A brief outline of the European defense system, integrated into the European External Action Service and its importance to the Union

The European Union will launch the Conference on the Future of Europe on May 9th, marking the beginning of the event that will feature debates between institutions, politicians and civil society on several topics that concern the community, including security and defense. It is clear that the majority of the European Union favors a common defense effort, and the Union has taken steps to ensure a solid structure to lay the framework for a possible integration of forces. Following the efforts to unify foreign policy objectives, a unified defense is the next logical step for European integration.

Course for the Somali National Armed Forces, led by a Spanish Colonel with instructors from Italy, Sweden, Finland and Spain [EUTM-Somalia].

ARTICLE / José Antonio Latorre    

According to the last standard Eurobarometer, around 77% of Europeans support a common defense and security policy among European Union member states. The support for this cause is irregular, with the backing spanning from 58% (Sweden) to 93% (Luxembourg). Therefore, it is expected that security and defense will definitely take a prominent role in the future of the Union.

In 2017, the European Commission launched the "White Paper on the Future of Europe," a document that outlines the challenges and consequently the possible scenarios on how the Union could evolve by 2025. In the field of security, the document considers three different scenarios: Security and Defense Cooperation, Shared Security and Defense, and Common Defense and Security. In the first scenario, the member states would cooperate on a voluntary basis, similarly to an ad-hoc system. The second scenario details one where the tendency would be to project a stronger security, sharing military and economic capabilities to enhance efficiency. The final scenario would be one where members expand mutual assistance and take part in the integration of defense forces; this includes a united defense spending and distribution of military assets to reduce costs and boost capabilities.

Although these are three different predictions, what is clear is that the enhancement of European security is of greatest importance. As former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said in the 2016 State of the Union address: "Europe can no longer afford to piggyback on the military might of others. We have to take responsibility for protecting our interests and the European way of life. It is only by working together that Europe will be able to defend itself at home and abroad." He was referring to the paramountcy of a strategic autonomy that will permit the union to become stronger and have more weight in international relations, while depending less on the United States.

The existing framework on security

The European Union does not have to start from scratch to achieve these goals, since it currently has a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) branch. The bureau is situated within the EU Military Staff, part of the European External Action Service in Brussels. This operational headquarters was established on June 8th, 2017, with the aim of boosting defense capabilities for the European Union outside its borders. It was created in order to strengthen civil/military cooperation through the Joint Support Coordination Cell and the Civil Planning and Conduct Capability, avoiding unnecessary overlap with NATO. Its main responsibilities include operational planning and conduct of the current non-executive missions; namely the European Union Training Missions (EUTM) in Mali, Somalia and Central African Republic.

A non-executive mission is an operation conducted to support a host nation with an advisory role only. For example, EUTM Somalia was established in 2010 to strengthen the Somali federal defense institutions through its three-pillar approach: training, mentoring and advising. The mission is supporting the development of the Somali Army General Staff and the Ministry of Defense through advice and tactical training. The mission has no combat mandate, but it works closely with the EU Naval Force - Operation ATALANTA (prevention and deterrence of privacy and protection of shipping), EUCAP Somalia (regional civilian mission), and AMISOM (African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia), in close cooperation with the European Union. The mission, which is located in Mogadishu, has a strength of over 200 personnel, with seven troop contributing states, primarily from Italy and Spain. Non-executive missions have a clear mandate of advising, but they can be considered as a prototype of European defense cooperation for the future.

The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is the framework for cooperation between EU member states in order to conduct missions to maintain security and establish ties with third countries through the use of military and civilian assets. It was launched in 1999 and it has become a bedrock for EU foreign policy. It gives the Union the possibility to intervene outside its borders and cooperate with other organizations, such as NATO and the African Union, in peacekeeping and conflict prevention. The CSDP is the umbrella for many branches that are involved with security and defense, but there is still a need for an enhancement and concentration of forces that will expand its potential.

Steppingstones for a larger, unified project

Like all the European Union, the CSDP is still a project that needs construction, and a European Union military should be a priority. In recent years, there have been efforts to implement measures to advance towards this goal. Firstly, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was launched in 2017 to reinforce defense capabilities and increase military coordination at an interoperable level. Participation is voluntary, but once decided, the country must abide by legally binding commitments. So far, 25 member states have joined the integrated structure, which depends on the European External Action Service, EU Military Staff and the European Defense Agency. Presently, there are 46 projects being developed, including a Joint EU Intelligence School, the upgrade of Maritime Surveillance, a European Medical Command and a Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Center, among the many others. Although critics have suggested that the structure will overlap with NATO competences, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that he believed "that PESCO can strengthen European defense, which is good for Europe but also good for NATO". It is important to add that its alliance with NATO was strengthened through common participation in the cybersecurity sector, joint exercises, and counterterrorism. Secondly, the launch of the European Defense Fund in 2017 permits co-funded defense cooperation, and it will be part of the 2021-2027 long-term EU budget. Finally, the mentioned Military Planning and Conduct Capability branch was established in 2017 to improve crisis management and operational surveillance.

Therefore, it is a clear intention of the majority of the European Union to increase capabilities and unify efforts to have a common defense. Another aspect is that a common military will make spending more efficient, which will permit the Union to compete against powers like China or the United States. Again, the United States is mentioned because although it is an essential ally, Europeans cannot continue to depend on their transatlantic partner for security and defense.

A European Union military?

With a common army, the European Union will be a significant player in the international field. The integration of forces, technology and equipment reduces spending and boosts efficiency, which would be a historical achievement for the Union. European integration is a project based on peace, democracy, human dignity, equality, freedom and the protection and promotion of human rights. If the Union wants to continue to be the bearer of these values and protect those that are most vulnerable against the injustices of this century, then efforts must be concentrated to reach this objective.

The Union is facing tough challenges, from nationalisms and internal divides to economic and sanitary obstacles. However, it is not the first time that unity has been put at risk. Brexit has shown that the European project is not invulnerable, that it is still not fully constructed. The European way of life is a model for freedom and security, but this must be fought for and protected; it can never be taken for granted.

Europe has lived an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity due to past endeavors at its foundation. It is evident that there will always be challenges and critics, but the only way to continue to be a leader is through unification; and it starts with a European Army. There are already mechanisms in place to ensure cooperation, such as those explored with non-executive missions. These are the stepping-stones for defense coordination and partnerships in the future. Although it is a complex task, it seems more necessary than ever before. For the protection of Western values and culture, for the promotion of human rights and dignity, and for the defense of freedom and democracy, European integration at the defense level is the next step in the future of the European Union.

Former ECB president takes charge of Italy with a diary of reforms and a return to Atlanticism

After a few years of political instability, in mid-February Italy inaugurated a government that is stronger in principle, headed by Mario Draghi, former president of the European Central Bank. His technical profile , his prestige after eight years in European governance and the formation of a government with a certain national unity are an opportunity for Italy to overcome the current health and economic crisis and to undertake the reforms that the country needs.

Mario Draghi, accepting the assignment to form a government in February 2021 [Presidency of the Republic].

article / Matilde Romito, Jokin de Carlos Sola

For more than a year, the government of Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte had been strongly contested from within, especially due to the disagreements of Italia Viva, the party led by Matteo Renzi, on economic subject . The straw that broke the camel's back was Renzi's civil service examination of Conte's proposed plan for the use of aid from the Recovery Fund set up by the European Union to deal with the crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. Conte lost his majority on January 13 following the resignation of three ministers belonging to Italia Viva and on January 26 he presented his Withdrawal. On 3 February the President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella, entrusted the training of the new government to Mario Draghi, former President of the European Central Bank (ECB).

At the start of his mandate, Mario Draghi set out his objectives. He stressed the importance of the country maintaining a certain unity in such a difficult historical moment and indicated that his priority will be to offer more opportunities and fight against the status quo that prevents the implementation of reforms.

On February 17, Mario Draghi obtained the confidence of Parliament, recording one of the largest majorities since the Second World War. Draghi then formed a government made up of different political forces, with the purpose of tackling the management of the consequences of the pandemic in a framework of national unity: in addition to various technical ministers (8), the Cabinet includes representatives of the 5 Star Movement (4), the Democratic Party (3), the Lega (3), Forza Italia (3), Liberi e Uguali (1) and Italia Viva (1). This internal diversity, which on some issues manifests itself in opposing positions, could lead to some governmental instability.

National policy: recovery and reforms

The Draghi Government has proposed as a priority the vaccination campaign and the economic reactivation, as well as reforms in the tax system and in the public administration and justice system. The former President of the ECB has shown a certain capacity for innovation in organizational Structures as well as for delegating tasks, all of which will be tackled quickly, according to his maxim that "we will do it soon, we will do it very soon".

