▲ Attack in Kashmir linked to groups of Pakistani origin [tweeted by @ANI].

ESSAY / Isabel Calderas [Ignacio Lucas as research assistant].

There is a myriad of security concerns regarding external factors when it comes to Pakistan: India, Afghanistan, the Saudi Arabia-Iran split and the United States, to name a few. However, there are also two main concerns that come from within: jihadism and organized crime. They are interconnected but differ in many ways. The latter is frequently overlooked to focus on the former, but both have the capacity of affecting the country, internally and externally, as the effectiveness of dealing with them impacts the perception the international community has of Pakistan. While internally disrupting, these problems also have international reach, as such groups often export their activities, adversely affecting at a global scale. Therefore, international actors put so much pressure on Pakistan to control them. Historically, there has been much scepticism over the government's ability, or even willingness to solve these risks. We will examine both problems separately, identifying the impact they have on the national and international arena, as well as the government's approach to dealing with either and the future risks they entail.

1. JIHADISM

Pakistan's education system has become a central part of the country's radicalization phenomenon[1], in the materialization of madrassas. These schools, which teach a more puritanical version of Islam than had traditionally been practiced in Pakistan, have been directly linked to the rise of jihadist groups[2]. Saudi Arabia, who has always had very close relations with Pakistan, played a key role in their development, by funding the Ahl-e-Hadith and Deobandi madrassas since the 1970s. The Iranian revolution bolstered the Saudi's imperative to control Sunnism in Pakistan, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave them the vehicle to do so[3]. In these schools, which teach a biased view of the world, students display low tolerance for minorities and are more likely to turn to jihadism.

Saudi and American funding of madrassas during the Soviet occupation helped the Pakistani army's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), become more powerful, as they channelled millions of dollars to them, a lot of which went into the madrassas which sent mujahedeen fighters to fight for their cause[4]. The Taliban's origins can also be traced to these, as the militia was raised mainly from Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Saudi-funded madrassas[5].

Madrassas are especially popular in the poorer provinces of the country, where parents send their children to them for several non-religious reasons. First, because the Qur'an is written in Arabic and madrassas teach this language[6]. The dire situation of many families forces millions of Pakistanis to migrate to neighboring, oil-rich Arabic-speaking countries, from where they send remittances home to help support their families. Secondly, the public-school system in Pakistan is weak, often failing to teach basic reading skills[7], something the madrassas do teach.

Partly in response to the international pressure[8] it has been under to fight terrorism within its territory; Pakistan has tried to reform the madrassas. The government has stated its intention to bring madrassas under the umbrella of the education ministry, financing these schools by allocating cash otherwise destined to fund anti-terrorism security operations[9]. It plans to add subjects like science to the curriculum, to lessen the focus on Islamic teachings. However, this faces several challenges, among which the resistance from the teachers and clerical authorities who run the madrassas outstands[10].

Before moving on to the prominent radical groups in Pakistan, we would like to make a brief summary on a different cause of radicalization: the unintended effect of the drone strategy adopted by the United States.

The United States has increasingly chosen to target its radical enemies in Pakistan through the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), which can be highly effective in neutralizing objectives, but also pose a series of risks, like the killing of innocent civilians that are in the neighboring area. This American strategy, which Pakistan has publicly criticized, has fomented anti-American sentiment among the Pakistanis, at a ratio on average of every person killed resulting in the radicalization of several more people[11]. The growing unpopularity of drone strikes has further weakened relations between both governments, but shows no signs of changing in the future, if recent attacks carried by the U.S. are any indication. Pakistan's efforts to de-radicalize its population will continue to be undermined by the U.S. drone strikes[12].

Pakistan's anti-terrorism strategy is linked to its geostrategic and regional interests, especially dealing with its eastern and western neighbors[13]. There are many radical groups operating within their territory, and the government's strategy towards them shifts depending on their goal[14]. Groups like the Afghan Taliban, who target foreign invasions in their own country, and Al Qaeda, whose jihad against the West is on a global scale, have been allowed to use Pakistani territory to coordinate operations and take refuge. Their strategy is quite different for Pakistani Taliban group, Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) who, despite being allied with the Afghan Taliban, has a different goal: to oust the Pakistani government and impose Sharia law[15]. Most of the military's campaigns aimed at cracking down on radicals have been targeted at weakening groups affiliated with TTP. Lastly, there are those groups with whom some branches of the Pakistani government directly collaborate with.

Pakistan has been known to use jihadi organizations to advance its security objectives through proxy conflicts. Pakistan's policy of waging war through terrorist groups is planned, coordinated, and conducted by the Pakistani Army, specifically the ISI[16] who, as previously mentioned, plays a vital role in running the State.

Although this has been a longstanding cause of tension between the Pakistani and the American governments, the U.S. has made no progress in persuading or compelling the Pakistani military to sever ties with the radical groups[17], even though the Pakistani government has stated that it has, over the past year, 'fought and eradicated the menace of terrorism from its soil' by carrying out arrests, seizing property and freezing bank accounts of groups proscribed by the United States and the United Nations[18]. Their actions have been enough to keep them off the FATF's blacklist for financing terrorism and money laundering[19], which would prevent them from getting financing, but concerns remain about ISI's involvement with radical groups, the future of the relations between them, the overall activity of these groups from within Pakistani territory, and the risk of a future attack to its neighbors.

We will use two of Pakistan's main proxy groups, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, to analyze the feasibility of an attack in the near future.

1.1. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)

Created to support the resistance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, LeT now focuses on the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Kashmir, the highest priorities for the Pakistani military's foreign policy. The Ahl-e-Hadith group is led by its founder, Hafiz Saeed. Its headquarters are in Punjab. Unlike its counterparts, it is a well-organized, unified, and hierarchical organization, which has become highly institutionalized in the last thirty years. As a result, it has not suffered any major losses or any fractures since its inception[20].

Since the Mumbai attacks in 2008 (which also involved ISI), for which LeT were responsible, its close relationship with the military has defined the group's operations, most noticeably by restraining their actions in India, which reflects both the Pakistani military's desire to avoid international pressure and conflict with their neighbor and the group's capability to contain its members. The group has calibrated its activities, although it possesses the capability to expand its violence. Its outlets for violence have been Afghanistan and Kashmir, which align with the Pakistani military's diary: to bring Afghanistan under Pakistan's sphere of influence while keeping India off-balance in Kashmir[21]. The recent U.S.-Taliban deal in Afghanistan and militarization of Kashmir by India may change this. LeT has benefited handsomely for its loyalty, receiving unparalleled protection, patronage, and privilege from the military. However, after twelve years of restraint, Lashkar undoubtedly faces pressures from within its ranks to strike against India again, especially now that Narendra Modi is prime minister.

1.2. Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM)

The Deobandi organization, led by its founder Masood Azhar, has had close bonds with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban since they came into light in 2000. With the commencement of the war on terror in Afghanistan, JeM reciprocated by launching an attack on the Indian Parliament on December 2001, in cooperation with LeT. However, it ignored the Pakistani military's will in 2019 when it launched the Pulwama attack, after which the government of Pakistan launched a countrywide crackdown on them, taking leaders and members into preventive custody[22].

Risk assessment

Although it has gone rogue before, Jaish-e-Muhammad has been weakened by the recent government's crackdown. What remains of the group, consolidated under Masood Azhar, has repaired ties with the military. Although JeM has demonstrated it still possesses formidable capability in Indian Kashmir, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba represents the main concern for an attack on India in the near future.

Lashkar has been both the most reliable and loyal of all the proxy groups and has also proven it does not take major action without prior approval from the ISI, which could become a problem. Pakistan has adopted a policy of maintaining plausible deniability for any attacks in order to avoid international pressure after 9/11, thus LeT's close ties with the military make it more likely that its actions will provoke a war between the two countries.

The United States has tried for several years to get Pakistan to stop using proxies. There are several scenarios in which Lashkar would break from the Pakistani state (or vice versa), but they are farfetched and beyond foreign influence: a) a change in Pakistan's security calculus, b) a resolution on Kashmir, c) a shift in Lashkar's responsiveness and d) a major Lashkar attack in the West[23].

a) A change in Pakistan's security calculus is the least likely, as the India-centric understanding of Pakistan's interests and circumstances is deeply embedded in the psyche of the security establishment[24].

b) A resolution on Kashmir would trouble Lashkar, who seeks full unification of all Kashmir with Pakistan, which would not be the outcome of a negotiated resolution. More so, Modi's recent decision regarding article 370 puts this possibility even further into the future.

c) A shift in Lashkar responsiveness would be caused by the internal pressures to perform another attack, after more than a decade of abiding by the security establishment's will. If perceived as too powerful of insufficiently responsive, ISI would most likely seek to dismantle the group, as they did with Jaish-e-Muhammad, by focusing on the rogue elements and leaving Lashkar smaller but more responsive. This presents a threat, as the group would not allow itself to be simply dismantled but would probably resist to the point of becoming hostile[25].

d) The last option, a major Lashkar attack in the West, is also unlikely, as the group has not undertaken any major attack without perceived greenlight from ISI.

This does not mean that an attack from LeT can be ruled out. ISI could allow the group to carry out an attack if, in the absence of a better reason, it feels that the pressure from within the group will start causing dissent and fractures, just like it happened in 2008. It is in ISI's best interest that Lashkar remains a strong, united ally. Knowing this, it is important to note that a large-scale attack in India by Lashkar is arguably the most likely trigger to a full-blown conflict between the two nations. Even a smaller-scale attack has the potential of provoking India, especially under Modi.

If such an attack where to happen, India would not be expected to display a weak-kneed gesture, as PM Modi's policy is that of a tough and powerful approach in defense vis-à-vis both Pakistan and China. This has already been made evident by its retaliation for the Fidayeen attack at Uri brigade headquarters by Jaish-e-Muhammad in 2016[26]. It has now become evident that if Pakistan continues to harbour terrorist groups against India as its strategic assets, there will be no military restraint by India as long as Modi is in power, who will respond with massive retaliation. In its fragile economic condition, Pakistan will not be able to sustain a long-drawn war effort[27].

On the other hand, Afghanistan, which has been the other focus of Pakistan's proxy groups, is now undergoing a process which could result in a major organizational shift. The Taliban insurgent movement has been able survive this long due to the sanctuary and support provided by Pakistan[28]. Furthermore, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba's participation in the Afghan insurgency furthered the Pakistani military's goal of having a friendly, anti-India partner on its western border[29]. The development and outcome of the intra-Afghan talks will determine the continued use of proxies in the country. However, we can realistically assume that, at least in the near future, radical groups will maintain some degree of activity in Afghanistan.

It is highly unlikely that the Pakistani intelligence establishment will stop engaging with radical groups, as it sees in them a very useful strategic tool for achieving its security goals. However, Pakistan's plausible deniability approach will come into question, as its close ties with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba make it increasingly hard for it to deny involvement in its acts with any credibility. Regarding India, any kind of offensive from this group could result in a large-scale conflict. This is precisely the most likely scenario to occur, as Modi's history with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and their twelve-year-long "hiatus" from impactful attacks could propel the organization to take action that will impact the whole region.

