One third of countries have developed a national cybersecurity strategy, but mobilized capabilities are minimal

A dozen Latin American countries have already developed a national cybersecurity strategy, but in general the capacities mobilized in the region to deal with cybercrime and cyberattacks are still limited. In a continent with high use of social networks, but at the same time with some power network and internet access problems that make it difficult to react to cyber-attacks, the risk of widespread organized crime groups increasingly resorting to cybernetics is high.

article / Paula Suárez

In recent years, globalization has made its way into all parts of the world, and with it have emerged several threats in the field of cyberspace, which requires special treatment by the governments of all states. Globally, and not only in Latin America, the main areas under threat in terms of cybersecurity are, essentially, computer crime, network intrusions and politically motivated operations.

The latest reports on cybersecurity in Latin America and the Caribbean, conducted jointly by the Inter-American development Bank (IDB) and the Organization of American States (OAS), indicate that a third of the countries in the region have begun to take some steps to address the growing cybersecurity risks. However, they also note that efforts are so far limited, given the general lack of preparedness for the threat of cybercrime; they also suggest the need for a reform of protection policies in the coming years, especially with the problems that have come to light with the Covid-19 crisis.  

The IDB and the OAS (OAS) have collaborated on several occasions to publicize the status and raise awareness of cybersecurity issues, which have been increasing as globalization has become part of everyday life and social networks and the Internet have become more deeply integrated into our daily lives. To address this new reality, both institutions have created a Cybersecurity Observatory for the region, which has published several programs of study.

If until the 2016report cybersecurity was a topic little discussed in the region, currently with the increase of technology in Latin America and the Caribbean it has become a topic of interest for which states tend to be increasingly concerned, and therefore, to implement relevant measures, as highlighted in the 2020report .

Transportation, educational activities, financial transactions, many services such as food, water or energy supply and many other activities require cybersecurity policies to protect civil rights in the digital realm such as the right to privacy, often violated by the use of these systems as a weapon.

Not only socially, but also economically, investment in cybersecurity is critical to prevent the damage caused by online crime. For the Gross Domestic Product of many countries in the region, attacks on infrastructure can account for from 1% to 6% of GDP in the case of attacks on critical infrastructure, which translates into incompetence on the part of these countries to identify cyber dangers and to take the necessary measures to combat them.

According to the aforementioned study, 22 of the 32 countries analyzed are considered to have limited capabilities to investigate crimes, only 7 have a plan to protect their critical infrastructure, and 18 of them have established a so-called CERT or CSIRT (Computer Security Incident or Emergency Response Team). These systems are not currently developed uniformly in the region, and they lack the capacity and maturity to provide an adequate response to network threats, but their implementation is necessary and, increasingly, they are being supported by institutions such as the OAS to improve them.

In this area, the Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) has a work core topic, due to the great need in this region, to attend governments so that they can benefit from the identification of cyber threats and the association's strategic security mechanisms, mainly to protect the economies of these countries.

As already mentioned, awareness of the need for such measures has been increasing as cyber attacks have also increased, and countries such as Colombia, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Panama have established a proper strategy to combat this damage. In contrast, many other Latin American and Caribbean countries such as Dominica, Peru, Paraguay and Suriname have lagged behind in this development, and although they are on the way, they need institutional support to continue in this process.

The problem in combating such problems is usually rooted in the states' own laws. Only 8 of the 32 countries in the region are party to the Budapestagreement , which calls for international cooperation against cybercrime, and a third of these countries do not have appropriate legislation in their legal framework for cybercrime.

For the states party to this agreement, these guidelines can serve as a great financial aid develop domestic and procedural laws with respect to cybercrime, which is why the adherence or at least the observation of these guidelines is being promoted by organizations such as the OAS, with the recommendations of specialized units such as the REMJA Cybercrime work group , which advises on the reform of criminal law with respect to cybercrime and electronic evidence.

On the other hand, it was not until the beginning of this year that, with the incorporation of Brazil, 12 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have established a national cybersecurity strategy, due to the lack of qualified human talent. Although it is worth mentioning the two countries in the region with the greatest development in the field of cybersecurity, which are Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.

Of the problems mentioned, we can say that the lack of national strategy in terms of cybersecurity exposes these countries to various attacks, but to this must be added that the companies that sell cybersecurity services and provide technical and financial support in the region are mostly from Israel or the United States, and are linked to a rather militarized security and defense perspective, which will be a challenge in the coming years because of the skill that China is showing on this side of the hemisphere, especially linked to 5G technology.

Cyber malpractices are a threat not only to the Economics Latin America and the Caribbean, but also to the functioning of democracy in these states, an attack on the rights and freedoms of citizens and the values of society. For this reason, the need for investment in civilian infrastructure and military capacity is becoming apparent. To achieve this, the states of the region are willing to cooperate, firstly, in the unification of their legal frameworks based on the models of the Budapest agreement and the instructions of the European Union, whose perspective to face the new challenges in cyberspace is having a great impact and influence in the region.

 Moreover, with the coming Covid-19 crisis, the states of the region are generally willing to collaborate by developing their own national strategies, consistent with the values of the organizations they are part of, to protect both their current means and their emerging technologies (artificial intelligence, quantum, high performing computing and others). Cyber threats are intended to be addressed through channels open to partnership and dialogue, since the Internet has no borders, and the harmonization of legal frameworks is the first step towards strengthening not only regional but also international cooperation.

[Lilia M. Schwarcz and Heloisa M. Starling, Brazil: a biographydiscussion: Madrid, 2016), 896 pp.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

Presenting the history of a vast country like Brazil in a single Issue, although extensive, is not an easy task, if you want to go deep enough. "Brazil. A Biography" (for this review we have used Penguin's English edition, from 2019, somewhat later than the publication of the work in Spain; the original in Portuguese is from 2015) is an account with the appropriate lens. "Brazil is not for beginners," say the two authors in the introduction, expressing with that quotation from a Brazilian musician the way they conceived the book: knowing that they were addressing an audience with generally little knowledge about the country, they had to be able to convey the complexity of national life (of what constitutes a continent in itself) but without making the reading agonizing.

The book follows a chronological order; however, the fact of starting with some general considerations and building the first chapters around certain social and political systems generated successively by the sugar cane plantations, the enslavement of the African population and the search for gold makes the life of Brazil advance before our eyes without having the sensation of a mere shifting of dates. Later comes a 19th century that for Hispanics has the interest of seeing the negative of the history we know with respect to the Spanish American colonies (as opposed to the Spanish case, during the Napoleonic wars the Court of Portugal moved entirely to Rio de Janeiro and independence did not result in several republics, but in a centralized monarchy of its own). And then a 20th century that in Brazil constituted a good compendium of the political vicissitudes of the contemporary world: from the Estado Novo of Getúlio Vargas, to the military dictatorship and the restoration of democracy.

The work of Schwarcz and Starling, professors at the University of São Paulo and the Federal University of Minas Gerais, respectively, focuses on political processes, but always wrapping them with the parallel social and cultural processes that occur together in any country. The Issue provides a lot of information and bibliographical references for all the historical periods of Brazil, without disregarding some in order to deal more with others, and the reader can dwell especially on those moments that are of greater interest.

Personally, I have been more interested in reading about four periods, relatively distant from each other. On the one hand, the attempts of France and Holland in the 16th and 17th centuries to set foot in Brazil (they were not permanently successful, and both powers had to settle for the Guianas). Then the emergence and consolidation in the 18th century of Minas Gerais as the third vertex of the Brazilian heartland triangle (Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Belo Horizonte). Then the description of the life of a European-style court in the circumstances of the tropical climate (the monarchy lasted until 1889). And finally the experiences of mid-20th century developmentalism, with Juscelino Kubitschek and João Goulart in a tour de force between democratic compromise, presidential personalism and the undercurrents of the Cold War.

The reading of this book provides many keys to better understand certain behaviors of Brazil as a country. On the one hand, how the immensity of the territory and the existence of areas that are difficult for the State to reach -the Amazon is a clear example-, gives an important role to the Army as guarantor of the continuity of the nation (the success, perhaps momentary, of Bolsonaro and his appeal to the Armed Forces has to do with that, although this last presidency is no longer included in the book). On the other hand, how the division of territorial power between mayors and governors generates a multitude of political parties and forces each presidential candidate to articulate multiple alliances and coalitions, sometimes incurring in a "buying and selling" of favors that generally ends up having a cost for the country's institutionality.

The book's essay was completed before the collapse of the Workers' Party governmental era. That is why the consideration of the governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff is, perhaps, somewhat complacent, as a sort of "end of history": since the end of the military dictatorship in 1985, the country would have evolved in the improvement of its democratic and social life until the time crowned by the PT. The "Lava Jato case" has shown rather that "history continues".

Bahrain and UAE foreign ministers sign Abraham Accords with Israeli premier in September 2020 [White House].

essay / Lucas Martín Serrano

It is interesting to incorporate a touch of history to any subject of geopolitical analysis. History is a fundamental financial aid to understand the present. And most conflicts, problems, frictions or obstacles, whether between nations or public or private entities, always have an underlying historical background. Moreover, taken to the field of negotiation, regardless of its level, demonstrating a certain historical knowledge of the adversary is useful because, on the one hand, it is not only a sample interest and respect towards him, which will always put us in an advantageous position, but, on the other hand, any stumbling block or difficulty that appears has a good chance of having its historical counterpart, and precisely there we can find the way to a solution. The party that has a greater depth of knowledge will significantly increase the chances of a solution more favorable to its interests.

In ancient times, the territory now occupied by the United Arab Emirates was inhabited by Arab tribes, nomadic farmers, artisans and traders. The plundering of the merchant ships of European powers that sailed along its coasts, approaching them more than was advisable, was commonplace. And, in a way, a way of life for part of its inhabitants. It was in the 7th century when Islam settled in the local culture. Of the two currents that emerged after the disputes that took place after the death of the Prophet, it was the Sunni current that gained hegemony from the 11th century onwards.

