time in the Western Hemisphere itself, to secure the agreements that put an end to the civil wars in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and Guatemala (MINUGUA). At the end of that decade, the MOMEP was articulated to impose an armistice between Peru and Ecuador, which were at war in the Cenepa War.

Also in Colombia, some leaders at some point considered the possibility of apply for the presence of blue helmets in order to control and, in the long term, put an end to the FARC insurrection. Later Colombian President Álvaro Uribe proposed in 1998 the presence of international troops in the face of the inability of the government of the time to control the situation, but the initiative was not carried out. After the peace agreement in 2016, the signatory parties asked the UN for a mission statement to monitor compliance with the terms of the agreement, known as UNVMC, which operates with a maximum of 120 people (some civilians and a hundred military and police), of which, in January 2020, 94 came from Latin American countries.

The contrast between Uruguay and Mexico

Today, the countries of the region are present in 14 different peace missions (out of the total of 21 promoted by the UN), especially in Africa but also in other parts of the world. In MINUSCA, convened for the pacification of the Central American Republic, 9 Latin American nations participate, the same issue as in UNVMC, the mission statement of verification of the peace agreements in Colombia. In UNMISS, mission statement of attendance in South Sudan, 8 countries participate and in MONUSCO, implemented in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 7 do so.

As mentioned above, Uruguay is the largest contributor to the missions underway (1,126 personnel, as of January 31). This staff is basically assigned to MONUSCO (934) and to a lesser extent to UNDOF (170), which ensures security in the Golan Heights as a separation force between Syrians and Israelis; in total, Uruguayan blue helmets are present in 6 different missions. This service has been especially recognized by the United Nations, which values Uruguay's long trajectory in this subject: for example, it highlighted its attendance in the mission statement carried out in Haiti after the disaster caused by hurricane Dean, to which it assigned 13,000 troops between 2007 and 2014. The contribution of Uruguay, a country of only 3.5 million inhabitants, is greater than that of Spain (648), France (732) or Italy (1084).

On the other hand, the case of Mexico is the most striking because of its very limited participation in peacekeeping missions, considering that it is one of the powers in the region. The North American country is the second Latin American nation that uses the most resources for the development its Armed Forces, with a total of 7 million dollars, placing it, by far, behind the first place that corresponds to Brazil, with a total of almost 29.5 million dollars. Historically, Mexico has participated in more than 80 peacekeeping missions, providing troops from the Federal Police and the Army, generally in low issue. The previous president, Enrique Peña Nieto, announced in 2014 that Mexican units would once again participate decisively in armed operations in support of the UN, however today their contribution is reduced to 13 people (9 experts and 4 employees), which represents only 1% of Latin American participation. The most relevant reason to explain the Mexican phenomenon is the long tradition in favor of the Estrada doctrine of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. In addition, the Mexican Constitution restricts the deployment of troops abroad unless Mexico has declared war on an enemy.

▲ The British Raj in 1909 showing Muslim majority areas in green

ESSAY / Victoria Paternina and Claudia Plasencia

Pakistan's partition from India in 1947 marked the beginning of a long road of various territorial disputes, causing different effects in the region. The geopolitics of Pakistan with India are often linked when considering their shared history; and in fact, it makes sense if we take the perspective of Kashmir as the prominent issue that Islamabad has to deal with. However, neither the history nor the present of Pakistan can be reduced to New Delhi and their common regional conflict over the Line of Control that divides Kashmir.

The turbulent and mistrustful relations between India and Pakistan go beyond Kashmir, with the region of Punjab divided in two sides and no common ground between New Delhi and Islamabad. In the same way, the bitter ties between Islamabad and a third country are not exclusively with India. Once part of Pakistan, Bangladesh has a deeply rooted hatred relationship with Islamabad since their split in 1971. Looking beyond Kashmir, Punjab and Bangladesh show a distinct aspect of the territorial disputes of the past and present-day Pakistan. Islamabad has a say in these issues that seem to go unnoticed due to the fact that they stand in the shadow of Kashmir.

This essay tries to shed light on other events that have a solid weight on Pakistan's geopolitics as well as to make clear that the country is worthy of attention not only from New Delhi's perspective but also from their own Pakistani view. In that way, this paper is divided in two different topics that we believe are important in order to understand Pakistan and its role in the region. Punjab and Bangladesh: the two shoved under the rug by Kashmir.

