The hydrocarbon field is the central axis of the Gas 2020-2023 Plan of President Alberto Fernández, which subsidizes part of the investment

Activity of YPF, Argentina's state-owned hydrocarbons company [YPF].

ANALYSIS / Ignacio Urbasos Arbeloa

Argentina is facing a deep economic crisis that is having a severe impact on the standard of living of its citizens. The country, which had managed to emerge with enormous sacrifices from the 2001 corralito, is seeing its leaders committing the same macroeconomic recklessness that led the national Economics to collapse. After a hugely disappointing mandate of Mauricio Macri and his economic "gradualism", the new administration of Alberto Fernandez has inherited a very delicate status , now aggravated by the global and national crisis generated by Covid-19. The public debt already represents almost 100% of the GDP, the Argentine peso is worth less than 90 units per US dollar, while the public deficit persists. Economics remains in recession, accumulating four years of decline. The IMF, which lent nearly $44 billion to Argentina in 2018 in the largest loan in the institution's history, has begun to lose patience with the lack of structural reforms and hints of debt restructuring by the government. In this critical status , Argentines are looking to the development of the unconventional oil industry as a possible way out of the economic crisis. In particular, the Vaca Muerta super field has been the focus of attention of international investors, government and citizens for a decade, being a very promising project not Exempt environmental and technical challenges.

The energy sector in Argentina: a history of fluctuations

The oil sector in Argentina has more than 100 years of history since oil was discovered in the Patagonian desert in 1907. The geographical difficulties of the area -lack of water, distance from Buenos Aires and saline winds of more than 100 km/h- made the project advance very slowly until the outbreak of the First World War. The European conflict interrupted coal imports from England, which up to that date constituted 95% of Argentina's energy consumption. The emergence of oil in the interwar period as a strategic raw subject revalued the sector, which began to receive huge foreign and domestic investments in the 1920's. By 1921 YPF was created, the first state-owned oil business in Latin America, with energy self-sufficiency as its main goal. The country's political upheaval during the so-called Década Infame (1930-43) and the effects of the Great Depression damaged the incipient oil sector. The years of Perón's government saw a timid take-off of the oil industry with the opening of the sector to foreign companies and the construction of the first oil pipelines. In 1958 Arturo Frondizi became President of Argentina and sanctioned the Hydrocarbons Law of 1958, achieving an impressive development of the sector in only 4 years with an immense public and private investment policy that tripled oil production, extended the network of gas pipelines and generalized the access of industry and households to natural gas. The oil regime in Argentina maintained the ownership of the resource in the hands of the state, but allowed the participation of private and foreign companies in the production process.

Since the successful decade of the 1960s in oil subject , the sector entered a period of relative stagnation in parallel with Argentina's chaotic politics and Economics at the time. The 1970s was a complex journey in the desert for YPF, mired in enormous debt and unable to increase production and ensure the longed-for self-sufficiency.

With the so-called Washington Consensus and the arrival of Carlos Menem to the presidency in 1990, YPF was privatized and the state monopoly over the sector was fragmented. By 1998, YPF was fully privatized under the ownership of Repsol, which controlled 97.5% of its capital. It was in the period 1996-2003 when maximum oil production was reached, exporting natural gas to Chile, Brazil and Uruguay, and exceeding 300,000 barrels of crude oil per day in net exports.

However, a change in trend soon began with state intervention in the market. Domestic consumption with fixed sales prices for oil producers was less attractive than the export market, encouraging private companies to overproduce in order to export oil and increase revenues exponentially. With the rise in oil prices during the so-called "commodity super-cycle" during the first decade of this century, the price difference between exports and domestic sales increased, generating a real incentive to focus on production. Exploration was thus left in the background, since domestic consumption was growing rapidly due to tax incentives and a near horizon was foreseen without the possibility of exports and, therefore, lower income from the increase in reserves.

The 2001 crisis was overcome in a context of fiscal and trade surplus, which made it possible to recover the confidence of international creditors and reduce the public debt Issue . The energy sector was precisely the main driver of this recovery, accounting for more than half of the trade surplus in the 2004-2006 period and one of Argentina's main sources of fiscal revenues. However, as mentioned above, this production was not sustainable due to the existence of a fiscal framework that distorted oil companies' incentives in favor of immediate consumption without investing in exploration. By 2004, a new tariff was applied to crude oil exports that floated on the basis of the international price of crude oil, reaching 45% if the price was above US$45. The excessively rentier approach of Néstor Kirchner's presidency ended up dilapidating the incentives for investment by the sector, although it is true that they allowed for a spectacular increase in derived fiscal revenues, boosting Argentina's generous social and debt payment plans. As a good sample this decline in exploration, in the 1980s more than 100 exploratory wells were drilled annually, in 1990 the figure exceeded 90 and by 2010 the figure was 26 wells per year. This figure is especially dramatic if we take into account the dynamics that the oil and gas sector usually follows, with large investments in exploration and infrastructure in times of high prices, as was the case between 2001-2014. 

In 2011, after a decade of debates on the oil sector in Argentina, President Cristina Fernández decided to expropriate 51% of the shares of YPF held by Repsol, citing reasons of energy sovereignty and the decline of the sector. This decision followed the line taken by Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales in 2006 to increase the weight of the State in the hydrocarbons sector at a time of electoral success for the Latin American left. The expropriation took place the same year that Argentina became a net energy importer and coincided with the finding of the large shale reserves in Neuquén precisely by YPF, today known as Vaca Muerta. YPF at that time was the direct producer of approximately one third of Argentina's total Issue . The expropriation took place at the same time as the imposition of the "cepo cambiario", a capital control system that made private foreign investment in the sector even less attractive. Not only was the country unable to recover its energy self-sufficiency, but it also entered a period of intense imports that hindered access to dollars and produced a large part of the macroeconomic imbalance of the current economic crisis.

The arrival of Mauricio Macri in 2015 foresaw a new stage for the sector with policies more favorable to private initiative. One of the first measures was to establish a fixed price at the "wellhead" of Vaca Muerta's operations with the idea of encouraging the start-up of projects. As the economic crisis worsened, the unpopular measure of increasing electricity and fuel prices by more than 30% was chosen, generating enormous discontent in the context of a constant devaluation of the Argentine peso and the rising cost of living. The Energy portfolio was marked by enormous instability, with three different ministers who generated enormous legal insecurity by constantly changing the regulatory framework for hydrocarbons. Renewable solar and wind energy, boosted by a new energy plan and a greater liberalization of investments, managed to double their energy contribution during Mauricio Macri's stay in the Casa Rosada.

The first years of Alberto Fernández have been marked by an unconditional support to the hydrocarbons sector, being Vaca Muerta the central axis of his energy policy, announcing the Gas Plan 2020-2023 that will subsidize part of the investment in the sector. On the other hand, despite the context of health emergency during 2020, 39 renewable energy projects were installed, with an installed power of about 1.5 GW, which represents an increase of almost 60% over the previous year. In any case, the continuity of this growth will depend on the access to foreign currency in the country, essential to be able to buy panels and windmills from abroad. The renewable energy boom in Argentina led Danish Vestas to install the first windmill assembly plant in the country in 2018, which already has several plants producing solar panels to supply domestic demand.

Characteristics of Vaca Muerta

Vaca Muerta is not a field from a technical point of view, it is a sedimentary training of enormous magnitude and has scattered deposits of natural gas and oil that can only be exploited with unconventional techniques: hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. These characteristics make Vaca Muerta a complex activity, which requires attracting as much talent as possible, especially from international players with experience in the exploitation of unconventional hydrocarbons. Likewise, conditions in the province of Neuquén are complex considering the scarcity of rainfall and the importance of the fruit and vegetable industry, in direct competition with the water resources required for the exploitation of unconventional oil.

Since its finding, the potential of Vaca Muerta has been compared to that of the Eagle Ford basin in the United States, a producer of more than one million barrels per day. Evidently, the Neuquén region has neither the oil business ecosystem of Texas nor its fiscal facilities, making what could be geologically similar in reality two totally different stories. In December 2020 Vaca Muerte produced 124,000 barrels of oil per day, a figure that is expected to gradually increase throughout this year to reach 150,000 barrels per day, about 30% of the 470,000 barrels per day that Argentina produced in 2020. Natural gas follows a slower process, pending the development of infrastructure that will allow the transportation of large volumes of gas to consumption and export centers. In this regard, Fernández announced in November 2020 the Argentine Gas Production Promotion Plan 2020-2023 with which the Casa Rosada seeks to save dollars via import substitution. The plan facilitates the acquisition of dollars for investors and improves the maximum selling price of natural gas by almost 50%, to US$3.70 per mbtu, in the hope of receiving the necessary investment, estimated at US$6.5 billion, to achieve gas self-sufficiency. Argentina already has the capacity to export natural gas to Chile, Uruguay and Brazil through pipelines. Unfortunately, the floating vessel exporting natural gas from Vaca Muerte left Argentina at the end of 2020 after YPF unilaterally broke the ten-year contract with the vessel's owner, Exmar, citing economic difficulties, limiting the capacity to sell natural gas outside the continent.  

One of the great advantages of Vaca Muerta is the presence of international companies with experience in the aforementioned US unconventional oil basins. The learning curve of the North American fracking sector after 2014 is being applied in Vaca Muerta, which has seen drilling costs drop by 50% since 2014 while gaining in productivity. The arrival of US capital may accelerate if Joe Biden's administration fiscally and environmentally restricts oil activities in the country, agreement to his environmentalist diary . Currently the main operator in Vaca Muerta after YPF is Chevron, followed by Tecpetrol, Wintershell, Shell, Total and Pluspetrol, in an ecosystem with 18 oil companies working in different blocks.

Vaca Muerta as a national strategy

It is clear that achieving energy self-sufficiency will help Argentina's macroeconomic problems, the main headache for its citizens in recent years. Not Exempt environmental risk, Vaca Muerta can be a lifeline for a country whose international credibility is at historic lows. The pro-hydrocarbon narrative assumed by Alberto Fernandez follows the line of his Mexican counterpart Andres Lopez Obrador, with whom guide intends to lead a new moderate left-wing axis in Latin America. The ghost of the nationalization of YPF by the now vice-president Cristina Fernandez, as well as the recent breach of contract with Exmar continue to generate uncertainty among international investors. On the other hand, the poor financial status of YPF, the main player in Vaca Muerta, with a debt of more than US$ 8 billion, is a major burden for the country's oil expectations. Likewise, Vaca Muerta is far from realizing its potential, with significant but insufficient production to guarantee revenues that would bring about a radical change in Argentina's economic and social status . In order to guarantee its success, a context of favorable oil prices and the fluid arrival of foreign investors are needed. Two variables that cannot be taken for granted given the Argentine political context and the increasingly strong decarbonization policy of the traditional oil companies.

