[Iván Garzón, Rebeldes, Románticos y Profetas. La responsabilidad de sacerdotes, políticos e intelectuales en el conflicto armado colombiano (Bogotá: Ariel, 2020) 330 pp].

review / Paola Rosenberg

The book "Rebels, Romantics and Prophets" written by Iván Garzón sample the role played by priests, politicians and intellectuals in the internal armed conflict in Colombia and the responsibility they had in it. A war that marked the country politically, economically, socially and ideologically. Revolutionary movements in Latin America were characterized by the use of violence and the employment weapons to reach power; more or less strong depending on the country, guerrilla groups had in any case a great influence on the course of events in the region during the second half of the twentieth century. The essay by Garzón, professor of Political Theory at the Universidad de La Sabana, focuses especially on the role of the Catholic Church in the different movements and on the contradictory ideas and actions that sustained the conflict over time [he summarizes his purpose in this essay as follows video].

"Rebels, Romantics and Prophets" questions and criticizes the responsibility of these groups regarding the resource violence and the use of weapons to achieve social change in Colombia. Iván Garzón challenges the participants of the armed conflict in Colombia to reflect on their role in it and to assume their responsibility to build a better society. In addition, the book aims to open a discussion on the past, present and future of the role and influence of the Catholic Church and intellectuals in society.

The revolutionary waves in Latin America in those years were strengthened by the Marxist ideas of the time. Those ideas defended that the economic development of third world countries was not possible without a rupture of the capitalist market; due to social inequality and class struggle. Therefore, it was necessary to advocate the use of violence in order to come to power. After the triumph of the Cuban revolution in 1959, guerrilla ideas spread rapidly throughout Latin America. Cuba demonstrated that revolution was possible: through armed struggle and Marxist ideas, social development could be achieved. This is how strong revolutionary movements began to emerge in these countries. Colombia was definitely no exception.

One of the young and main protagonists mentioned in the book is Camilo Torres, who was swept up in the revolutionary waves in Colombia. Also known as "the guerrilla priest" or the "Che Guevara of the Christians", Torres was a very influential leader in Colombia in the second half of the 20th century. A guerrilla priest, a hero to some, but a villain to others. Only 37 years old, he died in a troop clash on February 15, 1966, a year after joining the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas. Willing to sacrifice his life and take up arms for his country and social change, Torres affirmed that revolution was inevitable and that it was necessary to contribute to it. Different intellectuals evaluate his figure in the book: some criticize the priest for his "failure" and his incorrect decision to take up arms, others justify him by pointing out that he submitted to a "just war".

Camilo Torres represents the group of rebels, whom the author describes as the "warriors of a failed revolution. They used arms out of an often religious commitment. They justified violence and saw it as a representation of honor, bravery and submission. The rebels decided to take up arms, go out into the bush and join the guerrillas in order to make the Christian faith effective and help the poor. Many of these rebels like Torres focused on Christianity's primary mandate to love their neighbor. They felt an obligation to collaborate in bringing about radical change in the country's political, economic and social Structures . They desired a more just society and sacrificed their lives to achieve it, no matter the means. Many came to the conclusion that the only way to achieve this change was through violent struggle. Their actions sample how the dominant ideas of the time justified the use of violence, going against purely Christian ideas.

In the conflict there was also the group of the "romantics", those who approved of the cause, respected it, but did not get their hands dirty. They were priests, politicians and intellectuals who intervened in the moral and intellectual discussion to justify the reasons for the revolution. They were the passionate ones, the minds behind the acts that directly influenced the warriors who went to the mountains to fight.

Finally, there were the "prophets": the priests, politicians and intellectuals who were completely opposed to armed struggle and the use of violence to bring about change in society. The prophets refused to make a pact with the devil and betray the moral values of the Church. They thought that there were other means to achieve social justice; peaceful and bloodless means. In the end, these were the ones who were right; it was a useless, costly and unwinnable struggle.   

In conclusion, both the rebels and the Romantics found in their moral and political views a full justification for the use of violence. The prophets never approved of this cause, but rather criticized it by emphasizing its secularized and contradictory character. Iván Garzón seeks to open a discussion on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the use of violence as a political means to achieve justice.

Today, the word revolution continues to be linked to violence due to the many traumatic conflicts experienced by many Latin American nations. In Colombia, as in many other countries, the revolutionaries won ideologically, but not in practice. For this reason, it can be concluded that in general, violent internal conflicts only lead to destabilize countries and end innocent lives. The book attempts to make religious and intellectual participants in the armed conflict reflect on their responsibility or guilt in the armed conflict. This discussion between criticism or justification of the armed struggle is still necessary today due to the constant threat to democratic institutions in Latin America.

WORKING PAPER / María del Pilar Cazali

[Download the document]

ABSTRACT

The Brexit deal has led to a shift in the UK's relationship not only with the European Union but also with other countries around the world. Africa is key in the new relationships the UK is trying to build outside from the EU due to their historical past, the current Commonwealth link, and the important potential trade deals. This article looks to answer how hard the UK will struggle with competition in the African country as an individual state, no longer member of the EU. These struggles will be especially focused on trading aspects, as they are the most important factors currently for the UK in the post-Brexit era, and it's also the strongest focus of the EU in Africa.

[Peter Zeihan, Desunited Nations. The Scramble for Power in an Ungoverned World (New York: Harper Collins, 2020) 453 pgs]

October 14, 2020

review / Emili J. Blasco

The world seems to be heading towards what Peter Zeihan calls "the great disorder". His is not a catastrophist vision of the international order for the mere pleasure of wallowing in pessimism, but rather a fully reasoned one. The retreat of the United States is leaving the globe without the ubiquitous presence of the one who ensured the global structure we have known since World War II, forcing other countries into more insecure intercontinental trade and to make a living in an environment of "disunited nations".

Zeihan has long been drawing consequences from his seminal idea, set out in his first book, The Accidental Superpower (2014): the success of fracking has given the United States energy independence, so it no longer needs Middle Eastern oil and will progressively withdraw from much of the world. In his next book, The Absent Superpower (2016), he detailed how American withdrawal will leave other countries unable to secure important maritime trade routes and reduce the proliferation of developed contacts in this era of globalization. The latter has now been accelerated by the Covid pandemic, which came as a third Issue, Desunited Nations (2020), was about to be published. Zeihan did not have time to include a reference letter to the ravages of the virus, but there was no need because his text was in any case heading in the same direction.

Zeihan, a geopolitical analyst who worked with George Friedman at Stratfor and now has his own signature, studies this time how the different powers will adapt to the "great disorder" and which of them have better prospects. The book is "about what happens when the global order is not only crumbling, but when many leaders feel that their countries will be better off tearing it down. And it's not just a Trump Administration thing: "The push for American retreat didn't start with Trump, nor will it end with him," Zeihan says.

The author believes that, in the new outline, the United States will remain a superpower, China will not reach a hegemonic position and Russia will continue its decline. Among other minor powers, France will lead the new Europe (not Germany; while the British "are doomed to a multi-year depression"), Saudi Arabia will give more concern to the world than Iran and Argentina will have a better future than Brazil.

To focus on the US-China rivalry, it would be good to pick up some of the arguments put forward by Zeihan for his skepticism about the consolidation of the Chinese boom.

To be an effective superpower, China needs greater control of the seas. The problem is not to build a large outward-oriented navy, but, since it is already difficult to sustain such a huge effort over time, it must also have simultaneously "a huge defensive navy and a huge air force and a huge internal security force and a huge army and a huge intelligence system and a huge special forces system and a global deployment capability".

For Zeihan, the question is not whether China will be the next hegemon, which "it cannot be", but "whether China can even hold together as a country". Vectors that work against it are the impossibility of feeding its entire population on its own, the lack of sufficient energy sources of its own, the strong territorial imbalances or demographic constraints, such as the fact that there are 41 million Chinese men under 40 years of age who will never be able to get married.

It is not uncommon for American authors to predict a future collapse of China. However, episodes such as the coronavirus, initially seen as a serious stumbling block for Beijing, never end up cutting short the forward march of the Asian colossus, even though, logically, China's economic growth figures have been moderating over the years. Hence, at times, the bad omens of many could be interpreted more as wishful thinking than as an analysis with sufficient doses of realism. Zeihan certainly writes in a somewhat "loose" way, with blunt statements that seek to shake the reader, but his geopolitical axioms seem to be generally endorsed: if we liquefy well what he says in his three books, we have a clear notice where the world is supposed to be going; and that is where it is indeed going.

COMMENTARY / Juan Luis López Aranguren

If traditional diplomacy is understood as the relations exercised between official representatives of States, in recent years a new concept of diplomacy has gained popularity and has become increasingly important in relations between nations: cultural diplomacy. Assuming that culture is the vehicle through which nations communicate with each other, cultural diplomacy is the exchange of culture, ideas and information that nations around the world engage in to achieve mutual understanding that will advance the construction of a more just and stable world. In this context, the celebration of the Olympic Games is one of the most important cultural diplomacy events that a nation can achieve to project and share its culture and identity with the rest of the world. In this regard, Japan reaffirmed its position as a global benchmark for this diplomacy with its public appearance at the closing ceremony of the 2016 Rio Olympics. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe appeared in the guise of the world-famous character Mario to pick up the baton for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics. Japan thus used an icon of Japanese pop culture to project its cultural identity to the entire planet. 

In this dimension of soft power or cultural diplomacy, the Olympic Games are the greatest exponent of it. Already in their origin, in 776 B.C., the Olympic Games revealed themselves as a diplomatic tool of extraordinary strength by forcing a sacred truce between the different city-states that participated in them. Therefore, from its very origin, it was possible to achieve international political objectives by employing this cultural tool . This measure was observed to the point that if any city-state violated this truce, its athletes were expelled from the competition.

This same demonstration has been repeated in more recent times, demonstrating that the Olympics have been a diplomatic battleground throughout history. In 1980 the USA and 65 other countries boycotted the Moscow Olympics in protest against the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan. In retaliation, the USSR and 13 other states boycotted the next Olympics in 1984 in Los Angeles.