Punjab

The tale of territorial disputes is rooted deeply in Pakistan and Indian relations; the common mistake is to believe that New Delhi and Islamabad only fight over Kashmir. If the longstanding dispute over Kashmir has raised the independence claims of its citizens, Punjab is not far from that. On the edge of the partition, Punjab was another region in which territorial lines were difficult to apply. They finally decided to divide the territory in two sides; the western for Pakistan and the eastern for India. However, this issue automatically brought problems since the majority of Punjabis were neither Hindus nor Muslims but rather Sikhs. Currently, the division of Punjab is still in force. Despite the situation in Pakistan Punjab remains calm due to the lack of Sikhs as most of them left the territory or died in the partition. The context in India Punjab is completely different as riots and violence are common in the eastern side due to the wide majority of Sikhs that find no common ground with Hindus and believe that India has occupied its territory. Independence claims have been strengthened throughout the years on many occasions, supported by the Pakistani ISI in order to destabilize India. Furthermore, the rise of the nationalist Indian movement is worsening the situation for Punjabis who are realizing how their rights are getting marginalized in the eyes of Modi's government.

Nonetheless, the question of Punjabi independence is only a matter of the Indian side. The Pakistan-held Punjab is a crucial province of the country in which the wide majority are Muslims. The separation of Punjab from Islamabad would not be conceived since it would be devastating. For Pakistan, it would mean the loss of 72 million inhabitants; damaging the union and stability of the country. All of this taking into account that Punjab represents a strong pillar for the national economy since it is the place where the Indus river - one of the most important ones - flows. It can be said that there is no room for independence of the Pakistani side, nor for a rapprochement between both parts of the former Punjab region. They have lost their main community ties. Besides, the disagreements are between New Delhi and Eastern Punjab, so Islamabad has nothing to do here. According to that, the only likely long-term possibility would be the independence of the Indian side of the Punjab due to the growth of the hatred against New Delhi. Additionally, there are many Sikhs living abroad in UK or Canada who support the independence of Punjab into a new country "Khalistan" strengthening the movement into an international concern. Nevertheless, the achievement of this point would probably increase the violence in Punjab, and in case they would become independent it would be at the expense of many deaths.

There is a last point that must be taken into account when referring to India-Pakistan turbulent territorial relations. This is the case of the longstanding conflict over water resources in which both countries have been increasing tensions periodically. Considering that there is a scarcity of water resources and a high demand of that public good, it is easy to realize that two enemies that share those resources are going to fight for them. Furthermore, if they both are mainly agrarian countries, the interest of the water would be even harder as it is the case of Pakistan and India. However, for more than five decades both Islamabad and New Delhi have maintained the Indus Waters Treaty that regulates the consumption of the common waters. It divides the six rivers that flow over Pakistan and India in two sides. The three western ones for Pakistan, and the other three of the eastern part for India. Nevertheless, it does not mean that India could not make any use of the Pakistani ones or vice versa; they are allowed to use them in non-consumptive terms such as irrigation, but not for storage or building infrastructures[1]. This is where the problem is. India is seemed to have violated those terms by constructing a dam in the area of the Pakistani Indus river in order to use the water as a diplomatic weapon against Islamabad.

This term has been used as an Indian strategy to condemn the violence of Pakistan-based groups against India undermining in that way the economy of Pakistan which is highly dependent on water resources. Nevertheless, it is hard to think that New Delhi would violate one of the milestones treaties in its bilateral relations with Pakistan. Firstly, because it could escalate their already existent tensions with Pakistan that would transform into an increase of the violence against India. Islamabad's reaction would not be friendly, and although terrorist activities follow political causes, any excuse is valid to lead to an attack. Secondly, because it would bring a bad international image for PM Modi as the UN and other countries would condemn New Delhi of having breached a treaty as well as leaving thousands of people without access to water. Thirdly, they should consider that rivers are originated in the Tibet, China, and a bad movement would mean a reaction from Beijing diverting the water towards Pakistan[2]. Finally, India does not have enough infrastructure to use the additional water available. It is better for both New Delhi and Islamabad to maintain the issue over water resources under a formal treaty considering their mutual mistrust and common clashes. Nevertheless, it would be better for them to renew the Indus Waters Treaty in order to include new aspects that were not foreseen when it was drafted as well as to preserve the economic security of both countries.

