[Pablo Pérez López, Charles de Gaulle, el estadista rebelde (Ciudadela: Madrid, 2020), 218 pp.]
review / Jairo Císcar
Coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the death of Charles de Gaulle and the 75th anniversary of the Allied victory in World War II, Professor Pablo Pérez López publishes this new biography of "the most illustrious of the French", as he is sometimes referred to. When one undertakes the writing of a biography, and even more so when it is about a character about whom an infinite number of books and articles have been written, one runs the risk of becoming diluted in what has gone before and not contributing anything new. However, this Issue presents the character from a different perspective: his rebelliousness. Rebelliousness understood as a fight for what is believed to be just, as an active nonconformism that pushes to overcome mediocrity, as love and service to France in its darkest moments. I believe that this is precisely one of the book's greatest achievements: to present, in barely 200 pages and with a friendly and direct style, a new portrait of the French general, whom it praises -beyond the excusable chiaroscuros of every person- as a model to follow and an example of courage that is fully up to date.
The book presents De Gaulle's life chronologically, from his childhood to his death. It is essential, in order to understand the great man he would later become, to analyze his early life. We are presented with a restless and dreamy young man, a devout Christian from a very early age. A young man who, at the age of 14, discovered a vocation, that of military life, which would mark his entire life and the lives of millions of his compatriots, and who would apply himself to it to the point of becoming A Also noteworthy in the book is the extensive use of passages from his memoirs or handwritten texts of the protagonist, which reveal the most unknown facet of the character: his psyche, his love, his devotion, his rebelliousness. Because it must be emphasized that it sample a self-conscious (but not overbearing) De Gaulle, who is clear that he has a mission statement.
We soon move on to introduce the then captain, who stood out during the Great War for his wise analysis and foresight, whose love for France never clouded his judgment when it came to pointing out his own and others' failures. A young man who, despite the humiliation of being taken prisoner (despite his heroic efforts that earned him the Legion of Honor), never ceased to learn and examine the enemy, taking advantage of every moment of his 32 months of captivity.
His evolution is followed after the Great War, already as a promising member of Petáin's entourage. But not everything is success. De Gaulle's life is traced in the greatness of men who know how to overcome difficulties. Perhaps the most special, and where his true character is appreciated, is in the life of his daughter Anne, who suffered from Down syndrome, and with whom De Gaulle developed an extraordinary bond and closeness. It was with her that the thoughtful general dressed as an affable and affectionate father.
This training of his character seems to me essential to understand the rest of the book, and therefore the rest of his life. Without wanting to end up making a complete summary of the Issue (which, as mentioned above, covers his entire life, with special and necessary emphasis on his "political life"), it seemed necessary to reflect the singular proposal and goal of this book, which is none other than to show that more unknown side of the French general, that rebelliousness and nonconformism that pushed him to have a very important weight in the creation of the current form of the French Republic and whose imprint, 50 years after his death, is still alive in Europe and in French politics.
Personally, I was very attracted to the style and organization of the writing. It makes the proposal enjoyable and easy to read, while at the same time a very serious and profound work , which invites constant reflection. It sample the intimacy and loneliness of a man faced with the incomprehension of his contemporaries, with respect to whom he was always ahead of the curve. A man who, in the final, always put the greater good, his beloved France, before his own good. An expert tankman who knew how to lead his country in such different moments: the Free French government in London, the parade on the Champs Elysées, the revolt of Algiers, the birth of the Fifth French Republic, May '68 and his last resignation, as a man of honor, after losing the referendum on the Senate and the regions that he called, in one of his last acts of rebellion, against all his advisors.
Finally, De Gaulle was a rebel until death, refusing any state funeral and resting, together with his beloved daughter, in a small French village. His tombstone - which simply reads: Charles de Gaulle, 1890-1970 - merely shows his final rebellion. The man died, but the myth was born.
China, Russia and Iran have increased their relationship with needier Latin America due to Covid, which has also provided an opportunity for organized crime.
► Nicolás Maduro Guerra, after getting the Sputnik V vaccine, with the Russian ambassador in Caracas, in December 2020 [Russian Embassy].
report SRA 2021 / executive summary [PDF version] [PDF version].
MAY 2021-The serious health and economic crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic has accentuated Latin America's vulnerabilities, also in terms of regional security. On the one hand, it has increased dependence on external powers, whose influence has grown through the shipment of vaccines (China and Russia) or gasoline and food (Iran). On the other hand, it has reduced the means for states to combat organized crime, which has made some strategic moves, such as the consolidation of Paraguay as an important focus of drug trafficking. Although the status prolonged confinement has made it possible to reduce the homicide issue in some places, as in the case of Colombia, the deterioration of regional stability has led the United States to pay greater attention to the rest of the Western Hemisphere, with a clear warning given by the U.S. Southern Command.
The needs imposed by Covid-19 around the globe have made some safety requirements more pressing in certain countries. With international trade disrupted by movement limitations, China's food security has pushed its long-distance fishing fleets to adopt more aggressive behavior. Although a growing influx of Chinese fishermen has been detected in the waters off South America for some years now, in 2020 the status took a qualitative leap. The presence of more than 500 vessels raised concerns about the continuous evasion of radars, the use of non-permitted extraction systems and the disobedience of coastguards. The governments of Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru issued a joint statement calling for the supervision of an activity that Beijing refuses to submit to international inspection. The intimidation is reminiscent of the use of Chinese fishermen as a "shock force" in the South China Sea, although here the goal is not to gain sovereignty, but to gain fishing space. Washington has expressed concern about China's activity both around the Galapagos and in the South Atlantic.
