▲ Almagro's speech at the opening of the 49th OAS General Assembly in Medellin, Colombia in June 2019 [OAS].

COMMENTARY / Ignacio Yárnoz

At the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) held in Medellin last June, the tensions and divisions that currently exist within this international organization became evident. In the first place, these discrepancies were evident in the Venezuelan issue, an issue that took center stage at the meeting with the presentation of migration reports, criticism of the Bolivarian regime and the presence of the Venezuelan delegation representing the Guaidó government headed by Ambassador Gustavo Tarre.

These facts were met with the rejection of most of the Caribbean countries, who left the conference room at the presentation of the reports and declared their refusal to comply with any OAS resolution in which the Venezuelan delegation voted in favor. And the fact is that, in the opinion of the Caribbean countries, Venezuela formally left the organization in March and the presence of Guaidó's delegation as the legitimate representative of Venezuela contravenes international law and the principles of the OAS Charter, given that it represents a government without effective control of the territory or legal legitimacy. But the Caricom countries were not the only ones to express their protest, the delegation of Uruguay also left the conference room and that of Mexico expressed its displeasure at the presence of the Venezuelan opposition as a delegation of plenary session of the Executive Council right.

The controversy, however, not only revealed discrepancies on how to deal with the Venezuelan crisis, but also reflected another underlying reality, which is that Luis Almagro's candidacy for reelection as University Secretary of the organization hangs in the balance.

In December of last year, Uruguay's Almagro formally announced that, at the request of Colombia and the United States, he had decided to run for reelection with the assurance of having the necessary votes. Since then, however, the re-election landscape has darkened. The vote will take place in the first semester of 2020 and to get re-elected Almagro needs at least 18 votes from the 35 countries of the OAS (if we include Cuba, even if it does not actively participate).

Variables

The future of Almagro, who came to the position in May 2015, depends on several factors that will unfold this year. Mainly, the general elections in Argentina, Canada, Uruguay and Bolivia, which will be held between October and November. However, there are other variables that may also affect his reelection, such as the support he obtains from the Lima group countries or the possible division among Caricom members in this regard. Below, we will review these assumptions one by one.

In the case of the Bolivian elections, Almagro has already played his cards and has been accused of having used a double standard by harshly criticizing the Maduro regime, but then not being critical of the possibility of re-election of Evo Morales for a third time. Such re-election is supposedly not legal according to the Bolivian Constitution and was vetoed by the population in a referendum, but President Evo Morales has ignored it under the pretext that preventing him from being a candidate again is against human rights, an argument later endorsed by the Bolivian Supreme Court. The administrative office General administrative office of the OAS, despite not agreement with the "right to be reelected", did not raise any criticism or position against such election supposedly due to the possible Bolivian vote in favor of Almagro, something that could happen if Evo Morales is finally reelected but is not completely certain either. However, if not, he has already earned the animosity of civil service examination candidates such as Carlos Mesa or Óscar Ortiz and opposition leader Samuel Doria Medina who, if elected, would not vote for him.

Regarding Guatemala, the first round of the presidential elections gave the victory to Sandra Torres (22.08% of the votes) and Alejandro Giammattei (12.06% of the votes), who will face each other in the second round on Sunday, August 11. Should Torres be elected, she may align her stance with that of Mexico by adopting a less interventionist policy towards Venezuela and therefore against Almagro. In the case of the victory of Giammattei, a center-right politician, it is likely that he will align his positions with Almagro and vote in favor of him. Guatemala has always been aligned with US positions, so it is doubtful that the country would vote against a candidacy supported by Washington, although not impossible.

As for Argentina and Canada, the position will depend on whether the winning candidate in their respective elections is conservative or progressive. Even in the case of Canada, the possibility of a rejection of Almagro is open regardless of the political orientation of the new government, since while Canada has been critical of the Maduro regime, it has also criticized the internal organization of the OAS under the current University Secretary As far as Argentina is concerned, there is a clear difference between the presidential candidates: while Mauricio Macri would represent continuity in support for Almagro, the Alberto Fernández-Cristina Kirchner ticket would clearly represent a rejection.

