Brazilian congress approves ratification of the Technology Safeguards agreement signed by Trump and Bolsonaro

With the reactivation of its Alcantara launch center, the best located in the world due to its proximity to the Equator, the Brazilian space industry expects to reach a business Issue of 10 billion dollars per year from 2040, with control of at least 1% of the world sector, especially in the area of space launches. Jair Bolsonaro's government has agreed to guarantee technological confidentiality to the US, reaching an agreement that Washington had already tried unsuccessfully before the Workers' Party came to power.      

▲ space launch area of the Brazilian Alcântara space center [AEB].

article / Alejandro J. Alfonso [English version].

Brazil wants to be part of the new space era, in which private initiative, especially that of the United States, will play a major role, along with the traditional role of the national agencies of the major powers. With the Technology Safeguardsagreement , signed last March by Presidents Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro, the strategic Alcantara base will be able to launch rockets, spacecraft and satellites equipped with U.S. technology.

The guarantee of technological confidentiality - access to certain parts of the base will only be authorized to U.S. staff , although jurisdiction will remain with the Brazilian Air Force - will mean that Alcantara will no longer have to negotiate contracts with only 20% of the world market, as has been the case until now, something that hindered the economic viability of the base. However, the agreement also has a limiting aspect, since it only authorizes Brazil to launch national or foreign rockets and aircraft that contain technological parts developed by the US.

The new political context in Brazil meant that the agreement was ratified without problems on October 22 by the Chamber of Deputies and on November 12 by the Senate, a very different status from that experienced in 2000, when congress blocked a similar agreement promoted by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The subsequent arrival of the Workers' Party to power, with the presidencies of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, cooled relations between the two countries and Washington momentarily set aside its interest in Alcântara.

Brazil's space aspirations go back a long way; its aerospace industry is the largest in Latin America. In the 1960s it developed a first launch base, Hell's Barrier, near Natal. In 1994 the military matrix of the research was transformed into the civilian Brazilian Space Agency (AEB). In addition to the development of satellites, in 2004 AEB launched its first rocket. In 2006 a Brazilian astronaut joined the International Space Station, of which Brazil is a partner.

The Alcântara launch center is located in Maranhão, a state in northeastern Brazil. Alcántara is a small colonial town located 100 kilometers from São Luís, the state capital. The town has 22,000 inhabitants and has access to the sea. The launch center was built during the 1980s and has an area of 620 square kilometers. In addition, the launch base is located 2.3 Degrees south of the equator, making it an ideal location for launching satellites into geostationary orbit. The unique geographic conditions of the launch site attract companies interested in launching small to medium-sized satellites, generally used for communications or surveillance satellites. Unfortunately, the facility suffered a bad reputation when operations were briefly halted due to a failed launch in 2003, resulting in the death of 21 technicians and the destruction of some of the facilities. In 2002 the Agency

The United States is interested in Alcantara because of its strategic location. As mentioned above, the launch site is 2.3 Degrees south of the Equator, which allows U.S. rockets to save up to 30% in fuel consumption compared to launches from Cape Canaveral, Florida. Also, due to its proximity to the Equator, the drag to reach orbit is lower than Cape Canaveral, which means that companies can increase the weight of the rocket or the cargo it carries without adding additional fuel. Thus, this location offers U.S. companies the same advantages enjoyed by their European counterparts who use a launch site in French Guiana, located nearby, north of the equator. The Technology Safeguards agreement signed between Presidents Bolsonaro and Trump in March is intended to attract these U.S. companies by assuring them that U.S. companies that do use the Alcantara facility will have the necessary protection and safeguards so that their technology is not stolen or copied by Brazilian operators or engineers.

The Brazilian government is clearly interested in having the Americans use the Alcantara site. The global space industry is worth approximately $300 billion, and Brazil, which still has a space agency in development, could use the funds from leasing the launch site to further develop its space capabilities. The Brazilian Space Agency has been underfunded for many years, so additional revenue is especially convenient for it. In addition, Brazilian officials have speculated that the investment in the launch site will bring more investment to the Alcantara region in general, improving the quality of life in the area. For example, the Kourou base in French Guiana generates 15% of the GDP of that French overseas territory, directly or indirectly employment 9,000 people. In conclusion, the Bolsonaro government hopes that this agreement will deepen the relationship with the USA, and that it will also provide monetary means to invest in the launch site and its surroundings, and to invest in the Brazilian Space Agency.

However, this agreement has also been criticized. In 2000, President Cardoso's government attempted to sign a similar agreement with the George W. Bush administration which was ultimately blocked by the Brazilian congress for fear that Brazil would cede its sovereignty to the US. These same fears are still present today. Former Brazilian Foreign Minister Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães Nieto stated that the US is seeking to establish a military base in Brazil, thus injuring the sovereignty of the Brazilian people. Criticism is also directed at the essay of the agreement itself, which states that the money the Brazilian government earns from the US use of the launch center cannot be invested in rockets of exclusively Brazilian development , but can be invested in other areas related to the Brazilian Space Agency.

In addition to arguments about the integrity of Brazilian sovereignty, there is also a defense of the Quilombolas, descendants of Brazilian slaves who escaped their masters, who were displaced from their coastal lands when the base was built. Currently, the government is proposing to increase the size of the Alcantara launch site by 12,000 hectares, and Quilombo communities fear that they will once again be forced to move, causing them further impoverishment. This has been the subject of discussion in both the Brazilian congress and the U.S.congress , with Democratic House representatives introducing a resolution calling on the Bolsonaro government to respect the rights of the Quilombolas.

The Technology Safeguards agreement is mainly a commercial agreement in order to attract more U.S. companies to Brazil for the Alcantara site, which would save money for these companies due to the ideal location of the launch site, while they would have the opportunity to invest in the Brazilian space program. However, due to the controversies mentioned above, some may consider this as a unilateral agreement where only U.S. interests prevail, while the Brazilian government and people lose sovereignty over a strategic site. However, it should be noted that Brazil has traditionally developed an important aeronautical industry (Embraer, recently bought by Boeing, is an excellent example) and the Alcantara base provides the opportunity for Brazil to leap into the new space age.

For decades, the U.S. closed its doors to Mexican avocados; today it needs them to meet its growing demand.

In 2019, there will be a record of Mexican avocado imports in the United States: almost 90% of the million tons of avocados consumed by Americans will come from the neighboring country, which leads world production. After being banned for decades in the US -alleging phytosanitary issues, mainly invoked by California producers-, the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement opened the doors of the US market to this Mexican product, first with reservations and since 2007 without restrictions. The arrival of Trump to the presidency marked a drop in imports, but then they have not stopped rising.

▲ Interest in healthy food has increased avocado consumption around the world

article / Silvia Goya

Social trends such as veganism or "real fooding" have increased the world production of avocado, a fruit valued for its healthy fat and vitamin contribution, which is a good complement to a multitude of dishes. In the United States, moreover, the food tradition of millions of Hispanics - the avocado comes from a tree native to Central and South America(Persea americana) - has encouraged the consumption of a product that, like few others, marks the relations between the United States and Mexico.

The US department Agriculture (USDA) forecasts that to meet the growing domestic consumption of avocado (which has increased 5.4 times since 2000, from 226,000 tons to 1.2 million in 2018), in 2019 the country will have to increase its imports significantly, so that they will go from 87% to 93% of the availability product. That will mean an increase in imports from Mexico, which in 2018 already contributed 87% of the avocado from abroad. This need for imports is partly due to production problems recorded in California, the state with the highest production in the US (about 80%), well ahead of the second, Florida, and a great litigator in the past to prevent the skill of Mexican avocados.