Accelerating vaccination

As for the vaccination campaign, Draghi is applying maximization and firmness. First of all, he reformed the administrative summits in charge of the vaccination plan and appointed General Francesco Paolo Figliuolo, a military expert in logistics, as the new extraordinary commissioner for the Covid-19 emergency. By then the daily doses supplied reached 170,000, but Figliuolo, together with the director of the Civil Protection, Fabrizio Curcio, and the Minister of Health, Roberto Speranza, have set as a goal totriple this issue. To this end, new vaccination sites have been set up, such as companies, gyms or empty parking lots, and a mobilization of health staff for vaccination work has been promoted.

The Draghi government has also adopted greater firmness at the international level, as was the decision to block the export to Australia of 250,000 doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine. Although supported by the EU, the measure took many countries by surprise and made Italy the first EU member to apply such a legal mechanism. On March 12, the Government announced the possibility of future production in Italy of some of the vaccines already approved internationally.

Economics: structural reforms

The economic diary of the new Government will be characterized by structural reforms to promote productivity, as well as by the application of economic aid aimed at those most affected by the crisis, with the goal of relaunching the country and fighting against the new social inequalities. The Government is finalizing the Recovery Plan to be submitted to Brussels in order to obtain the funds provided by the EU.

During his mandate as ECB President Draghi promoted structural reforms in several European countries; therefore, his leadership will be a core topic for the promotion of reforms aimed at increasing productivity, reducing bureaucracy and improving the quality of Education. The government promises more expense on Education and the promotion of a more sustainable and digitized Economics , as called for by the EU Green Deal.

Through the "Sostegni" legislative decree, the government is implementing an aid plan. Some of them are aimed at defraying the modification of the redundancy framework implemented by Conte, but this requires a more consensual negotiation.

Streamlining of public administration and Justice

The reform of the public administration has been entrusted to framework D'Alberti, lawyer and professor of Administrative Law at La Sapienza in Rome. The reform will follow two paths: greater connectivity and an update of the competencies of civil servants.

In relation to Justice, the purpose is to implement several of the recommendations forwarded by the EU in 2019 and 2020. Among other measures, the EU calls for a greater efficiency of the Italian civil judicial system, through a faster work of the courts, a better distribution of the work, the adoption of simpler procedural rules and an active repression of corruption.

Foreign Policy: Atlanticism and less enthusiasm for China

One of the first consequences of Draghi's election as Prime Minister has been the new image of stability and willingness to cooperate that Italy has come to project not only in Brussels but also in Washington, both politically and economically. Nevertheless, many aspects of Conte's foreign policy will be maintained, given the continuity of Luigi di Maio as Foreign Minister.

Beyond Europe, Draghi's priorities will be mainly two: the new rapprochement with Washington - in the framework of a convinced Atlanticism, within multilateralism - and the reinforcement of Italian policy in the Mediterranean. Draghi's arrival also has the potential to break with Conte's rapprochement with China, such as the inclusion of Italian ports in the New Silk Road. While this may secure Italy as a major U.S. ally, any decision will have to take into account the Chinese investment that may be committed.

Contribution to European governance

Italy is the third largest Economics in the EU and the eighth largest in the world, so its economic performance has some international repercussions. Draghi has assured his commitment to the recovery and his contacts with European elites may help to ease the tension in discussions with other EU members on the distribution of funds, especially the so-called Next Generation EU. During the Euro Crisis Draghi was one of the main advocates of structural reforms and now these are again vital to avoid an increase in expense that could cause debt to grow too high or budget cuts that would hurt growth.

Draghi has declared that "without Italy there is no Europe, but without Europe there is less Italy" and he intends to make Italy a more active and committed subject in Europe, while trying to balance the interests of France, Germany and the Netherlands. Merkel's departure at the end of 2021 opens the possibility of a power vacuum in the European committee ; with France and Italy being the second and third Economics their partnership could bring stability and ensure the persistence of the Recovery Fund. This in turn may end up causing governance problems with Germany and the Netherlands in case of disagreements on the use of the funds. However, Draghi has been reticent about France's geopolitical proposals to establish Europe as an independent actor from the United States. This may end up poisoning the potential new special relationship between Rome and Paris.

The advertisement of willingness for dialogue and concord with both Turkey and Russia may end up causing problems in Brussels with other countries. In the Turkish case, it may compromise relations with Greece in the Mediterranean. However, the strong criticism of Erdogan, whom he called a dictator, for having diplomatically humiliated Ursula von der Leyen during her visit to Ankara, seems to rule out counterproductive approaches. On the other hand, his desire for dialogue also with Moscow may end up sitting badly in the Baltic capitals, as well as in Washington. 

The Mediterranean: immigration, Libya and Turkey

Draghi also referred to strategic areas outside the EU close to Italy: the Maghreb, the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Regarding the latter, Italy's priorities do not seem to change: the goal is to control immigration. To this end, Draghi hopes to establish cooperation with Spain, Greece and Cyprus.

In this area the stability of Libya is important, and Italian support for the Government of National agreement (GNA) established in Tripoli, one of whose main advocates in the EU has been Luigi Di Maio, who continues to head the Foreign Ministry, will continue. Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah has declared to be ready to collaborate on immigration issues with Draghi, but the latter seems to be skeptical towards bilateral deals and will prefer that it takes place in a European framework .

This goes against the policy of Greece and France, who support the Libyan National Army, based in Tubruk, because of the GNA's Islamist connections and Turkey's support for them. These differences in relation to Libya have already caused problems and made it difficult to establish sanctions against Ankara.

Seizing the opportunity

The new Draghi Government represents an opportunity for Italy to achieve a certain political stability after years of ups and downs. The integration in the same government of people from different ideological backgrounds can contribute to the national unity required by the present status. The emergency and exceptional nature of the Covid-19 crisis gives Italy an opportunity to implement not only measures against the pandemic but also radical structural changes to transform the Economics and public administration, something that would otherwise be too much of a hindrance.

On the other hand, although within a certain continuity, Draghi's government represents a change in the international strategic chessboard, not only for Brussels, Berlin and Paris but also for Washington and Beijing, given that the more Atlanticist tendencies will distance it from both Russia and China.

Italian governments are not known for their duration and this one does not offer any guarantee of permanence either, considering that the effort of unity made is due to the temporary nature of the crisis. Nevertheless, Draghi's own profile projects an image of seriousness and responsibility.

Spain, although affected, is not as badly affected as other European partners

The United Kingdom's exit from the European Union finally materialized on the last day of 2020. The compromise on fisheries was the last point of the arduous negotiations and the differences were only overcome a few conference before the unpostponable deadline. The fisheries agreement reached provides that for five and a half years EU vessels will continue to have access to fish in British waters. Although affected, Spain is not as badly affected as other European partners.

Fishing fleet in the Galician town of Ribeira [Luis Miguel Bugallo].

article / Ane Gil

The Withdrawalagreement culminating Brexit ran aground in its final stretch on the fisheries issue, despite the fact that the UK's fishing activity in its waters contributes only 0.12% of British GDP.

That discussion, which nearly derailed the negotiations, centered on the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the area beyond territorial waters - at a maximum distance from the coast of 200 nautical miles (about 370 kilometers) - in which a coastal country has sovereign rights to explore and exploit, conserve and manage natural resources, whether living or non-living. In the UK EEZ there are fish-rich fishing grounds, accounting, with an average of 1.285 million tons of fish per year, according to a 2019 study by the European Parliament's Fisheries Committee, for 15% of the total EU catch. Of these catches, only 43% was taken by British fishermen, while the remaining 57% was taken by the other EU countries. The European countries that had access to fishing in British waters were Spain, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Ireland and Sweden.

Therefore, the entrance into force of Brexit would mark the withdrawal the United Kingdom from the Common Fisheries Policy, which defines the access of European vessels to the Exclusive Economic Zone.

Initial perspectives

During its membership of the EU, the UK was part of the Common Fisheries Policy, whereby all EU member states' fishing fleets have equal access to European waters. In the EU, fishing rights are negotiated annually by the ministers of each member state and national quotas (the amount of fish of each species that each country's fleet can catch) are set using historical data as a reference letter.

The Spanish fishing fleet followed the negotiations closely, as it had a lot to lose with a bad agreement. On the one hand, a agreement Brexit could mean a reduction in income of 27 million euros related to fishing in British waters; it would also lead to a drastic reduction in catches of hake, roosterfish and mackerel for Spanish fishing vessels specialized in these species. On the other hand, employment would also be affected if the agreement established a drastic reduction in catches. Eighty Spanish vessels are licence to fish in British waters, which means almost 10,000 work related to this activity.