2. DRUG TRAFFICKING

Drug trafficking constitutes an important problem for Pakistan. It originates in Afghanistan, from where thousands of tonnes are smuggled out every year, using Pakistan as a passageway to provide the world with heroin and opioids[30]. The following concept map has been elaborated with information from diverse sources[31] to present the different aspects of the problem aimed to better comprehend the complex situation.

 

 

Afghanistan, one of the world's largest heroin producers, has supplied up to 60% and 80% of the U.S. and European markets, respectively. The landlocked country takes advantage of its blurred border line, and the remoteness and inaccessibility of the sparsely populated bordering regions with Pakistan, using it as a conduit to send its drugs globally. The Pakistani government is under a lot of pressure from the international community to fight and minimize drug trafficking from its territory.

Pakistan feels a special kind of pressure from the European Union, as its GSP+ status could be affected if it does not control this problem. The GSP+ is dependent on the implementation of 27 international conventions related to human rights, labour rights, protection of the environment and good governance, including the UN Convention on Fighting Illegal Drugs[32]. Pakistan was granted GSP+ status in 2014 and has shown commitment to maintaining ratifications and meeting reporting obligations to the UN Treaty bodies[33]. However, one of the aspects of the scheme is its "temporary withdrawal and safeguard" measure, which means the preferences can be immediately withdrawn if the country is unable to control drug trafficking effectively[34]. This has not been the case, and the EU has recognized Pakistan's efforts in the fight on drugs; the UN has also removed it from the list of cannabis resin production countries[35]. Anti-corruption frameworks have been strengthened, along with legislation review and awareness building, but they have been advised that better coordination between law enforcement agencies is needed[36].

The GSP+ status is very important to Pakistan, as the European Union is their first trade partner, absorbing over a third of their total exports in 2018, followed by the U.S., China and Afghanistan[37]. The Union can use this as leverage to obtain concessions from Pakistan. However, the approach they have taken so far has been of collaboration in many areas, including transnational organized crime, money laundering and counter-narcotics[38]. In this sense, the EU ambassador to Pakistan recently stated that the new Strategic Engagement Plan of 2019 would "further boost their relations in diverse fields"[39].

Even with combined efforts, eradicating the drug trafficking problem in Pakistan has proven to be very difficult. This is because production of the drug is not done in its territory, and even if border patrols are strengthened, it will be very hard to stop drugs from coming in from its neighbor if the Afghan government doesn't take appropriate measures themselves.

 

 

A "5 whys" exercise has led us to understand that the root cause of the problem is the fact that most farmers in Afghanistan are too poor to turn to different crops. A nearly two decade war has ravaged the country's land, leaving opium crops, which are cheaper and easier to maintain, as the only option for most farmers in this agrarian nation. A substantial investment in the country's agriculture to produce more economic options would be needed if any serious advance is expected to be made in stopping illegal drug trafficking. These investments will have to be a joint effort of the international community, and funding for the government will also be necessary, if stability is to be reached. Unless this is done, opium will likely remain entangled in the rural economy, the Taliban insurgency, and the government corruption whose sum is the Afghan conundrum.[40]. And as long as this does not happen, it is highly unlikely that Pakistan will be able to make any substantial progress in its effort to fight illicit drugs.

▲ Prime Minister Imran Kahn, at the United Nations General Assembly, in 2019 [UN].

ESSAY / M. Biera, H. Labotka, A. Palacios

The geographical location of a country is capable of determining its destiny. This is the thesis defended by Whiting Fox in his book "History from a Geographical Perspective". In particular, he highlights the importance of the link between history and geography in order to point to a determinism in which a country's aspirations are largely limited (or not) by its physical place in the world.[1] The geographical location of a country is capable of determining its destiny.

Countries try to overcome these limitations by trying to build on their internal strengths. In the case of Pakistan, these are few, but very relevant in a regional context dominated by the balance of power and military deterrence.

The first factor that we highlight in this sense is related to Pakistan's nuclear capacity. In spite of having officially admitted it in 1998, Pakistan has been a country with nuclear capacity, at least, since Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government started its nuclear program in 1974 under the name of Project-706 as a reaction to the once very advanced Indian nuclear program.[2] The first factor we highlight in this sense is related to Pakistan's nuclear capacity.[2] The first factor we highlight is related to Pakistan's nuclear capacity.

The second factor is its military strength. Despite the fact that they have publicly refused to participate in politics, the truth is that all governments since 1947, whether civilian or military, have had direct or indirect military support.[3] The governments of Ayub Khan or former army chief Zia Ul-Haq, both through a coup d'état, are faithful examples of this capacity for influence.[4] The military is a key factor in the development of the country's political system.[5] The military is a key factor in the development of the country's economy.

The existence of an efficient army provides internal stability in two ways: first, as a bastion of national unity. This effect is quite relevant if we take into account the territorial claims arising from the ethnic division caused by the Durand Line. Secondly, it succeeds in maintaining the state's monopoly on force, preventing its disintegration as a result of internal ethnic disputes and terrorism instigated by Afghanistan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA region).[5] The existence of an efficient army provides stability in two ways: firstly, as a bastion of national unity.

Despite its internal strengths, Pakistan is located in one of the most insecure geographical areas in the world, where border conflicts are intermingled with religious and identity-based elements. Indeed, the endless conflict over Kashmir against India in the northeastern part of the Pakistani border or the serious internal situation in Afghanistan have been weighing down the country for decades, both geo-politically and economically. The dynamics of regional alliances are not very favorable for Pakistan either, especially when US preferences, Pakistan's main ally, seem to be mutating towards a realignment with India, Pakistan's main enemy.[6] The country's regional alliances are not very favorable for Pakistan either, especially when US preferences, Pakistan's main ally, seem to be mutating towards a realignment with India, Pakistan's main enemy.[6 

On the positive side, a number of projects are underway in Central Asia that may provide an opportunity for Pakistan to re-launch its economy and obtain higher standards of stability domestically. The most relevant is the New Silk Road undertaken by China. This project has Pakistan as a cornerstone in its strategy in Asia, while it depends on it to achieve an outlet to the sea in the eastern border of the country and investments exceeding 11 billion dollars are expected in Pakistan alone[7]. In this way, a realignment with China can help Pakistan combat the apparent American disengagement from Pakistani interests.

For all these reasons, it is difficult to speak of Pakistan as a country capable of carving out its own destiny, but rather as a country held hostage to regional power dynamics. Throughout this document, a review of the regional phenomena mentioned will be made in order to analyze Pakistan's behavior in the face of the different challenges and opportunities that lie ahead.

History

Right after the downfall of the British colony of the East Indies colonies in 1947 and the partition of India the Dominion of Pakistan was formed, now known by the title of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The Partition of India divided the former British colony into two separate territories, the Dominion of Pakistan and the Dominion of India. By then, Pakistan included East Pakistan (modern day) Pakistan and Oriental Pakistan (now known as Bangladesh).

It is interesting to point out that the first form of government that Pakistan experienced was something similar to a democracy, being its founding father and first Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Political history in Pakistan consists of a series of eras, some democratically led and others ruled by the military branch which controls a big portion of the country.

-The rise of Pakistan as a Muslim democracy: 1957-1958. The era of Ali Jinnah and the First Indo-Pakistani war.

-In 1958 General Ayub Khan achieved to complete a coup d'état in Pakistan due to the corruption and instability.

-In 1971 General Khan resigned his position and appointed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as president, but, lasted only 6 years. The political instability was not fruitful and rivalry between political parties was. But in 1977 General Zia-ul-Haq imposed a new order in Pakistan.

-From 1977 to 1988 Zia-ul-Haq imposed an Islamic state.

-In the elections of 1988 right after Zia-ul-Haq's death, President Benazir Bhutto became the very first female leader of Pakistan. This period, up to 1999 is characterized by its democracy but also, by the Kargil War.

-In 1999 General Musharraf took control of the presidency and turned it 90º degrees, opening its economy and politics. In 2007 Musharraf announced his resignation leaving open a new democratic era characterized by the War on Terror of the United States in Afghanistan and the Premiership of Imran Khan.

 

 

Human and physical geography

The capital of Pakistan is Islamabad, and as of 2012 houses a population of 1.9 million people. While the national language of Pakistan is English, the official language is Urdu; however, it is not spoken as a native language. Afghanistan is Pakistan's neighbor to the northwest, with China to the north, as well as Iran to the west, and India to the east and south.[8] The country has a population of 1.9 million people.

Pakistan is unique in the way that it possesses many a geological formation, like forests, plains, hills, etcetera. It sits along the Arabian Sea and is home to the northern Karakoram mountain range, and lies above Iranian, Eurasian and Indian tectonic plates. There are three dominant geographical regions that make up Pakistan: the Indus Plain, which owes its name to the river Indus of which Pakistan's dominant rivers merge; the Balochistan Plateau, and the northern highlands, which include the 2nd highest mountain peak in the world, and the Mount Godwin Austen.[9] Pakistan's traditional regions are a consequence of progression. These regions are echoed by the administrative distribution into the provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which includes FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) and Balochistan.

Each of these regions is "ethnically and linguistically distinct."[10] But why is it important to understand Pakistan's geography? The reason is, and will be discussed further in detail in this paper, the fact that "terror is geographical" and Pakistan is "at the epicenter of the neo-realist, militarist geopolitics of anti-terrorism and its well-known manifestation the 'global war on terror'..."[11] But why is it important to understand Pakistan's geography?

Punjabi make up more than 50% of the ethnic division in Pakistan, and the smallest division is the Balochi. We should note that Balochistan, however small, is an antagonistic region for the Pakistani government. The reason is because it is a "base for many extremist and secessionist groups." This is also important because CPEC, the Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor, is anticipated to greatly impact the area, as a large portion of the initiative is to be constructed in that region. The impact of CPEC is hoped to make that region more economically stable and change the demography of this region.[12] The impact of the CPEC is expected to make that region more economically stable and change the demography of this region.[12

The majority of Pakistani people are Sunni Muslims, and maintain Islamic tradition. However, there is a significant number of Shiite Muslims. Religion in Pakistan is so important that it is represented in the government, most obviously within the Islamic Assembly (Jamāʿat-i Islāmī) party which was created in 1941.[13]

This is important. The reason being is that there is a history of sympathy for Islamic extremism by the government, and giving rise to the expansion of the ideas of this extremism. Historically, Pakistan has not had a strict policy against jihadis, and this lack of policy has poorly affected Pakistan's foreign policy, especially its relationship with the United States, which will be touched upon in this paper.

Current Situation: Domestic politics, the military and the economy

Imran Khan was elected and took office on August 18th, 2018. Before then, the previous administrations had been overshadowed by suspicions of corruption. What also remained important was the fact that his election comes after years of a dominating political power, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Imran Khan's party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) surfaced as the majority in the Pakistan's National Assembly. However, there is some discussion by specialists on how prepared the new prime minister is to take on this extensive task.

