Albania and North Macedonia forced to accept tougher negotiating rules, as Serbia and Montenegro reassess their options

Brexit has been absorbing the EU's negotiating attention for many months and now Covid-19 has slowed down non-priority decision processes. In October 2019, the EU decided to cool talks with the Western Balkans, under pressure from France and some other countries. Albania and North Macedonia, which had done the work that Brussels had requested in order to formally open negotiations, have seen the rules of the game changed just before the start of the game.

▲ Western Balkans meeting with EU countries held in London in 2018 [European Commission].

article / Elena López-Doriga

Since its origins, the European Community has been evolving and expanding its competencies through treaties structuring its functioning and purposes. issue membership of the organization has also expanded considerably: it began with 6 countries (France, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) and now consists of 27 (following the recent departure of the United Kingdom).

The most remarkable year of this enlargement was 2004, when the European Union undertook to integrate 10 new countries, which was a great challenge, given that these countries were mainly from Central and Eastern Europe, coming from the "iron curtain", with less developed economies coming out of communist systems and Soviet influence.

The next goal in the enlargement is the possible integration into the EU of the Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia). However, at a summit held in Brussels at the end of 2019 for the opening of accession negotiations for new members, some EU countries were against continuing the process, so for the time being the accession of the candidate countries is going to have to wait. Some EU leaders have described this postponement as a "historic mistake".

Expansion into Central and Eastern Europe

In May 1999, the European Union launched the Stabilization and association Process. The Union undertook to develop new contractual relations with Central and Eastern European countries that expressed a desire to join the Union through stabilization and association agreements, in exchange for commitments to political, economic, trade or human rights reform. As a result, in 2004 the EU integrated the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Slovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and Slovenia (the first member of the Western Balkans). In 2007 Bulgaria and Romania also joined the Union and in 2013 Croatia, the second Western Balkan country to join.

Integration of the Western Balkans

Since the end of the Yugoslav wars at the end of 2001, the EU has played a very prominent role in the Balkans, not only as an economic power subject reconstruction, but also as a guarantor of stability and security in the region. The EU's goal is in part to prevent the Western Balkans from becoming a security black hole, due to the rise of rising nationalism, the growing tension between Moscow and Washington, which fuels tensions between ethnic groups in the region, and the economic penetration of China into the area. Clearer progress towards Balkan integration was reaffirmed in the Commission's Western Balkans Strategy of February 2018 and in the Sofia Declaration following the EU-Western Balkans Summit held in the Bulgarian capital on May 17, 2018. At the Summit, EU leaders reiterated their unequivocal support for the European perspective of the Western Balkans. "I see for the Western Balkans no future other than the EU. There is no alternative, there is no plan B. The Western Balkans are part of Europe and belong to our community," said the then president of the European committee , Donald Tusk.

Official candidates: Albania and Macedonia

Albania applied for EU membership on April 28, 2009. In 2012, the Commission noted significant progress and recommended that Albania be granted candidate status, subject to the implementation of a number of outstanding reforms. In October 2013, the Commission unequivocally recommended that Albania be granted candidate status. Angela Merkel paid a visit to Tirana on July 8, 2015 and stated that the prospect of accession of the countries of the Balkan region to the European Union (EU) was important for peace and stability. He stressed that in the case of Albania the pace of the accession process depended on the completion of reforms in the judicial system and the fight against corruption and organized crime. In view of the country's progress, the Commission recommended the opening of accession negotiations with Albania in its 2016 and 2018 reports.

On the other hand, the Republic of North Macedonia (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) applied to join the Union in March 2004 and was granted candidate country status in December 2005. However, the country did not start accession negotiations because of the dispute with Greece over the use of the name "Macedonia". When it was successfully resolved through the Prespaagreement with the new name of the country - Northern Macedonia - the committee agreed on the possibility of opening accession negotiations with this country in June 2019, assuming the necessary conditions were met.

Potential Candidates: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a potential candidate country. Although it negotiated and signed a Stabilization and associationagreement with the Union in 2008, the entrance into force of this agreement was Fail mainly due to the country's failure to execute a core topic judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. In the meantime, the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not reached an agreement concerning the rules of procedure governing its meetings with the European Parliament (twice a year), as these meetings have not been held since November 2015, and this status constitutes a breach of the agreement by Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Kosovo is a potential candidate for EU membership. It declared its independence unilaterally in February 2008. All but five member states have recognized Kosovo's independence (Cyprus, Slovakia, Spain, Greece and Romania). Among the countries in the region, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have also not recognized Kosovo as an independent state. In September 2018, the European Parliament went a step further and decided to enter into inter-institutional negotiations, which are currently ongoing. However, the fact that not all member countries currently recognize its independence is a major brake.

Negotiating access: Montenegro and Serbia

Montenegro, one of the smallest states on the European continent, has been part of different empires and states over the past centuries, finally gaining independence peacefully in 2006. It applied to join the Union in December 2008; it was granted candidate country status in December 2010, and accession negotiations began in June 2012. By the end of 2018, 32 negotiating chapters had been opened, out of a total of 35.

Serbia 's process began in December 2009 when former President Boris Tadić officially submitted the membership application and also handed over to justice the war criminal Ratko Mladić, manager of the Srebrenica massacre during the Bosnian War, who was hiding in Serbian territory. However, the conflict with Kosovo is one of the main obstacles Serbia faces in achieving its accession to the European Union. It was granted candidate country status in March 2012, after Belgrade and Pristina reached an agreement on Kosovo's regional representation. The official opening of accession negotiations took place on January 21, 2014. In February 2018, the Commission published a new strategy for the Western Balkans stating that Serbia (as well as Montenegro) could join the Union by 2025, while acknowledging the "extremely ambitious" nature of this prospect. Serbia's future accession to the Union, like that of Kosovo, remains closely linked to the high-level dialogue between these two countries, held under the auspices of the Union, which should lead to a legally binding comprehensive agreement on the normalization of their relations.

A step back in the negotiations

In October 2019, a summit was held in Brussels whose goal was to structure the negotiations of the official candidates to join the EU. Both North Macedonia and Albania were convinced that a date would be set to start the long process of negotiations. However, the process reached an impasse after seven hours of wrangling, with France rejecting the entrance of both countries. France led the campaign against this enlargement, but Denmark and the Netherlands also joined the veto. They claim that the EU is not ready to take on new states. "It doesn't work too well at 28, it doesn't work too well at 27, and I'm not sure it will work any better with another enlargement. So we have to be realistic. Before enlarging, we need to reform ourselves," said French President Emmanuel Macron.

The then president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, considered that this suspension was a great historical mistake and hoped that it would only be momentary. For his part, Donald Tusk said he was "ashamed" of the decision, and concluded that North Macedonia and Albania were not to blame for the status created, as the European Commission's reports were clear that both had done what was necessary to start negotiations with the EU.

In Albania, Prime Minister Edi Rama stated that the lack of consensus among European leaders would not change Albania's future aspirations for EU membership. He assured that his government was determined to carry forward the reforms initiated, in the electoral, judicial and administrative fields, because it considered them necessary for the development of the country, not just because they were requested in Brussels.

In North Macedonia, on the other hand, the European rejection was deeply disappointing, as the country had proceeded to reform its institutions and judicial system and to fight corruption; it had also modified its Constitution, its name and its national identity. The refusal left this country, an official candidate for accession for 14 years, in a status of great uncertainty, so that Prime Minister Zoran Zaev decided to dissolve the Parliament and call elections for April 12, 2020 (later postponed due to the Covid-19 emergency). "We have fulfilled our obligations, but the EU has not. We are victims of a historical mistake that has caused a huge disappointment," Zaev assured.

A new, stricter process

Despite the fact that, according to the Commission, North Macedonia and Albania fulfilled the requirements to become accession candidates, Macron proposed to tighten the accession process. In order to unblock the status and continue with the process, which the EU claims to be a priority goal , Brussels has given in to the French president's request by setting a new methodology for integrating new countries.

The new process provides for the possibility of reopening chapters of the negotiations that were considered closed or of fail talks on any of the chapters; it even envisages paralyzing the negotiations as a whole. It is intended to give more weight to the governments and to facilitate the suspension of pre-accession funds or the suspension of the process if the candidate countries halt or reverse the reforms they have committed to. The new method will apply to Albania and North Macedonia, whose negotiations with the EU have not yet started, while Serbia and Montenegro will be able to choose whether to opt in, without having to change their established negotiating framework , according to the Commission.

March and April 2020 will be remembered in the oil industry as the months in which the perfect storm occurred: a drop of more than 20% in world demand at the same time as a price war was unleashed that increased the supply of crude oil, generating a status of unprecedented abundance. This status has highlighted the end of OPEC's dominance over the rest of the oil producers and consumers after almost half a century.

▲ Pumping structure in a shale oil field [Pixabay].

April 22, 2020

ANALYSIS / Ignacio Urbasos Arbeloa

On March 8, in view of the failure of the negotiations of the so-called OPEC+ group , Saudi Arabia offered its crude oil at discounts of between 6 and 8 dollars on the international market while announcing an increase in its production as of April 1 to a record 12 million barrels per day. The Saudi move was imitated by other producers such as Russia, which announced an increase of 500,000 barrels per day (bpd) as of the same date, when the cartel's previous agreements expire. The markets reacted immediately with a historic drop in prices of more than 30% in all international indexes and the opening of headlines announcing the beginning of a new price war. The oil world was stunned by the collapse in the price of crude oil, which reached historic lows on March 30, when the price of a barrel of WTI fell below 20 dollars, a psychological barrier that demonstrated the harshness of the confrontation and the historic consequences it could have for a sector of particular geopolitical sensitivity.

Previous experiences

Saudi Arabia, the world leader in the oil industry due to its vast reserves and its enormous production mainly oriented to exports, has resorted three times to a price war to obtain commitments from other producers to make supply cuts to stabilize international prices. The oil market, accustomed to an artificially high price, tends to suffer dramatic price declines when there are no restrictions on available supply. Due to the economic and political instability that these prices generate in the producing countries, they usually return quickly to the negotiating table, where Saudi Arabia and its partners in the Gulf Cooperation committee (GCC) are always waiting for them.

The first experience of this subject took place in 1985, after the Iran-Iraq war and the oil crisis of the seventies, the Saudi King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud took the decision to increase production unilaterally to recover the market share he had lost to the emergence of new producing regions such as the North Sea or the Gulf of Mexico. The experience led to a 50% drop in prices after more than a year of unrestricted production, which ended with an agreement in December 1986 by 12 OPEC countries to make the cuts demanded by Saudi Arabia and its allies.

In 1997, in response to Saudi Arabia's concern about the growing displacement of its oil from North American refineries in favor of Venezuelan and Mexican crude, the newly arrived Saudi monarch Abdullah bin Abdulaziz decided to announce in the middle of an OPEC summit in Jakarta that he would proceed to increase production without restrictions. The Saudi strategy did not count on the fact that the following year an economic crisis would break out among the emerging markets, with particular virulence in Southeast Asia and Russia, which plunged prices by 50% again until a new agreement was reached in April 1999.