Negotiations

Until Brexit, British waters and their exploitation were negotiated jointly with the rest of the maritime areas of the European Union. Brussels tried to maintain this relationship even if the United Kingdom left the EU, so the position of the European negotiators focused on preserving the fishing quota system that had been in force for a period of fifteen years. However, the British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, always ruled out any trade agreement that would grant European vessels access to British waters in exchange for better conditions for British financial services in the single market as offered by Brussels. London wanted to implement a regime similar to the Norwegian one, which negotiates year by year the catches of EU fleets in its waters, with the difference that in the Norwegian case the pact refers to average a dozen species, as opposed to almost a hundred in British waters.

We should bear in mind that the service sector represents 80% of the UK's GDP, while fishing activities account for only 0.12%. Therefore, it is quite evident that London's positions in the fisheries section were more political than economic. And the fact is that, although fishing activities have little impact on British Economics , the fishing sector does have political importance for the Eurosceptic cause, since regaining control of the waters was one of the promises in the Brexit referendum. Thus, this issue became a symbol of national sovereignty.

The starting point of the negotiations was the British government's demand to repatriate up to 80% of the catches in its waters of control, while the EU offered to refund the UK between 15% and 18%. Johnson wanted to retain management of the exploitation of its waters and to negotiate with the EU as a preferred partner . He expressed his initial intention to establish, from January 2021, more frequent negotiations on how to fish in his EEZ. This resulted in a finalagreement which means that European vessels will continue to be able to fish in British waters for five and a half years, in exchange for a 25% refund on the quotas EU vessels fish there, an Issue estimated to be worth some 161 million euros. In return, fishery products will continue to enter the European market at zero tariff. After this transitional stage, the EU and the UK will have to renegotiate year after year. If the agreement is violated, there are mechanisms that guarantee compensation, such as the establishment of tariffs.

Consequences for Spain and its European neighbors

The agreement provoked discontent in the UK fishing industry, which accused Johnson of caving in on the agreement. The National Federation of Fishermen's Organizations expressed disappointment that only marginal changes had been made to quotas and that EU fleets would continue to have access to British waters up to the six-mile limit. The prime minister responded that the UK could now catch "prodigious amounts of extra fish".

For the time being, the UK has already encountered some problems. The new customs agreement has been causing delays and trucks have to be checked at the borders. With a sudden overproduction, there will not be enough veterinarians to carry out the necessary export health certificates. Therefore, the new bureaucratic requirements have led to several cases of seafood rotting on the docks before it can be exported to the EU. It is estimated that the fishing industry is losing 1 million pounds per day due to these new requirements, which has caused many fishermen to reduce their daily catch.

But EU fishermen will also be affected, as until now they obtained catches in British waters with a total annual value of 650 million euros, according to the European Parliament, especially position Danish, Dutch and French vessels. In addition, Belgium is one of the countries most affected, as 43% of its catches are taken in British waters; it will now have to reduce its catches by 25% over the next 5 years. In addition, Belgian fishermen used to land their fish in British ports and then truck it to Belgium. However, this will no longer be possible. Along with Belgium, other countries that will suffer the most from the loss of fishing rights due to Brexit are Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands.

As for Spain, the fishing sector has acknowledged its unease about the annual negotiation that will take place after the initial five-year period, as well as the consequences on the future distribution of the remaining fishing quotas, on the Common Fisheries Policy itself, on the exchange of quotas between countries and on the sustainable management of marine stocks. However, in the short term, the Spanish fleet does not seem to be so affected in comparison with other European countries.

In fact, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Luis Planas, valued positively this agreement, considering it a "good agreement, which provides stability and legal certainty". Planas argued that the 25% reduction in the average value of the catches of the eight European countries fishing in British waters has limited effects on Spanish fishing activity and, by way of example, he stated that hake catches will only be reduced by 1%. That is, the current quota of 29.5% would drop to 28.5% in 2026. In addition, other species of greater interest to Spain (such as mackerel, horse mackerel and blue whiting) have not been included in the agreement and there are no reductions in deep-water species in high demand (such as black scabbardfish or grenadiers). In conclusion, Planas affirmed that Spain has only conceded on 17 of the 32 fishing resources allocated to the country. However, it is up to Brussels to go into details and decide on fishing quotas during the transition period opened on January 1, in which the eight countries fishing in British waters will have lower quotas.

In conclusion, Britain now has the ability to dictate its own rules subject fishing. By 2026, the UK can decide to completely withdraw access for EU vessels to British waters. But the EU could then respond by suspending access to its waters or imposing tariffs on UK fish exports.

An update on the Iranian nuclear accord between 2018 and the resumed talks in April 2021

The signatories of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), reached in 2015 to limit Iran's nuclear program, met again on April 6 in Vienna to explore the possibility of reviving the accord. The US withdrawal after Donald Trump becoming president put the agreement on hold and lead Tehran to miss its commitments. Here we offer an update on the issue until the international talks resumed.

Trump's announcement of the US withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018 [White House].

ARTICLE / Ana Salas Cuevas

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a key player in the stability of its regional environment, which means that it is a central country worth international attention. It is a regional power not only because of its strategic location, but also because of its large hydrocarbon reserves, which make Iran the fourth country in oil reserves and the second one in gas reserves.

In 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) brought to the light and warned the international community about the existence of nuclear facilities, and of a covert program in Iran which could serve a military purpose. This prompted the United Nations and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the P5: France, China, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom) to take measures against Iran in 2006. Multilateral and unilateral economic sanctions (the UN and the US) were implemented, which deteriorated Iran's economy, but which did not stop its nuclear proliferation program. There were also sanctions linked to the development of ballistic missiles and to the support of terrorist groups. These sanctions, added to the ones the United States imposed on Tehran in the wake of the 1979 revolution, and together with the instability that cripples the country, caused a deep deterioration of Iran's economy.

In November 2013, the P5 plus Germany (P5+1) and Iran came to terms with an initial agreement on Iran's nuclear program (a Joint Plan of Action) which, after several negotiations, translated into a final pact, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in 2015. The European Union adhered to the JCPOA.

The focus of Iran's motives for succumbing and accepting restrictions on its nuclear program lies in the Iranian regime's concern that the deteriorating living conditions of the Iranian population due to the economic sanctions could result in growing social unrest.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

The goal of these negotiations was to reach a long-term comprehensive solution agreed by both parties to ensure that Iran's nuclear program would be completely peaceful. Iran reiterated that it would not seek or develop any nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The real aim of the nuclear deal, though, was to extend the time needed for Iran to produce enough fissile material for bombs from three months to one year. To this end, a number of restrictions were reached.

This comprehensive solution involved a mutually defined enrichment plan with practical restrictions and transparent measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the program. In addition, the resolution incorporated a step-by-step process of reciprocity that included the lifting of all UN Security Council, multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program. In total, these obligations were key to freeze Iran's nuclear program and reduced the factors most sensitive to proliferation. In return, Iran received limited sanctions relief.

More specifically, the key points in the JCPOA were the following: Firstly, for 15 years, Iran would limit its uranium enrichment to 3.67%, eliminate 98% of its enriched uranium stocks in order to reduce them to 300 kg, and restrict its uranium enrichment activities to its facilities at Natanz. Secondly, for 10 years, it would not be able to operate more than 5,060 old and inefficient IR-1 centrifuges to enrich uranium. Finally, inspectors from the IAEA would be responsible for the next 15 years for ensuring that Iran complied with the terms of the agreement and did not develop a covert nuclear program.

In exchange, the sanctions imposed by the United States, the European Union and the United Nations on its nuclear program would be lifted, although this would not apply to other types of sanctions. Thus, as far as the EU is concerned, restrictive measures against individuals and entities responsible for human rights violations, and the embargo on arms and ballistic missiles to Iran would be maintained. In turn, the United States undertook to lift the secondary sanctions, so that the primary sanctions, which have been in place since the Iranian revolution, remained unchanged.

To oversee the implementation of the agreement, a joint committee composed of Iran and the other signatories to the JCPOA would be established to meet every three months in Vienna, Geneva or New York.

United States withdrawal

In 2018, President Trump withdrew the US from the 2015 Iran deal and moved to resume the sanctions lifted after the agreement was signed. The withdrawal was accompanied by measures that could pit the parties against each other in terms of sanctions, encourage further proliferation measures by Iran and undermine regional stability. The US exit from the agreement put the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on hold.

The United States argued that the agreement allowed Iran to approach the nuclear threshold in a short period of time. With the withdrawal, however, the US risked bringing this point closer in time by not waiting to see what could happen after the 10 and 15 years, assuming that the pact would not last after that time. This may make Iran's proliferation a closer possibility.

Shortly after Trump announced the first anniversary of its withdrawal from the nuclear deal and the assassination of powerful military commander Qasem Soleimani by US drones, Iran announced a new nuclear enrichment program as a signal to nationalists, designed to demonstrate the power of the mullah regime. This leaves the entire international community to question whether diplomatic efforts are seen in Tehran as a sign of weakness, which could be met with aggression.