Economically, Pakistan was in a bad shape even before the global Coronavirus-related crisis. In October 2019, the IMF predicted that the country's GDP would increase only 2.4% in 2020, compared with 5.2% registered in 2017 and 5.5% in 2018; inflation would arrive to 13% in 2020, three times the registered figure of 2017 and 2018, and gross debt would peak at 78.6%, ten points up from 2017 and 2018.[14] This context led to the Pakistani government to ask for a loan to the IMF, and a $6 billion loan was agreed in July 2019. In addition, Pakistan got a $2 billion from China. Later on, because of the Covid-19 pandemic, the IMF worsened its estimations on Pakistan's economy, and predicted that its GDP would grow minus 1.5% in 2020 and 2% in 2021.[15] The IMF also predicted that Pakistan's GDP would grow by 1.5% in 2020 and 2% in 2021.

Throughout its history, Pakistan has been a classic example of a "praetorian state", where the military dominates the political institutions and regular functioning. The political evolution is represented by a routine change "between democratic, military, or semi military regime types." There were three critical pursuits towards a democratic state that are worth mentioning, that started in 1972 and resulted in the rise of democratically elected leaders. In addition to these elections, the emergence of new political parties also took place, permitting us to make reference to Prime Minister Imran Khan's party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI).[16]

Civilian - military relations are characterized by the understanding that the military is what ensures the country's "national sovereignty and moral integrity". There resides the ambiguity: the intervention of the military regarding the institution of a democracy, and the sabotage by the same military leading it to its demise. In addition to this, to the people of Pakistan, the military has retained the impression that the government is incapable of maintaining a productive and functioning state, and is incompetent in its executing of pertaining affairs. The role of the military in Pakistani politics has hindered any hope of the country implementing a stable democracy. To say the least, the relationship between the government and the resistance is a consistent struggle.[17] The military's role in Pakistani politics has hindered any hope of the country implementing a stable democracy.

The military has extended its role today with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The involvement of the military has affected "four out of five key areas of civilian control". Decision making was an area that was to be shared by the military and the people of Pakistan, but has since turned into an opportunity for the military to exercise its control due to the fact that CPEC is not only a "corporate mega project" but also a huge economic opportunity, and the military in Pakistan continues to be the leading force in the creation of the guidelines pertaining to national defense and internal security. Furthermore, accusations of corruption have not helped; the Panama Papers were "documents [exposing] the offshore holdings of 12 current and former world leaders."[18] These findings further the belief that Pakistan's leaders are incompetent and incapable of effectively governing the country, and giving the military more of a reason to continue and increase its interference. In consequence, the involvement of civilians in policy making is declining steadily, and little by little the military seeks to achieve complete autonomy from the government, and an increased partnership with China. It is safe to say that CPEC would have been an opportunity to improve military and civilian relationships, however it seems to be an opportunity lost as it appears the military is creating a government capable of functioning as a legitimate operation.[19] The military is creating a government capable of functioning as a legitimate operation.

▲ Propaganda poster extolling the figure of Qaddafi, near Ghadames, in 2004 [Sludge G., Wikipedia].

May 11, 2020

essay / Paula Mora

On October 20, 2011, Colonel Muammar Muhamad Abu-Minyar Qaddafi was assassinated, ending a dictatorial regime that lasted more than forty years. That date signified hope, freedom and democracy, or at least those were the aspirations of many of those who contributed to change in Libya. However, the reality today, nine years later, is almost unimaginable for those rebels who on October 23, 2011 thought that their children could grow old in a democracy. The civil war that the country has been suffering since then has led to the disintegration of the nation. To understand this, it is paramount to understand the very nature of Libyan political power, totally different from that of its neighbors and its former metropolises: tribalism.

Libyan tribalism has three characteristics: it is contractual, since it is based on permanent negotiations; the territorial instructions of the peoples have been moving towards the cities, but the ties have not been loosened, and the territorial extension of these peoples exceeds the borders of Libya. The Libyan territory is composed of 90% desert, which has led to the persistence of tribal power. The native peoples have fought, and continue to fight, for territorial control and harmony of their territories, which is achieved through traditional alliances renegotiated from time to time between the three main regions of the country: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezan.

Tuareg tropism

The Bedouin culture and its mythology from pre-colonial trans-Saharan cave times explain why Qaddafi focused his policy on the Sahara and North Africa. These peoples considered the desert as a means of communication, not as an obstacle or a border. Under the dictatorship, Berber customs and speech were protected and promoted.

The Tuareg are a Berber people of nomadic tradition spread over five African countries: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali and Niger. They have their own language and customs. In Libya, they occupy the southwestern territory, along the borders of Algeria, Tunisia and Niger. The dictator proclaimed on numerous occasions his affinity with this people, even claiming to belong to this lineage on his mother's side. He considered them allies of his Pan-Africanist project .

Qaddafi did not see himself as the leader of the movement, but as a "guide" of the revolution. However, with the passage of time, this revolutionary vision was tempered into a realistic and pacifying vision. This change was mainly due to the inability of the Tuareg to overcome internal divisions (tribes) and their willingness to abandon the armed struggle. The consequences were that what started as a national and social struggle degenerated into drug and arms trafficking.

Italian colonialism

In April 1881, France occupied Tunisia. This provoked resentment in Italy because the regency of Tunisia was intended as a natural extension of Italy, given that 55,000 Italians resided in the territory. In view of this status, and to avoid a confrontation with France, Italy then decided to create a Libyan project . In 1882, Italy, Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire created the Triple Alliance. As a consequence, France opposed Italy's Libyan project .

Faced with France's civil service examination its plans in Libya, Italy sought compensation in the Red Sea and in 1886 tried, unsuccessfully, to conquer Ethiopia. But the Italian nationalism of the time was not about to give up, as it aspired to create "a greater Italy". After the Ethiopian victory, only two African alternatives remained: Morocco, which had already been practically colonized by France, or the Turkish Regency in Tripoli, which had been established since 1858.

Finally, Italy decided in favor of the latter and in 1902 sought the support of France to carry out its project. Under the Triple Alliance compromise, it offered neutrality on the shared border of the Alps in case of war and the Withdrawal of the Moroccan project . Paris was not interested, but Russia offered in 1908 its support to Italy to weaken the Ottoman Empire. Thus began the Italo-Turkish war. The Italian pretext was the alleged mistreatment of the settlers in Libya by the Turkish regime, to which it gave an ultimatum. Under Austro-Hungarian mediators, the Turks agreed to transfer control of Libya to Italy, a move that Italy considered a Turkish maneuver that only sought to gain time to prepare for war. On September 29, 1911, Italy declared war on the Ottoman Empire. This had important consequences for the Triple Alliance, as Austria-Hungary feared that the Libyan conflict would escalate into a direct conflict with the Ottoman Empire, while Germany was faced with the dilemma of having to choose sides, as it enjoyed good relations with both sides. On October 18, 1912, due to the open dangers on different fronts, the Ottoman Empire decided to sign the Treaty of Lausanne-Ouchy through which it ceded Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Dodecanese islands to Italy.

During World War I, Italy was part of the Triple Entente, so the Ottoman Empire did not declare war on it. The threat to Italian control of Libya was not so much among its European enemies, but among the population of the African country itself. Taking advantage of the war, the Sanûsiya (a Muslim religious order founded under the Ottoman Empire that opposed colonization) began to attack the Italian army. These rebels were gaining territory, until Italy's allies went on the offensive. On August 21, 1915, the day Italy switched to the Allied side, the tactics changed. Although also offering support, Italy's new allies were dealing with insurgencies in their colonies, and were mainly concerned with guarding their borders to prevent insurgents from getting through and spreading independence ideas.

On April 17, 1917, the emir Idris As-Sanûsi, an ally of the Ottoman Empire, realizing the proximity of the Allied victory, signed with Italy the Pact of Acroma, by which Italy recognized the autonomy of Cyrenaica and in exchange the emir accepted Italian control of Tripolitania.

 

 

Geographical distribution of ethnicities in Libya [Wikipedia].

 

Colonial independence

The Second World War played a core topic in Africa, as it encouraged nationalism on the continent. Italy, allied with Germany, tried between 1940 and 1942 to occupy the Suez Canal through the Libyan border, but the goal was not achieved.

In 1943, Libya fell into the hands of the Free France (of Charles de Gaulle) and England: the former administered Fezán; the latter, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. At the end of the war, and with Italy changing sides in the course of the war, Italy proposed a tripartite division of Libya. The United States and the Soviet Union opposed this, and stipulated that the territory would remain under the tutelage of the United Nations (UN). Two political positions were then opposed in Libya: on the one hand, the "progressives", who defended the creation of a unitary democratic state, and on the other hand, the original peoples of Cyrenaica, who defended a kingdom whose leader would be Mohammed Idris As-Sanûsi, the leader of the Sanûsiya.

On November 21, 1949, through Resolution 289, the United Nations set the independence of Libya for January 1, 1952. Without taking into account any geographical, historical, religious, cultural and political reality, the UN imposed the birth of a sovereign country made up of the three main independent regions. In 1950, the election of the National Assembly took place, composed of 60 deputies (20 per region). On December 2 of the same year, after arduous negotiations, the Assembly agreed that Libya would be a federal monarchy composed of three provinces, with Mohammed Idriss As-Sanûsi as King.

Initially, the Kingdom was able to establish itself given the international recognition and the finding oil fields that allowed Libya to become the richest country on the continent. This optimism, however, concealed the fact that the real Libyan problem lay within its borders: the country was ruled by the original peoples of Cyrenaica. To balance power, the king decided to appoint Mahmoud el-Montasser, a Tripolitanian, as prime minister.

However, the king made the mistake of not having based his monarchy on the Sanûsiya, but on his tribe, the Barasa. The regime became totalitarian. After pro-Nasser demonstrations, the king banned political parties in 1952, and dismissed more than ten governors, who were replaced by prefects. As for foreign relations, under the reign of Idriss, Libya signed with Great Britain a twenty-year alliance by which the British could use Libyan military instructions . With the United States it signed a similar one which granted permission to the Americans to build the Wheelus Field base near Tripoli. Finally, he signed a peace treaty with Italy whereby the former metropolis undertook to pay reparations as long as Libya protected the property of the 27,000 Italians still residing there. These measures brought the kingdom to its doom, since its neighboring countries and its population considered that the king was not showing solidarity with Egypt by aligning himself with the Western countries.

The fall of the monarchy

On September 1, 1969, a coup d'état took place in the country to overthrow Idriss; the latter, seriously ill, announced his abdication for the following day. The Revolutionary Command committee (RCC), constituted by the officers who had brought about this change of government, abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the Libyan Arab Republic. The military board that established itself in power was composed of a dozen members, mostly from the two main original peoples: the Warfalla and the Maghara. The latter were of Marxist ideology, which led to the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.

During the first weeks of government, the new leaders tried to take all possible precautions to avoid a British and American intervention. They issued a statement guaranteeing the safety of foreigners' property and promising that the oil companies would not be nationalized. In view of these statements, which were not in line with communism, the United States and the West recognized the new government on September 6.

The real intentions of the new government appeared soon after. A month after the statement, the Libyan authorities announced that the previous treaties concerning military instructions would have to be renegotiated. They also called for a renegotiation of the taxation of oil companies. Finally, in 1971, a single party was created: the Arab Socialist Union.