With the 21st century came the oil bonanza with the so-called commodity super cycle. commodity super cycle (2000-2014) (2000-2014) that kept oil prices at unknown figures above 100 dollars between 2008 and 2010-2014. This bonanza made it possible to increase investment in exploration and production, generating new extraction techniques that were previously unknown or simply economically unfeasible. In 2005, the USA was experiencing a worrying oil crisis, with production at historic lows of only 5.2 million bpd compared to 9.6 million bpd in 1970. Furthermore, the energy dependence of approximately 6 million bpd was solved with increasingly costly crude oil imports from the Persian Gulf, which after 9/11 was viewed with greater skepticism, and Venezuela, which already had Hugo Chávez as its political leader. High oil prices allowed the recovery of previously frustrated ideas such as hydraulic fracturing, which received massive permits to be developed as of 2005 with the goal of mitigating the country's other major energy crisis: the rapid decline in domestic natural gas production, a commodity much more expensive and difficult for the US to import. Hydraulic fracturing, also known as fracking, enabled an unexpected growth in natural gas production, which soon attracted the attention of the US oil sector. By 2008, a variant of fracking could be applied for oil extraction, a technique later called shale, giving rise to an unprecedented revolution in the United States that allowed the country's production to increase by more than 5 million barrels per day in the period 2008-2014. The change in the US energy landscape was such that in 2015 Barack Obama withdrew a 1975 law that prohibited the US from exporting domestically produced oil.

The Saudi reaction was swift, and at OPEC's Vienna headquarters in November 2014, it launched a new unrestricted production campaign that would allow the Kingdom to regain part of its market share. The effects on international markets were more dramatic than ever with a 50% drop in price in just 7 months. Multinational oil companies (IOCs) and national oil companies (NOCs) dramatically reduced their profits and were forced to make cuts not seen since the beginning of the century. Exporting countries also suffered the effects of lower fiscal revenues with many emerging markets plunged into unmanageable fiscal deficits, inflation and even recession; with Venezuela in particular entering from that year onwards into the socio-economic chaos we know today. To Saudi Arabia's despair, the North American shale industry showed unexpected resilience by maintaining a production of 4 million barrels per day for 2016 from the peak of 5 million in 2014. Saudi Arabia did not understand that shale oil, unlike conventional oil, was not a mature industry, but one in full expansion and development. North American producers managed to increase the oil recovery rate from 5% to 12% between 2008-2016, the equivalent of increasing productivity by 2.4 times. In addition, the elimination of less competitive companies allowed a reduction in the cost of services and easier access to transportation infrastructure. The nature of shale, with wells maturing in 18 months to 3 years, compared to 30 years or more for a conventional well, allowed production to be shut in for a short enough period of time to minimize the impact of lower prices, opting to keep the most competitive wells. Saudi Arabia gave up and opted for a Degrees turnaround in its strategy, although it did manage to bring Russia to the negotiating table. The longest price war in history, after almost 22 months, ended with an unprecedented agreement among OPEC countries with the incorporation of Russia and its energy sphere of influence, the OPEC+ group . A Russia wounded by international sanctions and the weakness of its currency had given in to Saudi Arabia, which, however, had not managed to defeat the US shale oil revolution.

North American shale production has not stopped growing, and despite its effectiveness, it is the only region in the world with a similar industry, growing at a rate of more than one million barrels per day per year. This status has provided the US with robust energy security by not depending on Venezuelan or Gulf crude imports. The country achieved positive net oil exports at the end of 2019 for the first time in more than half a century, adding to being a net exporter of natural gas, coal and refined products. Much of the geostrategic retreat exercised by the Trump Administration in the Middle East responds to a growing energy independence of the country that reduces its interests in the region.

The breakup of the OPEC+ group :

As mentioned, during the first week of March OPEC+ was meeting in Vienna seeking an agreement for a further cut of some 1.8 million barrels per day to alleviate the effects of the COVID-19 quarantine in China. The unease among producers was evident, having executed a similar cut in December 2019. Saudi Arabia was trying to share as much of the production cuts as possible when Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak said "niet", citing economic solvency for a decline in prices, wrecking any subject of agreement. It is not known whether the Russian refusal was part of a well-thought-out plan or simply a bluff to gain ground in the negotiations, but it was the beginning of a new price war. As can be seen in the graph below, the drop in the price of crude oil in the first month has been historic, without a similar reference letter in the history of negotiations between producers. The increase in the availability of oil in the markets due to the Saudi strategy of loading tankers with crude from its strategic reserves, together with a dry stop in the Economics and demand for oil, has generated a sudden price depression that had never been seen before in the sector. Previous price wars normally had the stabilizing element that the lower the price of oil products, the higher the consumption in the short term. However, due to the economic effects of the quarantine, this market counterweight disappears, generating in one month what on other occasions would have required between 12 and 15 months.

The effects of COVID-19 on world oil demand have been estimated at a 12.5% drop in March and are expected to reach 20% in April. In the areas of Europe most affected by the quarantine, the drop in fuel sales at service stations has reached 75%, a figure that is very likely to be replicated in the rest of the advanced economies as the measures are tightened, and which China is already beginning to leave behind after two months of confinement. The case of air transport is particular, as it consumes 16 million bpd and is currently totally suspended, with no clear date for the return to normality of international aviation. The partial stoppage of industrial production, the extent of which is still unknown, may imply even greater decreases in consumption. Such a status would not require an increase in production to generate a collapse in prices, which with the added pressure on the supply side are generating unprecedented levels of stress on storage, transportation and refining capacity.

A historical agreement :

In early April, Donald Trump, fearful that an oil glut could further depress prices and destroy the US oil industry, took the initiative to speak by telephone with the leaders of Saudi Arabia and Russia. In a paradoxical move, the President of the United States succeeded in bringing the main producers closer together to establish new cuts that would put an end to the price war. On April 9, after several weeks of speculation, the largest producer group of all time met, including OPEC members and 10 non-member countries among which Russia, Kazakhstan and Mexico stood out. After several days of negotiations, it was agreed to cut production by 23% in 20 countries with a combined production of more than 40 million barrels, leaving almost 10 million barrels out of the market, starting on the first day of May. The negotiations were coordinated by OPEC and the G20, which at the time was chaired by Saudi Arabia. In this way, a colorful agreement was reached whereby the aforementioned 10 million barrels were reduced among OPEC+ members, included in the table below, and another 5 million barrels were estimated to be reduced in an undetermined manner among the USA, Canada, Brazil and Norway. The latter cuts, due to the nature of their sectors, would be made through the free market and it remains to be seen how they will materialize.

There is some skepticism in the industry and markets about the effectiveness of these cuts, which account for 10-15% of the oil consumed globally before the COVID-19 crisis. Consumption has fallen by around 20% and oil storage capacity is starting to run out, reducing the margin for absorbing surplus oil. In addition, the cuts will start to be implemented on May 1, leaving three weeks of leeway that could further depress prices. The nature of the agreement, which is voluntary and difficult to monitor, leaves the door open to non-compliance with the established cuts, which are often difficult to apply due to the geological conditions of certain old wells or the existence of contracts that require financial compensation if supply is interrupted. In general, the level of compliance with OPEC agreements has been low, being of greater incidence in countries that export by sea and of lesser incidence in those that export by pipeline, which, unlike maritime cargo, cannot be controlled by satellite.

The main players:

Saudi Arabia:

Amid the wreckage of the OPEC+ negotiations, on March 6 Mohamed Bin Salman (MBS) led a new palace coup in which the former heir to the Saudi throne Mohammed bin Nayef and other members of the royal family were arrested and charged with plotting against Crown Prince MBS and his father Salman bin Abdulaziz. All this at a time when the heir to the Saudi throne seemed to be seeking to consolidate his power with a risky new strategy after the absolute failure of the Yemen War and the Vision 2030 national modernization plan.

Saudi Arabia's undisputed leadership in driving the oil market is based on its ability to increase its production in less than 6 months by several million barrels, something that no other country in the world is capable of doing. The increase in production also allows it to partially compensate for the decline in prices per barrel, which added to its foreign exchange reserves and its access to cheap credit allows Saudi Arabia to face a price war with an apparent resilience far superior to that of any other OPEC country. The low cost of producing a barrel of oil in the country, at around $7, also allows it to maintain revenues in almost any market context.

However, foreign exchange reserves, amounting to $500 billion, are 30% lower than in 2016, and may be insufficient to maintain the dollar-rial parity for more than two years without oil revenues, something fundamental for a society accustomed to an import-dependent opulence. Moreover, the fiscal deficit has been a major problem for the country that has been unable to reduce it below 4% after peaking at 16% in 2016 as a result of an insufficient recovery in oil prices and the costs of the war in Yemen. The energy dominance of oil has an expiration date and Saudi Arabia's finances are addicted to an activity that accounts for 42% of its GDP and generates 87% of tax revenues. For the time being, the Saudi Minister of Economics has already announced a 5% cut in the budget for 2020, a sample which the oil agreement does not ensure an optimistic scenario. In any case, Saudi Arabia has been one of the big winners in the price war. In the failed negotiations in March, Saudi Arabia produced 9.7 million barrels per day, a figure that had risen to 11 million barrels per day in the April negotiations. As the cuts are established proportionally, in just one month the Saudi kingdom obtained an increase of 1.3 million barrels in its market share. Likewise, the Saudi sovereign wealth fund Petroleum Investment Fund (PIF) bought shares in Eni, Total, Equinor, Shell and Repsol during the month of April, in a context of stock market falls in these companies.

Russian Federation:

Russia stood firm at the beginning of the price war, highlighting the resilience of the Russian energy sector and the Issue of the country's sovereign reserves, lower than those of Saudi Arabia but amounting to 435 billion dollars and a stabilization fund of another 100 billion: 33% more than in 2014. Paradoxically, international sanctions on the Russian oil sector have reduced its dependence on foreign countries, allowing the devaluation of the ruble, which is freely convertible, not to affect production and partially compensate for lower prices. Russia' s capacity to increase production in the short term, unlike Saudi Arabia, is less than 500,000 bpd, which leaves Russia unable to compensate lower prices with higher production, the main reason for the country to accept the result the April negotiations.

Vladimir Putin's leadership is unquestionable with a possible constitutional reform that would allow an extension of his term of office delayed due to COVID-19. The good relations of the Russian political elite with the oil oligarchy allow for unity of action in a country with greater atomization and presence of private capital in its companies. Alexander Novak's strategy seems to be in line with that of Igor Sechin, CEO of Rosneft, who are betting on a context of low prices that will end up deeply damaging the North American shale industry. There are speculations about a possible US diplomatic intervention with the Russian government in favor of the OPEC+ agreement in April. The latest move of Russia's Rosneft, abandoning Venezuela by selling all its assets to a business controlled by the Russian government, may be an explanation for this concession by Moscow to accept an agreement that for a month it tried, at least rhetorically, to avoid. The development of future US sanctions on the Russian oil sector will be a good indicator of this possible agreement.

United States:

For the US, the decreases in the price of oil represent one of the largest tax cuts of all time, in the words of its president, with a price of less than one dollar per gallon. However, the oil industry generates more than 10 million jobs in the US and is a central activity in many states such as Texas, Oklahoma or New Mexico, fundamental for a hypothetical Republican victory in the 2020 elections. In addition, the geostrategic importance of the sector, which has reduced US energy dependence to historic lows, has led Donald Trump to assume the responsibility of safeguarding the US oil industry. He himself coordinated the first steps towards a great agreement, through pressure, threats and concessions. The truth is that the price crisis has come at a time of certain exhaustion for the sector, which was beginning to suffer the effects of over-indebtedness and the pressure of investors to increase profits. North American crude oil, priced on the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) index, has experienced since 2011 an evaluation 10% lower than that of Brent or the OPEC Basket, the other global indexes, generating a hypercompetitive environment that was beginning to take its toll on shale producers, who have shown since the end of 2019 a 20% drop in the totalissue of drillings compared year to year. The North American market, which was already dragging storage and transportation problems since 2017, collapsed in the third week of April with negative prices due to the limitations to store oil and speculation in the futures markets.