In order to put an end to piracy and secure the maritime trade routes, the United Kingdom, from 1820, signature a peace treaty with the sheikhs of the area. In 1853 it went a step further and managed to sign another agreement by which the entire territory was placed under the military protectorate of the United Kingdom.

The area attracted the attention of powers such as Russia, France and Germany, and in 1892, to protect their interests, the agreement was signature guaranteeing the British a monopoly on trade and exports.

The area encompassing the present seven United Arab Emirates plus Qatar and Bahrain became known as the "Trucial States".

During World War I, the airfields and ports of the Gulf played an important role in the development the conflict in favor of the United Kingdom. At the end of World War II in 1945, the League of Arab States (Arab League) was created, formed by those who enjoyed some colonial independence. The organization attracted the attention of the Truce States.

In 1960, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was created, with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Venezuela as founders and headquartered in Vienna, Austria. The seven emirates, which would later form the United Arab Emirates, joined the organization in 1967.

Since 1968, nine emirates on the eastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula had begun negotiations to form a federal state. After the final withdrawal of British troops and after Bahrain and Qatar dissociated themselves from the process and gained independence separately, in 1971, six emirates became independent from the British Empire: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Qaywayn and Fujairah, forming the federation of the United Arab Emirates, with a legal system based on the 1971 constitution. Once consolidated, they joined the Arab League on June 12. The seventh emirate, Ras Al-Khaimah, joined the following year, with the emirates of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the capital, as the strongest components.

It was the beginning of the exploitation of the huge oil wells discovered years before that gave a total turnaround to the status. After the 1973 oil crisis, the Emirates began to accumulate enormous wealth, because OPEC members decided not to export any more oil to the countries that supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War.

Oil and tourism based on urban growth and technological development are the main sources of prosperity in the country today, and a very important fact from all points of view is that 80-85% of the UAE's population is currently immigrant.

current status

It has been especially during the last decade, and partly as a consequence of the events in the region since what became known as the Arab Spring, that the US has emerged as a regional power with the capacity to influence the area.

The main characteristic that can be attributed to this appearance on the international scene is the transformation of a conservative foreign policy, very much oriented towards "self-preservation", into a more open-minded one with a clear vocation not only to play a relevant role in the region, but also to influence it in order to protect its interests.

What can be considered as Abu Dhabi's main ambition is to become a major player capable of influencing the definition and establishment of governance Structures throughout the region according to its own model, securing and expanding trade routes, bringing its neighbors into it to create a sufficiently powerful economic node with the capacity to strengthen ties with the entire East African region and with Southeast Asia, in what seems another clear example of how the global geopolitical center is already definitively shifting towards the Asia-Pacific axis.

The Emirati model has been able to evolve to integrate a growing economic openness with a conservative political model and strong government whose main speech is built on the basis of a well-established and secure state. And all this combined with a great capacity as a service provider . And interestingly, the social model is relatively secular and liberal based by regional standards.

But a fundamental fact that cannot be forgotten is the outright rejection of any political or religious ideology that poses the slightest threat to the hegemony and supremacy of the State and its leaders.

It is Abu Dhabi, as the largest and most prosperous of the seven emirates, that exerts the most influence in setting the broad lines of both domestic and foreign policy. Indeed, the evolution of the model set by the UAE is firmly associated with Abu Dhabi's crown prince and de facto leader of the emirate, Mohamed bin Zayed (MbZ).

What cannot be lost sight of is that, although MbZ and his inner circle of trust share the same vision of the world and politics, his actions and decisions do not necessarily follow a pre-established plan. There is no basic doctrine with marked tactical and strategic objectives and the lines of work to be followed to achieve them.

Their way of carrying out the country strategy, if it can be called that, is based on a small group belonging to that inner circle, which puts on the table several options usually tactical and reactive to any problem or issue that arises to carry out. Based on these, the top leadership follows an ad hoc decision-making process that can lead to an excessive need for subsequent corrections and adjustments that in turn result in missed opportunities.

Threats - security status

Emirati authorities have a clear perception of what the main geostrategic threats to their development are: on the one hand, the Iranian-promoted transnational spread of Islamist political ideology and, on the other, the influence sought by the Muslim Brotherhood and its promoters and supporters, including Qatar and Turkey, is perceived as an existential threat to their vision of a more secular form of government, as well as to the stability of the current regional status quo, given that they can act as a catalyst for radicalism in the area.

However, Abu Dhabi has been much more belligerent in its speech against the Muslim Brotherhood and those who support them, while remaining cautious in its stance against Iran.

The recent agreement with the State of Israel has served to undermine the credibility of many of the traditional and deep-rooted clichés and at the same time has revealed the birth of a Jewish-Sunni bloc as a civil service examination to the belligerent and growing Shiite current led by Iran and its proxies, active in practically all the countries of the area and in all the regional conflicts.

This new status should serve the Western powers to confirm that in the Middle East region the vision of their own problems has changed and Iran and its particular way of exercising its foreign policy and defending its interests are now considered a much more destabilizing factor than the long-lasting Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The threat posed by Iran has acted as a catalyst in bringing together criteria while, in spite of everything, Israel is seen as an element that provides stability both militarily and economically.

The UAE-Israel Treaty

On September 15, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain formalized the normalization of their relations. This agreement means that four Arab states have now accepted Israel's right to exist, and this is undoubtedly a real diplomatic success.

The fact that it was precisely the UAE and Bahrain is no coincidence. Neither state has been involved in a direct war against Israel. And, if this characteristic is common to both states, Bahrain's relationship with Israel has been much more fluid than that of the UAE. This reality is supported by the Jewish community settled in Al-Qatif and its integration, which has translated into full and active participation in Bahrain's political life. This has helped to ensure that relations between Manama and Jerusalem have not been at all conflictive.

Despite being seen in the eyes of the general public as a novelty, the truth is that the recent agreement reached is the third "Peace Treaty" that the Hebrew country has signature with an Arab nation. However, it is the first that seems to be born with a sufficiently solid foundation to augur a new, much more stable and lasting status , in clear contrast to the relations resulting from the previous agreements with Egypt and Jordan, which were very limited to personal relations and in the field of security and conventional diplomacy.

The new agreement with Israel establishes a new partnership path that affects the entire Middle East, including substantially counterbalancing Iran's influence, fostering trade relations, tourism, partnership in military subject , intelligence sharing, cooperation in the health area and thus helping to position the UAE to lead Arab diplomacy in the region by offering a solid civil service examination to Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its Palestinian arm in Gaza, Hamas, and thus opening the door for other countries in the area to take steps in the same direction.

Israel's decision to fail the announced annexation under its sovereignty of certain areas of the West Bank is test that these moves in the region are much deeper and much more prepared and agreed in advance than can be imagined.

And this is precisely one of the major differences with previous agreements. The great expectation that has been created and the clear indications that other countries, including Saudi Arabia, will follow the UAE's lead.

In fact, a significant step has been taken in this direction, and it was something as simple as an Israeli "EI-Al" plane flying over Saudi airspace carrying as passengers a large issue of businessmen, official staff and investors on their way to the Emirates as a gesture of goodwill. And contrary to what might have been expected at other times, this did not have any repercussions in the Arab world, nor did it provoke any protest or demonstration against it subject

Places such as Amman, Beirut, Tunis and Rabat, where traditionally demonstrations against the Israeli "occupation" and similar accusations are usually large in terms of participation, remained completely calm on this occasion.

But if this fact has gone unnoticed by the general population, it has not gone unnoticed by the leaders of the Middle East powers and the violent organizations they use as proxies.

For those who aspire to follow in the UAE's footsteps and establish relations with Israel, this has served as a spur to reaffirm their decision, as the sense of unease or even danger emanating from the streets in the Arab world regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that such a move could provoke has diminished.

On the contrary, it has been a hard lesson for Iran and its proxies . Not only because the Palestinian cause, raised and put on the table for so long, has notably diminished its importance, but also because it has coincided in time with potestas in both Iraq and Lebanon in the complete opposite direction, that is, against Iran's interference in the internal affairs of both countries.

As a conclusion, it should be drawn that, although this absence of protests over the Israel-UAE agreement may seem surprising, it is nothing more than a clear sign of a long process of political maturation and evolution within the Arab world in general.

The population of the Middle East in general no longer aspires to a pan-Arabist, pan-Islamic unity, to the establishment of the Great Caliphate or, in the case of Iran or Turkey, to imperialist dreams that are a thing of the past. What the mass of the people and society really want is to improve their welfare, to have more and more attractive economic opportunities, to have a good educational system, to improve the levels of development in all areas, to have the rule of law, and for the rule of law to be equal for all in their respective countries.

The treaty that is the subject of this item fits perfectly within these aspirations and this mental outline . The masses who once took to the streets no longer believe that the Palestinian cause is worthy of more effort and attention than their own struggle to achieve a better future for their nations.

And, this is very important, despite the opacity of the ayatollahs' regime, in Iran, the population is less and less submissive to policies that lead the country to a series of permanent conflicts with no end in sight, which cause a waste of the country's resources to maintain them.

Just two days after the advertisement the peace agreement , the United Arab Emirates lifted the ban on telephone communication with Israel, with Hebrew Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi and his Emirati counterpart Abdullah binZayed symbolizing the opening of this new line of communication.

Almost immediately thereafter, a team from the Israeli Foreign Ministry traveled to Abu Dhabi to begin looking for possible sites for the future Israeli embassy headquarters.

A significant flow of investment from the UAE is being channeled to Israeli companies seeking new ways to treat COVID19 and to develop new tests to detect the disease. The increase in business deals between Israeli and Emirati companies has been almost immediate, and the "El-Al" company is already working to open a direct corridor between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi.

All this is favoring that, in view of the new status and new approaches, Morocco, Oman and other Arab countries are making moves to follow in the UAE's footsteps. Israel's attractiveness is only increasing, in a significant evolution from being the most hated country in the region to being the most desired partner .

However, one factor to consider is the impact in the US and Europe. In the West, in general, the Palestinian cause is gaining support mainly due to the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. Therefore, changes in relations with Israel are likely not only to fail to undermine that support, but to spur increased efforts to prevent normalization through disinformation campaigns spreading hatred of Israel.