Bangladesh

Punjab is a territory obligated to be divided in two between India and Pakistan, yet Bangladesh separated itself completely from Pakistan and finds itself in the middle of India. Bangladesh, once part of Pakistan, after a tumultuous war, separated into its own country. While India did not explicitly intervene with Bangladesh and Pakistan's split, it did promote the hatred between the two for its own diary and to increase in power. The scarring aspect of the split of Bangladesh from Pakistan is the bloody war and genocide that took place, something that the Bengali people still have not overcome to this day. The people of Bangladesh are seeking an apology from Pakistan, something that does not look like it is going to come anytime soon.

Pakistan and Bangladesh share a bitter past with one another as prior to 1971, they were one country which separated into two as a result of a bloody war and emerging political differences. Since 1971 up to today, India and the Awami league have worked to maintain this hatred between Bangladesh and Pakistan through propagandist programs and different techniques. For example, they set up a war museum, documentaries and films in order to boast more the self-proclamation of superiority on behalf of India against Bangladesh and Pakistan. India and the Awami League ignore the fact that they have committed atrocities against the Bengali people and that in large part they are responsible for the breakup between Pakistan and Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) worked to improve relations with Pakistan under the governments of Ziaur Rahman, Begum Khaldia Zia, and Hossain Mohammad Ershad in Bangladesh, who had maintained distance from India. Five Pakistani heads of government have visited Bangladesh since 1980, along with signing trade and cultural agreements to improve relations between the two nations.[3] While an alliance between Pakistan and Bangladesh against India is not a realistic scenario, what is important for Pakistan and Bangladesh for the next decade to come is attempt to put their past behind them in order to steer clear of India and develop mutually beneficial relations to help improve their economies. For example, a possible scenario for improving Pakistan and Bangladesh relations could be to join the CPEC to better take advantage of the trade opportunities offered within South Asia, West Asia, Central Asia, and China and Russia.[4] The CPEC will be a key player in this process.

Despite decades of improving trade and military links, especially as a defense against Indian supremacy in the region, the two countries continue to be divided by the question of genocide. Bangladesh wants Pakistan to recognize the genocide and its atrocities and teach them as a part of its history. However, Pakistan has refused to do so and has even referred to militant leader executed for war crimes as being killed for his loyalty to Pakistan.[5] Bangladesh is a country with a long history of genocide.

Even though India supported Bangladesh in its independence from Pakistan, Bangladesh thinks that India is self-serving and that they change ideas depending on their own convenience.[6] An alliance of Pakistan and Bangladesh, even though it is against a common enemy, India, is not realistic given the information recently provided. India is a country that yes, even though they helped Bangladesh against Pakistan, they are always going to look out for themselves, especially in search to be the central power in the region. India sees still a lot of potential for their power in the coming decades. Indian PM Narendra Modi is very keen on making strategic choices for the country to transform and increase its global leadership position.[7] India's strategy for the next few years has been to make the right choices for the future.

The hostile relations between Pakistan and India find their peak in its longstanding conflict over Kashmir, but Punjab and Bangladesh must not be put in the shadow. The further directions of both PM Imran Khan and PM Modi could have consequences that would alter the interests of Punjab and Bangladesh as different actors in the international order. In the case of Punjab their mutual feelings of mistrust could challenge the instability of a region far from being calm. It is true that independence claims is not an issue for Pakistan itself since both Islamabad and Pakistan-held Punjab would lose in that scenario, and they both know it. Nonetheless, Indian Punjabis' reality is different. They have crucial problems within New Delhi, again as a historical matter of identity and ethnicity that is still present nowadays. Sikhs have not found common ground with Hindus yet and it does not seem that it will happen in a near future. In fact, tensions are increasing, posing a threat for two nations with their views on Kashmir rather than on Punjab. In the case of Bangladesh, its relations with Pakistan did not have a great start. Bangladesh gained freedom with help from India and remained under its influence. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh took a long time to adjust to the shock of separation and their new reality, with India in between them.

