Map of the Japanese vision of the Free and Open Pacific [MoFA].

JOURNAL / Carmen Tirado Robles

[8-page document. PDF download ].

INTRODUCTION

The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept is said to date back to the article by Indian naval officer Captain Gurpreet Khurana, who first wrote about this geopolitical concept in early 2007, in a graduate paper "Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation". At that time, the free and open Indo-Pacific was primarily a geographical concept describing the maritime space stretching from the East African and West Asian littorals, across the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific Ocean to the East Asian coasts. At the same time, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe presented his foreign policy plan based on democratic values from which he proposed "I will engage in strategic dialogues at the leader's level with countries that share fundamental values such as Australia and India, with a view to widening the circle of free societies in Asia as well as in the world", which together with the consolidation of relations with the United States ("The times demanded that Japan shift to proactive diplomacy based on new thinking. I will demonstrate the 'Japan-U.S. Alliance for Asia and the World' even further, and to promote diplomacy that will actively contribute to stalwart solidarity in Asia"), creates the concept of Quadrilateral or Quad, as opposed to a Sino-centric view of Asia.

The idea of the Quad joins the FOIP when Abe, in August 2007, in his speech to the Indian Parliament, based on the "Confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans" and "dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and prosperity" of Asia's largest geographical region and later, already in his second term, presented at the VI Tokyo lecture on African development , which took place in Nairobi (Kenya) on August 27, 2016 (TICAD VI), the new geopolitical framework of the Indo-Pacific.

[Alyssa Ayres, Our Time Has Come. How India Is Making Its Place in the World (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2020) 360 pgs].

review / Alejandro Puigrefagut

A progressively rising India wants to occupy a prominent place among the global powers. In recent decades, discussions about India's global rise and place in the world have been on the rise, sometimes in a context of possible alliances to counter China's excessive dominance.

Alyssa Ayres, an expert on India, Pakistan and South Asia at the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, reflects well, through her book Our Time Has Come. How India Is Making Its Place in the World, the role played by this democracy at the international level, the obstacles it continues to face and the implications of its rise for the United States and other countries in the Indo-Pacific region, such as Pakistan and China. It is fair to say that India's economic expansion has placed it among the world's leading emerging powers, but now it wants to move forward and gain a place among the global powers.

For a full understanding of India's global role, the author analyzes its internal political, economic and social realities. India is the world's largest democracy, thus encompassing a wide range of national and regional parties advocating radically disparate policies. This creates complications in reaching agreements that benefit a large part of the population. In addition, other factors that complicate the relationship between the population are social division and religion. To begin with, India has a serious problem of social division caused by the distinction between social classes, or castes, some of which continue to have an important weight in decision making. Likewise, the religious question takes on a prominent role due to the large number of religions that coexist in the Indian territory; however, the Hindu and Muslim majority are the ones that mark the political diary .

Ayres highlights two characteristics that shape India's position in the world today: India's own perception of itself as a development country and its abstention from global entanglements. According to the author, despite India's emergence as one of the world's largest economies, it continues to have a domestic perception of itself as a country doomed to always be among the development nations. As a result, domestic economic policies slow down and hinder international ambitions and are thus in continuous conflict. On the other hand, India has historically stayed out of major global issues and international blocs with its policy of non-alignment.

Our Times Has Come, while defending India's high position in the international system, also highlights the major challenges India faces for not having abandoned its old policies. Firstly, Economics is still certainly protectionist and there is no clear consensus on the new inputs that a more open market Economics could bring. Second, India continues to struggle with the bequest of its non-alignment foreign policy and remains ambivalent about how it should exercise its power in multilateral institutions. And third, India remains overly protective of its autonomy, and thus seeks to shape its international interactions on Indian terms. Hence, India tends to move cautiously and deliberately in the international sphere.

On the other hand, the book emphasizes the relationship between India and the United States. The interaction between the two countries differs from their relations with other states because New Delhi, while seeking a closer strategic and economic relationship with the US, does not want to be subject to the obligations inherent in this alliance, but rather to acquire authority without having to bow to Washington.

Ayres emphasizes the need to reform global governance to create a specific space for New Delhi. His recommendations include support for India's membership in the UN Security committee and other institutions that establish the global economic and security diary . It is clear that India, as a rising power, should be better understood and appreciated on its own terms. In other words, New Delhi should acquire a more pivotal role in the international arena and take some leadership to avoid being squeezed by its direct competitors at the regional and global level.

The pages of Our Times Has Come provide several years of first-hand knowledge and study of India's foreign policy, showing its complexities and the major characteristics that shape it. Scholar Alyssa Ayres, through this book, offers us an essential analysis to understand what India is, but, above all, what it wants to become.

COMMENTARY / Norman Sempijja

February 1st, 2021

When President Yoweri Museveni came to power in 1986, he oversaw a reset of Ugandan politics for the next 35 years. He outlawed parties and formed a movement system which although has sometimes been described as a one-party state was crucial in bringing all groups on board to chart the way forward for a country that had been ravaged by misrule and conflict for almost 20 years.

Fast forward 2021, we are faced with a slightly different situation but of likely grave consequences. Uganda is in the middle of a stand-off between President Museveni and his challenger Mr Robert Kyagulanyi (also known as Bobi Wine). The issue relates to the outcome of the 2021 presidential election which although was held in a very peaceful manner had gross vote-counting irregularities. The Uganda electoral commission gave Museveni 58.6% and Kyagulanyi 34.8%. On the other hand, the tallying centres set up by Kyagulanyi's team using the Uvote app where declaration forms were uploaded once counting was done have so far given Kyagulanyi 71% and Museveni around 25% of the vote. Vote counting is still ongoing. With Kyagulanyi unlikely to concede Museveni decided to put him under house arrest to prevent him from leading mass protests. The internet was also switched off for 5 days and at the moment social average can only be accessed through the use of VPN services.

