Argentina, Paraguay, Colombia and Honduras have already made C signal, while Brazil and Guatemala have pledged to do so shortly.

• The 25th anniversary of the AMIA bombing served to trigger a cascade of pronouncements, breaking down the lack of adequate legal instruments against the group.

• Several countries have established lists of terrorist organizations, allowing for greater coordination with the United States in the fight against terrorism in the region.

• Hezbollah's involvement in illicit economies in the TBA and in drug trafficking networks explain the decision of the countries concerned in South and Central America.

▲ report to the deceased in the AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires [Nbelohklavek].

report SRA 2020 / Mauricio Cardarelli [PDF version].

MAY 2020-The 25th anniversary of the largest terrorist attack in Latin America-the attack on the Argentine Israelite Mutual association (AMIA) on July 18, 1994-served as an opportunity for several countries in the region to announce their purpose to declare the Lebanese Shiite organization Hezbollah a terrorist group . Hezbollah is blamed for the AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires, which killed 85 people, as well as the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in the Argentine capital two years earlier, which killed another 22 people.

The year 2019, then, meant an important leap in the confrontation of Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere, since previously no Latin American nation had declared as terrorist that organization, which is indeed designated as such by the United States, the European Union and other countries. In fact, the Latin American codes of law, beyond the guerrilla phenomenon itself, have hardly taken into account the external terrorist fact, since these are states that have not suffered as other parts of the planet the rise of international terrorism, especially so far this century and especially from the hand of Islamist radicalism.

The round of declarations was opened by Argentina itself in July, on the anniversary of the AMIA massacre. In mid-August it was Paraguay's turn, while Brazil then announced its intention to follow in the same footsteps. Then the United States catalyzed the process, so that in the framework the III Hemispheric Ministerial lecture on Combating Terrorism, held in mid-January 2020 in Bogota, both Colombia and Honduras proceeded to include Hezbollah in lists of terrorist organizations. For his part, the Guatemalan president-elect pledged to take a similar measure when he assumes the presidency.

The cataloguing already effectively carried out by Argentina, Paraguay, Colombia and Honduras (countries attentive to the activity of Hezbollah in the so-called Triple Border or to its involvement in drug trafficking), and the not yet executed, but supposedly imminent, cataloguing of Brazil and Guatemala should help in a more forceful fight against this radical group by the national security forces and in the sentences of the respective courts of justice.

If already in 2018 the arrest of part of the network of the Barakat clan represented a step forward in the police coordination of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay in the shared border area (the Triple Frontier, a place of intense commercial activity and of financing and concealment of Hezbollah operatives, sheltered by elements of a large Muslim population), the steps of 2019 constitute a decisive action.

Infiltration in Latin America

Hezbollah militants and cells have been able to penetrate Latin America in the last decades, first of all by taking advantage of the Lebanese diaspora. As a result of the civil war experienced by Lebanon between 1975 and 1990, thousands of people emigrated to the American continent, sometimes settling in places where there was already a certain Arab presence, as was the case of Palestinians or Syrians. Although some of these immigrants were Christians, others were Muslims; awareness among the latter of the fight against Israel led to the formalization of networks for financing radical groups, in a process of money laundering from the profuse commercial activity - and also smuggling - carried out in many of these enclaves.

A strategic point in this dynamic has been the Triple Border, where some 25,000 people of Lebanese origin live, as well as other Arab groups: it is the area with the most Muslims in Latin America. The porous border connects Ciudad del Este (Paraguay), with 400,000 inhabitants; Foz de Iguazú (Brazil), with 300,000, and Puerto Iguazú (Argentina), with 82,000. It is a hotbed of illicit activities linked to money laundering, counterfeiting, smuggling and drug trafficking. Illicit trade in the tri-border area is estimated to be worth some US$18 billion a year. The authorities have been able to identify Hezbollah financing networks, as well as the presence of group operatives (the preparations for the Buenos Aires bombings of 1992 and 1994 were traced back to this tri-border enclave). Last year, Assad Ahmad Barakat and some fifteen members of his clan, dedicated to generating funds for Hezbollah, were arrested.

Other points of support for Hezbollah have been certain places in Brazil with mosques and radicalized Shiite cultural centers, which host activities of extremist clerics such as Bilal Mohsen Wehbe. On the other hand, Hugo Chavez's rapprochement strategy with Iran implied a close partnership manifested in the submission of Venezuelan passports to Islamists and their participation in the drug business under the protection of Chavez's leadership. This interrelation also contributed to its greater dispersion throughout the region, through Hezbollah's progressive ties with those who participate in the drug trafficking structure, such as the FARC or some Mexican cartels (Los Zetas and Sinaloa).

Signaling cascade

Argentina opened the round of Hezbollah finger-pointing (and creation, in most cases, of lists of terrorist groups, which did not previously exist in Latin American countries) on the 25th anniversary of the AMIA bombing, in July 2019. The then President Mauricio Macri, who had put an end to the Kirchnerist presidencies, of certain complicity with Iran, approved the creation of a public registry of persons and entities linked to acts of terrorism and its financing (RePET).

On the occasion of the important anniversary, the University Secretary of the Organization of American States (OAS), Luis Almagro, encouraged the countries of the continent to make this subject of declaration against Hezbollah.

Paraguay followed in Argentina's footsteps a month later. The government of Mario Abdo Benítez had been criticized for not acting decisively in the Triple Border, whose smuggling, such as tobacco, and other illicit activities feed the perception of corruption that accompanies the country's politicians. The Paraguayan president also plans to introduce a package of legislative reforms against money laundering.

Brazil announced on August 20 its intention to proceed in the same way as its two neighbors, although it has not yet implemented this decision. At the end of February 2020, Eduardo Bolsonaro, son of the Brazilian president and national deputy, confirmed that the step would be taken "soon"; he suggested that the delay in adopting the measure was due to the fact that the application of the terrorist group grade is also being considered for other organizations, such as Hamas.

In December it was the advertisement of Guatemala, whose elected president, Alejandro Giammattei, communicated that when he took position he would put Hezbollah on a black list. Giammattei linked the decision to a pro-Israeli policy that would also lead him to move the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, following the example of the United States (Honduras and Paraguay are also on the same line). Giammattei took office on January 14, but has not yet implemented his promises.

Behind these moves by Latin American countries was U.S. diplomacy. The deployment of this was evident in the third meeting of the Hemispheric Ministerial lecture on Combating Terrorism, an initiative promoted by Washington with Hezbollah in its sights, among other objectives. This meeting was held on January 20, 2020 in Bogota and was attendance by the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo.

Colombia took advantage of the meeting, which it hosted, to announce its consideration of Hezbollah as a terrorist group . President Iván Duque announced that three days before the country's National Security committee he had adopted the U.S. and European Union lists of terrorist individuals and organizations. The approved list included the ELN guerrillas and FARC dissidents, and the former FARC disappeared from the list.

Honduras, the Central American country that is the most compliant with US strategies, also made its international advertisement in the same lecture. Its foreign minister commented at the end of a previousmeeting of the National Security and Defense committee that Honduras had designated Hezbollah as a terrorist group and proposed to create a registry of persons and entities linked to terrorism and its financing.