The upcoming Tokyo 2021 Olympic Games (delayed one year due to the pandemic) do not carry any controversy of this subject. Instead, they have been conceived as a historic opportunity to reinvent the country internally and globally after the Fukushima catastrophe (or Great East Japan Earthquake). To this end, C official graduate project Tokyo 2020 Action & Legacy Plan 2016 has been designed to achieve three objectives: firstly, to maximize the connection of Japanese citizens and groups with the Tokyo Olympics. Secondly, to maximize cultural projection both nationally and globally. Thirdly and finally, to ensure a bequest of value to future generations, as it was on the occasion of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics.

These three objectives set by the Japanese government will be expressed in five dimensional pillars on which action will be taken. These five pillars are articulated in the manner of Olympic rings, intertwining with each other and strengthening the domestic and international impact of these Olympic Games. These dimensions are, starting with the most immediate to the purely sporting aspect itself, the promotion of sport and health. The second, connecting with culture and Education. The third, also with great importance for its potential to reform Tokyo in particular and Japan in general, urban planning and sustainability. Not surprisingly, the Japanese government and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government have made great efforts to build ambitious infrastructure to accommodate these Olympics, to the point of relocating the famous and iconic Tsukiji fish market that has been a symbol of the city since 1935. Fourth, the Olympics will be used to revive Economics and technological innovation, just as the 1964 Tokyo Olympics did when it showcased the first Shinkansen, or bullet trains, which have become one of Japan's technological icons. Finally, fifthly, Japan saw the Olympic Games as an opportunity to overcome the crisis and trauma caused by the Fukushima disaster (a catastrophe that in Japan is referred to as the Great East Japan Earthquake).

In addition to these five objectives, ranging from the more specific to the more general, a sixth goal or unofficial dimension will be added in 2020: to project Japan's recovery from the COVID pandemic domestically and internationally. In this sense, the Olympic Games will not only be a symbol of overcoming a particular Japanese disaster, but may allow the Japanese country to position itself as a model in the management against the pandemic and in the promotion of economic recovery.

The deteriorating status of the small Mediterranean country benefits Hezbollah and its patron saint, Iran.

With four different prime ministers so far this year, it is difficult to escape the vicious circle in which Lebanon finds itself, so that the continuity of the current political system and the severe financial crisis seem inevitable. This perpetuation gives rise to a number of possibilities, almost all of them bleak, for the Lebanese future. Here are some of these scenarios.

▲ State of the port of Beirut after the explosion on August 4, 2020 [Mehr News Agency/Wikipedia].

article / Salvador Sánchez Tapia

To say that the Lebanese political system is dysfunctional is nothing new. Based on a sectarian balance of power established in 1989 after a long civil war, it perpetuates the existence of clientelistic networks, encourages corruption, hampers the country's economic development and hinders the creation of a cross-cutting Lebanese national identity that transcends religious denominations.

For some time now, Lebanon has been immersed in an economic and social crisis of such magnitude that it has led many analysts to wonder whether we are facing a new case of a failed state. In October 2019, the country was rocked by a wave of demonstrations that the government itself considered unprecedented, unleashed by the advertisement the Executive to address the severe economic crisis with several unpopular measures including taxing the use of the popular Whatsapp application. The protests, initially focused on this issue, soon incorporated complaints against rampant corruption, the uncontrolled increase in the cost of living, or the lack of employment and opportunities in the country.

This popular pressure forced the resignation of the unity government led by Saad Hariri at the end of the same month. The government was replaced in January 2020 by a more technical government led profile former Education Minister Hassan Diab. The new government had little room for maneuver to introduce reforms before the coronavirus pandemic was declared, and soon found itself beset by the same street pressure that had toppled the previous government, with demonstrations continuing despite the restrictions imposed by the pandemic.

The devastating explosion in early August 2020 in the port of Beirut only further plunged the country into the downward spiral into which it was already plunged. Despite the voices that tried to see the hand of Israel or Hezbollah behind the catastrophe that took the lives of 163 people, the Lebanese population soon sensed that this was but the logical consequence of years of corruption, bureaucratic sloppiness and withdrawal the national infrastructure. Again there was a crescendo of popular indignation; again the government was forced to resign at a plenary session of the Executive Council.

With the echoes of the explosion still alive, at the end of August, Mustafa Adib, former Lebanese ambassador to Germany, was entrusted by President Aoun with the task of forming a government. Unable to complete such an arduous task, among other reasons because of Hezbollah's insistence on controlling the Ministry of Finance, Adib resigned on September 26, leaving the country on the brink of the precipice in which it still finds itself.

It is difficult to make predictions about Lebanon's future, beyond predicting that it looks bleak, as a complex dynamic of internal and external forces is gripping the country. Despite the pressure, at least from the urbanized and cosmopolitan Beirut, to put an end to it, it is enormously complex to untangle the dense skein of clientelistic networks that have controlled the country since its independence, not only because of the benefits it has generated for a small group of privileged people, but also because many fear the alternatives to a model that, with all its flaws, has avoided a reproduction of the savage civil war that took place between 1975 and 1990.

Its geographical status makes it difficult for Lebanon to escape the general climate of instability prevailing in the Middle East and the influence exerted on the country by regional and international actors such as Israel, Iran, Syria and France, especially if one considers that the problems of the Levantine state are so deep and its national leadership so weak that it does not seem to be able to overcome them on its own.

The drama of Lebanon is that its own sectarian division makes it difficult for nations to emerge that are willing to donate with cross-cutting criteria to help bridge the gap that divides the country internally, and that the financial aid it may receive from actors such as Iran or Saudi Arabia only reinforces it. The efforts of French President Emmanuel Macron, self-appointed as the driving force behind Lebanese reconstruction, do not seem, for the moment, to be gaining momentum. At the donors' lecture he convened on July 9 with fifteen heads of state, he obtained contributions worth $250 million to revitalize the moribund Lebanese Economics . Meanwhile, the mayor of Beirut estimates the reconstruction costs of the August explosion in the capital's port at between 3 and 5 billion dollars.

As a mirror image of this difficulty, Lebanese communities, comfortably ensconced in the status quo, reject financial aid, no doubt necessary, if they feel it could be detrimental to their respective power instructions . Hezbollah, for example, does not accept IMF programs, complicating the achievement of the necessary national consensus that would facilitate IMF support. It is difficult to escape from this vicious circle, so that the continuation of the current political system, and with it the continuation of the serious Lebanese financial crisis, seems inevitable. From this perpetuation result some possibilities, almost all of them bleak, for the Lebanese future. The first is that Lebanon will continue to slide down the inclined plane that is turning it into a failed state, and that this condition will eventually lead to a civil war precipitated by events similar to those that occurred during the Arab Spring in other states in the region. This eventuality would resurrect the ghosts of the past, produce regional instability that would be difficult to measure but which would undoubtedly provoke the intervention of regional and international actors, and could end up dismembering the country, a result that would only sow the seeds of further instability throughout the region.

Without going to that extreme, the internal disorder could break the precarious balance of power on which Lebanese political life is based, to the benefit of one of its sectarian groups. Hezbollah, the undisputed leader of the country's Shiite faction, appears here as the most organized and strongest group within the country and, therefore, as the one that stands to gain the most from this breakdown. It should be noted that, in addition to the support of the entire 27 internship of Lebanese Shiites, the militia-organization is viewed favorably by many members of the divided Christian community - some 45 percent of the country's population - who put their desire for internal Security Service in the country before other considerations. Aware of this, the leader of Hezbollah, Hasan Nasrallah, sample moderate in his proposals, seeing in the Sunni community, supported by Saudi Arabia, his real rival, and trying to broaden his power base.

Iran would undoubtedly be the real winner in this scenario, since it does not seem realistic to think of a Hezbollah that, once it has come of age, would have a life of its own outside the regime of the ayatollahs. Tehran would complete, with this new piece, the Shiite arc that connects Iran with Iraq and, through Syria, with the Eastern Mediterranean. The destabilizing effects of such a status, however, cannot be underestimated if one takes into account that the mere possibility of the Islamic Republic of Iran gaining absolute control of Lebanon constitutes a casus belli for Israel.

On a positive grade , the serious crisis the country is going through and the strong popular pressure, at least in urban areas, may be, paradoxically, a spur to overcome the sectarian system that has contributed so much to generate this status. However, such a transition only has a chance of advancing - no matter how tenuous - with strong external wholesale support.

In this scenario, the role of the international community should not be limited to the contribution of economic resources to prevent the collapse of the country. Its involvement must favor the development and support of civic-political movements with an intersecting base that are capable of replacing those who perpetuate the current system. To this end, in turn, it is imperative that the contributing nations lend their financial aid in a high-minded manner, renouncing any attempt to shape a Lebanon to suit their respective national interests, and forcing the elites controlling the factions to abdicate the status quo in favor of a true Lebanese identity. The obvious question is: is there any real chance of this happening? The reality, unfortunately, does not allow for high hopes.

Ankara is implementing a strategic plan for the control of the three maritime zones surrounding the country

▲ Parade of members of the Turkish Naval Force [Nérostrateur].

ANALYSIS / Lucas Martín*.

Several actions carried out by Turkey in recent times indicate the implementation of the so-called "Blue Homeland" doctrine.

Among the various facts to be taken into account we can take as an initial element the agreement signed with one of the two contenders for power in Libya, the GNA to be more precise.

Through it, the GNA de facto handed over control of Libyan territorial waters to Turkey while establishing a maritime corridor for Ankara in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.

The importance of having de facto control of these waters is not only the enormous Issue of maritime traffic that passes through them, but also the fact that they contain strategic natural gas reserves and are also a transit area for several gas pipelines that supply Europe.

If we add this treaty to Turkey's movements in the Mediterranean, the Aegean, as well as its involvement in the conflicts in Syria and Libya, we see that they are but different but complementary parts of an ambitious plan meticulously drawn up by Ankara for some years now to gain maritime control of the Eastern Mediterranean and adjacent areas. The ultimate aim of this plan would be to give Turkey economic and energy independence to ensure the country's growth in all areas.