The pandemic has been a propitious occasion for the consolidation of penetration in Latin America by China and, to a lesser extent, Russia. Thanks to "vaccine diplomacy", Beijing is now a fully global partner : not only in terms of trade and loans for infrastructure, but also on a par with the United States and Europe in terms of pharmaceutical excellence and health care provider . While it is true that Latin America is getting more "Western" vaccines - only Peru, Chile and Argentina have contracted more Chinese and Russian doses - the export of injectables from China and Russia has increased its influence in the region. Huawei has managed to enter the 5G tender in Brazil in exchange for vaccines, and Beijing has offered them to Paraguay if it abandons its recognition of Taiwan. In addition to clinical trials in several Latin American nations in the second half of 2020, Argentina and Mexico will produce or package Sputnik V starting in June.
The worsening of the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela throughout 2020, on the other hand, made it easier for Iran to strengthen its ties with the regime of Nicolás Maduro, resuming a special relationship already in place during the presidencies of Chávez and Ahmadinejad. With no more credits from China or Russia, Venezuela looked to the Iranians to try to reactivate the country's paralyzed refineries. With no particular success in that endeavor, Iran ended up becoming a supplier of more than 5 million barrels of gasoline through cargo ships; it also delivered food to supply a supermarket opened by the Iranians in Caracas. With oil production at a minimum, Maduro paid for Tehran's services with shipments of gold, worth at least 500 million dollars.
All this activity of extra-hemispheric powers in the region is pointed out by the US Southern Command, the US military structure in charge of Latin America and the Caribbean, as a cause of serious concern for Washington. In his annual appearances before congress, the head of SouthCom has progressively raised the Degree Threat. In his last appearance, at the beginning of 2021, Admiral Craig Faller was particularly alarming about China's advance in the region: he referred to the controversy over Chinese fishermen - their alleged invasion of exclusive economic zones and illegal activity - and to the $1 billion credit announced by Beijing for financial aid in sanitary material against Covid-19. Faller said that the US "is losing its positional advantage" and called for "immediate action to reverse this trend".
Another of Washington's concerns relates to transnational crime, specifically that perpetrated by Latino gangs in the United States. In the last year, US federal prosecutors have for the first time brought charges against members of the Mara Salvatrucha for crimes against national security. The US continues to classify the gangs as a criminal organization, not a terrorist group , but in charges filed in July 2020 and January 2021 against the MS-13 leadership imprisoned in El Salvador, it has moved to consider some of its leaders as terrorists. The department Justice considers the connection between the decisions taken in Salvadoran prisons and crimes committed in the United States to be proven. In the last five years, US courts have convicted 504 gang members, 73 of whom received life sentences.
In terms of citizen security, the prolonged confinements for Covid-19 have allowed for a slight reduction in violence figures in some countries, especially in the first half of 2020. In the case of Colombia, this temporary effect was combined with the trend to leave the homicide issue that has been observed in the country since the beginning of the negotiations for the peace process in 2012, so that the 2020 figures represented a historic low, with a rate of 24.3 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, the leave since 1975. Several programs of study consider that there is a link between the demobilization of the FARC and the consistent drop in the level of violence that the country is experiencing. This is a positive development that is overshadowed by the murder of social leaders and former guerrillas, which at the beginning of 2021 had already reached more than 1,000 since the signature of the peace agreement in 2016.
The drug trafficking chapter has seen two notable developments in the last year. One is the increase in "trials" of coca cultivation in Honduras and Guatemala, which were previously only transit countries for cocaine. Both are consolidating their beginnings as producer countries, which is an important qualitative leap despite the fact that production is still very limited. After cocaine processing laboratories were located in both countries, the first plantations were discovered in 2017 in Honduras and in 2018 in Guatemala; since then, more than 100 hectares of coca bush have been detected, a very small number for the time being. Throughout 2020, Honduras eradicated 40 hectares of cultivation and Guatemala 19. Part of this own production infrastructure came to light in the trial held in the US against Tony Hernandez, brother of the president of Honduras, who in March 2021 was sentenced to life imprisonment.
For its part, Paraguay is on the rise on the drug trafficking map, as South America's biggest marijuana producer and a distributor of cocaine from Peru and Bolivia. Most of the marijuana cultivation takes place around Pedro Juan Caballero, near the border with Brazil, which is the country's criminal center. The plantations reach some 8,000 hectares, with production reaching 30,000 tons, of which 77% goes to Brazil and 20% to Argentina. At the beginning of 2021, more than 30 tons of cocaine shipped from Paraguay were located in northern European ports, making it a decisive "hub" for the distribution of this drug.
Behind the tension between Qatar and its neighbors is the Qatari ambitious foreign policy and its refusal to obey
Recent diplomatic contacts between Qatar and Saudi Arabia have suggested the possibility of a breakthrough in the bitter dispute held by Qatar and its Arab neighbors in the Gulf since 2017. An agreement could be within reach in order to suspend the blockade imposed on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain (and Egypt), and clarify the relations the Qataris have with Iran. The resolution would help Qatar hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup free of tensions. This article gives a brief context to understand why things are the way they are.
▲ Ahmad Bin Ali Stadium, one of the premises for the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar
ARTICLE / Isabelle León
The diplomatic crisis in Qatar is mainly a political conflict that has shown how far a country can go to retain leadership in the regional balance of power, as well as how a country can find alternatives to grow regardless of the blockade of neighbors and former trading partners. In 2017, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain broke diplomatic ties with Qatar and imposed a blockade on land, sea, and air.
When we refer to the Gulf, we are talking about six Arab states: Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. As neighbors, these countries founded the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 to strengthen their relation economically and politically since all have many similarities in terms of geographical features and resources like oil and gas, culture, and religion. In this alliance, Saudi Arabia always saw itself as the leader since it is the largest and most oil-rich Gulf country, and possesses Mecca and Medina, Islam's holy sites. In this sense, dominance became almost unchallenged until 1995, when Qatar started pursuing a more independent foreign policy.
Tensions grew among neighbors as Iran and Qatar gradually started deepening their trading relations. Moreover, Qatar started supporting Islamist political groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, considered by the UAE and Saudi Arabia as terrorist organizations. Indeed, Qatar acknowledges the support and assistance provided to these groups but denies helping terrorist cells linked to Al-Qaeda or other terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State or Hamas. Additionally, with the launch of the tv network Al Jazeera, Qatar gave these groups a means to broadcast their voices. Gradually the environment became tense as Saudi Arabia, leader of Sunni Islam, saw the Shia political groups as a threat to its leadership in the region.