[A. Patanru, M. Pangestu, M.C. Basri (eds), Indonesia in the New World: Globalisation, Nationalism and Sovereignty. ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute. Singapore, 2018. 358 p.]

review / Irati Zozaya

The book consists of fifteen articles, written by different experts, on how Indonesia has dealt with globalization and what effect it has had on the country. The texts have been coordinated by Arianto A. Patunru, Mari Pangestu and M. Chatib Basri, Indonesian academics with experience also in public management , having served as ministers in different governments. The articles combine general approaches with specific aspects, such as the consequences of the opening up to international trade and investment in the mining industry or the nationalization of foodstuffs.

To explain Indonesia's current status , the book occasionally recapitulates periods of its history. Precisely one of the concepts that comes up frequently in the book is that of nationalism: it could be said, according to the authors, that this is what has most marked Indonesia's relationship with the world, regardless of who has led this country of 260 million inhabitants at any given time.

The first part of the book reference letter more generally to Indonesia's experience with globalization, nationalism and sovereignty. They begin by showing the colonial era and how, due to the imposition by Holland and Great Britain of an opening to the world, a strong nationalist sentiment begins to emerge. After the occupation by Japan during the Second World War, a total autarchy was implemented, thus leading the citizens to a problem that is still very present in Indonesia today: the internship of smuggling. In 1945 the country achieved its long-awaited independence under the presidency of Sukarno, who closed Indonesia to the rest of the world to focus on reaffirming national identity and developing its capabilities. This led to the deterioration of the Economics and the consequent hyperinflation, which ushered in a new era: the New Order.

In 1967, with Suharto's accession to the presidency, a cautious opening to foreign trade and investment flows began. However, Suharto repressed political activity and during his tenure the military gained much influence and the government retained control over Economics. In addition, the end of his presidency coincided with the Asian financial crisis (1997-1998), which led to a fall in the country's economic growth and a slowdown in poverty reduction, and consequently a growth in inequality. The financial crisis undermined confidence in the president and culminated in the collapse of the New Order.

The next period addressed is the Reformasi, an era that marked the beginning of a more open and democratic political climate. The next two presidents, Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) and Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001-2004), were more concerned with economic recovery and democratic consolidation and a protectionist system regarding Economics endured. The book does not focus much on the next president, Yudhoyono (2004-2014), remarking only that he was an internationalist who maintained a more cautious and ambivalent stance on economic issues.

Finally, in the 2014 elections, Joko Widodo came to power and holds the position of president today. Under him, Indonesia has returned to the path of economic growth and has stabilized as a reasonably successful democracy. As the president, commonly known as Jokowi, has taken new steps to emphasize political sovereignty and promote economic autarky and national cultural revival, his term has been characterized as 'new nationalism'. In his political speech , Jokowi puts Indonesia as a goal of foreign conspiracies and calls to be on guard against such threats. However, the country maintains an ambivalent stance towards international openness and cooperation since, although trade restrictions have increased again in recent decades, Jokowi emphasizes global engagement and has reactivated regional negotiations.

All this has led to public dissatisfaction with globalization, with up to 40% of citizens believing that globalization threatens national unity. One of the most negative and important effects in Indonesia is that of workers who have been forced to migrate and work abroad under very poor conditions. However, the later parts of the book also show the positive consequences that globalization has had in Indonesia, manifesting itself in higher productivity, increased wages or economic growth, among others. The authors therefore emphasize the importance of constructing a narrative that can generate public and political support for the opening up of the country and counteract the growing anti-globalization sentiment.

As it happens in a book that is the sum of articles by different authors, its reading can be somewhat heavy due to a certain reiteration of contents. However, the variety of signatures also implies a plurality of approaches that undoubtedly provides a wealth of perspectives for the reader.

The region purchased only 0.8% of total Russian arm exports in 2015-2019; the US has recovered its position as the main arms supplier for the Americas

• Over the last five years, the region carried out 40% less arms imports than during 2010-2014; the end of the commodity boom era reduced military equipment purchases

• Chavez's Venezuela got almost $20 billion in Russian loans to buy weapons, but the collapse of the Venezuelan oil industry has left Moscow without a clear full repayment

• The arrival of the Bolivarian left to power in many countries brought tight relations with Moscow. But the pink revolutions wave has subsided in almost all places.

▲ A Russian Sukhoi Su-30MK2 bought by Venezuela, in Barquisimeto in 2016 [Carlos E. Pérez].

ARS Report 2020 / Peter Cavanagh[PDF version] [PDF version].

MAY 2020-Over the last two decades Latin America increased its military expenditure. As the Latin American countries improved their economies, they looked to modernize their military and defense systems. The purchasing spree was notorious during the golden decade of high commodity prices (2004-2014), especially during the first five years, which were the most profitable in public income terms. After the commodity boom was over the region lowered its military purchases.

The trend was not uniform. Meanwhile Central America and the Caribbean, less affected by the commodity cycle, kept increasing the expenditure in arms imports over the last years, South America, more depending on minerals and oil exports, reduced the volume of arms transfers. Taken the region as a whole, Latin America's military purchases were 10% of global arms transfers in 2010-2014, and 5.7% in 2015-2019, according to SIPRI. Between the two periods, arms imports by Latin America dropped 40%.

This general evolution was mirrored by the ups and downs of Russia's portfolio in the region. Moscow managed to exploit the opportunity of the golden decade to the fullest. Russia positioned itself as a willing partner in arms sales and became the leading arms exporter in the region, surpassing China and the United States by far. Russia tried to exert its influence in Latin America to the highest extent possible, taking advantage of a wave of leftist governments (the so-called pink revolutions). Latin America has traditionally fallen under the sphere of influence of the United States. With Russian arms sales in the region, it serves as a direct challenge to US influence. As the second largest exporter of military arms in the world, after the US, Russia has a unique opportunity to affect policy in the region.

However, it is important to note that from 2014 onwards, Latin American arms imports have really begun to drop off, and this includes Russian exports as well. Russian arms exports decreased by 18% globally between 2010-2014 and 2015-2019, first affected by a prominent drop of purchases by India (-47%), which is its main client (25% of Russia's sales in that period), and, less importantly, by a reduction of imports from the Americas. Russian sells to Latin American countries were only 0.8% of total Russian military exports. From 2014 onwards the US recovered its traditional position as the main arms supplier for the region.

Countries

In the last two decades Venezuela has been Russia's biggest customer in the Western Hemisphere. Since the mid 2000's, after Hugo Chavez consolidated his power, Venezuela has purchased almost $20 billion in military equipment from Moscow. The years 2005 and 2006 saw the beginning of the transactions: Russian loans for Chavez's government to buy arms in exchange of future Venezuelan oil deliveries.

Over the years Caracas carried out more than thirty operations of arms acquisitions. more than the number of operations done by the other countries combined: Mexico 7, Peru 6, Nicaragua 5, Brazil 4, Colombia 3, Ecuador 2, and Argentina, Uruguay and Cuba 1 each. Among other significant material Venezuela acquired 24 Sukhoi fighters Su-30MK2s (and ordered 12 more), the S-300 surface-to-air missile system, various combat and transport helicopters such as the Mi-35M and Mi-26 models, and 92 T-72M1 tanks.

The prospects of Russia getting all its money back any time soon from Venezuela is quite low. Due to the severe economic conditions of the country, Venezuela has not been able to continue its payments, so the terms of the debt had to be renegotiated. Since 2014 Moscow has not delivered any new material. After the withdrawal of the giant Russian energy company Rosneft from the country at the beginning of 2020 there have been fewer ways for the Russians to recover the loans. In many respects, this has left Venezuelan-Russian relations at a crossroads.