Finally, the civil service examination by Turkey, Qatar and Iran was something that can be described as predictable, but it is also a clarifying element. The Iranian president has called the agreement a "grave mistake", while his Turkish counterpart has threatened to close the UAE embassy in Turkey. In both cases, the ultimate reason for this reaction is the same: the use of the Palestinian cause for the benefit of their own interests and, coincidentally, both are on this occasion coincidental, to distract public opinion from the difficult economic status that, for different reasons, the two countries are going through.

Regional policy

The most important and enduring element in the UAE's foreign and security policy is its strategic alliances with the US and Saudi Arabia. Although the UAE has followed a more independent line over the last decade, the developments and this new direction would not have been possible without the support of the US, on whose protection the small but wealthy and at the same time sparsely populated state relies, and on whom it can count when exporting its energy resources in the event of a conflict.

Even during the time of the Obama administration, when relations became strained due to the policy taken by the US in relation to the events of the "Arab Spring" and with respect to Iran, the strategic alliance between the two nations was maintained.

The clearly defined anti-Iranian policy of the government led by Donald Trump, equivalent to that of the UAE, facilitated a rapid improvement in relations once again, and the new US administration saw the Emirates as a fundamental pillar on which to base its policy in the Middle East. Thus, today, together with Israel and Saudi Arabia, the UAE is the main US ally in the region.

Unlike the US, Saudi Arabia became a strategic partner in the UAE's new regional policy during Obama's tenure. In fact, the two nations have maintained close ties since the birth of the Emirates in 1971, but the new young state naturally remained in the shadow of the other, more established nation, following the policies of its "big brother".

This status changed with the rise to power of Mohamed Bin Zayed who, since 2011, was determined to champion a political line of joint actions in the region that have ultimately been decisive. MbZ found his perfect counterpart in Saudi Prince Mohamed Bin Salman, who gradually, since 2015 was taking the reins as the visible head of Saudi Arabia's policy. To such an extent that in certain cases such as Yemen and Qatar, the UAE's leadership and drive seems to have been the binding force of joint regional policies.

Alliances

United States

The US role as an ally of the UAE dates back to the early 1980s, just after the Iranian revolution of 1979, which meant the loss of its most important ally in the region and the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war.

However, it was the 1990-1991 Gulf War that, with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, showed the UAE how vulnerable the small Gulf States were to military aggression by any of their powerful neighbors.

In order to ensure protection, and in the same way as other countries in the region, the UAE favored an increased US presence on its territory in the years following the war. This was concluded with a bilateral security agreement signed in July 1994. Under this agreement, the United States received access to the Emirates' air instructions and ports and, in return, undertook to protect the country from possible external aggression. What is interesting, and gives a measure of how the status has evolved, is that the agreement remained secret at Abu Dhabi's request because of the UAE's fear of possible criticism and protests both internally and from Iran.

Initially, the UAE was just another US ally in the Persian Gulf. However, its importance as a partner increased between 1990 and 2000, in part due to the port of Jebel Ali, which became the US Navy's most used base outside the country, and the Al Dhafra air base, a core topic facility for US activities in the region.

Moreover, since the end of the 1990s, the UAE began a process to show itself to its new ally as a reliable and more relevant partner , increasing the quantity and level of its cooperation. Following that line, Emirati military forces have participated in all major US operations in the Middle East, from the Gulf War in 1991 to Somalia in 1992, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan since 2002, Libya since 2011, and Syria (in the framework of the fight against Daesh) between 2014 and 2015. Only participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was avoided by the Emirates, and in a very vehement way. From this involvement, the UAE Armed Forces have gained a great deal of experience on the ground which has redounded to their effectiveness and professionalism.

This involvement in the not infrequently controversial US military actions in Arab countries has undoubtedly been a key element for the United States. Not only because of what it means from the point of view of image and narrative that at least one Muslim country supported them, but also because Abu Dhabi's contribution has not been limited to the military aspect. Humanitarian organizations have acted in parallel with the aim of gaining the support of the population wherever they have intervened by investing huge amounts of money. The clearest example is Afghanistan, where Emirates has spent millions of dollars on humanitarian and development projects to help stabilize the country, while providing a small contingent of special operations forces in the particularly dangerous southern part of the country since 2003. In addition, between 2012 and 2014 they expanded their deployment with six F16 aircraft to support air operations against the Taliban. Even when the US began its phased withdrawal after 2014, Emirati troops continued in Afghanistan.

Getting the UAE on board in the cause of fighting the jihadists was not a difficult task at all, as its leaders are particularly averse to any form of religious extremism that affects the political system within Islam. This is the main reason for its Air Force's involvement in the US-led coalition against Daesh in Syria between 2014 and 2015. To such an extent that, after the US aircraft, it was those from the UAE that carried out the most sorties against jihadist targets.

But the partnership was not limited to the US. Both Australia and France had the air instructions of the emirates at their disposal to carry out their operations.

Only the open break in hostilities and the UAE's involvement in the 2015 Yemen War reduced its involvement in the fight against Daesh.

But it has not all been easy. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 produced deep misgivings in the UAE, which considered it a grave mistake. Their fear was that such an intervention would end up increasing Iran's influence over Iraq, or lead to civil war, which would destabilize the whole region.

Fears were realized when in 2005 a Shiite coalition close to Iran won the elections in Iraq and war broke out, leaving the UAE with its hands tied to try to influence the status quo in any way. Their biggest concern then was that a premature withdrawal of all U.S. forces would further complicate the status.

The renewed relationship with the Trump administration has led to the signature a new security and cooperation agreement signed in 2017. In contrast to what happened in 1994, the contents of the agreement have been made public, and reference letter mainly to the presence of US troops on Emirati soil on a permanent basis. The agreement also covers the training of Emirati Armed Forces and the conduct of joint exercises on a regular basis.

Thanks to this agreement, the US presence in the Emirates is larger than ever. There are currently some 5,000 men deployed between the Al Dhafra air base, the port of Jebel Ali and some other small instructions or naval stations. At the aforementioned air base alone there are 3,500 men who, from there, operate from F-15, F-22 and F-35 fighter jets, in addition to reconnaissance aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

For its part, the UAE has continued to develop its own military capabilities by acquiring US-made material, mainly anti-aircraft systems ("Patriot" and THAAD) and fighter planes (110 F-16s). In addition, for a couple of years now, the UAE has shown great interest in acquiring the new F-35, although negotiations, not without some reluctance, are still ongoing.

Problems arose in 2018 for the supply of precision-guided munitions to both the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as both countries were using them in the Yemen War. The murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Kashoggi compounded the resistance from the US congress , forcing President Trump to use his veto power in order to maintain the supply. This gives a measure of how decisive the current administration's attitude towards both countries is.

Despite all the difficulties mentioned above, the current US administration has redoubled its efforts to support the UAE in its regional policies, as they are in line with US objectives.

The first goal has been to build an anti-Iran alliance among Middle Eastern states that includes the UAE as acore topic partner along with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This plan is fully in line with Abu Dhabi's aspiration to gain some leadership in the region, and is likely to prosper, as the UAE is likely to support the US in a solution to the Palestinian conflict that is quite in line with the Israeli proposal .

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is currently the UAE's most important ally in the region. Both states are financed by crude oil exports and both are equally wary of the expansionist ambitions of their powerful neighbors, especially Iran.

However, for a long time, despite this alliance, the UAE has feared that Saudi Arabia, using its unequal size in terms of population, military strength and oil production capacity, would try to maintain a hegemonic position in the Persian Gulf.

In 1981, the countries of the Persian Gulf seized the opportunity to create an alliance that excluded the then major regional powers. Thus, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE created the Cooperation committee for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC). This committee had a joint military force that never reached a significant size. The biggest test of the GCC's weakness and ineffectiveness was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait without any civil service examination by the supranational body.

As a result , the UAE relied on the US for its protection, the only country that was both willing and able to undertake the task of defending the small state against potential foreign aggression.

The consequence at the regional level is marked by the convergence of interests of Saudi Arabia and the UAE which, between 2011 and 2019, have pursued common regional political objectives relying if necessary on their military capabilities.

As an example, we have Bahrain's financial aid request to the GCC in 2011 when its rulers felt threatened by Shiite protest movements. However, its most relevant intervention was its support for the coup d'état in Egypt against President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013.

India

Socio-political and economic relations between the GCC members and India have always been very close, and have been based on the understanding that a secure and stable environment both politically and socially in the Persian Gulf environment and in the Indian subcontinent are critical factors for the development of the respective countries and their trans-regional ties.

From India's perspective, improving its technological and economic development goes hand in hand with New Delhi's ability to strengthen its partnerships around the world. In this regard, the Persian Gulf countries, and especially the UAE, are seen as a bridge to access knowledge, capabilities, resources and markets to enhance this development.

In 2016, the hitherto bilateral relations between the two countries were formalized in a strategic cooperation agreement called CSP(Comprehensive Strategic Partnership).

For the UAE, India is a modern country, a political phenomenon independent of the West that maintains strong religious and traditional roots without renouncing its diversity. In a way, and with some reservations, it is a mirror for the UAE to look into.

The cooperation agreement is cross-cutting and covers issues as diverse as the fight against terrorism, exchange information and intelligence, measures to combat money laundering, cybersecurity, as well as cooperation on defense subject , financial aid and humanitarian financial aid , etc.

On the more economic side, the initiative includes concrete actions to facilitate trade and investment, with the UAE committing to a $75 billion goal to support the development of new generation infrastructure in India, especially railways, ports, roads, airports and industrial parks.

With regard to the energy sector, the agreement provides for the UAE's participation in the modernization of the oil sector in all its branches, taking into account the development of a strategic reservation .

Very significant is the part dealing with the development of technology for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, as well as cooperation in the aerospace sector including the joint development and launching of satellites, as well as the necessary ground control infrastructure and all necessary applications.