Amid this melee is Covid-19 virus rampaging through the country. The health services are still not fully prepared to deal with a massive outbreak and although the lockdown has been eased, the economic impact will be felt for years. For a country that is largely agro-based and relies heavily on the informal sector, the impact has been dire on the already struggling population. Secondly, a worrying trend has emerged internationally where various variants of the Covid virus have been registered. For example, we have new covid-19 strains in the United Kingdom, South Africa, Brazil and Japan for now. Thus, questions have lingered about the effectiveness of the current vaccines in circulation to combat these new variants. But that is beside the point. Uganda has not secured any of the vaccines yet.

Therefore, Museveni as head of state faces a difficult situation. Does he pour the meagre resources at his disposal to contain Kyagulanyi? Or does he negotiate with him to chart a way forward out of this debilitating situation? Obviously, in trying to answer these questions he will have to weigh the cost-benefits to the solutions and gauge if they fit in his diary.

So, let us imagine Museveni throws all his resources at containing Kyagulanyi. Well, he will have to curtail social average especially as it was crucial to ending former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. It is that powerful. But we should note that the internet is hard to police and is a medium through which a lot of people make a living. Either way patience will run out for the people whose livelihoods will be curtailed in the process. They will have no option but to organize protests. The bad news for Museveni is that according to African Union brief on the Sahel 2020 it is clear that violent clashes and violence against civilians are on the rise during these covid-19 times. If we mirror that with the November riots in Uganda, we are likely to see more protests if the heavy-handed policies of the state are continuously applied.

Museveni will also have to maintain Kyagulanyi under house arrest, but he will further draw the ire of the international community as his current gambit on the elections was a stretch too far. He may have burnt up his remaining currency with several international stakeholders. Apart from Western societies, citizens in different African countries have grown tired of Museveni and are pressuring their countries not to acknowledge his electoral win. This exasperation is among the young people especially in Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria and South Africa to mention but a few.

A combination of continental and international loss of support could set Uganda the same path as Zimbabwe under Mugabe if Museveni resorts to outright violence. We could see sanctions being applied on top of the travel restrictions already imposed on key players within Museveni's government. The problem for Museveni is Uganda does not possess strong support in East Africa as Mugabe did in Southern Africa. Plus, Museveni's relationship with President Kagame has been frosty, to say the least. Either way, he will have to deal with mass protests in support of freedom for Kyagulanyi in Uganda. This will call for further investment in the police and army to contain the situation. Let us not forget that with the fluid nature of Covid-19 pandemic, the country could face deep human security issues. Hence containing Kyagulanyi will come at a very political and economic cost both to Museveni and Uganda.

What if Museveni decided to negotiate with Kyagulanyi and form a government of national unity? This wouldn't be without precedent as Museveni set into place the movement system discussed earlier that brought everyone on board and for 10 years the country benefited from collective governance (except the north which was experiencing an insurgency). I'm of the persuasion that Uganda is again on similar footing. Institutions have been degraded and cannot perform independently. There is a lot of frustration with the current regime as exemplified by the parliamentary elections where the vice president and 24 ministers lost their seats. By inviting Kyagulanyi onboard Museveni will be pressing the reset button especially as he will inject young people into the system, and they could play a key role in reducing corruption and improving service delivery.

It would cost Museveni some political capital among the entrenched supporters, but it will save his legacy. He will be seen as a father of a nation mentoring young leaders to take over from him. Right now, he is seen as an insensitive, power-hungry despot. But that could change in an instant if he goes for a coalition with Kyagulanyi and other leaders like Mugisha Muntu, Nobert Mao and Patrick Amuriat. The resources that would have been spent on containing them would be allocated to the heavily challenged health care system to combat Covid-19 and other ailments.

Moreover, this will save the National Resistance Movement political party from oblivion once Museveni goes. The reason for this is the party has struggled to attract a strong intellectual and ideological talent within its ranks as it has been accused of nepotism. This would be a good time to reset the party and its structures and prepare for the transition from Museveni. By co-opting the opposition into government this will put them under scrutiny and any blunders they make will further give NRM a softer landing come 2026.

The benefit for Kyagulanyi would be experience in government. Although he was a member of parliament, gaining further experience in public governance would do him a lot of good and also build a strong support base within the country. Since his political party has the largest number of opposition members of parliament this will give him further credibility and foundation to strengthen his National Unity platform party (NUP). The same will apply for the Alliance for National Transformation (ANT) led by Mugisha Muntu. The other parties like Forum for Democratic Change (led by Patrick Amuriat) and Democratic Party (led by Nobert Mao) will get a new lease of life.

Therefore, due to the circumstances afoot, it would be of immense political worth to form a government of national unity under the leadership of President Yoweri Museveni but with considerable influence of the other parties especially the National Unity Platform, Alliance for National Transformation, Democratic Party and Forum for democratic Change. This will pause the political animosity as the country goes into reforms to ensure more transparent electoral and governance processes.

Satellite image of the Canary Islands [NASA].

COMMENTARY / Natalia Reyna Sarmiento

The global pandemic caused by Covid-19 has forced the application of quarantines and other restrictions in all parts of the world and this has greatly limited the movement of people from one country to another. Nevertheless, the migratory phenomenon has continued its course, also in the case of Europe, where the closure of borders during part of 2020 has not prevented illegal immigration, such as from sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, in this time of pandemic, the health misery of poor countries has added another reason for flight from the countries of origin.

The increase in migration in recent decades has been a consequence of various humanitarian challenges. Lack of security, fear of persecution, violence, conflicts and poverty, among other reasons, generate a status of vulnerability that in many cases pushes those who suffer from these circumstances to leave their country in search of better conditions. The emergence of Covid-19 has been another element of vulnerability in societies with scarce medical resources in the last year as well, while the arrival of migrants without knowing whether or not they were carriers of the virus has aggravated social resistance to immigration in developed economies. Both issues went hand in hand especially in the migratory crisis experienced by the Canary Islands throughout 2020, especially in the last few months.

Fourteen years after the "cayuco crisis", the archipelago experienced another B in the arrival of immigrants (this time the term that has become generalized for their boats is pateras). In 2020, more than 23,000 immigrants arrived in the Canary Islands, in crossings that at least claimed the lives of nearly 600 people. If in 2019 about a hundred boats with illegal immigrants arrived to the islands, in 2020 there were more than 550, which speaks of a migratory phenomenon multiplied by five.