Consequently, the Gulf countries, except for Oman and Kuwait, decided to implement a blockade on Qatar. As political conditioning, the countries imposed specific demands that Qatar had to meet to re-establish diplomatic relations. Among them there were the detachment of the diplomatic ties with Iran, the end of support for Islamist political groups, and the cessation of Al Jazeera's operations. Qatar refused to give in and affirmed that the demands were, in some way or another, a violation of the country's sovereignty.
A country that proves resilient
The resounding blockade merited the suspension of economic activities between Qatar and these countries. Most shocking was, however, the expulsion of the Qatari citizens who resided in the other GCC states. A year later, Qatar filed a complaint with the International Court of Justice on grounds of discrimination. The court ordered that the families that had been separated due to the expulsion of their relatives should be reunited; similarly, Qatari students who were studying in these countries should be permitted to continue their studies without any inconvenience. The UAE issued an injunction accusing Qatar of halting the website where citizens could apply for UAE visas as Qatar responded that it was a matter of national security. Between accusations and statements, tensions continued to rise and no real improvement was achieved.
At the beginning of the restrictions, Qatar was economically affected because 40% of the food supply came to the country through Saudi Arabia. The reduction in the oil prices was another factor that participated on the economic disadvantage that situation posed. Indeed, the market value of Qatar decreased by 10% in the first four weeks of the crisis. However, the country began to implement measures and shored up its banks, intensified trade with Turkey and Iran, and increased its domestic production. Furthermore, the costs of the materials necessary to build the new stadiums and infrastructure for the 2022 FIFA World Cup increased; however, Qatar started shipping materials through Oman to avoid restrictions of UAE and successfully coped with the status quo.
This notwithstanding, in 2019, the situation caused almost the rupture of the GCC, an alliance that ultimately has helped the Gulf countries strengthen economic ties with European Countries and China. The gradual collapse of this organization has caused even more division between the blocking countries and Qatar, a country that hosts the largest US military base in the Middle East, as well as one of Turkey, which gives it an upper hand in the region and many potential strategic alliances.
The new normal or the beginning of the end?
Currently, the situation is slowly opening-up. Although not much progress has been made through traditional or legal diplomatic means to resolve this conflict, sports diplomacy has played a role. The countries have not yet begun to commercialize or have allowed the mobility of citizens, however, the event of November 2019 is an indicator that perhaps it is time to relax the measures. In that month, Qatar was the host of the 24th Arabian Gulf Cup tournament in which the Gulf countries participated with their national soccer teams. Due to the blockade, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain had boycotted the championship; however, after having received another invitation from the Arabian Gulf Cup Federation, the countries decided to participate and after three years of tensions, sent their teams to compete. The sporting event was emblematic and demonstrated how sport may overcome differences.
Moreover, recently Saudi Arabia has given declarations that the country is willing to engage in the process to lift-up the restrictions. This attitude toward the conflict means, in a way, improvement despite Riyadh still claims the need to address the security concerns that Qatar generates and calls for a commitment to the solution. As negotiations continue, there is a lot of skepticism between the parties that keep hindering the path toward the resolution.
Donald Trump's administration recently reiterated its cooperation and involvement in the process to end Qatar's diplomatic crisis. Indeed, US National Security Adviser Robert O'Brien stated that the US hopes in the next two months there would be an air bridge that will allow the commercial mobilization of citizens. The current scenario might be optimistic, but still, everything has remained in statements as no real actions have been taken. This participation is within the US strategic interest because the end of this rift can signify a victorious situation to the US aggressive foreign policy toward Iran and its desire to isolate the country. This situation remains a priority in Trump's last days in office. Notwithstanding, as the transition for the administration of Joe Biden begins, it is believed that he would take a more critical approach on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, pressuring them to put an end to the restrictions.
This conflict has turned into a political crisis of retention of power or influence over the region. It is all about Saudi Arabia's dominance being threatened by a tiny yet very powerful state, Qatar. Although more approaches to lift-up the rift will likely begin to take place and restrictions will gradually relax, this dynamic has been perceived by the international community and the Gulf countries themselves as the new normal. However, if the crisis is ultimately resolved, mistrust and rivalry will remain and will generate complications in a region that is already prone to insurgencies and instability. All the countries involved indeed have more to lose than to gain, but three years have been enough to show that there are ways to turn situations like these around.
The electricity interconnection project between Ceuta and the Peninsula, of the Spanish Electricity network , is already five years behind schedule. Its execution must be a priority in order to integrate the autonomous city in the future routes of the Europe-Africa connection.
article / Ignacio Urbasos Arbeloa
19.05.2021. In 1997 the submarine electrical interconnection between Tarifa and Punta Fardioua in Morocco was completed. This new connection joined the gas pipeline inaugurated in 1996 that crossed Morocco from Algeria to Spain and Portugal, forging a Spanish-Moroccan energy alliance that would allow economic development and security of energy supply for both partners. This infrastructure, with a capacity of 700 MW, was capable of supplying Morocco with nearly 50% of its annual electricity needs. This was a strategic link for the Maghreb country, which experienced a 5.8% annual growth in electricity demand during the 1990s. In 2006, this interconnection doubled its capacity to 1.4 GW, the first international interconnection between two continents in the world to reach this size. Despite recent frictions between Spain and Morocco over illegal immigration, fishing agreements and above all the Perejil incident, the recently arrived Socialist government led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was committed to strengthening ties between the two sides of the Strait of Gibraltar, continuing with the energy interconnection. Although at the beginning the submarine cable was mainly used for the export of electricity from Spain, in recent years bilateral exchanges have been balancing out, as a result of Morocco's strategy of energy autonomy.