Today, India has growing and multifaceted socio-economic ties with both Israel and the Persian Gulf countries, and especially the UAE. The diaspora of Indian workers in the Persian Gulf accounts for annual remittances of nearly $50 billion. Trade relations bring in more than $150 billion to the Asian country's coffers, and almost two thirds of the country's hydrocarbon needs come from that region. It is therefore evident that the new status is viewed with special interest from this part of the world, assessing opportunities and possible threats.

Obviously, any agreement such as this one, which at least a priori implies more stability and a normalization of relations, will always be beneficial, but its weaknesses and the possible evolution of the status must also be taken into account.

Thus, from a geopolitical point of view, India has welcomed the re-establishment of relations between the UAE and Israel, as both are strategic partners.

The new scenario that is opening up between Israel and the GCC seems to bring closer a moderate and consistent solution to the Palestinian problem, making the work of Indian diplomacy much easier.

But we must be cautious, and especially in this part of the world, nothing is of one color. This hopeful agreement could have a perverse effect that could further polarize the jihadist sectors of the Arab world, pitting them even more against each other.

The possibility of the Persian Gulf region becoming the new battleground where Iranian and Israeli proxies clash cannot be completely ruled out, especially in those areas controlled by the Shiites. However, it is not a likely option for the time being.

But for India, managing the economic implications of the new treaty is even more important. With defense and security cooperation as key pillars, both sides are now beginning to contemplate the real economic potential that will be opened up by complementing their economies.

Reactions to the treaty: scenarios   

Faced with an event as relevant as the one described above, it is to be expected that there will be reactions in several directions, and depending on these, the evolution of the status may be different.

The actors that can play a relevant role in the different scenarios are the UAE and the new alliance, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Palestine and the Muslim Brotherhood.

It should not be forgotten that the background of this treaty is economic. If its development is successful, it will bring stability to a region that has long been punished by all subject of conflicts and confrontations and will lead to an exponential increase in commercial operations, transfer of technology and the opening of new routes and collaborations, mainly with Southeast Asia.

The role of the US will be decisive in any of the scenarios that may arise, but in any of them its position will be to minimize its physical presence and support the signatories of the treaty with political, economic and defense actions through the supply of military material.

The treaty has a strong economic component fixed on the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia. This is but one more sign of how the world's geopolitical center of gravity is shifting to the Asia-Pacific region and this is one of the main reasons for the unconditional support of the US.

Members of the UAE government have traditionally viewed more radical Islamist ideologies and policies as posing an existential threat to the country's core values. Both the Shiite sectarian regime in Iran and the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood group are seen as a constant threat to the stability of the region's powers.

For the UAE, these transnational movements are a catalyst for radicalism throughout the region.

In view of the above, the following scenarios are plausible:

Scenario 1

For the time being, the Palestinians are the ones whose interests will be most harmed by the new status . Prominent figures in Palestinian society, as well as senior officials of the Palestinian Authority, have considered the new treaty as a betrayal. As mentioned, the Palestinian issue is taking a back seat in the Arab world.

If, as is predicted, more countries join the new treaty in the coming months, the Palestinian Authority may try by all means to bring its claims and its struggle back to the forefront. To this end, it would count on the support of Iran and its proxies and Turkey. In this status, it would start by delegitimizing the governments of the countries that have aligned themselves with the UAE and Israel through a strong information campaign at all levels, with a massive use of social networks in order to mobilize the most sensitive and pro-Palestinian population. The goal would be to promote demonstrations and/or revolts that would create doubts in those who have not yet adhered to the pact. These doubts could lead to a change of decision or delay in new accessions, or these new candidates to join the treaty could increase the conditions related to the Palestinians in order to join it. This option is the most dangerous because of the possibility of generating dissension or internal discussions that could lead to an implosion of the pact.

A likely scenario of leave intensity can be considered.

Scenario 2

The position taken by Saudi Arabia is a core topic. And it will be decisive in gauging Iran's reaction. In the Middle East ecosystem, Iran is the power that has the most to lose from this new alliance. The struggle for hegemony within the Muslim world cannot be forgotten. And this struggle, which is also religious, as it pits Shiites and Sunnis against each other, has Iran and Saudi Arabia as its main protagonists.

Saudi Arabia is likely to join the treaty, but given the status, and in an attempt not to further tighten the rope with its main enemy, it may decide not to join the treaty, but to support it from outside with specific or bilateral agreements. Always with the rest of the Arab countries that are members of it, which would act as a bridge for its relations with Israel. It would be a way to wash its face and avoid the express recognition of the State of Israel or its direct relations with it. It is necessary to take into account the pockets of Shiite majority in the country, which could be encouraged by Iran.

However, in a worst-case scenario, Iran will react through its proxies, intensifying its activity in Yemen, trying to promote protests and revolts inside Saudi Arabia, reinforcing its support for Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon and even its militias in Iraq.

Support for the protests that have already taken place in Sudan will also be part of this campaign. Sudan is a very unstable country, with very weak power Structures that are unlikely to be able to quell high-intensity revolts.

The goal would be to inflame the region under the cover of support for the Palestinian people in order to dissuade further adherence to the treaty, as well as to undermine the effectiveness of the treaty, giving the image of instability and insecurity in the region. This will discourage potential investors from approaching the UAE attracted by the enormous economic possibilities it offers while keeping Saudi Arabia busy with its southern flank and its internal problems. Some action without a clear or recognized perpetrator against ships transiting the Gulf, as has already happened, or the boarding of any of them by Iranian forces under any subject of accusation or legal ruse, cannot be ruled out. Direct actions involving Iranian forces are not likely.

Turkey may become involved by providing weapons, technology and even mercenary fighters to any of the factions acting as Iran's proxy.

This scenario can be considered as possible and of average intensity.

Scenario 3

Iran needs either the governments or the population of the different countries of the Middle East to continue to see Israel as its main enemy and threat. Among other reasons, because it is a narrative of internal consumption that is recurrently used to divert the attention of its own population from other problems subject So far, the unifying element of this way of looking at Israel has been the Palestinian conflict. Therefore, it is likely that actions will be taken that will provoke a reaction from Israel. These actions may be within the State of Israel itself from Palestinian or Lebanese territory, always in the position of Iran's proxies. A provocation result in an Israeli attack on Arab territory, probably against Iran or Syria, cannot be ruled out. The ultimate goal would not be the Hebrew State but to undermine the treaty's instructions , to create social unrest among the signatories, to prevent Saudi Arabia's accession and to be able to use the Palestinian conflict in its own interests.

This is a possible and high intensity scenario. 

Conclusions

The emergence of the UAE as an emerging geopolitical power in the Middle East has been as surprising as it has been precipitous, since not so long ago international observers did not give much hope for the life of the new federation of small states that had just been born.

On the contrary, the UAE and Abu Dhabi, its largest and most prosperous emirate, in particular, has been increasing its position over the last decade, playing a decisive role in the region. To such an extent that, to this day, the UAE's actions are considered to have facilitated to some extent the changes we are witnessing.

Western politicians are generally dazzled by the perceived liberalism of the UAE and the ability of its elites to speak both literally and figuratively their own language. It is important that they become familiar with the UAE model in all its aspects and, what is the core topic, that they understand that Abu Dhabi expects to be treated by all as an equal. Dealing with the UAE in this way and considering it a robust and reliable partner also means sending them the message of a clear intention to support them.

One of the major consequences of this agreement may be to de-escalate the Palestinian conflict, if not end it, then permanently limit it. For generations, this conflict has been used by political and religious leaders throughout the Arab and Muslim world to distract their attention from other issues. It was an easy and readily available resource . But it is now recognized that it is a territorial dispute between two peoples, and future negotiations have no choice but to go down that road, putting the focus on the outdated Palestinian leadership.

There is the not inconsiderable possibility that the agreement reached could have a domino effect and drag other states in the area to follow in the footsteps of the UAE, which in some cases would only mean publicizing the de facto relations they already have with the State of Israel. In this regard, talks between the Omani foreign minister and his Israeli counterpart are known to have taken place just after the signature the treaty with the UAE.

Also, the Israeli Prime Minister held a meeting with Sudanese leader Abdel Fattah Burhan, which could be a sign of upcoming moves on that flank as well.

Although the leak had consequences for a high-ranking Sudanese official, the government did not deny the contacts. And all this was confirmed when the US, in advertisement of Sudan's forthcoming removal from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism, followed the agreement between Israel and Sudan to normalize their diplomatic relations.

For years, US policy has been to demilitarize its position in the Middle East; the cost of its presence has been very high compared to the benefits it brings, as well as generating some animosity. Both the US and other G8 members support the UAE as the economic leader in the region. This support provides them with the ideal position to deploy their economic interests in the region(commodities, research and development & investment). 

This position of US/UAE support (plus some G8 countries), strengthens the role of the Arab country in the region in political and military subject , and in a certain way allows its new allies and supporters to have some influence in organizations such as OPEC, GCC, Arab League) and in neighboring countries, but from a more Arab and less Western position.

Regarding the issue of the UAE's purchase of the F-35, it is undeniable that this issue makes Israel uncomfortable despite the change in relations. The main reason is the fear of an equalization in military capabilities that could be dangerous. However, this will not be an obstacle to progress in future peace agreements and in the development the peace agreement. Such a major operation would take years to materialize and by then, relations between Jerusalem and Abu Dhabi will have been consolidated. Moreover, it may even be welcomed by Israel, as it would strengthen its military capabilities vis-à-vis its main opponents in the region.

It is becoming increasingly apparent in the Arab world that Israel is too small to harbor imperialistic aspirations, in contrast to countries like Turkey and Iran, both of which formed former empires, and which seem intent on trying to restore what they once achieved or were.

Instead, Israel is increasingly seen as a strong, prosperous and dynamic enough country that cooperation with Jerusalem is a smart move that can provide benefits to both sides.

The agreement between Israel and the UAE may have been driven in part by their fear of Iran's advances and the danger it poses. But the benefits to them go far beyond that issue.

These extend to economic investment possibilities, finance, tourism and especially know-how sharing. The UAE can benefit from Israel's technological and scientific advantage just as Israel can profit from the UAE's position as a hub for international services and a key entrance the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia.