As Venezuela continues to decline rapidly, Russia is faced with deciding whether to keep making large investments in a country where it is tremendously risky or just abandon all efforts which have been made over the past few decades. Only time will tell which course of action the Kremlin will take.

Besides Venezuela there are a handful of other nations which have also carried out arms deals with Moscow. Nicaragua for example has been the beneficiary of many arms deals. According to the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, in the first decade of the 21st century almost no arms orders had been made. However, this changed two years after Daniel Ortega came to power in 2007. Since then 90% of all military imports that Nicaragua has received have been supplied by Russia. In 2016, 50 T-72B1 Russian tanks were shipped to Nicaragua as part of a reported $80 million deal. Then in 2017 two Antonov An-26 military transport aircraft were sent.

The Nicaraguan government justified these purchases, saying that the equipment would be used as part of the struggle against drug trafficking. However, this has caused many other Latin American nations to become concerned of a military imbalance in the region, especially because some of the new equipment is more proper for waging war rather than keeping internal security.

Reports on Nicaraguan-Russian relations point to the fact that Russia may have ulterior motives beyond just influence. In many ways it comes down to military real estate. The arms deals between the two countries has been seen as an attempt on the part of Russia to curry favor with the Nicaraguan government in attempts to gain access refuelling facilities by the equator.

Other significant Russian arms sales recipients, as already mentioned, include states such as Peru, Mexico and Brazil. In the case of Peru, a country that even during the Cold War had some Soviet weapons systems in its inventory in order to diversify its arm imports, the most recent deal occurred between 2014 and 2016 valued at approximately half a billion dollars: the purchase of 24 transport helicopters Mi-8MT and Mi-17 (another 24 units were ordered in 2017).

Mexico has not Russians among its main arms suppliers (64% of Mexican purchases were to the US in the period 2015-2019; 9.5% to Spain and 8.5% to France), but still it carried out six arms deals with Russia since 2000. There has not been a deal made since 2011 when three Mil Mi-17 Military helicopters were purchased.

Brazil has also had a handful of deals with Russia in recent years, during the presidencies of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, when an amore pro-Russia stance was held by the government. This has changed immensely since the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018. The Brazilian government is now openly concerned for Russian influence in the region and has begun to take a more pro-USA stance when it comes to foreign policy. In any case, in the period 2015-2019 the main arms suppliers to Brazil were France (26%), the US (20%) and the UK (17%).

Overall, Russian arms sales to Latin America grew considerably, with some fluctuations, over the course of the last twenty years. The latest trend however has been a significant drop in overall Russian arms exports to Latin America. Between 2015 and 2019, as already mentioned, Latin America accounted for only 0.8% of all Russian arms exports.

This drop can be attributed to two main factors. In the first place, the change of ideological orientation in the Latin American countries, with less leftist parties in power. Secondly, the end of a booming economy in the region. And additional reason could be the international sanctions against some specific Russian industries due to the aggressive foreign policy conducted by Putin.

Spain sells less defense material to Latin American countries than it would be entitled to according to the trade Issue

• In 2019 there was a recovery in Spanish arms sales to Latin America, surpassing 2018 figures, which were the lowest in a long time

• In the last five years, Spain sold 691.2 million euros worth of defense material to the region, 3.6% of its world arms exports.

• Mexico (24.8%), Ecuador (22.5%), Brazil (16.1%), Peru (14.4%) and Colombia (8.6%) are the five countries that purchased the most material from Spain in the last five years.

▲ Airbus NH90 helicopter, with final assembly at Airbus Military facilities in Spain [Airbus].

report SRA 2020 / Álvaro Fernández[PDF version] [PDF version].

MAY 2020-Latin American countries are an area of clear commercial interest for Spain. However, despite being the seventh largest exporter of armaments in the world and therefore particularly active in this sector, Spain sells less defense material to Latin America and the Caribbean than it would be entitled to by the overall export quota it maintains with the region.

If between 2014 and 2018 Spain maintained its overall export of products to Latin America between 5.3% and 6.5% of its global exports, in the case of the arms sector it moved around 3.2% in 2016 and 2017 and fell to 1.06% in 2018. It is to be expected that this minimum percentage will have risen again in 2019, a year for which there are still no complete official data , but in view of those of the first semester , it would seem that it will not even be close to 3%.

The explanation for this lower weight of arms exports in the overall Spanish exports to Latin America can be found in two facts. One is the smaller budget dedicated to the purchase of this subject of material by most Latin American countries, compared to some large buyers(in 2018 Spain's first customer was Germany - in turn the fourth largest exporter in the world -, which cornered 33% of Spanish sales). The other is that Latin American nations have other important market options: the United States, Russia and China (first, second and fifth largest arms exporters in the world; France is the third).

In 2018 there was a significant drop in Spanish defense exports to Latin America, which were 38.3 million euros, well below any of the preceding years. Partial data for 2019 indicate a recovery, although without reaching the figures recorded in 2015, when a peak of €239.4 million was reached, or those of the previous years of 2016 and 2017, when they were €130.7 million and €139.3 million, respectively.

The decline in 2018 corresponds to a smaller purchase list from most Latin American customers. Of the five largest customers over the past five years, Colombia was the only one to maintain a similar level of purchases, worth €11 million. Colombia and the next largest buyer, Mexico, were the only ones to slightly increase their imports in 2017, although they were lower than in previous years. The reduction was significant for the next two customers in 2018, Brazil and Peru. That year marked a further reduction in imports by Ecuador, which over the five-year period has been steadily cutting its order book to Spain.

The figures considered in this article only take into account defense material, not other subject material, which the administrative office of State of Commerce considers separately, such as riot control material, hunting and sporting weapons, as well as dual-use technology products.

General and Latin American sales

Spain has around 130 companies dedicated to the armaments sector. Among them are Airbus Military, Navantia and Indra, which are among the 100 largest defense and security companies in the world. Most of the sector are private companies, although there are some unique cases of public ownership, such as Navantia, dedicated to shipbuilding, both civil and military, created in 2005 when the assets of another public business , the IZAR group , were spun off.

According to the official data of the administrative office of State of Commerce, the issue of exports of defense material has been increasing notably during the last years. More than half of the Spanish arms exports during 2018 and the first semester of 2019 had as recipients countries belonging to NATO or the European Union. In 2017 they exceeded 4.3 billion euros, after several years of rises in this market. In contrast, arms worth €3,720.4 million were sold in 2018, which was 14.4% less. The first semester of 2019, however, saw an improvement, reaching €2,413 million, an increase of 41.5% compared to the same period of the previous year.

As regards trade with Latin America, between 2014 and 2018 Spain sold military equipment worth €691.2 million to the region, a figure that represents 3.6% of the total of €19,042 million exported by Spain for arms.

In the five years as a whole, the first importer was Mexico, which with purchases worth 171.4 million euros (of which 140.9 million corresponded to 2015 alone), acquired a quarter (24.8%) of the defense material sold by Spain to Latin America in that five-year period. As the second country, Ecuador stands out, with 155, 7 million and 22.5% (slightly more than half -85.9 million- were purchases made only in 2014). It is followed by Brazil, which made more regular acquisitions throughout this time, with 111.8 million and 16.1%); Peru, with 99.5 million and 14.4% (the largest amount -78.4 million- was executed in 2017), and Colombia, with 59.5 million and 8.6%.