The big question now is how to reconcile large-scale fossil fuel development with Argentina's latest climate change commitments: to reduce CO2 emissions by 19% by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Similarly, the promising trajectory in renewable energy development during Mauricio Macri's presidency may lose momentum if the oil and gas sector attracts public and private investment, displacing solar and wind.

Vaca Muerta will most probably advance slowly but surely as international oil prices stabilize upwards. The possibility of generating foreign currency and boosting an Economics on the verge of collapse should not be underestimated, but expecting Vaca Muerta to solve Argentina's problems by itself can only end in a new episode of frustration in the southern country.

Qatar's economic reinforcement and expanded relations with Russia, China and Turkey have made the blockade imposed by its Gulf neighbors less effective.

It is a reality: Qatar has won its battle against the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia after more than three years of diplomatic rupture during which the two countries, together with other Arab neighbors, isolated the Qatari peninsula commercially and territorially. Economic and geopolitical reasons explain why the blockade imposed has finally faded away without Qatar giving in to its autonomous diplomatic line.

Qatar's emir Tamim Al Thani at the 2018 Munich Security lecture [Kuhlmann/MSC].

article / Sebastián Bruzzone

In June 2017, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Libya, Yemen and the Maldives accused the Al Thani family of supporting Islamic terrorism and the Muslim Brotherhood and initiated a total blockade on trade to and from Qatar until Doha complied with thirteen conditions. However, last January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman welcomed Qatar's Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani with an unexpected embrace in the Saudi city of Al-Ula, sealing the end of yet another dark chapter in the modern history of the Persian Gulf. But how many of the thirteen demands has Qatar fulfilled to reconcile with its neighbors? None.

As if nothing had happened. Tamim Al Thani arrived in Saudi Arabia to participate in the 41st Gulf Cooperation committee (GCC) Summit where member states pledged efforts to promote solidarity, stability and multilateralism in the face of challenges in the region, which is confronted by Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program, as well as its sabotage and destruction plans. In addition, the GCC as a whole appreciated the mediating role of Kuwait, then U.S. President Donald J. Trump and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner.

The meeting of the Gulf Arab leaders has been the thaw in the political desert after a storm of mutual accusations and instability in what was called the "Qatar diplomatic crisis"; this rapprochement, as an immediate effect, clears the normal preparation of the soccer World Cup scheduled to take place in Qatar next year. The return of regional and diplomatic understanding is always positive in urgent situations such as an economic crisis, a world pandemic or a common Shiite enemy arming missiles on the other side of the sea. In any case, the Qatar of the Al Thani can be crowned as the winner of the economic pulse against the Emirati Al Nahyan and the Saudi Al Saud unable to suffocate the small peninsula.

The factors

The relevant question brings us back to the initial degree scroll prior to these lines: how has Qatar managed to withstand the pressure without buckling in the slightest in the face of the thirteen conditions demanded in 2017? Several factors contribute to explaining it.

First, the injection of capital by the QIA (Qatar Investment Authority). At the beginning of the blockade, the banking system suffered a capital flight of more than $30 billion and foreign investment fell sharply. The Qatari sovereign wealth fund responded by providing $38.5 billion to provide liquidity to the banks and revive the Economics. The sudden trade blockade by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia led to a financial panic that prompted foreign investors, and even Qatari residents, to transfer their assets out of the country and liquidate their positions in fear of a market collapse.

Second, the rapprochement with Turkey. In 2018, Qatar came to Turkey's rescue by committing to invest $15 billion in Turkish subject assets and, in 2020, to execute a currency swap agreement in order to raise the value of the Turkish lira. In reciprocity, Turkey increased commodity exports to Qatar by 29% and increased its military presence in the Qatari peninsula in case of a possible invasion or attack by its neighbors, building a second Turkish military base near Doha. In addition, as an internal reinforcement measure, the Qatari government has invested more than $30 billion in military equipment, artillery, submarines and aircraft from American companies.

Third, the rapprochement with Iran. Qatar shares with the Persian country the South Pars North Dome gas field, considered the largest in the world, and positioned itself as a mediator between the Trump Administration and the Ayatollah government. Since 2017, Iran has supplied 100,000 tons of food daily to Doha in the face of a potential food crisis caused by the blockade of the only land border with Saudi Arabia through which 40% of the food was entering.

Fourth, the rapprochement with Russia and China. The Qatari sovereign wealth fund acquired a 19% stake in Rosneft, opening the door to a partnership between the Russian oil company and Qatar Petroleum and to more joint ventures between the two nations. In the same vein, Qatar Airways increased its stake to 5% of the capital of China Southern Airlines.

Fifth, its reinforcement as the world's leading exporter of LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas). It is important to know that Qatar's main economic engine is gas, not oil. That is why, in 2020, the Qatari government initiated its expansion plan by approving a $50 billion investment to expand its liquefaction and LNG carrier capacity, and a $29 billion investment to build more offshore offshore offshore platforms in North Dome. The Qatari government has forecast that its LNG production will grow by 40% by 2027, from 77 to 110 million tons per year.

We should keep in mind that LNG transportation is much safer, cleaner, greener and cheaper than oil transportation. Moreover, Royal Dutch Shell predicted in report "Annual LNG Outlook Report 2019" that global LNG demand would double by 2040. If this forecast is confirmed, Qatar would be on the threshold of impressive economic growth in the coming decades. It is therefore in its best interest in that status to maintain its solvent public coffers and a stable political climate in the Middle East region. As if that were not enough, last November 2020, Tamim Al Thani announced that future state budgets will be configured on the basis of a fictitious price of $40 per barrel, a value considerably smaller than the WTI Oil Barrel or Brent Oil Barrel which is around $60-70. In other words, the Qatari government will index its public expense considering the volatility of hydrocarbon prices. In other words, Qatar seeks to be proactive in the face of a possible collapse in the price of crude oil, promoting an efficient public expense policy.

And sixth, the maintenance of the Qatar Investment Authority's investment portfolio , valued at $300 billion. The assets of the Qatari sovereign wealth fund constitute a life insurance policy for the country, which can order its liquidation in situations of extreme need.

Qatar has a very important role to play in the future of the Persian Gulf. The Al Thani dynasty has demonstrated its capacity for political and economic management and, above all, its great foresight for the future vis-à-vis the other countries of the Gulf Cooperation committee . The small peninsular "pearl" has struck a blow on the table by imposing itself on the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, and on the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed, who did not even show up in Al-Ula. This geopolitical move, plus the Biden Administration's decision to maintain its hard-line policy towards Iran, seems to guarantee the international isolation of the Persian country's ayatollah regime.

IDF soldiers during a study tour as part of Sunday culture, at the Ramon Crater Visitor Center [IDF].

ESSAY / Jairo Císcar

The geopolitical reality that exists in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean is incredibly complex, and within it the Arab-Israeli conflict stands out. If we pay attention to History, we can see that it is by no means a new conflict (outside its form): it can be traced back to more than 3,100 years ago. It is a land that has been permanently disputed; despite being the vast majority of it desert and very hostile to humans, it has been coveted and settled by multiple peoples and civilizations. The disputed territory, which stretches across what today is Israel, Palestine, and parts of Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria practically coincides with historic Canaan, the Promised Land of the Jewish people. Since those days, the control and prevalence of human groups over the territory was linked to military superiority, as the conflict was always latent. The presence of military, violence and conflict has been a constant aspect of societies established in the area; and, with geography and history, is fundamental to understand the current conflict and the functioning of the Israeli society.

As we have said, a priori it does not have great reasons for a fierce fight for the territory, but the reality is different: the disputed area is one of the key places in the geostrategy of the western and eastern world. This thin strip, between the Tigris and Euphrates (the Fertile Crescent, considered the cradle of the first civilizations) and the mouth of the Nile, although it does not enjoy great water or natural resources, is an area of high strategic value: it acts as a bridge between Africa, Asia and the Mediterranean (with Europe by sea). It is also a sacred place for the three great monotheistic religions of the world, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the "Peoples of the Book", who group under their creeds more than half of the world's inhabitants. Thus, for millennia, the land of Israel has been abuzz with cultural and religious exchanges ... and of course, struggles for its control.

According to the Bible, the main para-historical account of these events, the first Israelites began to arrive in the Canaanite lands around 2000 BC, after God promised Abraham that land ".... To your descendants ..."[1] The massive arrival of Israelites would occur around 1400 BC, where they started a series of campaigns and expelled or assimilated the various Canaanite peoples such as the Philistines (of which the Palestinians claim to be descendants), until the Kingdoms of Israel and Judah finally united around the year 1000 BC under a monarchy that would come to dominate the region until their separation in 924 BC.

It is at this time that we can begin to speak of a people of Israel, who will inhabit this land uninterruptedly, under the rule of other great empires such as the Assyrian, the Babylonian, and the Macedonian, to finally end their existence under the Roman Empire. It is in 63 BC when Pompey conquered Jerusalem and occupied Judea, ending the freedom of the people of Israel. It will be in 70 AD, though, with the emperor Titus, when after a new Hebrew uprising the Second Temple of Jerusalem was razed, and the Diaspora of the Hebrew people began; that is, their emigration to other places across the East and West, living in small communities in which, suffering constant persecutions, they continued with their minds set on a future return to their "Promised Land". The population vacuum left by the Diaspora was then filled again by peoples present in the area, as well as by Arabs.

The current state of Israel

This review of the historical antiquity of the conflict is necessary because this is one with some very special characteristics: practically no other conflict is justified before such extremes by both parties with "sentimental" or dubious "legal" reasons.

The current state of Israel, founded in 1948 with the partition of the British Protectorate of Palestine, argues its existence in the need for a Jewish state that not only represents and welcomes such a community but also meets its own religious requirements, since in Judaism the Hebrew is spoken as the "chosen people of God", and Israel as its "Promised Land". So, being the state of Israel the direct heir of the ancient Hebrew people, it would become the legitimate occupier of the lands quoted in Genesis 15: 18-21. This is known as the concept of Greater Israel (see map)[2].

On the Palestinian side, they exhibit as their main argument thirteen centuries of Muslim rule (638-1920) over the region of Palestine, from the Orthodox caliphate to the Ottoman Empire. They claim that the Jewish presence in the region is primarily based on the massive immigration of Jews during the late 19th and 20th centuries, following the popularization of Zionism, as well as on the expulsion of more than 700,000 Palestinians before, during and after the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, a fact known as the Nakba[3], and of many other Palestinians and Muslims in general since the beginning of the conflict. Some also base their historical claim on their origin as descendants of the Philistines.