Qaddafi's government

On April 15, 1973, almost four years after the coup d'état of '69, Gaddafi gave a speech in which he invited the "popular masses" to take back the power seized by the Arab Socialist Union party. He imposed himself as head of the country, promoting a cultural and political revolution that proposed, on the one hand, a reform of the institutions with a stricter application of the precepts of the sharia, and on the other hand, the idea that the aggressors of the people were the Arab countries allied with the West and Israel.

Gaddafi based his power on a profound tribal recomposition. The first measure he took, the day after taking power, distrustful of Cyrenaica and its tribes loyal to King Idriss, was to form an alliance with the people of Hada, with which he sought to balance the power of the Barasa.

Secondly, he divorced his wife, of Turkish-Kouloughli origin, who constituted an obstacle to the alliances with the peoples that were necessary for him to expand his power base. He then married a Firkeche woman, a segment of the Barasa tribe. This marriage allowed him to build an alliance between the Qadhafa and the great tribes of Cyrenaica linked to the Barasa.

Third, he also built an alliance with the Misrata, a literate elite that subsequently occupied many of the regime's posts. However, over time, this alliance broke down and led to a growth of hatred towards the colonel that would play an important role in the revolution that brought down Qaddafi.

Fourthly, after having lost Misrata, Gaddafi recomposed his strategy by relying on his own confederation, that of the Awlad Sulaymans, enemies of Misrata since the time of Italian rule. This alliance covered the city of Tripoli and geographically extended the territory of the ruler.

Fifthly, the ruler's problem would be the result of the previous points: tribal alliances. Fractions of his allies conspired against him in 1973 to attempt a coup d'état. Gaddafi's army, however, prevented it and condemned the ringleaders to death. From this point on, the colonel began to distrust the tribes of this region, Tripolitania, and gradually began to break off relations with them. This would prove fatal to him.

Qaddafi facing the world

International activism under Gaddafi sought the fusion of the Arab peoples with the goal of creating a transnational caliphate. In 1972, although he did not yet control the whole of Libyan territory, he contributed to the creation of the Union of Arab Republics (Libya, Egypt and Syria), which was dissolved in 1977. In 1984, he created the Libyan-Moroccan Union, which would disappear two years later. Four other attempts were made: with Tunisia in 1974, with Chad in 1981, with Algeria in 1988 and with Sudan in 1990; none of them succeeded. These attempts at union caused tensions on the continent, especially with Egypt, with which there was a border conflict from July 21 to 24, 1977. As a result, the mutual border was closed until March 1989.

As for the rest of the world, the dictator's support for terrorist movements during the 1980s made him enemies, especially the United States, Great Britain and France. Several attacks by the Libyan regime, such as the shooting down of an American plane over the Scottish town of Lockerbie and the assassination of ambassadors, led the UN Security committee in 1992 to adopt a policy of trade and financial embargo sanctions. Added to this was the socialist orientation of the colonel, who nationalized the oil companies and the assets of Italian residents on the grounds that they had been stolen during the colonial era.

The fall of the regime

Over time, the regime lost power and national support. This decline was due to the march of Economics, as the citizens benefited from the direct income from hydrocarbons: health and Education were free, and agriculture was subsidized. In addition, there was a project to create a "Great Man Made River" (GMMR), 4,000 kilometers long. In summary, the five million inhabitants had an exceptional life, with a GDP per capita of 3,000 euros in 2011.

The main civil service examination came from Islamic circles, more specifically from the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist groups (Sunni Islamic ultra-right movement), who from 1995 onwards were radicalized with the financial aid of groups from Afghanistan. Their reasons for opposing Gaddafi were the westernization of the country: leaving behind to some extent the Tuareg tropism and a turn towards the countries of the North. That same year an Islamist rebellion broke out, initiated by the Front for the Liberation of Libya in Cyrenaica. Qaddafi responded with a major crackdown, establishing anti-Islamic laws that punished anyone who did not denounce the Islamists and the closure of most zawiya (religious schools and monasteries), especially those of the Sanûsiya.

In 2003, Libya acknowledged its involvement in the Lockerbie bombing and undertook to compensate all victims. This led to the lifting of sanctions by the UN Security committee . In December of the same year, the country renounced the production of weapons of mass destruction and in 2004 acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With these new measures, the regime began to ally itself with Western countries, which in turn promoted the industrialization of the country. One example was the treaty signed between Gaddafi and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, whereby Italy undertook to reimburse Libya $5 billion over a period of 25 years, provided that the African country opened up to the Italian market and avoided illegal immigration to Europe.

Libya did not experience "the Arab Spring", as it was suffering from a civil war born in Cyrenaica, which began as an uprising of a Berber minority living near the border with Tunisia. Qaddafi, fearful of spoiling the good image he had finally managed to build in the international community, decided not to use military force to re-establish his power in Cyrenaica, but as time went on he had no choice but to do so. This action led to what he already knew: international outcry.

The first country to oppose was Nicolas Sarkozy's France. Under the pretext of humanitarian interference, France, together with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, decided to destroy the Qaddafi regime. In March 2011, they recognized the National Transitional committee (NTC). The African Union also wanted the change of government, but nevertheless advocated that this should be done through negotiation, in order to avoid negative consequences such as the disintegration of the state. 

During the month of February 2011, the colonel had to face a triple uprising. In Cyrenaica, by the jihadists (remember the anti-Islamic laws), who were also supported by Turkey and the local mafias, who felt threatened by the Italo-Libyan agreement on migration. In Tripolitania, by the Berbers, who now saw their identity denied in favor of the defense of Arab nationalism. Finally, also in Misrata, the zone had a staff account to settle with the dictator since 1975 (tribal conflict).

Gaddafi took preventive measures, such as banning demonstrations or suspending sporting events, and announced social reforms favorable to the population, thinking that these were grievances that would not transcend. His error of analysis was to think that the protest had a social motive, whereas its reasons were tribal, regional, political and religious subject

The government was able to control the status for a month, until on February 15 the violence escalated into a full-blown civil war.

Foreign interference began on March 17, when the French Foreign Minister promoted in the UN Security committee Resolution 1973, which authorized the creation of a no-fly zone over Libya, as well as the imposition of the "necessary measures" to grant protection to civilians. This resolution excluded land occupation, and was supported by the Arab League, with military air support from Qatar.

A few days later, on March 21, the intervention of NATO countries went beyond the guidelines of Resolution 1973, as Gaddafi's residency program was bombed under the pretext that it served as a command center. The African Union, supported by Russia, then called for the "immediate cessation of all hostilities". For its part, the Arab League reminded NATO that it was deviating from its stated objectives. However, the Western countries paid no heed. On March 31, through his son Saif al-Islam, the colonel proposed a referendum on the establishment of democracy in Libya. NATO was ready to consider his proposals, but the National Transitional committee was categorically opposed, demanding as it did, quite simply, the removal of Gaddafi from power.

On September 16, the Security committee , through Resolution 2009, created the United Nations Support mission statement in Libya (UNSMIL). Its goal was to attend the national authorities in restoring security and the rule of law through the promotion of political dialogue and national reconciliation.

The "liberation" of the country took place on October 23, 2011, when Qaddafi was captured on his way to Fezzan, accompanied by his son. His convoy was attacked by NATO air forces. He was taken prisoner and subsequently lynched by his compatriots. The president of the National Transitional committee , Mustapha Adbel Jalil, then proclaimed himself the new legitimate ruler of the country until new elections.

Libya after Gaddafi

The transitional president declared on his first day that Sharia would be the basis of the Constitution as well as the law, reestablished polygamy and outlawed divorce. The consequences of the civil war were tremendous: they led to the disintegration of the country. Qaddafi's death did not mark the end of the conflict, as the tribal, regional and religious militias that participated in the war defended different visions of what the new government should be like, making unification impossible.

Externally, territorial decontrol changed the geopolitics of the Sahara-Sahel region, offering new opportunities to jihadists.

Three periods can be distinguished. The first, between 2011 and 2013, could be considered as the time of uncertainty, but also the time of democratic hope and illusion. Despite wars between different peoples over different ideologies (defenders of the old regime against Muslim fundamentalists defending Islamic traditions) and a territorial proxy war (Cyrenaica against Tripolitania for the capital of the new state), what appeared to be democratic mechanisms were being put in place.

On October 31, 2011, Abdel Rahim al-Keeb, a native of Tripoli, was elected Prime Minister of the transitional government by 26 votes out of 51. Legislative elections took place on July 7, 2012; they were won by the General National congress (GNC), which replaced the Transitional National committee . But the status was far from being consolidated. On September 11, 2012, the American ambassador John Christopher Stevens was assassinated by a Salafist group called Ansar al-Sharia.

The second period began in early 2013. Libya was on the path to normalization through democratic elections and the reactivation of oil and gas exports. However, the following year saw the beginning of lawlessness and attempts to recompose internal order. The "democratic advances" had not been enough, as the regions had a great deal of autonomy and there was no border security. No one had been able to control Libyan territory in its entirety. Chadian President Idriss Déby, who had already warned of these consequences when the West intervened in the civil war, called the new Libyan status a "Somalization".

From February 2014 onwards, this lawlessness resulted in a series of resignations of "government" officials due to threats by the various militias in the country and protests in front of the NGC, as the government was not dissolved after the expiration of the mandate. On February 20, elections were held for the 60 members of the Constituent Assembly whose goal was to draft a new constitution, but only 15% of the voters participated. Meanwhile, on March 6, in Rome, at the International lecture on Libya, the Italian Foreign Minister considered that the main problem was the "overlapping of legitimacy".

The third period, took place at the end of 2014, when the so-called "second Libyan war" started. From 2015 onwards, the Islamic State entered the scene, which changed the Libyan political picture. The UN created a transitional executive body called the Government of National agreement (GNA), with the goal of directing Libyan politics in this new status. It was formed by the union of the General National congress and the House of Representatives. It is composed of 32 ministers, and Fayez-al Sarraj holds the position of president of the Presidential committee and prime minister of the GNA.

Libya then found itself with two parliaments, one in Tripoli, under the control of the Islamists, and the other, recognized by the international community, in Tobruk, Cyrenaica, near the Egyptian border, which had been forced to desist from action by jihadist forces. This led to the start of another conflict, which is still ongoing today. In Cyrenaica, a confused and multiform war is taking place, involving jihadists and supporters of General Khalifa Haftar, who leads the Libyan National Army (LNA) and opposes both the jihadists and the Government of National agreement . Through his army, the general launched air strikes against Islamist groups in Benghazi in May, with the goal of seizing the parliament. He also accused Prime Minister Ahmed Maiteg of cooperating with Islamist groups. In June, Maiteg resigned after the Supreme Court ruled that his appointment was illegal.

In 2014, Haftar launched "Operation Dignity" against the Islamists, trying to remove from power Colonel Moktar Fernana, commander of the military police and elected by Misrata and the Muslim Brotherhood. This mission statement failed due to the power of the different Muslim militias throughout the territory of Tripolitania, divided into different areas: there is the city of Misrata, which is jihadist territory under the command of the Muslim Brotherhood; to the West, the Arabic-speaking Berber militia of Zenten reigns; in the capital, the Islamist militia Farj Lybia is in control, while Fezzan and the Great South have become almost autonomous territories, where the Tuareg are fought.