Some countries

Mexico figures as the first buyer of Spanish defense material in the last five years (2014 and 2018) due to purchases made in 2015, when it acquired four transport aircraft, worth €127.2 million. In 2018 it only imported €10.1 million in parts, pieces and spare parts for Spanish-made aircraft, equipment for engines of an aircraft derived from a European cooperation program and instruments of an air surveillance system.

Brazil is one of the countries with the greatest diversity in the destination of its imports. In recent purchases, 19.7% were for private business , 74.2% for the Armed Forces and the remaining 5.9% were for individuals. In 2018, it purchased €7.9 million in pistols, rifles and magazines for private individuals, as well as day sights, spare parts for armored vehicles and spare parts for Spanish and U.S.-made aircraft for the Armed Forces.

Colombia imported in 2018 a total of €11 million in spare parts for artillery howitzer maintenance, artillery ammunition, spare parts for Spanish and U.S.-made armored vehicles, and parts for Spanish-made transport aircraft.

Until a few years ago, Venezuela was an important client for the Spanish arms industry. However, after the authoritarian drift taken by the government of Nicolás Maduro, relations in this field have weakened. Even in 2015, Spain sold him defense material worth 15.3 million euros, in operations that were shrouded in controversy since some of the exported equipment could be used in the severe repression carried out against citizens. Since then, with the increase of tensions between the Chavista regime and the United States or the European Union, a series of restrictions have been placed on the export of this subject of material to Venezuela. Thus, sales went from having a value of 3.3 million euros in 2017 to only 44,000 euros in 2018, corresponding to the payment for spare parts and parts for the modernization of French-made armored vehicles, in a transaction that was approved before the trade restrictions on this subject imposed by the EU.

The official data provided by the State Trade administrative office distinguish between authorized exports and realized exports. Authorizations do not always materialize in actual sales and sometimes these are executed in subsequent years. The difference is noteworthy especially in Venezuela, whose political status forced to restrict exports for that country. In 2018 Spain suspended four licenses already approved for Caracas, related to helicopter maintenance and the provision of electro-optical supplies and systems. In addition, extensions of contracts for the modernization of battle tanks were denied.

Bolivia and Nicaragua have stopped buying defense material from Spain: if between 2014 and 2018 they made no purchases, between 2007 and 2013 they imported 1.5 million and 62,000 euros, respectively.

Cuba, which had a peak in purchases in 2015 at €208,080, in 2018 spent €20,600 on pistols and pistol barrels for the Police.

June 1, 2020

ANALYSIS / Salvador Sánchez Tapia [Brigadier General (Res.)].

The COVID-19 pandemic that Spain has been experiencing since the beginning of 2020 has highlighted the commonplace, no less true for having been repeated, that the concept of national security can no longer be limited to the narrow framework of military defense and demands the involvement of all the nation's capabilities, coordinated at the highest possible level which, in the case of Spain, is none other than that of the Presidency of the Government through the National Security committee .[1] In the case of Spain, this is none other than the Presidency of the Government through the National Security committee .

In coherence with this approach, our Armed Forces have been directly and actively involved in a health emergency a priori far from the traditional missions of the military arm of the nation. This military contribution, however, responds to one of the missions entrusted to the Armed Forces by the Organic Law of National Defense, as well as to a long tradition of military support to civil society in case of catastrophe or emergency.[2] In its execution, units of the three Armies have carried out tasks as varied and apparently unrelated to their natural activity, such as the disinfection of nursing homes or the transfer of corpses between hospitals and morgues.

This status has stirred up a certain amount of discussion in specialized and professional circles about the role of the Armed Forces in present and future security scenarios. From different angles, some voices are calling for the need to reconsider the missions and dimensions of the Armed Forces, in order to align them with these new threats, not with that of the classic war between states.

This vision seems to have one of its points of support in the apparently empirical confirmation of the current absence internship conventional armed conflicts - understood as those that pit armies with conventional means against each other maneuvering on a battlefield - between states. From this reality, it is concluded that this form of conflict is practically banished, being little more than a historical relic replaced by other less conventional and less "military" threats such as pandemics, terrorism, organized crime, fake news, disinformation, climate change or cybernetics.

The corollary is evident: it is necessary and urgent to rethink the missions, dimensions and equipment of the Armed Forces, since their current configuration is designed to confront outdated conventional threats, and not for those that are emerging in the present and future security scenario.

A critical analysis of this idea sample, however, a somewhat more nuanced picture. From a purely chronological point of view, the still unfinished Syrian civil war, admittedly complex, is closer to a conventional model than to any other subject and, of course, the capabilities with which Russia is making its influence felt in this war by supporting the Assad regime are fully conventional. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and occupied South Ossetia and Abkhazia in a conventional offensive operation. In 2006, Israel was confronted in South Lebanon by a hybrid enemy like Hezbollah - in fact, this was the model chosen by Hoffman as the prototype for coining the term "hybrid" - which combined elements of irregular warfare with fully conventional ones.[3] Earlier still, in 2003, the United States invaded Iraq in a massive armored offensive.[4] In 2007, the United States invaded Iraq in a massive armored offensive.

If the case of Syria is eliminated, considering it doubtfully classifiable as a conventional war, it can still be argued that the last conflict of this nature -which, moreover, involved territorial gain- took place only twelve years ago; a period of time short enough to think that conclusions can be drawn that would allow conventional warfare to be dismissed as a quasi-extinct procedure . In fact, the past has recorded longer periods than this without significant confrontations, which could well have led to similar conclusions. In Imperial Roman times, for example, the Antonine era (96-192 AD), involved a long period of internal Pax Romana briefly disrupted by Trajan's campaigns in Dacia. More recently, after Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo (1815), the Central Powers of Europe experienced a long period of peace of no less than thirty-nine years.[5] Needless to say, the end of both periods was marked by the return of war to the foreground.

It can be argued that the status is now different, since humanity today has developed a moral rejection of war as a destructive and therefore unethical and undesirable exercise. This distinctly Western-centric - if you prefer the neologism - or, if you prefer, Eurocentric stance, takes the part for the whole and assumes this view as unanimously shared at the global level. However, the experience of the Old Continent, with a long history of destructive wars among its states, with a highly aging population, and with little appetite to remain a relevant player in the International System, may not be shared by the whole world.

Western rejection of war may, moreover, be more apparent than real, being directly related to the interests at stake. It is conceivable that, faced with an immediate threat to its survival, any European state would be willing to go to war, even at the risk of becoming a pariah ostracized by the international system. If, when the time came, such a state had sacrificed its traditional military muscle in pursuit of the fight against more ethereal threats, it would have to pay the price associated with such a decision. It should be borne in mind that states choose their wars only to a certain extent, and that they may be forced into them, even against their will. As Trotsky said, "you may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you".

The analysis of the historical periods of peace referred to above suggests that, in both cases, they were made possible by the existence of a moderator power stronger than that of the political entities that made up the Roman Empire and post-Napoleon Europe. In the first case, this power would have been that of Rome itself and its legions, sufficient to guarantee the internal order of the empire. In the second, the European powers, at odds for many reasons, nevertheless remained united against France in the face of the possibility that the ideas of the French Revolution would spread and undermine the foundations of the Ancien Régime.

Today, although it is difficult to find a verifiable cause-effect relationship, it is plausible to think that this "pacifying" force is provided by American military power and the existence of nuclear weapons. Since the end of World War II, the United States has provided an effective security umbrella under whose protection Europe and other regions of the world have been spared the scourge of war in their territories, developing feelings of extreme rejection towards any of its forms.