Donald Trump has finally reached a global agreement that does not directly bind the U.S., but leaves it to the market to regulate the cuts that seem more than foreseeable. In this way, the Trump administration allows itself not to have to intervene in the oil market, something that would surely force the development of legislation and a complex discussion to save the polluting oil industry at the taxpayer's expense. From the Senate, several politicians from both parties have tried to introduce to the parliamentary discussion the need for tariffs or sanctions to those producers that flood the domestic market, recovering old initiatives such as the NOPEC Act. These threats have given the President a position of strength at the international level, being one of the big winners of the OPEC+ agreement in April. In fact, when negotiations seemed on the verge of collapse due to Mexico's refusal to assume the 400,000 barrels per day cut, the US intervened by announcing that it would be the US that would assume it. Subsequent leaks have shown the existence of a financial insurance contracted by Mexico in case of low oil prices, which would be charged per barrel produced. The US intervention, more rhetorical than internship since the country lacks a concrete production to be cut, saved the agreement from a new failure.

Petroleum products refining facilities [Pixabay].

Nothing will ever be the same again:

The shale oil revolution has transformed the oil industry and generated a new geopolitical balance to the detriment of OPEC. Since 2016, OPEC+ countries have made cuts estimated at 5.3 million barrels per day, in that period the North American shale industry has increased its production by 4.2 million barrels, making it clear that the oligopolistic strategy of the producing countries has come to an end. All that remains is the free market, in which they have an advantage due to lower production costs. However, to final eliminate a large part of the North American shale would take more than 3 years of prices below 30 dollars, at which time a large part of the companies' debt would mature and the decrease in the issue of new wells would seriously affect total production. A journey in the desert for many producing countries that have billionaire plans for economic diversification during this decade, probably the last decade of absolute energy dominance of hydrocarbons. Contrary to what was expected at the beginning of the century, the world has entered a period of oil abundance that will reduce energy costs unless a coordinated intervention in the market remedies it. The emergence of new producers, mainly the United States, Canada and Brazil, together with the collapse of Venezuelan and Libyan production, have left OPEC 's market share in 2020 at around 33%, in free fall since the beginning of the century when it exceeded 40%.

Global demand for crude oil has declined to such an extent that cutbacks can only be expected to prevent a drop below US$15 a barrel, prolonging as long as possible the total filling of the remaining oil storage systems. Global oil storage capacity is one of the great unknowns in the industry, with diverging estimates. The bulk of the storage capacity is supported by importing countries, which since the 1973 oil crisis decided to create the International Energy Agency to, among other things, coordinate infrastructure to mitigate dependence on OPEC. The strategic nature of these reserves, together with their rapid development in the last decade by China and its companies, make access to this information very difficult. In particular, the Chinese company Sinopec has developed a strategy of building oil storage facilities throughout the China Sea, including in foreign countries such as Indonesia to resist any possible blockade of the Strait of Malacca, the Asian country's geopolitical weak point. Private companies also have onshore and floating storage capacity, of an undetermined Issue , which has already begun to be used with imaginative formulas: disused pipelines, oil tankers and even trains and trucks now stopped by quarantine. In the short term, these strategic reserves will be gradually filled at a rate similar to 20 million barrels per day, an estimate of the current differential between supply and demand. In 50 days, if no agreement is reached to cut production, the amount in storage would exceed 1 billion barrels, which would probably saturate the market's capacity to absorb more oil, generating a total collapse in prices.

A return to economic normalcy is increasingly on the distant horizon, with sectors such as aviation and tourism set to be weighed down by COVID-19 for a long time to come. The impact on oil demand will be prolonged, more so given the storage capacity that will now serve as a counterweight to any upward movement in international prices. The shale industry, with great flexibility, will begin to hibernate while waiting for a new, more favorable context. The COVID-19 crisis will have a particularly virulent impact on oil-exporting development countries, which have more delicate socio-economic balances. The oil world is undergoing major changes as part of the energy transition and the development of new technologies. The crisis unleashed by COVID-19 is only the beginning of the great transformations that the industry will undergo in the coming decades. A much-repeated phrase to refute the already dismissed Peak Oil theory is that the Stone Age did not end because of the lack of stones and contemporary society will not stop using hydrocarbons because of their depletion, but because of their obsolescence.

▲ Members of the Armed Forces setting up a pavilion at Ifema for the treatment of Covid-19 [Defense].

COMMENTARY / Salvador Sánchez Tapia

The Spanish Government's declaration of a state of alarm on March 15 as an instrument to fight the spread of COVID 19 has brought with it the not very usual image of soldiers of the Armed Forces (FAS) operating in the main cities and roads throughout Spain to cooperate in the fight against the virus.

For most Spaniards, the presence of military units carrying out their missions on public roads is a rarity to which they are not accustomed, with the exception of the relatively frequent activity of the Military Emergency Unit (UME) in support of civil society, which is well known to a public that, in general, values it very positively.

Apart from these actions, it can be said that the image of uniformed soldiers working directly in front of the public is not common. This subject support is not, however, a novelty, and responds to a long tradition of social attendance provided by the military institution to its fellow citizens when it has been called upon.

Several elements in our recent history have contributed to produce what seems to be a certain estrangement between Spaniards and their Armed Forces. Among them are the shift in the missions of the Armed Forces abroad with the birth of the democratic regime in 1975; the long years of the fight against ETA terrorism, which led Spanish soldiers to hide their military status from the public to safeguard their security; the progressive reduction in the size of the Armed Forces, which eliminated many of the provincial garrisons maintained by the Armies; or the end of military service, which ended up making the Armed Forces unknown to its citizens.

This detachment, if it has existed or exists, has been one-way, for even at times when the military institution may have been most ignored, soldiers have remained close to their fellow citizens, from whom they come, and whom they serve, supporting them in the most difficult situations. Numerous examples testify to the army's long history of service to the citizenry. To corroborate this statement, it is enough to cite cases such as the military support in the floods suffered by Valencia in 1957; that of Operation "Alazán", carried out in 1981 in support of the State Security Forces and Corps in their fight against ETA terrorism, sealing the French-Spanish border; that of Operation "Sentinel", carried out in 1981 in support of the Spanish Army in its fight against ETA terrorism, sealing the French-Spanish border; Operation "Centinela Gallego", in which, for years, Army units have been monitoring the Galician mountains to prevent forest fires; the fight against the spread of camalote in the Guadiana River; or the construction of mobile bridges in many towns in Spain, such as Montblanc, to restore communications after violent meteorological phenomena had interrupted them.

On this occasion, it has been the declaration of the state of alarm that has brought the Armed Forces to the forefront of public attention. Due to the novelty of this intervention, it seems appropriate, at this point, to make a reference letter to the rationale behind the decision to employment the military instrument, and to make known what can and cannot be expected from the actions of the Armed Forces in this subject situations.

The coronavirus pandemic clearly sample the reality that the security challenges faced by modern societies require a multidisciplinary, cooperative response, in which all the forces of society participate, contributing their particular capabilities to produce the synergy required to solve a crisis. The Armed Forces cannot remain outside this effort, and must act on an equal footing with other public and private actors. Sometimes, when the crisis is of a military nature, they will do so by leading the effort; at other times, they will assume a support role to other agents, which they will carry out without seeking any subject prominence.

In the specific case of this crisis, the contribution of the Armed Forces to the effort by deploying resources responds, not merely to an intention to graphically capture this reality, but also to the recognition that the crisis will be long, that it will require the cooperation of all, and that the solution requires the contribution of resources beyond the ordinary ones.

The main mission of the Armed Forces is the military defense of Spain against external threats. From this mission derive their organization, their preparation, their dimensions, and the equipment and armament that equips them, optimized, within the possibilities of the human and material resources of the Nation, and in agreement with the will of the Spanish people, to respond to the demands of this mission, which constitutes their true raison d'être [1].

This does not preclude that the Armies can and should fulfill other missions, which they will execute within their capabilities. In fact, from a legal point of view, military participation in the coronavirus crisis is reasonable if one takes into account that, agreement to the Organic Law of National Defense, one of the missions of the Armed Forces is to "preserve, together with the institutions of the State and the Public Administrations, the security and welfare of citizens in cases of serious risk, catastrophe, calamity or other public needs, as established in the legislation in force" [2].

The Royal Decree declaring the state of alarm leaves no doubt as to the legislator's intention to involve the Armed Forces in the resolution of the crisis, since Article 4 establishes the Minister of Defense as one of the competent authorities delegated by the President of the Government for the coordinated management of the crisis, and because it specifically and explicitly empowers these authorities to require the Armed Forces to act in tasks that guarantee the effective fulfillment of the measures included in the decree [3].

By virtue of the provisions of the Military degree program Law, when a state of alarm is declared, the members of the Armed Forces are invested as "agents of the authority" with regard to the duties set forth in the decree of declaration, which brings them closer to police subject functions. Specifically, and in agreement with Article 5.2. of the decree, this condition empowers them to "carry out checks on persons, goods, vehicles, premises and establishments that are necessary to verify and, where appropriate, prevent the services and activities suspended in this royal decree from being carried out, except for those expressly exempted". To this end, "they may issue the necessary orders and prohibitions and fail the activities or services that are being carried out".

Having defined the legal framework for action, it should also be considered that the employment the Armed Forces requires a minimum familiarity with the military organization, as well as with its capabilities and limitations. While it is true that the Armed Forces offer a wide range of possibilities for action, it is necessary to be aware that there are tasks for which they are not qualified, and that the use of these capabilities must be in accordance with their specific employment possibilities and procedures.

This reality, together with the imperative need for the employment of military means to be done in a coordinated manner with all the actors involved in the resolution of the crisis, justifies the presence of the Chief of Defense Staff (JEMAD) -who is also the advisor the President of the Government and the Minister of Defense in operational subject in the Situation Committee that the Royal Decree of declaration of the state of alarm has constituted in support of the Government.

The first and most important capacity with which the military institution contributes to the resolution of the crisis is that which resides in the people who serve in uniform. The Armed Forces put at the disposal of the Nation, not only the power given by the number of its members but, above all, the imponderable strength of its values, placed at the service of the common good: the generous submission , the spirit of sacrifice, the work , the sense of duty, and so many others that are so necessary in times like these, and that make it possible to entrust to the Armed Forces those missions that entail more risk and fatigue, in the certainty that they will do their best to fulfill them.

In the realm of the unquantifiable, there is also the not inconsiderable capacity for planning operations that the Armed Forces have at all levels, from the strategic to the tactical, including the operational. The General Staffs of the three Armies, and those of their subordinate units, have an enormous potential for the organization, coordination and planning of complex operations which, if used, is extremely useful.

The diversity and versatility of a large part of the material means of the Armed Forces makes them particularly useful in circumstances such as the current one. Among the catalog of possibilities are some as varied as the transport, both of staff and equipment, supplies, merchandise, material, or any urgent or essential item, at any distance and by air, sea, or land, especially if it has to be done to remote or difficult to reach places; the support to the construction of shelters, hospitals, or any other installation with the means of castramation of the Army Engineers, who can also carry out specialized works to improve communications, or to ensure the supply of water, electricity, or other services; the sanitary and epidemiological support to the civilian population with specialized staff -both doctors and nurses-; attendance in the distribution and even the packaging of food for large groups; the execution of security and protection tasks for essential or particularly sensitive installations, such as power production and distribution plants; the surveillance and control of compliance with the terms of the state of alarm by land, sea and air, either with staff or with conventional or remotely manned means; support for disinfection operations in large areas; the production of medicines or means of health protection; communications support; the provision of essential services such as control of airspace, or interurban public transport or within major cities; etc. The list could be extended almost ad infinitum.