On the one hand, some opinions consider that, by remaining within the JCPOA, renouncing proliferation options and respecting its commitments, Iran gains credibility as an international actor while the US loses it, since the agreements on proliferation that are negotiated have no guarantee of being ratified by the US Congress, making their implementation dependent on presidential discretion.

On the other hand, the nuclear agreement adopted in 2015 raised relevant issues from the perspective of international law. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action timeline is 10 to 15 years. This would terminate restrictions on Iranian activities and most of the verification and control provisions would expire. Iran would then be able to expand its nuclear facilities and would find it easier to develop nuclear weapons activities again. In addition, the legal nature of the Plan and the binding or non-binding nature of the commitments made under it have been the subject of intense discussion and analysis in the United States. The JCPOA does not constitute an international treaty. So, if the JCPOA was considered to be a non-binding agreement, from the perspective of international law there would be no obstacle for the US administration to withdraw from it and reinstate the sanctions previously adopted by the United States.

The JCPOA after 2018

As mentioned, the agreement has been held in abeyance since 2018 because the IAEA inspectors in Vienna will no longer have access to Iranian facilities.

Nowadays, one of the factors that have raised questions about Iran's nuclear documents is the IAEA's growing attention to Tehran's nuclear contempt. In March 2020, the IAEA "identified a number of questions related to possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at three locations in Iran". The agency's Director General Rafael Grossi stated: "The fact that we found traces (of uranium) is very important. That means there is the possibility of nuclear activities and material that are not under international supervision and about which we know not the origin or the intent".

The IAEA also revealed that the Iranian regime was violating all the restrictions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The Iranian leader argued that the US first violated the terms of the JCPOA when it unilaterally withdrew the terms of the JCPOA in 2018 to prove its reason for violating the nuclear agreement.

In the face of the economic crisis, the country has been hit again by the recent sanctions imposed by the United States. Tehran ignores the international community and tries to get through the signatory countries of the agreement, especially the United States, claiming that if they return to compliance with their obligations, Iran will also quickly return to compliance with the treaty. This approach has put strong pressure on the new US government from the beginning. Joe Biden's advisors suggested that the agreement could be considered again. But if Washington is faced with Tehran's full violation of the treaty, it will be difficult to defend such a return to the JCPOA.

In order to maintain world security, the international community must not succumb to Iran's warnings. Tehran has long issued empty threats to force the world to accept its demands. For example, in January 2020, when the UK, France and Germany triggered the JCPOA's dispute settlement mechanism, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a direct warning, saying: "If Europeans, instead of keeping to their commitments and making Iran benefit from the lifting of sanctions, misuse the dispute resolution mechanism, they'll need to be prepared for the consequences that they have been informed about earlier".

Conclusions

The purpose of the agreement is to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power that would exert pressure on neighboring countries and further destabilize the region. For example, Tehran's military influence is already keeping the war going in Syria and hampering international peace efforts. A nuclear Iran is a frightening sight in the West.

The rising in tensions between Iran and the United States since the latter unilaterally abandoned the JCPOA has increased the deep mistrust already separating both countries. Under such conditions, a return to the JCPOA as it was before 2018 seems hardly imaginable. A renovated agreement, however, is baldly needed to limit the possibilities of proliferation in an already too instable region. Will that be possible?

After referendums in 2018 and 2019, the Guatemalan government submitted its report to The Hague in 2020 and the Belizean government has one year to reply.

Guatemala presented its position before the International Court of Justice in The Hague last December, with a half year delay attributed to the emergency status of Covid-19; now Belize will have one year to respond. Although the ICJ will then take its time to draft a judgment, it can be said that the territorial dispute between the two neighbors has begun its final stretch, considering that the dispute over this Central American enclave dates back to the 18th century.

Coats of arms of Guatemala (left) and Belize (right) on their respective flags.

article / Álvaro de Lecea

The territorial conflict between Guatemala and Belize has its roots in the struggle between the Spanish Empire in America and the activity of England in the Caribbean during the colonial era. The inaction of the Spanish Crown at the end of the 18th century in the face of British invasions in what is now Belize, which at that time was Spanish territory, allowed the English to establish a foothold in Central America and begin to exploit continental lands in search of precious woods, such as palo de tinte and mahogany. However, the reservations placed by Guatemala on part of the Belizean land - it claims more than 11,000 km2, almost half of the neighboring country; it also claims the corresponding maritime extension and some cays - generated a status of tension and conflict that has been maintained to the present day.

In 2008, both countries decided to hold referendums on the possibility of taking the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), so that it could rule on the division of sovereignty. The Belizeans approved to take that step in 2018 and the Guatemalans the following year. The issue was formalized before the ICJ in The Hague on June 12, 2019.

Historical context

The territory of present-day Belize was colonized by Spain in the mid-16th century, as part of the Viceroyalty of New Spain and dependent on the captaincy of Guatemala. However, since there were no mineral resources there and there was hardly any population, the metropolis paid little attention to the area. This scarce Spanish presence favored the attack of pirates and to avoid them, the Spanish Crown allowed an increasing English exploitative activity in exchange for defense. England carried out a similar penetration in the Caribbean coasts of Nicaragua, but while the Spanish managed to expel the English from there, in the area of Belize they consolidated their settlement and finally obtained the territory by the Treaty of Paris of 1783, by which Spain disengaged itself from that Central American corner. That concession and another one three years later covered only 6,685 km2, a space close to the coast that England later enlarged, inland and to the south, since Spain was not active in the area. Since then, the enclave has been known as "British Honduras".

The cession did not take into account the claims of the Guatemalans, who considered the space between the Sarstún and Sibún rivers as their own. Both with west-east course, the first draws, in the south of what is now Belize, the border with Guatemala; the other, further north, runs through the center of Belize, with mouth next to its capital, splitting the country in two. However, given the urgency of international recognition when it declared its independence in 1821, Guatemala signed several agreements with England, the great power of the time, to ensure the viability of the new state. One of them was the Aycinena-Wyke Treaty (1859), by which Guatemala accepted the Belizean borders in exchange for the construction of a road that would improve its access from its capital to the Caribbean. However, both parties blamed the other for not complying with the Treaty (the road was not built, for example) and Guatemala declared it null and void in 1939.

In the Constitution promulgated in 1946, Guatemala included the claim in the drafting, and has insisted on that position since the neighboring country, under the name of Belize, gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1981. Already in 1978 the UN approved a resolution guaranteeing the rights to self-determination and territorial protection of the Belizean people, which also called for a peaceful resolution of the neighboring conflict. Guatemala did not recognize the existence of the new sovereign state until 1991 and even today continues to place some limits on the progressive coupling of Belize in the Central American Integration System. Because of its English matrix, Belize has historically maintained a closer relationship with the English-speaking Caribbean islands.

Map of Central America and, in detail, the territorial dispute between Guatemala and Belize [Rei-artur / Janitoalevic Bettyreategui].

Adjacency Line and the role of the OAS

Since 2000, the Organization of American States (OAS), of which both nations are members, has mediated between the two countries. That same year, the OAS brokered an agreement with the goal of fostering trust and negotiations between the two neighbors. In order to achieve these objectives, the OAS, through its Peace Fund, actively supported the search for a solution by providing technical and political support. In fact, thanks to this rapprochement, talks on the dispute were resumed and the creation of the "Adjacency Line" was agreed upon.

This is an imaginary line that basically follows the line that from north to south has been "de facto" separating the two countries and is where most of the tensions take place. Over the years, both sides have increased their military presence there, in response to incidents attributed to the other side. Due to these frequent discussions, in 2015 Belize had to request financial aid from the British navy. Precisely in this Adjacency Zone is located an OAS office, whose purpose is to promote contacts between the communities and to verify certain transgressions to the agreements already signed.

One of the most promising developments that took place under the umbrella of the OAS was the signature in 2008 of what was called the "specialagreement between Guatemala and Belize to submit Guatemala's territorial, insular and maritime claim to the International Court of Justice". Under this agreement , both countries undertook to submit to simultaneous popular consultations on the acceptance of the Court's mediation. However, in 2015, through the protocol of the Special agreement between Belize and Guatemala, it was allowed that such popular consultations would not be held at the same time. Both parties committed to accept the Court's decision as "decisive and binding" and to comply with and implement it "fully and in good faith".

The Hague and the impact of the future resolution

The referendums were held in 2018, in the case of Guatemala, and in 2019, in the case of Belize. Although the percentages of both popular consultations were somewhat disparate, the results were positive. In Belize, the yes vote obtained 55.37% of the votes and the no vote, 44.63%. In Guatemala, the results were much more favorable for the yes vote, with 95.88% of the votes, compared to 4.12% for the no vote.