On the basis of its unrivaled military power, the United States - and we with it - have been able to develop the idea, supported by the facts, that no other power will be so suicidal as to engage in open conventional warfare. The conclusion is obvious: conventional warfare -against the United States, I might add- becomes, in the internship, unthinkable.

This conclusion, however, is not based on a moral preference, nor on the conviction that other forms of warfare or threat are more effective, but simply on the realization that, faced with the enormous conventional power of the United States, one can only seek asymmetry and confront it by other means. To paraphrase Conrad Crane, "there are two kinds of enemy: the asymmetrical and the stupid."[6] The enemy is the asymmetric.

In other words, classical military power is a major deterrent that financial aid in explaining the leave recurrence of conventional warfare. Not surprisingly, even authors who preach the end of conventional warfare advocate that the United States should retain its conventional warfare capability.[7] The United States has been a major force in conventional warfare for many years.

From North America, this idea has permeated the rest of the world or, at least, the European cultural sphere, where it has become a truth that, under the guise of incontestable reality, obviates the possibility of the United States initiating a conventional war - as occurred in 2003 - or of it occurring between two nations of the world, or within one of them, in areas where armed conflict continues to be an acceptable tool .

In an exercise of cynicism, it could be said that such a possibility does not change anything, since it does not concern us. However, in today's interconnected world, there will always be the possibility that we will be forced to intervene for ethical reasons, or that our security interests will be affected by what happens in countries or regions a priori geographically and geopolitically distant from us, and that, probably hand in hand with our allies, we will be involved in a classic war.

Although still in place, the commitment of U.S. military power to Western security is under severe strain as America is increasingly reluctant to assume this role alone, and is demanding that its partners make a greater effort on behalf of its own security. We are not suggesting here that the transatlantic link will break down immediately. It seems sensible, however, to think that its maintenance comes at a cost to us that may drag us into some armed conflict. It is worth asking, moreover, what might happen if one day the U.S. commitment to our security were to lapse and we had transformed our armed forces to focus exclusively on "new threats," dispensing with a conventional capability that would undoubtedly reduce the cost that someone would have to incur if they decided to attack us with such means subject

A final consideration has to do with what appears to be the unstoppable rise of China to the role of major player in the International System, and with the presence of an increasingly assertive Russia, which is demanding to be considered once again as a major global power. Both nations, especially the former, are in a clear process of rearmament and modernization of their military, conventional and nuclear capabilities, which does not exactly augur the end of conventional warfare between states.

To this must be added the effects of the pandemic, which are still difficult to glimpse, but among which there are some worrying aspects that should not be overlooked. One of these is China's effort to position itself as the real winner of the crisis, and as the international power of reference letter in the event of a repetition of a global crisis such as the present one. Another is the possibility that the crisis may result, at least temporarily, in less international cooperation, not more; that we may witness a certain regression of globalization; and that we may see the erection of barriers to the movement of people and goods in what would be a reinforcement of realist logic as a regulatory element in international relations.

In these circumstances, it is difficult to predict the future evolution of the "Thucydides trap" in which we currently find ourselves due to the rise of China. It is likely, however, to bring with it greater instability, with the possibility of it escalating into some conventional subject conflict, whether between great powers or through proxies. In such circumstances, it seems advisable to be prepared for the most dangerous scenario of an open armed conflict with China, as the best way to avoid it or, at least, to confront it in order to preserve our way of life and our values.

Finally, we cannot overlook the capacity that many of the "new threats" - global warming, pandemics, etc. - have as generators, or at least catalysts, of conflicts that could lead to a war that could well be conventional.

From all of the above it can be concluded, therefore, that, if it is true that the recurrence of conventional warfare between states is minimal today, it seems risky to think that it could be put away in some obscure attic, as if it were an ancient relic. However remote the possibility may seem, no one is in a position to guarantee that the future will not bring conventional warfare. Neglecting the ability to defend against it is therefore not a prudent option, especially considering that, if needed, it is not possible to improvise.

The emergence of new threats such as those referred to in this article, perhaps more pressing, and many of them non-military or, at least, not purely military, is undeniable, as is the need for the Armed Forces to consider them and adapt to them, not only to maximize the effectiveness of their contribution to the nation's effort against them, but also as a simple matter of self-protection.

In our opinion, this adaptation does not involve abandoning conventional missions, the true raison d'être of the Armed Forces, but rather incorporating as many new elements as necessary, and guaranteeing that the Armed Forces fit into the coordinated effort of the nation, contributing to it with the means at their disposal, considering that, in many cases, they will not be the first response element, but a support element.

This article does not argue -it is not its goaleither for or against the need for Spain to rethink the organization, dimensions and equipment of the Armed Forces in view of the new security scenario. Nor does it enter into the question of whether it should do so unilaterally, or in agreement with its NATO allies, or seeking complementarity and synergy with its European Union partners. Understanding that it is up to the citizens to decide what Armed Forces they want, what they want them for, and what effort in resources they are willing to invest in them, what this article postulates is that national security is better served if those who have to decide, and with them the Armed Forces, continue to consider conventional warfare, enriched with a multitude of new possibilities, as one of the possible threats that the nation may have to face. Redefining the adage: Si vis pacem, para bellum etiam magis.[8] The adage: Si vis pacem, para bellum etiam magis.

The bi-national Colombian-Venezuelan guerrilla character provides the Maduro regime with another shock force in the face of external military harassment or a coup d'état.

• ELN has reached some 2,400 fighters between the two countries; its main funding now comes from illicit businesses in Venezuela, such as drugs and illegal mining.

• FARC dissidents number at least 2,300; the group with the greatest projection is the one led in Venezuela by Iván Márquez, former issue two of the FARC.

• Elenos' and ex-FARC cooperate operationally in certain activities promoted by the Maduro regime, but their future organic convergence is unclear.

▲ FARC dissidents led by Ivan Marquez announce their return to arms, August 2019 [video image].

report SRA 2020 / María Gabriela Farjardo[PDF version].

MAY 2020-The consolidation of the two main Colombian guerrilla groups -the ELN and some remnants of the former FARC- as active forces also in Venezuela, thus articulating themselves as Colombian-Venezuelan groups, constitutes one of the main notes of 2019 in the field of American regional security.

Both groups would have some 1,700 troops in Venezuela (two thirds would be from the ELN), of which one third (570) would correspond to recruitment among Venezuelans. Used by the Chavista regime for guerrilla training of its irregular forces and as a shock vanguard in case of external military harassment or coup, the ELN and the ex-FARC are involved in drug trafficking, smuggling and extraction of gold and other illegal mining, both in the areas close to the border with Colombia, where they have operated for many years, and in the Venezuelan interior, such as the mining-rich states of Amazonas and Bolivar.

Following the peace agreement signed between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in November 2016, the National Liberation Army (ELN) began a process of expansion that allowed it to fill the vacuum left by the FARC in various illicit activities, although its estimated issue of 2,400 troops is a far cry from the more than 8,000 that the FARC had at the time of their demobilization. Although it has had to compete with FARC remnants that are still active as mafia elements, the ELN has become Colombia's main guerrilla group, also focused on organized crime. The ELN's January 17, 2019 attack in Bogota on the Police Cadet School, which killed 22 people, marked the end of an agonizing peace dialogue with the government and a flight forward as a criminal organization.