From Ceuta, the route of the submarine cable has always been considered a lost historical opportunity. The autonomous city produces electricity from old diesel generators, which apart from being inefficient and expensive, have high levels of particulate emissions in the air and greenhouse gases. The city of Ceuta is the only region in Spain that does not produce renewable electricity, a status with little room for improvement considering the scarcity of space for its development. From network Eléctrica Española there is already a plan to develop a submarine cable between La Línea (Cádiz) and Ceuta, which has encountered civil service examination from environmental groups in Cádiz and the mayor of the area, which has forced to delay its installation from 2016 to the present. The CNMC granted in February 2021 at the request of network Eléctrica Española the character of singular project to this interconnection, which should facilitate the beginning of the installation that already raises alternative routes to reach the necessary social consensus. The submarine cable will have a rapid amortization, as it will eliminate the costs associated with the isolated electricity system in Ceuta, and will allow reducing the carbon emissions of this City, in line with the Spanish Climate Strategy, which aims to achieve zero net greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. The cable will join other similar interconnection infrastructures in Spain, such as those existing between the Balearic electricity system and the Peninsula or the submarine cable linking the Bay of Biscay with the French region of Aquitaine.
The cable will also diversify future interconnections between Spain and Morocco, which should grow as Morocco increases the amount of renewable energies in its electricity mix. Morocco, which has an ambitious decarbonization strategy, is committed to the development of renewable energies as a driver of future national economic growth and as a lever to ensure its regional leadership. Morocco already has interconnections with Algeria of 1.2 GW, and is planning a connection line with Portugal and Mauritania.
In any case, it is clear that Spain is a necessarily vital partner for Morocco's green project , which aims to export both electricity and renewable hydrogen to the European Union in the future. Spain 's position as a necessary energy bridge should serve as a strong argument in bilateral negotiations. In this sense, Ceuta should become a strategic point for future extensions in the electrical interconnection on both sides of the strait. The Moroccan strategy of implicit pressure on Ceuta and Melilla by closing cross-border trade or allowing the crossing of illegal immigrants is a move that clearly meets the definition of a gray zone offensive. The Alaouite dynasty has been making public and palpable for decades, specifically since its independence in 1956, its traditional longing and strategic interest in the only two non-insular territories that Spain has in North Africa. Connecting the peninsular electricity system with Ceuta should be considered as a strategic project for the benefit of national energy security, the reduction of greenhouse gases and the improvement of air quality. In addition, raising Ceuta as a necessary crossing point in the future electricity interconnections between Africa and Europe would offer Spain deterrence and negotiation capacity against a Morocco that does not hesitate to use direct pressure on the cities of Ceuta and Melilla to achieve its objectives in the bilateral relations Spain-Morocco.
[Juan Tovar Ruiz, La doctrina en la política exterior de Estados Unidos: De Truman a Trump ( Madrid: Catarata, 2017) 224 pages.]
review / Xabier Ramos Garzón
Every change in the White House leads to an analysis of the outgoing president's policies and to speculation about the policies of the incoming president. Given the weight of the United States in the world, the vision on international affairs of each administration is decisive for the world order. Juan Tovar Ruiz, professor of International Relations at the University of Burgos, deals in this book with the essence of the foreign policy of each president - mainly from Truman to Trump (Biden's, logically, is yet to be defined) - which in many cases follows a defined road map that has come to be called "doctrine".
Among the book's strengths are the fact that it combines several points of view: on the one hand, it covers, from the realist point of view, the structural and internal effects of each policy, and on the other, it analyzes the ideas and interactions between actors taking into account the constructivist point of view. The author explores the decision-making processes and their consequences, considers the ultimate effectiveness of American doctrines in the general context of international relations, and examines the influences, ruptures and continuities between different doctrines over time. Despite the relatively short history of the United States, the country has had an extensive and complex foreign policy which Tovar, focusing on the last eight decades, synthesizes with special merit, adopting a mainly general point of view that highlights the substantive.
The book is divided into seven chapters, organized by historical stages and, within each, by presidents. The first chapter, by way of introduction, covers the period following the independence of the United States until the end of World War II. This stage is sample as a core topic in the future American ideology, with two particularly decisive positions: the Monroe Doctrine and Wilsonian Idealism. The second chapter deals with the First Cold War, with the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson doctrines. Throughout the chapter, the different postulates are contextualized and the issues that were core topic in the creation of doctrines that only affected the foreign policy of the moment, but were imbricated in the core of American political thought are pointed out. The third chapter deals with the Distension, the period between 1969 and 1979 in which the doctrines of Nixon and Carter took place. The fourth chapter takes us to the Second Cold War and the end of the US-USSR confrontation, a time when we find the doctrines of Reagan and Bush senior. From this point, the following chapters (fifth, sixth and seventh) deal with the Post-Cold War period, with the doctrines of Clinton, Bush junior and the most recent ones - therefore still subject to study - of Obama and Trump.
In the conclusions, the author summarizes each of the chapters on the basis of academic or political characterizations and makes some qualifications, such as warning that in his opinion Obama's foreign policy is rather a "non-doctrine", since it combines elements of different ideologies and is partly contradictory. Obama dealt with various conflicts in different ways: he dealt realistically with "wars of necessity" (Afghanistan) and in agreement with the liberal internationalist approach with conflicts such as Libya. Although the flexibility pursued by Obama may be considered a weakness by some, since he did not follow a firm and marked policy, it can also be seen as the necessary adaptation to a continuously changing environment. There are many occasions when an American president, such as Bush Jr., has pursued a rigid foreign policy, ideologically speaking, that ultimately achieved little practical success written request
Another example of a variant of the conventional doctrine that the author sample is the "anti-doctrine" carried out by Trump. The man who was president until 2021 implemented a policy characterized by numerous contradictions and variations with respect to the role that the US had been playing in the world, thus casting doubts and uncertainties on the expected performance of the American superpower. This was due to Trump's political inexperience, both domestically and domestically, which caused concern not only among international actors but also in the core of Washington itself.