In June 2014, parliamentary elections took place. The Islamist parties were defeated, there was a leave turnout due to insecurity and the boycott of the dominant parties, and a confrontation arose between the forces loyal to the NTC and those of the new Parliament or House of Representatives (HoR). Finally, the National Salvation Government emerged, with Nouri Absuhamain, an ally of the Muslim Brotherhood, as president.

In July, national security deteriorated severely following several events. Tripoli International Airport was destroyed due to conflicts between the Misrata militia and its Dawa Libya operation against the Zintan militia; the HoR moved to Tobruk after the Tripoli Supreme Court (composed of the NTC) dissolved it; the NTC voted itself a replacement for the House of Representatives; Asar al-Sharia moved to control Benghazi; and UN envoys left the country due to increasing insecurity.

On January 29, 2015, the LNA and its Tripoli allies declared a ceasefire following the "Libyan Dialogue" organized by the UN in Geneva to encourage reconciliation between the different sides. On December 17 of the same year, the Libyan Political agreement , or Skhirat agreement , promoted by UNSMIL, took place. Its goal was to resolve the dispute between the legitimate House of Representatives, based in Tobruk and al-Bayda, and the NTC, based in Tripoli. A 9-member Presidency committee was created to form a unity government that would lead to elections in two years. The HoR was to be the sole parliament and would act as such until the elections.

On March 30, 2016, the GNA arrived in Tripoli by sea due to the air blockade. The settlement of the legitimate government prompted the UN to return to the territory after two years in April. In addition, the GNA, together with U.S. air forces, liberated Sirte from ISIS in December 2016. However, the LNA continued to gain territory, counting in September with the control of the eastern oil terminals.

In July 2017, the LNA drove ISIS out of Benghazi. A year later, it controlled Derna, the last western territory under terrorist groups. On December 17, Haftar declared the Libyan Political agreement null and void, as elections had not taken place, highlighting the obsolescence of the Libyan government created by the UN. The general then began to gain strength in the national and international context: "All the institutions created under this agreement are null and void, as they have not obtained full legitimacy. Libyans feel that they have lost their patience and that the promised period of peace and stability has become a distant fantasy," Haftar declared.

April 19, 2019 was the date on which the Libyan National lecture was to be held in Ghadamas to advance agreements and close a date on which the presidential and parliamentary elections would be held. However, days before the lecture convocation was cancelled due to the LNA's "Operation Dignity Flood" with the goal of the "liberation" of the country.

 

 

Correlation of forces in the Libyan civil war, February 2016 [Wikipedia].

 

Foreign interference

The current Libyan status is worrying. The international community fears that the country could become the next Syria. The National Liberation Army, led by Haftar, is supported by the United Arab Emirates, hoping to stop the advance of the Muslim Brotherhood, which it considers a terrorist organization. It is also supported by Egypt and Russia, interested in controlling the country's energy resources. The Government of National agreement , with Fayez al-Sarraj as leader, represents the legitimate government for the international community (the UN recognizes it). Moreover, it is supported by the United States and the European Union countries (except France), as well as Turkey and Qatar, which provide military support (especially the Turks). However, the United States and the EU defend the maritime borders of Greece and Israel against the desired Turkish project to build gas pipelines across the Mediterranean to supply itself.

The rapprochement between Haftar and France began in 2015. The European country tried to transform the LNA into a legitimate actor by assisting him with clandestine operatives, special forces and advisors. On July 20, 2016, Holland's France officially declared its military support for him after the killing of three French special forces soldiers in Benghazi at the hands of the GNA, which argued that it was a "violation of its national sovereignty." On July 25, 2019, the Paris Summit took place. Macron invited the two leaders to dialogue on peace and unity. France's greatest interest is to eradicate terrorism.

On March 6, 2019, the Abu Dhabi agreement brought together the leaders of the most important sides of the Libyan war and emphasized several aspects: Libya as marital status, shortening of the government transition period, unification of state institutions (such as the Central Bank), the cessation of hatred and its incitement, the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections by the end of the year, the peaceful transfer of power, the separation of powers and the monitoring of the agreed points by the UN. The location of the meeting sample the strong involvement of the United Arab Emirates in this war, especially as an ally of General Haftar. The Persian Gulf country denied supporting the attack on Tripoli which took place on March 31, 2020 by the LNA. However, several Libyan media outlets stated that two military cargo planes arrived at the Emirati Al-Khadim airbase in the east of the Libyan city of Marj from Abu Dhabi's Sweihan airbase.

On November 27, 2019, the Maritime Border agreement between the GNA and Turkey took place. Turkish President Erdogan and Fayez al-Sarraj signed two memorandums of understanding. They agreed on an 18.6 nautical mile limit as a shared maritime border between Turkey and Libya and signed a military cooperation agreement whereby Ankara would send soldiers and weaponry. Instead of creating a new troop, which would take longer, Turkey offered a salary of $200 per month to fight in Libya as opposed to the $75 it gave for fighting in Syria.

The problem with the maritime border is that it ignores the islands of Cyprus and Greece and violates their rights under the 1994 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, although neither country has gone to the Law of the Sea Tribunal. The Turkish interest lies in the possibility of the presence of oil and natural gas off the southern coast of Crete. The agreement will for the time being last as long as the GNA lasts, in an unstable status to which the unpopularity of the military intervention in Turkey also contributes.

On January 2, 2020, the presidents of Algeria and Tunisia met with Khalifa Haftar. The Algerian president, Abdelmadjid Tebboune, insisted that the solution to the Libyan problem must be internal and not depend on the influx of arms brought about by foreign interference. He proposed the creation of new institutions allowing the organization of general elections and the establishment of the new instructions of the Libyan democratic state with the approval of the UN.

On January 6, the LNA took control of Sirte. This city is strategic as it is close to Libya's "average oil moon", a coastal strip where several important oil export terminals are located.

On January 12, Russia and Turkey declared a truce in Syria and Libya. This agreement was a quid pro quo, since Russia has greater interests in Syria than in Libya, as it seeks a port in the Mediterranean, and Turkey, as explained above, wishes to build a gas supply system across the Mediterranean Sea from Libya. However, the agreement is not being fulfilled, especially in the Libyan scenario. UN envoys allege that both countries continue to provide weaponry to the guerrillas.

On January 19, the Berlin lecture took place, which constituted an attempt to appease the status of the country. The United States, Russia, Germany, France, Italy, China, Turkey and Algeria took part and expressed their commitment to put an end to political and military interference in the country. Without the intervention of third parties, the country would not be able to sustain a civil war because none of the sides is strong enough. The lecture also discussed the non-compliance with the arms embargo established by the UN Security committee in 2011. The problem is that no power, especially Turkey and Russia, recognizes its involvement, so there are no responsibilities and no sanctions.

A week later, the first violation of the pact took place. As for the truce, the Haftar government, with the goal of recovering the capital, launched an offensive towards the city of Misrata, where an important base of the Government of National agreement is located. Moreover, the UN special mission statement in Libya (UNSMIL) affirmed that material continues to reach the fighting sides by air.

On March 31, the European Union launched "Operation Irini" ("peace" in Greek). It replaces the 2015 "Operation Sophia", which was aimed goal combating human trafficking off the Libyan coast. The new operation has changed its main goal , as it will fight to enforce the arms embargo. In addition, it has other secondary tasks such as the control of oil smuggling, the continuation of the training of the Libyan coast guard and the control of human trafficking through the collection of information with the use of air patrols. This initiative is born above all by Italy, the first country to which Libyan refugees arrive and therefore concerned about immigration. This leadership is manifested in the development the operation, since the headquarters is in Rome and the operational management is in position of Italian Rear Admiral Fabio Agostini. For the time being, it has a duration of one year.

On April 5, the UN called for a cessation of hostilities to combat Covid-19. It called for a humanitarian truce involving not only the national sides but also foreign forces. The virus claimed the life of Mahmoud Jibril, former prime minister and leader of the rebellion against Gaddafi.

New regional geopolitics and conclusion

We can define the new Libyan geopolitics through the following points. First, the spread of arms throughout the Sahara-Sahel region, the area of old and current conflicts. Secondly, the border threat felt by Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia due to the internal conflict. Finally, the disinterest of the new Libyan authorities in the Greater South, as it has practically become independent, controlling almost all trade through the Sahara. Al-Qaeda, through subgroups such as Fajr Lybia, is trying to establish an Islamic State of North Africa imitating that of Iraq. To this end, in the conquered areas, Daesh destroys the tribal paradigm by liquidating tribal chiefs who do not want to ally with them in goal to terrorize the rest. It is through these practices that all the jihadist militias were able to ally themselves at the end of 2015. Faced with this, the United Nations sponsored Fayez Sarrraj as Prime Minister, who was installed in Tripoli in April 2016. 

Libya is a privileged state in terms of natural wealth. However, in its history it has suffered a lot and continues to do so. It has gone through monarchies, colonization and dictatorships until finally becoming today a failed state. Its political structure is complicated, as it is tribal, and therefore none of the political systems has succeeded completely because it has not managed to harmonize the internal organizations. Today the country consists of three rival governments and hundreds of militias and armed groups that continue to compete for power and control of territory, trade routes and strategic military sites. For the status to be resolved, the countries actively involved in the conflict (Russia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Qatar) need to comply with the UN arms embargo. In addition, foreign powers must increase their understanding of the country to be successful in bringing about the best possible solution. Even if Libya is on the verge of becoming the next Syria, there are still opportunities to save the status quo and give the country what it has long lacked: stability.

 

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[Joseph S. Nye. Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump.. Oxford University Press. New York, 2020. 254 pp]

review / Emili J. Blasco

The question that serves as the degree scroll for the new book by Jospeh Nye, known to the general public for having coined the expression "the most important thing in the world". soft powerThe author's entrance is not a concession to secularized thinking, but rather a lack of boldness in asserting the importance of ethical reflection in foreign policy decisions, an importance that, despite the question mark, one senses is defended by the author.

In fact, the question itself is a core topic in the discipline of international relations. A common approach is to see the world scenario as a conjunction of states that struggle against each other, in an anarchic dynamic where the law of the strongest prevails. Internally, the state may be driven by criteria of the common good, attending to the different needs of its inhabitants and making decisions at the national or local level through democratic processes. But beyond its own borders, does the legitimacy granted by its own voters not require the president to guarantee the security of its citizens against external threats and to safeguard the national interest against that of other states?

The fact that the state is the basic subject in international relations marks, of course, a dividing line between the two spheres. And therefore the question of whether the ethical discernment demanded of the leader in the domestic sphere should also be demanded of him in the foreign sphere is fully pertinent.

Only from extreme positions that consider that the state is a wolf for the state, applying the Hobbesian principle to international order (disorder) (and here there would be no supra-state to discipline this tendency of the state-individual), can it be defended that amorality governs all against all. On a lower rung is the so-called offensive realism and, on a lower rung, defensive realism.