These results show how the Belizeans look askance at the decision of The Hague because, although with the final determination of the border they will close forever any claim, they risk losing part of their territory. On the other hand, the prospect of gain is greater in the Guatemalan case, because if its proposal is accepted -or at least part of it- it would strategically expand its access to the Caribbean, now somewhat limited, and in the case of losing, it would simply remain as it has been until now, which is not a serious problem for the country.

The definition of a clear and respected border is necessary at this point. The adjacent line, observed by the OAS peace and security mission statement , has managed to limit tensions between the two countries, but the reality is that certain incidents continue to take place in this unprotected zone. These incidents, such as the murders of citizens of both countries or mistreatment attributed to the Guatemalan military, cause the conflict to drag on and tensions to rise. On the other hand, the fact that there is no clear definition of borders facilitates drug trafficking and smuggling.

This conflict has also affected Belize's economic and trade relations with its neighbors in the region, especially Mexico and Honduras. Not only due to the lack of land boundaries, but also maritime. This area is very rich in natural resources and has the second largest coral reef reservation in the world, after Australia. In addition, this has, as expected, affected bilateral relations between the two countries. While the regional organizations are betting on a more relevant regional integration, the tensions between Belize and Guatemala prevent any improvement in this aspect.

The President of Guatemala has stated that, regardless of the result the Tribunal, he intends to strengthen bilateral relations, especially in areas such as trade and tourism, with neighboring Belize. For their part, the Caricom heads of state expressed in October 2020 their support for Belize, their enthusiasm for the ICJ's intervention and their congratulations to the OAS for its mediation work.

Qatar's economic reinforcement and expanded relations with Russia, China and Turkey have made the blockade imposed by its Gulf neighbors less effective.

It is a reality: Qatar has won its battle against the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia after more than three years of diplomatic rupture during which the two countries, together with other Arab neighbors, isolated the Qatari peninsula commercially and territorially. Economic and geopolitical reasons explain why the blockade imposed has finally faded away without Qatar giving in to its autonomous diplomatic line.

Qatar's emir Tamim Al Thani at the 2018 Munich Security lecture [Kuhlmann/MSC].

article / Sebastián Bruzzone

In June 2017, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Libya, Yemen and the Maldives accused the Al Thani family of supporting Islamic terrorism and the Muslim Brotherhood and initiated a total blockade on trade to and from Qatar until Doha complied with thirteen conditions. However, last January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman welcomed Qatar's Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani with an unexpected embrace in the Saudi city of Al-Ula, sealing the end of yet another dark chapter in the modern history of the Persian Gulf. But how many of the thirteen demands has Qatar fulfilled to reconcile with its neighbors? None.

As if nothing had happened. Tamim Al Thani arrived in Saudi Arabia to participate in the 41st Gulf Cooperation committee (GCC) Summit where member states pledged efforts to promote solidarity, stability and multilateralism in the face of challenges in the region, which is confronted by Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program, as well as its sabotage and destruction plans. In addition, the GCC as a whole appreciated the mediating role of Kuwait, then U.S. President Donald J. Trump and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner.

The meeting of the Gulf Arab leaders has been the thaw in the political desert after a storm of mutual accusations and instability in what was called the "Qatar diplomatic crisis"; this rapprochement, as an immediate effect, clears the normal preparation of the soccer World Cup scheduled to take place in Qatar next year. The return of regional and diplomatic understanding is always positive in urgent situations such as an economic crisis, a world pandemic or a common Shiite enemy arming missiles on the other side of the sea. In any case, the Qatar of the Al Thani can be crowned as the winner of the economic pulse against the Emirati Al Nahyan and the Saudi Al Saud unable to suffocate the small peninsula.

The factors

The relevant question brings us back to the initial degree scroll prior to these lines: how has Qatar managed to withstand the pressure without buckling in the slightest in the face of the thirteen conditions demanded in 2017? Several factors contribute to explaining it.

First, the injection of capital by the QIA (Qatar Investment Authority). At the beginning of the blockade, the banking system suffered a capital flight of more than $30 billion and foreign investment fell sharply. The Qatari sovereign wealth fund responded by providing $38.5 billion to provide liquidity to the banks and revive the Economics. The sudden trade blockade by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia led to a financial panic that prompted foreign investors, and even Qatari residents, to transfer their assets out of the country and liquidate their positions in fear of a market collapse.

Second, the rapprochement with Turkey. In 2018, Qatar came to Turkey's rescue by committing to invest $15 billion in Turkish subject assets and, in 2020, to execute a currency swap agreement in order to raise the value of the Turkish lira. In reciprocity, Turkey increased commodity exports to Qatar by 29% and increased its military presence in the Qatari peninsula in case of a possible invasion or attack by its neighbors, building a second Turkish military base near Doha. In addition, as an internal reinforcement measure, the Qatari government has invested more than $30 billion in military equipment, artillery, submarines and aircraft from American companies.

Third, the rapprochement with Iran. Qatar shares with the Persian country the South Pars North Dome gas field, considered the largest in the world, and positioned itself as a mediator between the Trump Administration and the Ayatollah government. Since 2017, Iran has supplied 100,000 tons of food daily to Doha in the face of a potential food crisis caused by the blockade of the only land border with Saudi Arabia through which 40% of the food was entering.

Fourth, the rapprochement with Russia and China. The Qatari sovereign wealth fund acquired a 19% stake in Rosneft, opening the door to a partnership between the Russian oil company and Qatar Petroleum and to more joint ventures between the two nations. In the same vein, Qatar Airways increased its stake to 5% of the capital of China Southern Airlines.

Fifth, its reinforcement as the world's leading exporter of LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas). It is important to know that Qatar's main economic engine is gas, not oil. That is why, in 2020, the Qatari government initiated its expansion plan by approving a $50 billion investment to expand its liquefaction and LNG carrier capacity, and a $29 billion investment to build more offshore offshore offshore platforms in North Dome. The Qatari government has forecast that its LNG production will grow by 40% by 2027, from 77 to 110 million tons per year.

We should keep in mind that LNG transportation is much safer, cleaner, greener and cheaper than oil transportation. Moreover, Royal Dutch Shell predicted in report "Annual LNG Outlook Report 2019" that global LNG demand would double by 2040. If this forecast is confirmed, Qatar would be on the threshold of impressive economic growth in the coming decades. It is therefore in its best interest in that status to maintain its solvent public coffers and a stable political climate in the Middle East region. As if that were not enough, last November 2020, Tamim Al Thani announced that future state budgets will be configured on the basis of a fictitious price of $40 per barrel, a value considerably smaller than the WTI Oil Barrel or Brent Oil Barrel which is around $60-70. In other words, the Qatari government will index its public expense considering the volatility of hydrocarbon prices. In other words, Qatar seeks to be proactive in the face of a possible collapse in the price of crude oil, promoting an efficient public expense policy.

And sixth, the maintenance of the Qatar Investment Authority's investment portfolio , valued at $300 billion. The assets of the Qatari sovereign wealth fund constitute a life insurance policy for the country, which can order its liquidation in situations of extreme need.

Qatar has a very important role to play in the future of the Persian Gulf. The Al Thani dynasty has demonstrated its capacity for political and economic management and, above all, its great foresight for the future vis-à-vis the other countries of the Gulf Cooperation committee . The small peninsular "pearl" has struck a blow on the table by imposing itself on the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, and on the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed, who did not even show up in Al-Ula. This geopolitical move, plus the Biden Administration's decision to maintain its hard-line policy towards Iran, seems to guarantee the international isolation of the Persian country's ayatollah regime.

Several countries in the Americas are celebrating in 2021 their two-hundredth anniversary of a break with Spain that did not always mean a final independence.ca celebrate in 2021 their two centuries of a break with Spain that did not always mean a final independence.

Several American nations are commemorating this year the two centuries of their separation from Spain, recalling a process that took place in all the Spanish possessions in continental America within a few years of each other. In some cases, it was a process of successive independences, as happened with Guatemala, which later belonged to the Mexican Empire and then to a Central American republic, and Panama, which was part of Colombia until the 20th century. But even later, both countries experienced direct interference by the United States, in episodes that were very decisive for the entire region.

Panama Canal submission ceremony to the Panamanian authorities on December 31, 1999.

article / Angie Grijalva

During 2021, several American countries celebrate their independence from Spain; the largest and most festive of these is Mexico. In other nations, the date of 1821 is colored by later historical developments: Panama also commemorates every year the day in 1903 when it broke with Bogota, while in the case of Guatemala that independence did not immediately imply a republic of its own, since together with its neighboring nations in 1822 it was nominally dependent on Mexico and between 1823 and 1839 it was part of the United Provinces of Central America and the Federal Republic of Central America. Moreover, the regional hegemony of the United States called into question in later decades the full sovereignty of these countries: Guatemala suffered in 1954 the first coup d'état openly promoted by Washington in the Western Hemisphere, and Panama did not have absolute control over its entire territory until the United States handed over the canal in 1999.