The realization of the enormous amount of possible support, together with the magnitude of the pandemic itself, and the consideration of the fact that military capabilities are sized to meet the needs arising from the most likely operational scenarios, and not for a massive support scenario such as the one we are now facing, suggest that, in this case, the needs far exceed the possibilities of the Armed Forces and that, without proper planning, the institution could be totally consumed in the development these noble tasks.

The above would be very laudable, but it would anchor the entire National Defense capability in a task other than the military defense of Spain, rendering the Armed Forces incapable of dealing with the tasks which, it is reasonable to argue, constitute the raison d'être of the Armed Forces, and which must continue to be attended to, even in the midst of a pandemic. Beyond that, they would also be unable to sustain the operational efforts that the Government has decided that the Armed Forces should carry out abroad, some of which could be reconsidered.

The aforementioned limitations make it advisable to measure the effort required from the Armed Forces -also because they must sustain it over a long period of time-, which must be provided with a selective criterion, the Armed Forces acting in application of the principle of subsidiarity, when there are no civilian agencies, public or private, capable of providing support, or when the support is of a risky, dangerous or arduous nature that makes the employment military resources advisable.

With the exception of the EMU, the Armed Forces are not specifically equipped, organized, or trained for the subject of tasks inherent to an emergency such as the current one. In some cases, military capabilities are directly applicable in a situation such as the coronavirus. In others, however, the provision of support cannot be immediate and requires a minimum period of adaptation, reprogramming, and training to ensure that military capabilities are applied in a manner appropriate to the nature of an operational environment with which the soldier may be unfamiliar. For example, it is not desirable to simply employ a unit trained for high-intensity combat in emergency or humanitarian support roles without first making the transition [4].

In this adaptation time, it is always necessary to include the response time that the units must have between missions to recover, reorganize, maintain the material in operational conditions, fill in the consumed resources, plan the new mission, move between employment scenarios, etc. Even if they are in a high availability situation and their response time is reduced to a minimum, it will never be equal to zero if they have already been employed.

The employment the Armed Forces in this subject of tasks must always be done with a criterion of strict temporality. If this does not happen and the Armed Forces perpetuate in their missions of support to the civilian population, there is a possibility that they will progressively expand their tasks, atrophying the development of civilian agencies that could and should preferably perform them, and becoming their competitors; that they may, in the process, neglect their fundamental tasks -to the point of reorganizing, equipping and training themselves only for their civilian support dimension-; and that they may compromise the neutrality and the character of disinterested servants that the citizens demand from their Armed Forces and that they appreciate so much from them. As soon as the situation allows it, the Armed Forces, with the exception of the UME, it is understood, must return to their usual framework of action.

That moment has not yet arrived. The end of the crisis is not yet in sight, and Spaniards must be prepared for a long battle against COVID 19. In this struggle, citizens can be convinced that their Armed Forces, and all those who compose them, will be at their side, attending to their needs, sharing the same hardships, participating in their mourning. When the virus has been defeated, they will rejoice with them and, in silence, they will return naturally to their duties, without waiting for applause, with the intimate satisfaction of having fulfilled their duty in the service of their compatriots.

* Brigadier General (R)

[1] An exception to this is the EMU, a unit specially organized to carry out tasks in support of the civilian population.

[2] An issue outside of this work, and which would be the subject of a more in-depth analysis, is that the aforementioned Organic Law 5/2005 introduces a change, extending them, of the constitutional missions that Article 8 of the Magna Carta imposes on the Armed Forces.

[3] Royal Decree 463/2020, of March 14.

[4] Consider, for example, the differences between providing a facility protection service in an area of operations, in an environment that may be hostile, and which is subject to certain Rules of Engagement (ROE), and providing it in a nuclear power plant on national territory in a circumstance such as the present one. As can be easily understood, the response cannot be the same, and employing in the latter an individual trained for the former requires a certain adaptation.

One of the main instruments for combating poverty loses its relevance between the end of the "golden decade" and the beginning of the "second lost decade

The so-called Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) submission cash transfers to underprivileged families with a commitment to schooling, medical check-ups or other basic requirements that, along with improving household income, sought to promote the options of the younger generation - have helped in the last two decades to significantly increase theaverage class in Latin America. But once the subsistence level was surpassed, citizens recently began to demand improved services, such as teaching, healthcare or transportation - as seen in the protests of recent months in the region - to which the CCTs no longer provided an answer. Just when the countries were thinking of readapting their policies in response to this change of perspective, the crisis triggered by Covid-19 threatened to throw millions of people back into poverty, making cash transfers necessary once again, this time without conditionalities.

▲ Beneficiaries of Brazil's Bolsa Família, one of the pioneering conditional cash transfer programs [Gov. of Brazil].

article / María Gabriela Fajardo

The first Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs in Latin America, a pioneer region in the implementation of this instrument, were developed in the mid-1990s in Brazil and Mexico with the intention of "transforming and halting the intergenerational transmission of poverty through the development of human capabilities in the most vulnerable families," as stated in a report by ECLAC (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean). CCTs were designed to provide support to families status poverty or extreme poverty with minor children. The submission these monetary aids (also non-monetary) was made as long as the families complied with basic conditions of health, Education and nutrition of the minors.

The implementation of CCTs spread rapidly throughout the region. In 1997, only four countries had any of these programs: Brazil (Bolsa Escola), Ecuador (Bono Solidario), Honduras (Programa de Asignación Familiar) and Mexico (Progresa). A decade later, almost all Latin American countries had adapted the initiative.

Although in some cases this tool has been controversial, given that some governments have been able to use it as "an instrument of social policy and its targeting is discussed as a strategy to address actions that must operate under restricted budgets", according to the aforementioned ECLAC report , the truth is that CCTs are considered to have contributed to the socioeconomic progress of the region. This was recently pointed out by Alejandro Werner, director for the Western Hemisphere of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). "In the last 15 years," he said, attributing part of the credit to CCTs, "important progress has been made in the topic poverty alleviation and reduction of income maldistribution. Thus, Latin America is probably the region with the greatest improvement in income distribution.

Between 2002 and 2014, a time known in Latin America as the "golden decade" (a consequence of the commodities boom ), the poverty rate in the region fell from 45.4% to 27.8%, so that 66 million people overcame that status, agreement to the Social Panorama of Latin America 2019 published by ECLAC. Additionally, the extreme poverty rate decreased from 12.2% to 7.8%. However, since 2015, the level of poverty and extreme poverty began to increase, a patron saint that has continued since then, albeit moderately. For 2019, ECLAC predicted an increase in poverty and extreme poverty to fees of 30.8% and 11.5%, respectively, so that 27 million more people returned to situations of poverty compared to 2014. 

The challenge: from extreme poverty to the class average

This slight reversal indicates that many who in that "golden decade" gained access to the class average, making this sector of the population a majority for the first time, now find themselves in a high Degree of vulnerability Degree At the same time, these people have seen how, having overcome their previous survival status , their expectations of subsequent progress and access to better services from the State have not been met. The new challenge in many countries was to make public policies revolve around other factors that would allow the consolidation of these people in the class average. This neglect generated discontent that contributed to the large protests experienced in several Latin American countries at the end of 2019.

The greater demands of a population in better conditions made structural deficiencies more evident. "The region's structural deficiencies have become more evident and their solution is part of the demands of broad social groups, particularly the new generations," according to the Social Panorama report . Specifically, ECLAC warned about "segmented access to quality public and cultural services".

In Werner's words, "having achieved such a significant reduction in the reduction of poverty also generates an important challenge for policy makers in Latin America, since the design of social policies must be oriented to address other factors, not to the reduction of extreme poverty. It is not that we have to forget about that, but clearly the challenge now is to focus also on addressing those segments of the population that are no longer in poverty, which are class average". After highlighting the precariousness of this large group of the population that has moved up the social ladder, the IMF manager for the Western Hemisphere indicated that "clearly the instruments to address this vulnerability are different from the conditional transfer schemes that were implemented in the past", and he specifically mentioned access to quality Education and health.

But the States have faced the need for this paradigm shift without budgetary support. It is evident that there is little state reaction capacity to meet the new needs of the vulnerable population affected by low educational levels, few work opportunities and the inefficiency of the pension system.

The countries have found that economic growth, which between 2000 and 2013 hovered jointly around 2%, has been weakening since 2014. Thus, real GDP per capita in the region has declined by 0.6% per year. The causes of this decline in economic growth can be classified into two factors, as explained by Werner. First, structural causes have inhibited potential growth due to "the scarcity of investment, slow productivity growth, a Pass business climate, leave infrastructure quality and Education". Secondly, within the cyclical causes, the weak global economic growth and the low price of raw materials have also affected the uncertainty of large regional economies such as Brazil and Mexico, the sudden economic stoppages of stressed economies such as Argentina and Ecuador, and the social tensions that took place in the last quarter of 2019.

Coronavirus

The emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic has worsened the economic outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean, for which the April 2020 report forecasts a 5.2% drop in GDP this year. Although the IMF estimates a recovery of 3.4% in 2021, this will not be enough to allay fears of a new "lost decade". In his most recent intervention to comment on these data, Werner warned that between 2015 and 2025 GDP per capita "will be flat".

To cope with this new status, socially aggravated by the health crisis and the suffering of so many people, governments are resorting to direct cash transfers, no longer conditional, to vulnerable households. In a way, we are returning to a stage of need, even prior to the moment when CCTs were extended. We are returning to the urgency of the 1980s, known in Latin America as the lost decade, when countries had to apply shock measures to get out of a serious public debt crisis.

The president of the Inter-American development Bank (IDB), Luis Alberto Moreno, believes that it is still too early to speak of a second lost decade, but agrees that the moment leads to unconditional transfer programs. "The big question is whether everything we have achieved in the last 15 years in terms of reducing poverty and extreme poverty, with the incorporation of some Latin Americans into the middle classes, will be lost or whether, on the contrary, the capacity of the social systems and the governments' drive to increase debt and public expense will cushion the effects," Moreno said. All the countries "are strengthening the transfer programs that were developed almost two decades ago, and which have been very successful", although "in this case they will not be conditional, in order to preserve the income of many families".

Apart from China, Italy has received aid from Russia and Cuba, making a risky geopolitical move in the European context.

The global spreading of the virus is putting under stress the big ally of the Union, the United States, which is demonstrating its lack of an efficient social health care system. Furthermore, the initial refusal of Washington to send help to the EU was seen as an opportunity for countries like Russia, China and Cuba to send medical and technical support to those countries of the EU that are most affected by the virus. Italy has taken aid send by Beijing, Moscow and Havana, shaking the geopolitical understandings of the EU's foreign policy.

▲ Russia's aid arrived in Italy in the middle of the pandemic crisis [Russian Defense Ministry].

ARTICLE / Matilde Romito

The World Health Organisation (WHO) declared Corona Virus (Covid-19) a pandemic on the 11th of March, 2020. The fast widespread of the virus pushed numerous countries around the world and especially in Europe where there is the highest number of confirmed cases, to call for a lockdown. This extreme measure is not only leading the EU and the entire world towards an unprecedented economic crisis, but it is also redefining geopolitics and the system of alliances we were used to.