Donald Trump's first year in the White House meant a slight decline in Mexican avocado imports, which in 2017 dropped to 774,626 tons. However, in 2018, a new record was reached, with 904,205 tons, up 17%, in a context of non-materialization of the trade threats launched by the Trump Administration, which finally agreed to the renewal of the free trade agreement with Mexico and Canada. Last year, imports from Mexico accounted for 87% of total avocado purchases abroad; the rest, up to 1.04 million tons, corresponded to those from Peru (8%), Chile (2.5%) and Dominican Republic (2.5%).

History of a veto

The B in avocado sales in the US has attracted the attention of drug cartels, which have clashed for control of the business in some Mexican states such as Michoacán - the major producer of avocados, especially the Hass variety, which is the most widely marketed - giving rise to a "new drug trade". However, the history of controversy between the two countries over this berry goes back a long way. It was in 1914 when the then US Secretary of Agriculture signed a quarantine notice declaring the need to prohibit the importation of avocado seeds from Mexico due to a weevil that the seed carried. In 1919 the "Quarantine of nurseries, plants and seeds" was enacted. This regulatory framework was in force for decades.

During the period of the 1970s, the discussion on the entrance of Mexican avocados into the U.S. market remained in the political limelight due to the insistence of Mexican Plant Health Service officials. Investigations in several Mexican avocado-producing states, however, found weevils in some of the seeds, which did not allow a change in the regulatory policy of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the USDA department Therefore, in 1976 the USDA, in a letter to its Mexican counterpart, stated that it should continue "as in the past, against the issuance of permits for the importation of avocados from Mexico".

Following these events, U.S. policy toward avocados from its neighboring country remained restrictive until trade liberalization and harmonization of sanitary and phytosanitary measures began to change the context in which governments considered plant health problems and imports. For most of the 20th century, the policy of protection had been to deny access to products that might harbor pests; in the last decade, however, the rules began to change.

The creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 and the World Trade Organization in 1995 paved the way for new Mexican requests for access to the U.S. avocado market. Although NAFTA's main goal was the elimination of tariffs by 2004, it also provided for the harmonization of sanitary and phytosanitary measures between trading partners. However, this free trade agreement explicitly recognizes that each country can establish regulations to protect human, animal and plant life and health, so when the risk of pest infestation is high, the country has the legitimacy to place restrictions on trade.

With the implementation of NAFTA in 1994, the U.S. government came under increased pressure to facilitate the importation of agricultural products from Mexico, including avocados. This led to a shift in USDA's phytosanitary policy to a new policy of "mitigation or technological solutions". APHIS is the branch of government charged with implementing the phytosanitary provisions of NAFTA in the case of the US. APHIS considered that fruit flies - present in a wide variety of species - could also be found in Mexican avocados, so Mexican Plant Health Service officials had the difficult task of proving that the insect was not present in their avocados and that those of the Hass variety were not susceptible to Mexican fruit fly attack. Between 1992 and 1994, Mexico submitted two work plans with their respective research. The first was rejected while the second, despite pressure from the California Avocado Commission (CAC), was accepted.

This second plan called for access of Mexican avocados to 19 of the 50 U.S. states during the months of October through February. In late June 1995, the USDA issued a proposal rule outlining the conditions under which Hass avocados grown on approved plantations in Michoacán could enter the United States. It was in late 1997 that the USDA issued a final rule authorizing the importation of such avocados into the US. This was the first time that the USDA used the so-called "systemsapproach " to manage the risks posed by quarantine pests.

At the conclusion of the second shipping season in February 1999, Mexico requested an expansion of the program to increase the issue of U.S. states to which it could export and allow the shipping season to begin one month earlier (September) and end one month later (March). In 2001, the USDA met with the Mexican Plant Health Service and agreed to consider expanding the importing states to 31 and the import dates from October 15 to April 15. The good relationship established between Presidents George W. Bush and Vicente Fox had a clear influence on this expansionary movement.

Imports in tons. In 2018, imports of 1.04 million tons (87% from Mexico)source: USDA].

Liberalization

For five years Mexican avocados had been shipped to the U.S. without detecting a single pest. Although the expansion of Mexican avocado imports seemed inevitable, the CAC filed a lawsuit against the USDA from California, alleging that Mexican avocados did have pests. In response, the USDA conducted an research and published a draft "pest riskassessment " in 2003 confirming that Mexican avocados did not carry the fruit fly.

The USDA had shifted from its previous position of domestic protection to a new position that benefited importation. Thus, in 2004 the USDA issued a new rule to expand the import program to all 50 states for 12 months of the year. This rule provided for California, Florida and Hawaii to delay the importation of avocados for up to one year in order to test the effectiveness of the proposed regulations. Therefore, it was not until January 2007 that Mexico was allowed to export avocados to California and Florida; since then it has been allowed to export to all states year-round, thus quickly making the US the world's largest importer of Mexican avocados.

Until 2017, the import of Mexican avocados remained stable; however, as previously indicated, with Trump's arrival to the White House, US-Mexico relations again faltered around various issues, one of them being the export of food from Mexico to the US, with avocados as an emblematic case. The new US president threatened a 20% tariff on Mexican avocados to finance the wall he intended to build on the border.

In June 2018 Trump again threatened to place a 25% tariff on avocados and later in May 2019 threatened to impose a 5% tariff on all goods from Mexico.

In March 2019, when the migratory wave occurred, the US president threatened to close the border with Mexico and consecutively withdrew his decision, however, the mere fact that Trump threatened to close the border already escalated the price of avocado by 34%.

U.S.-Mexico avocado relations remain unstable. Although much progress has been made since the implementation of NAFTA, various interests are still at stake that could lead the US to reduce imports of Mexican avocados. Avocados can hardly escape the uncertainty of the U.S.-Mexico relationship.

U.S. agreements with the Northern Triangle may have had a deterrent effect before entering into force

In the first month following the extension of the Asylum Cooperation Agreements (ACA) to the three Northern Triangle countries, apprehensions at the US border have fallen below recent years. The actual reduction in migrant inflows evidenced by this has to do with Mexico's increased control over its border with Guatemala, but may also be due to the deterrent effect of the advertisement the agreements, whose implementation has not yet fully begun and therefore has yet to demonstrate whether they will be directly effective.

▲ Honduran migrants held by Guatemalan border guards, October 2018 [Wikimedia Commons].

article / María del Pilar Cazali

Attempts to entrance the United States through its border with Mexico have not only returned to the levels of earlier in the year, before the number of migrants soared and each month set a new record high, reaching 144,116 apprehensions and inadmissions in May( U.S.Border Guard figures that provide an indirect assessment of the evolution of migration), but have continued to decline to below several previous years.

The month of October (the first month of the 2020 US fiscal year), there were 45,250 apprehensions and inadmissions at the US southern border, below the figure for the months of October 2018, 2015 and 2016 (though not 2017). This allows us to predict that the total number of apprehensions and inadmissions in the new fiscal year will fall clearly below the record of 977,509 recorded in 2019. This boom had to do with the migrant caravans that began at the end of 2018 in the Central American Northern Triangle (Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala), following a migratory flow that, with different intensities, began in the 1980s due to political and economic instabilities in those countries.

This migration crisis led President Trump's U.S. administration to implement harsher deportation policies, including changing conditions for expedited deportations. In addition, the White House pressured Mexico with the threat of tariffs on its products if it did not help reduce the flow of migrants crossing Mexican soil, prompting President López Obrador to deploy the newly created National Guard to the border with Guatemala. Trump combined these measures with the negotiation with the Northern Triangle countries of Asylum Cooperation Agreements (ACAs), which were initially improperly referred to as "safe third countries", adding to the controversy they generated.

agreement with Guatemala

Due to US threats to impose tariffs on Guatemala if it failed to reduce the issue of migrants from or passing through Guatemala on their way to the US, the Guatemalan government accepted the terms of an attention announced by Trump on July 26, 2019. The agreement provides that those seeking asylum in the US but who have previously passed through Guatemala will be brought back to the US so that they can remain there as asylees if they qualify. The United States sees this as a safe third country agreement .