Why did this increase occur, redirecting to the Canary Islands a flow that at other times has sought the Mediterranean route? On the one hand, the sea crossing to reach Europe still prevails, because in addition to the cost of airfare -prohibitive for many-, the flights require documentation that often is not possessed or that facilitates a control by the authorities -departure and arrival- that you want to avoid. On the other hand, the difficulties in points of the Mediterranean route, such as stricter policies in the admission of refugees rescued from the sea imposed by Italy or the status of war that Libya lives, where itineraries arrive from Sudan, Nigeria and Chad, for example, derived part of the pressure of the migratory mafias towards the Canary Islands. Morocco's attitude may also have played a role in this.

Spain has an interest in maintaining a good relationship with Morocco for obvious reasons. Its border with Ceuta and Melilla and its proximity to the Canary Islands make it a neighbor that can contribute both to security and to intensifying migratory pressure on Spanish territory. Precisely at a critical moment in the Canary Islands crisis, the Spanish Minister of the Interior, Fernando Grande-Marlaska, went to the neighboring country on November 20 to meet with his Moroccan counterpart, Abdelouafi Laftit, with the intention of requesting financial aid from the Alaouite monarchy to put a stop to the migratory crisis. However, although in the following days a decrease of arrivals of small boats to the Canary Islands was registered, soon the arrivals were increasing again, leaving effectiveness of the visit made by Marlaska.

On the other hand, in those weeks, Pablo Iglesias, vice-president of the Spanish government and University Secretary of Podemos, called on Morocco to hold a referendum on the future of Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony under Moroccan tutelage admitted by the UN until the holding of an enquiry for the Saharawi people. The admission in the same days of Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara by the Trump Administration (in exchange for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Morocco and Israel) led Rabat to expect a revision of the Spanish position, which is aligned with the UN approach. The ratification of this by Iglesias and above all his tone of demand made the Moroccan monarch, Mohamed VI, decide not to receive the President of the Spanish Government, Pedro Sanchez, on a trip to the neighboring country. Other issues, such as the delimitation of territorial waters made by Morocco in January, expanding its exclusive economic zone, have increased the disagreements between the two countries.

In addition to the normal tension in the Canary Islands due to the arrival of thousands of immigrants in a short time, there were also the health risks due to the pandemic. Beyond the fears spread by some about the possible entrance of people actually infected with the coronavirus, the established protocols obliged to keep isolated those arriving in small boats, which caused a problem of overcrowding in facilities that were not initially adequate.

The Spanish Red Cross created areas reserved for the isolation of people who tested positive for Covid-19. In addition, temporary macro-camps were set up to rehouse thousands of migrants who were first housed in different hotels. The transfer of groups of them by plane to points on the Peninsula created controversy that the government had to deal with. The entrance of 2021 has, at least momentarily, lowered the pressure.

GLOBAL AFFAIRS JOURNAL #3 / January 2021

download the PDF of the complete Journal ]download the PDF of the complete Journal ].

The globe rotates a few Degrees further to the West.

PRESENTATION

There was a time when the world's strategic axis was in Europe. With the incorporation of the New World into the global order, the axis shifted for a long time to the Atlantic, between Europe and America. The consolidation of the primacy of the United States made it the pivot of the world. With the development of the Asian tigers, the specific weight of the planet shifted to the Pacific, between America and Asia. Later, the initial concept of Asia-Pacific gradually lost the sense of space between two coasts to eventually refer only to the shore where China is located, as it has grown as a superpower and has become the focus of general attention. We are now witnessing another progression in the rotation of the globe, again a few Degrees further to the West. Asia-Pacific gives way to the idea of Indo-Pacific by bringing India into the equation. And it is possible that, in the future, as Eurasia becomes more compact and Africa participates more in international decisions, the way to look at the world map will be to have the Indian Ocean in the middle, as a global Mediterranean.

Today, in any case, we are witnessing a new Indo-Pacific moment. It is a new world order in which China no longer occupies the center where it aspired to settle: the ground has begun to move before it can fully settle. Beijing's own strategic haste has triggered the mobilization of the Asian environment, which is partly supported by India which, by demographic Issue and economic potential, can serve as a lever to counterbalance China's continental counterweight. Global Affairs Journal addresses in this issue the articulation of this counterweight, which revolves around the initiatives of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and the so-called Quad, whose vertexes are Japan, India, Australia and the United States, with implications also for ASEAN.

Index

THE INDO-PACIFIC AS A NEW GLOBAL GEOPOLITICAL AXIS 

Juan Luis López Aranguren [Introduction].

Professor of International Relations, University of Zaragoza

p. 6-11 [PDF version].

PRESENT COMPLEXITIES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

Shahana Thankachan

Researcher at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, India

p. 12-17 [PDF version].

UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA BEFORE

THE EMERGENCE OF CHINA AS A GREAT POWER

Florentino Portero

Director of the Institute of International Politics, Francisco de Vitoria University.

p. 18-27 [PDF version].

FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC: A JAPANESE INITIATIVE

OF FOREIGN POLICY FOR GLOBAL COOPERATION

Carmen Tirado Robles

Coordinator of the Japan research group , University of Zaragoza.

p. 28-35 [PDF version].

THE ASEAN'S INDO-PACIFIC DILEMMA

Fernando Delage

Director of the Dept. programs of study International programs of study , Universidad Loyola Andalucía

p. 36-43 [PDF version].

RECOMMENDED READINGS

J. L. López Aranguren, S. Sánchez Tapia

E. J. Blasco, A. Puigrefagut

p. 44-46 [PDF version].

The inclusion of private investment and the requirement of efficient credits differ from the overwhelming amount of loans from Chinese state banks

The active role of China as lender to an increasing number of countries has forced the United States to try to compete in this area of "soft power". Until last decade the US was clearly ahead of China in official development assistance, but Beijing has used its state-controlled banks to pour loans into ambitious projects worldwide. In order to better compete with China, Washington has created the US International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC), combining the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and with USAID's Development Credit Authority (DCA).