Nye, a scholar of international relations, believes that realist theory is a good starting point for any president when defining a country's foreign policy, given that he must be guided especially by the ethics of responsibility, as he fulfills a "fiduciary role." "The first moral duty of a president is that of a trustee, and this begins with ensuring the survival and security of the democracy that elected him." But from this point on, the possibilities for international partnership and mutual benefit must also be explored, not closing the entrance to approaches of liberalism or cosmopolitanism.

"When survival is at stake, realism is a necessary basis for a moral foreign policy, though not sufficient," says Nye, for whom it is a "matter of Degree." "Since there is never perfect security, the moral question is what Degree of security should be assured before other values such as welfare, identity or rights become part of a president's foreign policy." He adds, "Many of the most difficult moral decisions are not all-or-nothing [...] The difficult moral decisions are in the middle. While it is important to be cautious about the dangers of a slippery slope, moral decisions rest on matching ends and means with each other." He concludes that "the maintenance of international institutions and regimes is part of moral leadership".

From the very beginning of the book, Nye uses the three conditions that have traditionally been used in moral treatises to judge an action as ethically good: that the intention, the means and the consequences are good at the same time.

Using these three yardsticks, the author analyzes the foreign policy of each of the U.S. presidents since World War II and establishes a final ranking that combines both the morality of their actions on the international scene and the effectiveness of their policies (because it is possible to have an ethical foreign policy that does little to further a country's national interests).

Thus, of the fourteen presidents, he considers that the four with the best grade in that combination are Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower and Bush I. In the middle he places Reagan, Kennedy, Ford, Carter, Clinton and Obama. And as the four worst he mentions Johnson, Nixon, Bush II and ("tentatively incomplete") Trump. Having made the ranking, Nye warns that he may have given precedence to the Democratic administrations for which he worked.

The book is a quick review of the foreign policy of each presidency, highlighting the presidents' doctrines, their successes and failures (as well as examining the ethical component), so it is also interesting as a succinct history of U.S. international relations over the past eighty years.

The aspect of morality perhaps lacks a greater academic foundation, since it is a discipline that has been especially studied since the scholastic era. But Nye's purpose was not to delve into this subject, but to offer a brief study of applied morality.

Reading Nye is always thought-provoking. Among other reflections he makes might be the idea of the new prospects that would have opened up for the world if particularly propitious times had coincided in the calendar. In particular, he suggests that if Brezhnev and his gerontocratic generation had left earlier and the USSR had also been beset by serious economic problems earlier, Gorbachev might have come to power coinciding with Carter's presidency; what they would have achieved together is, however, the realm of speculation.

▲ A view of the Badshahi Mosque, in Lahore, capital of the Punjab province [Pixabay].

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS REPORT / Naomi Moreno, Alejandro Puigrefagut, Ignacio Yárnoz

 

Download the document [pdf. 1.4MB]

 

May 2020

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report has been aimed at examining the future prospects for Pakistan in the 2025 horizon in relation to other States and to present various scenarios through a prospective strategic analysis.

The research draws upon the fact that, despite the relatively short space of time, Pakistan is likely to undergo several important changes in its international affairs and thus feel forced to rethink its foreign policy. This strategic analysis suggests there could be considerable estrangement between the U.S. and Pakistan and, therefore, the American influence will decrease considerably. Their security alliance could terminate, and Pakistan would cease to be in U.S.' sphere of influence. Moreover, with the new BRI and CPEC projects, China could move closer to Pakistan and finally become its main partner in the region. The CPEC is going to become a vital instrument for Pakistan, so it could significantly increase Chinese influence. Yet, the whole situation risks jeopardizing Pakistan's sovereign independence.

India-Pakistan longstanding dispute over Kashmir seems to be stagnated and will possibly remain as such in the following years. India has taken steps to annex its administered territory in Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan could potentially follow. The possibility of an open conflict and a nuclear standoff remains possible as both nuclear powers have very different strategies and conceptions which could lead to misinterpretation and a nuclear escalation. 

In the quest to rethink its foreign policy, the U.S.-Taliban peace and the empowerment of the group has come as a bolt from the sky for Pakistan. Through its ties with the Taliban, Pakistan could gain itself a major presence in the region namely by reaching out to Central Asia and advance its interest to curtail India's influence. Amid a dire economic crisis, with regards to the Saudi Iranian Cold War, Pakistan could seek a way in which it can recalibrate its stance in favor of the resource-rich Saudi alliance while it appeases sectarian groups who could strongly oppose this potential policy.

 Pakistan ought to acknowledge that significant changes ought to be made in both the national and international sphere and that decisive challenges lay ahead.

Beijing has announced the construction of a fifth base, equaling those of the United States issue

While there is widespread international monitoring of the positions taken by the great powers in the Arctic, given that global warming opens up trade routes and possibilities for resource exploitation, geopolitical movements around Antarctica go more unnoticed. With any national claims frozen by the existing agreements on the South Pole continent, the steps taken by the superpowers are minor, but also significant. As in the Arctic, China is a new player, and is increasing its stakes.

▲ Shared camp for scientific research in Antarctica [Pixabay].

May 8, 2020

article / Jesús Rizo

Antarctica is the southernmost continent and at the same time the most extreme due to its geographical and thermal conditions, which seriously limit its habitability. Human presence is almost impossible in the so-called East Antarctica, located two thousand meters above sea level, which constitutes more than two thirds of the continent, being, therefore, the highest average altitude. Moreover, since Antarctica is not an ocean, as is the case with the Arctic, it is not affected, except in its continental perimeter, by the increase in sea temperature due to climate change.

In addition to these difficulties for human presence, there are the limitations imposed by international regulations, which have imposed a moratorium on any claim of sovereignty or commercial exploitation, something that does not happen in the Arctic. Action in Antarctica is strongly determined by the Antarctic Treaty (Washington, 1959) which, in Articles I and IX, reservation the continent for scientific research and peaceful activities. In addition, it prohibits nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive wastearticle V), and all non-peaceful measures of a military naturearticle I).

This treaty is complemented and developed by three other documents: the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR, Canberra, 1980), the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCFA, London, 1988) and the protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection ( Madrid, 1991), which prohibits "any activity related to mineral resources, except for scientific research " until 2048. In the final, the so-called Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) "shields" the Antarctic region from the exploitation of its resources and the increase of international tensions, since, in addition to the above, it freezes territorial claims for as long as it is in force. However, this does not prevent global powers from also seeking a foothold in Antarctica.

The most recent action corresponds to the People's Republic of China, which aspires to play a major role in the area, as is the case in the Arctic. Already with four scientific instructions on the southern continent (the Antarctic instructions Great Wall, Zhongshan, Kunlun and Taishan, the first two permanent and the last two functional in summer), last November it announced the construction of its fifth base (thus equaling the United States in terms of issue ). The new facility, in the Ross Sea, would be operational in 2022.

In relation to these scientific stations, since Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, China is seeking to create a Specially Managed Antarctic Zone for the protection of the environment around the Kunlun base, something resisted by its regional neighbors, since it would give Beijing dominion over the activities carried out there. This is the most important Chinese base, essential for its programs of study in astronomical subject and, therefore, for the development of BeiDou, the Chinese satellite navigation system, fundamental for the expansion and modernization of its armed forces and which rivals the GPS (United States), Galileo (EU) and GLONASS (Russia) systems. In this regard, and in view of the military implications of Antarctica, the Treaty established the possibility for any country to carry out inspections of any of the instructions present there, as a way of ensuring compliance with the provisions of the agreement article VII). However, the danger and cost of these inspections have been considerably reduced, not to mention that the Kunlun base is located in one of the most climatically hostile regions of the continent.

On the other hand, China currently has two icebreakers, the Xue Long I and Xue Long II, the latter built entirely on Chinese territory with the Finnish Aker Arctic's attendance . Experts believe that, following the construction of this vessel, the People's Republic could be close to building nuclear-powered icebreakers, something currently only undertaken by Russia and which would have global consequences.

But the importance of Antarctica for China is not only reflected in the technical and technological advances it is making, but also in its bilateral relations with countries close to the southern continent such as Chile and Brazil, the former with original consultative status and with a territorial claim in the ATS; the latter with consultative status only. Last September, the Andean country held the first meeting of the Jointcommittee on Antarctic Cooperation with the People's Republic, in which, among other matters, the use of the port of Punta Arenas by China as a base for the supply of staff and materials to its Antarctic facilities was discussed, conversations that will require further deepening. As for Brazil, the Chinese business CEIEC (China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation) financed in January a new Brazilian Antarctic base for US$ 100 million.

 

Approximate location of the main Antarctic instructions . In blue, the U.S. instructions , in red, those of Russia, and in yellow, those of China.

 

Finally, it is worth analyzing the American and Russian influence in the Antarctic, although China is expected to be the most important player in the region, at least until the Madrid protocol is opened for review in 2048. The United States has three permanent instructions (the McMurdo, Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station and Palmer instructions ) and only two summer instructions (the Copacabana and Cape Shirreff instructions ), so the construction of the new Chinese base will equal the total issue of U.S. instructions .

For its part, Russia, the dominant power in the Arctic, is also the dominant power in its southern counterpart, at least in terms of the issue of instructions, since it has six, four of which operate annually (Mirni, Novolazarevskaya, Progrés and Vostok) and the other two only in the summer (Bellingshausen and Molodiózhnaya). However, it should be noted that Russia has not opened any Antarctic base since the collapse of the USSR, the most recent being Progrés (1988), although it is true that it has tried, for example, to reopen the Soviet base Russkaya, without success. The United States also established most of its Antarctic instructions in the middle of the Cold War, in the 1950s and 1960s, except for the two summer ones (Copacabana in 1985 and Cape Shirreff in 1991).

China, on the other hand, opened the Great Wall base in 1985, the Zhongshan base in 1989, the Kunlun base in 2009 and the Taishan base in 2014 and, as mentioned above, has a new one pending for 2022.

In addition to the countries mentioned above, another twenty countries have research instructions in Antarctica, among them Spain, which has consultative status in the Antarctic Treaty. Spain has two summer instructions in the South Shetland Islands, the Juan Carlos I base (1988) and the Gabriel de Castilla base (1998). It also has a temporary scientific camp located on the Byers Peninsula of Livingston Island.

May 5, 2020

COMMENT / Carlos Jalil

Covid-19 has forced many states to take extraordinary measures to protect the welfare of their citizens. This includes the suspension of certain human rights on grounds of public emergency. Rights such as freedom of movement, freedom of speech, freedom of meeting , and privacy are affected by state responses to the pandemic. Therefore, we ask: Do states unduly affect freedom of speech when combating fake news? Do they unduly restrict our freedom of movement and meeting or even deprive us of our freedom? Do they infringe on our right to privacy with new tracking applications? Is it justified?

To protect public health, human rights treaties allow states to adopt measures that may restrict rights. article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and article 15 of the Europeanagreement on Human Rights (ECHR) provide that in situations of public emergency threatening the life of the nation, states may take measures and derogate from their treaty obligations. Similarly, article 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) allows states parties to fail their obligations in emergency situations that threaten the independence or security of the nation.