A safe third countryagreement is an international mechanism that makes it possible to receive in one country those seeking asylum in another. The agreement signed in July prevents asylum seekers from receiving U.S. protection if they passed through Guatemala and did not first apply for asylum there. The U.S. goal is to prevent migrants from Honduras and El Salvador from seeking asylum in the United States. The responsibility for processing protection requests will fall on Washington in only three cases: unaccompanied minors, persons with a U.S.-issued visa or admission document, or persons who are not required to obtain a visa. Those who do not meet the requirements will be sent to Guatemala to await resolution of their case, which could take years. On the other hand, the agreement does not prevent Guatemalan and Mexican applicants from seeking asylum in the United States.

The president of Guatemala, Jimmy Morales, had previously announced that a similar agreement could become part of the immigration negotiations being carried out with the US. In Guatemala, after the advertisement the agreement, multiple criticisms arose, because the security conditions of both countries are incomparable. To this were added rumors about the true content of the agreement that Morales had signed, since it was not immediately revealed to the public. Faced with this uncertainty, the Minister of the Interior, Enrique Degenhart, declared that the agreement was only for Hondurans and Salvadorans, not for nationals of other Latin American countries, and that the text did not explicitly mention the term "safe third country".

The week following the advertisement, three appeals for legal protection against the agreement were filed before the Constitutional Court of Guatemala, arguing that the country is not in a position to provide the protection it supposedly offers and that the expense it would entail would weaken the economic status of the population itself. However, Degenhart defended the agreement saying that the economic repercussions would have been worse if the pact with Washington had not been reached, because the U.S. tariffs would endanger half of Guatemala's exports and the jobs that accompany these sectors.

These criticisms came not only from Guatemalan citizens, but also from public figures such as Guatemala's Human Rights Ombudsman, Jordán Rodas, citing a lack of transparency on the part of the government. Rodas insisted that Guatemala is not fit to be a safe third country because of its low production, Education, public health and security indicators. Similar ideas have also been expressed by organizations such as Amnesty International, for which Guatemala is not safe and cannot be considered as a safe haven.

In its pronouncement, the Constitutional Court of Guatemala affirmed that the Guatemalan government needs to submit the agreement to the approval of congress in order for it to be effective. This has been rejected by the government, which considers that international policy is the direct skill of the country's president and therefore will begin to implement the decision made with Washington without further delay.

Apprehensions and inadmissions made by U.S. border guards, distributed by month during the last fiscal years (FY) [Taken from CBP].

Also with El Salvador and Honduras

Despite all this controversy generated since July as a result of the pact with Guatemala, the US developed similar efforts with El Salvador and Honduras. On September 20, 2019, the president of El Salvador, Nayib Bukele, signed an agreement assimilable to the figure of the safe third country, although it was not explicitly called as such either. It commits El Salvador to receive asylum seekers who cannot yet enter the U.S., similar to the agreement with Guatemala. El Salvador's agreement has the same three assumptions in which the U.S. will have to make a position migrant protection.

The Salvadoran government has received similar criticism, including a lack of transparency in the negotiation and denial of the reality that the country is unsafe. Bukele justified the signature by saying it would mean the extension of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for the more than 190,000 Salvadorans living in the US. In October 2019, the Salvadoran Foreign Ministry said that this agreement is not a safe third country because El Salvador is not in the serious migratory situations in which Guatemala and Honduras are in terms of the flow of people, so it is only an agreement of non-violation of rights to minimize the number of migrants.

On September 21, 2019 the Honduran government also made public the advertisement of an agreement very similar to the one accepted by its two neighbors. It states that the U.S. will be able to deport to Honduras asylum seekers who have passed through Honduras. Like the other two countries, the Honduran government received criticism that it is not a safe destination for migrants as it is one of the countries with the highest homicide fees in the world.

Despite the criticism generated over the three agreements, in late October 2019 the Donald Trump administration announced that it was in final preparations to begin sending asylum seekers to Guatemala. However, by the end of November, the sending of non-Guatemalan asylum seekers had yet to occur. The inauguration in early January of President-elect Alejandro Giammattei, who announced his desire to rescind certain terms of the agreement, may introduce some variation, although perhaps his purpose is to extract some more concessions from Trump, in addition to the agricultural visas that Morales negotiated for Guatemalan seasonal workers.

The flood of unaccompanied alien minors suffered by the Obama Administration in 2014 has been surpassed in a 2019 with a new migration peak

In the summer of 2014, the United States suffered a migration crisis due to an unexpected increase in the issue of unaccompanied foreign minors, mostly Central American, arriving at its border with Mexico. What has happened since then? Although oscillating, the Issue of this immigration subject went down, but in 2019 a new record has been registered, hand in hand with the ˝caravan crisis˝, which has led to a rise again in total apprehensions at the border.

▲ U.S. border agents search unaccompanied minors at the Texas-Mexico border in 2014 [Hector Silva, USCBP-Wikimedia Commons].

article / Marcelina Kropiwnicka [English version].

The United States hosts more immigrants than any other country in the world, with more than one million people arriving each year, either as legal permanent residents, asylum seekers and refugees, or in other immigration categories. While there is no exact figure for how many people cross the border illegally, US Customs and Border Control authorities measure changes in illegal immigration based on the number of apprehensions made at the border; these apprehensions serve as an indicator of the total issue of attempts to enter the country illegally. In terms of data, it can be concluded that there have been notable changes in the demographics of illegal migration at the border with Mexico (southwest border, in official U.S. terms) in recent years.

The peak of apprehensions at the border with Mexico was during 2000, when 1.64 million people were apprehended attempting to enter the United States illegally. The numbers have generally declined since then. In recent years there have been more apprehensions of non-Mexicans than Mexicans at the U.S.-Mexico border, reflecting a decrease in the issue of unauthorized Mexican immigrants arriving in the United States over the past decade. The increase, in fact, was largely due to those fleeing violence, gang activity and poverty in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, a region known as the Central American Northern Triangle.

The nations included in the Northern Triangle are among the poorest in Latin America - a high percentage of the population still lives on less than $2 a day (the international poverty line is $1.90) - and there has been little progress in reducing poverty in recent years. Within Latin America and the Caribbean, Honduras has the second highest percentage of population living below the poverty line (17%), after Haiti, according to the latest World Bank data .

Unaccompanied foreign minors

While fewer adults, unaccompanied by family, have attempted to cross the border without authorization in the last decade, there has instead been a surge of unaccompanied alien minors (UACM) attempting to enter the United States from Mexico. The migration of unaccompanied minors is not new; what is new now is the Issue and the need to implement policies in response to this problem. The increase in apprehensions of MENAs in FY 2014 caused alarm and prompted both intense media scrutiny and the implementation of policy responses; attention was sustained even as the phenomenon declined. Numbers dropped again to just under 40,000 apprehensions of minors the following year.

The international community defines an unaccompanied migrant minor as a person, "who is under the age of eighteen" and who is "separated from both parents and is not being cared for by an adult who by law or custom has the responsibility to do so." Many of these unaccompanied minors immediately present themselves to U.S. border security, while others enter the country unnoticed and undocumented. Not only this, but the children have no parents or legal guardians available to provide care or physical custody, which quickly overwhelms local border patrol services.

In 2014 many of the unaccompanied children claimed that they were under the false impression that the Obama Administration was granting "permits" to children who had relatives in the U.S., as long as they arrived by June at the latest. These false convincements and propagated hoaxes were even more potent this past year, especially as President Trump continues to reinforce the idea of restricting migrants' access to the US. The cartels have continued to transport an increasing issue of Central American migrants from their countries to the United States.