▲ The US agency helped to provide clean, safe, and reliable sanitation for more than 100,000 people in Nairobi, at the end of 2020 [USIDFC].

January 22, 2021

ARTICLE / Alexandria Casarano

It is not easy to know the complete amount of the international loans given by China in recent years, which skyrocketed from the middle of last decade. Some estimates say that the Chinese state and its subsidiaries have lent about US$ 1.5 trillion in direct loans and trade credits to more than 150 countries around the globe, turning China into the world's largest official creditor.

The two main Chinese foreign investment banks, the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank, were both established in 1994. The banks have been criticized for their lack of transparency and for blurring the lines between official development assistance (ODA) and commercial financial arrangements. To address this issue, Beijing founded the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) in April of 2018. The CIDCA will oversee all Chinese ODA activity, and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce will oversee all commercial financial arrangements going forward.

An additional complaint about Chinese foreign investment concerns "debt-trap diplomacy." Since the PRC first announced its "One Belt One Road" initiative in 2013, the Chinese government has steadily increased its investment in the developing world even more dramatically than it had in the early 2000's (when Chinese foreign aid was increasing annually by approximately 14%). At the 2018 China-Africa Convention Forum, the PCR pledged to invest US$ 60 billion in Africa that year alone. The Wall Street Journal said of the PRC in 2018 that it was "expanding its investments at a pace some consider reckless." Ray Washburn, president of the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), called the Chinese One Belt One Road initiative a "loan-to-own" program. In 2018, this was certainly the case with the Chinese funded Sri Lankan port project, which led the Sri Lankan government to lease the port to Beijing for a 99-year period as a result of falling behind on payments.

OPIC, founded in 1971 under the Nixon administration, was recommended for elimination in the Trump administration's 2017 budget. However, following the beginning of the US-China trade war in 2018, Washington reversed course completely. President Trump's February 2018 budget recommended increasing OPIC's funding and combining it with other government programs. These recommendations manifested themselves in the Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) Act, which was passed by Congress on October 5, 2018. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) called the BUILD Act "the most important piece of U.S. soft power legislation in more than a decade."

The US International Development Finance Corporation

The principal achievement of the BUILD Act was the creation of the US International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC), which began operation as an independent agency on December 20, 2019. The BUILD Act combined OPIC with USAID's Development Credit Authority to form the USIDFC and established an annual budget of US$ 60 billion for the new organization, which is more than double OPIC's 2018 budget of US$ 29 billion.

▲ USIDFC's investment commitments by region for the FY 2020. The US$ 29.9 billion is only a fraction of the agency's budget [USIDFC].

According to the Wall Street Journal, OPIC "has been profitable every year for the last 40 years and has contributed US$ 8.5 billion to deficit reduction," a financial success which can primarily be attributed to project management fees. As of 2018, OPIC managed a portfolio valued at US$ 23 billion. OPIC's strong fiscal track record, combined with both the concept of government program streamlining and the larger context of geopolitical competition with China, generated bipartisan support for the BUILD Act and the USIDFC.

The USIDFC has several key new capacities which OPIC lacked. OPIC's business was limited to "loan guarantees, direct lending and political-risk insurance," and suffered under a "congressional cap on its portfolio size and a prohibition on owning equity stakes in projects." The USIDFC, however, is permitted under the BUILD Act to "acquire equity or financial interests in entities as a minority investor."

Both the USIDFC currently and OPIC before its incorporation are classified as Development Finance Institutions (DFIs). DFIs seek to "crowd-in" private investment, that is, attracting private investment that would not occur otherwise. This differs from the Chinese model of state-to-state lending and falls in line with traditional American political and economic philosophy. According to the CSIS, "The USIDFC offers [...] a private sector, market-based solution. Moreover, it fills a clear void that Chinese financing is not filling. China does not support lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and it rarely helps local companies in places like Africa or Afghanistan grow."

In the fiscal year of 2020, the most USIDFC's investments were made in Latin America (US$ 8.5 billion) and Sub-Saharan Africa (US$ 8 billion). Lesser but still significant investments were made in the Indo-Pacific region (US$ 5.4 billion), Eurasia (US$ 3.2 billion), and Middle East (US$ 3 billion). This falls in line with the USIDFC's goal to invest more in lower and lower-middle income countries, as opposed to upper middle countries. OPIC had previously fallen into the pattern of investing predominantly in upper-middle countries, and while the USIDFC is still legally authorized to invest in upper-middle income countries for national security or developmental motives.

These investments serve to further US national interests abroad. According to the USIDFC webpage, "by generating economic opportunities for citizens in developing countries, challenges such as refugees, drug-financed gangs, terrorist organizations, and human trafficking can all be addressed more effectively." Between 2002 and 2014, financial commitments in the DFI sector have increased sevenfold, from US$ 10 billion to US$ 70 billion. In our increasingly globalized world, international interests increasingly overlap with national interests, and public interests increasingly overlap with private interests.

Ongoing USIDFC initiatives

The USIDFC has five ongoing initiatives to further its national interests abroad: 2X Women's Initiative, Connect Africa, Portfolio for Impact and Innovation, Health and Prosperity, and Blue Dot Network. In 2020, the USIDFC "committed to catalyzing an additional US$ 6 billion of private sector investment in global women's economic empowerment" by joining the 2X Women's Initiative which seeks global female empowerment. About US$1 billion for this US$ 6 billion commitment has been specially pledged to Africa. Projects that fall under the 2X Women's Initiative include equity financing for a woman-owned feminine hygiene products online store in Rqanda, and "expanding women's access to affordable mortgages in India."

Continuing the USIDFC's special focus on Africa follows the Connect Africa initiative, under which the USIDFC has pledged US$ 1 billion to promote economic growth and connectivity in Africa. The Connect Africa initiative involves investment in telecommunications, internet access, and infrastructure.