In this process, the ELN has also been establishing itself in Venezuela, not only in border areas and as a place of refuge and hiding place as before, but also in other parts of the neighboring country and as an area of activity. The same has happened with the FARC dissidents led by Iván Márquez, Jesús Santrich and El Paisa, who on August 29 announced their return to arms, in a video presumably recorded in Venezuela. The interest of Nicolás Maduro's regime in having the help of armed elements of these characteristics has led the ELN and the ex-FARC of Márquez, who was the FARC's issue 2 and its chief negotiator in the peace negotiations held in Havana, to become bi-national groups, with recruitment of Venezuelans as well.

ELN

The growing presence of these groups in Venezuela has been noted by Colombian authorities. The commander of the Military Forces, General Luis Navarro, indicated in the middle of the year that some 1,100 ELN members (slightly more than 40% of the 2,400 fighters that the organization has, although other sources consider this total figure to be leave ) were taking refuge in Venezuela and that the group harbored at least 320 Venezuelan citizens in its ranks.

Meanwhile, while attending the United Nations General Assembly at the end of September, President Ivan Duque raised the ELN's presence in Venezuela to 1,400 troops. Duque indicated that there were 207 geographical points controlled by the ELN on Venezuelan soil, including several training camps and twenty airstrips for drug trafficking, as documented in a controversial dossier that was not released to the public because it contained some erroneous test photographs.

A few days earlier, Foreign Minister Carlos Holmes Trujillo told the OAS about the location of ELN fronts and FARC dissidents in Venezuela and referred to their close connections with the Chavista regime. "The links would be made with members of the armed forces, the national guard, military intelligence, as well as with irregular groups such as the Bolivarian Liberation Force," he said.

Other details were investigated by the Ideas for Peace Foundation (FIP), which in its report stated that the ELN finances itself through criminal activities such as extortion and maintains control of gasoline smuggling and mining in several regions of Colombia and Venezuela. In Venezuelan territory, with a presence in at least twelve of its 24 states, it controls gold mines in Bolivar state, hundreds of kilometers from the Colombian border, and coltan mining activities in Amazonas state. These illicit acts would account for 70 percent of their profits according to information attributed to Colombian intelligence. Thus, the ELN's base of operations in Venezuela would currently be the insurgent group 's largest source of income.

FARC Dissidences

As for FARC dissidents, Colombian government sources midway through 2019 put the number at around 2,300 individuals (including non-demobilized elements, others who returned to arms, and new recruits). While this is close to the figure offered for the ELN, it must be taken into account that FARC dissidents are atomized.

Some 600 of them are reportedly in Venezuela, including some 250 Venezuelans who have reportedly joined their ranks (almost 10 percent of their total strength). Although these are separate groups that operate on their own, most attention has been given to the one led by Ivan Marquez, due to its coordination with the Maduro regime. One episode involving this group was the alleged assassination attempt in Colombia on Rodrigo Londoño, who led the FARC as Timochenko and who has remained loyal to the peace accords. Londoño accused Márquez and El Paisa of ordering the action, thwarted by Colombian security forces and unveiled in January 2020, so that other former guerrillas would return to arms as they ran out of leadership in civilian life.

Internal documentation of the Venezuelan secret services published by Semana reveals the close partnership between the Maduro government, the ELN and the ex-FARC. "The regime went from hiding fugitive guerrillas in the early 2000s to serving as the headquarters of operations for these groups. Not only do they prepare themselves militarily, but they also train the militias and the so-called colectivos in guerrilla warfare tactics and strategies," the weekly indicated.

All this is producing an operational convergence in Venezuela between the ELN and the ex-FARC. However, the status does not necessarily lead to a merger of the two groups, which in Colombia maintain their differences, also encouraged by the aspirations of the different criminal groups into which the FARC dissidents have split, which are referred to in the plural for a reason.

On the other hand, the implementation of the Peace Accords was framed in 2019 in a growing climate of insecurity caused by the murder during the year of 77 former FARC guerrillas (173 since the signature the peace agreement in 2016) and 86 local social leaders, according to the report of the UN University Secretary, António Guterres. Colombian organizations raise the latter figure, such as the Instituto de programs of study for development and peace(Indepaz), which speaks of 282 homicides, often linked to the attempt to replace coca with legal crops in regions where drug trafficking is active. In any case, this is a decrease compared to 2018, something that can be attributed to the fact that the new territorial distribution of the armed groups has already been consolidated and they have less effective resistance.

U.S. Southern Command highlights Iranian interest in consolidating Hezbollah's intelligence and funding networks in the region

• Throughout 2019 Rosneft tightened its control over PDVSA, marketing 80% of production, but U.S. sanctions forced its departure from the country

• The arrival of Iranian Revolutionary Guard troops comes amidst a U.S. naval and air deployment in the Caribbean, not far from Venezuelan waters.

• The Iranians, once again beset by Washington's sanctions, return to the country that helped them to circumvent the international siege during the era of the Chávez-Ahmadinejab alliance.

​

▲ Nicolas Maduro and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani at a meeting in Tehran in 2015 [Hossein Zohrevand, Tasnim News Agency].

report SRA 2020 / Emili J. Blasco [PDF version].

MAY 2020-In a short period of time Venezuela has gone from depending on credits from China, to relying on the Russian energy sector (as was particularly evident in 2019) and then to asking for financial aid from Iran's oil technicians (as was seen at the beginning of 2020). If the Chinese public loans were supposed to keep the country running, the Rosneft aid was only intended to save the national oil company, PDVSA, while the financial aid from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard only aims at reactivating some refineries. Each time those who assist Venezuela are smaller in size and the purpose is more and more reduced.

In just ten years the large Chinese public banks granted $62.2 billion in credits to the Venezuelan government. The last of the 17 credits came in 2016; since then Beijing has disregarded the knocks Nicolás Maduro has given at its door. Although already since 2006 Chavismo had also received credits from Moscow, (some $17 billion, for the purchase of arms from Russia itself), Maduro turned to pleading with Vladimir Putin when the Chinese financial aid ended. Not wanting to give any more credits, the Kremlin articulated another way to help the regime that at the same time ensured the immediate collection of benefits. Thus began Rosneft's direct involvement in various aspects of the Venezuelan oil business, beyond the specific exploitation of some fields.

This mechanism was particularly relevant in 2019, when the progressive US sanctions on Venezuela's oil activity began to have a great effect. To circumvent the sanctions on PDVSA, Rosneft became a marketer of Venezuelan oil, controlling the placing on the market of most of the total production (between 60% and 80%).

Washington's threat to punish Rosneft also caused the company to shift its business to two subsidiaries, Rosneft Trading and TNK Trading International, which in turn gave up this activity when the United States pointed them out. Despite the fact that Rosneft generally serves the geopolitical interests of the Kremlin, the fact that its shareholding includes BP or Qatari funds means that the company does not risk its profit and loss account so easily.

The departure of Rosneft, which also saw no economic sense in continuing to get involved in reactivating the Venezuelan refineries, whose paralysis has plunged the country into a generalized lack of fuel supply to the population, left Maduro without many options. The Russians abandoned the Armuy refinery at the end of January 2020 and the following month the Iranians were already resuming the attempt to put it into operation. Within weeks Iran's new involvement in Venezuela became public: Tarek el Assami, the Chavista leader with the strongest connections to Hezbollah and the Shiite world, was appointed Oil Minister in April, and in May five cargo ships brought fuel oil and presumably refining machinery from Iran to Venezuela.

