August 31, 2020

COMMENTARY / Luis Ángel Díaz Robredo*.

It may be sarcastic to some, and even cruel, to hear that these circumstances of a global pandemic by COVID-19 are interesting times for social and individual psychology. And it may be stranger still, to take these difficult times into account when establishing relationships with the security and defense of states.

First of all, we must point out the obvious: the current circumstances are exceptional because we have never before known a threat to health that has transcended such diverse and decisive areas as world Economics , international politics, geostrategy, industry, demography... Individuals and institutions were not prepared a few months ago and, even today, we are still dealing with them with a certain degree of improvisation. Mortality and contagion fees have skyrocketed and the resources that the public administration has mobilized are unknown to date. Without going any further, the Balmis operation - missionmission statement of support against the pandemic, organized and executed by the Ministry of Defense - has deployed 20,000 interventions, during 98 days of state of alarm and with a total of 188,713 mobilized military personnel.

In addition to the sanitary tasks of disinfection, logistics and health support, there have been other tasks more typical of social control, such as the presence of the military in the streets and at critical points or reinforcement at borders. This work, which some people may find disconcerting due to its unusual nature of authority over the population itself, is justified by atypical group behaviors that we have observed since the beginning of the pandemic. Suffice it to cite a few Spanish examples that reflect how in some moments there have been behaviors that are not very logical for social imitation, such as the accumulation of basic necessities (food) or not so basic necessities (toilet paper) that emptied supermarket shelves for a few hours.

There have also been moments of lack of solidarity and even of certain social tension due to the fear of contagion against vulnerable groups, such as the elderly with COVID-19 who were transferred from one town to another and who were booed by the neighborhood that received them and had to be escorted by the police. Also, infrequently but equally negative and unsupportive, there have been cases in which some health workers suffered fear and rejection by their neighbors. And lately, the sanctioning and arrest of people who did not respect the rules of social distance and individual protection has been another common action of the authorities and State Security Forces and Corps. These events, which fortunately have been limited and quickly solved by the authorities, have been more than surpassed by many other positive social behaviors of solidarity, altruism and generosity among citizens.

However, since national security must contemplate not only ideal scenarios but also situations with shortages or possible risks, these social variables must be taken into account when establishing a strategy.

Secondly, the flow of information has been a veritable tsunami of forces and interests that have overwhelmed the information capabilities of entire societies, business groups and even individuals. Official media, private media, social networks and even anonymous groups with destabilizing interests have competed in this game to capture the citizen's attention. If this status has shown anything, it is that the excess of information can be as disabling as the lack of information, and that even the use of false, incomplete or somehow manipulated information makes us more susceptible to influence in front of the public.
This makes us more susceptible to manipulation by external agents or even vulnerable to cyber hacking, with obvious dangers for social stability, the operability of health services, the facilitation of organized crime or even the mental health of the population.

Third and finally, we cannot forget that society and our institutions - including those related to security and defense - have their greatest weakness and strength based on the people who make them up. If there is one thing that the pandemic is test , it is the psychological strength of individuals due to the circumstance of uncertainty about the present and future, management of fear of illness and death, and an innate need for attachment to social relationships. Our ability to cope with this new VUCA (Vulnerability, Uncertainty, Complexity, Ambiguity) scenario that affects each and every social and professional environment requires a leadership style that is
and professional environments requires a strong leadership style, adapted to this demanding status , authentic and based on group values. There is no unilateral solution today, if not with the effort of many. It is not empty words to affirm that the resilience of a society, of an Armed Forces or of a human group , is based on working together, fighting together, suffering together, with a cohesion and a work properly trained.

Having said this, we can understand that psychological variables - at the individual and grouplevel groupare at play in this pandemic status and that we can and should use the knowledge provided by Psychology as a serious science, adapted to real needs and with a constructive spirit, to plan the tactics and strategy of the current and future scenarios derived from Covid-19.

Undoubtedly, these are interesting times for psychology.

* Luis Ángel Díaz Robredo is a professor at the School of Education and Psychology of the University of Navarra.

[Parag Khanna, The Future is Asian. Simon & Schuster. New York, 2019. 433 p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

Parag Khanna's book may be greeted with suspicion at the entrance because of the apparent axiomatic nature of its degree scroll. However, the blunt assertion on the cover is softened when one begins to read the pages inside. The thesis of the work is that the world is in a process of asianizationnot of chinizationMoreover, this process is presented as another coat of paint on the planet, not as a color that will be clearly predominant or definitive.

It is possible that the discussion of whether the United States is in decline and will be replaced by China as the preeminent superpower prevents seeing other parallel developments. Those watching Beijing's rise in the world order, writes Khanna, "have often been paralyzed by two views: either China will devour the world or it is on the verge of collapse. Neither is correct." "The future is Asian, even for China," he asserts.

Khanna believes that the world is moving towards a multipolar order, something that is also true in Asia, even if China's size often dazzles.

It is possible that this judgment is influenced by the author's Indian origin and also by his time living in the United States, but he offers figures to support his words. Of the 5 billion people living in Asia, 3.5 billion are not Chinese (70%): China, therefore, has only a third of Asia's population; it also accounts for slightly less than half of its GDP. Other data: half of the investments leaving the continent are non-Chinese, and more than half of foreign investments go to Asian countries other than China. Asia, therefore, "is more than China plus".

It is not just a question of size, but of wills. "A China-led Asia is no more acceptable to most Asians than the notion of a U.S.-led West is to Europeans," says Khanna. He rejects the idea that, because of China's power, Asia is heading toward a kind of tributary system like the one ruled in other centuries from Beijing. He points out that this system did not go beyond the Far East and was based mainly on trade.

The author reassures those who fear Chinese expansionism: "China has never been an indestructible superpower presiding over all of Asia like a colossus". Thus, he warns that while Europe's geographical characteristics have historically led many countries to fear the hegemony of a single power, in the case of Asia its geography makes it "inherently multipolar", as natural barriers absorb friction. In fact, the clashes that have taken place between China and India, China and Vietnam or India and Pakistan have ended in stalemates. "Whereas in Europe wars have occurred when there is a convergence in power between rivals, in Asia wars have taken place when there is a perception of advantage over rivals. So the more powerful China's neighbors like Japan, India or Russia are, the less likelihood of conflict between them."

For Khanna, Asia will always be a region of distinct and autonomous civilizations, especially now that we are witnessing a revival of old empires. The geopolitical future of Asia will not be led by the United States or China: "Japan, South Korea, India, Russia, Indonesia, Australia, Iran and Saudi Arabia will never come together under a hegemonic umbrella or unite in a single pole of power".

There will not be, then, a chinization of the world, according to the author, and the Asianization that is taking place - a shift of the planet's specific weight towards the Indo-Pacific - should not be seen as a threat to those who live elsewhere. Just as there was a Europeanization of the world in the 19th century, and an Americanization in the 20th century, in the 21st century we are witnessing an Asianization. Khanna sees this as "the most recent sedimentation substrate in the geology of global civilization," and as a "layer" he does not assume that the world Withdrawal to what came before. "Being more Asian doesn't necessarily mean being less American or European," he says.

The book analyzes the weight and fit of different Asian countries in the continent. Of Russia, he says it is strategically closer to China today than at any time since its communist pact in the 1950s. Khanna believes that geography leads to this understanding, as it invites Canada to maintain good relations with the United States; he predicts that climate change will further open up the lands of Siberia, which will integrate them more with the rest of the Asian continent.

As for India and China's relationship, Khanna believes that both countries will have to accept each other as powers more normally. For example, despite India's reluctance towards China's Silk Road and India's own regional connectivity projects, in the end the two countries' preferred corridors "will overlap and even reinforce each other," ensuring that products from Asia's interior reach the Indian Ocean. "Geopolitical rivalries will only accelerate the Asianization of Asia," Khanna sentences.