Under the Portfolio for Impact and Innovation initiative, the USIDFC has dedicated US$ 10 million to supporting early-stage businesses. This includes sponsoring the Indian company Varthana, which offers affordable online learning for children whose schools have been shut down due to the Covid-19 crisis.

The Health and Prosperity initiative focuses on "bolstering health systems" and "expanding access to clean water, sanitation, and nutrition." Under the Health and Prosperity initiative, the USIDFC has dedicated US$ 2 billion to projects such as financing a 200+ mile drinking water pipeline in Jordan.

The Blue Dot Network initiative, like the Connect Africa initiative, also invests in infrastructure, but on a global scale. The Blue Dot Network initiative differs from the aforementioned initiatives in being a network. Launched in November 2019, the Blue Dot Network seeks to align the interests of government, private enterprise, and civil society to facilitate the successful development of infrastructure around the globe.

It is important to note that these five initiatives are not entirely separate. Many projects fall under several initiatives at once. The Rwandan feminine products e-store project, for example, falls under both the 2X Women's initiative and the Health and Prosperity initiative.

[Rory Medcalf, Indo-Pacific Empire. China and the Contest for the World's Pivotal Region (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020) 310 pp].

review / Salvador Sánchez Tapia

In 2016, Prime Minister Abe of Japan and his Indian counterpart, Narendra Modi, took a trip on the bullet train linking Tokyo to Kobe to visualize the birth of a new era of bilateral cooperation. On the basis of this anecdote, Rory Medcalf proposes to the reader a reconceptualization of the most dynamic region of the globe that leaves behind the one that, due to the American influence, has predominated for some time under the denomination "Asia-Pacific", and which does not reflect a broader geopolitical reality.

The degree scroll of the book is somewhat misleading, as it seems to allude to an eventual world domination exercised from the Indo-Pacific region, and the struggle of China and the United States for it. This is not what the book offers.

For Medcalf, an Australian who has spent many years working in his country's foreign service, "Indo-Pacific" is an alternative geopolitical concept that encompasses a vast and eminently maritime region comprising the Pacific and Indian Oceans, through which most of the world's maritime trade flows, as well as the coastal territories connected by both seas. At the center of this immense and diverse space are Australia, acting as a sort of vertebral hinge, and the area of Southeast Asia comprising the Strait of Malacca, a vital maritime passage.

The proposed geopolitical approach serves as an argument for articulating a regional response to China's growing and increasingly threatening power that does not involve confrontation or submissive capitulation. In the author's words, it is an attempt, made from a liberal point of view, to counter China's desire to capitalize on the region in its favor.

In this sense, Medcalf's proposal is for the region's middle powers - India, Australia, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, etc. - to achieve greater coordination in order to design a future that takes into account China's legitimate interests, but in which these powers effectively balance Beijing's power. The future of the region must be designed with China, but not imposed by China. Nor by the United States, which is nonetheless recognized as a core topic in the region, and whose support the author is counting on to flesh out the idea.

The argument of the book follows a chronological script in which there are three clearly differentiated parts: past, present and future. The first of these sets out the historical reasons for considering the Indo-Pacific as a region in its own right, and sample the shortcomings of the "Asia-Pacific" vision.

The present block is descriptive in nature and briefly presentation the main players in the Indo-Pacific scenario, China's growing military power, and how China is using it to return, reminiscent of the time of Chinese navigator Zheng He, to the Indian Ocean, now an arena of geoeconomic and geopolitical confrontation, as well as a core topic of Chinese economic growth as a route for the resources the country needs, and as a maritime part of the global project of the new Silk Road.

As for the future, Medcalf offers his proposal for the region, based on a geopolitical outline in which Australia, of course, occupies a central place. On a scale ranging from cooperation to conflict, through coexistence, competition and confrontation, the author argues for the coexistence of the players on the Indo-Pacific chessboard with China, and proposes actions in the three areas of promoting development in the countries most vulnerable to Chinese influence -extortion, in some cases; Deterrence, in which the United States will continue to play a central role, but which cannot be based exclusively on its nuclear power, but rather on the growth of the military capabilities of the countries of the region; and diplomacy, exercised at various levels -bilateral, multilateral and "minilateral"- to generate mutual trust and establish norms to avoid an escalation towards confrontation and even conflict.

These three instruments must be accompanied by the internship two principles: solidarity and resilience. The former seeks a greater capacity to manage China's rise in a way that promotes a balance between the balance of power and rapprochement, avoiding the extremes of containment and accommodation to the giant's designs. On the other hand, the region's states are becoming more resistant to China's power and more capable of recovering from its negative effects.

There is no doubt that this geopolitical approach , which follows in the wake of Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" policy, is made from a distinctly Australian perspective and that, consciously or not, it enhances the role of this continent-nation, and serves its particular interests in defining its place in the world and maintaining a secure and stable environment in the face of an increasingly threatening China.

While recognizing this motivation, which is a logical consequence of the application of the old concepts of realism, the proposal vision is not without merit. For one thing, it allows us to conceptualize China in a way that captures the interest in the Indian Ocean as integral to China's view of itself in relation to the world. For another, it serves as a wake-up call, both to the many Asian middle powers and to the small Pacific island states, about the Chinese threat, offering the manna of an alternative to conflict or uncritical submission to the Chinese giant. Finally, it incorporates -at least conceptually- the United States, together with India and Japan, into a multinational effort capable, because of the economic and demographic weight of the participants, of balancing China's power.

If the intention of the concept is to foster awareness in the region of the need to balance China's power, then it can be argued that the overly Australian-centric proposal completely omits China's land dimension, and the desirability of incorporating into that balance other regional middle powers that, while not among the maritime powers, share with them the fear of China's growing power. Similarly, although the riparian nations of Africa and the Americas may be thought to form an integral part of the entity defined by the Indo-Pacific basins, they are conspicuously absent from the geopolitical design , with the exception of the United States and Russia. References to Africa are very rare; Central and South America are simply unnamed.