However, although these arguments are weak, beyond historical conjecture, the reality is, nonetheless, that these aspirations have been the ones that have provoked the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This properly begins in the early 20th century, with the rise of Zionism in response to the growing anti-Semitism in Europe, and the Arab refusal to see Jews settled in the area of Palestine. During the years of the British Mandate for Palestine (1920-1948) there were the first episodes of great violence between Jews and Palestinians. Small terrorist actions by the Arabs against Kibbutzim, which were contested by Zionist organizations, became the daily norm. This turned into a spiral of violence and assassinations, with brutal episodes such as the Buraq and Hebron revolts, which ended with some 200 Jews killed by Arabs, and some 120 Arabs killed by the British army.[4] The Palestinian people were killed in a spiral of violence and assassinations.

Another dark episode of this time was the complicit relations between the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Almin Al-Husseini, and the Nazi regime, united by a common diary regarding Jews. He had meetings with Adolf Hitler and gave them mutual support, as the extracts of their conversations collect[5]. But it will not be until the adoption of the "United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine" through Resolution 181 (II) of the General Assembly when the war broke out on a large scale.[6] The Jews accepted the plan, but the Arab League announced that, if it became effective, they would not hesitate to invade the territory.

And so, it was. On May 14, 1948, hours after the proclamation of the state of Israel by Ben-Gurion, Israel was invaded by a joint force of Egyptian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Syrian and Jordanian troops. In this way, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War began, beginning a period of war that has not stopped until today, almost 72 years later. Despite the multiple peace agreements reached (with Egypt and Jordan), the dozens of United Nations resolutions, and the Oslo Accords, which established the roadmap for achieving a lasting peace between Israel and Palestine, conflicts continue, and they have seriously affected the development of the societies and peoples of the region.

The Israel Defense Forces

Despite the difficulties suffered since the day of its independence, Israel has managed to establish itself as the only effective democracy in the region, with a strong rule of law and a welfare state. It has a Human Development Index of 0.906, considered very high; is an example in education and development, being the third country in the world with more university graduates over the total population (20%) and is a world leader in R&D in technology. Meanwhile, the countries around it face serious difficulties, and in the case of Palestine, great misery. One of the keys to Israel's success and survival is, without a doubt, its Army. Without it, it would not have been able to lay the foundations of the country that it is today, as it would have been devastated by neighboring countries from the first day of its independence.

It is not daring to say that Israeli society is one of the most militarized in the world. It is even difficult to distinguish between Israel as a country or Israel as an army. There is no doubt that the structure of the country is based on the Army and on the concept of "one people". The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) act as the backbone of society and we find an overwhelming part of the country's top officials who have served as active soldiers. The paradigmatic example are the current leaders of the two main Knesset parties: Benny Ganz (former Chief of Staff of the IDF) and Benjamin Netanyahu (a veteran of the special forces in the 1970s, and combat wounded).

This influence exerted by the Tzahal[7] in the country is fundamentally due to three reasons. The first is the reality of war. Although, as we have previously commented, Israel is a prosperous country and practically equal to the rest of the western world, it lives in a reality of permanent conflict, both inside and outside its borders. When it is not carrying out large anti-terrorist operations such as Operation "Protective Edge," carried out in Gaza in 2014, it is in an internal fight against attacks by lone wolves (especially bloody recent episodes of knife attacks on Israeli civilians and military) and against rocket and missile launches from the Gaza Strip. The Israeli population has become accustomed to the sound of missile alarms, and to seeing the "Iron Dome" anti-missile system in operation. It is common for all houses to have small air raid shelters, as well as in public buildings and schools. In them, students learn how to behave in the face of an attack and basic security measures. The vision of the Army on the street is something completely common, whether it be armored vehicles rolling through the streets, fighters flying over the sky, or platoons of soldiers getting on the public bus with their full equipment. At this point, we must not forget the suffering in which the Palestinian population constantly lives, as well as its harsh living conditions, motivated not only by the Israeli blockade, but also by living under the government of political parties such as Al-Fatah or Hamas. The reality of war is especially present in the territories under dispute with other countries: the Golan Heights in Syria and the so-called Palestinian Territories (the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip). Military operations and clashes with insurgents are practically daily in these areas.

This permanent tension and the reality of war not only affect the population indirectly, but also directly with compulsory military service. Israel is the developed country that spends the most defense budget according to its GDP and its population.[8] Today, Israel invests 4.3% of its GDP in defense (not counting investment in industry and military R&D).[9] In the early 1980s, it came to invest around 22%. Its army has 670,000 soldiers, of whom 170,000 are professionals, and 35.9% of its population (just over 3 million) are ready for combat. It is estimated that the country can carry out a general mobilization around 48-72 hours. Its military strength is based not only on its technological vanguard in terms of weapons systems such as the F-35 (and atomic arsenal), material, armored vehicles (like the Merkava MBT), but also on its compulsory military service system that keeps the majority of the population trained to defend its country. Israel has a unique military service in the western world, being compulsory for all those over 18 years of age, be they men or women. In the case of men, it lasts 32 months, while women remain under military discipline for 21 months, although those that are framed in combat units usually serve the same time as men. Military service has exceptions, such as Arabs who do not want to serve and ultra-Orthodox Jews. However, more and more Israeli Arabs serve in the armed forces, including in mixed units with Druze, Jews and Christians; the same goes for the ultra-orthodox, who are beginning to serve in units adapted to their religious needs. Citizens who complete military service remain in the reserve until they are 40 years old, although it is estimated that only a quarter of them do so actively.[10] The same goes for the ultra-orthodox, who are beginning to serve in units adapted to their religious needs.

Social cohesion

Israeli military service and, by extension, the Israeli Defense Forces are, therefore, the greatest factor of social cohesion in the country, above even religion. This is the second reason why the army influences Israel. The experience of a country protection service carried out by all generations creates great social cohesion. In the Israeli mindset, serving in the military, protecting your family and ensuring the survival of the state is one of the greatest aspirations in life. From the school, within the academic curriculum itself, the idea of patriotism and service to the nation is integrated. And right now, despite huge contrasts between the Jewish majority and minorities, it is also a tool for social integration for Arabs, Druze and Christians. Despite racism and general mistrust towards Arabs, if you serve in the Armed Forces, the reality changes completely: you are respected, you integrate more easily into social life, and your opportunities for work and study after the enlistment period have increased considerably. Mixed units, such as Unit 585 where Bedouins and Christian Arabs serve,[11] allow these minorities to continue to throw down barriers in Israeli society, although on many occasions they find rejection from their own communities.

Israelis residing abroad are also called to service, after which many permanently settle in the country. This enhances the sense of community even for Jews still in the Diaspora.

In short, the IDF creates a sense of duty and belonging to the homeland, whatever the origin, as well as a strong link with the armed forces (which is hardly seen in other western countries) and acceptance of the sacrifices that must be made in order to ensure the survival of the country.

The third and last reason, the most important one, and the one that summarizes the role that the Army has in society and in the country, is the reality that, as said above, the survival of the country depends on the Army. This is how the military occupation of territories beyond the borders established in 1948, the bombings in civilian areas, the elimination of individual objectives are justified by the population and the Government. After 3,000 years, and since 1948 perhaps more than ever, the Israeli people depend on weapons to create a protection zone around them, and after the persecution throughout the centuries culminating in the Holocaust and its return to the "Promised Land," neither the state nor the majority of the population are willing to yield in their security against countries or organizations that directly threaten the existence of Israel as a country. This is why despite the multiple truces and the will (political and real) to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, the country cannot afford to step back in terms of preparing its armed forces and lobbying.

Obviously, during the current Covid-19 pandemic, the Army is having a key role in the success of the country in fighting the virus. The current rate of vaccination (near 70 doses per 100 people) is boosted by the use of reserve medics from the Army, as well as the logistic experience and planning (among obviously many other factors). Also, they have provided thousands of contact tracers, and the construction of hundreds of vaccination posts, and dozens of quarantine facilities. Even could be arguable that the military training could play a role in coping with the harsh restrictions that were imposed in the country.

The State-Army-People trinity exemplifies the reality that Israel lives, where the Army has a fundamental (and difficult) role in society. It is difficult to foresee a change in reality in the near future, but without a doubt, the army will continue to have the leadership role that it has assumed, in different forms, for 3,000 years.

[1] Genesis 15:18 New International Version (NIV). 18: "On that day the Lord made a covenant with Abram and said, 'To your descendants I give this land, from the Wadi [a] of Egypt to the great river, the Euphrates'."

[2] Great Israel matches to previously mentioned Bible passage Gen. 15: 18-21.

[3] Independent, JS (2019, May 16). This is why Palestinians wave keys during the 'Day of Catastrophe'. Retrieved March 23, 2020, from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/nakba-day-catastrophe-palestinians-israel-benjamin-netanyahu-gaza-west-bank-hamas-a8346156.html

[4] Ross Stewart (2004). Causes and Consequences of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. London: Evan Brothers, Ltd., 2004.

[5] Record of the Conversation Between the Führer and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem on November 28, 1941, in Berlin, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. XIII, London , 1964, p. 881ff, in Walter Lacquer and Barry Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader, (NY: Facts on File, 1984), pp. 79-84. Retrieved from https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-mufti-and-the-f-uuml-hrer#2."Germany stood for uncompromising war against the Jews. That naturally included active opposition to the Jewish national home in Palestine. .... Germany would furnish positive and practical aid to the Arabs involved in the same struggle .... Germany's objective [is] ... solely the destruction of the Jewish element residing in the Arab sphere .... In that hour the Mufti would be the most authoritative spokesman for the Arab world. The Mufti thanked Hitler profusely. "

[6] United Nations General Assembly A / RES / 181 (II) of 29 November 1947.

[7] Tzahal is a Hebrew acronym used to refer to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).

[8] Newsroom (8th. June 2009). Arming Up: The world's biggest military spenders by population. 03-20-2020, by The Economist Retrieved from: https://www.economist.com/news/2009/06/08/arming-up

[9] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (nd). SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Retrieved March 21, 2020, from https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex

[10] Gross, JA (2016, May 30). Just a quarter of all eligible reservists serve in the IDF. Retrieved March 22, 2020, from https://www.timesofisrael.com/just-a-quarter-of-all-eligible-reservists-serve-in-the-idf/

[AHRONHEIM, A. ( 2020, January 12). Arab Christians and Bedouins in the IDF: Meet the members of Unit 585. Retrieved March 19, 2020, from https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/The-sky-is-the-limit-in-the- IDFs-unique-Unit-585-613948

Several countries in the Americas are celebrating in 2021 their two-hundredth anniversary of a break with Spain that did not always mean a final independence.ca celebrate in 2021 their two centuries of a break with Spain that did not always mean a final independence.