From the analysis of the different doctrines presented in the book, we can see how each one of them is adapted to a specific social, historical and political context, and at the same time they all respond to a shared political tradition of a country that, as a superpower, manifests certain constants when it comes to maintaining peace and guaranteeing security. But these constants should not be confused with universal aspects, since each country has its own particularities and specific interests: simply adapting U.S. positions to the foreign policy plans of other countries can lead to chaotic failures if these differences are not recognized.
For example, countries such as Spain, which depend on membership of the European Union, could not enter into random wars unilaterally as the United States has done. However, Spain could adopt some elements, such as in subject decision making, since this subject of doctrines greatly facilitates objectifying and standardizing the processes of analysis and resolutions.
WORKING PAPER / Jokin de Carlos Sola
ABSTRACT
During and after the fall of the Soviet Block the three countries of Germany, Denmark and Sweden saw an opportunity to increase their influence on the region that centuries before they had possessed. They did this through diplomatic support of the opposition and communication strategies and once the new countries were either independent or liberal democracies, they used their economic and political power to attract them. This was done by buying and investing in the new privatized assets of these countries, soft power and in some cases diplomatic pressure. By this way Germany, Sweden and Denmark did not only got new investment hubs and markets for their products but also support in the Governance of the European Union.
China, Russia and Iran have increased their relationship with needier Latin America due to Covid, which has also provided an opportunity for organized crime.
► Nicolás Maduro Guerra, after getting the Sputnik V vaccine, with the Russian ambassador in Caracas, in December 2020 [Russian Embassy].
report SRA 2021 / executive summary [PDF version] [PDF version].
MAY 2021-The serious health and economic crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic has accentuated Latin America's vulnerabilities, also in terms of regional security. On the one hand, it has increased dependence on external powers, whose influence has grown through the shipment of vaccines (China and Russia) or gasoline and food (Iran). On the other hand, it has reduced the means for states to combat organized crime, which has made some strategic moves, such as the consolidation of Paraguay as an important focus of drug trafficking. Although the status prolonged confinement has made it possible to reduce the homicide issue in some places, as in the case of Colombia, the deterioration of regional stability has led the United States to pay greater attention to the rest of the Western Hemisphere, with a clear warning given by the U.S. Southern Command.
The needs imposed by Covid-19 around the globe have made some safety requirements more pressing in certain countries. With international trade disrupted by movement limitations, China's food security has pushed its long-distance fishing fleets to adopt more aggressive behavior. Although a growing influx of Chinese fishermen has been detected in the waters off South America for some years now, in 2020 the status took a qualitative leap. The presence of more than 500 vessels raised concerns about the continuous evasion of radars, the use of non-permitted extraction systems and the disobedience of coastguards. The governments of Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru issued a joint statement calling for the supervision of an activity that Beijing refuses to submit to international inspection. The intimidation is reminiscent of the use of Chinese fishermen as a "shock force" in the South China Sea, although here the goal is not to gain sovereignty, but to gain fishing space. Washington has expressed concern about China's activity both around the Galapagos and in the South Atlantic.
The pandemic has been a propitious occasion for the consolidation of penetration in Latin America by China and, to a lesser extent, Russia. Thanks to "vaccine diplomacy", Beijing is now a fully global partner : not only in terms of trade and loans for infrastructure, but also on a par with the United States and Europe in terms of pharmaceutical excellence and health care provider . While it is true that Latin America is getting more "Western" vaccines - only Peru, Chile and Argentina have contracted more Chinese and Russian doses - the export of injectables from China and Russia has increased its influence in the region. Huawei has managed to enter the 5G tender in Brazil in exchange for vaccines, and Beijing has offered them to Paraguay if it abandons its recognition of Taiwan. In addition to clinical trials in several Latin American nations in the second half of 2020, Argentina and Mexico will produce or package Sputnik V starting in June.
The worsening of the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela throughout 2020, on the other hand, made it easier for Iran to strengthen its ties with the regime of Nicolás Maduro, resuming a special relationship already in place during the presidencies of Chávez and Ahmadinejad. With no more credits from China or Russia, Venezuela looked to the Iranians to try to reactivate the country's paralyzed refineries. With no particular success in that endeavor, Iran ended up becoming a supplier of more than 5 million barrels of gasoline through cargo ships; it also delivered food to supply a supermarket opened by the Iranians in Caracas. With oil production at a minimum, Maduro paid for Tehran's services with shipments of gold, worth at least 500 million dollars.
All this activity of extra-hemispheric powers in the region is pointed out by the US Southern Command, the US military structure in charge of Latin America and the Caribbean, as a cause of serious concern for Washington. In his annual appearances before congress, the head of SouthCom has progressively raised the Degree Threat. In his last appearance, at the beginning of 2021, Admiral Craig Faller was particularly alarming about China's advance in the region: he referred to the controversy over Chinese fishermen - their alleged invasion of exclusive economic zones and illegal activity - and to the $1 billion credit announced by Beijing for financial aid in sanitary material against Covid-19. Faller said that the US "is losing its positional advantage" and called for "immediate action to reverse this trend".
Another of Washington's concerns relates to transnational crime, specifically that perpetrated by Latino gangs in the United States. In the last year, US federal prosecutors have for the first time brought charges against members of the Mara Salvatrucha for crimes against national security. The US continues to classify the gangs as a criminal organization, not a terrorist group , but in charges filed in July 2020 and January 2021 against the MS-13 leadership imprisoned in El Salvador, it has moved to consider some of its leaders as terrorists. The department Justice considers the connection between the decisions taken in Salvadoran prisons and crimes committed in the United States to be proven. In the last five years, US courts have convicted 504 gang members, 73 of whom received life sentences.
In terms of citizen security, the prolonged confinements for Covid-19 have allowed for a slight reduction in violence figures in some countries, especially in the first half of 2020. In the case of Colombia, this temporary effect was combined with the trend to leave the homicide issue that has been observed in the country since the beginning of the negotiations for the peace process in 2012, so that the 2020 figures represented a historic low, with a rate of 24.3 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, the leave since 1975. Several programs of study consider that there is a link between the demobilization of the FARC and the consistent drop in the level of violence that the country is experiencing. This is a positive development that is overshadowed by the murder of social leaders and former guerrillas, which at the beginning of 2021 had already reached more than 1,000 since the signature of the peace agreement in 2016.