Critical moments in 2014 and 2019

In 2014, during Obama's second term, total apprehensions along the border with Mexico reached 569,237 (this figure includes "non-admissible" individuals), a record only surpassed now. While the increase over the previous year was 13%, the increase was much more B apprehensions of MENAs; these went from 38,759 in FY 2013 to 68,541 in FY 2014 (in the US the fiscal year runs from October of one year to September of the next), an increase of almost 80%, more than four times those recorded in FY 2011. In the case of minors from Honduras, the number rose in one year from 6,747 to 18,244; those from Guatemala rose from 8,068 to 17,057, and those from El Salvador from 5,990 to 16,404 (those from Mexico, on the other hand, fell from 17,240 to 15,634). The highest issue of apprehensions occurred in May, a month in which arrests of MENAs accounted for 17% of total apprehensions.

Since 2014, apprehensions of unaccompanied minors, although fluctuating, declined in issue. But 2019 saw a new record high, reaching 76,020, with a peak in the month of May. However, they accounted for only 9% of total apprehensions that month, as this time it was not properly a crisis of MENAs, but rather inserted into a B in total apprehensions. While overall apprehensions dropped significantly during the first six months of Trump's presidency, they then rose, reaching a 2019 total of 851,508 (with "non-admissibles" the figure reached 977,509), more than doubling from 2018. The issue of total apprehensions increased by 72% from 2014 to 2019 (in the case of MENAs the increase was 11%).

Apprehensions of unaccompanied alien minors at the US-Mexico border, between 2012 and 2019 (figure 1), and comparison of 2014 and 2019 by month (figure 2). source: US Customs and Border Patrol.

Reaction

The United States had various domestic policies aimed at addressing the massive increase in immigration. However, with the overwhelming spike in 2014, Obama requested funding for a program to "repatriate and reintegrate migrants to Central American countries and to address the root causes of migration from these countries." Although funding for the program was fairly consistent in recent years, President Trump 's proposed 2018 budget reduced financial aid to these countries by approximately 30%.

The Trump Administration has made progress in implementing its immigration diary , from beginning construction of the wall on the border with Mexico to launching new programs, but the hard line already promised by Trump in his degree program to the White House has proven ineffective in stopping thousands of Central American families from crossing the southwest border into the United States. With extreme gang violence being rampant and technicalities in the US immigration system, the motivation for migrants to leave their countries will remain.

Some U.S. and Canadian diplomats who were in Havana between 2016 and 2018 are still not fully recovered from ailments they suffered

▲ Building of the U.S. Embassy in Cubadepartment of State].

ANALYSIS / Eduardo Villa Corta

Three years ago, U.S. diplomatic staff stationed in Cuba began to feel physical discomfort supposedly caused by strange sounds to which they had apparently been exposed; Washington spoke of a ˝sonic attack˝, but although the symptoms suffered by those affected have been determined to be anomalous, it has not been possible to establish what caused them. However, although the symptoms suffered by those affected have been determined to be anomalous, it has not been possible to establish what caused them. Was it really an attack? Who was behind it? We review here the main hypotheses and conjectures that have been made, and point out their weaknesses.

In late 2016 and early 2017, several U.S. diplomats stationed in Havana, as well as members of their families, reported suffering from dizziness, vertigo and sharp pains in their ears that could be caused by strange sounds to which they had been exposed. According to their testimonies, the sounds came from a specific direction, and they had heard them in their own residences or, in some cases, in hotel rooms, while people staying in neighboring houses or adjoining rooms had not heard any special sounds. The phenomenon also affected Canadian diplomats in the Cuban capital. In all, some forty people were treated for these symptoms.

Acoustic attack

Echoing the facts reported by its staff in Cuba, in mid-2017 the U.S. State department stated that the symptoms could have been caused by a sonic attack by the Cuban government directed against diplomats and their families. In October 2017, President Donald Trump directly accused Havana: "I believe Cuba is manager; yes, I do."

At the beginning of 2018, the State department issued a travel alertstatement not to travel to Cuba due to a possible health crisis and withdrew a large part of the staff of the diplomatic mission statement in Havana, reducing its activity to the minimum possible. At that time, a total of 24 Americans had been affected.

At the time, the Canadian government also indicated that its diplomats had experienced similar complaints. Ottawa decided to evacuate the families of its employees in Cuba and in early 2019 proceeded to reduce the embassy staff in the face of what appeared to be the appearance of a fourteenth case.

The Cuban government denied from the outset being involved in any harassment operation against the U.S. or Canada. ˝There is no test about the cause of the reported ailments, nor is there any evidence to suggest that these health problems have been caused by an attack of any kind˝, Havana assured. Raul Castro's government offered its cooperation in research the facts, with nothing coming to light that could explain the case. No devices that could have provoked the sounds appeared.

Adding confusion to the status, at least two US diplomats stationed in China, busy at the consulate general in Guangzhou, the largest that the US has in the country, presented in early 2018 also the symptoms already described. Washington evacuated them and issued a health warning about missions in mainland China.

The Associated Press published in October 2017 a recording of the alleged sounds causing the reported ailment, and indicated that government agencies had been unable to determine the nature of the noise and explain its relationship to the bodily disorders caused. Months later, he noted that internal FBI reports did not even establish that there had been an "attack". Other media highlighted the lack of cooperation in the research, due to jurisdictional zeal, between the State department , the FBI and the CIA.

Symptoms of "Havana syndrome".

A medical team from the University of Pennsylvania, at the request of the U.S. Government, examined 21 people affected by what the press began to call "Havana syndrome". The research, initially published in March 2018 in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), indicated that most of the patients reported problems with report, concentration and balance, and determined that they appeared to have suffered injuries to extensive brain networks.

Further data from the same team extended to 40 patients, released in July 2019, led to the conclusion that the diplomats had experienced some craniocerebral trauma. The results of the MRI scans, compared with those of a group healthy individuals, revealed differences in the white and gray Issue of the brain, in the integrity of the microstructures of the cerebellum and in the functional connectivity of the subnetworks for hearing and spatial vision, but not for executive functions.

This report concluded that the diplomatic staff had been physically injured, although it could not determine the cause. It also noted that the patients do not experience a usual recovery, as they are not recovering quickly from the symptoms, as in other cases of similar "contusions" or ear problems.

IF IT WASN'T AN ATTACK, WHAT WAS IT?

As no clear cause has been established as to what caused the ills suffered by the U.S. and Canadian diplomatic staff and some of their family members, the very reality of an attack has been called into question. Although several alternative explanations have been put forward, none of them are fully convincing.

1) Collective hysteria

Formulation. Some neurologists and sociologists, such as Robert Bartholomew, have suggested that it could be a case of mass hysteria. Given the pressure to which some of the diplomats working in very unfriendly environments are subjected, and the endogamic relationship in which they live, living almost exclusively among themselves, it could explain a mutual conviction of an external attack that even has somatic consequences.

Weak spot. Both the research of the University of Pennsylvania and the State department doctor, Charles Rosenfarb, who appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations committee , came to rule out that the symptoms suffered by the diplomats were due to a mere mental mechanism. It is very difficult that about sixty people, including Americans and Canadians, convinced each other of an aggression of this subject and then almost all of them developed the same brain lesions.

2) Microwave

Formulation. The researcher team at the University of Pennsylvania, while not pointing to any possible cause of the ailments, did not rule out certain assumptions, such as that of microwave affectation. This aspect was insisted upon by research published in 2018 in the journal Neural Computation, which considered the symptoms consistent with exhibition to electromagnetic microwave (RF/MW) radiation.