"Mavi Vatam" - Blue Homeland

The so-called "Gerasimov Doctrine", which theorizes on the evolution of war conflicts and provides guidelines for action in the current framework , is well known. But it is much less well known that a country like Turkey developed its own doctrine almost two decades ago, trying to outline the geostrategic movements necessary to achieve some basic objectives for the development the Turkish nation and to achieve its leading role in the international concert.

The father of the plan is Admiral Cem Gurdeniz, and it was first exposed in 2006 under the name "Blue Homeland Doctrine".

The admiral bases his theory on three pillars, which would take a long time to discuss in detail. However, and for the case at hand, it is interesting to dwell at least briefly on the second pillar. Under this, Gurdeniz defines what he considers to be the areas of maritime jurisdiction that belong to Turkey and which he values as vital for its survival and development. These encompass areas of the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. By defining these he establishes the territorial waters, the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

The admiral himself recognizes that the problem is far from being in the Black Sea, where an agreement was reached with the extinct Soviet Union to establish the limits of the continental shelf in 1978 and later, in 1987, the EEZ. Moreover, after the disappearance of the USSR, agreements were reached with Georgia, Bulgaria and Ukraine.

The issue is centered on the Mediterranean and the Aegean. Precisely the current epicenter of events.

The current established limits, EEZ agreements, etc., have been imposed on Turkey by the European Union, according to our protagonist, who considers them particularly burdensome as far as the Greek area and Cyprus are concerned. Turkey focuses the responsibility on the EU to prevent Turkish development to some extent, which is interesting when Turkey itself has tried to become part of the Union.

The axis on which Turkish actions have been pivoting in recent times is defiance. And this is found again in the admiral's own words, who states that the "Blue Homeland" "notoriously challenges and defies the current map".

But despite what it may seem, this is not the final goal of the "Mavi Vatam" doctrine. This challenge is the way to achieve its real goal, which is none other than to achieve the control and consolidation of the three maritime zones surrounding the country in order to exert its influence both regionally and internationally, thus gaining the energy resources necessary to sustain Turkey's economic and demographic growth without having to depend on third countries.

But as is the rule in these matters, history always plays a key role, and this time is no different.

The Turks continue to view as an affront the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923, which circumscribes the country to its current borders and limits. The Treaty of Sèvres, much more beneficial, but signed by the Ottoman Empire after World War I, was invalidated by this treaty.

In Lausanne, the fragmentation of the empire was dictated de facto, defining not only the borders of Turkey, but also those of Greece and Bulgaria, concluding Turkish sovereignty over the Dodecanese islands, Cyprus, Egypt, Sudan, Syria and Iraq. Kurdistan ceased to be a unit, being divided among several countries, and Armenia was divided between Turkey and the USSR. The conditions limited the ability of the Turks to act, putting the country under the umbrella of the Western powers, a status that has been maintained for almost 100 years since the signature.

In order to understand the current status , a series of factors and circumstances must be taken into account.

During the Cold War period and with the existence of the communist bloc and its military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, the Western protective umbrella over Turkey became more of a necessity forced by circumstances than an imposition. The geostrategic status of the Ottoman country gave it a vital importance for both blocs, and in the event of hostilities breaking out it would be one of the first territories to suffer the consequences. As a vivid example of this geostrategic core topic , we should remember the role played by the American instructions equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles located on Turkish soil in the negotiations to de-escalate what later became known as the "Cuban missile crisis".

But from the distant 1960s to the present, the world has changed completely. The balances of power have shifted, and events since the beginning of the 21st century, and especially during the last decade, have led today's leaders to believe that their time has come.

At the time, the fall of the communist bloc and the period of Russia's weakness began to lay the instructions for an idea deeply rooted in today's Turkey, the main thrust of which is that the protective umbrella of the West is no longer so necessary (it should not be forgotten that this umbrella was also seen in a certain sense as a corset).

The consolidation of this idea has coincided with a period of great economic and demographic growth in the Ottoman country, with forecasts of reaching 90 million inhabitants by 2030. Both parameters have major economic implications, as they imply an increase B country's energy needs. If these needs are not met, it will not be possible to sustain this population growth or to match it with adequate industrial development .

The basis for essential industrial development is energy independence. It is one of the core topic factors that can allow the different projects to go ahead. At present, energy needs are covered by supplies from third countries. The main exporters of energy resources to Turkey are Russia, Iran, Iraq and Libya. This external dependence is one of the reasons for the spectacular development of Turkey's military capabilities in recent years and its direct involvement in various unstable scenarios: keeping the energy supply uninterrupted. And therein lies one of the main reasons for the interventions in northern Syria, northern Iraq and Libya.

However, this is not the only reason for such interventions; there are other political motivations, commitments that force Turkey to take sides in one way or another. The Kurdish problem, worthy in itself of a monographic paper, is one of them.

But despite possible political motivations, the main focus of the "Blue Homeland Doctrine" is the need to achieve energy independence. For this it is necessary to take control of the necessary energy resources and to achieve freedom of action in this field.

Two are the spheres he defines to achieve this goal. The first would consist of establishing an area of security and immediate control of the seas surrounding the country: the Mediterranean, the Aegean and the Black Sea. The second, of a strategic nature, extends to the Red Sea, the Caspian Sea and the Arabian Sea, including the Persian Gulf.

Turkey's dominance of the maritime space mentioned above includes control over the gas and oil reserves in those waters. This position of maritime dominance is reinforced through the establishment of alliances with the countries in the area, providing them with support, establishing military instructions in their territory and providing military material and training to their armies, thus ensuring their support. This is a fact, and Turkey already has instructions in Somalia, Sudan, Libya and Qatar, countries to which it supplies weapons systems of its own manufacture and with which it has military agreements of various kinds.

An aside should be made at this point. These moves are not welcomed by all the countries in the region, some of which see their current position and their own aspirations for growth in power and influence in the region threatened. The existence of a dominant regional power does not usually leave much room for maneuver. And it is also important to quote at this point other words of the father of the "Blue Homeland" doctrine: "Turkey does not need any ally to protect the Homeland. The Homeland is the Homeland. Our continental shelf is our homeland and we have to protect it".

However, he claims that in the future relations between Italy, Tunisia, Libya and Turkey will be the main axis of the Mediterranean. He deliberately leaves out countries such as France, Greece and Spain.

Traditionally, the Turkish Naval Force's usual area of operations was the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Aegean. However, it has recently extended its area of operation to the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, and even operates in close partnership with Pakistan.

This strategic vision, centered on the control of the sea, apart from the reasons previously mentioned regarding the control of energy resources, can be explained by Turkey's conviction that its special orography, very abrupt, already offers a natural and dissuasive defense against any aggression by land.

Moreover, the "Blue Homeland" doctrine is based on the assumption that Turkey must be an eminently maritime power. It is, therefore, a realistic doctrine of self-defense of the maritime areas that rightfully belong to Turkey, in order to protect them with an eye to the generations to come.

Therefore, the maritime borders, which extend over three different seas, are so far perceived as the weak point of the nation. And that is precisely what is in the process of transformation.

This point of view has its historical roots in the former Ottoman Empire, which Admiral Cem Gürdeniz reference letter to on numerous occasions in his writings. It was the one that led Erdogan, shortly after coming to power, to initiate a comprehensive program of development and modernization of his Naval Force known as "Milgem". In this project , heavy investments of all subject have been made, and no effort has been spared, because in order to achieve the development of armed forces, especially in its maritime aspect, that will support the goal of becoming a regional and international power, it is core topic a technological development independent of the Turkish industry.

In recent years, the Turkish defense industry has undergone a spectacular evolution, demonstrating the effectiveness of its developments in the Libyan, Syrian and, more recently, in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Great emphasis has been placed on the development of warships, unmanned aerial systems (UAVs) and advanced weapons systems of high quality. Especially the chapter on UAVs is particularly significant, and should be the subject of an in-depth study, including from the national point of view in Spain.

Again, here we find two clearly defined intentions. On the one hand, to reach a leading technological level in its armed forces to support the achievement of the objectives previously mentioned, and on the other hand, to position itself as a reference letter in the field of arms exports, to achieve income and to be able to influence the countries of interest and their policies in the same way as the United States, China and Russia do.

More specifically, framework theMilgemprogram, four anti-submarine corvettes, one intelligence gathering vessel, four surface warfare frigates and four anti-aircraft frigates have been built. The program also includes four state-of-the-art corvettes for the Pakistan Navy as a way of exporting its advances, enhancing the already close partnership between the two countries and, of course, obtaining economic benefits for the arms industry.

Similarly, 33 new landing barges capable of transporting both troops and armored vehicles have been delivered to the Turkish Naval Force. Turkey's development and improvement of amphibious assault capabilities is a factor to be taken into account in a hypothetical increase in tension with Greece, especially with regard to claims over the islands located to the east of the country and its waters.

The development of the naval warfare capabilities is completed with the manufacture of six new invoice submarines under HDW licence in Turkey itself, namely the U-214 model . These new submersibles are equipped with an AIP system that allows them to remain for long periods without surfacing, and join the ten that the Ottoman country has been operating up to now.

This is one of the most significant data from the point of view of its destabilizing capacity. Until now, it has been Greece that has maintained a certain technological superiority in this field. But the entrance into service of the new Turkish units significantly changes the balance of power. The submarines, in addition to serving as perfect intelligence gathering platforms, especially in the SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) and COMINT (Communications Intelligence) disciplines, are excellent deterrent weapons, capable of denying an entire fleet access to a large area.

The most significant element of the pretentious Turkish program is an amphibious assault ship (LHD) called "Anadolu". This ship, with very similar characteristics to the "Juan Carlos I" operated by the Spanish Navy, is a qualitative leap in terms of the capabilities it provides, as it can not only transport landing barges, but from its deck it can operate different types of helicopters, UAVs and, where appropriate, vertical take-off combat aircraft.

Currently, the only aircraft with these characteristics compatible with the ship is the American F-35 B, which is the variant with vertical take-off and landing capability (VSTOL). Turkey was among the nations that had decided to acquire this fighter aircraft, although in its A version, which is the standard version for the Air Force, the submission of the first units of which had already been scheduled.