Panama and its canal

The Panama Canal project was important for the United States because it would make it possible to easily connect its two coasts by sea and consolidate the global rise sought by Theodore Roosevelt's presidency, guided by the maxim that only the nation that controlled both oceans would be a truly international power. Given the refusal of Colombia, to which the province of Panama then belonged, to accept the conditions set by the United States to build the canal, resuming the work on the paralyzed French project , Washington was faced with two options: invade the isthmus or promote Panama's independence from Colombia[1]. The Republic of Panama declared its independence on November 3, 1903 and with it Roosevelt negotiated a very favorable agreement for the United States that gave it perpetual sovereignty over the canal and over a wide strip of land on either side of it. Washington thus gained control of Panama and extended its regional dominance.

After a decade of difficult work and a high issue of deaths among the labor force, which came from all over the Caribbean and Asia, due to dengue fever, malaria and yellow fever, in 1913 the Atlantic and Pacific oceans were finally connected and the canal was opened to the transit of ships.

Over time, U.S. sovereignty over a portion of the country and the military instructions installed there fueled a rejection movement in Panama that became especially virulent in the 1960's. The Carter Administration admitted to negotiating the cession of the canal in a 1977 agreement that incorporated the Panamanians in the management of inter-oceanic traffic and set the submission of all installations in 1999. The Carter Administration agreed to negotiate the cession of the canal in a 1977 agreement that incorporated the Panamanians in the management of inter-oceanic traffic and set the submission of all facilities in 1999. When this finally took place, the country experienced the occasion as a new independence celebration, saying goodbye to U.S. troops that only ten years earlier had been very active, invading Panama City and other areas to arrest President Manuel Noriega for drug trafficking.

Critical moment in Guatemala

The Panama Canal gave the United States an undoubted projection of power over its hemisphere. However, during the Cold War, Washington also found it necessary to resort to operations, in some cases direct, to overthrow governments it considered close to communism. This occurred with the overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala in 1954.

The arrival of Árbenz to the presidency in 1951 constituted a threat to the United Fruit Company (UFCO) because of the agrarian reform he was promoting[2]. Although the advance of communist parties in Latin America was beginning to grow, the real threat in certain countries was the expropriation of land by US monopolies. It is estimated that by 1950, the UFCO owned at least 225,000 hectares of land in Guatemala, of which the agrarian reform was to expropriate 162,000 hectares in 1952. With political support from Washington, UFCO claimed that the compensation offered did not correspond to the true value of the land and branded the Árbenz government as communist even though this was not true.

In 1953, the newly inaugurated Eisenhower Administration established a plan to destabilize the government and stage a coup d'état against Árbenz. On the one hand, Secretary of State John F. Dulles sought the support of the Organization of American States, encouraging the condemnation of Guatemala for receiving a shipment of arms from the Soviet Union, which had been acquired due to the refusal of the United States to sell arms to the Central American country. On the other hand, the CIA launched the mission statement PBSUCCESS to guarantee the quartermaster of a faction of the Guatemalan Army ready to rebel against Árbenz. The movement was headed by Colonel Castillo Armas, who was in exile in Honduras and from there opened the invasion on June 18, 1954. When the capital was bombed, the bulk of the Army refused to respond, leaving Árbenz alone, who resigned in a few days.

Once in power, Castillo Armas returned the land expropriated from UFCO and brought new U.S. investors into the country. Dulles called this victory "the greatest triumph against communism in the last five years". The overthrow of Árbenz was seen by the United States as a model for further operations in Latin America. The Nobel award for Literature Mario Vargas Llosa has pointed out that this action against Árbenz could be seen as "the moment when Latin America was screwed", since for many it was the evidence that the normal development of democracy was not possible, and that pushed certain sectors to defend revolution as the only way to make their societies prosper.

[1] McCullough, D. (2001). The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914. Simon & Schuster.

[2] G. Rabe, S. (2017). Intervention in Guatemala, 1953-1954. In S. G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism. The University of North Carolina Press.

The nascent English kingdom was consolidated in civil service examination to power on the other side of the English Channel, giving rise to a particularism that is particularly alive today.

With no turning back now, once Brexit has been consummated, England is seeking to establish a new relationship with its European neighbors. Its departure has not been seconded by any other country, which means that London has to come to terms with a European Union that remains a bloc. Despite the drama with which many Europeans have welcomed Britain's farewell, this is yet another chapter in the complex relationship that a large island has with the continent to which it is close. Island and continent continue where geography has placed them -at a distance of particular value- and will possibly reproduce vicissitudes already seen throughout their mutual history.

Fragment of the Bayeux tapestry, illustrating the battle of Hastings in 1066.

article / María José Beltramo

The result of the 2016 referendum on Brexit may have come as a surprise, as the abrupt manner in which the United Kingdom finally and effectively left the European Union on December 31, 2020, has undoubtedly come as a surprise. However, what we have seen is not so alien to the history of the British relationship with the rest of Europe. If we go back centuries, we can see a geopolitical patron saint that has been repeated on other occasions, and also today, without having to speak of determinism.

Although it is worth mentioning some previous moments in the relationship of the insular Britannia with the continent next to which it is located, such as the period of Romanization, the gestation of the patron saint that at the same time combines linkage and distancing, or even rejection, we can perhaps place it at the beginning of the second millennium, when from Norman invasions that cross the English Channel the nascent kingdom of England is consolidated precisely against the power of the other shore.

England in Norman times

Normandy became a political entity in northern France when in 911, after Viking invasions, the Norman chief Rolon reached an agreement with the Frankish king that guaranteed him the territory in exchange for its defense[1]. Normandy became a duchy and gradually adopted the Frankish feudal system, facilitating the gradual integration of both peoples. This intense relationship would eventually lead to the full incorporation of Normandy into the kingdom of France in 1204.

Before the progressive Norman dissolution, however, the Scandinavian people settled in that part of northern France carried their particular character and organizational capacity, which ensured their independence for several centuries, across the English Channel.

The Norman-English relationship began in 1066 with the Battle of Hastings, in an invasion that led to the Duke of Normandy, William the Conqueror, being crowned king of England in London. The arrival of the Normans had several consequences. From the political point of view, they introduced the islands into the European relations of the time and adapted English feudalism to Norman feudalism, a mixture that would lay the instructions for the future English parliamentarism. In terms of Economics, the Normans demonstrated their Scandinavian organizational capacity in the reorganization of productive activities. In their different conquests, the Normans knew how to take advantage of the best of each system and adapt it to their culture and needs, and so it happened in England, where they developed a particular idiosyncrasy.

From this contact with the continent, England began to consolidate as a monarchy without leaving its link with the Duchy of Normandy. However, with its strengthening after the fall of the Plantagenets in France, England gained the momentum it lacked to finally become an independent kingdom, completely separated from the continent, detached from a Normandy with a weak and critical lineage. In fact, the absorption of the Norman duchy by the kingdom of France facilitated the development and consolidation of the English monarchy as an independent and strong entity[2].

The separation with respect to the European continent refers us to Ortega y Gasset's analysis of European decadence and the moral crisis it is going through[3]. The continental powers, being in a status of geographical continuity, and therefore in greater contact, are more likely to spread their status among themselves and to be dominated by another major power. England, having broken the bridge of feudal ties that connected it with the rest of Europe, finds no difficulty in distancing itself when it sees fit, always in its own interests, something we see repeated several times throughout its history. This is especially evident in the vicissitudes that punctuate the United Kingdom's relationship with the continent throughout the final decades of the second millennium.

English status since 1945

The Second World War greatly weakened the United Kingdom, not only economically, but also as an empire. In the subsequent process of decolonization, London lost possessions in Asia and Africa; moreover, the Suez Canal conflict confirmed its decline as a key player, precisely at the hands of the United States, which had replaced it as the world's leading power. The post-war confrontation with the Soviet Union and the American presence in Europe meant that the transatlantic relationship was no longer based on the preferential link that Washington had with England, so the role of the British also diminished[4].

In 1957, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg created the European Economic Community (EEC). Conservative Harold MacMillan, British Prime Minister from 1957 to 1963, refused to include the United Kingdom in the initiative, but aware of the need to revitalize British Economics and "the difficulty of maintaining a policy that was alien to European interests", he promoted the creation in 1959 of the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) together with Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria and Portugal.

The Common Market proved to be a success and in 1963 the United Kingdom considered joining it, but was blocked by de Gaulle's France. In 1966, the British again submitted their application, but it was again rejected by De Gaulle. The French general's conception of Europe did not include the Atlantic bloc, he still thought of building Europe on a Franco-German axis.