Several American nations are commemorating this year the two centuries of their separation from Spain, recalling a process that took place in all the Spanish possessions in continental America within a few years of each other. In some cases, it was a process of successive independences, as happened with Guatemala, which later belonged to the Mexican Empire and then to a Central American republic, and Panama, which was part of Colombia until the 20th century. But even later, both countries experienced direct interference by the United States, in episodes that were very decisive for the entire region.

Panama Canal submission ceremony to the Panamanian authorities on December 31, 1999.

article / Angie Grijalva

During 2021, several American countries celebrate their independence from Spain; the largest and most festive of these is Mexico. In other nations, the date of 1821 is colored by later historical developments: Panama also commemorates every year the day in 1903 when it broke with Bogota, while in the case of Guatemala that independence did not immediately imply a republic of its own, since together with its neighboring nations in 1822 it was nominally dependent on Mexico and between 1823 and 1839 it was part of the United Provinces of Central America and the Federal Republic of Central America. Moreover, the regional hegemony of the United States called into question in later decades the full sovereignty of these countries: Guatemala suffered in 1954 the first coup d'état openly promoted by Washington in the Western Hemisphere, and Panama did not have absolute control over its entire territory until the United States handed over the canal in 1999.

Panama and its canal

The Panama Canal project was important for the United States because it would make it possible to easily connect its two coasts by sea and consolidate the global rise sought by Theodore Roosevelt's presidency, guided by the maxim that only the nation that controlled both oceans would be a truly international power. Given the refusal of Colombia, to which the province of Panama then belonged, to accept the conditions set by the United States to build the canal, resuming the work on the paralyzed French project , Washington was faced with two options: invade the isthmus or promote Panama's independence from Colombia[1]. The Republic of Panama declared its independence on November 3, 1903 and with it Roosevelt negotiated a very favorable agreement for the United States that gave it perpetual sovereignty over the canal and over a wide strip of land on either side of it. Washington thus gained control of Panama and extended its regional dominance.

After a decade of difficult work and a high issue of deaths among the labor force, which came from all over the Caribbean and Asia, due to dengue fever, malaria and yellow fever, in 1913 the Atlantic and Pacific oceans were finally connected and the canal was opened to the transit of ships.

Over time, U.S. sovereignty over a portion of the country and the military instructions installed there fueled a rejection movement in Panama that became especially virulent in the 1960's. The Carter Administration admitted to negotiating the cession of the canal in a 1977 agreement that incorporated the Panamanians in the management of inter-oceanic traffic and set the submission of all installations in 1999. The Carter Administration agreed to negotiate the cession of the canal in a 1977 agreement that incorporated the Panamanians in the management of inter-oceanic traffic and set the submission of all facilities in 1999. When this finally took place, the country experienced the occasion as a new independence celebration, saying goodbye to U.S. troops that only ten years earlier had been very active, invading Panama City and other areas to arrest President Manuel Noriega for drug trafficking.

Critical moment in Guatemala

The Panama Canal gave the United States an undoubted projection of power over its hemisphere. However, during the Cold War, Washington also found it necessary to resort to operations, in some cases direct, to overthrow governments it considered close to communism. This occurred with the overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala in 1954.

The arrival of Árbenz to the presidency in 1951 constituted a threat to the United Fruit Company (UFCO) because of the agrarian reform he was promoting[2]. Although the advance of communist parties in Latin America was beginning to grow, the real threat in certain countries was the expropriation of land by US monopolies. It is estimated that by 1950, the UFCO owned at least 225,000 hectares of land in Guatemala, of which the agrarian reform was to expropriate 162,000 hectares in 1952. With political support from Washington, UFCO claimed that the compensation offered did not correspond to the true value of the land and branded the Árbenz government as communist even though this was not true.

In 1953, the newly inaugurated Eisenhower Administration established a plan to destabilize the government and stage a coup d'état against Árbenz. On the one hand, Secretary of State John F. Dulles sought the support of the Organization of American States, encouraging the condemnation of Guatemala for receiving a shipment of arms from the Soviet Union, which had been acquired due to the refusal of the United States to sell arms to the Central American country. On the other hand, the CIA launched the mission statement PBSUCCESS to guarantee the quartermaster of a faction of the Guatemalan Army ready to rebel against Árbenz. The movement was headed by Colonel Castillo Armas, who was in exile in Honduras and from there opened the invasion on June 18, 1954. When the capital was bombed, the bulk of the Army refused to respond, leaving Árbenz alone, who resigned in a few days.

Once in power, Castillo Armas returned the land expropriated from UFCO and brought new U.S. investors into the country. Dulles called this victory "the greatest triumph against communism in the last five years". The overthrow of Árbenz was seen by the United States as a model for further operations in Latin America. The Nobel award for Literature Mario Vargas Llosa has pointed out that this action against Árbenz could be seen as "the moment when Latin America was screwed", since for many it was the evidence that the normal development of democracy was not possible, and that pushed certain sectors to defend revolution as the only way to make their societies prosper.

[1] McCullough, D. (2001). The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914. Simon & Schuster.

[2] G. Rabe, S. (2017). Intervention in Guatemala, 1953-1954. In S. G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism. The University of North Carolina Press.

A minimum agreement at the last moment avoids the chaos of a agreement Brexit, but further negotiations will have to be held over the next few years.

Fragment of Brexit mural [Pixabay].

ANALYSIS / Pablo Gurbindo

After the United Kingdom officially left the European Union on January 31, 2020 at midnight, with the entrance into force of the Withdrawalagreement , it seemed that the issue that has practically monopolized the discussion in Brussels in recent years had been settled. But nothing could be further from the truth. The "political Brexit" had been resolved, but the "economic Brexit" still remained to be resolved.

In order to avoid chaos, this agreement provided for a transition period of 11 months, until December 31, 2020. During this period the United Kingdom, despite being already outside the EU, had to continue to be subject to European legislation and the Court of Justice of the EU as before, but without having a voice and a vote in the EU. The goal of this transition was to give both parties time to reach an agreement to define the future relationship. All parties knew that 11 months would not be enough time. Only a new trade agreement takes years to negotiate, the agreement with Canada took 7 years, for example. For this, the transition period included a possible extension before June 30, but Johnson did not want to ask for it, and promised his citizens to have a trade agreement by January 1, 2021.

With the fear of a possible Brexit without agreement, and the serious consequences it would have for the economies and citizens of both parties, an agreement was finally reached on December 24, just one week before the end of the transition period.

This agreement entered into force on January 1, 2021 on a provisional basis, since there was not enough time for it to become C in one week. The question now is: what does this agreement consist of, what have been the sticking points, and what have been the first tangible consequences during these first months?

The agreement on Trade and Cooperation (ACC)

What needs to be made clear from the outset is that this is a minimum agreement . It is a hard Brexit. A agreement Brexit has been avoided which would have been catastrophic, but it is still a hard Brexit.

The PCA between the United Kingdom and the European Union comprises a free trade agreement , a close association on subject of public security and a general governance framework .

The most important points of the agreement are the following:

Trade in goods

The PCA is very ambitious in this sense, as it establishes free trade between the two parties without any tariff or quota subject any product. If there had been no agreement in this sense, their trade relationship would have been governed by the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), with its corresponding quotas and tariffs. However, this free trade has a catch. This absence of any tariff or quota subject is only for "British originating" products, and this is where the complexity lies.

The rules of origin are detailed in the PCA, and although as a general rule the agreement is generous in qualifying a product as "British", there are certain sectors where this certification will be more demanding. For example, for an electric vehicle produced in the UK and exported to the EU to avoid tariffs, at least 45% of its added value must be British or European and its battery must be entirely British or European. From now on, proving the origin of each shipment in certain sectors is going to become a bureaucratic hell that did not exist before December 31. And the re-export of unprocessed foreign products from British soil to Europe will now be subject to a double tariff: one on entrance to the United Kingdom and another on entrance to the Union.

However, even if there are no tariff or quota subject on products, the usual trade flow will not be maintained. For example, in the area of trade in agri-food products, the absence of an agreement in the United Kingdom's sanitary and phytosanitary regime means that from now on, trade in these products will require sanitary certificates that were not previously required. This increase in "red tape" may have important consequences for products that are more easily substitutable, as importers of these products will prefer to avoid this extra bureaucracy by switching from British suppliers to other European ones.

Financial Services

In the subject services, the agreement is rather poor, but the lack of agreement on financial services, a very important sector for the United Kingdom, which alone generates 21% of British services exports, stands out.

While the United Kingdom was part of the Union, its financial institutions could operate freely throughout the EU thanks to the "financial passport", since all Member States have agreed on similar regulatory and supervisory rules for the markets. But this no longer applies to the UK.

The British government unilaterally decided to maintain easy access to its markets for EU entities, but the EU has not reciprocated.

In the absence of agreements on financial subject , European rules and regulations concerning third country entities, as a general rule, simply facilitate the establishment of these entities in the Union in order to operate in its markets.

One of the EU's objectives with this lack of reciprocity may have been the desire to wrest part of its capital from the City of London, Europe's leading financial place .

Citizens

Most of this section was resolved with the Withdrawal agreement , which guaranteed for life the maintenance of acquired rightsresidency program, work...) for European citizens already on British soil, or British citizens on European soil.

The ACC has agreed to abolish the need to apply for visas bilaterally for tourist stays not exceeding 3 months. For these cases it will now be necessary to carry a passport, not just a national identity card. But for longer stays, residency program or work visas will be required.

As for the recognition of professional and university degrees and qualifications, despite the UK's interest in maintaining them automatically as they are now, the EU has not allowed it. This could mean, for example, that qualified professionals such as lawyers or nurses will find it more difficult to have their degree scroll recognized and be able to work.

data protection and security cooperation

The agreement will allow police and legal cooperation to continue, but not with the same intensity as before. The United Kingdom will no longer be part of the EU data instructions on these matters. Exchanges of information will only be made at the written request of a party, either by requesting information or by sending information on its own initiative.

British relations with Europol (European Police Office) or Eurojust (European Agency for Judicial Cooperation) will be maintained, but as an external partnership .