But the Ankara government's decision to acquire state-of-the-art Russian anti-aircraft equipment, such as the S-400 system, has led the United States to veto its continuation in the F-35 B acquisition program. In fact, the first aircraft destined for the Ottoman country have been sold to the USAF. In any case, Turkey's intention was not to acquire the VSTOL version, which leaves in the air its real intention as to which aircraft will equip the ship.

The project will be completed with the construction of a second amphibious assault ship, the "Trakya". The possession of two units of this subject provides the Turkish naval force with capabilities far superior to those of its neighbors in the region, giving it the ability to project its amphibious force in strategic operations and in two scenarios simultaneously.

The real value of these capabilities is not the operative itself, but the deterrent capability it represents.

Turkey's involvement in the conflicts in Syria and Libya has provided the Turkish Armed Forces, and within these its naval units, with an enormous and valuable combat experience that has been very useful for update and improving its doctrine and operational capabilities. This, together with the high quality of the training of its units, the quality of its equipment and the technological and armament development described above, are the three pillars necessary for the implementation of the "Blue Homeland" doctrine. The great unknown is how the other regional powers, directly affected by the advance of this strategic plan, will react.

By way of conclusion, it can be said that the interests are multiple and often crossed, and affect not only the countries bordering this area of the Mediterranean, but also powers such as Russia and France and international organizations such as NATO.

Incidents have already occurred between nations that were supposed to be allies, even leading France to withdraw from the NATO operation in the Mediterranean due to the problem between a French and a Turkish frigate, and resulting in an attack on Turkish positions by Rafale aircraft from instructions in the United Arab Emirates, but whose nationality remains unclear.

There is no doubt that the Turkish attitude, and the implementation of its plan, puts the Atlantic Alliance in a weak status , since one of the reasons behind the plan is Turkey's perception that it no longer needs the protection of the Western umbrella for the defense of its interests.

On the other hand, Turkey is playing with the trump card of holding the key to the entrance door to the torrent of immigrants from Syria, Libya, Somalia and Eritrea to the European Union. And it will use it as a means of pressure in the face of any European reaction or position against its interests.

The Eastern Mediterranean has regained the leading role in world geopolitics that it had in the 16th century, only this time we have new powers such as Russia that also claim their space and their need for a permanent and strong presence in that area. We cannot ignore the relationship that this Russian need has with the Crimean conflict and the strategic need to be able to control in a certain way both sides of the Bosporus and to ensure the exit of the Black Sea fleet to the Mediterranean.

All these economic, energy and political interests are creating a very complicated status where the "internal" conflicts in Syria and Libya also come together, creating an over-presence of military units, combatants, private military companies, weapons systems, aircraft, UAVs, etc. that at any moment, and due to any unexpected error, can lead to an incident that, however slight, can have unforeseeable and irreparable consequences.

* The author is a lieutenant colonel of Infantry and analyst of Geopolitics.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kasapoglu, 'The Blue Homeland': Turkey's largest naval drill. Anadolu Agency 27 February.

SETA Security Sadar Turkey's geopolitical landscape in 2020

Kara Harp Okulu Bilim Dergisi, "An assesment of eastern mediterranean maritime boundary delimitation agreement between Turkey and Libya" Science Journal of Turkish Military Academy Haziran /June 2020.

Eyal Pinko, "Turkey's Maritime Strategy Ambitions: The Blue Homeland Doctrine (Mavi Vatan)" Research Institute for European and American Studies(www.rieas.gr) April 2020.

Armenia and Azerbaijan face off in a conflict that also involves Turkey and Russia

▲ Monument to the Armenian capture of the city of Shusha in the war over Nagorno Karabakh in the 1990s [Wikipedia].

ANALYSIS / Irene Apesteguía

The region of Nagorno-Karabakh, traditionally inhabited by Christian Armenians and Muslim Turks, is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan. However, its population is Armenian-majority, with a pro-independence sentiment. In Soviet times it became an autonomous region within the republic of Azerbaijan and it was in the war of the 1990s when, in addition to leaving some 30,000 dead and about one million people displaced, separatist forces captured additional Azeri territory. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, ethnic discrepancies between Azerbaijan and Armenia have deepened. Even a 2015 census of Nagorno Karabakh reported that no Azeris lived there, whereas, in Soviet times, Azeris made up more than one-fifth of the population. Since the truce between the two former Soviet republics in 1994, there has been a stalemate status , with the failure of several negotiations to reach a permanent peace agreement . The dispute has remained frozen ever since.

Last September 27, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan once again led to a military confrontation. The latest developments go far beyond the usual clashes, as there are reports of downed helicopters, use of combat drones and missile attacks. In 2016 there was a violent escalation of the conflict, but Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, was not occupied, nor was any martial law declared. If one thing is clear, it is that the current escalation is a direct consequence of the freezing of the negotiation process. Moreover, this is the first time that armed outbreaks have occurred at such short intervals, the last escalation of the conflict having taken place last July.

Azerbaijani Defense Minister Zakir Hasanov threatened on September 27 with a "big attack" on Stepanakert if the separatists did not stop shelling its settlements. Nagorno Karabakh declared that it would respond in a "very painful" way. Armenia, for its part, warned that the confrontation could unleash a "full-scale war in the region".

The leaders of both countries hold each other responsible for this new escalation of violence. According to Azerbaijan, the Armenian Armed Forces constantly provoked the country, firing on the army and on crowds of civilians. Moreover, on multiple local Azerbaijani TV channels, President Ilham Aliyev has declared that Armenia is preparing for a new war, concentrating all its forces in Karabakh. Even the Azeri authorities have restricted the use of the internet in the country, mainly limiting access to social networks.

In its counter-offensive operation, Azerbaijan mobilized staff and tank units with the support of artillery and missile troops, front-line aviation and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), the Ministry's press statement said. In addition, agreement to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a number of Syrians from jihadist groups, Turkish-backed factions, are fighters in Nagorno-Karabakh. This has been corroborated by Russian and French sources. In any case, it would not be surprising when Turkey sits side by side with Azerbaijan.

For its part, Armenia blames Azerbaijan for starting the fighting. Armenian authorities announced that the Azerbaijani army had attacked with rocket-propelled grenade launchers and missiles. Armenia has not stopped preparing, as in the weeks prior to the start of the battle, multiple shipments of Russian weapons had been detected in the country through heavy transport flights. On the other hand, Armenia's defense minister has accused Turkey of exercising command and control of Azerbaijan's air operations through Boeing 737 Airborne Early Warning & Control aircraft , as Turkey has four of these planes.  

Triggers

Both powers were on alert due to the July clashes. Since then, they have not abandoned military preparedness at the hands of their external allies. Therefore, the current events cannot be described as coming out of the blue. After the July outbreak, the feeling persisted that the armed confrontation had simply Fail

Hours after the outbreak of fighting, Armenia declared martial law and general mobilization. Azerbaijan, on the contrary, declared that such action was not necessary, but finally the parliament decided to impose martial law in some regions of the country. Not only was martial law decreed, but also the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense declared the liberation of seven villages, the establishment of a curfew in several cities and the recapture of multiple important heights. It is clear that all occupied territories have crucial strategic value: Azerbaijan has secured visual control of the Vardenis-Aghdara highway, which connects to Armenian-occupied Karabakh. The road was completed by Armenia three years ago, in order to facilitate quick military cargo transfers, an indication that this is a strategic position for Armenia.

Drone warfare has also been present in the conflict with Turkish and Israeli drones used by Azerbaijan. The anti-drone measures that Armenia has to carry out are involving Iran in the matter.

An important factor that may have led to the conflict was the changes in the diplomatic leadership in Baku. Elmar Mammadyarov, Azerbaijan's foreign minister, left his position during the July clashes. He has been replaced by former Education Minister Jeyhun Bayramov, who does not have much diplomatic experience. Meanwhile, Hikmet Hajiyev, foreign policy advisor to Azerbaijan's president, has seen his role in these areas increased.

But the problem is not so much centered on the new appointments. For the past few years, Mammadyarov was the biggest optimist about the concessions Armenia might be willing to make under Nikol Pashinyan's new government. And that is because ever since Armenia's Velvet Revolution, which brought Pashinyan to the post of prime minister in 2018, Azerbaijan had harbored the hope that it could resolve the conflict. This hope was shared by many diplomats and experts in the West. Moreover, even within Armenia, Pashinyan's opponents called him a traitor because, they claimed, he was selling the country's interests in exchange for Western money. All this hope for Armenia disappeared, as the new Armenian Prime Minister's position on Nagorno-Karabakh was harsher than ever. He even declared on several occasions that "Karabakh is Armenia". All this led to the strengthening of Azerbaijan's position, which hardened after the July clashes. Baku has never ruled out the use of force to try to solve the problem of its territorial integrity.

In the 2016 conflict there were many efforts to minimize these armed disturbances, mainly by Russian diplomacy. These have been supported by the West, which saw Moscow's mediation as positive. However, negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have not resumed, and the excuse of the coronavirus pandemic has not been very convincing, according to domestic media.

More points have led to the current escalation, such as increased Turkish involvement. After the July clashes, Turkey and Azerbaijan conducted joint military exercises. Ankara's representatives began talking about the ineffectiveness of the peace process, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, speaking last month at the UN General Assembly, described Armenia as the biggest obstacle to long-term peace in the South Caucasus. This is not to say that Turkey provoked the new escalation, but it certainly helped push Azerbaijan into a more emboldened attitude. The Turkish president stated on Twitter that "Turkey, as always, stands with all its brothers and sisters in Azerbaijan." Moreover, last August, the Azeri defense minister said that, with the financial aid of the Turkish army, Azerbaijan would fulfill "its sacred duty," something that can be interpreted as the recovery of lost territories.

International importance

In a brief review of the allies, it is worth mentioning that the Azeris are a majority population of Turkish origin, with which Turkey has close ties, although unlike the Turks, most Azeris are Shiite Muslims. As for Armenia, Turkey has no relations with the country, since the former is a majority Orthodox Christian country that historically has always relied on Russia.