In conclusion, Punjab and Bangladesh tend to be the less important territorial issues, and not a priority neither for Islamabad nor for New Delhi that are more engaged in Kashmir. However, considering the magnitude of both disputes, we should appreciate how the Sikhs in the Indian-held territory of Punjab as well as the Bengali people deserve the same rights as the Kashmiris to be heard and to have these territorial disputes settled once and for all.

BIBLIOGRAPHY .

Ayres, Alyssa. "India: a 'Major Power' Still below Its Potential." Lowy Institute, July 24, 2018.

Iftikhar, Momin. "Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations." The Nation. The Nation, December 15, 2018.

"Indus Water Treaty: Everything You Need to Know". ClearIAS.

Muhammad Hanif, Col. "Keeping India out of Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations." Daily Times, March 6, 2018.

Sami, Shafi. "Pakistan Bangladesh Relations In the Changing International Environment." JSTOR. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 2017.

Shakoor, Farzana. "Pakistan Bangladesh Relations Survey." JSTOR. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 2017.

From the success of super-minister Sérgio Moro to the failure of 'hugs, not bullets': two different signs in the first year of populist presidents in Brazil and Mexico

• AMLO promised to end the continuous annual rise in homicides registered in the terms of his two predecessors, but throughout 2019 he accentuated it

• Improved figures in Brazil are overshadowed by an increase in accidental deaths in police operations and in the issue of temporary inmates in prisons

• In the first months of 2020 in both Mexico and Brazil homicides have increased, but confinement by Covid-19 could affect annual statistics

▲ The Mexican president at the launch of the National Guard in June 2019 [Gov. of Mexico].

report SRA 2020 / Túlio Dias de Assis and Marcelina Kropiwnicka[PDF version].

MAY 2020-One of Latin America's best-known conflicts is its high level of violence, often as a consequence of the strong presence of organized crime. Within this regional paradigm, not all leaders face the problem of crime in the same way. While some opt for a more passive policy, others prefer to bet on the iron fist, despite the risks it may entail. 2019 was the first year in office of Andrés Manuel López Obrador and Jair Bolsonaro, populist leaders of opposing ideologies, who came to power barely a month apart. In Brazil homicides went down, in Mexico they went up.

Mexico

Throughout 2019 there were a total of 35,588 victims of intentional homicide in Mexico. This means that, as 2019 came to an end, an all-time high in homicides at the national level was left behind. In doing so, President López Obrador, known by the abbreviation AMLO, failed to fulfill his electoral promise to reduce violence. Although he maintained his approval rating at 72% at the end of 2019, his acceptance has been damaged in the aftermath by his management of the coronavirus health crisis.

Three previous administrations had favored military combat against drug cartels, but López Obrador established a divergent security strategy upon his arrival, focusing more on the self-described "abrazos, no balazos" (hugs, not bullets) approach . This approach led to the release of Ovidio Guzmán, son of Joaquín 'El Chapo' Guzmán, which the government argued was motivated by a desire to avoid an escalation of cartel violence. In addition, AMLO created the National Guard, a new security force that has been deploying tens of thousands of troops, formerly from the Army and Federal Police, to tackle organized crime in core topic areas across the country. While the new strategy aims to strengthen security and tackle violence in the cities, it has so far failed to curb barbarism. The president has even reneged on another promise and announced that for the time being the army will remain on the streets sharing the role of citizen security.

The issue of intentional homicides in 2019 was 34,582, up 2.5% from 33,743 the previous year; femicides reached 1,006, up 10.3% from 912 in 2018, according to the National Public Security System (SNSP). Although in previous years, during the term of Presidents Enrique Peña Nieto, there were greater increases - the previous increases were 15.7% (from 2017 to 2018), 26.5% (from 2016 to 2017) and 25.1% (from 2015 to 2016) - the 2019 homicides represent the highest overall figure recorded in the last two decades. The figures of Felipe Calderón's (PAN) term, the first to take the Army to the streets to fight drug trafficking, were surpassed in Peña Nieto's (PRI) term and now there has been an increase again in the first year of López Obrador (Morena). All three criticized the security management of their predecessors and all three failed in their purpose (AMLO at least for the moment).