The pandemic. On January 30, 2020, the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared the first outbreak of novel coronavirus a 'public health emergency of international concern'. In mid-February, numerous cases of corona virus began to be reported in northern Italy and in several European countries. Initially, the spread of the virus mainly hit Italy, which reported the biggest number of cases among the EU states. In March, Italy started with the implementation of social-distancing measures and the consequent lockdown of the country, followed by Spain, France and other European countries. On March 11, 2020, the WHO declared covid-19 a global pandemic. Currently, Europe is the region of the world with the highest number of confirmed cases. According to the WHO, on April 6, Europe reached 621,407 cases compared to the 352,600 cases in America and the 112,524 in Western Asia.

The global lockdown. At first, several major airlines suspended their flights from and to China, in order to avoid further contaminations. Now, the majority of flights in Europe and in other regions have been cancelled. The biggest areas of world are under lockdown and the economic consequences of this are becoming more and more evident. A forced social distancing seems to be the only way to contain the spread of the virus and the closing of national borders is currently at the center of states' policies to combat the virus. However, some European countries, such as Sweden, do not seem to agree on this.

Lack of solidarity

We are assisting to a global situation of 'everybody for oneself,' and this has become highly evident within the EU itself. Individual countries within the Union have shown high levels of egoism on different occasions. The North-South divide within the EU is clearer than ever, particularly between the Netherlands and Austria on the one side, and Italy, Spain, France and Greece on the other side. The former group of countries is asking for compromise and conditions to lend money to the most afflicted ones for countering the crisis, while the latter group is asking the EU to share the debts accumulated in order to save European economies (eurobonds).

The different spread-intensity of the virus in different European countries has shown more than once the fragility of the Union, which demonstrated to be led by the arrogance of the rich. On different occasions European leaders have shown a lack of European identity, solidarity and common vision. For instance, at the beginning of the crisis France and Germany attempted to 'cover with the European flag' medical products directed to Italy, by declaring them 'European products', trying to compensate the initial inaction of the EU. Another example, could be the seizure by the Czech Republic of 110,000 Chinese masks and thousands of breathing supports, which were destined to Italy (March the 21st). Moreover, the lack of unity also came from an unjustified action of protectionism undertaken by Poland, which closed its market to agricultural products coming from Italy on March 18, despite it was already known that the virus could not be spread through such products.

Nevertheless, there are some good and unexpected examples of solidarity. For instance, a good lesson on European solidarity came from the small state of Albania. The Albanian prime minister Edi Rama taught European leaders what it means to be part of the EU by sending a medical unit to the Italian region of Lombardy, despite the numerous difficulties Albania is facing, thus showing that the fight against the virus has no nationality and it cannot leave room for selfish calculations. Moreover, more recently Germany has accepted to receive and take care of numerous patients coming from Italy, where the majority of health infrastructures are saturated.

Overall, little comprehension and solidarity has been shown between European member states, thus being criticised by the European Commission president, Ursula Von Der Leyen.

Geopolitical tensions

The EU is going through numerous changes in the relations between its members. The closing up of individual countries poses a big challenge to the EU itself, which is founded on freedom of movement of people and goods.

Currently, sending masks and medicines seems to have become the main means for countries to exert influence in global affairs. The global spreading of the virus is putting under stress the big ally of the Union, the United States (US), which is demonstrating its lack of an efficient social health care system. Furthermore, the initial refusal of Washington to send help to the EU was seen as an opportunity for countries like Russia, China and Cuba to send medical and technical support to those countries of the EU that are most affected by the virus, like Italy and Spain. After having seen its hegemonic position in Europe under threat, the US decided to send monetary help to some European countries, such as 100 million dollars to Italy, in order to help in countering the emergency.

At the end, the EU seems to start standing all together. But, did the European countries take action on time? Generally, countries, like human beings, are more likely to remember one bad impression better than numerous good ones. Therefore, are countries like Italy going to 'forgive' the EU and its initial inactivity? Or are they going to fall back on countries like Russia and China, which have shown their solidarity since the beginning?

Furthermore, did the EU take action because of an inherent identity and solidarity? Or was it just a counteraction to the Chinese and Russian help? It seemed that specifically Germany's mobilisation followed the exhortation of the former president of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi. He accused Germany and other countries of taking advantage of the virus for imposing a 'conditionality' to the countries that were asking for help. Moreover, in an interview on the Financial Times he called for an exceptional investment in the economies and for a guarantee of the debts, in order to jointly face the crisis, because no country can face this unprecedented threat alone. Now, anti-virus economic action turned into a matter of urgency for Europe and the European Commission is working on a common European response to the crisis.

Future perspectives

Probably, after the end of the virus spread, the world will assist to important changes in the global dynamics of alliances. Russia and China will most likely have one or more European allies to advance their interests in the EU. On the one side, this could lead to a further weakening of the EU governance and to the re-emergence of nationalism on states' behavior within the Union. And on the other side, it could lead to the development of further mechanisms of cooperation among the EU members, which will go beyond the eurobonds and will probably extend to the sanitary dimension.

To preserve its unity, the European political-economic-cultural area will need to be strengthened, by fighting inequalities with a new model of solidarity. Its future prosperity will most likely depend on its internal market.

Nevertheless, for now the only thing we can be sure about is that the first impression on the EU was very bad and that this situation is going to lead all of us towards an unprecedented economic crisis, which most probably will redefine the political relationships between the world's biggest regions.

▲ Members of the Blue Helmets in their deployment in Mali [MINUSMA].

April 20, 2020

ESSAY / Ignacio Yárnoz

INTRODUCTION

It has been 72 years since the first United Nations peacekeeping operation was deployed in Israel/Palestine to supervise the ceasefire agreement between Israel and his Arab neighbours. Since then, more than 70 peacekeeping operations have been deployed by the UN all over the world, though with special attention to the Middle East and Africa. Over these more than 70 years, hundreds of thousands of military personnel from more than 120 countries have participated in UN peacekeeping operations. Nowadays, there are 13 UN peacekeeping operations deployed in the world, seven of which are located in African countries supported by a total of 83,436 thousand troops (around 80 percent of all UN peacekeepers deployed around the world) and thousands of civilians. The largest missions in terms of number of troops and ambitious objectives are those in the Democratic Republic of Congo (20,039 troops), South Sudan (19,360 troops), and Mali (15,162 troops)[1].

Peacekeepers in Africa, as in other regions, are given broad and ambitious mandates by the Security Council which include civilian protection, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency operations or protection of humanitarian relief aid. However, these objectives must go hand by hand with the core UN peacekeepers principles, which are consent by the belligerent parties, impartiality (not neutrality) and the only use of force in case of self-defence[2].

Although peace operations can be important for maintaining stability and safeguarding democratic transitions, multilateral institutions such as UN face challenges related to country contributions, training, a very hostile environment and relations with host governments. It is often stated that these missions have failed largely because they were deployed in a context of ongoing wars where the belligerents themselves did not want to stop fighting or preying on civilians and yet have to manage to protect many civilians and reduce some of the worst consequences of civil war.

In addition, UN peacekeepers are believed to be deployed in the most recent missions to war zones where not all the main parties have consented. There is also mounting international pressure for peacekeepers to play a more robust role in protecting civilians. Despite the principle of impartiality, UN peacekeepers have been tasked with offensive operations against designated enemy combatants. Contemporary mandates have often blurred the lines separating peacekeeping, stabilization, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, atrocity prevention, and state-building.

Such features have often been referred to the case of the peacekeeping operation in Mali (MINUSMA) as I will try to sum up in this essay. This mission, ongoing since 2013 is on its seventh year and tensions between the parties have still not ceased due to several reasons I will further explain in this essay. Through a summarized history of the ongoing conflict, an explanation of the current military/police deployment, the engagement of third parties and an assessment on the risks and opportunities of this mission as well as an analysis of its successes and failures I will try to give a complete analysis on what MINUSMA is and its challenges.

Brief history of the conflict in Mali

During the last 8 years, Mali has been immersed in a profound crisis of Governance, partner instability, terrorism and human rights violations. The crisis mentioned stems from several factors I will try to develop in this first part of the analysis. The crisis derives from long-standing structural conditions that Mali has experienced, such as ineffective Governments due to weak State institutions; fragile social cohesion between the different ethnic and religious groups; deep-rooted independent feelings among communities in the north due to marginalization by the central Government and a weak civil society among others. These conditions were far exacerbated by more recent instability, a spread corruption, nepotism and abuse of power by the Government, instability from neighboring countries and a decreased effective capacity of the national army.

It all began in mid-January 2012 when a Tuareg movement called Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) and some Islamic armed groups such as Ansar Dine, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Mouvement pour l'Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) initiated a series of attacks against Government forces in the north of the country[3]. Their primary goals for these rebel groups though different could be summarized into declaring the Northern regions of Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao (the three together called Azawad) independent from the Central Government of Mali in Bamako and re-establishing the Islamic Law in these regions. The Tuareg led rebellion was reinforced by the presence of well-equipped and experienced combatants returning from Libya's revolution of 2011 in the wake of the fall of Gadhafi's regime[4].

By March 2012, the Malian Institutions had been overwhelmingly defeated by the rebel groups and the MNLA seemed to almost have de facto taken control of the North of Mali. As a consequence of the ineffectiveness to handle the crisis, on 22 March a series of disaffected soldiers from the units defeated by the armed groups in the north resulted in a military coup d'état led by mid-rank Capt Aamadou Sanogo. Having overthrown President Amadou Toumane Toure, the military board took power, suspended the Constitution and dissolved the Government institutions[5]. The coup accelerated the collapse of the State in the north, allowing MNLA to easily overrun Government forces in the regions of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu and proclaim an independent State of Azawad on 6 April. The Military board promised that the Malian army would defeat the rebels, but the ill-equipped and divided army was no match for the firepower of the rebels.

Immediately after the coup, the International Community condemned this act and lifted sanctions against Mali if the situation wasn't restored. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) appointed the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, as the mediator on the crisis and compromised the ECOWAS would help Malian Government to restore order in the Northern region if democracy was brought back[6]. On 6 April, the military board and ECOWAS signed a framework agreement that led to the resignation of Capt Aamadou Sanogo and the appointment of the Speaker of the National Assembly, Dioncounda Traoré, as interim President of Mali on 12 April. On 17 April, Cheick Modibo Diarra was appointed interim Prime Minister and three days later, he announced the formation of a Government of national unity.

However, something happened during the rest of the year 2012 after the Malian government forces had been defeated. Those who were allies one day, became enemies of each other and former co-belligerents Ansar Dine, MOJWA, and the MNLA soon found themselves in a conflict.

Clashes began to escalate especially between the MNLA and the Islamists after a failure to reach a power-sharing treaty between the parties. As a consequence, the MNLA forces soon started to be driven out from the cities of Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao. The MNLA forces lacked as many resources as the Islamist militias and had experienced a loss of recruits who preferred the join the better paid Islamist militias. However, the MNLA stated that it continued to maintain forces and control some rural areas in the region. As of October 2012, the MNLA retained control of the city of Ménaka, with hundreds of people taking refuge in the city from the rule of the Islamists, and the city of Tinzawatene near the Algerian border. Whereas the MLNA only sought the Independence of Azawad, the Islamist militias goal was to impose the sharia law in their controlled cities, which drove opposition from the population.