The drug trafficking chapter has seen two notable developments in the last year. One is the increase in "trials" of coca cultivation in Honduras and Guatemala, which were previously only transit countries for cocaine. Both are consolidating their beginnings as producer countries, which is an important qualitative leap despite the fact that production is still very limited. After cocaine processing laboratories were located in both countries, the first plantations were discovered in 2017 in Honduras and in 2018 in Guatemala; since then, more than 100 hectares of coca bush have been detected, a very small number for the time being. Throughout 2020, Honduras eradicated 40 hectares of cultivation and Guatemala 19. Part of this own production infrastructure came to light in the trial held in the US against Tony Hernandez, brother of the president of Honduras, who in March 2021 was sentenced to life imprisonment.
For its part, Paraguay is on the rise on the drug trafficking map, as South America's biggest marijuana producer and a distributor of cocaine from Peru and Bolivia. Most of the marijuana cultivation takes place around Pedro Juan Caballero, near the border with Brazil, which is the country's criminal center. The plantations reach some 8,000 hectares, with production reaching 30,000 tons, of which 77% goes to Brazil and 20% to Argentina. At the beginning of 2021, more than 30 tons of cocaine shipped from Paraguay were located in northern European ports, making it a decisive "hub" for the distribution of this drug.
Most of the cultivation takes place in the area around Pedro Juan Caballero, near the Brazilian border, which is the country's criminal center.
° Marijuana plantations cover some 8,000 hectares, with a production of 30,000 tons, 77% of which goes to Brazil and 20% to Argentina.
As a transit point for cocaine from Peru and Bolivia, Paraguay has made a leap in the Issue of shipments to Europe: at the beginning of 2021, there was a record shipment of 23 tons.
° The Paraguayan congress has C medical use of marijuana; for the moment it is not following in the footsteps of Mexico, the leading producer in the Americas, which is discussion its full legalization.
► Paraguayan President Mario Abdo Benítez and the then Argentine Minister of Security, eradicating marijuana plants in PJC [Gov. of Paraguay].
report SRA 2021 / Eduardo Uranga [ PDF version].
MAY 2021-Paraguay is on the rise on the drug trafficking map, as the largest producer of marijuana in South America and a distributor of cocaine from Peru and Bolivia. With an estimated cannabis cultivation area of almost 8,000 hectares and an annual production that can approach 30,000 tons, Paraguay exports this drug to Brazil and Argentina. The cocaine that passes through the country is destined for these two large neighbors and especially for Europe: in February 2021, German authorities intercepted a shipment of 16 tons of cocaine, the largest ever shipped from Paraguay, a finding that rose to 23 tons counting a shipment located two days earlier in Antwerp. Another 11 tons were found in the same port in early April.
Although, in the case of Paraguay, the most surprising development in the last year has been this leap in the capacity to generate large cocaine shipments, the rapid evolution of the international context in relation to marijuana - for example, the UN reclassified it in December 2020, noting its therapeutic potential - makes this other lucrative illicit trade particularly topical.
The growing legalization of the hemp leaf that is beginning to take place in some countries, generating its own productions (unlike coca, which due to its specific conditions is cultivated almost only in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, marijuana can be grown in different places, also in greenhouses) offers business perspectives to the farmers who today in Paraguay deal with its illegal cultivation, The Paraguayan mafia structure, which is of Brazilian origin, is not so much interested in marijuana as in Uruguay, the only nearby country that has legalized national production for open use, because Paraguayan marijuana would have to be sold more cheaply than Uruguayan marijuana in order to compete in Uruguay, the only nearby country that has legalized national production for open use. Mexico, which is the largest producer in the Americas, is in the process of decriminalizing its recreational use; Paraguay is not there yet, but the law approved in August 2020 to allow medicinal use, admits individual cultivation if there is a medical certificate .
Production and eradication
Marijuana production is linked to organized crime, which operates especially in the border areas with Brazil. According to figures provided by the National Anti-Drugadministrative office (SENAD), the largest operations against the cultivation of this drug take place in the department Amambay, whose capital, Juan Pedro Caballero, is the country's criminal center. That city is adjacent to the Brazilian border and shares an urban mass with the Brazilian town of Punta Porá. The adjacent department of Canindeyú, also bordering Brazil, is also home to extensive plantations.
In the decade 2009-2019, SENAD destroyed 9,838 hectares of marijuana plant cultivation in Amambay and 2,432 in Canindeyú, together representing around 90% of the 15,045 hectares eradicated nationwide. In 2019, the latest damage referenced by SENAD, authorities eradicated 1,468.5 hectares, the highest figure of the decade, which not only indicates an increase in the anti-narcotics effort, but also suggests an increase in the extensions cultivated.
Paraguay is estimated to have between 6,000 and 8,000 hectares with marijuana plants. An improved seed introduced a few years ago has made it possible to expand the usual two annual harvests to three or even four harvests, raising productivity to between two and three tons of marijuana herb per hectare, bringing total production to as much as 20,000 tons per year. These figures may have been underestimated, as SENAD has estimated that up to 30,000 tons of weed could have left the country in the last year.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) World Drug Report 2020 places Paraguay as the country with the largest marijuana seizures, at over 1,000 tons per year. The report also indicates that hemp resin production is minimal (1.1 tons in 2016) and that 77% of the marijuana generated in Paraguay is destined for the Brazilian market and 20% for the Argentine market.
In the Americas, Paraguay's production is second only to Mexico, which has an estimated 12,000 hectares of plantations, agreement to the US government's 2021 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). The cultivated area eradicated by Mexican authorities is also greater, although that effort has fallen in recent years (5,478 hectares in 2016, 4,193 in 2017 and 2,263 in 2018), as indicated by the UNODC report , which at the same time notes that some 200 tons of marijuana were seized in Mexico in 2018, compared to 400 in 2017.