Weak point. Not all the symptoms shown by patients could be a consequence of exhibition radiation of this subject, which also has a diverging literature on its effects on the human body. Moreover, it is not known that there is a microwave weapon that can affect the brain.

3) Ultrasound

Formulation. A team of computer experts at the University of Michigan suggested in 2018 that it could be a case of exhibition to some ultrasound subject , perhaps coming from malfunctioning listening equipment that mixed multiple ultrasonic signals.

Weak point. The recording of one of the sound episodes - the sample released by AP - is not sufficient to determine its nature. It is also possible that the sound was somewhat different in other cases.

4) Crickets

Formulation. A research from the Universities of California-Berkeley and Lincoln, from the existing sound sample , considered in January 2019 that the possible cause of the attacks was made by cricketsspecifically crickets Anurogryllus muticus. The research was a comparative study between the sound emitted by this variant of crickets and the sample of one of the acoustic episodes in Havana.

Weak point. The sound perceived by the diplomats was directional, so it was not heard by neighboring people. If they had been crickets in their natural environment, the sound would have spread around.

5) Neurotoxins

Formulation. A May 2019 joint study by two Canadian research centers attributed the symptoms suffered by diplomats to exhibition to neurotoxins from pesticides used to spray mosquitoes, a common internship in embassy buildings.

Weak point. The diplomats affected related the beginning of their physical discomfort to situations experienced in their own residences or in hotel rooms, where there was no fumigation.

IF IT WAS AN ATTACK, WHO DID IT?

Given that the previous explanations do not seem entirely solid, the US Government maintains the hypothesis of an attack. If it really happened, who was behind it? Here, too, there are various conjectures.

1) Castro regime

The first option considered, assumed in principle by the US given the public accusations made from Washington, has been to attribute the alleged attacks to the Cuban regime itself. With them, Havana would try to maintain pressure on the Americans, in spite of the formal reestablishment of diplomatic relations, with the goal of marking each other's territory.

Weak point. The incidents began to occur during the Obama Administration, in a context of a ˝honeymoon˝ marked by the reopening of embassies and Barack Obama's visit to Havana. The normal thing is that at the end of 2016, in view of the U.S. elections, the Castro regime would not want to give reasons to the next U.S. president to twist the diplomatic line opened by Obama. It could make sense that after Donald Tump's later revocation of the previous openness measures, Cuba would want to punish the new Administration, but not before seeing the direction it would take; in any case, the attacks would only justify the hard line followed by Trump, which does not benefit the island.

2) A sector of Castroism

Fidel Castro was attributed with an unaccommodating attitude towards his brother Raul's decision to reestablish diplomatic relations with the United States. Although he died in November 2016, people around him might have tried to torpedo that rapprochement, convinced that hostility with Washington was the best way to ensure the survival of the regime as conceived by its founder.

Weak point. Although Fidel Castro's reluctance towards rapprochement with the U.S. is true, it is difficult to think that the most conservative sector within Castroism would dare to boycott so directly Raul Castro's fundamental political line. Another thing is that, after he handed over the presidency of Cuba to Miguel Díaz-Canel in April 2018, some sectors within the regime could make internal movements to send certain messages, but the changeover occurred when most of the acoustic episodes had already taken place.

3) A third country (Russia, China)

The third option would be that a third country generated the attacks. American intelligence indicates that the most viable option in this case would be Russia. Moscow has been keen to return to operating in the Caribbean, as in the Cold War, and aggression against U.S. diplomats in Cuba would fit in with its strategy. It has also been suggested that China might want to repay Washington in its backyard with the same harassment that the Chinese believe they feel from the US in their nearest seas.

Weak point. The return of Russia to the Caribbean is certainly documented, and it is conceivable that Moscow could have promoted a punctual action against some specific goal , but it seems difficult that it would have sustained over time an operation that harms Cuba's sovereignty. As for China's presence in the US neighborhood, it is a less confrontational move than the one carried out by Russia. For the rest, if Beijing had chosen foreign soil in order to better erase the traces of an action against US diplomats, then the cases recorded in Guangzhou would not have occurred.

With its megacity and technology zone project , the Saudis are seeking to consolidate an economic alternative to oil.

NEOM, an acronym for New Future, is the name of the new city and economic-technological area , with an area three times the size of Cyprus, that Saudi Arabia is promoting in the northwest of the country, opposite the Sinai Peninsula. In addition to seeking alternatives to oil, with NEOM the Saudis intend to rival the urban innovations of Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha. The project also involves shifting Saudi interest from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea and closer ties with Egypt, Jordan and Israel.

Aspect of the future NEOM megacity, agreement to the vision of its promoters [NEOM Project].

article / Sebastián Bruzzone Martínez

Middle Eastern states are seeking to diversify their revenues and avoid possible collapse of their economies in order to counteract the end-of-oil crisis expected in the middle of the 21st century. The sectors favored by the Arabs are renewable energy, luxury tourism, modern infrastructure and technology. The region's governments have found ways to unify these four sectors, and Saudi Arabia, together with the United Arab Emirates, seems to want to be at the forefront of the Arab technology degree program

While the world looks to Sillicon Valley in California, Shenzhen in China or Bangalore in India, the Saudi government has begun preparations for the creation of its first independent economic and technological zone: NEOM (short for the Arabic term Neo-Mustaqbal, New Future). The project was headed until recently by Klaus Kleinfeld, former CEO of Siemens AG, who has been replaced by Nadhmi Al Nasr as CEO of NEOM, following his appointment as an advisor to the Saudi Crown.

On October 24, 2017, at the Future Investment Initiative lecture held in Riyadh, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman announced this $500 billionproject , part of the Saudi Vision 2030 political program. The territory where NEOM will be located is in the border area between Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, on the shores of the Red Sea, through which almost ten percent of world trade flows, with a temperature 10ºC lower than the average of the rest of the countries of the Gulf Cooperation committee , and located less than eight hours' flight from 70% of the world's population, so it could become a major passenger transport hub.

As announced by the Saudi government, NEOM will be a special economic city, with its own civil and tax laws and Western social customs, of 26,500 square kilometers (the size of Cyprus multiplied by three). The main objectives are to attract foreign investment from multinational companies, diversify the oil-dependent Saudi Economics , create a free market space and home to millionaires, "a land for free and stress-free people; a start-up the size of a country: a blank sheet of paper on which to write the new era of human progress," says a promotional video of the project. All this under the slogan: "The world's most ambitious project: an entire new land, purpose-built for a new way of living". According to the project's website and official accounts, the 16 sectors of energy, mobility, water, biotechnology, food, manufacturing, communication, entertainment and fashion, technology, tourism, sports, services, health and wellness, Education, and livability will generate 100 billion dollars a year.

Thanks to a report published by The Wall Street Journal and prepared by the consulting firms Oliver Wyman, Boston Consulting Group and McKinsey & Co., which, according to them, had access to more than 2,300 confidential planning documents, some of the ambitions and luxuries of the futuristic city have come to light. Among them are flying cars, holograms, a Jurassic Park-style theme park of robot dinosaurs and Genetics edition, never-before-seen technologies and infrastructure, luxury hotels, resorts and restaurants, mechanisms that create clouds to cause rainfall in arid areas, beaches with glow-in-the-dark sand, and even an artificial moon.

Another goal of the project is to make NEOM the safest city on the planet, through state-of-the-art surveillance systems that include drones, automated cameras, facial and biometric recognition machines and an AI capable of reporting crimes without the need for citizens to report them. Similarly, the leaders of the urban initiative themselves predict that the city will be an ecological center of great projection, basing its power supply system solely on solar and wind energy obtained from panels and windmills, as they have a whole desert to install them.