Foreign intervention

Following the events of 2012, the Malian interim authorities requested United Nations assistance to build the capacities of the Malian transitional authorities regarding several key areas to the stabilization of Mali. Those areas were the reestablishment of democratic elections, political negotiations with the opposing northern militias, a security sector reform, increased governance on the entire country and humanitarian assistance.

The call for assistance came in the form of a UN deployment in mid-January 2013 authorized by Security Council resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012. This resolution gave the UN a mandate with two clear objectives: provide support to (i) the on-going political process and (ii) the security process, including support to the planning, deployment and operations of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA)[7].

The newly designated mission was planned to be an African led mission (Africa Union and ECOWAS) and funded through the UN trust fund and the European Union Africa Peace Facility. The mission was mandated several objectives: (i) contribute to the rebuilding of the capacity of the Malian Defence and Security Forces; (ii) support the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north; (iii) support the Malian authorities in maintaining security and consolidate State authority; (iv) provide protection to civilians and (iv) support the Malian authorities to create a secure environment for the civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

However, the security situation in Mali further deteriorated in early January 2013, when the three main Islamist militias Ansar Dine, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, advanced southwards. After clashing with the Government forces north of the town of Konna, some 680 kilometers from Bamako, the Malian Army was forced to withdraw. This advance by the Islamist militias raised the alarms in the International arena as they were successfully taking control of key areas and strategic spots in the country and could soon advance to the capital if nothing was done.  

The capture of Konna by extremist groups made the Malian transitional authorities to consider requesting once again the assistance of foreign countries, in particular to its ancient colonizer France, who accepted launching a military operation to support the Malian Army. It is also true that France was already keen on intervening as soon as possible due the importance of Sévaré military airport, located 60 km south of Konna, for further operations in the Sahel area.

Operation Serval, as coined by France, was initiated on 11 January with a deployment of a total of 3,000 troops[8] and air support from Mirage 2000 and Rafale squadrons. In addition, the deployment of AFISMA to support the French deployment was fostered. As a result, the French and African military operations alongside the Malian army successfully improved the security situation in northern areas of Mali. By the end of January, State control had been restored in most major northern towns, such as Diabaly, Douentza, Gao, Konna and Timbuktu. Most terrorist and associated forces withdrew northwards into the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains and many of their leaders such as Abdelhamid Abou Zeid were reported eliminated.

Despite taking control back to the government authorities and restoring the territorial integrity of the country, serious security challenges remained. Although the main cities had been taken back, terrorist attacks remained frequent, weapons proliferated in the rural and urban areas, drug smuggling was increasing and other criminal activities were also maintained active, which undermine governance and development in Mali. Therefore, the fight just transitioned from a territorial and conventional war to a guerrilla style warfare much more difficult to neutralise.

United Nations deployment

Following the gradual withdrawal of the French troops from Mali (Operation Serval evolved to Operation Barkhane in the Sahel region), AFISMA took responsibility to secure the stabilization and the implementation of a transitional roadmap which demanded more resources and engagement from more countries. As a consequence, AFISMA mission officially transitioned to be MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) by Security Council Resolution 2100 of April 25, 2013[9].

Seven years after, MINUSMA mission accounts with a deployment of 11,953 military personnel, 1,741 police personnel and 1,180 civilians (661 national - 585 international, including 155 United Nations Volunteers)[10] deployed in 4 different sectors: Sector North (Kidal, Tessalit, Aguelhoc) Sector South (Bamako) Sector East (Gao, Menaka, Ansongo) Sector West (Tombouctou, Ber, Diabaly, Douentza, Goundam, Mopti-Sevare). The $1 Billion budget mission (financed by UN regular budget on Peacekeeping operations) accounts with personnel from more than 50 different countries being Chad, Bangladesh or Burkina Faso the biggest contributors in terms of number of troops (Figure 1).

The command and control of the ground forces is headed by both commanders Lieutenant General Dennis Gyllensporre (military deployment) and MINUSMA Police Commissioner Issoufou Yacouba (police deployment). Regarding the political leadership of the mission, the Special Representative of the Secretary-general (SRSG) and Head of MINUSMA is Mr. Mahamat Saleh Annadif, an experienced diplomat on peace processes in Africa and former minister of Foreign Affairs of Chad.

Other international actors engaged

MINUSMA however is not the only international actor engaged in the security and political process of Mali. Institutions as the European Union are also on the ground helping specifically on the training of the Malian Army and helping develop their military capabilities.

The European Union Training Mission in Mali[11] (EUTM Mali) is composed of almost 600 soldiers from 25 European countries including 21 EU members and 4 non-member states (Albania, Georgia, Montenegro and Serbia). Since the beginning of the mission initially designed to end 15 months after the start in 2013 (First Mandate), there have been several extensions of the periods to end the mission by Council Decision (Second Mandate 2014-2016, Third Mandate 2016-2018) until today where we are on the Fourth Mandate (Extended until 2020 by Council Decision 2018/716/CFSP in May 2018). The strategic objectives of the 4th Mandate are:

• 1st to contribute to the improvement of the capabilities of the Malian Armed Forces under the control of the political authorities.

• 2nd to support G5 Sahel Joint Force, through the consolidation and improvement of the operational capabilities of its Joint Force, strengthening regional cooperation to address common security threats, especially terrorism and illegal trafficking, especially of human beings.

Regarding this last actor mentioned, the G5 Sahel Joint force (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad) is an intergovernmental cooperation framework created on 16 February 2014 and seeks to fight insecurity and support development in the Sahel Region with the train and support of the European Union and external donors.

Its first operation, launched on July 2017, consisted in a Cross-Border Joint Force settled in Bamako to fight terrorism, cross-border organized crime and human trafficking in the G5 Sahel zone in the Sahel region. The United Nations Security Council welcomed the creation of this Joint Force in Resolution 2359 of 21 June 2017, which was sponsored by France[12]. At full operational capability, the Joint Force will have 5,000 soldiers (seven battalions spread across three zones: West, Centre and East). It is active in a 50 km strip on either side of the countries' shared borders. Later on, a counter-terrorism brigade is to be deployed to northern Mali.

Finally, as I explained before, France gradually withdrew from Mali and transformed Operation Serval to Operation Barkhane[13], a force, with approximately 4,500 soldiers, spread out between Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad to counter the terrorist threat on these territories. With a budget of nearly €600m per year, it is France's largest overseas operation and engages activities such as combat patrols, intelligence gathering and filling the Governance gap of the absent Government institutions.

Troop and Police contributors to MINUSMA [Source: UN]. 

Retrieved from MINUSMA Fact Sheet[25].

Assessment on the situation of MINUSMA

Since its establishment, MINUSMA has achieved some of its objectives in its early stages. From 2013 to 2016, the situation in Northern Mali improved, the numbers of civilians killed in the conflict decreased and large numbers of displaced persons could return home. In addition, MINUSMA supported the celebration of new elections in 2013 and assisted the peace process mainly between the Tuareg rebels and the Government. The peace process culminated in the 15 May 2015 with the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, commonly referred to as the Algiers Agreement[14][15].

The Algiers Agreement was an accord concluded between the Malian Government and two coalitions of armed groups that were fighting the government and against each other, being (i) the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) and (ii) the Platform of armed groups (the Platform). Although imperfect, the peace agreement gave the basis to a continued dialogue and steps were made by the Government regarding the devolution of competences to regional institutions, laws of reconciliation and reintegration of combatants and resources devoted to infrastructure projects in the northern regions[16].

However, since 2016 the situation has deteriorated in several aspects. Violence has increased as jihadist groups have been attacking MINUSMA forces, the Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMA), and the Algiers Agreement signatories (CMA and the platform). As a consequence, MINUSMA has sustained an extraordinary number of fatalities compared to other recent UN peace operations.

Since the beginning of the Mission in 2013, 206 MINUSMA peacekeepers have died during service in Mali[17]. In the last report of Secretary General, it is noted that during the months of October, November and December 2019, there have been 68 attacks against MINUSMA troops in the regions of Mopti (46), Kidal (9), Ménaka (5), Timbuktu (4) and Gao (4) resulting in the deaths of two peacekeepers and eight contractors and in injury to five peacekeepers, one civilian and two contractors[18].

During this same period, the Malian Armed Forces have also experienced a loss of 193 soldiers and 126 injured. The deadliest attacks occurred in Boulikessi and Mondoro (Mopti Region) on 30 September; in Indelimane (Ménaka Region) on 1 November; and in Tabankort (Ménaka Region) on 18 November. MINUSMA provided support for medical evacuations for the national defence and security forces, as well as fuel and equipment to reinforce some camps.

In addition, during this last 3 months, there have been 269 incidents, in which 200 civilians were killed, 96 civilians were injured and 90 civilians were abducted. More than 85 per cent of deadly attacks against civilians took place in Mopti Region. Between 14 and 16 November, a series of attacks against Fulani villages in Ouankoro commune resulted in the killing of at least 37 persons.

As we can see from the data, Mopti region has further deteriorated regarding civilian protection and increased terrorist activity. What is more surprising is that this region in not located in the north but rather in the centre of the country. Mopti and Ségou regions in central Mali are where violence is increasingly spreading. Two closely intertwined drivers of violence can be distinguished: interethnic violence and jihadist violence against the state and its supporters.

The attacks directed primarily towards the Malian security forces and MINUSMA by jihadists have been committed by the jihadist group Katiba Macina, which is part of the GSIM (Le Groupe de Soutien à l'Islam et aux Musulmans), a merger organisation resulting from the fusion of Ansar Dine, forces from Al-Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI), Katiba Macina and Katiba Al-Mourabitoune. This organisation formed in 2017 has triggered the retreat of an already relatively absent state in the central areas. The Katiba exerts violence against representatives of the state (administrators, teachers, village chiefs, etc.) in the Mopti region, provoking that only 30 to 40 per cent of the territorial administration personnel remains present. Additionally, only 1,300 security forces are stationed across the vast region (spanning 79,000 km²). 

Between the Jihadist activities and the retaliation activities by government forces, there has been a collateral consequence as self-defence militias have proliferated. However, these militias have not only exerted self-defence but also criminal activities and competition over scarce local resources. To this problem we have to add the ethnic component where violence exerted by militias is associated with ethnic differences (mainly the Dogon and Fulani). Jihadists have instrumentalised this rivalry to gain sympathizers and recruits and turned the radicalisation problem and the interethnic rivalry into a vicious trap. The ethnicisation of the conflict reinforces the stigmatisation of the Fulani as "terrorists". Meanwhile, the state has tolerated and even cooperated with the Dogon militia to cope with the terrorist threat. However, these groups are supposedly responsible for human rights violations, which again fosters radicalisation among the Fulani population feeling they are left alone in this conflict. As a matter of fact, the Dogon Militia is alleged to be responsible of the 23 March assassination of 160 Fulani in the village of Ogossagou (Mopti Region)[19].

Northern Mali has not remained calm meanwhile, the Ménaka region has also experienced a violence raise. Recent counterterrorism efforts led by ethnically based militias resulted in a counterproductive effects leading to human rights violations and atrocities between Tuareg Daoussahaq and Fulani communities. Due to again the absence Malian security forces or MINUSMA blue helmets, civilians have had no choice but to rely on their own self-protection or on armed groups present in the area, escalating the vicious problem of violence as in the Mopti region. 

Strategic dilemmas of MINUSMA

Given this situation, several dilemmas arise in the current situation in which the mission is. The original Mandate of MINUSMA for 5 years has already expired and now the mission is in a phase of renewal year by year, which makes it a suitable time to rethink the overall path where this mission should continue.