In assessing the importance of Asia, the book includes Middle East oil. Technically, this region is part of the continent, but it is such a separate chapter with its own dynamics that it is difficult to see it as Asian territory. The same is true when Israel or Lebanon are label as such. It may give the impression that the author is lumping everything together to make the figures more impressive. He argues that the Middle East is becoming less and less dependent on Europe and the United States and is looking more to the East.

Khanna is in a position to reasonably defend himself against most of the objections that can be made to his text. The most controversial, however, is the justification, close to defense, that he makes of technocracy as a system of government. Beyond the descriptive attitude of a model that in some countries has been the subject of significant economic and social development , Khanna even seems to endorse its moral superiority.

▲ Members of Colombia's National Liberation Army [Voces de Colombia].

ESSAY / Angel Martos

Terrorism and transnational organized crime are some of the most relevant topics nowadays in international security. The former represents a traditional threat that has been present during most our recent history, especially since the second half of the twentieth century. International organized crime, on the other hand, has taken place throughout history in multiple ways. Examples can be found even in the pre-industrial era: In rural and coastal areas, where law enforcement was weaker, bandits and pirates all over the world made considerable profit from hijacking vehicles along trade routes and roads, demanding a payment or simply looting the goods that the merchants carried. The phenomenon has evolved into complex sets of interconnected criminal networks that operate globally and in organized way, sometimes even with the help of the authorities.

In this paper, the author will analyze the close interaction between terrorism and organized crime often dubbed the "crime-terror continuum". After explaining the main tenets of this theory, a case study will be presented. It is the network of relations that exists in Latin America which links terrorist groups with drug cartels. The evolution of some of these organizations into a hybrid comprising terrorist and criminal activity will also be studied.

Defining concepts

The crime-terror nexus is agreed to have been consolidated in the post-Cold War era. After the 9/11 attacks, the academic community began to analyze more deeply and thoroughly the threat that terrorism represented for international security. However, there is one specific topic that was not paid much attention until some years later: the financing of terrorist activity. Due to the decline of state sponsorship for terrorism, these groups have managed to look for funding by partnering with organized criminal groups or engaging in illicit activities themselves. Starting in the 1980s with what later came to be known as narco-terrorism, the use of organized crime by terrorist groups became mainstream in the 1990s. Taxing drug trade and credit-card fraud are the two most common sources of revenues for these groups (Makarenko, 2010).

The basic level of relationship that exists between two groups of such different nature is an alliance. Terrorists may look for different objectives when allying with organized crime groups. For example, they may seek expert knowledge (money-laundering, counterfeiting, bomb-making, etc.) or access to smuggling routes. Even if the alliances may seem to be only beneficial for terrorist groups, criminal networks benefit from the destabilizing effect terrorism has over political institutions, and from the additional effort law enforcement agencies need to do to combat terrorism, investing resources that will not be available to fight other crimes. Theirs is a symbiotic relation in which both actors win. A popular example in the international realm is the protection that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) offered to drug traders that smuggle cocaine from South America through West and North Africa towards Europe. During the last decade, the terrorist organization charged a fee on the shipments in exchange for its protection along the route (Vardy, 2009).

The convergence of organizations

Both types of organizations can converge into one up to the point that the resulting group can change its motives and objectives from one side to the other of the continuum, constituting a hybrid organization whose defining points and objectives blur. An organization of this nature could be both a criminal group with political motivations, and a terrorist group interested in criminal profits. The first one may for example be interested in getting involved in political processes and institutions or may use violence to gain a monopolized control over a lucrative economic sector.

Criminal and terrorist groups mutate to be able to carry out by themselves a wider range of activities (political and financial) while avoiding competitiveness, misunderstandings and threats to their internal security. This phenomenon was popularized after the 1990s, when criminal groups sought to manipulate the operational conditions of weak states, while terrorist groups sought to find new financial sources other than the declining state sponsors. A clear example of this can be found in the Italian Mafia during the 1990s. A series of deliberate bombing attacks were reported in key locations such as the Uffizi Galleries in Florence and the church of St. John Lateran in Rome. The target was not a specific enemy, but rather the public opinion and political authorities (the Anti-Mafia Commission) who received a warning for having passed legislation unfavorable to the interests of the criminal group. Another example far away from Europe and its traditional criminal groups can be found in Brazil. In the early 2000s, a newly elected government carried out a crackdown on several criminal organizations like the Red Commandthe Amigos dos Amigos, and the group Third Commandwhich reacted violently by unleashing brutal terrorist attacks on governmental buildings and police officers. These attacks gave the Administration no other choice but to give those groups back the immunity with which they had always operated in Rio de Janeiro.

On the other side of the relationship, terrorist organizations have also engaged in criminal activities, most notably illicit drug trade, in what has been a common pattern since the 1970s. Groups like the FARC, ETA, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), or Shining Path are among them. The PKK, for example, made most of its finances using its advantageous geographic location as well as the Balkan routes of entry into Europe to smuggle heroin from Asia into Europe. In yet another example, Hezbollah is said to protect heroin and cocaine laboratories in the Bekaa Valley, in Lebanon.

Drug trafficking is not the only activity used by terrorist groups. Other criminal activities serve the same purpose. For example, wholesale credit-card fraud all around Europe is used by Al Qaeda to gain profits (US$ 1 million a month). Furthermore, counterfeit products smuggling has been extensively used by paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland and Albanian extremist groups to finance their activities.

Sometimes, the fusion of both activities reaches a point where the political cause that once motivated the terrorist activity of a group ends or weakens, and instead of disbanding, it drifts toward the criminal side and morphs into an organized criminal association with no political motivations) that the convergence thesis identifies is the one of terrorist organizations that have ultimately maintained their political façade for legitimation purposes but that their real motivations and objectives have mutated into those of a criminal group. They are thus able to attract recruits via 2 sources, their political and their financial one. Abu SayyafThe Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and FARC are illustrative of this. Abu Sayyaf, originally founded to establish an Islamic republic in the territory comprising Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago (Philippines), is now dedicated exclusively to kidnapping and marijuana plantations. The former granted them US$ 20 million only in 2000. Colombian FARC, since the 1990s, has followed the same path: according to Paul Wilkinson, they have evolved from a revolutionary group that had state-wide support into a criminal guerrilla involved in protection of crops and laboratories, also acting as "middlemen" between farmers and cartels; kidnapping, and extortion. By the beginning of our century, they controlled 40 per cent of Colombia's territory and received an annual revenue of US$ 500 million (McDermott, 2003).

"Black hole states

The ultimate danger the convergence between criminal and terrorist groups may present is a situation where a weak or failed state becomes a safe haven for the operations of hybrid organizations like those described before. This is known as the "black hole" syndrome. Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Angola, Sierra Leone and North Korea are examples of states falling into this category. Other regions, such as the North-West Frontier Province in Pakistan, and others in Indonesia and Thailand in which the government presence is weak can also be considered as such.

Afghanistan has been considered a "black hole state" since at least the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989. Since the beginning of the civil war, the groups involved in it have sought to survive, oftentimes renouncing to their ideological foundations, by engaging in criminal activity such as the production and trafficking of opiates, arms or commodities across the border with Pakistan, together with warlords. The chaos that reigns in the country is a threat not only to the nation itself and its immediate neighbors, but also to the entire world.

The People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is, on the other hand, considered a criminal state. This is because it has engaged in transnational criminal activities since the 1970s, with its "Bureau 39", a government department that manages the whole criminal activity for creating hard currency (drug trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, privacy, etc.). This was proved when the Norwegian government expelled officials of the North Korean embassy in 1976 alleging that they were engaged in the smuggling of narcotics and unlicensed goods (Galeotti, 2001).

Another situation may arise where criminal and terrorist groups deliberately foster regional instability for their own economic benefits. In civil wars, these groups may run the tasks that a state's government would be supposed to run. It is the natural evolution of a territory in which a political criminal organization or a commercial terrorist group delegitimizes the state and replaces its activity. Examples of this situation are found in the Balkans, Caucasus, southern Thailand and Sierra Leone (Bangura, 1997).