Regarding the entrance to the Indian subcontinent, it should be noted that for India the most important part of the agreement is to manage the economic side of the synergies caused by the agreement.

The UAE and Bahrain can become intermediaries for Israeli exports of both commodities and services to various parts of the world.

Israel has a strong defense, security and surveillance equipment industry. It is a leader in dryland farming, solar energy, horticulture, high-tech jewelry and pharmaceuticals.

Moreover, Israel has the capacity to provide highly skilled and semi-skilled labor to the GCC countries, especially if they come from the Sephardic and Mizrahim ethnic groups, many of whom speak Arabic. Even Israeli Arabs can find opportunities that help to further build ties and bridges that bridge the cultural divide.

Israel's incursion into the Gulf has the potential to influence the politico-economic architecture that India has been building for years, being, for example, one of the largest suppliers of workers, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals etc.

The largest customers in Dubai's real estate market, as well as the largest issue of tourists visiting the country, come from India. But in this changing scenario there is scope for three-way synergies, making India a major player in this.

The final conclusion that can be drawn by way of future evaluation is that this new relationship will undoubtedly be a model for other Sunni states to follow, transforming a region mired in 19th century conflicts into one of the power centers of the 21st century.

* Lieutenant Colonel of Infantry. Geopolitical Analyst

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acharya, Arabinda, "COVID-19: A Testing Time for UAE-India Relations? A Perspective from Abu Dhabi," Strategic Analysis, September 2020.

Arab Center for Research and Policy studies, "The Abraham Agreement: normalization of relations or announcement of an existing Emirati - Israeli alliance?". Qatar, August 2020.

Karsh, Ephraim, ed., "The Israel-UAE Peace: A Preliminary Assessment", Ramat Gan: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, cafeteria University, September 2020.

Salisbury, Peter, "Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy", The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme, London: July 2020.

Steinber, Guido, "Regional Powers, United Arab Emirates", German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, July 2020.

The Trump Administration concludes its assertive management of the region and passes the baton to the Biden Administration, which appears to be committed to multilateralism and cooperation.

With the world at a standstill because of Covid-19, the Asian giant has taken the opportunity to resume a whole series of operations goal at expanding its control over the territories bordering its coastline. Such activities have not left the United States indifferent, and despite its complex internal status , it has taken action. With Mike Pompeo's visits throughout the Asia Pacific, the American power is increasing the process of containment of Beijing, materialized in a quadruple alliance between the United States, Japan, India and Australia. The new executive that the White House will inaugurate in January may involve a renewal of US actions which, without breaking with the Trump Administration, will recover the spirit of the Obama Administration, i.e. guided by greater cooperation with the countries of the Asia-Pacific and a commitment to dialogue.

Airstrip installed by China on Thitu or Pagasa Island, the second largest of the Spratlys, whose administration has been internationally recognized for the Philippines [Eugenio Bito-ononon Jr].

article / Ramón Barba

During the pandemic, Beijing has taken the opportunity to resume its actions in Asia Pacific waters. In mid-April, China proceeded to designate land in the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Archipelago and Macclesfield Bank as new districts of the city of Sansha, a town on China's Hainan Island. This management assistant assignment caused the subsequent protest of the Philippines and Vietnam, who claim sovereignty over these areas. Beijing's attitude has been accompanied by incursions and sabotage of ships in the area. See the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel, which China denies, arguing that it had suffered an accident and was carrying out illegal activities.

China's actions since the summer have been increasing instability in the region through military exercises near Taiwan or confrontations with India due to its border problems; on the other hand, in addition to the civil service examination the Philippines and Vietnam of Chinese moves, there is growing tension with Australia after the latter requested an investigation into the origin of the COVID-19, and the increase in maritime tensions with Japan. All this has led to a response from the United States, which claims to be the defender of free navigation in the Asia-Pacific, thus justifying its military presence and emphasizing that the People's Republic of China is not in favor of free transit, democracy or the rule of law.

US makes a move

Tensions between China and the United States in relation to the present dispute have been on the rise throughout the summer, with both increasing their military presence in the area (in addition, Washington has sanctioned 24 Chinese companies that have helped to militarize the area). All this has recently resulted in Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's visits to the Asia Pacific during the month of October. Prior to this round of visits, he had made statements in September at the ASEAN Virtual Summit urging countries in the region to limit their relations with China.

The dispute over these waters affects Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei and Malaysia, countries which, together with India and Japan, were visited by Pompeo (among others) in order to ensure greater control over Beijing's actions. During his tour, the US Secretary of State met with the foreign ministers of India, Australia and Japan to join forces against the Asian giant. Washington then signed in New Delhi a military agreement on the exchange satellite data to better track Chinese movements in the area, and paid a state visit to Indonesia. It should be recalled that Jakarta had so far been characterized by a growing friendship with Beijing and a worsening of relations with the United States due to a decrease in aid from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program. However, during Pompeo's visit , the two countries agreed to improve their relations through greater cooperation in regional, military procurement, intelligence, joint training and maritime security.

Thus, this move by Washington has implied:

• The consolidation of a quadruple alliance between India, Japan, Australia and the United States that has been materialized in the joint military exercises in the Bay of Bengal in early November. It should be recalled that this is in addition to Washington's traditional allies in the area (the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). In addition, the possibility of closer ties with Vietnam remains open.

• The expansion of its military presence in the area, increasing the flow of material sold to Taiwan, also highlighting the visits of high-ranking officials from Washington throughout July and the following months.

• Return of the destroyer USS Barry to the waters of the South China Sea with the goal of serving as a symbol of civil service examination of Chinese actions, and as a defender of freedom of navigation, peace and stability.

• Indonesia will move its Naval Combat Force (permanently based in Jakarta) to Natuna, islands bordering the South China Sea, rich in natural resources and disputed between the two countries.

• ASEAN takes a stand for peace and stability and in favor of UNCLOS 1982 (which establishes the governing legal framework for the law of the sea) during the summit held in Vietnam on November 12-15.

The ratio decidendi behind the Chinese performance

As a first approach to the ratio decidendi behind China's actions, it should be recalled that since 2012, taking advantage of the regional instability, the Asian giant alluded to its historical right over the territories of the South Sea to justify its actions, arguments dismissed in 2016 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. On the basis of the argument that Chinese fishermen once frequented the area, the appropriation of more than 80% of the territory has been justified and has since pitted Beijing against Manila.

On the other hand, Luis Lalinde, in his article China and the importance of dominating the Surrounding Sea (2017) gives a more complete view of the matter, alluding not only to historical reasons, but also to economic and geopolitical reasons. First of all, more than half of the hydrocarbons from which China is supplied transit through the Asia Pacific region, which in turn constitutes the world's main economic hub. In addition, Beijing has been deeply affected by the "century of humiliations", characterized by a lack of Chinese control over its territory due to maritime invasions. Finally, the domination of the seas, together with the already achieved continental weight, are vital for China's hegemonic projection in an area of increasing economic weight worldwide. For this reason, the so-called "string of pearls" has been established for the defense of strategic, security and energy supply interests from the Persian Gulf to the South Sea.

Lalinde's arguments justify China's actions in recent years, however, Bishop (2020), at the Council on Foreign Relations, states that the reason behind China's recent attitude is due to issues of internal instability, while a small sector of the Chinese intelligentsia sample critical and distrustful of Xi's leadership. They argue that the pandemic has weakened the Chinese Economics and the Chinese government, so that through foreign policy actions it must appear strong and vigorous. Finally, the importance of the control of the seas in relation to the Silk Road project should be taken into account. On its maritime side, China is investing heavily in Indian and Pacific ports which it does not rule out using for military purposes (see ports in Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Pakistan). Among the main opponents of this alliance are the United States, Japan and India, also against China's belligerent attitude, as we have seen.

Biden era: opportunities in a complicated scenario

Joe Biden's presidency will be marked by great challenges, both internal and external. We are facing a United States marked by a health crisis, with an increasingly polarized society and an Economics whose recovery, despite the measures adopted, raises doubts as to whether it will be a "V" or a "W". In addition, relations with Latin America and Europe have been deteriorating as a result of the measures taken by President Trump. 

The relationship between China and the US has been fluctuating in recent years. The Obama Administration, aware of the importance that the Asia-Pacific region has been gaining, coupled with the opportunity that the Silk Road presents for Beijing to expand its economic and military dominance, proposed in its second term its Pivot to Asia policy, beginning to finance and provide aid to countries in the region. During the years of the Trump Administration, the relationship with Beijing has deteriorated considerably, which puts Biden in a scenario in which he will have to face a trade war, the technological degree program in the battle for 5G, as well as regional security and human rights issues.

The countries of the region are demanding an effective response from the American giant to contain China in which Washington's promise of a free and open navigation zone is realized. However, the United States has to be cautious, since, with the exception of Vietnam, the Philippines, and partly Indonesia and Singapore, the rest of the countries in the region do not feel the need for an American intervention with any urgency. However, with the exception of Cambodia, the rest of the countries do not approve of the possibility of Chinese hegemony either.

In general, experts suggest that in the midst of this storm, the new US president will adopt a cautious but continuist attitude, to say the least. Probably, in line with the Obama Administration, he will tend to bet on multilateralism, economic subject alliances and regional integration without exercising an authoritarian attitude, lowering the aggressiveness of the Trump Administration, but being firm in his stance. All this implies looking for different areas in which to cooperate, such as climate change, the reduction of the Freedom of Navigation Missions or the increase of activities of Capacity Building.

A look into the near future

We will have to be attentive to the latest developments of the Trump Administration in relation to this conflict, as well as to the measures that Biden will adopt during his first months in office. However, everything suggests that, in this increasingly tense status , Washington will adopt a cautious stance. As we have seen, Pompeo's trips have served the United States to reaffirm its presence in the area, assuming a leadership role, providing the response that some countries such as the Philippines desire. However, although, as has been said, it will be necessary to keep an eye on the coming months, with the instructions already in place, it is most likely that Biden will continue the line of the Trump Administration but with a commitment to regional integration, multilateralism, diplomacy and economic cooperation in order to gain new support, strengthen its alliances and contain Beijing, thus justifying its presence in the area as the only power capable of bringing together regional forces to prevent a feared Chinese hegemony.