Participation in Union programs

The United Kingdom will continue to be part of some Community programs such as: Horizon, the main European scientific cooperation program; Euratom, through a cooperationagreement external to the ACC; ITER, an international program for the study of fusion energy; Copernicus, a program led by the European Space Agency for the development of autonomous and continuous Earth observation capacity; and SST (Space Surveillance and Tracking), a European program for tracking space objects to avoid their collision.

But on the other hand, the UK will not continue in other programs, most notably the important Erasmus student exchange program. Johnson has already announced the creation of a national student exchange program named after the British mathematician Alan Turing, who cracked the Enigma code during World War II.

Friction points in the negotiation

There have been certain points which, due to their complexity or symbolism, have been the main points of friction between the Union and the United Kingdom. They have even jeopardized the success of the negotiations. The three main sticking points for the negotiations have been: fisheries, the level-playing field and governance.

Fishing

The disproportionate importance that fishing has had on the negotiation is surprising, considering that it only represents 0.1% of the British GDP, and is not an essential sector for the EU either. Its importance lies in its symbolic value, and the importance given to it by Brexit supporters as an example of recovering lost sovereignty. It should also be borne in mind that it is one of the points on which the UK had the upper hand in the negotiations. British waters are home to some of Europe's main fishing grounds, which have been accounting for 15% of total European fisheries. Of these fishing grounds, 57% were taken by the EU-27 and the remaining 43% by British fishermen. This percentage greatly infuriated the British fishing sector, which has been one of the main sectors supporting Brexit.

The British intention was to negotiate annual access quotas to its waters, following Norway's example with the EU. But finally a 25% cut in catches has been agreed upon in a progressive manner, but maintaining access to British waters. This agreement will be in force for the next five and a half years, after which new negotiations will be necessary, which will then be on an annual basis. In exchange, the EU has kept the possibility of commercial retaliation in the event that European fishermen are denied access to British waters.

"Level-playing field"

The topic of unfair skill was one of the most worrying issues in Brussels. Given that from now on the British do not have to follow European legislation, there was concern that, just a few kilometers from the Union, a country of the size and weight of the United Kingdom would considerably reduce its labor, environmental, tax or public aid standards. This could result in many European companies deciding to relocate to the UK because of this reduction in standards.

The agreement establishes a monitoring and retaliation mechanism in cases of discrepancies if one of the parties feels aggrieved. If there is a dispute, depending on the case, it will be submitted to a panel of experts, or it will be submitted to arbitration. For the EU a system where tariff offsets would have been automatic and if not interpreted by the CJEU would have been preferable. But for the UK one of its main objectives in the negotiation was not to be under the jurisdiction of the CJEU in any form.

Governance

The governance design of the agreement is complex. It is chaired by the Joint association committee , which will ensure that the PCA is correctly applied and interpreted, and in which all issues that may arise will be discussed. This committee will be assisted by more than thirty specialized committees and technical groups.

If a dispute arises, it shall be submitted to this joint association committee . If a solution is not reached by mutual agreement , then an external arbitration will be held, the decision of which is binding. In case of non-compliance, the aggrieved party is authorized to retaliate.

This instrument allows the EU to cover its back against the risk of the UK breaching part of the agreement. This risk gained a lot of strength during the negotiations, when Johnson presented to the British Parliament the Internal Market Act, which aimed to avoid any internal customs subject in the UK. This bill would go against the "Irish safeguard" agreed by Johnson himself and the EU in the Withdrawalagreement , and would go against international law as a clear contravention of the principle of "pacta sunt servanda". In the end this law was not passed, but it created great tension between the EU and the UK, in the British civil service examination of Johnson and even among its own ranks by calling into question the international credibility of the country.

Consequences

During the first months of the ACC's entrance into force, several important consequences have already been observed.

The controversial withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Erasmus program has already been felt. According to British universities, applications for programs of study from European citizens have fallen by 40%. The pandemic has played a role in this significant reduction, but it should also be noted that university fees in the UK after the program's exit have increased fourfold.

In terms of financial services, the City of London has already lost its degree scroll as Europe's leading financial center to Amsterdam in the first few months of the year. Daily equity trading in Amsterdam in January totaled 9.2 billion euros, higher than the 8.6 billion euros managed by the City. The London average last year was EUR 17.5 billion, far higher than the second-ranked European place , Frankfurt, with an average of EUR 5.9 billion. Last year, Amsterdam's average trade figure was 2.6 billion euros, making it the sixth largest financial place in Europe. The EU's lack of reciprocity in financial services has been able to achieve its goal for the time being.

One of the most curious anecdotes demonstrating the changes brought about by Brexit during these first months was the viral video of the Dutch customs authorities confiscating ham sandwiches from transporters arriving by ferry from the United Kingdom to the Netherlands. With the entrance into force of the PCA, animal products are not allowed to be exported without the corresponding health certificates.

Despite the absence of tariffs and quotas, the increased bureaucracy was expected to affect exchange and it has. According to data from the UK Road Transport association , UK exports to the EU via the ports fell by 68% in January compared to the same month last year.

It seemed that the British fishing sectors could be among the main beneficiaries of the agreement, but after these first months British fishermen are not satisfied. New bureaucratic requirements are slowing down deliveries and some fishermen are complaining that their catches are going to waste because they cannot be delivered on time to certain European markets. According to Scottish fishing representatives, delays due to bureaucracy are causing a loss of one million pounds a day to the sector. It should be borne in mind that UK fish exports to the EU accounted for 67% of the total in 2019. Faced with complaints from the sector, the British government has already announced a financial aid of 23 million pounds.

Conclusion

The agreement reached is undoubtedly a better result than the no agreement, but it is an incomplete agreement , and further negotiations will be necessary. The future of the PCA will depend on the change of position of the United Kingdom, which during the negotiation has prioritized having regulatory autonomy and recovering its "lost sovereignty". The agreement is also fragile as it allows either party to terminate the negotiated relationship if 12 months' notice is given.

The European Union and the United Kingdom are doomed to understand each other. The Union will have to learn to live with a neighbor with a lot of power and influence, and the United Kingdom will have to learn to live in the sphere of influence of the 27.

But, when the time comes, the United Kingdom will always have the option of article 49 of the EU Treaty, which regulates the accession of new countries to the Union.

[Marko Papic, Geopolitical Alpha. An Investment Framework for Predicting the Future (Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley, 2021), 286 pp.]

March 3, 2021

review / Emili J. Blasco

"In the post-Trump and post-Brexit era, geopolitics is all that counts," says Marko Papic in Geopolitical Alpha, a book on political risk whose purpose is to provide a method or framework of work for those engaged in foresight analysis. A consultant in investment funds, Papic condenses here his experience in a profession that has gained attention in recent years due to growing national and international political instability. If risk factors used to be concentrated in development or emerging countries, they are now also present in the advanced world.

With the degree scroll of the book, Papic designates a process of analysis in which geopolitics itself, in its most geographically related sense, is only a part of the considerations to be taken into account, as the author argues that political and then economic (and financial) determinants matter first. For the analysis as a whole and the estimates to which it gives rise, Papic uses the qualifier "alpha geopolitics" (or "alpha geopolitics"), as if referring to a plus or reinforced geopolitics: one that takes into account political or macroeconomic constraints in addition to the traditional geopolitical imperatives.

At bottom it is a question of nominalism, in a collateral battle in which the author entangles himself unnecessarily. One might say that it is a settling of scores with his former employer, the Stratfor led by George Friedman, whom Papic praises in his pages, but who he seems to criticize underhandedly for basing much of his foresight on the geography of nations. To suggest that, however, is to make a caricature of Friedman's sound analysis. In any case, Papic has certainly reinforced his training with financial programs of study and makes useful and interesting use of them.

The central idea of the book, leaving aside this anecdotal rivalry, is that in order to determine what governments will do, it is not the intentions they proclaim, but what constrains them and forces them to act in a certain way. "Investors (and anyone interested in political forecasting) should focus on the material constraints, not the preferences of politicians," says Papic, and adds a phrase that he repeats, written in italics, in several chapters: "Preferences are optional and subject to constraints, while constraints are neither optional nor subject to preferences.

These material constraints, according to the order of importance established by Papic, are political constraints (the majority available, the opinion of the average voter, the level of popularity of the government or the president, the time in power or the national and international context, among other factors), macroeconomic and financial constraints (budgetary room for maneuver, levels of deficit, inflation and debt, value of bonds and currency...) and geopolitical constraints (the imperatives that, initially derived from geography -the particular place that countries occupy on the world chessboard-, mark the foreign policy of nations)....) and geopolitical (the imperatives that, initially derived from geography - the particular place that countries occupy on the world board - mark the foreign policy of nations). To that list, add constitutional and legal issues, but only to be taken into account if the above-mentioned factors do not pose any constraint, as it is well known that politicians have little problem circumventing the law.

The author, who presents all this as a method or framework of work, considers that the fact that there may be irrational politicians who are not subject entrance objective material constraints does not derail the approach, since this status is eventually overcome because "there is no irrationality that can alter reality". However, he admits as a possible objection that, just as the opinion of the average voter conditions the actions of the politician, there may be a "hysterical society" that conditions the politician and that it itself is not affected in the short term by objective constraints that make it bend to reality. "The time it takes for an entire society to return to sanity is an unknown and impossible prognosis," he acknowledges.

Papic proposes a reasonable process of analysis, broadly followed by other analysts, so there is no need for a certain initial, somewhat smug boasting about his personal prospective skills, which are indispensable for investors. Nevertheless, the work has the merit of a systematized and rigorous exhibition .

The text is punctuated with specific cases, whose analysis is not only well documented but also conveniently illustrated with B tables. Among them, the one presenting the evolution of the pro-euro opinion in Germany and the growing Europhile position of the average German voter, without which Merkel would not have reached the previously unthinkable point of accepting the mutualization of debt in the EU. Or those that note how the trade of England, France and Russia with Germany increased before the First World War, or that of the United States with Japan before the Second World War, which exemplifies that rivalry between nations does not normally affect their commercial transactions.

Other interesting aspects of the piece are his warning that " class average will force China out of geopolitical excitement," because international instability and risk endangers Chinese economic progress, and "keeping your class average happy takes precedence over world domination." "My constraint-based framework suggests that Beijing is much more constrained than U.S. policymakers seem to think (...) If the U.S. pushes too hard on trade and Economics, it will threaten the prime directive for China: escape the middle-income trap. And that is when Beijing would respond with aggression," says Papic.