In Sierra Leone, for example, it is now evident that the violence suffered in the 1990s during the rebellion of the Revolutionary United Forces (RUF) had nothing to do with politics or ideals - it was rather a struggle between the guerrilla and the government to crack down on the other party and reap the profits of illicit trade in diamonds. There was no appeal to the population or political discourse whatsoever. The "black hole" thesis illustrates how civil wars in our times are for the most part a legitimization for the private enrichment of the criminal parties involved and at the same time product of the desire of these parties for the war to never end.

The end of the Cold War saw a shift in the study of the nexus between crime and terrorism. During the previous period, it was a phenomenon only present in Latin America between insurgent groups and drug cartels. It was not until the emergence of Al Qaeda's highly networked and globally interconnected cells that governments realized the level of threat to international security that non-state actors could pose. As long as weak or failed states exist, the crime-terror nexus will be further enhanced. Moreover, the activity of these groups will be buttressed by effects of globalization such as the increase of open borders policies, immigration flows, international transportation infrastructure, and technological development. Policymakers do not pay enough attention to the criminal activities of both types of organizations. Rather than dealing with the political motivations of a group, what really makes the difference is to focus on its funding resources - credit-card frauds, smuggling, money laundering, etc.

The following section focuses on the crime-terror continuum that exists between illegal drug trade and terrorist networks. This phenomenon has emerged in many regions all around the world, but the case of Latin America, or the Andean region more specifically, represents the paradigm of the characteristics, dangers and opportunities of these situations.

NARCO-TERRORISM CASE STUDY:

When drug trafficking meets political violence

The concept of narco-terrorism was born in recent years as a result of the understanding of illicit drug trade and terrorism as two interconnected phenomena. Traditionally linked with Latin America, the concept can now be found in other parts of the world like, for example, the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan), or the Golden Triangle (Thailand, Laos and Myanmar).

There is no consensus on the convenience and accuracy of the term "narco-terrorism," if only because it may refer to different realities. One can think of narco-terrorism as the use of terrorist attacks by criminal organizations such as the Colombian Medellin Cartel to attain an immediate political goal. Or, from a different point of view, one can think of a terrorist organization engaging in illicit drug trade to raise funds for its activity. Briefly, according to Tamara Makarenko's Crime-Terror Continuum construct all organizations, no matter the type, could at some point move along this continuum depending on their activities and motivations; from the one extreme of a purely criminal organization, to the other of a purely political one, or even constituting a hybrid in the middle (Makarenko, 2010).

There is a general perception of a usual interaction between drug-trafficking and terrorist organizations. Here, it is necessary to distinguish between the cooperation of two organizations of each nature, and an organization carrying out activities under both domains. There are common similarities between the different organizations that can be highlighted to help policymaking more effective.

Both type of organizations cohabit in the same underground domain of society and share the common interest of remaining undiscovered by law enforcement authorities. Also, their transnational operations follow similar patterns. Their structure is vertical in the highest levels of the organization and turns horizontal in the lowest. Finally, the most sophisticated among them use a cell structure to reduce information sharing to the bare minimum to reduce the risk of the organization being unveiled if some of its members are arrested.

The main incentive for organizations to cooperate are tangible resources. Revenues from narcotics trafficking might be very helpful for terrorist organizations, while access to explosive material may benefit drug trade organizations. As an example, according to the Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2004, an estimated US$ 2.3 billion of the total revenue of global drug trade end up in the hands of organizations like Al Qaeda. Another example is the illegal market of weapons emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, field of interest of both types of networks. On the other hand, intangible resources are similar to tangible in usefulness but different in essence. Intangible resources that drug trafficking organizations possess and can be in the interests of terrorist ones are the expertise on methods and routes of transports, which could be used for terrorist to smuggle goods or people - drug corridors such as the Balkan route or the Northern route. On the other way around, terrorists can share the military tactics, know-how and skills to perpetrate attacks. Some common resources that can be used by both in their benefit are the extended networks and contacts (connections with corrupt officials, safe havens, money laundering facilities, etc.) A good example of the latter can be found in the hiring of ELN members by Pablo Escobar to construct car bombs.

The organizations are, as we have seen, often dependent on the same resources, communications, and even suppliers. This does not lead to cooperation, but rather to competition, even to conflict. Examples can be traced back to the 1980s in Peru when clashes erupted between drug traffickers and the terrorist Shining Pathand in Colombia when drug cartels and the FARC clashed for territorial matters. Even the protection of crops terrorists offer to drug traffickers is one of the main drivers of conflict, even if they do find common grounds of understanding most of the time; for example, in terms of government, revenue-motivated organizations are a threat to the state as they fight to weaken some parts of it such as law enforcement or jurisdiction, while politically-motivated ones wish not only to undermine the state but to radically change its structures to fit their ideological vision (state-run economy, religious-based society, etc.).

The terrorism and drug connection in the Andean Region

Nowhere has the use of illicit drug trade as a source of funds for terrorism been so developed as in the Andean Region (Steinitz, 2002). Leftist groups such as FARC and Peruvian Shining Pathas well as right-wing paramilitary organizations such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) are involved in this activity. At the beginning, the engagement between terrorists and drug traffickers was limited only to fees imposed by the former on the latter in exchange for the protection of crops, labs and shipments. Later, FARC and AUC have further expanded this engagement and are now involved in the early stages of the traffic itself - the main substance being cocaine, and the main reward money and arms from the drug syndicates. The terrorist cells can therefore be considered a hybrid of political and criminal groups. The following paragraphs will further analyze each case.

Peru's Shining Path

Shining Path (SL) started to operate in the Huallaga Valley, a strong Peruvian coca region, several years after its foundation, in 1980. Peru was at the time the world's first producer of coca leaf. The plant was then processed into coca paste and transported to Colombian laboratories by traffickers. Arguably, the desire for profit from the coca business rather than for political influence was the ultimate motive for Shining Path's expansion into the region. SL protected the crops and taxed the production and transportation of coca paste: the 1991 document "Economic Balance of the Shining Path" shows that the group charged US$ 3,000-7,000 per flight leaving Huallaga. Taxes were also levied in exchange for a service that the group provided the coca growers: negotiating favorable prices with the traffickers. In the late 1980s, SL's annual income from the business was estimated at US$ 15-100 million (McClintock, 1998).

The Peruvian government's fight against SL represents a milestone in the fight against the terrorism-crime nexus. Lima set up a political-military command which focused on combating terrorism while ignoring drugs, because a reasonable percentage of the Peruvian population eked out a living by working in the coca fields. The government also avoided using the police as they were seen as highly corruptible. They succeeded in gaining the support of peasant growers and traffickers of Huallaga Valley, a valuable source of intelligence to use against SL. The latter finally left the Valley.

But it was not a final victory. Due to the vacuum SL left, the now more powerful traffickers reduced the prices paid for the coca leaf. SL was no longer there to act as an intermediary in defense of peasants and minor traffickers, so thanks to the new lower prices, the cocaine market experienced a boom. The military deployed in the area started to accept bribes in exchange for their laissez-faire attitude, becoming increasingly corrupted. President Fujimori in 1996 carried out a strategy of interdiction of the flights that departed from the Valley carrying coca paste to Colombia, causing the traffickers and farmers to flee and the coca leaf price to fall notably. However, this environment did not last long, and the country is experiencing a rise in drug trade and terrorist subversive activities.