During the pandemic, some states have declared a state of emergency and, because of the impossibility of respecting certain rights, have derogated from their obligations. However, derogations are subject to requirements. General Comment 29 on States of Emergency of the United Nations Human Rights committee establishes six conditions for derogations, which are similar in the treaties mentioned above: (1) official proclamation of a state of emergency and public emergency threatening the life of the nation; (2) proportionality required by the requirements of the status in terms of duration, geographical coverage and substantive basis; (3) non-discrimination (however the ECHR does not include this condition); (4) conformity with other international law obligations; (5) formal notification of the derogation to the respective treaty bodies (these must include full information on the measures, their reasons and documentation of laws adopted); and (6) prohibition of derogation from non-derogable rights.

The last condition is particularly important. The aforementioned treaties (ICCPR, ECHR and ACHR) explicitly state the rights that cannot be derogated from. These, also called absolute rights, include, inter alia: right to life, prohibition of slavery and servitude, principle of legality and retroactivity of law, and freedom of conscience and religion.

However, derogations are not always necessary. There are rights that, on the contrary, are not absolute and have the inherent possibility of being limited, for which it is not necessary for a state to derogate from its treaty obligations. This means that the state, for reasons of public health, may limit certain non-absolute rights without the need to give notice of derogation. These non-absolute rights are: the right to freedom of movement and meeting, freedom of expression, the right to freedom of staff and privacy. Specifically, the right to freedom of movement and association is subject to limitations on grounds of national security, public order and health, or the rights and freedoms of others. The right to freedom of expression may be limited by respect for the rights or reputation of others and by the protection of national security, public order and public health. And the rights of freedom of staff and privacy may be subject to reasonable limitations in accordance with the provisions of human rights treaties.

Despite these possibilities, countries such as Latvia, Estonia, Argentina and Ecuador, which have officially declared a state of emergency, have resorted to derogation. Consequently, they have justified Covid-19 as an emergency threatening the life of the nation, notifying the United Nations, Organization of American States and the committee of Europe of the derogation from their international obligations under the aforementioned treaties. On the contrary, most of the states adopting extraordinary measures have not proceeded to such derogation, based on the inherent limitations of these rights. Among them are Italy and Spain, countries seriously affected, which have not derogated, but have applied limitations.

This is an interesting phenomenon because it demonstrates the differences in the interpretations of states, also subject to their national legislatures, of international human rights law. Clearly there is a risk that states applying limitations abuse the state of emergency and violate human rights. It may therefore be that some states interpret derogations as reflecting their commitment to the rule of law and the principle of legality. However, human rights bodies are also likely to find the measures adopted by non-derogating states consistent with pandemic status . Except, in both cases, situations of torture, excessive use of force and other circumstances affecting absolute rights.

In the aftermath of the pandemic, courts and tribunals are likely to decide whether the measures adopted were necessary. But in the meantime, states should consider that extraordinary measures adopted should be temporary, subject to appropriate health conditions and within the framework law.

[George Friedman. The Storm Before the Calm. America's Discord, the Coming Crisis of the 2020s, and the Triumph Beyond. Doubleday. New York, 2020. 235 pp.]

review / E. Villa Corta, E. J. Blasco

The degree scroll of the new book by George Friedman, the driving force behind the geopolitical analysis and intelligence agency Stratfor and later creator of Geopolitical Futures, does not reference letter to the global crisis created by the Covid-19 pandemic. When he speaks of the crisis of the 2020s, which Friedman has been anticipating for some time in his commentaries and now explains at length in this book, he is referring to deep and long-lasting historical movements, in this case confined to the United States.

Beyond the current pandemic, therefore, which is somewhat circumstantial and not addressed in the text (its composition is previous), Friedman suggests that the United States will reinvent itself at the end of this decade. Like a machine that, almost automatically, incorporates substantial changes and corrections every certain period of time, the US is preparing for a new leap. There will be a prolonged crisis, but the US will emerge triumphant from it, Friedman predicts. US decline? Quite the opposite.

Unlike his previous books, such as The Next Hundred Years or Flashpoints, Friedman this time leaves Friedman's global geopolitical analysis to focus on the United States. In his reflection on American history, Friedman sees a succession of cycles of approximate length. The current ones are already in their final stages, and the reinstatement of both will coincide in the late 2020s, in a process of crisis and subsequent resurgence of the country. In the institutional field, the 80-year cycle that began after the end of the Second World War is coming to an end (the previous one had lasted since the end of the Civil War in 1865); in the socioeconomic field, the 50-year cycle that began with Ronald Reagan in 1980 is coming to an end (the previous one had lasted since the end of the Great Recession and the arrival of Franklin D. Roosevelt to the White House).

Friedman does not see Donald Trump as the catalyst for change (his effort has simply been to restore the status created by Reagan for the working class average , affected by unemployment and loss of purchasing power), nor does he believe that whoever replaces him in the coming years will be. Rather, he places the turnaround around 2028. The change, which will take place in a time of great confusion, will have to do with the end of the technocracy that dominates American political and institutional life and with the creative disruption of new technologies. The author wants to denote America's skill to overcome adversity and take advantage of "chaos" in order to achieve fruitful growth.

Friedman divides the book into three parts: the creation of the nation as we know it, the cycles we have gone through and the prognosis for the next one. In this last part he presents the challenges or adversities that the country will have to face.

Regarding the creation of the country, the author reasons about the subject of government created in the United States, the territory in which the country is located and the American people. This last aspect is perhaps the most interesting. He defines the American people as a merely artificial construct. This leads him to see the U.S. as a machine that automatically fine-tunes its functioning from time to time. As an "invented" country, the U.S. reinvents itself when its cycles run out.

Friedman presents the training of the American people through three overlapping types: the cowboy, the inventor and the warrior. To the cowboy, who seeks to start something completely new and in an "American" way, we owe especially the social construct that is so unique to the United States. To the inventor belongs the drive for technological progress and economic prosperity. And the warrior condition has been present from the beginning.

The second part of the book deals with the aforementioned issue of cycles. Friedman considers that US growth has been cyclical, in a process in which the country reinvents itself from time to time in order to continue progressing. After reviewing the periods so far, he locates the next great change in the US in the decade that has just begun. He warns that the gestation of the next stage will be complicated due to the accumulation of events from past cycles. One of the issues that the country will have to resolve has to do with the paradox between the desire to internationalize democracy and human rights and that of maintaining its national security: "liberating the world" or securing its position in the international sphere.

The present moment of change, in which, agreement to the author, the institutional and socio-economic cycles will collide, is a time of deep crisis, but a long period of calm will follow. Friedman believes that the first "tremors" of the crisis were felt in the 2016 elections, which showed a radical polarization of American society. The country will have to reform not only its complex institutional system, but also various socio-economic aspects.

This last part of the book - dedicated to the resolution of problems such as the student debt crisis, the use of social networks, new social constructions or the difficulty in the educationalsector educationalis probably the most important. If the mechanicity and automatism in the succession of cycles determined by Friedman, or even its very existence, are questionable (other analyses could lead other authors to consider different stages), the real problems that the country has today are easily ascertainable. Thus, the presentation of proposals for their resolution has an undoubted value.

▲ Tourist population in Gjirokastër district, southern Albania [Pixabay].

ESSAY / Jan Gallemí

Last November 24, 2019, the French government of Enmanuel Macron led the veto, along with other states such as Denmark or the Netherlands, to the accession of the Balkan nations of Albania and North Macedonia to the European Union. As justified by the President of the French Fifth Republic, this is because the largest issue of economic refugees entering France is from the Balkans, specifically from the aforementioned Albania. The latter country applied to the European Union on April 28, 2009 and on June 24, 2014 it was unanimously agreed by the 28 EU countries to grant Albania candidate country status. The reasons for this rejection are mainly economic and financial.[1]. There is also a slight concern about the diversity that exists in the ethnographic structure of the country and the conflicts that this could cause in the future, not only within the country itself but also in its relationship with its neighbors, especially with the issue of Kosovo and relations with Greece and North Macedonia.[2]. However, another aspect that has also been explored is the fact that Albania's accession would mean the incorporation into the EU of the first state in which the religion with the largest issue of followers is Islamic, specifically the Sunni branch. In this essay we will proceed to analyze the impact of this aspect and observe how or to what extent Albanian values, mainly because they are primarily Islamic in religion, may combine or diverge with those on which the common European project is based.

Evolution of Islam in Albania

It is necessary to go back in history to take into account the reasons why a European country like Albania has developed a social structure in which the religion most professed by part of the population is Sunni. Because of the geographical region in which it is located, it would theoretically be more common to think that Albania would have a higher percentage of orthodox population than Sunni.[3]. The same is true for Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Originally this region was mostly Orthodox Christian in the south (like most of the Balkan states today) due to the fact that it was one of the many territories that made up the Byzantine Empire until the 13th century, when this nation gained its independence. However, the reason why Islam is so present in Albania, unlike its neighboring states, is that it was more religiously influenced by the Ottoman Empire, successor to the Byzantine Empire. This fell in 1453 and its territories were occupied by the Ottomans, a Turkish people established at that time on the Anatolian peninsula. According to historians such as Vickers, it was between the 17th and 18th centuries that a large part of the Albanian population converted to Islam.[4]The reason for this, as John L. Esposito points out, was that for the Albanian population, changing their religion meant getting rid of the higher taxes that Christians had to pay in the Ottoman Empire.[5].

Religion in Albania has since been shaped by events. As far as we know from programs of study such as those of Gawrych in the 19th century, the Albanian society was then mainly divided into three groups: Catholics, Orthodox and Sunnis (the latter represented 70% of the population). During this same century many of the known nationalisms of European character were born and in the Balkans began what is known as the crisis of the East. During this period many Balkan peoples revolted against the Ottomans, but the Albanians, being identified with them by their religion, initially remained faithful to the Sultan.[6]. Because of this support, Muslim Albanians began to be pejoratively referred to as "Turks."[7]. This caused Albanian nationalism to distance itself from the emerging Ottoman pan-Islamism of Sultan Abdualhmid II. From this emerged, according to Endresen, an Albanian national revival called Rilindja, which sought the support of Western European powers.[8].

Generally, the Balkan independence movements that emerged in the 19th century reinforced Christian as opposed to Muslim sentiment, but in Albania this was not the case; as Stoppel points out, both Albanian Christians and Muslims cooperated in a common national goal .[9]. This fostered the coexistence between both beliefs (already present in earlier times) and allowed the differentiation of this movement with Hellenism.[10]. It should be noted that at that time in Albania Muslims and Christians were peculiarly distributed territorially: in the north there were more Catholic Christians who were not so influenced by the Ottoman Empire and in the south there was also a predominance of Orthodox because of the border with Greece. On November 28, 1912 the Albanians, being led by Ismail Qemali, finally declared independence.