The supply did not solve much (the gasoline would barely be enough for a few weeks' consumption) and the Iranian technicians, at least some of them led by the Revolutionary Guard, were hardly going to be able to fix the refining problem. Meanwhile, Tehran was getting in return important shipments of gold as payment for its services (nine tons, according to the Trump Administration). The Iranian airline Mahan, used by the Revolutionary Guards in their operations, was involved in the transports.

Thus, suffocated by the new sanctions outline imposed by Donald Trump, Iran returned to Venezuela in search of economic oxygen and also political partnership with Washington, as when Mahmud Ahmadinejad allied with Hugo Chávez to alleviate the restrictions of the first sanctions regime suffered by the Islamic nation.

U.S. naval and air deployment

Iran's "interference" in the Western Hemisphere had already been mentioned, among the list of risks to regional security, in the appearance of the head of the U.S. Southern Command, Admiral Craig Faller, on Capitol Hill in Washington (in January he went to the Senate and in March to the House of Representatives, with the same written speech ). Faller referred mainly to Iran's use of Hezbollah, whose presence in the continent has been aided by Chavism for years. According to the admiral, that activity linked to Hezbollah "allows Iran to gather intelligence and carry out contingency plans for possible retaliatory attacks against the United States and/or Western interests."

However, the novelty of Faller's intervention was in two other matters. On the one hand, for the first time, the head of the Southern Command placed China's risk ahead of Russia's, in a context of growing rivalry between Washington and Beijing, which is also manifested in the taking of positions on Chinese investments in strategic infrastructure works in the region.

On the other hand, he announced a forthcoming "increased U.S. military presence in the hemisphere", something that began to take place at the end of March 2020 when U.S. ships and planes were deployed in the Caribbean and the Pacific to reinforce the fight against drug trafficking. In the context of his speech, this increased military activity in the region was understood as a necessary notice to extra-hemispheric countries.

"Above all, in this fight what matters is persistent presence," he said, "we have to be present on the field to compete, and we have to compete to win." Specifically, he proposed more joint actions and maneuvers with other countries in the region and the "recurring rotation of small special operations forces teams, soldiers, sailors, pilots, Marines, Coast Guardsmen and National Guard staff to help us strengthen those partnerships."

But the arrival of U.S. ships near Venezuelan waters, just a few days after the announcement on March 26 from New York and Miami of the opening of a macro-court case for drug trafficking and other crimes against the main Chavista leaders, among them Nicolás Maduro and Diosdado Cabello, gave this military deployment a connotation of physical encirclement of the Chavista regime.

That deployment also gave some context to two other developments that occurred shortly thereafter, offering misleading readings: the failed Operation Gideon on May 3, by a group of mercenaries who claimed to have the intention of infiltrating the country for Maduro (the increased transmission capabilities acquired by the US in the area, thanks to its maneuvers, were not used in principle in that operation), and the arrival of the Iranian ships at the end of the month (the US deployment raised suspicions that Washington could intercept the advance of the ships, which did not happen).

Regional security in the Americas has been the focus of concern over the past year in Venezuela. We also review the sale of arms by Russia and Spain to the region, the Latin American presence in peacekeeping missions, drugs in Peru and Bolivia, and homicides in Mexico and Brazil.

▲ Igor Sechin, CEO director Rosneft, and Nicolás Maduro, in August 2019 [Miraflores Palace].

report SRA 2020 / executivesummary [PDF version].

MAY 2020-Throughout 2019, Latin America had several hotspots of tension -violent street protests against economic measures in Quito, Santiago de Chile and Bogota, and against political decisions in La Paz and Santa Cruz, for example-, but as those conflicts subsided (in some cases, only temporarily) the constant problem of Venezuela as the epicenter of insecurity in the region re-emerged.

With Central American migration to the United States reduced to a minimum by the restrictive measures of the Trump Administration, it has been Venezuelan migrants who have continued to fill the shoulders of South American roads, moving from one country to another, and now numbering more than five million refugees. The difficulties that this population increase entails for the host countries led several of them to increase their pressure on the government of Nicolás Maduro, approving in the OAS the activation of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal attendance (TIAR). But that did not push Maduro out of power, nor did the assumption in January 2019 by Juan Guaidó of the position of president-in-charge of Venezuela (recognized by more than fifty countries), the failed coup d'état a few months later or the alleged Operation Gideon invasion of May 2020.

Although Maduro seems to have stabilized, the geopolitical background has been shifting. The year 2019 saw Rosneft gaining a foothold in Venezuela as an arm of the Kremlin, once China had moved away as a credit contributor. The risk of not recovering everything borrowed made Russia act through Rosneft, obtaining the benefit of commercializing up to 80% of the country's oil. However, the US sanctions finally forced the departure of the Russian energy company, so that at the beginning of 2020 Maduro had no other major extra-hemispheric partner left to turn to but Iran. The Islamic republic, itself subject to a second sanctioning regime, thus returned to the close relationship it maintained with Venezuela in the first period of international punishment, cultivated by the Chávez-Ahmadinejad tandem.

This Iranian presence is closely followed by the United States (it coincides with a deployment of the Southern Command in the Caribbean), always alert to any impulse that Hezbollah - Iranian proxy - may receive in the region. In fact, 2019 marked an important leap in the disposition of Latin American countries against that organization, as several of them qualified it as terrorist for the first time. Argentina, Paraguay, Colombia and Honduras approved that declaration, following the 25th anniversary in July of the AMIA bombing, attributed to Hezbollah. Brazil and Guatemala undertook to do so shortly. With this declaration, several of these countries have drawn up lists of terrorist organizations, making it possible to pool strategies.

The destabilization of the region by the status in Venezuela has a clear manifestation in the reception and promotion in that country of the Colombian guerrillas. In August, the former issue two of the FARC, Iván Márquez, and some other former leaders announced, presumably from Venezuelan territory, their return to arms. Both this dissident nucleus of the FARC and the ELN had begun to consolidate at the end of the year as Colombian-Venezuelan groups, with operations not only in the Venezuelan border area, but also in the interior of the country. Both groups together have some 1,700 troops in Venezuela, of which almost 600 are Venezuelan recruits, thus constituting another shock force at the service of Maduro.

Russia's exit from Venezuela comes at a time when Moscow is apparently less active in Latin America. This is the case, of course, in the field of arms sales. Russia, which had become an important exporter of military equipment to the region, has seen its sales decrease in recent years. If during the golden decade of the commodity boom various countries spent part of their important revenues on the acquisition of armaments (which also coincided with the spread of the Bolivarian tide, better related to Moscow), the collapse of commodity prices and some governmental changes made Latin America the destination of only 0.8% of total arms exports by Russia in the period 2015-2019. The United States has regained its position as the largest seller to the rest of the continent.

Spain occupies a prominent position in the arms market, as the seventh largest exporter in the world. However, it lags behind in the preferences of Latin American countries, to which it sells less defense material than it would be entitled to by the general trade Issue it maintains with them. Nevertheless, the level of sales increased in 2019, after a year of particularly low figures. In the last five years, Spain has sold 3.6% of its global arms exports to Latin America; in that period, its main customers were Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru and Colombia.