For the moment, NEOM is only a project that is in the initiation phase. The territory where the big city will be located is a desert terrain, mountains up to 2,500 meters high and 468 kilometers of virgin coastline of turquoise blue water, with a palace and a small airport. NEOM is being built from scratch, with an initial outlay of $9 billion from the Saudi sovereign wealth fund Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority (SAMA). Apart from foreign business investment, the Saudi government is looking for workers from all professional sectors to help in their respective fields: jurists to draw up a civil, criminal and tax code; engineers and architects to design a modern, efficient and technological infrastructure and energy plan; diplomats to collaborate in its promotion and cultural coexistence; scientists and doctors to encourage clinical and biotechnological research and welfare; academics to boost Education; economists to make income and expenditure profitable; personalities specializing in tourism, fashion and telecommunications... But, above all, people and families to inhabit and bring life to the city.

As reported by the Arab newspaper Rai Al Youm, Mohammed bin Salman has submitted C proposal drawn up by a Saudi legal committee together with the United Kingdom, which consists in providing a VIP document that will offer special visas, residency program rights to investors, senior officials and workers of the future city. Contracts have already been awarded to the US engineering business Aecom and construction contracts to the English Arup Group, the Canadian WSP and the Dutch Fugro NV.

However, not everything is as ideal and simple as it seems. Despite the great interest of 400 foreign companies in the project, according to the local government, there is uncertainty about its profitability. The problems and scandals related to the Saudi crown, such as the imprisonment of family members and dissidents, corruption, unequal rights, the military intervention in Yemen, the case of the murder of journalist Khashoggi and the possible political crisis following the future death of King Salman bin Abdulaziz, Mohammed's father, have caused investors to tread carefully. In addition, in the region where the city is to be built, there are villages of locals who would be relocated and "compensated and supported by social programs", according to the Saudi government, which will be the subject of reproach by human rights groups.

In conclusion, NEOM is a unique project on a par with the Arab sheikhs themselves, who have adopted a far-sighted economic vision. It is expected that by 2030 it will be possible to live in the city, even if construction is still underway and not completely finished. According to the markets, the project, still far from completion, seems to be on track. It already has a €20 billion structural financing commitment with BlackStone, and a €45 billion technology financing commitment with SoftBank. Since such a project has never been seen before and therefore there are no references, it is difficult to determine whether the visionary plan will be successfully consolidated or whether it will remain just smoke and mirrors and huge losses of money.

In the largest countries in the region, private guards outnumber police officers four to one and have ten times more weapons than in Europe.

High rates of violence in Latin America and the deficient presence of state authority in parts of the territory have led to the proliferation of private security companies throughout the region. There are now more than 16,000 companies in issue industry that involves more than 2.4 million people. The sector faces significant challenges, such as imprecise legality in many cases, a deficit of experience, forms incompatible with civil and human rights in certain places and the risk of escalation of arsenals.

article / Martín Biera Muriel

The proliferation of private security companies in Latin America is linked to crime and violence statistics in the region. It is estimated that 19 out of every 20 violent crimes that occur in the world take place in Latin America, where 17 of the 20 most violent cities in the world and 4 of the 5 most violent countries are located.

The status has led to an "explosive growth" in the privatization of security in Latin America, as described in the report "Security for Sale" by the Inter-American Dialogue. The increase in the issue of Private Defense and Security Companies (PMSCs) has been seen not only in countries with acute conflicts, such as Colombia, where in the last ten years there has been a 126% increase, but also in countries with greater social peace and institutionalism, such as Chile, which in five years has seen a 50% increase. The total number of companies dedicated to this function in Latin America reached 16,174 in 2017, as specified at the time by the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

The PMSC sector

The term PMSCs includes both the security companies used in developed countries, normally dedicated to guarding establishments or individuals, as well as defense companies that can replace functions usually reserved to the State. The latter developed after the end of the Cold War and have become an important player in international relations, participating in leave and even high intensity conflicts.

These defense companies operate in a framework of complicated legality, whose regulation attempted to be standardized in 2008 with the Montreaux Document, a compilation of legal obligations and best practices aimed at guaranteeing the sovereignty of States and protecting human rights. Although the text applies more directly to situations of armed conflict, it also provides a regulatory framework for security companies in general, given the tenuous borderline between one subject of companies and others, especially in Latin America, where the authority of the State often does not reach the entire national territory, some civil conflicts are particularly virulent and some use the Armed Forces in the fight against criminal violence and the maintenance of public order.

More guards than policemen

The more than 16,000 PMSCs in Latin America employ around 2.4 million people. While security guards issue police worldwide, in many Latin American countries there is a particular imbalance between the issue of police officers and private agents: in Colombia, Brazil and Mexico the ratio is one police officer to four PMSC members; in extremely violent countries such as Honduras and Guatemala the ratio is even one to seven. It is also the case that many members of the police resort to moonlighting, working as police officers during the day and becoming security agents at night in a neighborhood, business or building.

The largest companies are those dedicated to surveillance and escorting VIP clients. The largest are of European and U.S. origin and specialize in one part of the sector, especially in the protection of private property. Most of them operate in cities or in natural resource extraction centers isolated from urban areas. In relation to the frequent criticisms that these companies receive for allegedly supplanting the functions of the legally constituted authority, it is necessary to point out that the legal framework in which the large companies operate is strict and supervised.

degree program of armament

It can be argued that the skill among operators has generated a kind of degree program in which each business wants to offer more efficient services. In turn, as there is a greater issue of agents and more modern weapons, criminals also tend to increase their firepower and capabilities to meet their objectives, which consequently leads companies to also increase the caliber of their weaponry, in a spiral that is difficult to control. Statistics show that Latin America has the highest ratio of firearms per security guard in the world outside those areas affected by conflict. This ratio is ten times higher than the ratio of small arms in Europe.

This has led to criticism of certain PMSCs in Latin America for having contributed, directly or indirectly, to illegal arms trafficking and the growth of armed gangs, generating a vicious circle. For example, in 2015 ninety people were arrested in San Francisco (some of them linked to PMSCs) for belonging to an arms trafficking network linked to the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). There have also been cases of theft and misplacement of weapons imported from the region, both by individual private security contractors and by the military itself; these weapons then enter the black market. Thus, more than 40% of illegal arms in El Salvador are linked to some 460 private security companies, despite the obligation to have an official registry for their identification.

Challenges

Reducing the high levels of insecurity is one of the main challenges facing many Latin American countries. The reasons for the persistent violence in their societies are manifold; among them are political corruption and economic inequality. The wealthier classes may consider themselves targets of attempted robbery or kidnapping, but the lower classes also suffer from high crime rates, in their case without the possibility of resorting to private security.

Private security in Latin America faces two major challenges. One is the illegality of part of the sector: illegal companies are growing faster than in the legal sector; in Brazil, for example, the issue of informally employed guards exceeds the number of formal ones. The other is the lack of training or experience of a certain Issue of private guards. Addressing the need for greater legal regulation, and for regulation that is more adjusted to national specificities, and the desirability of greater training will help to reduce the gray zone in which in many cases they operate and the violations of human rights.

The deterioration of recent years seems to have been corrected in several indicators on democratic health and economic environment.

Costa Rica has traditionally been a model of democratic functioning in a region with serious institutional deficits, which has earned it a mediating role in different conflicts. The increase of internal problems -strikes, citizen protests, crisis of bipartisanship...- have seemed to have diminished Costa Rica's international prestige in recent years. Is Costa Rica suffering from democratic and institutional deterioration?

▲ Facade of the National Theater of Costa Rica, in San José [Pixabay].

article / Ramón Barba

The political unrest of recent years in Costa Rica, in a regional context of the "angry vote" and the consequent "outsider phenomenon", has given the impression of a setback in the country's institutional virtues. The goal of this article is to determine, based on different indicators of democratic health and economic and political satisfaction, whether there are objective data that ratify this perception.