With regard to the EU, the author sees no risks for European integration in the next decade. "The geopolitical imperative is clear: integrate or perish into irrelevance. Europe is not integrating because of some misplaced utopian fantasy. Its sovereign states are integrating out of weakness and fear. Unions out of weakness are often more sustainable in the long run. After all, the original thirteen colonies of the United States integrated out of fear that the United Kingdom might eventually invade them again."

Another suggestive contribution is to label as the "Buenos Aires Consensus" the new economic policy that the world seems to be entering, moving away from the Washington Consensus that has governed international economic standards since the 1980s. Papic suggests that we are exchanging the era of "laissez faire" for one of a certain economic dirigisme.

The nascent English kingdom was consolidated in civil service examination to power on the other side of the English Channel, giving rise to a particularism that is particularly alive today.

With no turning back now, once Brexit has been consummated, England is seeking to establish a new relationship with its European neighbors. Its departure has not been seconded by any other country, which means that London has to come to terms with a European Union that remains a bloc. Despite the drama with which many Europeans have welcomed Britain's farewell, this is yet another chapter in the complex relationship that a large island has with the continent to which it is close. Island and continent continue where geography has placed them -at a distance of particular value- and will possibly reproduce vicissitudes already seen throughout their mutual history.

Fragment of the Bayeux tapestry, illustrating the battle of Hastings in 1066.

article / María José Beltramo

The result of the 2016 referendum on Brexit may have come as a surprise, as the abrupt manner in which the United Kingdom finally and effectively left the European Union on December 31, 2020, has undoubtedly come as a surprise. However, what we have seen is not so alien to the history of the British relationship with the rest of Europe. If we go back centuries, we can see a geopolitical patron saint that has been repeated on other occasions, and also today, without having to speak of determinism.

Although it is worth mentioning some previous moments in the relationship of the insular Britannia with the continent next to which it is located, such as the period of Romanization, the gestation of the patron saint that at the same time combines linkage and distancing, or even rejection, we can perhaps place it at the beginning of the second millennium, when from Norman invasions that cross the English Channel the nascent kingdom of England is consolidated precisely against the power of the other shore.

England in Norman times

Normandy became a political entity in northern France when in 911, after Viking invasions, the Norman chief Rolon reached an agreement with the Frankish king that guaranteed him the territory in exchange for its defense[1]. Normandy became a duchy and gradually adopted the Frankish feudal system, facilitating the gradual integration of both peoples. This intense relationship would eventually lead to the full incorporation of Normandy into the kingdom of France in 1204.

Before the progressive Norman dissolution, however, the Scandinavian people settled in that part of northern France carried their particular character and organizational capacity, which ensured their independence for several centuries, across the English Channel.

The Norman-English relationship began in 1066 with the Battle of Hastings, in an invasion that led to the Duke of Normandy, William the Conqueror, being crowned king of England in London. The arrival of the Normans had several consequences. From the political point of view, they introduced the islands into the European relations of the time and adapted English feudalism to Norman feudalism, a mixture that would lay the instructions for the future English parliamentarism. In terms of Economics, the Normans demonstrated their Scandinavian organizational capacity in the reorganization of productive activities. In their different conquests, the Normans knew how to take advantage of the best of each system and adapt it to their culture and needs, and so it happened in England, where they developed a particular idiosyncrasy.

From this contact with the continent, England began to consolidate as a monarchy without leaving its link with the Duchy of Normandy. However, with its strengthening after the fall of the Plantagenets in France, England gained the momentum it lacked to finally become an independent kingdom, completely separated from the continent, detached from a Normandy with a weak and critical lineage. In fact, the absorption of the Norman duchy by the kingdom of France facilitated the development and consolidation of the English monarchy as an independent and strong entity[2].

The separation with respect to the European continent refers us to Ortega y Gasset's analysis of European decadence and the moral crisis it is going through[3]. The continental powers, being in a status of geographical continuity, and therefore in greater contact, are more likely to spread their status among themselves and to be dominated by another major power. England, having broken the bridge of feudal ties that connected it with the rest of Europe, finds no difficulty in distancing itself when it sees fit, always in its own interests, something we see repeated several times throughout its history. This is especially evident in the vicissitudes that punctuate the United Kingdom's relationship with the continent throughout the final decades of the second millennium.

English status since 1945

The Second World War greatly weakened the United Kingdom, not only economically, but also as an empire. In the subsequent process of decolonization, London lost possessions in Asia and Africa; moreover, the Suez Canal conflict confirmed its decline as a key player, precisely at the hands of the United States, which had replaced it as the world's leading power. The post-war confrontation with the Soviet Union and the American presence in Europe meant that the transatlantic relationship was no longer based on the preferential link that Washington had with England, so the role of the British also diminished[4].

In 1957, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg created the European Economic Community (EEC). Conservative Harold MacMillan, British Prime Minister from 1957 to 1963, refused to include the United Kingdom in the initiative, but aware of the need to revitalize British Economics and "the difficulty of maintaining a policy that was alien to European interests", he promoted the creation in 1959 of the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) together with Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria and Portugal.

The Common Market proved to be a success and in 1963 the United Kingdom considered joining it, but was blocked by de Gaulle's France. In 1966, the British again submitted their application, but it was again rejected by De Gaulle. The French general's conception of Europe did not include the Atlantic bloc, he still thought of building Europe on a Franco-German axis.

In the 1970s there was a directional shift in European politics. The British Conservatives won the 1970 elections and in 1973 their country joined the EEC. The international economic crisis, which was particularly difficult in the United Kingdom, prompted the Labour Party, back in power, to propose a review of the conditions of membership and Premier Harold Wilson called a referendum in 1975: 17 million Britons wanted to remain (67% of voters) compared with only 8 million who called for a first Brexit.

However, when the European Monetary System (EMS) was launched in 1979 to equalize currencies and achieve "economic convergence," the United Kingdom decided not to join this voluntary agreement . Europe was experiencing a gradual economic boom, but British Economics was not keeping pace, which partly led to the early elections of 1979. These were won by the Conservatives with Margaret Thatcher, who remained in Downing Street until 1990. The Thatcher revolution "marked the way out of the crisis of the 1970s". In 1984, London reduced its contribution to EU funds and Thatcher, who was very reluctant to accept EU budgets and other procedures that reduced national sovereignty, again asked for a review of the agreements.

In 1985 the Schengen Agreements were signed (the opening of borders between certain countries generating a kind of much wider second border), which came into force ten years later. Again, the UK stayed out of it. As was also the case in relation to the euro, when the single currency came into effect in 2002, maintaining the pound sterling to this day.

Immigration from Central and Eastern European countries, following the 2004 EU enlargement, admitted by the Labour Party's Tony Blair, and the acceleration of financial harmonization mechanisms following the 2008-2011 crisis, faced with displeasure by the Conservative David Cameron, provided arguments for the anti-EU speech in the United Kingdom. This led to the rise of the anti-European UKIP and the assumption of its postulates by broad Tory sectors, finally amalgamated by the controversial personality of Boris Johnson.

In an interview with the BBC Johnson referred in 2016 to many of the arguments used in favor of Brexit, such as the dialectical vision that the United Kingdom has of its relationship with the continent or the fear of losing sovereignty and the dissolution of its own profile in the European magma. The premier returned to these ideas in his message to the British people as the country was about to begin its last year in the EU. His words were in some ways an echo of a centuries-old tug-of-war.

Repeating patterns

As we have seen, England has always maintained its own rhythm. Its geographical separation from the continent - far enough away to be able to preserve a particular dynamic, but also close enough to fear a threat, which sometimes proved to be effective - determined the distinctly insular identity of the British and their attitude towards the rest of Europe.

We are dealing with a power that throughout history has always sought to maintain its national sovereignty at all costs and whose geopolitical imperative has been to prevent the continent from being dominated by a rival great power (the perception, during the management the 2008 crisis, that Germany was once again exercising a certain hegemony in Europe may have fueled the Brexit).

Perhaps in the medieval period we cannot link this to a meditated political strategy, but we do see how, involuntarily and circumstantially, we can see how, from the very beginning, there are certain conditions that favor the distancing of the island from the continent, although without losing contact in a radical way. In more recent history we observe this same distant attitude, this time premeditated, with the pursuit of interests focused on the search for economic prosperity and the maintenance of both its global influence and its national sovereignty.

[1] Charles Haskins, The Normans in European History (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915).

[2] Yves Lacoste, Géopolitique : La longue histoire d'aujourd'hui (Paris: Larousse, 2006).

[3] José Ortega y Gasset, La rebelión de las masas (Madrid: Alianza publishing house, 1983). 

[4] José Ramón Díez Espinosa et al., Historia del mundo actual (desde 1945 hasta nuestros días), (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1996).

Attempt by both to reposition France at the geostrategic center of Europe, with civil service examination of Germany.

The nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte and the current president of the French Republic are not completely parallel lives, but there are some really suggestive similarities between the two. It is often said that French presidents revive some of the longed-for packaging of the decapitated monarchy; in Macron's case there is probably a lot of that, but also the assumption of geopolitical imperatives already evident in the Second Empire.

Napoleon III in uniform in an 1850 portrait, and Macron in his 2019 New Year's Eve televised message.

article / José Manuel Fábregas

Emmanuel Macron's decision to hold the G7 summit in the French Basque town of Biarritz in August 2019 brought about a symbolic rapprochement with the figure of Napoleon III. The emperor, and nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte, transformed the former fishing village into a cosmopolitan holiday hub where European aristocrats and members of the highest political echelons met on an international scale. Macron, for his part, returned Biarritz to the stage of the world's major political discussions.

Thus, two personalities come together who, with the attraction of having been the youngest heads of state in the country, share two fundamental aspects in their understanding of French politics. First, the influence that their childhood has had on both of them in developing a personalist way of understanding the head of state. And, secondly, how both have tried to reposition France at the geostrategic center of Europe and have been hindered by Germany. 

What is the role of the head of state?

Born fifth in the order of succession to Napoleon I, the young Louis Napoleon Bonaparte never foresaw that he would become heir to the imperial house in 1832. According to his biographer Paul Guériot, his mother, Hortense de Beauharnais, instilled in him from an early age the idea that he was destined to rebuild the now-defunct Napoleonic Empire. His mother's insistence that he had perfect intellectual and military training transformed Louis Napoleon - who received Education from the Jacobin, and follower of Robespierre's figure, Philippe Le Bas - into a solitary, shy and megalomaniacal person obsessed with restoring Napoleonic France[1].