The Colombian nexus expands

The collapse of the Soviet Union and an economic crisis in Cuba diminished the amount of aid that the FARC could receive. After the government's crackdown, with the help of Washington, of the Medellin and Cali cartels, the drug business in Colombia was seized by numerous smaller networks. There was not any significant reduction of the cocaine flow into the United States. The FARC benefited greatly from the neighboring states' actions, gaining privileged access to drug money. Peru under Fujimori had cracked down on the coca paste transports, and Bolivia's government had also put under strict surveillance its domestic drug cultivation. This elimination of competitors caused a doubling of coca production in Colombia between 1995 and 2000. Moreover, opium poppy cultivation also grew significantly and gained relevance in the US' East-coast market. The FARC also benefited from this opportunity.

According to the Colombian government, in 1998 the terrorist groups earned US$ 551 million from drug, US$ 311 million from extortion, and US$ 236 million from kidnapping. So much so that the organization has been able to pay higher salaries to its recruits than the Colombian army pays its soldiers. By 2000, the FARC had an estimated 15,000-20,000 recruits in more than 70 fronts, de facto controlling 1/3 of the nation's territory. Most of the criminal-derived money in the country comes nowadays from taxation and protection of the drug business. According to the Colombian Military, more than half both the FARC's fronts were involved in the collection of funds by the beginning of the 2000s decade, compared to 40% approx. of AUC fronts (Rebasa and Chalk, 1999).

The situation that was created in both scenarios required created a chaos in which the drug cartels, the cultivation syndicates and the terrorist organizations were the strongest actors. This makes it a very unstable environment for the peoples that lived in the territories under criminal/terrorist control. The tactics of law enforcement agents and government, in these cases, need to be carefully planned, so that multilateral counter-drug/counter-terrorist strategies can satisfactorily address threats existing at multiple dimensions. In the following section, the author will review some key aspects of the policies carried out by the US government in this domain.

The "War on Drugs" and the "War on Terror".

Since 9/11, policies considering both threats as being intertwined have become more and more popular. The separation of counter terrorism and counter-narcotics has faded significantly. Although in the Tashkent Conferences of 1999-2000 the necessary link between both was already mentioned, the milestone of cooperative policies is the Resolution 1373 of the UN Security Council (Björnehed, 2006). In it, emphasis is given to the close connection between terrorism and all kinds of organized crime, and therefore coordination at national, regional and global level is said to be necessary. War on drugs and war on terror should no longer be two separate plans of action.

The effectiveness of a policy that wishes to undermine the threat of illicit drug trade and terrorism is to a high degree dependent on successful intelligence gathering. Information about networks, suspects, shipments, projects, etc. benefits agencies fighting drug trafficking as well as those fighting terrorism, since the resources are most of the times shared. Narco-terrorism nexus is also present in legal acts, with the aim of blocking loopholes in law enforcement efforts. Examples are the Victory Act and the Patriot Act, passed in the US. Recognizing the natural link and cooperation between drug trade and terrorism leads to security analysts developing more holistic theories for policymakers to implement more accurate and useful measures.

However, there are many aspects in which illicit drug trade and terrorist activity differ, and so do the measures that should be taken against them. An example of a failure to understand this point can be found in Afghanistan, where the Taliban in 2000 set a ban on poppy cultivation which resulted in a strong increase of its price, this being a victory for traffickers since the trade did not stop. Another idea to have in mind is that strategies of a war on drugs differ greatly depending on the nature of the country: whether it is solely a consumer like the UK or a producer and consumer like Tajikistan. In regard to terrorism, the measures adopted to undermine it (diplomacy, foreign aid, democratization, etc.) may have minimal effect on the fight against drug trade.

Sometimes, the risk of unifying counter-policies is leaving some areas in which cooperation is not present unattended. Certain areas are suitable for a comprehensive approach such as intelligence gathering, law enforcement and security devices, while others such as drug rehabilitation are not mutually beneficial. Not distinguishing the different motivations and goals among organizations can lead to a failed homogenous policy.

CONCLUSIONS:

Multilevel threats demand multilevel solutions

Terrorism has traditionally been considered a threat to national and international security, while illicit drug trade a threat to human security. This perception derives from the effects of drugs in a consumer country, although war on drugs policies are usually aimed at supplier ones. Although it was already constituting a threat to regional stability during the twentieth century, it was not considered a crucial political issue until 9/11 attacks, when the cooperative link between criminal and terrorist organizations became evident. An example of unequal attention paid to both threats can be found in US's Plan Colombia in 2000: one of the main advocators of the legislation stated that the primary focus was on counter-drug, so the United States would not engage with Colombian counterinsurgency efforts (Vaicius, Ingrid and Isacson, 2003).The same type of failure was also seen in Afghanistan but in the opposite way, when the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) completely neglected any action against drug traffickers, the trade or the production itself.

The merging of drug trafficking and terrorism as two overlapping threats have encouraged authorities to develop common policies of intelligence gathering and law enforcement. The similarities between organizations engaged in each activity are the main reason for this. However, the differences between them are also relevant, and should be taken into consideration for the counter policies to be accurate enough.

Evidence of a substantial link between terrorists and criminals has been proved all along our recent history. Around the world, leaders of mafias and terrorist commanders have oftentimes worked together when they felt that their objectives were close, if not similar. When cohabitating in the outlaw world, groups tend to offer each other help, usually in exchange for something. This is part of human behavior. Added to the phenomenon of globalization, lines tend to be blurred for international security authorities, and thus for the survival of organizations acting transnationally.

The consequences can be noticed especially in Latin America, and more specifically in organizations such as the FARC. We can no longer tell what are the specific objectives and the motivations that pushed youngsters to flee towards the mountains to learn to shoot and fabricate bombs. Is it a political aspiration? Or is it rather an economic necessity? The reason why we cannot answer this question without leaving aside a substantial part of the explanation is the evolution of the once terrorist organization into a hybrid group that moves all along the crime-terror continuum.

The ideas of Makarenko, Björnehed and Steinitz have helped the international community in its duty to protect its societies. It cannot be expected for affected societies to live in peace if the competent authorities try to tackle its structural security issues only through the counter-terrorist approach or through the organized crime lens. The hybrid threats that the world is suffering in the twenty-first century demand hybrid solutions.

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Mutschke, R., (2000) 'The threat posed by organised crime, international drug trafficking and terrorism', written testimony to the General Secretariat Hearing of the Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime (13 December) [Accessed 14 June 2020].

Rebasa and Chalk, pp. 32-33; "To Turn the Heroin Tide," Washington Post, February 22, 1999, p. A9; "Colombian Paramilitary Chief Shows Face," Associated Press, March 2, 2000.

Steinitz, M., 2002. The Terrorism And Drug Connection In Latin America'S Andean Region. [online] Brian Loveman, San Diego State University. Available at [Accessed 10 April 2020].

Vaicius, Ingrid and Isacson, Adam "'The War on Drugs' meets the 'War on Terror' " (CIP International Policy Report February 2003) p. 13.

Vardy, N., 2009. Al-Qaeda's New Business Model: Cocaine And Human Trafficking. [online] Forbes. Available at [Accessed 14 June 2020].

Three visions

However, the desire to create a cooperative body within the Weimar Triangle is a challenge, as each country represents, in one way or another, one of the three foreign policy agendas that divide Europe.

At one end of the spectrum is French Gaullism, which advocates an independent Europe and is wary of the presence of the United States in Europe, as it should be remembered that France already has a strong army. Paris abandoned this perspective for the Atlanticist one in 2007 under Sarkozy, but it has been regained by Macron. This means that Macron's rhetoric could lead to clashes with the Americans, while he also seeks to set his own profile vis-à-vis Moscow and Beijing.

In the middle is German pragmatism: Germany does not want to increase conflicts and prefers to focus on its Economics. On the one hand it is negotiating with the Russians to receive gas for its industrial activity and on the other hand it wants US troops to remain on its territory, as their departure would force it to increase its security expense . In the European plans for recovery after the Covid-19 pandemic, Germany has been clearly more absent and Macron has been the one who has taken the initiative.