It is, in final, an interesting work that addresses an important global issue from a novel, realistic and thoughtful perspective, without falling into doomsday scenarios, but rather opening a door to a somewhat hopeful future in which a dominant China, whose power, it is argued, may already have reached its peak, may give rise to the flourishing of a shared space at the heart of a reconnected world in a way that the ancient navigators could not even have imagined.

The two countries are greatly exposed to solar radiation and they already share electricity interconnectors

Spain was an early developer of solar energy, but it didn't keep the pace with the required investments. The effort in renewables should mean a clear increase in installed capacity for solar energy. A partnership with Morocco, gifted with even stronger solar resources, could benefit both countries in producing and marketing this particular renewable energy. Spain and Morocco are about to have a third electricity interconnector.

January 7, 2021

ARTICLE / Ane Gil

Spain has a lot of potential in solar energy. Currently, its Germany who produces more photovoltaic electricity than Spain, Portugal or Italy in Europe. In fact, in 2019, Germany produced five times more solar energy than Spain (50 GW of installed capacity versus just 11 GW). This fact has little to do with the raw solar energy that the countries receive, considering that Spain is located in Southern Europe.

For how much solar irradiation Spain receives, the solar energy it produces is scarce. Up until 2013, the installed capacity for solar energy grew rapidly. However, since then, the country has fallen behind many other European countries in the development of capacity. The country initially had a leading role in the development of solar power, with low prices that encouraged a boom in solar power installed capacity. However, because of the 2008 financial crisis, the Spanish government drastically cut its subsidies for solar power and limited any future increases in capacity to 500 MW per year. Between 2012 and 2016, Spain was left waiting while other countries developed. The cost of this was high, seeing as Spain lost much of its world leading status to countries such as Germany, China and Japan.

However, as a legacy from Spain's earlier development of solar power, in 2018 Spain became the first country in the world using concentrated solar power system (CSP), which accounts for almost a third of solar power installed capacity in the country. Nevertheless, in 2019, Spain installed 4,752 MW of photovoltaic solar energy, which situated Spain as the sixth leading country in the world. As of 2019, Spain has a total installed solar generation capacity of 11,015 MW: 8,711 of photovoltaic energy and 2,304 of solar thermal.

Photovoltaic solar (PV) energy is usually used for smaller-scale electricity projects. The devices generate electricity directly from sunlight via an electronic process that occurs naturally on semiconductors, converting it into usable electricity that can be stored in a solar battery of sent to the electric grid. Solar thermal energy (STE) capture is usually used for electricity production on a massive scale, for its use in the industry.

Low solar energy generated in Spain

By 2020, Spain national system has reached the maximum generation capacity ever recorded: 110,000 MW of wind energy, photovoltaic (PV), hydraulic, conventional thermal power (natural gas, coal, fuel oil), nuclear, etc. This amount of energy contrasts with the increasingly thin demand of power, which in 2019 was 40,000 MW (40 GW). According to the data published by network Electrica de España, the renewable quota of energy amounts to a total of 55,247 MW (55 GW out of 110 GW). This 55 GW is composed of 46% corresponding to wind energy, 16% are photovoltaic and the rest (38%) corresponds to other renewable technologies. During 2019, the national renewable production has been 97,826 GW-hour, which represents 37.5% of the kilowatt-hour that the country demanded last year (the remaining 62.5% has been produced in nuclear power plants or facilities that burn fossil fuels).

So, we can clearly see that the percentage of solar energy is extremely low (3.5% solar photovoltaic and 2% solar thermic of the total kilowatts-hour generated). Nevertheless, Spain has the capability to increase these numbers. According to a report on power potential by country published by the World Bank, Spain has a long-term energy availability of solar resource at any location (average theoretical potential) of 4.575 kilowatts-hour per square meter (kWh/m2). This potential is indicated by the variable of global horizontal irradiation (GHI) on the country, which will vary according to the local factors of the land. Furthermore, the power output achievable by a typical PV system, taking into consideration the theoretical potential and the local factors of the land (average practical potential) is 4.413 kWh, excluding areas due to physical/technical constraints (rugged terrain, urbanized/industrial areas, forests...) PV power output (PVOUT), power generated per unit of the installed PV capacity over the long-term, is an average of 1.93 kilowatt-hours per installed kilowatt-peak of the system capacity (kWh/kWp). It varies according to the season from 1.43 to 2.67 kWh/kWp. Finally, it's worth mentioning that Spain's electric consumption (balance of production and external trade) in 2019 was of 238 TWh (= 2.38 x1011 kWh).

Morocco's solar energy plan

Africa is the continent that receives most solar irradiance, thus being the optimal continent to exploit solar energy. In this regard, Morocco is already aiming to take advantage of this natural resource. At first, this country launched a solar energy plan with investment of USD 9 billion, aiming to generate 2,000 MW (or 2 GW) of solar power by 2020. It has developed mega-scale solar power projects at five locations; at the Sahara (Laayoune), Western Sahara (Boujdour), South of Agadir (Tarfaya), Ain Beni Mathar and Ouarzazate. But Morocco is planning to go further. Morocco announced during COP21 that it planned to increase the renewables capacity to reach 52% of the total by 2030 (20% solar, 20% wind, 12% hydro). To meet the 2030 target, the country aims to add around 10 GW of renewable capacities between 2018 and 2030, consisting of 4,560 MW of solar, 4,200 MW of wind, and 1,330 MW of hydropower capacity. The Moroccan Agency for Renewable Energy revealed that by the end of 2019, Morocco's renewable energy reached 3,685 megawatts (MW), including 700 MW of solar energy, 1,215 MW of wind power, and 1,770 MW of hydroelectricity.

Now, what would happen if Spain partnered up with Morocco? Morocco is the only African country to have a power cable link to Europe. In fact, it's through Spain that these two electricity interconnectors arrive to Europe. The first subsea interconnection, with a technical capacity of 700 MW, was commissioned in 1997 and started commercial operation in 1998. The second was commissioned in the summer of 2016. Furthermore, a new interconnection had been commissioned. This should not only reduce the price of electricity in the Spanish market but it should also allow the integration of renewable energy, mainly photovoltaic, into European electricity system.