The fist dilemma arises given the split of the violent spots between the north and the centre of the country. MINUSMA was originally set up to stabilize the conflict in the north, but MINUSMA's 2019 Resolution 2480[20] has derived some attention and resources to the central regions and particularly on Protection of Civilians while maintaining its presence in the north too. However, the only problem is that this division on two has not come hand in hand with an increase in resources devoted to the mission, which means that attention paid to the central regions may be in spite of gains made in the north, making the MINUSMA mandate even more unrealistic.

This dilemma raises the problem of financing of the mission. As the years passes, financers of the mission (those that contribute to the General Budget on Peace Keeping Operations of UN) such as the US are getting impatient of not seeing results to a mission where $1 Billion is devoted out of the around $8 Billion of the General Budget. The problem is that for MINUSMA to accomplish its mission in Northern Mali, it has to make an enormous military and logistical effort. The ongoing violent situation calls for security precautions that tie up scarce resources which are no longer available for carrying out the mandate. To illustrate the problem, we can look at the expenditures of the mission and discover that around 80 per cent of its military resources are devoted to securing its own infrastructure and the convoys on which the mission depends to supply its instructions[21].

A final dilemma is related to the development of the terrorist threat. As we have analysed in this article, today's conflict in Mali is about terrorism and therefore requires counterterrorist strategies. However, there are people that state that MINUSMA should focus on the political part of the conflict stressing its efforts on the peace agreement. Current counterterrorism efforts conducted by the Malian Army are highly problematic as they have fuelled local opposition due to its poor human rights commitment. It has been reported the use of ethnic proxy militias (Such as the Dogon militias in Mopti region) who are responsible for committing atrocities against the civilian population. This makes the Central Government to be an awkward and not very trustworthy partner for MINUSMA. At the same time, returning to political tasks alone may further destabilize the country and possibly the whole Sahel-West African region.

Conclusion

There is no doubt MINUSMA operates hostile environment where around half of all blue helmets killed worldwide through malign acts since 2013 have lost their lives. However, MINUSMA has been heavily criticized by public opinion in Mali and accused of passivity regarding protection of civilians whereas critics say, blue helmets have placed their own security above the rest. The has contributed to this public perception by using the mission's problems as a scapegoat for its own failures. However, the mission (with its successes and failures) brings more advantages than inconveniences to the overall process of stabilization of Mali[22].

As many diplomats in Bamako and other public officials stress, the mission and its chief, Mahamat Saleh Annadif, play an important role as mediators both in Bamako politics and with respect to the peace agreement. We cannot discredit the mission of its contribution to Mali's stabilisation. As a matter of fact, it is legitimate to claim that the situation would be much worse without MINUSMA. Yet, the mission has not stopped the spread of violence but rather slowed down the deterioration process of the situation.

While much presence is still needed in northern Mali, we should not forget that the core of the problem to Mali's instability is partly on the political arena and therefore needs mediation. Therefore, importance of continuing political and military support to the peace process should not be underestimated.

At the same time, we have seen the situation over protection of civilians has worsened in the central regions, which requires additional resources. Enhancing MINUSMA's outreach and representation might prevent the central regions from collapsing, though solutions need to be found to ensure stability in the long term through mediation as well. Further expanding the mission in the central regions without affecting the deployment in the north and, therefore, not risking the stability of those regions, would require that MINUSMA have additional resources. This would clearly be the best option for Mali.

Resources could for instance be devoted to improve the lack of mobility in the form of helicopters and armoured carriers to make it possible for the mission to expand its scope beyond the vicinity of its instructions. Staying in the instructions makes MINUSMA more of a target than a security provider and only provides security to its nearby zones where the base is physically present. In addition, the most dangerous missions are carried out by African peacekeepers despite lacking adequate means whereas European countries' peacekeepers are mostly based in MINUSMA's headquarters in Bamako, Gao, or Timbuktu. While European peacekeepers possess more sophisticated equipment such as surveillance drones and air support, African troops do not benefit from those and have to face the most challenging geographical and security environments escorting logistical convoys[23].

Additionally, by accelerating the re-integration of former rebels to the Malian security forces, encouraging Malian police training, and demonstrating increased presence through joint patrols in most unstable areas to protect civilians are key to minimize the threat of further violence. Increased state visibility as we have analysed in this essay has driven to insecurity situations. Consequently, if it can be as much of the problem, it can also be the solution to re-establish some of its legitimacy alongside with the signatories of the Peace Accord to show good faith and engagement in the peace process[24]. 

In the end, any contribution MINUSMA can make will depend on the willingness of Malians to strive for an effective and inclusive government on the one hand and the commitment of the International community on the other. Supporting such a long-term process cannot be done on the cheap. Therefore, countries cannot continue to request to do more with the same or even less resources.

NOTES

[Scott Martelle, William Walker's Wars. How One Man's Private Army Tried to Conquer Mexico, Nicaragua, and Honduras. Chicago Review Press. Chicago, 2019. 312 p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

The history of U.S. interference in Latin America is long. In plenary session of the Executive Council Manifest destiny of expansion towards the West in the mid-nineteenth century, to extend the country from coast to coast, there were also attempts to extend sovereignty to the South. Those who occupied the White House were satisfied with half of Mexico, which completed a comfortable access to the Pacific, but there were personal initiatives to attempt to purchase and even conquer Central American territories.

One of those initiatives was led by William Walker, who at the head of several hundred filibusters -the American Falange-, snatched the presidency of Nicaragua and dreamed of a slave empire that would attract the investments of American Southerners if slavery was abolished in the United States. Walker, from Tennessee, first tried to create a republic in Sonora, to integrate that Mexican territory into the United States, and then focused his interest on Nicaragua, which was then an attractive passage for Americans who wanted to cross the Central American isthmus to the gold mines of California, where he himself had sought his fortune. Disallowed and detained several times by the US authorities, due to the problems he caused them with the neighboring governments, he was finally expelled from Nicaragua by force of arms and shot to death when he tried to return, setting foot in Honduras.

Scott Martelle's book is both a portrait of the character - someone without special leadership skills and with a rather delicate appearance unbecoming of a mercenary chief, who nevertheless knew how to generate lucrative expectations among those who followed him (2,518 Americans came to enlist) - and a chronicle of his military campaigns in the South of the United States. It also describes well the mid-19th century atmosphere in cities like San Francisco and New Orleans, full of migrants coming from other parts of the country and in transit to wherever fortune would take them.

It also offers a detailed account of the business developed by the magnate Vanderbilt to establish a route, inaugurated in 1851, that used the San Juan River to reach Lake Nicaragua and from there to go out to the Pacific, with the intention of establishing a railroad connection and the subsequent purpose of building a canal in a few years. Although the overland route was longer than the one that at that time was also being traced under similar conditions on the Isthmus of Panama, the boat trip from the United States to Nicaragua was shorter than the one that had to be made to Panama. The latter explains why, during the second half of the 19th century, the Nicaragua canal project had more supporters in Washington than the Panama project.

Although Panama is one of the symbols of US interference in its "backyard", the success of the transoceanic canal project and its return to the Panamanians largely deactivates a "black legend" that still exists in the Nicaraguan case. Nicaragua is probably the Central American country that has experienced the most US "imperialism". The Walker episode (1855-1857) marks a beginning; then followed the US government's own military interventions (1912-1933), Washington's close support for the Somoza dictatorship (1937-1979) and direct involvement in the fight against the Sandinista Revolution (1981-1990).

Walker arrived in Nicaragua attracted by the U.S. interest in the inter-oceanic passage and with the excuse of helping one of the sides fighting in one of the many civil wars between conservatives and liberals that were taking place in the former Spanish colonies. Elevated to chief of the Army, in 1856 he was elected president of a country in which he could barely control the area whose center was the city of Granada, on the northern shore of Lake Nicaragua.

As he established his power, he moved away from any initial idea of integrating Nicaragua into the United States and dreamed of forging a Central American empire that would even include Mexico and Cuba. Slavery, which in Nicaragua had been abolished in 1838 and he reinstated in 1856, entered into his strategy. He imagined it as a means of preventing Washington from renouncing to extend its sovereignty to those territories, given the internal balances in the US between slave and non-slave states, and as a capital attraction for southern slaveholders. He was finally expelled from the country in 1857 thanks to the push of an army assembled by neighboring countries. In 1860 he attempted a return, but was captured and shot in Trujillo (Honduras). His adventure was fueled by the belief in the superiority of the white and Anglo-Saxon man, which led him to despise the aspirations of the Hispanic peoples and to overestimate the warlike capacity of his mercenaries.

Martelle's book responds more to a historicist purpose than an informative one, so its reading is not so much for the general public as for those specifically interested in William Walker's fulibusterism: an episode, in any case, of convenient knowledge about the Central American past and the relationship of the United States with the rest of the Western Hemisphere.

UNHCR staff building a tent for Venezuelan refugees in the Colombian city of Cúcuta [UNHCR].

April 3, 2020

COMMENTARY / Paula Ulibarrena

The restrictive measures imposed by the states to try to contain the coronavirus epidemic mean that millions of people are no longer going to work or working from home. But not everyone can stop working or switch to teleworking. There are self-employed people, small businesses, neighborhood stores, street traders or street vendors, and freelance artists who live practically from day to day. For them and for many others who have no income or see their income reduced, expenses will continue to be the same: payment of utilities, rents, mortgages, school fees and, of course, food and medicine.

All these social impacts caused by the coronavirus crisis are already beginning to be questioned among those living in the "red zone" of the epidemic. In Italy, for example, some political groups have demanded that aid should not be given to large companies, but to this group of precarious workers or needy families, and are demanding a "basic quarantine income".

Similar approaches are emerging in other parts of the world and have even led some leaders to anticipate the demands of the population. In France, Emmanuel Macron announced that the government will assume the credits, and suspended the payment of rents, taxes and electricity, gas and water bills. In the United States, Donald Trump's government announced that checks will be sent to each family to face the expenses or risks implied by the pandemic.

In other major crises, the State has come to the rescue of large companies and banks. Now it is demanded that public resources be used to rescue those most in need.

In every crisis, it is the most disadvantaged who have the worst time, today there are more than 126 million people in the world in need of humanitarian attendance , including 70 million forcibly displaced persons. Among these groups, we are beginning to see the first cases of infection (Ninive-Iraq displaced persons camp, Somalia, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Sudan, Venezuela ....), the report of cases in Burkina Faso is particularly illustrative of the challenge of responding in a context where medical care is limited. Malian refugees who were once displaced to Burkina Faso are being forced to return to Mali, and ongoing violence inhibits humanitarian and medical access to affected populations.

Many refugee camps suffer from insufficient hygiene and sanitation facilities, creating conditions conducive to the spread of disease. Official response plans in the United States, South Korea, China and Europe require social distancing, which is physically impossible in many displacement camps and in the crowded urban settings in which many forcibly displaced people live. Jan Egeland, director general of the Norwegian Refugee committee , warned that COVID-19 could "decimate refugee communities." 

Jacob Kurtzer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington warns that national policies of isolation in reaction to the spread of COVID-19 also have negative consequences for people facing humanitarian emergencies. Thus the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration have announced the end of refugee resettlement programs, as some host governments have halted refugee entrance and imposed travel restrictions as part of their official response.

Compounding these challenges is the reality that humanitarian funding, which can barely meet global demand and may be affected as donor states feel they must focus such funds on the Covid-19 response at this time.