November 10, 2020

COMMENT / Sebastián Bruzzone

"We have failed... We should have acted earlier in the face of the pandemic." These are not the words of a political scientist, scientist or journalist, but of Chancellor Angela Merkel herself addressing the other 27 leaders of the European Union on October 29, 2020.

Anyone who has followed the news from March until today can easily realize that no government in the world has been able to control the spread of the coronavirus, except in one country: New Zealand. Its prime minister, the young Jacinda Ardern, closed the borders on March 20 and imposed a 14-day quarantine on New Zealanders returning from overseas. Her "go hard, go early" strategy has yielded positive results compared to the rest of the world: fewer than 2,000 infected and 25 deaths since the start of the health crisis. And the question is: how have they done it? The answer is relatively simple: their unilateral behavior.

The most skeptical to this idea may think that "New Zealand is an island and has been easier to control". However, it is necessary to know that Japan is also an island and has more than 102,000 confirmed cases, that Australia has had more than 27,000 infected, or that the United Kingdom, which is even smaller than New Zealand, has more than one million infected. The percentage of cases out of the total population of New Zealand is tiny, only 0.04% of its population has been infected.

As the world's states waited for the World Health Organization (WHO) to establish guidelines for a common response to the global crisis, New Zealand walked away from the body by ignoring its totally contradictory recommendations, which U.S. President Donald J. Trump called "deadly mistakes" while suspending American input to the organization. Japanese Vice Prime Minister Taro Aro went so far as to say that the WHO should be renamed the "Chinese Health Organization."

The New Zealand case is an example of the weakening of today's multilateralism. Long gone is the concept of multilateral cooperation that gave rise to the United Nations (UN) after World War II, whose purpose was to maintain peace and security in the world. The foundations of global governance were designed by and for the West. The powers of the 20th century are no longer the powers of the 21st century: emerging countries such as China, India or Brazil are demanding more power in the UN Security committee and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The lack of common values and objectives between developed and emerging countries is undermining the legitimacy and relevance of last century's multilateral organizations. In fact, China already proposed in 2014 the creation of the Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) as an alternative to the IMF or the World Bank.

The European Union is also not spared from the multilateral disaster because it has been attributed the shared skill in common safety matters in subject of public health (TFEU: art. 4.k)). On March 17, the European committee took the incoherent decision to close the external borders with third countries when the virus was already inside instead of temporarily and imperatively fail the Schengen Treaty. On the economic side, inequality and suspicion between the countries of the North and the South with a tendency to get into debt have increased. The refusal of Holland, Finland, Austria and other frugal countries to accept the unconditional financial aid required by a country like Spain, which has more official and political cars than the rest of Europe and the United States put together, called into question one of the fundamental principles on which the European Union was built: solidarity.

Europe has been the perfect storm in a sea of uncertainty and Spain, the eye of the hurricane. The European economic recovery fund is a term that overshadows what it really is: a financial rescue. A total of 750 billion euros divided mainly between Italy, Portugal, France, Greece and Spain, which will receive 140 billion and will be paid back by our grandchildren's children. It seems a fantasy that the first health aid Italy received came from third countries and not from its EU partners, but it became a reality when the first planes from China and Russia landed at Fiumicino airport on March 13. The pandemic is turning out to be an examination of conscience and credibility for the European Union, a ship on the way to shipwreck with 28 crew members trying to bail out the water that is slowly sinking it.

Great scholars and politicians confirm that states need multilateralism to respond jointly and effectively to the great risks and threats that have crossed borders and to maintain global peace. However, this idea collapses when one realizes that today's leading figure in bilateralism, Donald J. Trump, is the only American president since 1980 not to have started a war in his first term, to have brought North Korea closer to him, and to have secured recognition of Israel by Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates.

It is time to shift geopolitics towards updated and consensus-based solutions based on cooperative governance rather than global governance led by obsolete and truly powerful institutions. Globalist multilateralism that seeks to unify the actions of countries with very disparate cultural and historical roots under a single supranational entity to which they cede sovereignty may cause major clashes within the entente, provoke the departure of some of the dissatisfied members, the subsequent extinction of the intended organization and even enmity or a rupture of diplomatic relations.

However, if States with similar values, laws, customary norms or interests decide to group together under a Treaty or create a regulatory institution, even if they cede the necessary and fair sovereignty, the understanding will be much more productive. Thus, a network of bilateral agreements between regional organizations or between States has the possibility of creating more precise and specific objectives, as opposed to signing a globalist treaty in which the extensive letters and lists of its articles and members can become smoke and a mere declaration of intentions as has happened with the Paris Convention against Climate Change in 2015.

This last idea is the true and optimal future of international relations: regional bilateralism. A world grouped in regional organizations made up of countries with similar characteristics and objectives that negotiate and reach agreements with other groups of regions through dialogue, peaceful understanding, the art of diplomacy and binding pacts without the need to cede the soul of a State: sovereignty.

▲ Joe Biden and Barack Obama in February 2009, one month after arriving at the White House [Pete Souza].

COMMENTARY / Emili J. Blasco

This article was previously published, somewhat abbreviated, in the newspaper 'Expansión'.

One of the great mistakes revealed by the U.S. presidential elections is to have underestimated the figure of Donald Trump, believing him to be a mere anecdote, and to have disregarded, as whimsical, a large part of his policies. In reality, the Trump phenomenon is a manifestation, if not a consequence, of the current American moment and some of his major decisions, especially in the international arena, have more to do with national imperatives than with fickle occurrences. The latter suggests that there are aspects of foreign policy, manners aside, in which Joe Biden as president may be closer to Trump than to Barack Obama, simply because the world of 2021 is already somewhat different from that of the first half of the previous decade.

First, Biden will have to confront Beijing. Obama began to do so, but the more assertive character of Xi Jinping's China has been accelerating in recent years. In the superpower struggle, especially for dominance in the new technological era, the United States has everything at stake vis-à-vis China. It is true that Biden has referred to the Chinese not as enemies but as competitors, but the trade war was already started by the Administration of which he was Vice-President and now the objective rivalry is greater.

Nor is the withdrawal of the United States the result of Trump's madness. Basically, it has to do, to simplify somewhat, with the energy independence achieved by the Americans: they no longer need oil from the Middle East and they no longer have to be in all the oceans to ensure the free navigation of tankers. The 'America First' was somehow already started by Obama and Biden will not go in the opposite direction. So, for example, no major involvement in European Union affairs and no firm negotiations for a free trade agreement between the two Atlantic markets can be expected.

In the two main achievements of the Obama era - the nuclear agreement with Iran sealed by the United States, the EU and Russia, and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Havana - Biden will find it difficult to follow the path then defined. There may be attempts at a new rapprochement with Tehran, but there would be greater coordination against it on the part of Israel and the Sunni world, instances that now converge more. Biden may find that less pressure on the ayatollahs pushes Saudi Arabia toward the atomic bomb.

As for Cuba, the return to dissent will be more in the hands of the Cuban government than in those of Biden himself, who in the electoral loss in Florida has been able to read a rejection of any condescension with Castroism. Some of the new restrictions imposed by Trump on Cuba may be dismantled, but if Havana continues to show no real willingness to change and open up, the White House will no longer have to continue betting on political concessions to credit .

In the case of Venezuela, Biden will probably withdraw a good part of the sanctions, but there is no longer room for a policy of inaction like that of Obama. That Administration did not confront Chavismo for two reasons: because it did not want to bother Cuba given the secret negotiations it was holding with that country to reopen its embassies and because the level of lethality of the regime had not yet become unbearable. Today, international reports on human rights are unanimous on the repression and torture of the Maduro government, and also the arrival of millions of Venezuelan refugees in the different countries of the region make it necessary to take action on the matter. Here it is to be hoped that Biden can act in a less unilateral manner and, without ceasing to exert pressure, seek coordination with the European Union.

It often happens that whoever arrives at the White House takes care of national affairs in his first years and later, especially in a second term, focuses on leaving an international bequest . Because of age and health, it is possible that the new tenant will only be in office for a four-year term. Without Obama's idealism of wanting to "bend the arc of history" - Biden is a pragmatist, a product of the American political establishment - nor businessman Trump's rush for immediate gain, it is hard to imagine that his Administration will take serious risks on the international scene.

Biden has confirmed his commitment to begin his presidency in January by reversing some of Trump's decisions, notably on climate change and the Paris agreement ; on some tariff fronts, such as the outgoing administration's unnecessary punishment of European countries; and on various immigration issues, especially concerning Central America.

In any case, even if the Democratic left wants to push Biden towards certain margins, believing that they have an ally in Vice-President Kamala Harris, the president-elect can make use of his moderation staff : the fact that he has obtained better result in the elections than the party itself gives him, for the time being, sufficient internal authority. For the rest, the Republicans have held up quite well in the Senate and the House of Representatives, so that Biden arrives at the White House with less support on Capitol Hill than his predecessors. That, in any case, may help to reinforce one of the traits most valued today in the Delaware politician: predictability, something that the economies and foreign ministries of many of the world's countries are anxiously awaiting.

Emerged in 2008, the Paraguayan People's Army has created a conflict that has already claimed a hundred dead.

Marxist guerrillas in Latin America are a thing of the past. That conviction led to underestimate the emergence in 2008 of the Paraguayan People's Army (EPP), which since then has carried out a hundred violent actions, especially in rural areas of the northeast of the country. The conflict has claimed a hundred dead and as many wounded; there have also been kidnappings of personalities, which have given the EPP special media coverage. The creation of a controversial special military-police corps has not achieved the goal of putting an end to the group, which has led to criticism of the government's management of the problem.

article / Eduardo Villa Corta

The Paraguayan People's Army (EPP) was considered since its emergence as a small group of radicals that would have little to do. However, in just ten years it has become an organization capable of confronting the Paraguayan State: it has carried out a hundred terrorist actions, including a dozen kidnappings, causing some sixty deaths and a hundred wounded.