The international recognition of Albania by the Treaty of London meant the imposition of a Christian monarchy, which led to the indignation of the Muslim Albanians, who according to estimates accounted for 80% of the population, and provoked the so-called Islamic revolt. The revolt was led by Essad Pasha Toptani, who declared himself to be the "savior of Albania and Islam" and surrounded himself with disgruntled clerics. However, during the period of World War I, Albanian nationalists soon realized that religious differences could cause the fracturing of the country itself and decided to break ties with the Muslim world with the intention of being able to have "a common Albania", which led to Albania declaring itself as a country with no official religion; this allowed the training of a government with representation from the four main religious faiths: Sunni, Bektashi, Catholic and Orthodox. Albanian secularist elites programmed a reform of Islam that was more in line with Albania's traditions to make the country more distinct from Turkey, and religious institutions were nationalized. From 1923 onwards the Albanian National congress ended up carrying out the changes from a perspective very similar to that of Western liberalism. The most important reforms were the suppression of the hijab and the outlawing of polygamy, and a different way of praying was implemented, replacing the Salat ritual. But the biggest change was the substitution of Sharia law for Western-like laws.

During the Second World War Albania was occupied by fascist Italy and in 1944 a communist regime was imposed under the leadership of Enver Hoxha. This communist regime saw in the different religious beliefs of the country a danger to maintain the security of the authoritarian government, and therefore declared Albania as the first officially atheist state and proposed the persecution of the different religious practices. In this way repressive laws were imposed that prevented professing the Catholic or Orthodox faith, and prohibited Muslims from reading or possessing the Koran. In 1967, the government demolished as many as 2,169 religious buildings and transformed the rest into public buildings. Of 1,127 buildings that had some connection to Islam at the time, only about 50 remain today, and in very poor condition.[11]. It is believed that the impact of this subject of persecution was reflected in the increase of non-believers within the Albanian population. Between 1991 and 1992 a series of protests brought the regime to an end. In this new democratic Albania, Islam was again the predominant religion, but it was preferred to maintain the non-denominational nature of the state in order to guarantee harmony between the different beliefs.

Influences from the international field

Taking into account the reality of Albania as a country with a majority Islamic population, we will now analyze the impact of its accession to the European Union and to what extent the values of both contradict or combine.

To begin with, if all this is analyzed from a perspective based on the theory of "constructivism", as proposal by Helen Bull, it can be seen how Albania from the beginning of its history has been a territory whose social structure has been strongly influenced by the interaction of different international actors. During the years when it was part of the Byzantine Empire, it largely absorbed Orthodox values; when it was occupied by the Ottomans, most of its population adopted the Islamic religion. In the same way, during the de-Ottomanization of the Balkans, the country adopted currents of political thought such as liberalism due to the influence of Western European powers. This generated a desire to create a constitutionalist and parliamentary government whose vision of politics was not based on any religious morality.[12]. It can also be seen that the communist regime was imposed in a context common to that of the other Eastern European states. At the same time, it also returned to the democratic path as a consequence of the fall of the USSR, even though Albania had not maintained good relations with the Warsaw Pact since 1961.

Since Albania applied for EU membership, these liberal values have been strengthened again. In particular, Albania strives to improve its infrastructure and to eradicate corruption and organized crime. So it can be observed that Albanian society always adapts to being part of a supra-governmental organization. This is an important aspect because it means that the country is most likely to actively participate in the proposals made by the European Commission, without being driven by internal social values. However, this in turn gives a point in favor of those MEPs who claimed that the veto decision was a historical mistake. For if it does not alienate itself from the EU, Albania could alienate itself from other international actors. According to the MEPs themselves, these could be Russia or China.

However, there are two limitations to this statement. The first is that since 2012 Albania has been a member of NATO, so it is already partly alienated from the West in military terms. But a second aspect is more important, and that is that Albania already tried during the Cold War to alienate itself with Russia and China, but found that this had negative effects as it constituted a satellite state. On the other hand, and this is where Islamic values come into play, Albania today is part of organizations of an Islamic nature such as the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation). So the rejection of the EU could mean the realignment of Albania with other Islamic states, such as the Arabs or Turkey. Turkey's own government, currently led by Erdogan's party, has a neo-Ottomanist nature: it seeks to bring the states that formerly constituted the Ottoman Empire closer to its influence. Albania is being influenced by this neo-Ottomanism and a European rejection could bring it back into the bosom of this conception.[13]. In addition, if it approaches Middle Eastern Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Albania would run the risk of assimilating the Islamic values of these territories.[14]These are incompatible with those of the EU because they do not comply with many of the articles signed in the Universal Declaration of Rights of 1952.

Islam and the European Union

Another aspect would be to ask in which aspects do Islamic values contradict those of the EU? The European Union generally claims to be against polygamy, homophobia or religious practices that oppose the dignity of the person. This has generated, among other things, a powerful internal discussion of whether the hijab can be considered as an internship staff that should not be legally prevented. Many feminist groups are against this aspect as they relate it to family patriarchalism.[15]However, other EU groups claim that this is only a fully respectable individual andstaff internship and that its suppression would be a gesture of an Islamophobic nature. In any case, as mentioned above, Albania abolished both polygamy and the wearing of the hijab in 1923 as not reflecting the values of Islam in Albania.[16]. In this aspect it is observed that although Albania is a country of Islamic majority, this Islam is much more influenced by the Europeanist currents than by the Eastern ones: that is to say, an Islam adapted to the European customs and whose values are currently more similar to those of the neighboring Balkan states.

Some members of the European Parliament, generally from far-right groups, such as Ressamblement National or Alternativ für Deutschland, claim that Islamic values will never be compatible with European values because they are expansionist and radical in nature. The Dutch Geert Wilders claims that the Koran "is more anti-Semitic than Mein Kampf".[17]. In other words, they allege that those who profess Islam are incapable of maintaining good relations with other faiths because the Koran itself speaks of waging war against the infidel through Jihad. And as an example they cite the terrorist attacks that the Islamist group DAESH has provoked during the last decade, such as those perpetrated in Paris and Barcelona.[18]. But these groups should be reminded that a sacred text such as the Koran can be interpreted in many ways and that although some Muslim groups believe in this incompatibility of good relations with those who think differently, the majority of Muslims interpret the Koran in a very different way, just as happens with the Bible, although some very specific groups become irrational.

This is clearly the case in Albania, where since its democratization in 1991 there has been a national project integrating all citizens, regardless of their different beliefs. Rather, throughout its history as an independent country in Albania there has only been one period of religious persecution and this was due to the repression of communist authoritarianism. A limitation that could be given in this aspect would be the Islamic revolution that the country suffered in 1912. But it is worth noting that this revolution, despite its strong Islamic sentiment, served to overthrow a puppet government; after it no law was enforced to impose Islamic values on the rest. So it should be noted that the political model of Albania is very similar to the one exposed by Rawls in his book "Political Liberalism", because it configures a state with multiple values (although there is a predominant one), but its laws are not drafted based on any of them, but on common values among all of them based on reason.[19]. This model proposed by Rawls is one of the founding instructions of the European Union and Albania would be a state that would exemplify these same values.[20]. This is what the Supreme Pontiff Francis I said during his visit to Tirana in 2014: "Albania demonstrates that peaceful coexistence between citizens belonging to different religions is a path that can be followed in a concrete way and that produces harmony and releases the best forces and creativity of an entire people, transforming simple coexistence into true partnership and fraternity".[21]. 

Conclusions

It can be concluded that Albania's values as an Islamic majority state do not appear to be divergent from those of Western Europe and thus the European Union. Albania is a non-denominational state that respects all religious beliefs and encourages all individuals, regardless of their faith, to participate in the political life of the country (which has much merit due to the significant religious diversity that has distinguished Albania throughout its history). Moreover, Islam in Albania is extremely different from that of other regions due to the impact that European influence had on the region. Not only that, but also the country seems very willing to collaborate on common projects. The only thing that, in the field of values, would lead one to think that Albania is not suitable to join the EU would be that, just as it was influenced by the actors that have interacted with it throughout its history, it would be influenced again by Muslim states with values divergent from the European ones. But this is more likely to be the case if the European Union were to reject Albania, as it would seek the support of other allies in the international arena.

The implications of the accession of the first state with a Muslim majority to the EU would certainly be advantageous, since it would encourage the variety of religious thought within the Union and this could lead to a greater understanding between the different beliefs that make up the Union. There would be the possibility of a greater presence of Sunni deputies in the European Parliament and it would help to enhance coexistence within other EU states on the basis of what has been done in Albania, as may be the case in France, where 10% of the population is Muslim. It should also be said that Albania's exemplary multi-religious behavior would seriously weaken Euroscepticism and would also help to foster concord within the Balkan region. As Donald Tusk has argued, the Balkans must be given a European perspective and it is in the best interest of the EU that Albania becomes part of it.

▲ A woman crosses a bridge in a rural area of Pakistan [Pixabay].

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS REPORT / Naiara Goñi, Roberto Ramírez, Albert Vidal

 

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April 2020

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this strategic analysis report is to ascertain how geopolitical dynamics in and around Pakistan will evolve in the next few years.

Pakistani relations with the US will become increasingly transactional after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. As the US-India partnership strengthens to face China, the US will lose interest in Pakistan and their priorities will further diverge. In response, Beijing will remain Islamabad's all-weather strategic partner despite claims that the debt-trap could become a hurdle. Trade relations with the EU will continue to expand and Brussels will not use trade leverage to obtain Human Rights concessions from Islamabad. Cooperation in other areas will stagnate, and the EU's neutrality on the Kashmir issue will remain unchanged.

In Central Asia, Islamabad will maintain positive relations with the Central Asian Republics, which will be based on increasing connectivity, trade and energy partnerships, although these may be endangered by instability in Afghanistan. Relations with Bangladesh will remain unpropitious. An American withdrawal from Afghanistan will most likely lead to an intensification of the conflict. Thanks to connections with the Taliban, Pakistan might become Afghanistan's kingmaker. Even if regional powers like Russia and China may welcome the US withdrawal, they will be negatively affected by the subsequent security vacuum. Despite Pakistani efforts to maintain good ties with both Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), if tensions escalate Islamabad will side with Riyadh. Pakistan's weak non-proliferation credentials will be coupled with a risk of Pakistan sharing its nuclear arsenal with the Saudis.

A high degree of tensions will continue characterizing its relations with India, following the abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian constitution. Water scarcity will be another source of problems in their shared borders, which will be exacerbated by New Delhi's construction of reservoirs in its territory. Islamabad will continue calling for an internationalization of the Kashmir issue, in search of international support. They are likely to fight localized skirmishes, but there is a growing fear that the contentious issues mentioned above could eventually lead to an all-out nuclear war. PM Khan and Modi will be reluctant to establish channels of rapprochement, partly due to internal dynamics of both countries, be it Hindu nationalism or radical Islam.

A glance inside Pakistan will show how terrorism will continue to be a significant threat for Pakistan. As a result of Pakistan's lack of effective control in certain areas of its territory, the country has been used as a base of operations by terrorist and criminal groups for decades, to perpetrate all kinds of attacks and illegal activities, which will not change in the near future. Risks that should be followed closely include the power of anti-Western narratives wielded by radical Islamists, the lack of a proper educational system and an ambiguous counter-terrorism effort. In the midst of this hodgepodge, religion will continue to have a central role and will undoubtedly be used by non-state actors to justify their violent actions, although it is less likely that it will become an instrument for states to further their radical agendas.