Finally we find Polish Atlanticism. Poland is perhaps the most Atlanticist country in the EU. Even under the Trump Administration there has been a high level of pro-Americanism among the population and the political class . The government has bid to succeed in hosting a U.S. base, and Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak has enthusiastically praised the U.S. role as a defender of the free world. This is not new, as already the 2003 invasion of Iraq was supported by Poland, in the face of French and German rejection. Poland continues to see Russia as its greatest threat and the United States and NATO as guarantors of protection.

The Triangle returns

Its geographical status explains Poland's position and it is not going to stop wanting NATO instructions on its territory. However, it understands that it needs close allies with greater internal stability - hence its rapprochement with Germany and France - than that offered by the Trump Administration, whose international image is badly damaged, or a United Kingdom more occupied with managing Brexit than security issues.

On the other hand, Macron wants to prevent Poland from replacing the United Kingdom as the representative of US policy in Europe, so he has changed his strategy to avoid alienating it by criticizing its judicial reforms. Macron did not mention them during his visit to Warsaw in February this year and only encouraged to "respect European values". Somehow Macron understands that after Brexit he will need Poland to advance his European foreign policy plans and that is why it is important to bring it into the command conference room . Macron went so far as to say in Warsaw that Poland, Germany and France should lead the post-Brexit Union. He also announced the dispatch of 600 more men to Poland, which will bring the number of French soldiers in Poland to 5,100.

At this meeting, the two leaders agreed to meet with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, although the constraints imposed by the coronavirus pandemic have slowed down some contacts, while waiting for Economics to start to recover. The newly inaugurated German presidency of the committee , moreover, discourages Berlin from appearing overly aligned with a certain European vector. There may therefore be a certain temporary hibernation of the Weimar Triangle; in any case, although it is a risky formula, if coordinated with the Parliament and the Commission, its consolidation could represent a step forward in European cohesion and governance.

[Bruno Maçães, History Has Begun. The Birth of a New America. Hurst and Co. London, 2020. 203 p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

What if the United States were not in decline, but quite the opposite? The United States could actually be in its beginnings as a great power. This is what Bruno Maçães argues in his new book, the degree scroll -History Has Begun- in a certain sense refutes Fukuyama's end of history, which saw the democratization of the world at the end of the 20th century as the culmination of the West. Precisely, the hypothesis of the internationalist of Portuguese origin is that the USA is developing its own original civilization, separate from what has been understood until now as Western civilization, in a world in which the very concept of the West is losing strength.

Maçães' work follows three lines of attention: the progressive separation of the USA from Europe, the characteristics that identify the specific American civilization and the struggle between the USA and China for the new world order. The author had already developed aspects of these themes in his two immediately preceding works, already reviewed here: The Dawn of Eurasia y Belt and Roadand now focuses on the US. The three titles are basically a sequence: the progressive dissolution of the European peninsula in the Eurasian continent as a whole, the emergence of China as the superpower of this great continental mass and the remaining role of Washington on the planet.

As to whether the U.S. goes up or leave, Maçães writes in the book's introduction, "Conventional wisdom suggests that the United States has already reached its peak. But what if it is simply now beginning to forge its own path forward?" The Issue is written before the coronavirus crisis and the deep unease now apparent in American society, but even before that some signs of U.S. domestic unrest, such as political polarization or divergence over the direction of its foreign policy, were already evident. "The present moment in the history of the United States is both a moment of destruction and a moment of creation," says Maçães, who considers that the country is going through "convulsions" typical of this process of destructive creation. In his opinion, in any case, they are "the birth pangs of a new culture instead of the death throes of an old civilization".

It could be thought that the United States is simply evolving towards a mixed culture, the result of globalization, so that the influence that some European countries have had in shaping U.S. society in recent centuries is now being joined by Asian immigration. In fact, it is expected that by mid-century immigrants from the other side of the Pacific will outnumber those arriving from Mexico and Central America, which, although imbued with indigenous cultures, largely follow the Western paradigm. Between the first European and the new Asian heritage, a "hybrid Eurasian" culture could develop in the United States.

In fact, at one point in the book, Maçães asserts that the United States "is no longer a European nation," but "in fundamental aspects now seems more similar to countries like India or Russia or even the Republic of Iran." However, he disagrees with this hybrid Eurasian perspective and argues instead for the development of a new, indigenous American society, separate from modern Western civilization, rooted in new sentiments and thoughts.

When describing this different way of being, Maçães deals mainly with some manifestations, from which he gradually deduces deeper aspects. "Why do Americans speak so loudly?" he asks, referring to one such symptom. His theory is that American life emphasizes its own artificiality as a way of reminding its participants that, at bottom, they are experiencing a story. "The American way of life is consciously about language, storytelling, plot and form, and is meant to draw attention to its status as fiction." An entire chapter, for example, is devoted to analyzing the importance of television in the US. In the midst of these considerations, the reader may come to think that the reasoning has been drifting towards a cultural essay , leaving the field of international relations, but in the conclusion of the work the ends are conveniently tied up.

Having left this loose end here, the book goes on to analyze the pulse between Washington and Beijing. He recalls that since its rise as a world power around 1900, the permanent strategic goal of the United States has been to prevent a single power from controlling the whole of Eurasia. Previous threats in that sense were Germany and the USSR and today it is China. Normally, Washington would resort to the balance of power, using Europe, Russia and India against China (using a game historically employee by Great Britain for the goal of preventing a single country from controlling the European continent), but for the time being the US has focused on directly confronting China. Maçães sees the Trump Administration's policy as confusing. "If the US wants to adopt a strategy of maximum pressure against Beijing, it needs to be clearer about the end game": is this to constrain Chinese economic power or to convert China to the Western model , he asks. He intuits that the ultimate goal is to "decouple" the Western world from China, creating two separate economic spheres.

Maçães believes that China will hardly manage to dominate the supercontinent, since "the unification of the whole of Eurasia under a single power is so far from being inevitable that in fact it has never been achieved". In any case, he considers that, because of its interest as a superpower, the US may end up playing not so much the role of "great balancer" (given the weight of China it is difficult for any of its neighbors to exercise a counterweight) as that of "great creator" of the new order. "China must be trimmed down in size and other pieces must be accumulated, if a balance is to be the final product," he asserts.

It is here that the American character as a builder of stories and narratives finally comes back into the picture, with a somewhat flimsy argument. Maçães can see the US succeeding in this task of "great creator" if it treats its allies with autonomy. As in a novel, his role as narrator "is to bring all the characters together and preserve their own individual spheres"; "the narrator has learned not to impose a single truth on the whole, and at the same time no character will be allowed to replace him." "For the United States," Maçães concludes, "the age of nation-building is over. The age of world building has begun."

Pandemic reinforces the value of production centers in the same subregions

The free trade zones of Central America and the Caribbean have been an important driving force for the economies of the region. Favored by the increasing globalization of recent decades, they could now be boosted by a phenomenon in the opposite direction: "glocalization", the desirability of having production centers in the same sub-region, close to major markets, to avoid the problems in distant supply chains seen during this Covid-19 crisis that has so affected transportation and communications. The two leading Latin American free trade zone countries, the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica, offer affordable and sufficiently skilled labor at the doorstep of the United States.

▲ One of the Dominican Republic's free trade zones [CNZFE].

article / Paola Rosenberg

The so-called free trade zones, also known in some countries as free zones, are strategic areas within a national territory that have certain tax and customs benefits. In them, commercial and industrial activities are carried out under special export and import rules. It is a way of promoting investment and employment, as well as production and exports, thus achieving the economic development of a part of the country or of the country as a whole.

Free trade zones are important in Latin America and, in the case of the smaller economies, they are the main production and export hubs. agreement to the association of Free Trade Zones of the Americas (AZFA), there are some 3,500 free trade zones in the world, of which 400 are in Latin America, representing 11.4% of the total. Within this region, they have a special weight in the countries of Central America and the rest of the Caribbean basin. They are particularly important in the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica, as well as in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Colombia and Uruguay (also in Puerto Rico).