Corruption
Paraguay is a fertile ground for the establishment of criminal networks. Its strategic position is a determining factor and a fundamental condition for organized crime to choose Paraguay as a hub for its criminal activities. Located between the Peru-Bolivia coca production centers and the growing markets of Argentina and especially Brazil, which are also the destination of Paraguayan marijuana, the country is a place of operations for mafias, especially Brazilian. The conditions of the Triple Border - the conurbation formed by Ciudad del Este (Paraguay), Foz de Iguaçú (Brazil) and Puerto Iguazú (Argentina) - also encourage smuggling, product counterfeiting and money laundering, as well as the financing of terrorist groups(such is the case of Hezbollah).
Economic factors also play a role. Economic and social marginalization is an element that these organized crime gangs use to recruit "employees. However, this factor can only partly explain the particular development of these networks. Its dimension depends fundamentally on the level of acceptance and tolerance of corruption. Paraguay has, in this sense, the ideal conditions for the development these networks. This is due to its high levels of state corruption, as indicated in the Corruption Perceptions Index.
Underscoring the obstacle that corruption in Paraguay poses to the fight against drug trafficking, in January 2020 there was a mass escape from a prison in Pedro Juan Caballero of 75 inmates, mostly members of a Brazilian criminal gang known as the First Capital Command (CCP). The escape was facilitated by the collusion of officials and highlighted the impunity with which many of the drug traffickers operate.
Both are consolidating their start as producing countries, which represents an important qualitative leap despite the fact that production is still very limited.
° The first plantations were discovered in 2017 in Honduras and in 2018 in Guatemala; since then, more than 100 hectares of coca bush have been located.
° During 2020, Honduras eradicated 40 hectares of coca cultivation and Guatemala 19 hectares; in addition, almost twenty cocaine processing laboratories were destroyed.
° The extension of coca production into Central America is the work of Mexican cartels, which employ Colombian experts in locating the best areas for cultivation.
► Honduran anti-narcotics action in a coca plantation in October 2020 [Gov. of Honduras].
report SRA 2021 / Eduardo Villa Corta [ PDF version].
MAY 2021-Cocaine production has begun to spread to countries in Central America, which until recently were only transit points for cocaine coming mainly from Colombia, which is the world's largest producer, along with Peru and Bolivia.
The finding of laboratories for processing the drug in Honduras in 2009 already suggested the beginning of a change, confirmed by the location of coca bush crops themselves in 2017 in the same country and in 2018 in Guatemala. Since then, more than a hundred hectares have been located in both countries: those first two years some 50 hectares were counted together, a figure that was doubled in 2020 in what appears to be an acceleration of the process.
In any case, these are very small extensions, compared to those estimated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in its 2020 report for Colombia (around 180,000 hectares), Peru (almost 50,000) and Bolivia (around 25,000). In addition, the United States claims to have no record of cocaine generated in the Central American Northern Triangle entrance its territory.
Everything indicates that for now we are in a stage of experimentation or essay by Mexican cartels, which would be testing the aptitude of the terrain and climate of different areas and the quality of the product, with the financial aid of Colombian experts. Changes in the drug trafficking chain since most of the FARC left the illicit business in Colombia and the desire to reduce the complex logistics of transporting drugs to the United States explain these attempts in the Northern Triangle.
Honduras 
In Honduras, the location of crops has increased in the last two years. The latest International Narcotics Control Strategyreport (INCSR), dated March 2021, prepared by the US State department , includes official Honduran information accounting for the eradication in the first ten months of 2020 of 40 hectares of coca bushes. This represents an increase in the accounting of cultivation areas compared to previous years, which estimated the accumulation of 50 hectares throughout 2017 and 2018 in Honduras and Guatemala together.
The first evidence in Honduras that drug traffickers were not only using its territory as a transit point was the finding in 2009 in the province of Cortes of a laboratory for the transformation of coca leaves into cocaine hydrochloride. In ten years, twelve laboratories were discovered, and in 2020 alone the authorities proceeded to destroy at least eleven others, according to the INCSR. Although some had the capacity to produce up to 3.6 tons of cocaine per year, their facilities were rather "rudimentary," according to Honduran law enforcement agencies.
The existence of these laboratories led to the conclusion that at least since 2012 some amount of coca leaf could be growing in the country, but it was not until 2017 that a cultivated area was found, in the province of Orlando, with some 10,000 plants. In 2018, three other farms were located, one of which was 20 hectares. Cultivation and laboratory activity is not concentrated in a specific area, although half of the findings have been made in the aforementioned provinces of Orlando and Colon.
The last location reported, in a process of locating increasingly visible crops, was the one carried out by the National Anti-Drug Trafficking Directorate (DLCN) in March 2020, which corresponded to a field of about 4.2 hectares of cultivation and laboratory in the community of Nueva Santa Bárbara. In 2020, at least 15 coca fields were seized, with a total of 346,500 plants.
The DLCN estimates that Mexican cartels, such as those of Sinaloa and Jalisco, are behind this penetration, although they do not operate directly, with a deployment of armed individuals, but on several occasions through growers of Colombian origin, who know how to take care of the coca plant.
Recent convictions in the United States, such as that of the brother of Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez, have provided details of the drug trafficking corridor that is Honduras, but also the incipient homegrown production. As his trial exposed, Tony Hernandez, sentenced to life in prison in March 2021, had a direct relationship with a local cocaine laboratory .
Guatemala
In the case of Guatemala, the first finding of coca leaf cultivation took place in 2018. Although it was only one hectare in size, with 75,000 plants, it also meant the leap to incipient producer country. In addition to having been, like Honduras, a passageway for cocaine coming from Colombia, Guatemala had already distinguished itself for a moderate production of marijuana and for having begun to grow poppy, by extension of the activity of Mexican cartels involved in the heroin market, of which Mexico is the leading producer in the Americas. Now Guatemala, where narco-laboratories have also appeared, included coca among its illicit narcotics crops.