In the 1970s there was a directional shift in European politics. The British Conservatives won the 1970 elections and in 1973 their country joined the EEC. The international economic crisis, which was particularly difficult in the United Kingdom, prompted the Labour Party, back in power, to propose a review of the conditions of membership and Premier Harold Wilson called a referendum in 1975: 17 million Britons wanted to remain (67% of voters) compared with only 8 million who called for a first Brexit.

However, when the European Monetary System (EMS) was launched in 1979 to equalize currencies and achieve "economic convergence," the United Kingdom decided not to join this voluntary agreement . Europe was experiencing a gradual economic boom, but British Economics was not keeping pace, which partly led to the early elections of 1979. These were won by the Conservatives with Margaret Thatcher, who remained in Downing Street until 1990. The Thatcher revolution "marked the way out of the crisis of the 1970s". In 1984, London reduced its contribution to EU funds and Thatcher, who was very reluctant to accept EU budgets and other procedures that reduced national sovereignty, again asked for a review of the agreements.

In 1985 the Schengen Agreements were signed (the opening of borders between certain countries generating a kind of much wider second border), which came into force ten years later. Again, the UK stayed out of it. As was also the case in relation to the euro, when the single currency came into effect in 2002, maintaining the pound sterling to this day.

Immigration from Central and Eastern European countries, following the 2004 EU enlargement, admitted by the Labour Party's Tony Blair, and the acceleration of financial harmonization mechanisms following the 2008-2011 crisis, faced with displeasure by the Conservative David Cameron, provided arguments for the anti-EU speech in the United Kingdom. This led to the rise of the anti-European UKIP and the assumption of its postulates by broad Tory sectors, finally amalgamated by the controversial personality of Boris Johnson.

In an interview with the BBC Johnson referred in 2016 to many of the arguments used in favor of Brexit, such as the dialectical vision that the United Kingdom has of its relationship with the continent or the fear of losing sovereignty and the dissolution of its own profile in the European magma. The premier returned to these ideas in his message to the British people as the country was about to begin its last year in the EU. His words were in some ways an echo of a centuries-old tug-of-war.

Repeating patterns

As we have seen, England has always maintained its own rhythm. Its geographical separation from the continent - far enough away to be able to preserve a particular dynamic, but also close enough to fear a threat, which sometimes proved to be effective - determined the distinctly insular identity of the British and their attitude towards the rest of Europe.

We are dealing with a power that throughout history has always sought to maintain its national sovereignty at all costs and whose geopolitical imperative has been to prevent the continent from being dominated by a rival great power (the perception, during the management the 2008 crisis, that Germany was once again exercising a certain hegemony in Europe may have fueled the Brexit).

Perhaps in the medieval period we cannot link this to a meditated political strategy, but we do see how, involuntarily and circumstantially, we can see how, from the very beginning, there are certain conditions that favor the distancing of the island from the continent, although without losing contact in a radical way. In more recent history we observe this same distant attitude, this time premeditated, with the pursuit of interests focused on the search for economic prosperity and the maintenance of both its global influence and its national sovereignty.

[1] Charles Haskins, The Normans in European History (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915).

[2] Yves Lacoste, Géopolitique : La longue histoire d'aujourd'hui (Paris: Larousse, 2006).

[3] José Ortega y Gasset, La rebelión de las masas (Madrid: Alianza publishing house, 1983). 

[4] José Ramón Díez Espinosa et al., Historia del mundo actual (desde 1945 hasta nuestros días), (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1996).

Attempt by both to reposition France at the geostrategic center of Europe, with civil service examination of Germany.

The nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte and the current president of the French Republic are not completely parallel lives, but there are some really suggestive similarities between the two. It is often said that French presidents revive some of the longed-for packaging of the decapitated monarchy; in Macron's case there is probably a lot of that, but also the assumption of geopolitical imperatives already evident in the Second Empire.

Napoleon III in uniform in an 1850 portrait, and Macron in his 2019 New Year's Eve televised message.

article / José Manuel Fábregas

Emmanuel Macron's decision to hold the G7 summit in the French Basque town of Biarritz in August 2019 brought about a symbolic rapprochement with the figure of Napoleon III. The emperor, and nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte, transformed the former fishing village into a cosmopolitan holiday hub where European aristocrats and members of the highest political echelons met on an international scale. Macron, for his part, returned Biarritz to the stage of the world's major political discussions.

Thus, two personalities come together who, with the attraction of having been the youngest heads of state in the country, share two fundamental aspects in their understanding of French politics. First, the influence that their childhood has had on both of them in developing a personalist way of understanding the head of state. And, secondly, how both have tried to reposition France at the geostrategic center of Europe and have been hindered by Germany. 

What is the role of the head of state?

Born fifth in the order of succession to Napoleon I, the young Louis Napoleon Bonaparte never foresaw that he would become heir to the imperial house in 1832. According to his biographer Paul Guériot, his mother, Hortense de Beauharnais, instilled in him from an early age the idea that he was destined to rebuild the now-defunct Napoleonic Empire. His mother's insistence that he had perfect intellectual and military training transformed Louis Napoleon - who received Education from the Jacobin, and follower of Robespierre's figure, Philippe Le Bas - into a solitary, shy and megalomaniacal person obsessed with restoring Napoleonic France[1].

The revolution of February 1848, according to Jacob Talmon, was inevitable "although it was, however, an accident"[2]. The Israeli historian explains that the uprisings in various parts of Europe were a direct reaction to the territorial reordering of the congress of Vienna (1815). In this context of discontent or disillusionment with the Restoration system, the figure of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte may have benefited from the image of a romantic revolutionary assigned to him by the newspapers and opinion writings of the time. After failed coup attempts in Strasbourg (1836) and Bologna (1840), the future emperor spent a short period of time in prison. This was a decisive aspect in the construction of the romantic hero character that aroused so much admiration in a society that loved the novels of Alexandre Dumas[3]. The exploitation of this personality by means of a great propaganda apparatus allowed him to comfortably win the elections of December 1848. Thus, it could also be said that the establishment of the Second Empire - ratified by a popular plebiscite in November 1852 - was the next step in his main political project : the revival of Napoleonic France.

For his part, the current president of the French Republic also experienced an overprotective childhood that forged, like the last emperor of France, a solitary personality and an individualistic way of understanding politics. Anne Fulda underlines in her biography of Emmanuel Macron that, being born a year after the death of his older sister and after a complicated delivery, his birth was considered a miracle. This may have fostered, along with a competitive Education in which he excelled as a "child prodigy", his self-conviction that he was destined to rule the country[4]. However, his election as head of state was not the fruit of a long-term strategy, but rather, like that of Louis Napoleon, of a tactical move. The renovating image that Macron offered was cleverly exploited in an election in which he faced rivals who presented certain communicative weaknesses, such as those with a low profile like François Fillon (Republican) and Benoît Hamon (Socialist), or others with more extremist tones like Marine Le Pen (National Front) and Jean-Luc Mélenchon (Unsubmissive France).

In 2015, while still Minister of Economics, Emmanuel Macron made an interesting reflection for the weekly Le 1 on what was the role of the president in France. He understood that French citizens felt a lack after the fall of the monarchy that they had tried to fill by strengthening the figure of the president. This excessive weight of personalism in Macron's understanding of politics has also been demonstrated recently in the replacement of Édouard Philippe as prime minister. Because his popularity had grown in the last year as he had shown himself to be more charismatic and calm in counterpoint with the overacting and abusive protagonism of the president, Macron chose as his replacement Jean Castex, with a more technocratic profile that does not overshadow the president in the face of his reelection.

What role France should play in Europe

This firm commitment of both leaders to give greater importance and visibility to the position of head of state transcends the borders of the Gallic country. Napoleon III and Emmanuel Macron also share the desire to place France at the center of the European balance.

Having won the elections with a speech against the order inherited from the congress of Vienna, Napoleon III had his own European project based on the free integration or separation of the different national identities of the old continent. A clear example of this was the Crimean War (1854-1856). Fearing that the decadent Ottoman Empire would end up as a vassal of Russia, the emperor defended, together with the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Sardinia, its independence from the Ottomans in a conflict that would separate Russia from the other Western powers temporarily[5]. The Treaty of Paris (1856) would not only end the war, but also motivate Napoleon III to initiate an interventionist policy in Europe.

Napoleon III's imperial dream forced him to develop an active foreign policy focused on the expansion of French borders and the reordering of the continent taking into account two main values: nationalism and liberalism. However, Henry Kissinger rightly comments that his diplomatic work was so confused that "France got nothing"[6]. By supporting the unification of Italy at the cost of the loss of territory of the Austrian Empire, Napoleon unintentionally favored the creation of Germany. These facts strongly weakened the geostrategic influence of France in the face of the new European order to which he aspired. On the other hand, it was Bismarck's clever diplomatic tactics that would really put an end to the Vienna system, hastening the fall of the Second French Empire at the Battle of Sedan (1870).