These countries benefit from having abundant labor (especially trained in the Costa Rican case) and at low cost (especially in the Nicaraguan case), and this close to the United States. For manufacturers wishing to enter the U.S. market, it may be interesting to invest in these free trade zones, taking advantage of the tax advantages and labor conditions, while their production will be geographically very close to their destination.

The latter is gaining ground in a post-Covid-19 world. The trend toward subregionalization, in the face of the fractured dynamics of globalization, has been highlighted for other areas of the American continent, as in the case of the Andean Community, but it also makes a great deal of sense for greater integration between the United States and the Greater Caribbean. To the extent that the United States moves towards a certain decoupling from China, the free trade zones in this geographic area may also become more relevant.

Reproduction of the graphic report of the association of Free Trade Zones of the Americas (AZFA), 2018.

Export processing zones

Free zones can be export-oriented (external market), import substitution (internal market) or both. The former may have a high industrial component, either seeking diversification or depending on maquilas, or emphasizing logistics services (in the case of Panama's free zones).

Free zones for exporting products have been particularly successful in the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica. As AZFA indicates, of the $31.208 billion exported from Latin American free zones in 2018, first place went to the Dominicans, with $5.695 billion, and second to Costa Ricans, with $4.729 billion (third place went to Puerto Rico, with $3 billion). Exports from the Dominican Republic's free trade zones accounted for 56% of all exports made by that country; in the case of Costa Rica it was 48% (the third in the ranking was Nicaragua, with 44%).

The Dominican Republic is the country with the highest issue of free trade zones (71 multi-company zones) and its 665 companies generated the highest number of direct jobs (165,724). Costa Rica has 48 free zones (in third position, after Nicaragua), and its 343 companies generated 93,496 direct work (in fifth position).

In terms of the profitability for the country of this economic modality , for every dollar exempted between 2010 and 2015, Costa Rica's free zones generated an average of US$6.2 and US$5 for those of the Dominican Republic (El Salvador ranked second, with US$6).

With specific reference to Costa Rica, a report at the end of 2019 by the Costa Rican foreign trade promotion agency, Procomer, placed the contribution of free trade zones at 7.9% of GDP, generating a total of 172,602 work, both direct and indirect, with annual growth in the issue of jobs averaging 10% per year between 2014 and 2018. These areas account for 12% of the country's formal private sector employment . An important fact about the contribution to the development the local Economics is that 47% of the purchases made by the companies located in the free trade zones were from national companies. An important social dimension is that the zones contributed 508 million dollars to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund in 2018.

The Dominican Republic's free trade zone regime is particularly applauded by the World Bank, which describes the country as a pioneer in this subject productive and commercial promotion instrument, presenting it as "the best-known success story in the Western Hemisphere". agreement to the statistics of the Nationalcommittee of Export Processing Zones (CNZFE), these have contributed in recent years to 3.3% of GDP, thus contributing to the significant growth of the country's Economics in recent years (one of the highest fees in the region, with an average of over 6% until the onset of the current global crisis). The geographical proximity to the United States makes its free trade zones ideal for US companies (almost 40% of investment comes from the US) or for companies from other countries that want to export to the large North American market (34% of exports go to the US).

[Azar Gat, War in Human Civilization. Oxford University Press. Oxford (New York), 2006. 822 p.]

July 2, 2020

review / Salvador Sánchez Tapia

Among the numerous authors who have written on the war phenomenon in recent decades, the name of Azar Gat shines with its own light. From his Chair at Tel-Aviv University, this author has devoted an important part of his academic degree program to theorizing from different angles on the war, a phenomenon that he knows directly from his position as a reservist in the Tsahal (Israel Defense Forces).

War in Human Civilization is a monumental work in which the author sample his great erudition, together with his capacity to treat and study the war phenomenon combining the employment fields of knowledge as diverse as history, Economics, biology, archaeology or anthropology, putting them at the service of the goal of his work, which is none other than to elucidate what has moved and moves human groups towards war.

Throughout the almost seven hundred pages of this extensive work, Gat makes a study of the historical evolution of the phenomenon of war in which he combines a chronological approach that we could call "conventional" with a synchronic one in which he puts in parallel similar stages of evolution of war in different civilizations to compare cultures that, at a given historical moment, were in different Degrees of development and show how in all of them war went through a similar process of evolution.

In his initial approach, Gat promises an analysis that transcends any particular culture to consider the evolution of war in a general way, from its beginning to the present day. The promise, however, is broken when he reaches the medieval period because, from that moment on, he adopts a clearly Eurocentric vision that he justifies with the argument that the Western model of war has been exported to other continents and adopted by other cultures, which, without being totally false, leaves the reader with a somewhat incomplete vision of the phenomenon.

Azar Gat dives into the origin of the human species to try to elucidate if the phenomenon of war makes it different from the rest of the species, and to try to determine if conflict is an innate phenomenon in the species or if, on the contrary, it is a learned behavior.

On the first question, the work concludes that nothing makes us different from other species because, despite Rousseaunian visions based on the "good savage" that were so in vogue in the 1960s, the reality sample that intra-species violence, which was considered unique to humans, is in fact something shared with other species. Regarding the second question, Gat adopts an eclectic position according to which aggressiveness would be both innate and optional; a basic survival option that is exercised, however, in an optional manner, and which is developed through social learning.

Throughout the historical journey of the work, the idea, formulated in the first chapters, that the ultimate causes of war are evolutionary in nature and have to do with the struggle for the survival of the species, appears as a leitmotiv.

According to this approach, conflict would have its origin in the competition for resources and better reproductive opportunities. Although human development towards increasingly complex societies has obscured it, this logic would still guide human behavior today, mainly through the bequest of proximate mechanisms involving human desires.

An important chapter in the book is the author's dissection of the theory, first advanced during the Enlightenment, of the Democratic Peace. Gat does not refute the theory, but puts it in a new light. If, in its original definition, it advocates that liberal and democratic regimes are averse to war and that, therefore, the expansion of liberalism will advance peace among nations, Gat argues that it is the growth of wealth that really serves that expansion, and that welfare and the interrelationship favored by trade are the real engines of democratic peace.

Two are, then, the two main conclusions of the work: that conflict is the rule in a nature in which organisms compete with each other for survival and reproduction in an environment of scarce resources, and that, recently, the development of liberalism in the Western world has generated in this environment a feeling of repugnance towards war that translates into an almost absolute rejection of it in favor of other strategies based on cooperation.

Azar Gat recognizes that an important part of the human race is still far from liberal and democratic models, much more from the attainment of the Degree well-being and wealth which, in his view, goes hand in hand with the rejection of war. Although he does not say it openly, it can be inferred from his speech that this is, nevertheless, the direction towards which humanity is heading and that, the day it reaches the necessary conditions for this, war will finally be eradicated from the Earth.

Against this idea, one could argue the ever-present possibility of regression of the liberal system as a result of the demographic pressure to which it is subjected, or because of some global event that provokes it; or that other systems, equally rich but not liberal, replace the world of democracies in world domination.

The work is a must reference letter for any scholar or reader interested in the nature and evolution of the war phenomenon. Written with great erudition, and with a profusion of data that, at times, makes it a bit rough, War in Human Civilization is, without a doubt, an important contribution to the knowledge of war that is essential reading.

finding of a "significant" amount of oil in off-shore wells puts the former Dutch colony on the heels of neighboring Guyana

The intuition has proved to be correct and the prospections carried out under Suriname's territorial waters, together with the successful hydrocarbon reserves being exploited in Guyana's maritime limits, have found abundant oil. The finding could be a decisive boost for the development of what is, after Guyana, the second poorest country in South America, but it could also be an opportunity, as is the case with its neighbor, to accentuate the economic and political corruption that has been hindering the progress of the population.