The better provision of military equipment could suggest a greater participation in UN peacekeeping missions, perhaps as a way to maintain an active army, in a context of lack of regional deployments. However, of the total of 82,480 troops in the fourteen UN peacekeeping missions at the beginning of 2020, 2,473 came from Latin American countries, which represents only 3% of the total contingent. Moreover, almost half of the staff was contributed by one country, Uruguay (45.5% of the regional troops). Another small country, El Salvador (12%), is the next most committed to missions, while large countries are underrepresented, particularly Mexico.

In terms of public safety, 2019 brought the good news of a reduction in homicides in Brazil, which fell by 19.2% compared to the previous year, in contrast to what happened in Mexico, where they rose by 2.5%. If in his first year as president, Jair Bolsonaro scored an important achievement, thanks to the management of the super minister of Security Sérgio Moro (a success tarnished by the increase in accidental deaths in police operations), in his first year Andrés Manuel López Obrador failed to fulfill one of his main electoral promises and was unable to break the upward trend in homicides that has invariably occurred annually throughout the mandates of his two predecessors.

In terms of the fight against drug trafficking, 2019 saw two particularly positive developments. On the one hand, the eradication of coca crops for the first time in the VRAEM, Peru's largest production area. Given its complicated accessibility and the presence of Shining Path strongholds, the area had previously been left out of this subject's operations. On the other hand, the presidential change in Bolivia meant, according to the United States, a greater commitment by the new authorities to combat illicit coca cultivation and interdict drug shipments coming from Peru. In recent years Bolivia has become the major distributor of cocaine in the southern half of South America, connecting Peruvian and Bolivian production with markets in Argentina and especially Brazil, and with its export ports to Europe.

Venezuelans leaving the country to seek a livelihood in a place of refuge [UNHCR UNHCR].

[download the complete PDF]

REPORT SRA 2020

May 2020

PRESENTATION

The Covid-19 pandemic has radically altered safety assumptions around the world. The emergence of the coronavirus moved from China to Europe, then to the United States and then to the rest of the Western Hemisphere. Already economically damaged by its dependence on commodity exports since the onset of the Chinese slowdown, Latin America was suffering from the successive restrictions of the different geographical areas, to finally enter also into a production and consumption crisis and a health and labor catastrophe. The region is expected to be one of the hardest hit, with effects also in the field of security.

This annual report , however, focuses on American regional security in 2019. Although in some respects it includes events from early 2020, and therefore some early effects of the pandemic, the impact of the pandemic on issues such as regional geopolitics, state budgetary difficulties, organized crime and citizen security are left for next year's report .

To the extent that in recent months other developments that affected security in 2019 proved to be somewhat transitory, Venezuela remained the main focus of regional insecurity during the past year. In the report we analyze the return of Iran to the Caribbean country, after first China and then Russia preferred not to see their own economic interests harmed; we also note the consolidation of the ELN and part of the ex-FARC as Colombian-Venezuelan binational groups.

In addition, we highlight the progress in the first time that Hezbollah has been identified as a terrorist group by several countries and we provide figures on the drop in Russian arms sales to Latin America and on the relative lack of commercialization in the region of defense material produced by Spain. We also quantify the contribution of Latin American troops to UN peacekeeping missions, as well as the success of Bolsonaro and the failure of AMLO in the evolution of homicides in Brazil and Mexico. Regarding drug trafficking, 2019 saw the first coca crop eradication operation in the VRAEM, the most complicated area of Peru in the fight against drug trafficking.

CONTENTS

SUMMARY EXECUTIVE

Latin America's largest insecurity hotspot persists in Venezuela

EXTRAHEMISPHERIC PRESENCE

Iran returns to Venezuela as a last resort after the end of credits from China and Russia

Emili J. Blasco

ISLAMIST TERRORISM

The designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist throughout the Western Hemisphere brings together strategies

Mauricio Cardarelli

GUERRILLAS

ELN and ex-FARC have 1,700 troops in Venezuela, with one-third local recruits

María Gabriela Fajardo

ARMS IMPORTS

Russia became an important arms supplier for Latin America, but its sells have dropped

Peter Cavanagh

ARMS PURCHASES

Spanish arms exports to Latin America, below the peak of 2015 

Álvaro Fernández

PEACE MISSIONS 

Latin America contributes only 3% of the contingent of UN peacekeeping missions

Jaime Azpiri

PUBLIC SAFETY

Bolsonaro reduces homicides by 19.2% and López Obrador sees them rise by 2.5%.

T. Dias de Assis, M. Kropiwnicka

NARCOTRAPHIC

Peru eradicates coca plants for the first time in the VRAEM, Shining Path's area of action

Eduardo Villa Corta

[Ming-Sho Ho, Challenging Beijing's Mandate of Heaven. Taiwan's Sunflower and Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement. Temple University Press. Philadelphia, 2019. 230 p.]

review / Claudia López

Taiwan's Sunflower Movement and Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement achieved international notoriety throughout 2014, when they challenged the Chinese regime's 'Mandate of Heaven', to use the image that gives degree scroll to the book. It analyzes the origins, processes and also the outcomes of both protests, at a time of consolidation of the rise of the People's Republic of China. Challenging Beijing's Mandate of Heaven provides a detailed overview of where, why and how these movements came into being and achieved relevance.

Taiwan's Sunflower Movement developed in March and April 2014, when citizen demonstrations protested against the approval of a free trade agreement with China. Between September and December of the same year, the Umbrella Movement staged 79 days of protests in Hong Kong demanding universal suffrage to elect the highest authority of this enclave of special status within China. These protests attracted international attention for their peaceful and civilized organization.

Ming-Sho Ho begins by describing the historical background of Taiwan and Hong Kong from their Chinese origins. He then analyzes the status of both territories so far this century, when Taiwan and Hong Kong have begun to encounter increased pressure from China. It also reviews the similar economic circumstances that produced the two waves of youth revolts. In the second part of the book, the two movements are analyzed: the voluntary contributions, the decision-making process and its improvisation, the internal power shift, the political influences and the challenges of the initiative. The book includes appendices with the list of Taiwanese and Hong Kong people interviewed and the methodology used for the analysis of the protests.

Ming-Sho Ho was born in 1973 in Taiwan and has been a close observer of the island's social movements; during his time as a doctorate student in Hong Kong he also followed the political discussion in the former British colony. He is currently researching initiatives to promote renewable energy in East Asian nations.

Being from Taiwan gave him access to the Sunflower Movement and allowed him to develop a close relationship with several of its key activists. He was able to witness some of the students' internal meetings and conduct in-depth interviews with students, leaders, politicians, NGO activists, journalists and university professors. This provided him with a variety of sources for his research.

Although they are two territories with different characteristics - Hong Kong is under the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China, but enjoys management assistant autonomy; Taiwan remains independent, but its statehood is challenged - both represent a strategic challenge for Beijing in its consolidation as a superpower.

The author's sympathy for these two movements is obvious throughout the book, as is his admiration for the risk taken by these student groups, especially in Hong Kong, where many of them were convicted of 'public nuisance' and 'disturbing the peace' and, in numerous cases, ended up sentenced to more than a year in prison.

The two movements had a similar beginning and development , but each ended very differently. In Taiwan, thanks to the initiative, the free trade agreement with China failed and was withdrawn, and the protesters were able to call a farewell rally to celebrate that victory. In Hong Kong, police repression succeeded in stifling the protest and a final massive raid brought a disappointing end for the protesters. However, it is possible that without the experience of those mobilizations, the new student reaction that throughout 2019 and early 2020 has put the highest Chinese authorities on the ropes in Hong Kong would not have been possible.