Moreover, network Electrica de España (REE) stated that a collaborations agreement between the Spain and Morocco had been formed "to establish a strategic partnership on energy, whose objectives will be focused on the integration of networks and energy markets, the development of renewable energy and energy efficiency". But the possibilities don't stop there. If both countries further develop their solar energy capacities, they could jointly provide enough electricity to sustain Europe, through sustainable and renewable resources.

[Barack Obama, A Promised Landdiscussion: Madrid, 2020), 928 pp.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

A president's memoirs are always an attempt to justify his political actions. Having employee George W. Bush less than five hundred pages in "Decision Points" to try to explain the reasons for a more controversial management in principle, that Barack Obama uses almost a thousand pages for the first part of his memoirs (A promised land only covers the third year of his eight-year presidency) seems an excess: in fact, no U.S. president has ever required so much space in this exercise of wanting to tie up his bequest.

It is true that Obama has a taste for the pen, with some previous books in which he has already shown good narrative skills, and it is possible that this literary inclination has defeated him. But probably more decisive has been Obama's vision of himself and his presidency: the conviction of having a mission statement, as the first African-American president, and his ambition of wanting to bend the arc of history. When, with the passage of time, Obama begins to be just one more in the list of presidents, his book vindicates the historical character of his person and his achievements.

The first third of A Promised Land is particularly interesting. There is a cursory review of his life prior to entrance politics and then the detail of his degree program leading up to the White House. This part has the same inspirational charge that made so attractive My Father's Dreams, the book that Obama published in 1995 when he launched his campaign for the Illinois State Senate (in Spain it appeared in 2008, as a result of his campaign for the presidency). We can all draw very useful lessons for our own staff improvement: the idea of being masters of our destiny, of becoming aware of our deepest identity, and the security that this gives us to carry out many enterprises of great value and transcendence; to put all our efforts into a goal and take advantage of opportunities that may not come again; in final, to always think out of the box (when Obama saw that his work as senator of Illinois had little impact, his decision was not to leave politics, but to jump to the national level: He ran for senator in Washington and from there, only four years later, he reached the White House). These pages are also rich in lessons on political communication and electoral campaigns.

But when the narrative begins to address the presidential term, which began in January 2009, that inspirational tone falters. What was once a succession of generally positive adjectives for everyone begins to include diatribes against his Republican opponents. And here is the point that Obama does not manage to overcome: giving himself all the moral merit and denying it to those who, with their votes in congress , disagreed with the legislation promoted by the new president. It is true that Obama had a very frontal civil service examination from the Republican leaders in the Senate and the House of Representatives, but they also supported some of his initiatives, as Obama himself acknowledges. For the rest, which came first, the chicken or the egg? Large sectors of the Republicans immediately jumped on the bandwagon, as soon evidenced by the Tea Party tide in the 2010 mid-term elections (in a movement that would eventually lead to support for Trump), but it is also because Obama had arrived with the most left-wing positions in American politics in living memory. With his idealistic drive, Obama had set little example of bipartisan effort in his time in the Illinois and Washington Senate; when some of his reforms from the White House were blocked in congress, instead of seeking an accommodation -accepting a politics of the possible- he went to the streets to confront citizens with politicians who opposed his transformations, further entrenching the trenches of one and the other.

The British historian Niall Ferguson has pointed out that the Trump phenomenon would not be understood without Obama's previous presidency, although the bitter political division in the United States is probably a matter of a deep current in which leaders play a less leading role than we would suppose. Obama saw himself as the ideal person, because of his cultural mix (black, but raised by his white mother and grandparents), to bridge the widening rift in American society; however, he was unable to build the necessary ideological bridges. Bill Clinton faced a similar Republican blockade, in the congress led by Newt Gingrich, and made useful compromises: he reduced the ideological burden and brought an economic prosperity that relaxed public life.

A Promised Land includes many of Obama's reflections. He generally provides the necessary context to understand the issues well, for example in the gestation of the 2008 financial crisis. In foreign policy he details the state of relations with the major powers: animosity towards Putin and suspicion towards China, among other issues. There are aspects with different possible ways forward in which Obama leaves no room for a legitimate alternative position: thus, in a particularly emblematic topic , he charges against Netanyahu without admitting any mistake of his own in his approach to the Israeli-Palestinian problem. This is something that other reviews of the book have pointed out: the absence of self-criticism (beyond admitting sins of omission in not having been as bold as he would have wished), and the failure to admit that in some respects perhaps the opponent could have been right.

The narrative runs with a good internal rhythm, despite the many pages. The volume ends in 2011, at a random moment determined by the extension foreseen for a second submission; however, it has a climax with sufficient force: the operation against Osama bin Laden, for the first time told in the first person by the person who had the highest level of command. Although the Degree involvement of other hands in the essay is unknown, the work has a point of lyricism that connects directly with Los sueños de mi padre and that financial aid to attribute it, at least to a great extent, to the former president himself.

The book contains many episodes of the Obamas' domestic life. Obama's constant compliments to his wife, his admiration for his mother-in-law and the continuous references to his devotion to his two daughters could be considered unnecessary, especially because of their recurrence, in a political book. Nevertheless, they give the story the staff tone that Obama has wanted to adopt, giving human warmth to someone who was often accused of having a public image of a cold, distant and overly reflective person.

▲ A Challenger 2 tank on Castlemartin Ranges in Pembrokeshire, Wales, fires a 'Squash-Head' practice round [UK MoD].

January 7, 2021

COMMENTARY / Jairo Císcar Ruiz

At the end of last summer, two news pieces appeared in the forums and specialized magazines of the military field in the Anglo-Saxon world. The first of them was the forecast of the continuity (and worsening due to the current pandemic) of the spending cuts suffered in the UK Defense budget since 2010. The second, linked to the first, was the growing rumors of a possible withdrawal of the Challenger 2 tanks, which were already reduced to a quarter of their original strength. At a time of great economic instability, it seemed that the UK's strategic vision had decided to focus on its main assets to maintain its deterrent power and its projection of force: the very expensive nuclear arsenal and the maintenance and expansion of new naval groups in order to host the F-35B.