▲ Suriname's presidential palace in the country's capital, Paramaribo [Ian Mackenzie].

article / Álvaro de Lecea

So far this year, drilling in two 'off-shore' oil fields in Suriname has result positive, confirming the existence of "significant" oil in block 58, operated by the French company Total, in partnership with the American company Apache. Everything indicates that the same success could be obtained in block 52, operated by the also American ExxonMobil and the Malaysian Petronas, which were pioneers in prospecting in Surinamese waters with operations since 2016.

Both blocks are adjacent to the fields being exploited under the waters of neighboring Guyana, where for the moment it is estimated that there are some 3.2 billion barrels of extractable oil. In the case of Suriname, the prospections carried out in the first viable field, Maka Central-1, discovered in January 2020, speak of 300 million barrels, but the estimates from Sapakara West-1, discovered in April, and subsequent programmed prospections have yet to be added. It is considered that some 15 billion barrels of oil reserves may exist in the Guyana-Suriname basin.

Until this new oil era in the Guianas (the former English and Dutch Guianas; the French Guianas remains an overseas dependency of France), Suriname was considered to have reserves of 99 million barrels, which at the current rate of exploitation left two decades to deplete. In 2016, the country produced just 16,400 barrels per day.

political, economic and social status

With just under 600,000 inhabitants, Suriname is the least populated country in South America. Its Economics depends largely on the export of metals and minerals, especially bauxite. The fall in commodity prices since 2014 particularly affected the country's accounts. In 2015, there was a GDP contraction of 3.4% and 5.6% in 2016. Although the evolution then became positive again, the IMF forecasts for this 2020, in the wake of the global crisis due to Covid-19, a 4.9% drop in GDP.

Since gaining independence in 1975 from the Netherlands, its weak democracy has suffered three coups d'état. Two of them were led by the same person: Desi Bouterse, the country's president until this July. Bouterse staged a coup in 1980 and remained at the helm of power indirectly until 1988. During those years, he kept Suriname under a dictatorship. In 1990 he staged another coup d'état, although this time he resigned the presidency. He was accused of the 1982 murder of 15 political opponents, in a long judicial process that finally ended in December 2019 with a twenty-year prison sentence and is now appealed by Bouterse. He has also been convicted of drug trafficking in the Netherlands, for which the resulting international arrest warrant prevents him from leaving Suriname. His son Dino has also been convicted of drug and arms trafficking and is imprisoned in the United States. Bouterse's Suriname has come to be presented as the paradigm of the mafia state.

In 2010 Desi Bouterse won the elections as candidate of the National Democratic Party (NDP); in 2015 he was re-elected for another five years. In the elections last May 25, despite some controversial measures to limit the options for civil service examination, he lost to Chan Santokhi, leader of the Progressive Reform Party (VHP). He tried to delay the counting and validation of votes, citing the health emergency caused by the coronavirus, but finally at the end of June the new National Assembly was constituted and it should appoint the new president of the country during July.

Total's operations in Suriname and Guyana waters [Total].

Relationship with Venezuela

Suriname intends to take advantage of this prospect of an oil bonanza to strengthen Staatsolie, the state-owned oil company. In January, before the Covid-19 crisis became widespread, it announced the purpose of expanding its presence in the bond market in 2020 and also, conditions permitting, to list its shares in London or New York. This would serve to raise up to $2 billion to finance the national oil company's exploration campaign in the coming years.

On the other hand, Venezuela's territorial claims against Guyana, which affect the Essequibo -the western half of the former British colony- and which are being studied by the International Court of Justice, include part of the maritime space in which Guyana is extracting oil, but do not affect Suriname, whose delimitations are outside the scope of this old dispute.

Venezuela and Suriname have maintained special relations during Chavismo and while Desi Bouterse has been in power. Occasionally, a certain connection has been pointed out between drug trafficking under the protection of Chavista authorities and that attributed to Bouterse. The offer made by his son to Hezbollah to have training camps in Suriname, a matter for which he was arrested in 2015 in Panama at the request of the United States and tried in New York, can be understood in light of the relationship maintained by Chavism and Hezbollah, to whose operatives Caracas has provided passports to facilitate their movements. Suriname has supported Venezuela in regional forums at times of international pressure against the regime of Nicolás Maduro. In addition, the country has been increasingly strengthening its relations with Russia and China, from which in December 2019 it obtained the commitment of a new credit .

With the political change of the last elections, in principle Maduro's Venezuela loses a close ally, while it may gain an oil competitor (at least as long as Venezuelan oil exploitation remains at a minimum).

The high incidence of Covid-19 in the country contrasts with the government's swiftness in implementing measures

Peru has been an example in the Covid-19 crisis for its speed in applying containment measures and for approve one of the largest economic stimulus packages in the world, close to 17% of GDP. However, the high incidence of the pandemic, which has made Peru the second Latin American country in coronavirus cases and the third in deaths, has made it necessary to prolong the restrictions on activity longer than expected. This and lower external demand, weaker than initially forecast, have "more than eclipsed" the government's significant economic support, according to the IMF, which forecasts a 13.9% drop in GDP for Peru in 2020, the largest of the region's main economies.

lecture by Peruvian President Martín Vizcarra (r), in the presence of the head of Economics, María Antonieta Alva (l) [Gov. of Peru] [Gov. of Peru].

ARTICLE / Gabriela Pajuelo

International media such as Bloomberg y The Wall Street Journal have shown admiration for Peru's young Economics Minister, Maria Antonieta Alva. At 35, after a master's degree from Harvard and some experience in Peru's own administration, Alva designed one of the most ambitious economic stimulus plans in all of South America at the beginning of the crisis.

"From a Latin perspective, Peru is a clear leader in terms of macro response; I could have imagined a very different result if Toni wasn't there," he said. Ricardo Hausmannwho was Alva's professor during his stay at Harvard and leads a team of experts advising Peru and ten other countries to mitigate the effects of the coronavirus. The minister has also become one of the best known faces of President Martin Vizcarra's government among the popular classes.

Peru was one of the first countries in Latin America to apply a state of emergency, limiting freedom of meeting and transit in Peruvian territory and restricting economic activity. To prevent the massive spread of the virus, the government decreed the closure of borders, restrictions on interprovincial movement, a daily curfew and a mandatory period of national isolation, which has been extended several times and has become one of the longest in the world.

This extension, which was agreed upon due to the high incidence of the pandemic, has damaged the economic outlook more than expected. In addition, the prolongation of the emergency in countries to which Peruvian exports are destined has weakened their demand for raw materials and damaged the resurgence of Peru's Economics . This is what the IMF estimates, which between its April forecast and the one updated in June has added nine more points to the fall in Peruvian GDP for 2020. The IMF now considers that Peruvian Economics will fall by 13.9% this year, the highest among the region's main countries. Although the ambitious stimulus package will not have prevented this decline, it will boost the recovery, with a GDP increase of 6.5% in 2021, in turn the strongest rebound among the largest Latin American economies. Regarding this last forecast, the IMF specifies that, nevertheless, "there are significant leave risks, linked to national and global challenges to control the epidemic".

A socioeconomic context that does not financial aid to confinement

Despite restrictive social distancing measures, the pandemic has had a high incidence in Peru, with 268,602 diagnosed cases (in Latin America, second only to Brazil) and 8,761 deaths (behind Brazil and Mexico) as of June 25. These high figures are partly due to the fact that the country's socioeconomic conditions have meant that compliance with containment has not been very strict in certain situations. The social context has hindered compliance with mandatory quarantine due to structural problems such as the fragility of health services and infrastructure, the difficulty in making efficient public purchases, prison overcrowding and the digital divide.

The high level of labor informalityThe fact that in 2019 it was 72%, explains why many people must continue working to ensure their subsistence, without following certain protocols or access to certain material; at the same time, this informality prevents greater tax collection that would help to improve budget items such as healthcare. Peru is the second Latin American country with the lowest investment in healthcare.