In addition, Emmanuel Macron is presenting himself as the savior of the European Union in a context marked by the rise of populist and Eurosceptic movements. However, his ambitious reform projects have met with Angela Merkel's reluctance.

In a recent interview for The Economist, Emmanuel Macron pointed out that NATO was "brain dead" and that Europe was "on the edge of the precipice" by depending on the United States and lacking independence in terms of defense. Macron opts for greater integration of the European Union at the strategic level, going so far as to propose a single pan-European army. In response, German Chancellor Angela Merkel objected to him that Europe does not currently have the capacity to defend itself on its own and is consequently dependent on the Atlantic Alliance. In addition, Macron has also challenged the apparent agreement among the countries of the Union regarding the incorporation of new members and the relationship with Russia. The French president's veto of a possible incorporation of Albania and North Macedonia, claiming that they did not comply with EU clauses on corruption, has come to be described as a "historic mistake" by leaving the future of the Balkan countries at the mercy of Russia and China. He does not share this position with regard to Russia, with which he is willing to relax diplomatic relations and even suggests a greater integration of the country into Europe.

In final, Emmanuel Macron and Napoleon III share an excessively egocentric vision. The overexposure of certain personal characteristics in matters of State and the inordinate pretension to leadership in Europe are two aspects common to these two young leaders. Despite the fact that historiography has already judged the mistakes that precipitated Louis Napoleon into exile, it remains to be seen whether or not Macron is doomed to repeat the history of his predecessor.

[1] Guériot, P. (1944). Napoleon III. Madrid: Ediciones Técnicas.

[2] Talmón, J.L. (1960). Political messianism. La etapa romántica. Mexico City: Ed. Aguilar.

[3] Guériot, P. (1944). Napoleon III. Madrid: Ediciones Técnicas.

[4] Fulda, A. (2017). Emmanuel Macron, the president who has surprised Europe. Madrid: Ediciones Península.

[5] Milza, P. (2004). Napoleon III. Paris: Éditions Perrin.

[6] Kissinger, Henry (1994). Diplomacy (First Edition). Barcelona: Ediciones B.

Iranian hackers forged pre-election mailings of the Proud Boys, but the actual post-election performance of this and other groups proved more disruptive

If in the 2016 U.S. presidential election foreign meddling operations were led by Russia, in the 2020 election the focus was on Iranian hackers, because of the novelty they represented in a field of operations where Russians and Chinese were also active, each pursuing their own interests. In particular, Tehran was hoping for a defeat of Donald Trump so that his Democratic successor would reverse the harsh sanctions regime imposed against the Iranian regime. But those actions in cyberspace by Iran, Russia and China were ineffective due to the heightened alertness of American security and intelligence agencies. In the end, these outside attempts to discredit U.S. democracy and undermine voter confidence in its electoral system were dwarfed by the damage caused by the domestic chaos itself.

Assault on Capitol Hill, Washington, Jan. 6, 2021 [TapTheForwardAssist].

article / María Victoria Andarcia

Russia was always in the eye of US security during the 2020 election year, after its interference in the presidential election four years earlier was established. However, while the main concern remained Russia and there were also fears of an expansion of China's operations, Iran grabbed the headlines in some of the warnings issued by US authorities, probably because of the ease with which they were able to attribute various actions to Iranian actors. Despite this multiple front, the development the ballots did not yield any evidence that the foreign disinformation campaigns had been effective. The rapid identification of the actors involved and the offensive reaction by U.S. security and intelligence services may have prevented the 2016 status . As the Atlantic Council has noted, this time "domestic disinformation overshadowed foreign action."

Given the direct consequences that Joe Biden's arrival in the White House may have on Washington's policy towards Iran, this article pays more attention to Iranian attempts to affect the development the US elections. The incidence of Iranian operations was minimal and had a lower profile than those carried out by Russia in 2016 (a country that in turn had less involvement than in those previous elections).

Iranian operations

In May and June 2020, the first movements in Microsoft accounts were recorded, as later revealed by the company itself. An Iranian group called Phosphorus had succeeded in gaining access to accounts of White House employees and Trump's re-election campaign team. These were early signs that Tehran was mounting some subject of cyber operation.

In early August, the director of the Center for Counterintelligence and National Security, William Evanina, accused Tehran - as well as Moscow and Beijing - of using disinformation on the Internet to "influence voters, unleash disorder and undermine public confidence" in the system. Regarding Iran it stated, "We assess that Iran seeks to undermine U.S. democratic institutions and President Trump, and to divide the country ahead of the 2020 election." She added that Iranian efforts were focused on spreading disinformation on social media, where it circulated anti-U.S. content. Evanina attributed as the motivation for these actions the Iranian perception "that President Trump's re-election would result in a continuation of U.S. pressure on Iran in an effort to encourage regime change."

In the wake of the televised discussion between Trump and Biden on September 29, Twitter deleted 130 accounts that "appeared to originate in Iran" and whose content, which it had put the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on knowledge , was intended to influence public opinion during the presidential discussion . The company offered only four examples. Two of the accounts were pro-Trump: in one the Username was @jackQanon (in reference letter to the conspiratorial group QAnon) and the other expressed support for Proud Boys, a far-right organization with supremacist links that Trump had order "be on guard and be vigilant". The other two accounts had expressed pro-Biden messages.

In mid-October, the director of National Intelligence, John Ratcliffe, referred in a press conference to Iranian and Russian cyber actions as a threat to the electoral process. According to Ratcliffe, the Iranian operation consisted primarily of a series of e-mails purporting to be sent by the Proud Boys group . These emails contained threats of physical force for those who did not vote for Trump, and were intended to instigate violence and damage Trump's image by associating his campaign with radical groups and efforts to intimidate voters. Interestingly, the Proud Boys would later gain prominence for themselves in the post-election rallies in Washington and the takeover of the Capitol.

While Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Said Jatibzadeh denied these accusations, stressing that "Iran is indifferent to who wins the US elections", the US authorities insisted on their version and the US Treasury department s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned five Iranian entities for having attempted to undermine the presidential elections. According to the OFACstatement , the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Quds Force used Iranian media as platforms to spread propaganda and disinformation to the U.S. population.

agreement to OFAC, the Iranian audiovisual communications business Bayan Gostar, a regular collaborator of the Revolutionary Guard, had "planned to influence the election by exploiting social problems within the United States, including the COVID-19 pandemic, and by denigrating U.S. political figures." Iran's Islamic Radio and Television Union (IRTVU), which OFAC considers a propaganda arm of the Revolutionary Guard, and the International Virtual Media Union "assisted Bayan Gostar in his efforts to reach U.S. audiences." These media outlets "amplified false narratives in English and published derogatory propaganda articles and other content directed at the United States with the intent to sow discord among the U.S. audience."

Post-election performance

The United States claims that Iranian interference was not limited to the elections, which were held on November 3 (with an unprecedented level of advance and postal voting), but continued afterwards in the following weeks, trying to take advantage of the confusion caused by the questioning of the electoral result maintained by the Trump Administration. Days before Christmas, the FBI and the department Homeland Security department s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) disclosed that Iran was allegedly behind a website and several social media accounts aimed at provoking further violence against various U.S. officials. The website titled "Enemies of the People" contained photographs and staff information of both officials and private sector staff involved in the process of counting and authenticating votes cast in the election, sometimes in the face of allegations of fraud maintained by Trump and his supporters.

The action attributed to Iran can be interpreted as a way to avenge the drone strike ordered by Washington to assassinate Qasem Soleimani, head of the Qurds Force in Iraq, for whose death on January 3, 2020 Tehran had vowed retaliation. But above all it reveals an ongoing effort by Iran to alleviate the effects of the Trump-driven U.S. "maximum pressure" policy. Given Biden's expressed intention during the election campaign to change U.S. foreign policy toward the Islamic Republic, the Islamic Republic would have the opportunity to receive more lax U.S. attention if Trump lost the presidential election. Biden had indicated that if he came to power he would change policy toward Iran, possibly returning to the nuclear agreement signed in 2015 on the condition that Iran respect the limits on its nuclear program agreed to then. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was considered a milestone in the foreign policy of then President Barack Obama, but then the Trump Administration decided not to respect it because it considered that issues such as Iran's missile development and its military interference in other countries in the region had been left out.

A few days before the inauguration of the new American president, Iranian President Hassan Rohani urged Biden to lift the sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic and return to the 2015 nuclear agreement . Iran hopes that the Biden Administration will take the first steps to compensate for the actions of the previous administration and thus move towards a possible understanding between the two nations. The decision to return to the agreement will not be made immediately as Biden inherits a divided country and it will take time to reverse Trump's policies. With the Iranian presidential elections approaching in June of this year, the Biden administration is buying time to attempt a reformulation that will not be easy, as the context of the Middle East has changed substantially in the last five years.