The revolution of February 1848, according to Jacob Talmon, was inevitable "although it was, however, an accident"[2]. The Israeli historian explains that the uprisings in various parts of Europe were a direct reaction to the territorial reordering of the congress of Vienna (1815). In this context of discontent or disillusionment with the Restoration system, the figure of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte may have benefited from the image of a romantic revolutionary assigned to him by the newspapers and opinion writings of the time. After failed coup attempts in Strasbourg (1836) and Bologna (1840), the future emperor spent a short period of time in prison. This was a decisive aspect in the construction of the romantic hero character that aroused so much admiration in a society that loved the novels of Alexandre Dumas[3]. The exploitation of this personality by means of a great propaganda apparatus allowed him to comfortably win the elections of December 1848. Thus, it could also be said that the establishment of the Second Empire - ratified by a popular plebiscite in November 1852 - was the next step in his main political project : the revival of Napoleonic France.

For his part, the current president of the French Republic also experienced an overprotective childhood that forged, like the last emperor of France, a solitary personality and an individualistic way of understanding politics. Anne Fulda underlines in her biography of Emmanuel Macron that, being born a year after the death of his older sister and after a complicated delivery, his birth was considered a miracle. This may have fostered, along with a competitive Education in which he excelled as a "child prodigy", his self-conviction that he was destined to rule the country[4]. However, his election as head of state was not the fruit of a long-term strategy, but rather, like that of Louis Napoleon, of a tactical move. The renovating image that Macron offered was cleverly exploited in an election in which he faced rivals who presented certain communicative weaknesses, such as those with a low profile like François Fillon (Republican) and Benoît Hamon (Socialist), or others with more extremist tones like Marine Le Pen (National Front) and Jean-Luc Mélenchon (Unsubmissive France).

In 2015, while still Minister of Economics, Emmanuel Macron made an interesting reflection for the weekly Le 1 on what was the role of the president in France. He understood that French citizens felt a lack after the fall of the monarchy that they had tried to fill by strengthening the figure of the president. This excessive weight of personalism in Macron's understanding of politics has also been demonstrated recently in the replacement of Édouard Philippe as prime minister. Because his popularity had grown in the last year as he had shown himself to be more charismatic and calm in counterpoint with the overacting and abusive protagonism of the president, Macron chose as his replacement Jean Castex, with a more technocratic profile that does not overshadow the president in the face of his reelection.

What role France should play in Europe

This firm commitment of both leaders to give greater importance and visibility to the position of head of state transcends the borders of the Gallic country. Napoleon III and Emmanuel Macron also share the desire to place France at the center of the European balance.

Having won the elections with a speech against the order inherited from the congress of Vienna, Napoleon III had his own European project based on the free integration or separation of the different national identities of the old continent. A clear example of this was the Crimean War (1854-1856). Fearing that the decadent Ottoman Empire would end up as a vassal of Russia, the emperor defended, together with the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Sardinia, its independence from the Ottomans in a conflict that would separate Russia from the other Western powers temporarily[5]. The Treaty of Paris (1856) would not only end the war, but also motivate Napoleon III to initiate an interventionist policy in Europe.

Napoleon III's imperial dream forced him to develop an active foreign policy focused on the expansion of French borders and the reordering of the continent taking into account two main values: nationalism and liberalism. However, Henry Kissinger rightly comments that his diplomatic work was so confused that "France got nothing"[6]. By supporting the unification of Italy at the cost of the loss of territory of the Austrian Empire, Napoleon unintentionally favored the creation of Germany. These facts strongly weakened the geostrategic influence of France in the face of the new European order to which he aspired. On the other hand, it was Bismarck's clever diplomatic tactics that would really put an end to the Vienna system, hastening the fall of the Second French Empire at the Battle of Sedan (1870).

In addition, Emmanuel Macron is presenting himself as the savior of the European Union in a context marked by the rise of populist and Eurosceptic movements. However, his ambitious reform projects have met with Angela Merkel's reluctance.

In a recent interview for The Economist, Emmanuel Macron pointed out that NATO was "brain dead" and that Europe was "on the edge of the precipice" by depending on the United States and lacking independence in terms of defense. Macron opts for greater integration of the European Union at the strategic level, going so far as to propose a single pan-European army. In response, German Chancellor Angela Merkel objected to him that Europe does not currently have the capacity to defend itself on its own and is consequently dependent on the Atlantic Alliance. In addition, Macron has also challenged the apparent agreement among the countries of the Union regarding the incorporation of new members and the relationship with Russia. The French president's veto of a possible incorporation of Albania and North Macedonia, claiming that they did not comply with EU clauses on corruption, has come to be described as a "historic mistake" by leaving the future of the Balkan countries at the mercy of Russia and China. He does not share this position with regard to Russia, with which he is willing to relax diplomatic relations and even suggests a greater integration of the country into Europe.

In final, Emmanuel Macron and Napoleon III share an excessively egocentric vision. The overexposure of certain personal characteristics in matters of State and the inordinate pretension to leadership in Europe are two aspects common to these two young leaders. Despite the fact that historiography has already judged the mistakes that precipitated Louis Napoleon into exile, it remains to be seen whether or not Macron is doomed to repeat the history of his predecessor.

[1] Guériot, P. (1944). Napoleon III. Madrid: Ediciones Técnicas.

[2] Talmón, J.L. (1960). Political messianism. La etapa romántica. Mexico City: Ed. Aguilar.

[3] Guériot, P. (1944). Napoleon III. Madrid: Ediciones Técnicas.

[4] Fulda, A. (2017). Emmanuel Macron, the president who has surprised Europe. Madrid: Ediciones Península.

[5] Milza, P. (2004). Napoleon III. Paris: Éditions Perrin.

[6] Kissinger, Henry (1994). Diplomacy (First Edition). Barcelona: Ediciones B.

[Daniel Méndez Morán, 136. China's plan in Latin America (2018), 410 pages.]

review / Jimena Puga

Through first-person research in the field and the testimony of Chinese and Latin American staff , which give the story the character of a documented report, Daniel Méndez summarizes in detail the footprint that the growing Asian superpower is leaving in the region. This allows the reader to learn about the relations between the two cultures from an economic and, above all, political point of view. The number of the degree scroll -136- is the issue that, according to the author, Beijing assigns to its plan for Latin America, in its planning of different sectorial and geographical expansion programs around the world.

The book begins with a brief reflection on China's rapid growth since the death of Mao Zedong and thanks to Deng Xiaoping's growth and opening-up policies between 1980 and 2000. This resurgence has not only been reflected in Chinese Economics , but also in society. The new generations of Chinese professionals have better university training and a better command of foreign languages than their elders, and are therefore better prepared for international relations. However, Liu Rutao, economic and commercial counselor of the Chinese Embassy in Chile explains to the author that "the history of China's going abroad is only fifteen years old, so neither the government nor the companies have a very mature thinking about how to act abroad, so we all need to study".

However, the country's short experience in the international arena is not an obstacle because, as the book shows, China has a very effective shortcut to accelerate this learning process: money. In fact, the goal of many of the most important Chinese investments in Latin America is not only access to natural resources, but also to human capital and, above all, to knowledge. Thanks to their huge financial resources, Chinese companies are acquiring companies with experience and contacts in the Americas, hiring the best professionals in each country and buying brands and technologies. "This phase is very difficult. Chinese companies are going to pay to learn. But everything is learned by paying," diplomat Chen Duqing, China's ambassador to Brazil between 2006 and 2009, explained to Méndez.

After this overview, the book moves on to China's relationship with different Latin American partners. In the case of Mexico, there is a struggle against the famous made in China. The empire of the center went to Mexico 40 years ago to study the maquiladora program; when they returned, as Méndez explains, they said: "Mexico is doing that for the United States, we are going to do it for the world". And so, a few years later, China designed and improved the strategy. There is little doubt that made in China has won the day over the Mexican maquiladoras, and it is all these decades of skill and frustration that explain the complex political relations between the two countries. This is the testimony of the people interviewed by the author. To Jorge Guajardo, this model reminds him of the colonial order imposed by Spain and continued by the United Kingdom: "Sometimes I used to say to the Chinese: Gentlemen, you cannot see Latin America as anything other than a place where you go for natural resources and in return you send manufactured products. We were already a colony. And we did not like it, it did not work. And we chose to stop being a colony. You don't want to repeat that model.

The result of these new tensions is that neither country has achieved what it was looking for. Mexico has barely increased its exports to China and the Asian giant has barely increased its investments in the Latin American country. In 2017 there were only 30 Chinese companies installed in Mexico, a very small number compared to the 200 in Peru. Other diplomats from the continent recognize that in any international meeting in which both countries are present, the Latin American country is always the most reluctant to accept Beijing's proposals. For China, Mexican "resistance" is perhaps its greatest diplomatic stumbling block in the region: the best example that its rise has not benefited all the countries of the South.

Méndez says that, unlike Mexico, Peru's mining strategy has found an ideal partner on the other side of the Pacific. In need of minerals to feed its industry and build new cities, the huge Chinese demand has pulled strongly on Peruvian Economics . Between 2004 and 2017, trade between the two increased tenfold and the Asian giant became Peru's first trading partner . China is no longer only important for its demand for copper, lead and zinc, but also for its investment flows and its capacity to launch mining projects. These financial conditions, which are very difficult to obtain from private banks, are often the comparative advantage that allows Chinese state-owned companies to beat their Western competitors.

What does this mean for Latin America, and should Latin American countries be concerned about this political and economic strategy that invests massively in their natural resources through state-owned companies? As the book indicates, many diplomats think we should be vigilant. Unlike private companies, whose primary goal is to make profits and submit dividends to their shareholders, Chinese companies are ultimately written request controlled by politicians who may have another diary. In this sense, the expansion of so many state-owned enterprises in natural resources can also become a weapon of pressure and influence.

If any Latin American leader, for example, decided to meet with the Dalai Lama or oppose any diplomatic initiative led by Beijing, the Asian giant could use its state-owned companies in retaliation, warns Méndez. In the same way that if the Peruvian government wanted to cancel a project chimo for labor or environmental violations, Beijing could threaten to deny approval of phytosanitary protocols or delay other investments. In addition, China is increasingly aware that its image, its capacity for persuasion and its cultural attractiveness (soft power) are vital to expand its political and economic project .

On the other hand, further south in the region, Uruguay has become the perfect laboratory for China. Uruguayan factories are prepared for short production runs of a few thousand cars, the country has a skilled workforce and the good infrastructure makes it possible to set up plants in Brazil or Argentina in a very short time. It must be taken into account that Chinese companies are still little known in Latin America and do not have too many financial resources, and in Uruguay they can test the market.