As soon as the hostilities began, several states and international organizations called for a cease-fire. For example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in a telephone conversation with his Armenian counterpart, Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, called for an end to the fighting and declared that Moscow would continue its mediation efforts. Meanwhile, as it did after the July clashes, Turkey again expressed through various channels its plenary session of the Executive Council support for Azerbaijan. The Turkish Foreign Ministry assured that Ankara is ready to help Baku in any way. The Armenian president, hours before the start of the fire, mentioned that a new conflict could "affect the security and stability not only of the South Caucasus, but also of Europe". US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo expressed serious concerns and called on both sides to stop the fighting.

On the other hand, there is Iran, which is mainly Shiite and also has a large ethnic Azeri community in the northwest of the country. However, it maintains good relations with Russia. Moreover, having borders with both countries, Iran offered to mediate peace talks. This is where Iran's current problem over the new conflict is centered. Azeri activists called protests in Iranian Azerbaijan, which is the national territory of Azeris under Iranian sovereignty, against Tehran's support for Armenia. The arrests carried out by the Iranian government have not prevented further protests by this social sector. This response in the streets is an important indicator of the current temperature in northwest Iran.

As for Western countries, France, which has a large Armenian community, called for a cease-fire and the start of dialogue. The United States claimed to have contacted both sides to urge them to "cease hostilities immediately and avoid words and actions of little financial aid".

Russia may have serious concerns in the resumption of full-scale hostilities. It has made it clear on multiple occasions that the important thing is to prevent the conflict from escalating. One reason for that insistence may be that the Kremlin already has open fronts in Ukraine, Syria and Libya, in addition to the current status in Belarus, and the poisoning of Alexei Navalni. Moreover, despite the current attempt by the presidents of Russia and Turkey to show that relations between their countries are going well, the discrepancies between them, such as their views on Syria or Libya, are growing and becoming more and more diverse. And now, Vladimir Putin could not leave Armenia in the hands of Azerbaijan and Turkey.

The Minskgroup of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has as its main mission statement the mediation of peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and is co-chaired by Russia, France and the United States. In response to the present conflict, it called for a "return to ceasefire and resumption of substantive negotiations". Earlier this year, Armenia rejected the Madrid Principles, the main conflict resolution mechanism proposed by the Minsk group . Moreover, this initiative has been made increasingly impossible by the Armenian Defense Ministry's concept of "new war for new territories," as well as Nikol Pashinyan's idea of unification of Armenia and Karabakh. All this has infuriated the Azeri government and citizenry, which has increasingly criticized the Minsk group . Azerbaijan has also criticized the group s passivity in the face of what it considers Armenia's incendiary actions, such as the transfer of the capital of Karabakh to Susa, a city of great cultural importance for Azerbaijanis, or the illegal settlement of Lebanese and Armenians in occupied Azerbaijani territories.  

If any conclusion is to be drawn from this it is that, for many in both Azerbaijan and Armenia, the peace process has been discredited over the past three decades of failed negotiations, prompting increasing warnings that the status quo would lead to further escalation of the conflict.

Among some experts there is growing concern that Western countries do not understand the current status and the consequences that could result from the worst flare-up in the region in years. The director of the South Caucasus Office at the Heinrich Boell Foundation, Stefan Meister, has stated that the fighting between these two regions could go far. In his opinion, "the European Union and the West underestimate the conflict".

The European Union has also taken a stand. It has already order Armenia and Azerbaijan to reduce cross-border tensions, urging them to stop the armed confrontation and to refrain from actions that would provoke further tension and to take measures to avoid further escalation.

The conflict in the Caucasus is of great international importance. There are regular clashes and resurgence of tensions in the area. The relevance centers on the fact that any escalation of violence could destabilize global Economics , given that the South Caucasus is a corridor for gas pipelines running from the Caspian Sea to world markets, and more specifically, to Europe. If Armenia decides that Azerbaijan has escalated too far, it could attack Azerbaijan's South Caucasus Pipeline, which sends gas for Turkey's TANAP, and terminates with TAP, which supplies Europe. Another strategic aspect is the control of the city of Ghanai, as controlling it could connect Russia to Karabakh. In addition, control of this site could cut off connectivity between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey in relation to gas pipelines. There were already conflicts in this area last July, therefore, as a result of the new conflict, Azerbaijan has been predisposed to close the region's airspace.

In bright green, territory of Nagorno-Karabakh agreed in 1994; in soft green, territory controlled by Armenia until this summer [Furfur/Wikipedia].

A new war?

There are several possible outcomes for the current status . The most likely is a battle for small and not particularly important areas, allowing the symbolic declaration of a "victory". The problem centers on the fact that each opponent may have a very different view of things, so that a new side of confrontation is inevitable, raising the stakes of the conflict, and leading to a lower possibility of understanding between the parties.

Although unlikely, many analysts do not rule out the possibility that the current escalation is part of the preparations for negotiations and is necessary to shore up diplomatic positions and increase pressure on the opponent before resuming talks.

Whatever the reasoning behind the armed clashes, one thing is clear: the importance of military force in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process is growing by the day. The absence of talks is becoming critical. If the Karabakh pendulum is not mended soon and does not swing from generals to diplomats, it may become irreparable. And it will be then that the prospects of another regional war breaking out once again will cease to be a mere scenario described by experts.

While Russia continues to insist that there is no other option but the peaceful way, the Line of contact between the two sides in Nagorno Karabakh has become the most militarized area in Europe. Many experts have repeatedly shown as a possible scenario that Azerbaijan may decide to launch a military operation to regain its lost territory. The country, whose main source of income is its Caspian Sea oil wealth, has spent billions of dollars on new weaponry. In addition, it has been Azerbaijan that has replaced Russia as the largest carrier of natural gas to Turkey.

A major consequence of the conflict centers on potential losses for Russia and Iran. One more casualty of the conflict may be Russia's position as the leader of Eurasia. Another argument is based on the Turkish committee , which has demanded Armenia's withdrawal from Azerbaijani lands. The problem is that the members of that committee, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are also members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), led by Russia together with Armenia. On the other hand, Iran also panics sample the total solidarity expressed by Turkey to Azerbaijan, as more Azeris live in Iranian Azerbaijan than in the Republic of Azerbaijan.

We are facing one of the many conflicts exemplifying the new and current "style" of warfare, where great powers place themselves behind the backs of small conflicts. However, the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh will be small in extension, but not in importance, since in addition to contributing to the continuity in the destabilization of the Caucasian area , it can affect nearby powers, and even Europe. The West should give it the importance it deserves, because if it continues along the same lines, the door is open to a more violent, extensive and prolonged military conflict.

▲ Nicolás Maduro during a broadcasted speech [Gov. of Venezuela].

ESSAY / Isabelle León Graticola

It is no secret to anyone that Venezuela is going through the most convoluted economic and social crisis in its history, a crisis in which the creators have manipulated the existence of the people, degrading its integrity, and extinguishing everything that once characterized Venezuela.

The country holds a key geopolitical location that serves as a route for North America and the Caribbean to the rest of South America. Likewise, the country is endowed with abundant natural resources like natural gas, iron ore, diamonds, gold, and oil.1 Venezuela has the largest proven oil reserves in the world, with 302 billion barrels in January 2018, emanating an extremely rich country with astonishing potential.2 However, this crisis has not only hindered people's lives but has ironically dissipated the country's resources to consolidate the pillars of the regime to such an extent that today the government of Nicolás Maduro is importing oil from Iran. Inadequate policies that have weakened the society's sense of responsibility and nationalism, decreased foreign investment out of lack of trust, and annihilated the state-led oil production, therefore reinforcing the country's economic downfall and hyperinflation.

The Venezuelan government, headed by Nicolás Maduro, has managed its way to continue holding power despite accusations of corruption, crimes against humanity, and even drugs trafficking involvement. The perplexing partner and political crisis has created an unsustainable and violent context in which poorly informed people are manipulated by the government through speeches that take big significance on how society perceives the actual situation, as well as other countries' statements on the crisis. Up to this point, it has become difficult to understand what keeps bolstering this regime, but if the situation is analyzed from the nucleus, the well-orchestrated rhetoric of Chávez and his successor, Maduro, has contributed to support the ends and sustainment of the regime. 

Since Maduro reached power, poverty motivated violence has been rampant in Venezuela and insecurity has become a significant part of society's dynamics. Consequently, many protests against the government demanding for freedom and better living standards have taken place. Maduro's regime has been forced to employ tools such as fake news and hateful rhetoric to soften the anger of the people by manipulating them and brainwashing the armed forces to avoid uprisings. 

This article aims to analyze how Maduro's rhetoric has maintained a minority in the wrong side of history and a majority in constant battle by making erroneous accusations to third parties to justify the perturbed situation, while the government keeps enriching its wallet at the cost of the people and its smudged operations. Such feverish society gave rise to pure uncertainty, to a place where disinformation takes the form of a lethal weapon for the dangerous context in which it exists.

The background: Chávez's indoctrinated society

First, it is necessary to clarify that the focus of this article is merely on the rhetorical aspect as a pillar of the regime. However, when it comes to the background that has sustained Maduro's administration up to this day, there is a more complex reality, full of crime, death, manipulation, and corruption. Venezuela is an almost abnormal reality because, after more than twenty years, it is still tied to a group of people who have taken absolutely everything from it. From a man that portrayed nothing but hope for the poor, to one who has managed his way sticking to policies damaging to the very people they mean to help, and which, sooner or later, will make the regime collapse.

Hugo Chávez's presidency was characterized by a tremendous and persuasive oratory; he knew how to get to the people. Chávez's measures and campaigns were based on a psychological strategy that won him the admiration of the most impoverished classes of the country. Chávez arrived and gave importance and attention to the big mass of the population that previous governments had systematically neglected. People felt the time had come for them to have what they never had before. Filled with charisma and political mastery, his speeches always contained jokes, dances, and colloquial phrases that were considered indecent by the country's highest class and often misunderstood abroad.