In 2019, Guatemalan authorities made an effort to combat this activity. On September 4 of that year, they declared a 30-day state of siege in 22 municipalities in the north of the country. Police operations involved several seizures, especially in the Departments of Izabal, Alta Verapaz, Petén and Zacapa. Some 23 cultivation areas were located, eight of them in Izabal.
As a result of these findings, Interior Minister Enrique Degenhart admitted that Guatemala had become a cocaine-producing nation.
In the first ten months of 2020, 19 hectares of coca cultivation were eradicated and seven laboratories were destroyed, as indicated by the latest INCSR, specifying, in any case, that coca production in Guatemala has a "limited scale" (as in Honduras, but even below the neighboring country), at a distance from that recorded by the largest South American producers.
Increased role for gangs
Authorities in Honduras and Guatemala fear, due to increased drug production activity, that some areas of their countries will become the new "Medellin of Pablo Escobar". The existence of areas that are difficult to access and the lack of means to supervise and combat organized crime complicate counter-narcotics activities.
There is also a risk that the gangs or maras will gain even more power, entrenching or even aggravating the problem they pose. Because of their dominance of space, they have so far taken tolls for the passage of drugs throughout the territory, but with production in the Northern Triangle itself, they could also come to control the very origin of the drug, giving them the prerogatives of the cartels.
At the same time, international coordination against drug trafficking is complicated by the fact that it is more difficult to locate production centers and identify the actors involved in this activity.
High issue of murdered social leaders continues to dismay the country: 904 assassinations since the 2016 peace agreement
° In 2020, there were 24.3 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in Colombia, the leave figure since 1975, when there was a similar rate, and below that of other countries in the region.
° The homicide issue was 12,018 in 2020, following the progressive decline recorded since 2002, only openly broken in 2012, when 16,033 murders were committed.
° The programs of study conclude that there is a relationship between the demobilization of the FARC and the consistent decrease in the level of violence that the country is experiencing.
Religious ceremony in Dabeiba in February 2020, after recovering the remains of a man who disappeared in 2002 [JEP].
report SRA 2021 / Isabella Izquierdo [PDF version].
MAY 2021-Colombia is gradually reducing its levels of violence, at least in terms of the homicide rate, which in 2020 fell to 24.3 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, the leave figure since 1975. Although the drama of the murder of social leaders has overwhelmed Colombian society in the post-conflict management , the objectivity of the overall figures speaks of a reduction in violent deaths. This decrease has been sponsored in recent years by the withdrawal the FARC from the armed struggle and has presumably been favored in 2020 by the prolonged confinements established to face the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic.
The country closed 2020 with 12,018 homicides, the leave number in decades, less than half the number that occurred in the early 1990s, during the worst period of the armed conflict. At that time, the homicide issue was over 28,000 per year, or around 80 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Since then, with slight upturns in 2002 and 2012, Colombia has been reducing its levels of violence and today its homicide rate is far from the records being set by other countries in the region: although in some cases the health emergency has also helped to lower the figures, in 2020 the highest fees were those of Jamaica (46.5 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), Venezuela (45.6), Honduras (37.6), Trinidad and Tobago (28.2) and Mexico (27).
[In the case of Colombia, the authorities spoke at the end of 2020 of a rate of 23.79, although later homicide figures from the National Police and population data give as a result the calculation the 24.3 for which we have opted here).
Conflict and post-conflict
While ELN guerrillas remain active and several FARC dissidents continue to engage in criminal activities, around 8,000 former combatants were incorporated into civilian life as a result of the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC, which began negotiations in 2012 and was signed in 2016.
The years prior to the beginning of the contacts saw an increase in violence, and then a steady decrease since then, not only in violence related to the political conflict, but also in violence related to crime in general. When investigating homicide fees during the years of the peace talks with the FARC, the Criminal research Directorate and Interpol in Colombia showed a close relationship: when the armed confrontation increased or decreased, depending on the interests of the negotiators, the total number of homicides also increased or decreased. The good progress of the negotiation marked a dynamic of de-escalation of the armed conflict, with a reduction of 8.57% in the homicide rate between 2012 and 2015.
In 2017, already signed the Peace agreement , violence in Colombia reached its lowest numbers in 30 years, with 12,079 homicides and a rate of 25.02 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. However, in 2018 the trend varied slightly (12,130 homicides), something that was pronounced in 2019 (12,667), which alerted about the need to quickly implement conditions for the reintegration of ex-combatants, improve security in demilitarized zones and increase state presence in the territory.
The Institute of Legal Medicine concluded that the homicide figures of 2018 seemed to evidence a reactivation of the Colombian armed conflict. For its part, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights presented in 2019 a report evaluating the status of human rights in Colombia, with emphasis on the implementation of the contents of the Peace agreement : the highest homicide figures were in Antioquia, Cauca and Norte de Santander, where the clashes for the control of illicit economies were more violent.
Effect of Covid
Post-conflict measures and the arrival of the pandemic, with its movement restrictions, again led to a drop in homicides in 2020. In the period from March 20 to August 17, 2020, when the strictest confinements were in place, daily homicides per municipality fell, on average, by 16% from their pre-social distancing trend. In the weeks of total quarantine, the daily homicide issue even fell by about 40% from the pre-quarantine trend. From June 2020 onwards, the homicide issue returned to pre-quarantine trends. Crime dropped during the first months due to the fear of contagion, but quickly returned to the usual figures, especially in terms of robberies and thefts, when the economic status worsened and the need for food increased among the poor population. However, because of what happened in the first semester of the year, Colombia closed 2020 with the leave homicide ratein the last 46 years.
A clear negative of 2020, however, was the continuation of violence directed against social leaders and ex-combatants. Last year 297 local leaders were killed, bringing the total number of social actors killed from 2016 to February 2021 to 904. In the same period, 276 former guerrillas were killed, most of them involved in appearances before the Special Jurisdiction for Peace.