On the other hand, inequalityThe Gini index, which in 2018 was 42.8, is aggravated by the territorial distribution of the expense, linked to the centralization of employment of the rural population in Lima. During the pandemic, workers from the country's highlands who have migrated to the capital have wanted to return to their places of origin, as many are not on the payroll and do not have labor rights, in contravention of mobility restrictions.

This social context makes it possible to question some of the approved economic measures, according to some Peruvian academics. The president of the Peruvian Institute of Economics (IPE), Roberto Abusada, warned that Peru's macroeconomic strengths will not help forever. He considered that certain regulations cannot be complied withThe "setting parameters such as body mass index (BMI) or an age limit generates obstacles for this group of people, who could be highly qualified, and could not return to their workcenter".

Economic package

At the end of April, Minister Alva presented a $26 billion economic stimulus package, representing 12% of GDP. Additional measures raised this percentage to 14.4% of GDP a month later, and even then it would have been closer to 17%. Comparatively, this is one of the largest stimulus packages adopted in the world (in Latin America, the second country is Brazil, with a stimulus of 11.5% of GDP).

In agreement with the monitoring that the IMF Peru has adopted measures in three different areas: fiscal, monetary and macro-financial, and in terms of the exchange rate and balance of payments.

First, in terms of fiscal measures, the government approved 1.1 billion soles (0.14% of GDP) to address the health emergency. In addition, different measures have been implemented, among which two stand out: the "Stay in your home" bonus and the creation of the Business Support Fund for Micro and Small Enterprises (FAE-MYPE).

The first measure, for which the government approved approximately 3.4 billion soles (0.4% of GDP) in direct transfers, is a 380 soles (US$110) bond, targeted at poor households and vulnerable populations, of which there have been two disbursements. The second measure refers to the creation of a fund of 300 million soles (0.04% of GDP) to support MSEs, in an attempt to guarantee credit for work capital and to restructure or refinance their debts.

Among other fiscal measures, the government approved a three-month extension of the income tax declaration for SMEs, some flexibility for companies and households in the payment of tax obligations, and a deferral of household electricity and water payments. The entire fiscal support package accounts for more than 7% of GDP.

On the other hand, in terms of monetary and macro-financial measures, the Central reservation Bank (BCR) reduced the reserve requirement rate by 200 basis points, bringing it to 4%, and is monitoring the evolution of inflation and its determinants to increase monetary stimulus if necessary. It has also reduced reserve requirements , provided liquidity to the system with a package backed by government guarantees of 60 billion soles (more than 8% of GDP) to support loans and the chain of payments.

In addition, exchange rate and balance of payments measures have been implemented through the BCR's intervention in the foreign exchange market. By May 28, the BCR had sold approximately US$2 billion (0.9% of GDP) in foreign exchange swaps. International reserves remain significant at over 30% of GDP.

On the other hand, in the area of trade relations, Peru agreed not to impose restrictions on foreign trade operations, while liberalizing the loading of goods, speeding up the issuance of certificates of origin, temporarily eliminating some tariffs and waiving various infractions and penalties contained in the General Customs Law. This was especially true for transactions with strategic partners, as the European UnionAccording to Alberto Almendres, the president of Eurochambres (the association of European Chambers in Peru). 50% of foreign investment in Peru comes from Europe.

Peruvian exports, although the emergence of the coronavirus in China at the beginning of the year led to a slowdown in transactions with that country, mining and agricultural exports remained positive. in the first two months of the yearas indicated by the research and development Institute of Foreign Trade of the Lima Chamber of Commerce (Idexcam). Subsequently, the impact has been greater, especially in the case of raw material exports and tourism.

Comparison with Chile and Colombia 

The status in Peru can be analyzed in comparison with its neighbors Chile and Colombia, which will have a somewhat smaller drop in GDP in 2020, although their recovery will also be somewhat smaller.

In terms of the issue of confirmed Covid-19 cases as of June 25, Chile (259,064 cases) is similar in size to Peru (268,602), although the issue of deaths is almost half (4,903 Chileans and 8,761 Peruvians), which corresponds to the proportion of its total population.

In response to the pandemic, Chilean authorities implemented a series of measures, including the declaration of a state of catastrophe, travel restrictions, school closures, curfews and bans on public gatherings, and a telework law. This crisis came only a few months after the social unrest experienced in the country in the last quarter of 2019.

On the economic front, Chile approved a stimulus of 6.7% of GDP. On March 19, the authorities presented a fiscal package of up to US$11.75 billion focused on supporting corporate employment and liquidity (4.7% of OPIB), and on April 8, an additional US$2 billion of financial aid to vulnerable households was announced, as well as a credit guarantee scheme of US$3 billion (2%). In its June forecast update , the IMF expects Chile's GDP to fall by 7.5% in 2020 and increase by 5% in 2021.

As for Colombia, the level of contagion has been lower (77,313 cases and 2,611 deaths), and its economic package to deal with the crisis has also been smaller: 2.8% of GDP. The Government created a National Emergency Mitigation Fund, which will be partially financed by regional and stabilization funds (about 1.5% of GDP), complemented by the issuance of national bonds and other budgetary resources (1.3%). In its recent update, the IMF forecasts that Colombia's GDP will fall by 7.8% in 2020 and rise by 4% in 2021.

[Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo (eds). One Korea: visions of Korean unification. Routledge. New York, 2017. 234 p.]

review / Eduardo Uranga

Throughout the second half of the 20th century, tensions between superpowers in East Asia made this part of the world a hot spot in International Relations. Tensions remain today, such as the trade war that since 2018 has pitted the United States and the People's Republic of China against each other. However, over the past 70 years, one territory in particular has been affected by a continuing conflict that has several times claimed the world's attention. This region is undoubtedly the Korean peninsula.

This book, co-edited by Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo and bringing together various experts on inter-Korean relations, outlines the various possibilities of a future reunification of the two Koreas, as well as the various problems that need to be solved in order to achieve this goal. The perspectives of the various world powers on the conflict are also analyzed.

The Korean issue comes from World War II: after the country was occupied by Japan, its liberation ended up dividing the peninsula in two: North Korea (occupied by the Soviet Union) and South Korea (controlled by the United States). Between 1950 and 1953, the two halves fought a conflict, which eventually consolidated the partition, with a demilitarized zone in between known as the 38th Parallel or KDZ.

One of the formulas for Korean unification described in this book is unification through neutralization, proposal by both Koreas. However, the constant long-range nuclear missile tests conducted by North Korea in recent years present a major obstacle to this formula. In this atmosphere of mistrust, Korean citizens play an important role in promoting cooperation and friendship on both sides of the border with the goal of achieving the denuclearization of North Korea.

Another aspect that plays an important role in forcing a change in North Korea's attitude is its strategic culture. This must be differentiated from the traditional Korean strategic culture. North Korea has adopted various unification strategies over the years while maintaining the same principles and values. This strategic culture blends elements from the country's strategic position (geopolitically), history and national values. All this under the authority of the Juche ideology. This ideology contains some militaristic elements and promotes the unification of Korea through armed conflict and revolutionary actions.

As for the perspectives of the various world superpowers on a future Korean reunification, China has stated that it favors unification in the long term; a process undertaken in the short term would collide with Chinese national interests, as Beijing would first have to settle its disputes with Taiwan, or end the trade war against the United States. China has stated that it will not accept Korean unification influenced by a military alliance between the United States and South Korea.

On the other hand, the United States has not yet opted for a specific Korean unification policy. Since the 1950s, the Korean peninsula has been but one part of the overall U.S. strategic policy for the entire Asia Pacific region.

The unification of the Korean peninsula will be truncated as long as the United States, China and other powers in the region continue to recognize the status quo on the peninsula. It could be argued that perhaps an armed conflict would be the only way to achieve unification. According to the authors of this book, this would be too costly in terms of resources used and human lives lost. On the other hand, such a war could trigger a conflict on a global scale.