Chávez always built a drastic separation between the ideals of the United States and Venezuela and looked for ways to antagonize the former with his rhetoric. He began to refer to George W. Bush as "Mr. Danger", an imperial literary character of one of the most famous Venezuelan novels, Doña Bárbara.3

Hugo Chávez is one of the most revolutionary characters in Venezuelan history, one who brought the convoluted situation that today perpetuates in the country. Chávez persecuted journalists and political opponents, expropriated lands, nationalized Venezuela's key industries such as telecommunications, electricity, and the refining processes of heavy crudes, and slowly degraded the society as the exercise of power was directed to hold complete control of Venezuela's internal dynamics.4

Chávez extended education and medical assistance to the least favored classes and improved the living conditions of the needy. This policy did nothing but create among these classes a culture of dependence on the government. Chávez's supporters or Chavistas were the pillars that buttressed the government, while the wealthy were cataloged as "squealing pigs" and "vampires. "5 The Chavistas admired Chavez's charismatic character and his constant gifts; he gave them fridges and TVs, gadgets that they could never afford on their own. He also constructed buildings, under the "mission statement Vivienda" initiative, to give people living in slums a 'proper' home. All of this was possible because the oil prices at the time were skyrocketing; he used the oil income to buy his support. The general standard of life, however, continued to be poor. The government knew what to give and how to manipulate to stay in power, and that is precisely what made Hugo Chávez so powerful and almost impossible to defeat despite strong opposition. 

Historically, the United States has opposed left-wing governments in Latin America, so Chávez condemned the US, by referring to them as an imperialist power, or the "Empire". He disgraced US leaders and actions and transferred that anti-imperialistic and anti-capitalist approach to the population, part of which supported him and was blindly loyal to the cause. Chávez's alliance with Cuba under Fidel Castro led to the supply of oil at cut-rate prices, all related to the desire of reducing US economic influence in South America. Chavez's populist initiatives were the tenets of his administration and controversial foreign policy. These, along with his rhetoric and opposition from the Venezuelan wealthy class, deeply polarized the society and gave rise to what Venezuela has today: a divided society that has suffered from the lack of basic necessities, disinformation, and integrity.

Currently, the spokesmen of the Government of Nicolás Maduro address citizens at all hours from public channels and social networks to stir up the disgruntlement of the population toward the external enemy.6 Despite the poorly prepared speeches, the lack of vocabulary, and the improper formulation of sentences, Maduro has kept the colloquial and unformal rhetoric that characterized Chávez, but has failed to draw the connection that the late president enjoyed. The anti-imperialist strategy has been maintained, and, as the justification of the crisis, it has become the epicenter of the regime's speech. Nicolás Maduro's rhetoric revolves around two words: the US and the "Patria", a word frequently used by Chávez.

The base of Maduro's rhetoric: the love for Chávez

Shortly before dying in March 2013, Hugo Chávez appointed Vice President Nicolás Maduro as his successor. Chávez's charisma and legacy are what somehow ensured him that Maduro would provide a smooth transition. After Chávez's passing, Maduro took advantage of the momentum and sentiment that the Chavistas revealed and ensured that if picked, he would follow the steps of his predecessor and would continue to strengthen the 'Bolivarian Revolution'. Along with the continuity with Chávez's legacy, the defense of Venezuelan sovereignty in front of the US, and the social equality became the key messages of his administration.7 Nevertheless, Maduro had little support from the elites and inherited a country that was already economically weak due to the downfall of the oil prices and corruption.

In Chávez's wake, Maduro appealed to the emotion of the audience. He strongly claimed that the people were there for the 'Comandante' and said that "his soul and his spirit was so strong that his body could not stand it anymore, and he was released and now through this universe expanding filling us with blessings and love". He knew what this meant for the people and a crying audience exclaimed "Chávez lives, the fight goes on".

Maduro filled his rhetoric with the love for Chávez. He acknowledged that the Chavistas worshipped him as if he was God and that for ideological reasons, support for Maduro was guaranteed. Nevertheless, others recognized that the situation in the country was not favorable and questioned Maduro's ability to fill the void left by Chávez. When Maduro took power, the country entered a period of reinforced economic decline accompanied by hyperinflation that nowadays exceeds 10 million percent.8 As it was previously stated, the conditions of poverty surpass anything seen before in the country, which is now on the brink of collapse.

Furthermore, Venezuela went through two rounds of mass protests, in 2014 and 2018, that demanded freedom and change. Unfortunately, and as was expected from the government, thousands of violations of human rights were part of the demonstration's dynamics as brutal repression and the unjust imprisonment of demonstrators took place all along. Simultaneously, Maduro managed to call for rallies on the days of the major opposition's marches and retained the populist speech based on ideological arguments and emotional appeals among the minority of supporters to consolidate his power in Venezuela. Last year, in a regime rally on February 23rd, he condemned the elites as he explained that he was certain that from the bottom of his Chavista sentiment of loyalty to this battle, he was never going to be part of one. He stated that Venezuela will continue to be Patria for more many years to come. 

The ongoing crisis has forced many to survive rather than to live, but despite all, Maduro remains in control. Maduro has kept Chávez's anti-imperialist policy and has rejected any minimum support from the United States. The government takes advantage of the hunger and the vulnerable situation of its people and makes sure that it remains as the only source of food. It does not take responsibility and instead, blames the crisis on the 'economic war' that the US has imposed on Venezuela.9 When Juan Guaidó sworn himself the legitimate president, Maduro's supporters started raising firms in a campaign called "Hands off Venezuela", while the US was trying to get humanitarian assistance into Venezuela through the Colombian border in the name of Guaidó. 

In this sense, he explained in the same concentration speech that they were defending the national territory and the right to live freely and independently. Although it may seem ironic, because the government has killed hundreds of people with its police brutality and torture, this rhetoric is what has kept him the support of the hardcore revolutionary followers. The "Hands off Venezuela", was shouted and accompanied by the worst English pronunciation -that characterizes Maduro-, and followed with insults to Guaidó.

As Maduro yelled "puppet, clown, and beggar of imperialism and Donald Trump. If he is the President, where are the economic and social measures that he has applied for the people? It is a game to deceive and manipulate, it is a game that has failed, the coup d'état has failed" as the network audience shouted, "jail him, jail him!". He drew his speech to a hardcore anti-imperialist audience and firmly stated that the US intended to invade Venezuela and enslave it. Maduro finalized his speech by shouting "wave up the flag, up the Patria, for the people in defense of the Revolution".

Recently, the US State Department released a price for the capture of Maduro and his cabinet, not only for the crimes committed against the Venezuelan population, but also because of their involvement in a huge drug-trafficking network. With this, the regime's position has become more vulnerable and simultaneously pragmatic, but as tough actions were taken against possible threats and opposing figures, Maduro's rhetoric remains to deny its status and manipulating those that still support him. In another public speech, he stated that "Donald Trump's government, in an extravagant and extreme, vulgar, miserable action, launched a set of false accusations and like a racist cowboy of the 21st century, put a price on the heads of revolutionaries that are still willing to fight them". He one more time accused the US of being the main cause of the economic crisis of Venezuela.

Nicolás Maduro's speech has always been directed to the hardcore revolutionaries, those that worship Chávez since the beginning and who firmly believe in the socialist cause. Maduro has maintained his rhetoric despite the changes in the internal situation of the country; he has held an enduring method for antagonizing the opposition, the Venezuelan upper class, and the United States. On the other hand, regarding the strategic foreign allies, the regime openly gives declarations to support them, but again to somehow antagonize the United States. Indeed, this was the case of the US assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian top commander, in which government representatives attended the Iranian embassy to give the condolences in the name of the regime and swore to avenge Soleimani's death. The administration of Nicolás Maduro has no gray areas, everything is either black or white; the opposition, the upper class, the US, and the US-influenced countries are the enemies, and the rhetoric rarely leans toward a conciliatory message, rather has always revolved around these conflicting parties.

What is left

Twenty years have passed since the Chavismo arrived in the country. Nowadays, a passionate minority of the population keeps supporting Maduro. His regime continues to train armed groups to combat discontent headed by opposition leader Juan Guaidó. The Chavismo keeps being strong, but it has been fragmented by those who believe that the revolution ended at the moment Chávez died, and the ones that are convinced that supporting Maduro means being loyal to Chávez. In the case of Juan Guaidó, he keeps doing his efforts. He still has relative support and keeps being a source of hope. Nevertheless, many criticize the fact that he let again the people cool down. A close change is expected, but no one knows what the movements behind are. Meanwhile, the people will continue suffering and trying to survive.

Upon reflection, it can be noticed that Maduro's entire argumentation revolves around a confrontational rhetoric: the US and capitalism against Venezuela; Guaidó against the Patria; the elites against the Revolution.10 Far from recognizing the reality that the country faces and taking actions to improve it, this confrontational approach simply places the blame on those who have tried to bring a change in the internal dynamics of Venezuela. The regime has managed to construct a national united front against a common foreign enemy and to demonize the opposition.

Chávez and Maduro's rhetoric has followed a tangible objective: the Revolution. Maduro's regime up to this point is searching for a way to consolidate its power and sustain itself as the best way to elude a rather somber future in jail. This never-ending nightmare should have long ago collapsed due to the economic catastrophe, hyperinflation, political repression, human rights violations, and the lack of direction for Venezuela. Behind what maintains this structure there is nothing but the exercise of power and the almost absolute control of society. The Patria that they constantly speak of is running out of fuel to keep going. Nonetheless, the rhetorical deceptions of the Bolivarian revolution, which for two decades have appealed to the popular classes, settled in the collective mindset of the Chavismo and brought space for support in the Venezuelan society.

Chávez and Maduro's presidencies have been based on educating and changing the mindset of the population as they wanted; a population that is content with one box of food a month and which, unfortunately, hunts for the easy means to achieve its goals instead of fighting to improve its lot.

Today, the regime is fed on the memory of Hugo Chávez, on his promises, on his battle. As long as it keeps generating an illusion on the supporters, Maduro will appeal to it as a pillar of his administration and of the Revolution.