For this purpose , we will first analyze a set of indicators developed by the World Bank, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and The Economist magazine, and then we will also take into account some results of the Latinobarómetro survey . We will compare the values recorded in 2010, 2013, 2016 and, when possible, 2018.

Indicators

As for the Democracy Index prepared by The Economist, although Costa Rica maintains its second place among Latin American democracies, behind Uruguay and ahead of Chile (these are the three countries that usually obtain the best grade the different institutional parameters of the region), in the last decade a Costa Rican democratic decline is observed, apparently overcome in the most recent report. From a score of 8.04 achieved in the 2010 Democracy Index, Costa Rica dropped to 8.03 in 2013 and 7.88 in 2016, to regain ground in 2018 with an 8.07. The country remains the best democracy in Central America, followed at a distance by a stable Panama.

The deterioration of recent years has also been picked up by the development Index of Democracies in Latin America (IDD-LAT) of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, which has not yet published data referring to 2018, so this index cannot endorse whether there has been a recent recovery. In 2010, Costa Rica had a score average of 9.252; it barely varied in 2013, with a figure of 9.277, but dropped clearly in 2016, with 8.539 points. The components of the index that suffered the most were welfare policy creation and economic efficiency, where it dropped from 1st and 5th place, respectively, to 8th and 12th. The fact that Costa Rica remained between 1st and 3rd place in civil and political rights and in institutional and political efficiency in those years sample that the social concern of those years was more in the economic sphere than in the institutional sphere.

The World Bank's Good Governanceindicators also showa slight decline in the case of Costa Rica between 2013 and 2016data more recentdata have not yet been published). Regarding the Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness scales, the score dropped from 0.6 and 0.5, respectively, to 0.5 and 0.4. There has been little change in the Control of Corruption score.

citizen evaluation

The above indicators are prepared by experts who, by applying standardized criteria, seek to offer an objective estimate. But we also wanted to take into account the opinion of the citizens themselves, as expressed in the Latinobarómetrosurvey . These can be useful to indicate the perception that exists among the population regarding the institutional health of the country: satisfaction with the government system and the economic system.

The value of democracy remains high in Costa Rica, despite a negative trend in the region as a whole. Attending to four values that Latinobarómetro has included in its surveys corresponding to the years here chosen for our comparison, we see that indeed in 2016 the citizen perception was that of a worsening of status, but in 2018 an improvement is observed, reaching even more positive levels than in 2013. As for the evaluation of democracy, its consideration as the best system of government dropped from 77% to 72% and then has risen again to 77%, while its categorization as a preferable system has been increasing: 53%, 60% and 63%.

The perception of the economic environment, meanwhile, had a blip in 2013, but today it is in better condition. The statement "progress is being made" fell from 15% to 12%, but in 2018 it reached 22%, while satisfaction with future personal economic prospects fell from 45% to 20% to stand in 2018 at 52%.

Political unrest

Costa Rica is a country that retains strong institutions, although the political landscape is more divided, as test by the end of the two-party system (1953-2014), due to the decline in support for the National Liberation Party (PLN) and the Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC) and the emergence of the Citizen Action Party (PAC), to which the country's current president, Carlos Alvarado, belongs.

Corruption issues such as the "cimentazo case", the high public debt that has forced cutbacks in a country with certain well-established social benefits and a regional and international environment prone to populist solutions may be behind the political unrest observed in Costa Rica in recent years.

This occurs in a context of the "angry vote" in Latin America, which arises as a consequence of the political actions of the last twenty years in the region and a strengthening of the middle classes. Citizen dissatisfaction has led to the emergence of outsider politicians: people with relative popularity, short political degree program , without a determined strategy and with an "anti-political" speech . This is a patron saint that, although it is present in the emergence of the PAC, in any case does not fully correspond to the personality of President Alvarado, who actually seems to have contributed to redirect the Costa Rican restlessness.

Conclusions

Thus, from the analysis of the data observed here, it can be concluded that there was indeed a slight deterioration in both institutional circumstances and especially in economic conditions or expectations between 2013 and 2016, but the different scales have returned in 2018 to previous values, even improving in some cases to levels of ten years ago. This is something that can be observed both in the indicators in the position experts that follow standardized objective procedures and in the surveys of subjective citizen perception.

The sample used and the temporal sampling carried out have not been exhaustive, so it is not possible to specify whether the variations observed here are circumstantial fluctuations or part of a trend pointing in a certain direction.

management given to Chinese business prompts U.S. threat not to sell technology to Israel

The protests of the Trump Administration for having awarded the management of the port of Haifa to a Chinese business have not yet led the Netanyahu government to review the contract, which was processed at ministerial level without a plenary session of the Executive Council knowledge of its geopolitical implications. Chinese penetration in Israel - in the broader context of the Middle East - as well as the reaction of the United States, highlights a complicated triangle of relations: Israel wants Chinese investment, but fears losing American favor.

▲ container management at the port of Haifa, northern Israel [Wikipedia].

article / María Martín Andrade

The port of Haifa is one of Israel's main ports in terms of cargo throughput Issue It also has a strategic character: the port, in the north of the country, hosts the U.S. Sixth Fleet in its movements. The latter could be altered following the announcement of Israel's contract with the Chinese business Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) to operate the port for the next 25 years starting in 2021, which has not been very well received by Washington. The company, which has pledged to invest $2 billion to expand the facility into Israel's largest port, describes its functions as including the construction and installation of equipment and the day-to-day management of port activities, classifying the project as part of the One Belt, One Road initiative.

This initiative has its origins in the Silk Road, a trade pathway that linked China with various countries on the Asian continent until it reached Europe, and which dates back to the first centuries BC. The new version is based on the early schemes and aims to boost China by creating a network of infrastructure, investment and trade, and by establishing multilateral and bilateral ties with the various states along it, as well as with international companies.

All of the above, added to the growing industrial and transportation expansion that China is experiencing, also justifies the Asian country's interest in some of the natural resources that the Middle East offers, such as oil, which imports account for 50% of the total, which is another reason why China wants to gain a presence in different parts of the region and which is manifested, among other things, in its investment in canals and ports such as those of Haifa and Ashdad in Israel, Cherchell in Algeria, Said and Alexandria in Egypt, and Kumport in Turkey. Specifically, its investment in the port of Haifa is also contributing to the development of the Israel-Gulf Economic Corridor (IGEC), whose goal is to create a railway line that runs from the port of Haifa to the Jordanian-Israeli border, linking it to the Jordanian railway system.

However, China's ambitions to gain a greater presence in the Middle East collide with the pretensions of another "robust rival", the United States, which, also motivated by economic and security interests, has landed much earlier in the region and has no intention of sharing it. Thus, after learning of the plans in the port of Haifa, the U.S. response is manifested in threats that it might stop sharing intelligence data with Israel and reconsider holding future long-term exercises by the U.S. Navy in that port.

It is important to note that this is not the first time that the United States has intervened to hinder relations between China and Israel. The conditions under which the latter country was established, added to the hostile environment that surrounds it and the need to possess weapons to maintain and protect it, have contributed to the development of its technology, especially in defense subject , whose broad scope is due in part to the United States, which has been supplying the country with the latest in military technology since the 1960s. All this has contributed to the fact that Israeli exports in technological subject , mainly in defense subject , have become the main source of income for its industry.

During the 1970s, Chinese Economics began to modernize, and the next step was to extend this modernization to the military domain, so China began importing defense developments from Israel. These relations continued to expand until 2000, when the Middle Eastern country, under U.S. pressure, decided to cancel the agreement that allowed China to obtain four Phalcon radar systems. The reason given at the time by the United States for opposing the agreement was the possibility that China would benefit from this technology in a military conflict in Taiwan. However, China is not the only country with which Israel has had difficulties exporting its technology. In 2008, Washington denied that it could submit Heron drones to Russia.