As for Brazil, Méndez speaks especially of the diplomacy of satellites. Satellites are not only useful for bringing television to homes and for using GPS on cell phones, but also for their military capabilities and the political prestige they imply. Brazil has collaborated with other countries such as Argentina and the United States, but political and economic tensions almost always limit space cooperation. Although it may seem paradoxical, in the case of China the distance seems to be a blessing since there are no geopolitical problems between the two: sometimes it is more difficult to work with your neighbors than with people who are far away. For Beijing, space missions serve to increase all dimensions of its power: it increases its military capabilities and contributes to its space industry and competitiveness in an economic sector with a bright future. And finally, it also serves as a public relations campaign in the world. However, the technological and economic differences are becoming so apparent that even China is outgrowing the South American giant.

From a geostrategic point of view, Méndez does not want to miss the construction of a Chinese space station on a 200-hectare site in the Argentine province of Neuquén, which has an initial investment of 50 million dollars and is part of the Chinese program for the exploration of the Moon. In addition, Argentina is the only country where the presence of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China is so B popular among the society. This Chinese bank has managed to offer the same services as any other Argentine banking institution.

Finally, Chile is one of the countries with which Beijing has the best relations, but why doesn't China invest in Chile? The answer is simple. In Chile, investment processes are clear, transparent and equal for all countries. There are no exceptions and investors have to follow the complex legal regulations to the letter. The business culture is different, and the Chinese do not like the idea of needing lawyers and 20,000 permits for everything. They like to pay bribes, and in Chile corruption causes a lot of indignation.

Throughout this country-by-country analysis, the author has made one thing clear: China has a plan. Or at least, it has been able to bet for decades on the training of officials with the goal of designing a strategy in Latin America. This planning capacity and these long-term objectives have helped the Asian giant to advance in recent years and leave a deep mark in many countries of the American continent. And what does the plan consist of? It is clear that China's goal issue one is economic. It has managed to successfully "sneak" into the three major trade blocs that include Latin American countries: NAFTA, the Pacific Alliance and Mercosur.

But Economics per se is not the only thing that drives China. To achieve its economic goals, Beijing also needs political relations and allies who can defend its diplomatic positions. Its defense of non-interference in internal affairs and of a multipolar world demands in return the silence of Latin American countries on the violation of human rights in their country and respect, for example, for the one-China policy. The Asian giant wants to expand all its strengths and is not willing to give up any of them.

In conclusion, whether or not China has a strategy for Latin America, Latin America does not have a strategy for China. And China is not an NGO; if recent history shows anything, it is that each country seeks to defend its own selfish national interests in international relations. China has its diary and is pursuing it. Perhaps the time has come for Latin America to have its own.

Prepare to project "credible combat power" in new era of "strategic competition"

If the Arctic was an important theater in the Cold War, in the new geopolitical tension its progressive thawing even accentuates its strategic characteristics. In 2019, the U.S. department Defense adapted its Arctic strategy to the new approaches of rivalry with Russia and China, and then its concretization has corresponded to the forces most involved in that region: in 2020 the Air Force presented its own document and in this 2021 the Navy has done so, also involving the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard. The guidelines seek to ensure the projection of "credible combat power".

The crew of the submarine USS Connecticut at the ICEX 2020 exercises [US Navy].

February 17, 2021

article / Pablo Sanz

The Arctic is important because of the natural wealth still to be exploited in its subsoil (22% of the world's hydrocarbon deposits, which in terms of oil would be 90 billion barrels) and because of its strategic position on the globe: the two great continental masses of Eurasia and America converge there. The opening of new maritime routes thanks to the progressive thawing of the ice is not only a commercial advantage, but also makes it possible to act militarily more quickly in this and other scenarios.

Many countries are interested in promote cooperation and multilateralism in the region, and this is being done by the Arcticcommittee ; however, the complex security environment of the Arctic Circle has led the major powers to set strategies to defend their respective interests. In the case of the United States, the department Defense updated in June 2019 the Arctic strategy it had developed three years earlier, in order to bring it into line with the new approach that emerged with the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and carried over to the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), documents that leave behind the era of combating international terrorism and elevate the relationship with China and Russia to "rivalry", in a new geopolitical status of "strategic competition".

The Pentagon's Arctic strategy was then fleshed out by the Air Force in a report of its own, presented in July 2020, and then by the Navy in January 2021. Along the same general lines, these framework approaches are aimed at three objectives:

1) As an "Arctic nation", because of its sovereignty over Alaska, the United States must guarantee security in its territory and prevent threats to other parts of the country from polar positions.

2) The United States intends to establish and lead alliances and agreements in the Arctic in accordance with international law to maintain a stable status in the area.

3) The United States undertakes to preserve free navigation and free overflight in the Arctic Circle, while limiting Russian and Chinese interference contrary to such general freedom of access and transit.

To achieve these objectives, the Pentagon has defined three mechanisms for action:

(i) Raising awareness of the importance of the area: the ability of the department Defense to detect threats in the Arctic is a prerequisite for deterring or responding to activities of strategic competitors in the region.

ii) Improve and promote operations in the Arctic: the department Defense will improve the ability of its forces to operate in the Arctic through regular exercises and deployments to the region, both independently and together with allies. Some exercises will be conducted within the NATO context while others will be bilateral or multilateral.

iii) Strengthen the rules-based order governing the Arctic: The department Defense will continue to work with U.S. allies to maintain and strengthen the freedom of navigation and overflight regime. This will help deter aggressive acts in the area.

From the new NDS, the Defense department states that the U.S. Armed Forces must be able to solve the main problem detected -the erosion of the competitive edge against China and Russia-, being able to "stop and, if necessary, defeat aggression by a great power". To this end, it must develop a "more lethal, resilient, agile and ready" force, which in the Arctic region must achieve "credible deterrent power".

U.S. military doctrine warns that the "strategic buffer" that the Arctic "is eroding," becoming "an avenue of threat to national territory due to the advances of competing great powers". In addition, it "hosts critical launching points for global power projection and increasingly accessible natural resources." However, it warns that "the immediate possibility of conflict is leave".

Thus, within the context of the implementation of the national defense strategy, the Pentagon proclaims that it will continue to prepare its units in order to ensure that the Arctic is a secure and stable region where U.S. national interests, regional security and the joint work of the nations involved to address common problems are safeguarded.

The U.S. Air Force and Navy documents outline supporting measures to ensure the ability to deter hostile actions in the Arctic by all other regional competitors in the area, while prioritizing a cooperative and continuous approach that preserves the rules by which the Arctic is governed.

Air and sea

Because the Gulf of Mexico current is directed to the European side of the Arctic, the North American side suffers even harsher environmental conditions, with less maritime infrastructures and land routes. This makes the weight of the Air Force in the defense of this space clearly greater, contributing 80% of the resources that the Pentagon dedicates to the region.

Its operations are based at several locations. Six of them are in Alaska: the large air instructions at Elmendorf-Richardson and Eielson; the Clear missile early notice facility and the Eareckson missile defense radar; and other points for coordination, training and survival school. Two others are in Greenland: the Raven training range for LC-130 aircraft and the Thule missile early notice compound. In Canada, it has a system of some fifty radars shared by NORAD (North American Air Defense Command).

The Air Force intends to improve these capabilities, as well as command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C3ISR) capabilities. It also has set a goal of increasing refueling conditions. Once the F-35 deployment at Eielson is complete, Alaska will host more advanced fighters than any other location in the world.

For its part, the U.S. Navy is positioning itself around the concept of the "Blue Arctic", thus graphically expressing the progressive homologation of what has historically been an impassable white cap with the rest of the world's oceans. The Navy plans to increase its presence, both with manned ships and with new unmanned vessels. In its strategic document, it warns that research into new capabilities "may not be fully realized and integrated into the naval force for at least a decade".

The increased naval presence in the region will also be realized through increased operations already routinely conducted in the Arctic by the Second and Sixth Fleets and through synchronization with the Marine Corps and Coast Guard based in Alaska. To ensure this operational augmentation, the Navy will undertake an upgrade of its ship docking and attendance facilities.

The Navy document, which does not specify specific preparations, also does not include the Coast Guard's announced plans for a new fleet of icebreakers. There are currently only two in service and the plan is to build three medium and three heavy vessels by 2029.

With all this, Washington is trying to cope with the accelerated effort being made by its most direct competitors. In July 2020, the State department warned about the growing interest in the Arctic on the part of Russia and China, which it accused of engaging in "increasingly aggressive" competition and lamented that those countries that want "peace, freedom and democracy", including the United States, have been "naïve".

Russia and China

Russia has the largest land mass and population within the Arctic Circle, a region from which Russia derives 25% of its GDP. No other country has such a permanent military presence above the 66th parallel; nor does any other nation have so many icebreaking ships, a fleet Moscow wants to increase with fourteen new ships, one of them nuclear-powered.

Russia formed its joint strategic command of the Northern Fleet in December 2014. "Since then, Russia has gradually strengthened its presence by creating new Arctic units, refurbishing old infrastructure and airfields and establishing new military instructions along the coast. There is also a concerted effort to establish a network of air and coastal defense missile systems, early notice radars, rescue centers and a variety of sensors," according to the U.S. Defense department s Arctic strategic report . The United States also warns that Russia is attempting to regulate maritime traffic in the Northern Route in ways that may exceed its authority under international law.

China, on the other hand, without being an Arctic nation (Mohe, its northernmost city is at the same latitude as Philadelphia or Dublin) wants to be a major player in the region. It is an observer country of the Arctic committee and claims a "near-Arctic nation" status that Washington does not recognize. In 2018, it produced the first white paper on its Arctic policy and has integrated this area into its New Silk Road initiative.

China's diplomatic, economic and scientific activities in the Arctic have grown exponentially in recent years. At the moment its operational presence is limited: it has one Ukrainian-built polar-capable icebreaker (the Xuelong; it has recently built the Xuelong 2), which has sailed Arctic waters on operations that China describes as research expeditions.

The opening of Arctic sea routes is in China's interest, as it could shorten trade shipping times to Europe and reduce its dependence on flows through the Strait of Malacca, a particularly vulnerable point.

Lately, China has been engaging in increased diplomatic activities with the Nordic countries and has research stations in Iceland and Norway, as well as mining resources in Greenland. This highlights Beijing's growing interest in consolidating its presence in the Arctic despite its remoteness from the region.

Its great financial capacity, moreover, means that Russia is counting on China to develop energy and infrastructure projects in the region, as in the case of a liquefied natural gas facility in Yamal. According to Frédéric Laserre, an expert in Arctic geopolitics at Laval University, Russia has no choice but to accept Chinese capital to build and develop the infrastructure needed to exploit the resources because of Western economic sanctions.