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Venezuela facts and figures. 2019, https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/171.htm. Accessed 28 Nov. 2019.

2. US Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis. Venezuela. Jan. 2019, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=VEN. Accessed 28 Nov. 2019.

3. Livingstone, G. (2013, March 10). The secret of Hugo Chavez's hold on his people. Retrieved March 17, 2020, from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/the-secret-of-hugo-chavezs-hold-on-his-people-8527832.html

4. El País. (2007, January 08). Chávez announces the nationalization of the electric service and telecommunications. Retrieved July 01, 2020, from https://elpais.com/internacional/2007/01/08/actualidad/1168210811_850215.html

5. The Guardian (2012, October 08). Hugo Chávez: A victory of enduring charisma and political mastery. Retrieved March 17, 2020, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/08/hugo-chavez-victory-political-venezuela

6. Twitter, F., & Miraflores, P. (2017, July 23). Maduro, his ministers and the corruption of language. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/07/22/opinion/1500746848_239358.html

7. Grainger, S. Hugo Chávez and Venezuela Confront his Succession. Dec. 2012. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20678634. Accessed 29 Nov. 2019.

8. Sánchez, V. Venezuela hyperinflation hits 10 million percent. 'Shock therapy' may be only chance to undo economic damage. Aug. 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/02/venezuela-inflation-at-10-million-percent-its-time-for-shock-therapy.html. Accessed 29 Nov. 2019.

9. TVVenezuela. CLAP boxes no longer have what to feed Venezuelans. youtube Sept. 2019. Accessed 30 Nov. 2019.

10. Delgado, A., & Herrero, J. (2019, February 12). Venezuela rhetorics on Twitter: Guaidó vs. Maduro. Retrieved March 18, 2020, from https://beersandpolitics.com/retoricas-de-venezuela-en-twitter-guaido-vs-maduro

Faced with the biggest economic crisis since World War II, the EU itself has decided to borrow to help its member states.

▲ Commission President Von der Layen and European committee President Charles Michel after announcing the agreement in Julycommittee Europeancommittee ].

ANALYSIS / Pablo Gurbindo Palomo

"Deal!With this "tweet" at 5:30 in the morning of July 21, the president of the European committee , Charles Michel, announced the achievement of an agreement after the longest meeting in its history (more than 90 hours of negotiations). 

After the failed summit in February, the European countries were aware of the importance of reaching an agreement, but certain countries saw it as more urgent than others to finalize the Multiannual Financial framework (MFF) for the next seven years. But as with everything else, the Covid-19 pandemic has overturned this lack of urgency, and has even forced the Member States to negotiate, in addition to the budget, aid to alleviate the effects of the pandemic on the 27.

The agreement consists of an MFF of 1.074 trillion euros. A figure lower than that demanded in February by the so-called friends of cohesion (a conglomerate of countries from southern and eastern Europe) and the Commission itself, but also higher than the figure that the frugals (the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark and Sweden) were willing to accept. But it was not this figure that was the subject of the discussion, but how much and how the post-pandemic recovery fund was to be set up to help the countries most affected by the pandemic. The agreed Fund was 750 billion, divided into 390 billion to be given to the Member States in the form of grants, and the remaining 360 billion to be given in the form of a 70% loan to be disbursed between 2021 and 2022.

The figures are dizzying, and based on the February negotiations, where some of the members preferred something more austere, one might ask: How did we reach this agreement?

The Hamilton moment

With the arrival of Covid-19 in Europe and a considerable paralysis of all the world's economies, the European capitals quickly realized that the blow was going to be significant and that a strong response was going to be necessary to soften the blow. Proposals at the European level were not long in coming. For example, the European Parliament proposed a recovery package of 2 trillion euros on May 15, to be included in the MFF 2021-2027.

The most noteworthyproposal was presented on May 18 by French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. And not only because it was driven by the two main economies of the Union, but also because of its historic content.

There has been talk of Hamilton momentin allusion to Alexander Hamilton, one of the founding fathers of the United States and the first Secretary of the Treasury of the newly founded republic. In 1790 the thirteen states that made up the young American nation were heavily indebted due to the war effort of the Revolutionary War, which had ended only seven years earlier. To solve this problem, Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury, succeeded in convincing the federal government to assume the states' debt by "mutualizing" it. This event marked the strengthening of the American federal government and served to create the instructions of the U.S. national identity. 

It seems that with the Franco-German proposal , the Hamilton moment has arrived. The proposal is based on four pillars: 

1. European health strategy, which may include a joint reservation of medical equipment and supplies, coordination in the acquisition of vaccines and treatments. In turn, epidemic prevention plans shared among the 27 and common methods for registering the sick.

2. A boost to the modernization of European industry, supported by an acceleration of the ecological and digital transition.

3. Strengthening the European industrial sector, supporting production in the Old Continent and diversification of supply chains to reduce global dependence on European Economics .

4. 500 billion reconstruction fund for the regions most affected by the pandemic based on EU budgetary programs.

It is this fourth pillar which we can call "Hamiltonian" and which is historic as it would allow for the first time in history the EU itself to issue debt to finance this fund. This proposal has broken years of a German stance against any subject collective indebtedness. "We are experiencing the biggest crisis in our history... Due to the unusual nature of the crisis we are choosing unusual solutions," Merkel said in the joint video conference with Macron.  

According to this proposal , the funds would not be reimbursed directly by the countries but by the Community funds in the long term, either through its usual resources or through new sources of income. It should also be pointed out that the proposal referred to the submission of this fund in the form of subsidies, i.e., without any subject of interest for the recipient countries.

Among the reactions to this proposal were those of the frugal, who rejected that the funds should be provided in the form of subsidies. "We will continue to show solidarity and support for the countries most affected by the coronavirus crisis, but this should be in the form of loans and not subsidies," said Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz. The frugal proposal is that financial aid raised on the debt markets should be submit to the states at low interest rates, i.e. as a loan, and conditional on a reform program.

On May 27, the Commission announced its proposalproposal, very similar to the Franco-German one, but extended. The proposal consists of a 1.1 trillion euro MFF and a 750 billion euro recovery plan called Next Generation EU. This recovery plan is based on three pillars financed with new instruments but within pre-existing headings:

The first pillar covers 80% of the recovery plan. It deals with support to Member States in their investments and reforms following the Commission's recommendations. For this purpose, the pillar has the following instruments:

• Recovery and Resilience Mechanism (the most important part of the proposal): financial support for investments and reforms of the States, especially those related to the ecological and digital transition and the resilience of national economies, linking them to EU priorities. This mechanism would be composed of 310 billion in grants and 250 billion in loans.

• React-EU Fund within the cohesion policy with 55 billion. 

• Increase in the Just Transition Fund: this fund is intended to support States in undertaking the energy and ecological transition, to move towards a policy of climate neutrality. It would be increased to 40 billion.

• Increase in the European Agricultural Fund for Rural development : to support rural areas to comply with the European Green agreement . It would be increased by 15 billion.

The second pillar covers 15% of the plan. It focuses on boosting private investment, and its funds would be managed by the European Investment Bank (EIB):

• 31 billion Solvency Support Facility

• EU-Invest program increased to $15.3 billion

• New Strategic Investment Fund to promote investment in European strategic sectors 

The third pillar comprises the remaining 5%. It includes investments in aspects that have result key to the coronavirus crisis:

• EU4Health program to strengthen health cooperation. With a budget of 9.4 billion.

• Strengthening of rescEU, the European Union's Civil Protection Mechanism, by 2 billion.

• Horizon Europe project for the promotion of research and innovation worth 94.4 billion.

• 16.5 billion in support for foreign humanitarian financial aid .

To obtain the financing, the Commission would issue its own debt on the market and introduce new taxes of its own, such as a border carbon tax, emission rights, a digital tax or a tax on large corporations.

It should also be noted that both access to MFF and Next Generation EU aid would be conditional on compliance with the rule of law. Something that did not please countries such as Hungary or Poland, which, among others, consider that it is not clear and that it is a form of interference by the EU in their internal affairs.

Negotiation at the European Summit

With this proposal on the table, the heads of state and government of the 27 met on July 17 in Brussels amid great uncertainty. They did not know how long the summit would last and were pessimistic that an agreement would be reached.

The hot points of the negotiation were mainly the amount and form of the Reconstruction Fund. Countries such as Spain, Italy and Portugal wanted the aid to come in the form of subsidies in full and without any subject . On the other hand, the frugal countries, led at the summit by Mark Rutte of the Netherlands, wanted the reconstruction fund to be reduced as much as possible, and in any case to be provided in the form of loans to be refund and as an "absolute precondition". "Any financial aid from the North means reforms in the South. There is no other option," said Rutte at a press conference in The Hague.

As in any negotiation, positions were loosening. It was already clear that neither of the two positions was going to remain unscathed and that a mixed solution with both subsidies and loans was going to be the solution. But in what percentage? And with reform conditionality?

For Spain, Italy and Portugal, the subsidies could not be less than 400 billion, which was already a concession of the 500 billion from which they had started. For the frugal, who were joined by Finland, this figure could not exceed 350 billion, which would reduce the total Fund to 700 billion. This was a major concession by the frugal members, who went from talking about zero subsidies to accepting them as 50% of the amount. Michel's final proposal was 390 billion in subsidies and 360 billion in loans to try to convince all parties.

The big stumbling block, apart from the percentage, was the conditionality of reforms for the submission aid defended by the frugal. The ghost of the Troika imposed after the 2008 crisis was beginning to appear, to the disgrace of countries such as Spain and Italy. Rutte demanded that the national plans that countries had to submit to the Commission in order to receive the Fund should also pass through the committee of the 27 and that unanimous approval was necessary. This formula basically allowed any country to veto the national plans. Germany, for its part, did not go as far as the required unanimity, but did ask for some control by the committee.

Rutte's stance angered many countries that saw the proposal as a way to force reforms that have nothing to do with economic recovery.