However, both pieces of news have been quickly overtaken by the announcement of the Boris Johnson executive to inject about 22 billion dollars over 4 years to take British power back to the levels of 30 years ago. Also, the decommissioning of battle tanks was dismissed by ministerial sources, who argued that it was simply a possibility raised in the "Integrated Review" that is being carried out by the British Ministry of Defense.

Although the waters have calmed down, the discussion that has arisen as a result of these controversies seems extremely interesting, as well as the role that armored units will have on the battlefield of the future. This article aims to make a brief reflection, identifying possible scenarios and their implications.

The first of them It is a reality: the United Kingdom must improve its armored forces, which run the risk of becoming obsolete, not only in the face of threats (Russia has had since 2015 the T-14 Armata, a 5th generation tank; and recently the modernized version of the mythical T-90, Proryv-3), but also in front of their allies, such as France or Germany, which are already starting the project to replace their respective armor with the future European Main Battle Tank. It is not only a matter of improving their operational capabilities, but also of evolving their survival on the battlefield.

At a time when military technology is advancing by leaps and bounds (hypersonic projectiles; battlefield dominated by technology; extensive use of drones ...), it is necessary to rethink the traditional way of waging war. In the last Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, images and evidence of the effectiveness of the use of Israeli "suicide" drones could be seen against groups of infantry, but also against armored vehicles and tanks. Despite Foreign Policy accusing poor training and the complex terrain as the main factors for these casualties, the question is still up in the air: does the "classic" tank as we know it still have a place on the battlefield?

Experience tells us yes[1]. The tank is vital in large military operations, although, as noted above, new threats must be countered with new defenses. To this day, the tank remains the best vehicle to provide direct fire quickly and efficiently, against other armor, infantry, and reinforced enemy positions. By itself it is an exceptional striking force, although it must always act in accordance with the rest of the deployed troops, especially with Intelligence, Logistics units and the Infantry. It should not be forgotten that in a battlefield characterized by hybrid warfare, it is necessary to consider the increasingly changing environment of threats.

Sensors and detection systems on the battlefield are persistently more innovative and revolutionary, capable of detecting armored vehicles, even if they are camouflaged; when integrated with lethal precision firing systems, they make concealing and wearing heavy armor a challenge. There are technical responses to these threats, from countering electronic direction finding through spoofing and jamming, to mounting active protection systems on vehicle hulls.

Despite the above, obviously, the battle tank continues to be a great investment in terms of money that must be made, questionable in front of the taxpayer in an environment of economic crisis, although at the strategic level it may not be.

There are also those who broke a spear in favor of withdrawing the tanks from their inventories, and it seems that today they regret having made this decision. The United Kingdom has the example of the army of the Netherlands, which in 2011 withdrew and sold to Finland 100 of its 120 Leopard 2A6s as a means of saving money and changing military doctrine. However, with Russia's entry into Ukraine and its increasing threats to NATO's eastern flank, they soon began to miss the armored forces' unique capabilities: penetrating power, high mobility that enables turning movements to engulf the enemy, maneuverability, speed, protection, and firepower. In the end, in 2015, they handed over their last 20 tanks (crews and mechanics included) to the German army, which since then has a contingent of a hundred Dutch, forming the Panzerbataillon 414. Knowing how important the concept of "lessons learned" is in military planning, perhaps the UK should pay attention to this case and consider its needs and the capabilities required to meet them.

A roadmap to the middle position would be to move towards an "army of specialization", abandoning its armored units and specializing in other areas such as cyber or aviation; but this would only be possible within the framework of a defense organization more integrated than NATO. Although it is only a distant possibility, the hypothetical and much mentioned European Army -of which the United Kingdom would most likely be excluded after the Brexit- could lead to the creation of national armed forces that would be specialized in a specific weapon, relying on other countries to fulfill other tasks. However, this possibility belongs right now to the pure terrain of reverie and futurology, since it would require greater integration at all levels in Europe to be able to consider this possibility.

In the end we find the main problem when organizing and maintaining an army, which is none other than money. On many occasions this aspect, which is undoubtedly vital, completely overshadows any other consideration. And in the case of a nation's armed forces, this is very dangerous. It would be counterproductive to ignore the tactical and strategic aspects to favor just the purely pecuniary ones. The reality is that Western armed forces, whether from the United Kingdom or any other NATO country, face not only IEDs and insurgent infantry in the mountainous regions of the Middle East, but also may have to confront peer rivals equipped with huge armored forces. Russia itself has about 2,000 battle tanks (that is, not counting other armored vehicles, whether they are capable of shooting rounds or not). China increases that figure up to 6,900 (more than half are completely out of date, although they are embarking on a total remodeling of the Chinese People's Army in all its forces). NATO does not forget the challenges, hence the mission "Enhanced Forward Presence" in Poland and the Baltic Republics, in which Spain contributes a Tactical Group that includes 6 Leopard 2A6 Main Battle Tanks, 14 Pizarro Infantry Fighting Vehicles, and other armored infantry transports.

Certainly, war is changing. We can't even imagine how technology will change the battlefield in the next decade. Sometimes, though, it is better not to get ahead of time. Taking all aspects into account, perhaps the best decision the UK Ministry of Defense could make would be to modernize its tank battalions to adapt them to the current environment, and thus maintain a balanced military with full operational capabilities. It is plausible to predict that the tank still has a journey in its great and long history on the battlefield, from the Somme, to the war of the future. Time (and money) will tell what ends up happening.

[1] Doubts have existed since the very "birth" of the battle tank during the First World War. In each great war scene of the twentieth century that has contributed significant technological innovations (World War I; Spanish Civil War; World War II; Cold War; Gulf ...) it seemed that the tank was going to disappear under new weapons and technologies (first reliability problems, then anti-tank weapons and mines, aviation, RPG's and IED's...) However, armies have learned how to evolve battle tanks in line with the times. Even more valuable, today's tanks are the product of more than 100 years of battles, with many lessons learned and incorporated into their development, not only on a purely material level, but also in tactics and training.