EPP influence zones (light red) and places where there have been group instructions (dark red) [Mikelelgediento].

With an issue of activists ranging from thirty of its hard core to two hundred if its support networks are considered, the EPP has been a problem for the government for several years, which has not been able to dismantle it: 30 militants have died in confrontations with the forces of law and order and a hundred have been arrested, but the image offered by the authorities is one of ineffectiveness. The Paraguayan government's negative credit is also the fact that it did not take seriously the threat posed by the group 's constitution and its first actions.

The EPP was officially formed on March 1, 2008. Although its founders and main leaders had already planned the creation of this group prior to this date, its roots go back to 1992 and the Patria Libre Party, as documented by researcher Jeremy McDermott. The EPP presents itself as an armed group against the "bourgeois liberal" parliamentary system, but above all it is a Marxist movement that promotes the uprising of Paraguay's peasantry, hence its attempt to take root in the rural northeast of the country.

The 2008 presidential victory of Fernando Lugo at the head of a leftist alliance, putting an end to six decades of political dominance by the Colorado Party, may have encouraged the formation of the EPP, which then believed it was justified in its actions with the removal of Lugo in 2012 through a controversial impeachment trial carried out by the Parliament and labeled by Lugo's supporters as a coup d'état.

The first EPP attack, on March 16, 2008, consisted of the burning of agricultural machinery in the department of Concepción. The next was in December of the same year, with an attack on a barracks in Tacuatí, in the department of San Pedro. Since then, their movements have been centered especially between the south of the first of these Departments and the north of the second.

Despite being a more or less delimited zone, dismantling the EPP is not easy because the EPP's modus operandi makes its movements unpredictable. This is because, as McDermott explains, the group does not act like other insurgent organizations, such as the FARC. The core of the EPP is made up of some 30 full-time fighters, most of whom have family ties. They are led by ringleaders Alcides Oviedo and his wife Carmen Villalba, who are in jail; one of the leaders on the ground is Oswaldo Villalba. In addition, there are about fifty part-time activists, a logistical network that could reach two hundred people and local sympathizers who, without being very involved in the cause, provide information on search operations of the security forces. The group suffered in 2014 the split of one of its columns, which was renamed the Armed Peasant association (ACA) and in 2018, in agreement with the authorities, the EPP split into two groups to face the pressure of the security forces.

The aforementioned figures speak of a small group , far from the 8,000 members that the FARC had in 2016 at the time of their demobilization or the 4,000 members that the ELN currently has in Colombia, or the 3,000 that were attributed to Chile's Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front. Although the EPP is more similar to the latter, its operational cessation in 1999 left the FARC as the main training group for those who would later create the EPP, as evidenced by the documentation found in the computer of FARC leader Raul Reyes and the kidnapping of businesswoman Cecilia Cubas, daughter of a former Paraguayan president, at the end of 2004.

This action marked what has been a line of action for the EPP. Since 2008, in addition to extortion and assaults in order to finance itself, the group has carried out kidnappings in order to achieve greater media impact. These have been carried out against relatives of former presidents of the country or personalities with a high political profile , for whose release ransoms in excess of five million dollars have been order , although lower figures have been agreed in negotiations. It is usually agreed to submit part of the money in cash and part in food for the towns surrounding the EPP's area of operations.

The group has also carried out extortions and assaults in those areas where it operates, demanding "revolutionary taxes" from landowners and cattle ranchers, from whom they also steal cattle and food to meet the organization's daily sustenance needs.

Other notable actions carried out by the EPP are bombings. For example, there was an attack against the Supreme Court of Justice in Asunción at the beginning of the group's operations. A more recent attack was perpetrated on August 27, 2016 against a military vehicle in the eastern zone of Concepción: the explosives exploded as the convoy passed by and then the terrorists liquidated the survivors with firearms; eight military personnel were killed in the attack. According to authorities, this event marked a leap in the EPP's operations, from a group seeking economic resources to an organization with greater operational and military capacity.

To confront the EPP, President Horacio Cartes created the Joint Task Force (FTC) in 2013 in response to evidence that police action was ineffective, in part due to possible internal corruption. The JTF is composed of members of the Armed Forces, the National Police and the National Anti-Drug administrative office , under the command of a military officer and reporting directly to the president. The more expeditious nature of this unit has generated some controversy in the social and political discussion .

The EPP's most recent operation was the kidnapping of former Paraguayan vice-president Óscar Denis on September 9, 2020. For the release of Denis, leader of the Authentic Radical Liberal Party and active participant in Lugo's impeachment, the terrorists demand the release of their leaders, Alcides Oviedo and Carmen Villalba, as well as the submission of food supplies for the rural areas where they operate. The deadline set by the organization expired a few days later without the Government attending their request. There have been citizen mobilizations demanding Denis' freedom and the status is being followed in the country with concern, putting President Mario Abdo Benítez in a tight spot.

[Francisco Cancio, Enmienda: una revisión de la causa y el actuar argentino en la Guerra de las Malvinas (Náutica Robinsón: Madrid, 2020), 406 pp.]

review / Ignacio Cristóbal

This is an excellent book that analyzes some controversial issues of the Malvinas War (1982). The author, Francisco Cancio, is an expert on the subject and has made a conscientious search for information over the years in his visits to Argentina and the United Kingdom.

It is not a book on the history of the Malvinas War; there are other manuals that explain it very well, but here the author has tried something else. Whoever opens the book should have some knowledge of what happened then in the South Atlantic or else obtain it before going into its pages.

In my case, it was not difficult to get "hooked" by reading the book. From the data the author gives, he had similar experiences to mine. I was also watching the news in the spring of 1982 sitting next to my father, a military man; for our generation it was our first war. And like him, who on his trips to the United Kingdom, I imagine to practice his English language skills, would dive into British bookstores in search of documentation, I also learned about the Falklands when I was in those lands perfecting my English, going to museums and bookstores and to the barracks of Colchester, the city where I spent two summers, to talk to veterans of the conflict. You will be forgiven if, because of this staff involvement, I let my sympathy for the Argentine side go a little, while admiring the professionalism shown by the British troops.

The Malvinas War was a complete war from the military point of view. There were air and naval combats; intervention of submarines and satellites; landing and ground operations of special operations units, as well as actions of units at battalion level. It is very welcome that the first chapter, graduate "Genesis", while introducing the conflict begins to "prick balloons" about the real reason for going to war.

And the chapters go on and on with issues such as the "Super Etendart and the Exocet", where we imagine the Argentine naval pilots training in Brittany, France and leaving the flag very high, as it should have been. The interest increases when the author gets into the intelligence operations to "arm", without an "instruction book", the missiles that were already in Argentina. The French government played a complicated role in the conflict, but the diplomatic aspect (it was a member of NATO) took precedence over the commercial aspect. The French technicians sent to Argentina were the ones who gave the "do de pecho" by siding with Argentina and juggling to avoid creating more problems in the international balance.

The chapter on land operations is excellent and makes a spear in favor of the Argentine forces that had to deal with the enemy and the lack of logistic support from the continent. In those days there was a discussion in the public opinion about the dichotomy "conscript army" versus "professional army". It is clear in the chapter the damage that the Argentines inflicted on the reconquerors, but also their adverse status : the lack of basic means for resistance, counterattack and, why not to say it, hunger and cold. 

The naval part is dealt with in two interesting chapters that tell the story of the submarine "San Luis", which was bothering the British fleet during the whole war. If there had been no war, that submarine would have stayed in port. This is the level of those brave submariners. The other chapter is about the failed meeting, due to the lack of wind, of the two fleets. It is possibly one of the most critical moments of the battle. Had there been wind, the A-4 Skyhawk of the Argentine Navy could have driven the British fleet back to its home ports.

A separate chapter is "La guerra en los cielos" (The war in the skies), which gathers some of the most courageous operations of the Argentine pilots in those days. The author puts us in the cockpits of the fighters whose images still make our hair stand on end. Without wanting to give anything away to the reader, the interview with the former head of the Argentine Air Force in those days is for me the best part of the book. We must not forget that he was a member of the military board and the data he reveals about the "Russianfinancial aid " are very interesting and unknown.

And finally the long-awaited chapter "The Attack on the Invincible", which deals with probably the most compromising war action of the entire conflict. The author scrupulously analyzes the operation of attacking one of the two British aircraft carriers, the Invincible, with a clarity that makes it evident that something happened.

"Amendment" is, therefore, a highly recommendable book for those who already have some knowledge about the Falklands War, but at the same time it can provoke curiosity in other people who, without being initiated in this conflict, can help themselves in the reading by consulting basic information available on the Internet. It was a singular conflict, in which a country in the south of the world put in check the second power of NATO, helped without limits by the first and by a neighboring country. As Admiral Woodward, commander of the British fleet, said in his memoirs: "people do not know how close Britain came to losing the war". A fine final epitaph from a military professional who surely recognized the professionalism, bravery and courage of the enemy.

* Expert in military affairs

The current president made only one visit, also in the framework the G-20, compared to the six that Bush and Obama made in their first four years.

International travel does not tell the whole story about a president's foreign policy, but it does give some clues. As president, Donald Trump has only traveled once to Latin America, and then only because the G-20 summit he was attending was being held in Argentina. It is not that Trump has not dealt with the region -of course, the policy towards Venezuela has been very present in his management, but not having made the effort to travel to other countries of the continent reflects well the more unilateral character of his policy, little focused on gaining sympathy among his peers.

▲ signature in Mexico in 2018 of the free trade agreement between the three North American countriesdepartment of State, USA].

article / Miguel García-Miguel

With only one visit to the region, the U.S. president is the one who has made the fewest official visits since Clinton's first legislature, who also visited the region only once. In contrast, Bush and Obama paid more attention to the neighboring territory, both with six visits in their first legislature. Trump focused his diplomatic campaign on Asia and Europe and reserved Latin American affairs for visits by the region's presidents to the White House or to his Mar-a-Lago resort.