On average, 2,881 murders were committed per month in 2019; the highest issue recorded was 2,993 murders in June and the lowest issue was 2,731 in April. The state with the most homicides was Guanajuato, followed by the state of Mexico and leave California. In terms of homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants, Colima ranked first, with 98.3, followed by leave California (80.6) and Chihuahua (68.7).

Much of the violence that has occurred across the country is directly related to gang formations and drug traffickers, and the struggle for dominance of local markets. It is therefore not surprising that Colima, home to the strategic port of Manzanillo, a hotbed of illicit activities, is the state at the top of the blacklist. In addition, there is a partnership between criminal groups on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border for the mutual supply of drugs and weapons. Seventy percent of homicides are committed with firearms, many of which have been smuggled across the border. The status not only undermines security in Mexico but also in the United States. 

Donald Trump has urged Mexico to "wage war" against the cartels. In November he announced he was officially labeling them as terrorist organizations. "The United States is ready, willing and able to engage and do the work quickly and effectively," Trump tweeted at the time. However, he ended up postponing that proclamation at the request of the Mexican president.

In the first quarter of 2020, homicides continued their upward trend, with 269 homicides more than in the same quarter of the previous year. While the social distancing measures adopted during the Covid-19 crisis may change the trend in the second semester, the lower investment in security to direct public expense towards the health and economic sectors may push up the issue of murders.

Brazil

In contrast to Mexico, Brazil has achieved a series of more positive results, following a trend to leave already experienced in the last year of Michel Temer's presidency. This is mainly due to the measures taken by the until recently Minister of Justice and Public Security Sérgio Moro, former federal judge in charge of Operation Car Wash. Bolsonaro's choice of Moro as minister was not random, since Moro is considered by a large part of the population as a hero in the fight against corruption, due to the several trials he led against members of Odebrecht and the political class , including the one that would lead to the imprisonment of former president Lula da Silva. Having promised in the campaign a tough hand against crime and corruption, Bolsonaro decided to merge the ministries of Justice and Public Security and offer Moro its leadership.

The decision was a wise one and one of those that best sustained the Brazilian president's popularity in his first year in office, as test by a significant drop in the issue of violent crimes, including a 19% decrease in the issue of homicides. This is one of the most worrying indicators in Brazil, since it is the country with the highest gross annual homicide issue in the world. In 2018, homicides were 51,558, while in 2019 they dropped to 41,635, a decrease of 19.2%. Excluding larcenies from these figures, the decrease was from 49,120 to 29,750.

In addition, cargo thefts increased by 35% and drug seizures increased by 81%. In Rio de Janeiro, one of the most problematic states in terms of security, larcenies (robbery followed by death) were reduced by 34% and seizures of illegal weapons increased by 32%.

One of the measures that contributed most to this decline was the integration of the different state security force institutions at all levels: federal, state and municipal. This has allowed for a higher level of coordination, especially significant in the area of intelligence services, whose information now flows more easily between institutions. In addition, in this same area, it is worth mentioning the investments made in Big Data and intelligence systems. The main focus has been on facial recognition and video surveillance systems.

Another important policy has been the transfer of gang leaders to more isolated prisons, thus preventing them from communicating and coordinating with gang members on the outside.

Finally, the so-called "anti-crime package" should be mentioned: a series of laws and reforms to the penal code that increase the power of the security forces to act, in addition to establishing harsher penalties for violent crime, organized crime and corruption. The project C approved by the Brazilian Parliament is far from Moro's original proposal , but it has contributed, albeit to a lesser extent, to the decrease in crime.

On the other hand, these positive figures were accompanied by a worrying increase in accidental deaths in police operations, with several cases of children killed by stray bullets in shootouts between drug gangs and security forces going viral. In addition, the issue of provisional prisoners in Brazilian jails increased by 4.3% over the previous year. All this has encouraged criticism from most of the civil service examination and several human rights NGOs, both national and international.

In the first two months of 2020, 548 more deaths were recorded than in the same period of the previous year. This spike occurred in 20 of Brazil's 27 federal states, suggesting that this is a general trend rather than a sporadic episode. However, due to the mandatory quarantine library assistant in several states and municipalities, homicides fell again, making it difficult to extrapolate for the current year as a whole. Another factor to consider for 2020 is the recent resignation of Minister Moro; without him, the likelihood that the reforms initiated in the first year will continue is greatly reduced.