The president of the committee presented a proposal to bring the parties closer together: the "emergency brake". According to Michel's proposal , countries will have to submit their reform plan to the committee and it will have to be approved C qualified majority. After its approval, any country is allowed to submit to the committee its doubts about the fulfillment of the plans presented by a State; in this case, the committee would have a maximum period of three months to make a pronouncement. The country would not receive aid until a decision is received.

For those who may be surprised by the large concessions of the frugal, we must mention the figure of the "rebates" or compensatory checks. These are rebates on a country's contribution to the budget and were introduced in 1984 for the United Kingdom. The British were one of the main net contributors to the European budget , but they hardly benefited from its aid, 70% of which was earmarked for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Cohesion Fund. It was therefore agreed that the British would have a permanent discount on their contribution. Since then, other net contributor countries have been receiving these checks. Although in these cases they had to be negotiated with each MFF and were partial on a specific area.

It is a very controversial figure for many countries, and an attempt was already made to remove it in 2005. But what is undeniable is that it is a great bargaining chip. The frugal countries have wanted to keep it from the beginning, and even strengthen it. And faced with the difficulties of negotiation, the rest of the Member States have seen that it is an "affordable" and not very elaborate way of convincing the "hawks of the north". After an initial stance, they ended up increasing it: Denmark will receive 377 million (considerably higher than the initial 222 million); Austria will double its initial amount to 565 million; Sweden will receive 1,069 million (higher than the initial 823 million); and the Netherlands will receive 1,575 million. Germany, as the largest net contributor, will receive 3.671 billion.

The last important negotiation point to be addressed is the conditionality of compliance with the rule of law in order to receive the various funds and aid. Hungary and Poland, for example, have an open transcript for possible violation of article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which allows a Member State to be sanctioned for violating basic values of the Union such as respect for human rights or the rule of law. Many countries have pressed the issue, but given the difficulty in negotiations and a possible risk of vetoing the agreement depending on the vocabulary used by the Hungarian President Viktor Orban, this clause has come to nothing.

To recapitulate, and as stated at the beginning of the article, the agreement ended up with an MFF of 1.074 trillion euros; and a post-pandemic reconstruction fund, the Next Generation EU, of 750 billion, divided into 390 billion in the form of subsidies and 360 billion in the form of loans. To this must be added Michel's "emergency brake" for the submission aid and the significant sum of the "rebates".

The cutbacks

Yes, there have been. Apart from the already explained rule of law clause, there have been several cuts in several of the items proposed by the Commission. Firstly, a significant cut in the Just Transition Fund, which has been reduced from the initial proposal of 40 billion to 10 billion, to the anger of Poland in particular. Secondly, the rural development funds are reduced from 15 billion to 7 billion. Thirdly, the 16.5 billion fund to support external humanitarian financial aid , the 31 billion solvency support instrument ( proposal by the Commission) and the 9.4 billion EU4Health program have come to nothing. And finally, the Horizon Europe project would drop from the 94.4 billion proposed by the Commission to barely 5 billion.

Winners and losers?

It is difficult to speak of winners and losers in a negotiation where all parties have yielded a great deal in order to reach an agreement. Although it remains to be seen whether the positions of the countries were truly immovable from the beginning or whether they were simply used as an instrument of pressure in the negotiation.

The countries most affected by the pandemic, such as Italy and Spain, can be happy because they will receive a very large sum in the form of subsidies, as they wanted. But this conditionality that they were not going to accept in any way, in a way, is going to come to them softened in the form of Michel's "emergency brake". And the reforms they did not want to be forced to make, they will have to carry out in agreement the recovery plan they send to the committee, which, if not sufficient, may be rejected by the latter.  

The frugal have succeeded in getting conditional aid, but more than half of it will be in the form of subsidies. And as a rule, the monetary limits they advocated have been exceeded.

Countries such as Poland or Hungary have succeeded in making the conditionality of the rule of law ineffective in the end, but on the other hand they have received considerable cuts in funds, such as Just Transition, which are important especially in Central Europe for the energy transition.

But, in the final, each Head of State and Government has returned to his country claiming victory and assuring to have accomplished his goal, which is what a politician has to do (or appear to do) in the end.

For both the MFF 2021-2027 and Next Generation EU to go ahead, the European Parliament's ratification is still pending. Although the Parliament has always advocated for a more ambitious package than the one agreed, there is no fear that it will block it.

Conclusion

As I have said, this agreement can be described as historic for several reasons. Apart from the obvious extension of the European committee or the Covid-19 pandemic itself, it is historic because of the Hamilton moment that seems to be about to take place.

It seems that the Member States have learned that the formula used after the crisis in 2008 did not work, that crises affect the entire Union as a whole and that no one can be left behind. Cases such as Brexit and the rise of Eurosceptic movements throughout the continent set a dangerous precedent and could even jeopardize the continuity of the project.

The "mutualization" of debt will allow already heavily indebted countries, which would have problems to finance themselves due to their high risk premium, to get out of the crisis sooner and better. This decision will obviously cause problems that remain to be seen, but it shows that the 27 have realized that a joint financial aid was necessary and that they cannot go to war on their own. As Merkel said when presenting her plan after the pandemic together with Macron: "It is the worst crisis in European history", and she added that, in order to emerge "stronger", it is necessary to cooperate.

This step of some fiscal unity can be seen as a rapprochement to the Federal Europe, at least in the Eurozone, that has been discussed for decades now. Whether this is a path with or without return remains to be seen.

[Richard Haas, The World. A Brief Introduction (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2020), 378 p.]

August 31, 2020

review / Salvador Sánchez Tapia

During a fishing workshop on Nantucket with a friend and his son, then a computer engineering student at the prestigious Stanford University, Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, engaged the young man in conversation about his programs of study, and asked him what subjects he had, apart from the strictly technical ones. To his surprise, Haass found out how limited an issue he had taken. No Economics, no history, no politics. 

Richard Haass uses this anecdote, which he refers to in the introduction to The World. A Brief Introduction, to illustrate the general state of higher Education in the United States - which is, we might add, not very different from that of other countries - and which can be summarized in this reality: many students in the country that has the best universities in the world and which is also the most powerful and influential on the planet, which makes its interests global, can finish their university-level training without a minimum knowledge - let alone understanding - of the world around them, and of its dynamics and functioning.

The World. A Brief Introduction is a direct consequence of the author's concern about the seriousness of this important gap for a nation like the United States, and in a world like today's, in which what he calls the "Las Vegas rule" - what happens in the country stays in the country - does not work, given the interconnectedness that results from an omnipresent globalization that cannot be ignored.

The book is conceived as a basic guide intended to educate readers - hopefully including at least some of the plethora of uneducated students - of varying backgrounds and levels of knowledge, on the basic issues and concepts commonly used in the field of international relations.

By the very nature of the work, no informed reader should expect to find in this book great discoveries, revolutionary theories or novel approaches to contemplate the international order from a new perspective. Instead, what it offers is a systematic presentation of the essential concepts of this field of knowledge that straddles history, political science, sociology, law and geography.

The book avoids any theoretical approach. On the contrary, its goal is eminently practical, and is none other than to present in an orderly and systematic way the information that an average reader needs to know about the world in order to form a criterion of how it works and how it is articulated. It is, in final, to make him more "globally educated".

From his vantage point as president of one of the leading global think-tanks, and with the experience gleaned from his years of service as part of the security establishment of the two Bush presidents, Richard Haass has made numerous important contributions to the field of international relations. In the case of the book before us now, the author's merit lies in the effort he has made to simplify the complexity inherent in international relations. In a simple and attractive prose, accessible to readers of all subject, Richard Haass, demonstrating a great understanding of each of the subjects he deals with, has managed to distill their essence and capture it in the twenty-six chapters of this brief compendium, each of which would justify, on its own, an enormous literary production.

Although each chapter can be read independently, the book is divided into four parts in which the author approaches the status of today's world and the relations between states from different angles. In the first part, Haass introduces the minimal historical framework necessary to understand the configuration of the current international system, focusing in particular on the milestones of the Peace of Westphalia, the two World Wars, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War world.

The second part devotes chapters to different regions of the world, which are briefly analyzed from a geopolitical point of view. For each region, the book describes its status and analyzes the main challenges it faces, concluding with a look at its future. The chapter is comprehensive, although the regional division used for the analysis is somewhat questionable, and although it inexplicably omits any reference letter to the Arctic as a region with its own geopolitical identity and called to play a growing role in the globalized world to which the book constantly alludes.

The third part of the book is devoted to globalization as a defining and inescapable phenomenon of the current era with enormous impact on the stability of the international order. In several chapters, it reviews the multiple manifestations of globalization - terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, migration, cyberspace, health, international trade, monetary issues, and developmentdescribing in each case its causes and consequences, as well as the options available at all levels to deal with them in a way that is favorable to the stability of the world order.

Finally, the last section deals with world order - the most basic concept in international relations - which it considers essential given that its absence translates into loss of life and resources, and threats to freedom and prosperity at the global level. Based on the idea that, at any historical moment and at any level, forces that promote the stability of order operate alongside others that tend towards chaos, the chapter deals with the main sources of stability, analyzing their contribution to international order -or disorder-, and concluding with the significance this has for the international era we are living in. Aspects such as sovereignty, the balance of power, alliances, or war, are dealt with in the different chapters that comprise this fourth and final part.

The coda of the book, entitled Where to Go for More, is of particular interest to those who wish to delve deeper into these matters. This final chapter offers the reader a well-balanced and authoritative compendium of journalistic, digital and literary references whose frequent use, highly recommended, will undoubtedly contribute to the educational goal proposed by the author.

It is an informative book, written to improve the training of the American and, beyond that, the global public in matters related to the world order. This didactic character is not, however, an obstacle for Haass, at times, and in spite of his promise to provide an independent and non-partisan criterion that makes the reader less manipulable, to tinge these matters with his staff vision of the world order and how it should be, nor to exercise a criticism -somewhat veiled, it must be said- of the international policy, not very globalist, of the current tenant of the White House. Nevertheless, The World. A Brief Introduction offers a simple and complete introduction to the world of international relations, and is almost obligatory reading for anyone wishing to initiate themselves into the knowledge of the world order and the mechanisms that regulate it.