In fact, the Trump Administration spent time on Latin American issues, taking positions more quickly than the Obama Administration, as the worsening Venezuelan problem required defining actions. At the same time, Trump has discussed regional issues with Latin American presidents during their visits to the United States. There has been, however, no effort at multilateralism or empathy, going out to meeting them in their home countries to discuss their problems there.

Clinton: Haiti

The Democratic president made only one visit to the region during his first term in office. After the Uphold Democracy operation to refund Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power, on March 31, 1995, Bill Clinton traveled to Haiti for the transition ceremony organized by the United Nations. The operation had consisted of a military intervention by the United States, Poland and Argentina, with UN approval, to overthrow the military board that had forcibly deposed the democratically elected Aristide. During his second term, Clinton paid more attention to regional affairs, with thirteen visits.

Bush: free trade agreements

Bush made his first presidential trip to neighboring Mexico, where he met with then-President Fox to discuss a variety of issues. Mexico paid attention to the U.S. government's attention to Mexican immigrants, but the two presidents also discussed the operation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which came into force in 1994, and joint efforts in the fight against drug trafficking. The U.S. president had the opportunity to visit Mexico three more times during his first term to attend multilateral meetings. Specifically, in March 2002, he attended the International lecture on Financing for development, organized by the United Nations and which resulted in the Monterrey Consensus; Bush also took the opportunity to meet again with the Mexican president. In October of the same year he attended the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit, which that year was held in the Mexican enclave of Los Cabos. Finally, he set foot on Mexican soil once again to attend the Special Summit of the Americas held in Monterrey in 2004.

During his first term in office, Bush promoted the negotiation of new free trade agreements with several American countries, which marked his Administration's policy in relation to the Western Hemisphere. In the framework of this policy, he traveled to Peru and El Salvador on March 23 and 24, 2002. In Peru he met with the President of that country and with the Presidents of Colombia, Bolivia and Ecuador, in order to reach an agreement to renew the ATPA (Andean Trade Promotion Act), by which the US granted tariff freedom on a wide range of exports from those countries. The matter was finally resolved with the enactment in October of the same year of the ATPDEA (Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act), which maintained tariff freedoms in compensation for the fight against drug trafficking, in an attempt to develop the region economically to create alternatives to cocaine production. Finally, in the case of El Salvador, he met with the Central American presidents to discuss the possibility of a Free Trade Agreement with the region (known in English as CAFTA) in exchange for a reinforcement of security in the areas of the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism. The treaty was ratified three years later by the U.S. congress . Bush revisited Latin America up to eleven times during his second term.

Own elaboration with data from the Office of the Historian.

Obama: two Summits of the Americas

Obama began his tour of diplomatic visits to Latin America by attendance the V Summit of the Americas, held in Port-au-Prince (Trinidad and Tobago). The Summit brought together all the leaders of the sovereign countries of the Americas except for Cuba and was aimed at coordinating efforts to recover from the recent crisis of 2008 with mentions of the importance of environmental and energy sustainability. Obama attend again in 2012 the VI Summit of the Americas held this time in Cartagena de Indias (Colombia). No representatives from Ecuador or Nicaragua attended this Summit in protest against the exclusion of Cuba to date. Neither the President of Haiti nor the Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez attended, alleging medical reasons. The summit again discussed Economics and security issues with special relevance to the war against drugs and organized crime, as well as the development of environmental policies. He also took advantage of this visit to announce, together with Juan Manuel Santos, the entrance into effect of the Free Trade Agreement between Colombia and the US, negotiated by the Bush Administration and ratified after some delay by the US congress . The Democratic president also had the opportunity to visit the region on the occasion of the G-20 meeting in Mexico, but this time the main topic revolved around solutions to curb the European debt crisis.

In terms of bilateral meetings, Obama made a diplomatic tour between March 19 and 23, 2010 to Brazil, Chile and El Salvador, meeting with their respective presidents. He used the occasion to reestablish relations with the Brazilian left that had governed the country since 2002, to reiterate his economic and political alliance with Chile and to announce a US$200 million fund to strengthen security in Central America. During his second term he made up to seven visits, including the resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba, which had been paused since the triumph of the Revolution.

Trump: T-MEC

Donald Trump only visited Latin America on one occasion to attend the G-20 meeting , a meeting that was not even regional, held in Buenos Aires in December 2018. Among the various agreements reached were the reform of the World Trade Organization and the commitment of the attendees to implement the measures adopted in the Paris agreement , with the exception of the US, since the president had already reiterated his determination to withdraw from the agreement. Taking advantage of the visit, he signed the T-MEC (Treaty between Mexico, the United States and Canada, the new name for the renewed NAFTA, whose renegotiation had been a Trump demand) and met with the Chinese president in the context of the trade war. Trump, on the other hand, did not attend the VIII Summit of the Americas held in Peru in April 2018; the trip, which was also supposed to take him to Colombia, was canceled at the last minute because the US president preferred to remain in Washington in the face of a possible escalation of the Syrian crisis.

The reason for the few visits to the region has been that Trump has directed his diplomatic campaign towards Europe, Asia and to a lesser extent the Middle East, in the context of the trade war with China and the loss of power in the US international landscape.

Own elaboration with data from the Office of the Historian.

Only one trip, but monitoring of the region

Despite having hardly traveled to the rest of the continent, the Republican candidate has paid attention to the region's affairs, but without leaving Washington, as there have been seven Latin American presidents who have visited the White House. The main focus of the meetings has been economic development and the strengthening of security, as usual. Depending on the reality of each country, the meetings revolved more around the possibility of future trade agreements, the fight against drugs and organized crime, preventing the flow of illegal immigration to the United States or the search to strengthen political alliances. Although the US government website does not list it as an official visit , Donald Trump also met at the White House in February 2020 with Juan Guaidó, recognized as president in charge of Venezuela.

Precisely, if there has been a common topic to all these meetings, it has been the status of the economic and political crisis in Venezuela. Trump has sought allies in the region to encircle and pressure the Maduro government, which is not only an example of continuous human rights violations, but also destabilizes the region. The strong civil service examination the regime served Donald Trump as propaganda to gain popularity and try to save the Latino vote in the November 3 elections, and that had its award at least in the state of Florida.

Own elaboration with data from Office of the Historian.

COMMENTARY / Rafael Calduch Torres*.

As tradition dictates since 1845, on the first Tuesday of November, on the 3rd, the voting inhabitants of the fifty states that make up the United States will take part in the fifty-ninth Election Day, the day on which the Electoral high school is formed, which will have to choose between keeping the forty-fifth President of the United States of America, Donald Trump, or electing the forty-sixth, Joe Biden.

But the real problem facing not only the inhabitants of the USA, but also the rest of the world's population is that both Trump and Biden have their international strategy as a core topic at home, following in the wake of the change that took place in the country after the 9/11 attacks and whose fundamental result has been the absence of effective leadership of the American superpower in the last twenty years. For if there is one thing that must be clear to us, it is the fact that none of the candidates, as their predecessors did not, has a plan that would allow them to resume the international leadership that the United States enjoyed until the end of the 1990s; On the contrary, what urges them is to solve domestic problems and subordinate international issues, which a superpower of the stature of the United States must face, to the solutions adopted internally, which is one of the serious strategic errors of our era, since strong international leaderships that are coherent with the management of domestic problems have historically allowed the creation of meeting points in American society that cushion divisions and bring cohesion to the country.

However, despite these general similarities there is a clear difference between the two candidates when it comes to addressing international issues that will affect the results of the choice Americans will make on Tuesday.

"The Power of America's example". With this slogan, Biden's general proposal , much clearer and more accessible than Trump's, develops a plan to lead the democratic world in the 21st century based on using the way in which America's domestic problems will be solved as an example, binding and sustaining its international leadership; it goes without saying that the mere assumption that the internal problems of the United States are not exactly extrapolable to the rest of the international actors is not even taken into account.

Thus, the Democratic candidate , using a rather traditional rhetoric on the dignity of leadership, uses the connection between domestic and international reality to propose a program of national regeneration without specifying how this will restore the lost international leadership. This approach will be based on two main pillars: the democratic regeneration of the country and the reconstruction of the US class average which, in turn, will make it possible to underpin other international projects.

Democratic regeneration will be based on the strengthening of the educational and judicial systems, transparency, the fight against corruption or the end of attacks on the media, and is proposed as an instrument for the reestablishment of the country's moral leadership which, in addition to inspiring others, would serve for the US to transfer these US national policies to the international arena, for others to follow and imitate them through a sort of global league for democracy that seems very nebulous.

In the meantime, the reconstruction of the class average, the same to which Trump appealed four years ago, would involve greater investment in technological innovation and supposedly greater global equity in international trade, from which the United States would benefit the most.

Finally, all of the above would be complemented by a new era in international arms control through a new START treaty between the US and Russia, US leadership in the fight against climate change, an end to interventions on foreign soil, particularly in Afghanistan, and the reestablishment of diplomacy as the backbone of US foreign policy.

"Promises Made, Promises Kept!What is Trump's alternative? The current President does not reveal what his projects are, but he does propose a review of his "achievements" which, we understand, will give us an idea of what his foreign policy will be, which will revolve around the continuity of the US trade rebalancing based, as up to now, on shielding US companies from foreign investment, the imposition of new tariffs, the fight against fraudulent trade practices, especially by China, and the restoration of US relations with its allies in Asia/Pacific, the Middle East and Europe, but without specific proposals.

With regard to the area of security, treated in a differentiated manner by Trump, the recipe is the increase in defense spending, the shielding of US territory against terrorism and opposition to North Korea, Venezuela and Iran, which will be joined by the maintenance and expansion of the recent campaign of actions directed specifically against Russia, with the declared goal of containing it in Ukraine and preventing cyber-attacks.

But the reality is that both candidates will have to face global challenges that they have not considered in their programs and that will condition them decisively in their mandates, starting with the management of the pandemic and its economic effects on a global scale and including the growing competition from the European Union, especially as its common military and defense capabilities develop.

As we have just seen, none of the candidates will offer new solutions and therefore the situation is not likely to improve, at least in the short term.

* PhD in Contemporary History, graduate in Political Science and Administration. Professor at UNAV and UCJC.