On the flip side, the coronavirus could present an opportunity to de-escalate some armed conflicts. For example, the European Union has order a cessation of hostilities and cessation of military transfers in Libya to allow authorities to focus on responding to the health emergency. The Islamic State has issued repeated messages in its Al-Naba bulletin asking fighters not to travel to Europe and to reduce attacks while concentrating on staying free of the virus. 

Kurtzer suggests that this is an opportunity to reflect on the nature of humanitarian work abroad and ensure that it is not overlooked. Interestingly, developed countries face real medical vulnerability, indeed Médecins Sans Frontières has opened facilities in four locations in Italy. Cooperating with reliable humanitarian organizations at the national level will be of vital importance to respond to the needs of the population and at the same time develop a greater understanding of the vital work they perform in humanitarian settings abroad.

[Maria Zuppello, Il Jihad ai Tropici. Il patto tra terrorismo islamico e crimine organizzato in America Latina. Paese Edizioni. Roma, 2019. 215 p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

We usually link jihad with the Middle East. If anything, also with the African Sachel, opening the map to the west, or with the border of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, opening it to the east. However, Latin America also has a place in this geography. It has it as a place for financing the terrorist struggle - cocaine is a business that the Islamists take advantage of, as happens with heroin in the specific case of the Taliban - and also as a space in which to go unnoticed, off the radar (the Caribbean or Brazilian beaches are the last place that would be imagined as a hiding place for jihadists).

Jihad in the Tropics, by Italian researcher Maria Zuppello, deals precisely with that lesser-known aspect of global jihadism: the caipirinha jihadists, to put it graphically, to emphasize the normality with which these radicalized elements live in the Latin American context, although they are criminal networks more sinister than the name might suggest.

Zuppello's research , which is subtitled "the pact between Islamic terrorism and organized crime in Latin America", deals with various countries, although it is in Brazil where the author locates the main connections with the rest of the region and with the international Structures of various jihadist groups. In particular, she points out the link between the religious leader Imran Hosein, who propagates Salafist doctrines, and the attack against the Bataclan conference room in Paris, since his preaching had a special responsibility in the radicalization of one of the terrorists, Samy Amimour. Zuppello also analyzes the cross-contacts of the Brazilians who were arrested in 2016 in the Hashtag operation, in the final stretch of the preparation for the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro.

Zuppello's book begins with a presentation position Emanuele Ottolenghi, a researcher working at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington think tank. Ottolenghi is an expert on Hezbollah's presence in Latin America, on which he has written numerous articles.

In that presentation, Ottolenghi highlights the partnership established between jihadist elements and certain levels of the Latin American left, especially the Bolivarian left. "The extremist messages differ little from the anti-imperialist revolution rhetoric of the radical left, deeply rooted for decades in Latin America," he says. This explains "the appeal of the Islamic revolution to descendants of the Incas in the remote Andean community of Abancay, a four-hour drive from Machu Picchu, and to Cuban and Salvadoran revolutionaries (now dedicated to spreading Khomeini's word in Central America)."

For Ottolenghi, "the central topic of the red-green alliance between Bolivarians and Islamists is the so-called resistance to U.S. imperialism. Behind this revolutionary rhetoric, however, there is more. The creation of a strategic alliance between Tehran and Caracas has opened the door to Latin America for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah. Venezuela has become a hub for Iran's agents in the region".

Illicit trafficking generates millions of dollars of black money that is laundered through international circuits. The "Lebanese diaspora communities" in areas such as La Guaira (between Venezuela and Colombia), Margarita Island (Venezuela), the free trade zone of Colon (Panama) and the Triple Border (between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina) are important in this process.

Precisely that Triple Border has been the usual place to refer to when talking about Hezbollah in Latin America. The attacks occurred in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994 against the Israeli Embassy and the AMIA, respectively, had their operative origin there and since then, the financial links of that geographic corner with the Shiite extremist group have been frequently documented. Since the arrival of Hugo Chávez to power, there was a convergence between Venezuela and Iran that protected the obtaining of Venezuelan passports by Islamist radicals, who also took over part of the drug trafficking business as Chávez himself involved the Venezuelan state in the cocaine business.

The convergence of interests between organized crime networks in the region and jihadist elements raises the question, according to Zuppello, of whether "Latin America will end up being the new cash machine for financing global jihad", or even "something else: a hideout for fleeing foreign fighters or a new platform for attacks, or both".

One of the specific aspects to which Zuppello refers is the halal sector and its certifications, which is growing exponentially, causing concern among counter-terrorism authorities in various countries, who accuse the sector of concealing terrorist financing and money laundering. The halal meat trade has provided cover for dozens of Iranian meat inspectors, who have permanently settled in the region.

Investigations such as the one carried out in Jihad in the Tropics have led to the recognition of Hezbollah as a terrorist group by several Latin American countries for the first time in 2019.

Alliance maintains its focus on Russia, but for the first time expresses concern over Beijing's actions

NATO had begun 2020 in the spirit of leaving behind the internal problems of its particular annus horribilis - a 2019 in which the organization had reached "brain death," according to French President Emmanuel Macron - but the absence of global normality due to the coronavirus crisis is making it difficult to fully put into internship what was agreed at the London Summit, held last December to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the creation of the Alliance. Precisely, the London Declaration expressed concern about China's actions on issues such as 5G.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] member countries.

March 31, 2020

article / Jairo Císcar

NATO Summits bring together the Heads of State and/or Government of the member countries and serve to take strategic decisions at the highest level, such as the internship of new policies (as, for example, the New Strategic Concept at the Lisbon Summit 2010), the introduction of new members into the Alliance (Istanbul Summit 2004, with seven new members), or the advertisement major initiatives, as was done at the Newport Summit 2014, where the core coalition of what would later become the International Coalition against the Islamic State was announced.

The London Summit took place on December 3 and 4 to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the creation of the Alliance, which had its first headquarters in the British capital. At the work meetings, attended by all 29 member states, the focus was on three main issues: (a) the continuing tension-distension between Washington and Paris; (b) the economic issue, both the trade war between the European and US defense industry and the defense investment of member countries; and (c) the management of an increasingly fractious Turkey.

a) With regard to the Washington-Paris dispute, we witnessed a new chapter in the two ways of understanding the Atlantic Alliance on the part of two of the countries most committed to it. While the US continues to insist on the importance of focusing the Alliance's efforts on an Eastern axis (against Russia and Middle Eastern jihadism), France wants NATO's strategic axis to be centered in the South, in the African Sahel. This is a vision shared and supported by Spain, which participates in several missions on African soil such as EUTM-Mali or the Ivory Detachment in Senegal (which provides strategic transport in the area to the countries participating in AFISMA and especially to France). For Southern Europe, the greatest threat is the jihadist one, and it has its center of gravity in Africa. This is what Macron made known.

b) The economic issue continues to be fundamental, and this was addressed at the Summit. Since the 2014 Newport Summit, in which the 29 members agreed to direct their efforts to increase defense expense to at least 2% of GDP, only nine have achieved the goal (Spain is at the bottom, surpassing only Luxembourg with a derisory 0.92%). The United States, at the head of defense investment within NATO, contributes 22% of the entire budget. The Trump Administration not only wants this increase so that the Alliance has larger, more prepared and modernized armies, but also frames the increase in an ambitious commercial strategy, with the F-35 "Lightning" as the main product. As an example, Poland: after reaching the required 2%, this country announced the purchase of 35 F-35s and their software and technical support for $6.5 billion. Thus, the US was able to cope with the losses caused by the breakdown of the agreement with Turkey after the Ottomans acquired the Russian S-400 system. With this acquisition, Poland jo ins the club of seven other NATO members with this aircraft, facing the commercial offensive of the European producer bloc to continue selling "Eurofighter" packages and, especially, the recent Future Combat Air System (led by Airbus and Dassault), of which Spain is a member. Europe wants to create a strong Defense Industry community for reasons of self-sufficiency and to compete in the markets against the US industry, so we are facing a "mini" trade war between allied countries.

c) Regarding Turkey, the most uncomfortable member of NATO, there was a clear negative feeling. It is an unreliable ally, which is attacking other allies in Operation Inherent Resolve such as the Kurdish militias, considered terrorists by the Ankara government. Hovering over the leaders present in London was the fear of a possible invocation of article 5 of the Washington Treaty by Turkey calling for an active confrontation in Syria. NATO does not have much choice, for if it does not stand up to Erdogan, it would be pushing him completely into the Russian orbit.

London Declaration

The final statement of the summit showed a change of focus within the Alliance: until now, Russia was the main concern and, although it is still a priority, China is taking its place. The Declaration can be divided into three blocks.

1) The first block functions as an emergency stopgap, with the aim of satisfying the most discordant voices and creating a picture of apparent seamless union. In its first point, the member states reaffirm the commitment of all countries to the common values they share, citing democracy, individual freedom, human rights and the rule of law. As a gesture to Turkey, article 5 is mentioned as the cornerstone of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is clear that, at least in the short to medium term, Western countries want to keep Turkey as a partner, being willing to compromise in small gestures.

Further on, the Alliance insists on the need to "continue to strengthen the capabilities, both of member states and collectively, to resist all forms of attack". With regard to the 2% goal , which is paramount for the US and the top spending states, it is stated that good progress is being made, but that "more must and will be done".

2) The next block goes into a purely strategic and less political subject . The Alliance notes that the current international system is under attack by state and non-state actors. It highlights the threat posed by Russia to the Eurasian region and introduces irregular immigration as a source of instability.

With regard to this stabilization, the Alliance's main guidelines will be to ensure a long-term presence in Afghanistan, a stronger partnership with the UN, as well as a direct NATO-EU partnership , and to increase its global presence and work at all levels. The Alliance wants to increase its global presence and its work at all levels. The forthcoming accession of North Macedonia as the 30th member of the Alliance is sample clear message to Russia that there is no place in Europe for its influence.

Clearly, for NATO we find ourselves in 4th generation conflicts, with the use of cyber and hybrid warfare. The commitment to 360° security within the Alliance is mentioned. The Alliance is aware of the changing realities of the battlefield and the international arena, and sample its commitment to adapt and update its capabilities.

3) As a third block, for the first time China is mentioned directly as an issue requiring joint decisions. The leadership that China is assuming in the field of communications and internet, especially with 5G technology, is of deep concern in the Atlanticist bosom. In an operating environment where cyberwarfare and hybrid warfare will change the way we deal with conflict, we want to ensure the resilience of societies that are completely dependent on technology, especially by protecting critical infrastructure (government buildings, hospitals, etc.) and energy security. In London, the importance of developing our own systems so as not to depend on those provided by countries that could use them against consumers was also proclaimed, as well as the need to increase offensive and defensive capabilities in the cyber environment. It was recognized that China's growing influence in the international arena presents both opportunities and risks, and that it is an issue that must be closely and permanently monitored.

The Document ends with a statement of intent: "In times of challenge, we are stronger as an Alliance and our people are more secure. Our togetherness and commitment to each other has guaranteed our freedoms, values and security for 70 years. We act today to ensure that NATO guarantees these freedoms, values and security for generations to come."

Although it was a bittersweet summit, with many disagreements and unfortunate comments, the reality is that, outside of politics, the Alliance is prepared. It is aware of the threats it faces, both internal and external. It knows the realities of today's world and wants to act accordingly, with a greater and more lasting Degree involvement. Although words have often remained on paper, this Declaration and this Summit show an Alliance that, with its particularities, is ready to face the challenges of the 21st century; its old ghosts, such as Russia, and its new threats, such as China.