Despite all this, Sino-Israeli relations have managed to survive, with China becoming Israel's second largest trading partner in 2012, as well as developing new R&D partnership ties, consisting of a series of agreements and collaborations between academic institutions and companies from both countries.

However, considering the reaction of the United States to the Chinese involvement in the port of Haifa, it is not unthinkable to envisage a scenario in which American pressure would be repeated, in this case succeeding in abolishing the existing agreement with the Shanghai International Port business . If this happens, Israel would lose an important part of the investments it receives and trade relations with China would cool down, while Beijing could see one of its plans to create its ambitious Silk Road frustrated, although this would not mean its decline in the Middle East.

 What is unquestionable is that the United States no longer enjoys hegemony in this part of the world and has to come to terms with the idea that it will have to share influence with other great powers. That is why it may be more logical to achieve new forms of cooperation with China in order to establish mutually favorable conditions.

In conclusion, this new Chinese investment affirms what was already known: China's international presence is increasing and becoming more and more Issue, and it is wiser to adapt to the new changes than to get involved in love triangles that never have a happy ending for anyone.

Evolution of U.S. space strategy in the face of growing rivalry with China and Russia.

The prospect of engaging in battles in space, as an extension of wars that may be fought on Earth, seeking to interfere with the capabilities provided by satellites, has led the Trump Administration to promote a specific division of the US Armed Forces dedicated to this domain, the US Space Force. Although its constitution has yet to be approved by congress, the new Pentagon component will already have its budget.

▲ The X orbital vehicle in test operations in 2017, at Kennedy Space [US Air Force].

article / Ane Gil

More than 1,300 active satellites envelop the globe today, providing worldwide communications, GPS navigation, weather forecasting and planetary surveillance. The need to protect them against any attack, which could seriously disrupt the national security of countries, has become a priority for the major powers.

Since he arrived at the White House, Donald Trump has insisted on his idea of creating a Space Force, giving it the same rank as the five existing branches of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, Coast Guard). Trump signed last February 19 the directive for the creation of the US Space Force, whose final approval must still be given in congress. It would be the first military branch to be created in the United States since 1947, when the Air Force was launched. The Pentagon expects it to be operational by 2020.

As already announced almost a year ago by U.S. Vice President Mike Pence, this new Space Force will have its own facilities, although for the time being it will draw on the support and resources of the Air Force. According to Pence, the goal of the Space Force is to confront the alleged threats from Russia, China, North Korea and Iran in space. Although its ultimate goal is specifically to contain Russia and China, who for some years now have been developing their own methods to conquer space.

Obama-era strategic reports

The Trump Administration has called for such military specialization in space in the face of China's and Russia's skill in the same domain, which during the Obama Administration was still embryonic. However, although during Barack Obama's presidency the White House placed less emphasis on military developments in space capabilities, it also sought to promote the U.S. presence in space.

In the document National Space Policy of 2010, in a rather inclusive essay , the United States defended the right of all nations to explore space and called for all countries to work together to ensure respectful and manager space activity within a framework of international cooperation. The policy that was then being set looked primarily to the commercial and civilian dimension of space, in which the United States aspired to strengthen its leadership.

The document included, however, a section on security. Thus, it reference letter to the need to develop and operate information systems and networks that would provide national security coverage, facilitating defense and intelligence operations both in times of peace and in times of crisis and conflict. It also called for the development and implementation of plans, procedures, techniques and capabilities to ensure critical national security missions, using space assets and at the same time taking advantage of the non-space capabilities of allied countries or private companies.

What was presented there in a more generic way, the Obama Administration fleshed out in a subsequent strategy document, the National Security Space Strategy (NSSS). National Security Space Strategy of 2011, in which space was presented as a vital area for U.S. national security. The text warned that space is "increasingly congested, contested and competitive", which urged the U.S. to try to maintain its leadership, but without neglecting the international partnership to make space a safe, stable and secure place.

The document then set out strategic objectives and approaches. Specifically, the US proposed to "provide enhanced space capabilities" in order to improve system procurement, reduce the risk of mission failure, increase launch success and system operability, and train national security professionals to support all these space activities.

Another of the stated objectives was to "prevent and deter aggression against the space infrastructure that supports US national security", which as a central element included denying adversaries the significant benefits of an attack by strengthening the resilience of their systems architecture. However, the document specified that the US retains the right to respond in self-defense if deterrence fails.

Precisely in the latter case, the strategic text called for preparing one's capabilities to "defeat attacks and operatives in a degraded environment." It indicated that military and intelligence capabilities must be prepared to "combat" and defeat attacks directed at their space systems and support infrastructure. 

China-Russia rivalry in the Trump era

Donald Trump became president of the United States with his "America First" slogan, which he has also applied to space strategy, prioritizing his country's interests in a context of increased rivalry with Beijing and Moscow. His space policy emphasizes the dynamic and cooperative interaction between the military, civilian and commercial interests, respectively, of the Pentagon, NASA and private companies interested in extra-atmospheric flights. 

The first national security strategy document of the Trump era is the National Security Strategy (NSS) of December 2017. Although the report makes little reference letter to space, the text declares China and Russia to be "rivals", giving the US the opportunity to confront the opposing interests of these countries, also outside the Earth. The NSS proclaims that the US must maintain its "leadership and freedom of action in space", and warns of the risk of "other actors" achieving the capability to attack US space assets and thus gaining an "asymmetric advantage". "Any harmful interference or attack against critical components of our space architecture that directly affects this vital US interest will be met with a deliberate response in the time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing," the document warns.

Some of these military issues get further elaboration in the report months later produced by the Pentagon. In the April 2018 Space Operations document, the military leadership notes that several nations are making significant advances in offensive space control capabilities, with the intention of challenging the use of space by the U.S. and its allies, threatening their space assets. Therefore, it defends the importance of off-ground operations, which have the goal of securing and defending space capabilities against the aggressive activities of others.

"Our adversaries' progress in space technology," the report states, "not only threatens the space environment and our space assets, but may also deny us an advantage if we lose space superiority." To mitigate those risks and threats, the U.S. is engaged in "planning and conducting defensive and offensive operations."

The broad outlines of Trump's policy on space are set out in the document National Space Strategy of March 2018. It is a policy based on four pillars: reinforcing space architectures; strengthening deterrence and warfighting options; improving foundational capabilities, Structures and processes; and fostering enabling domestic and international environments.

Directives and budget

In addition to the security aspects already noted, the Trump Administration has also expressed a desire to "promote space commerce," for which it will "simplify and update regulations for commercial activity in space to strengthen competitiveness."

For oversight of these activities, which open up the space business to U.S. private companies and at the same time mark a horizon of mineral exploitation of asteroids and planets, Trump revived in June 2017 the National Space committee , under the White House, 24 years after it had been disbanded. In December 2017 Trump signed Space Police Directive-1, which ordered NASA to send US astronauts to the Moon once again, and in June 2018 he signed a directive on space traffic management (Space Policy Directive-3). The fourth directive is the one signed in February 2019 for the creation of the Space Force.

Trump's new policy has not been immune to criticism, as it is argued that erecting the Space Force as just another division of the Armed Forces could weaken the resources of the other divisions, putting the country at risk in the face of a possible attack or emergency on Earth. In fact, General James Mattis, Secretary of Defense during 2017 and 2018, publicly expressed some reluctance at first, although he later began to execute the president's plans.

agreement to the data provided following the recent presentation the budgets for the next fiscal year, the Space Force could have a staff of 830 people (divided between the Headquarters, the Space development Agency and the Space Command, which will require $300 million for its installation) and a budget of about $2 billion during the first five years. At the end of those five years, it could have a payroll of 15,000 people.