Uruguay represents a curious case of how internal politics and political games affect even members of the same party. We must not forget that Luis Almagro was a minister in the government of Pepe Mujica and that his first candidacy for University Secretary was presented by Uruguay. However, given the division in the political training to which he belonged, Frente Amplio, he earned some enemies such as those of the current government of Tabaré Vázquez. That is why Uruguay has been so critical of Luis Almagro despite being a compatriot and fellow party member. However, we should not doubt that he will also have his friends in the party that will change Uruguay's position. If so, no matter which candidate is elected (Luis Lacalle Pou for the National Party or Daniel Martinez for the Frente Amplio), Almagro would have a guaranteed vote: that of the right wing of the National Party by having a more critical thesis with Maduro (in fact, they recognized the Guaidó government as a party and criticized Uruguay's neutrality), or that of the left wing of the Frente Amplio by the contacts Almagro may have, although the latter is still a hypothesis given that the most extreme wing of the party is the one that still has the majority of votes within the Frente Amplio.

Another applicant

However, Almagro's chances for reelection could be frustrated if another aspirant presents his candidacy who could win the sympathy of the Lima group , created in August 2017 and integrated by a dozen countries of the Americas to coordinate their strategy in relation to Venezuela. Peru sounds like the one that could possibly present a candidate: Hugo de Zela, a Peruvian diplomat with 42 years of degree program who in April was appointed Peru's ambassador in Washington and who has played a very relevant role within the Lima group as coordinator. In addition, De Zela knows the structure of the OAS since he has served as chief of staff of the administrative office General on two occasions: first, between 1989 and 1994, when the head of the organization was the Brazilian Joao Clemente Baena Soares; and then between 2011 and 2015, with the Chilean José Miguel Insulza. This candidate, apart from his wide political experience, has the advantage of having been coordinator of the Lima group , which could give guarantees about the partnership between this group and the OAS on the Venezuelan issue.

If De Zela decides to run, the Lima group could break up and split its votes, which could favor the interests of the 14 countries of the Caribbean Community (Caricom), which usually vote as a bloc and have been dissatisfied with Almagro's management of the Venezuelan crisis. In fact, Caricom is already thinking of presenting a candidate that takes into account the interests of these countries, mainly climate change. The names that sound among Caricom members are the ambassador to the OAS of Antigua and Barbuda, Ronald Sanders, or the representative of Barbados to the UN, Liz Thompson.

However, there remains one hope in the Caricom community for Almagro. Saint Lucia, Haiti, Jamaica and the Bahamas broke ranks at the time of voting for the admission of Ambassador Gustavo Tarre appointed by the Guaidó government to represent Venezuela before the OAS (although technically what they supported is that he be appointed as "permanent representative appointed by the National Assembly, pending new elections and the appointment of a democratically elected government"). These four countries, although with a more moderate position than that of the Lima group , joined their position by accepting the designation of said representative with the aforementioned nuance. This is the third occasion so far this year that Caricom has broken ranks on the Venezuelan topic . This could give the University Secretary a trump card with which to play in order to obtain the support of some of these four countries, although he will need skillful negotiation techniques and give something in exchange to these countries, whether it be positions in the general administrative office or benefits in new programs and scholarships for integral development or climate change, for example.  

In conclusion, in the best possible scenario for Almagro and assuming that no country of the Lima group presents an alternative candidate , the candidacy for reelection of the current University Secretary would have 12 assured votes, 4 negotiable votes from St. Lucia, Jamaica, Haiti and Bahamas and 5 pending elections (Guatemala, Canada, Uruguay, Argentina and Bolivia). It is clear that Mexico, a large part of Caricom (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago) and Nicaragua will vote against. In addition, we must add the fact that any candidacy can be presented up to 10 minutes before the extraordinary General Assembly, which gives even more room for political games in the shadows and last-minute surprises. As we can see, it is a very difficult status for the University Secretary and it will surely mean more than one headache in this arithmetic of votes to get the position. Undoubtedly a fight for the position that will give much to talk about between now and February 2020.

[I. H. Daalder & James M. Lindsay, The Empty Throne. America's Abdication of Global Leadership. Public Affairs. New York, 2018. 256 p.]

review / Salvador Sánchez Tapia

The arrival of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States in January 2017 has unleashed a significant flow of publishing house that continues to this day, and in which numerous pens question, in substance and form, the new tenant of the White House from different angles.

In this case, two authors from the field of American think tanks , close to Barack Obama - one of them served during his presidency as US ambassador to NATO - offer us a very critical view of President Trump and his management at the head of the US executive branch. With the solid support of numerous quotes, statements and testimonies collected from the media, and in an agile and attractive language, they compose the portrait of an erratic, ignorant - in one passage they highlight without palliation his "ignorance on many issues, his unwillingness to accept advice from others, his impulsiveness, and his lack of critical thinking skills" -, arrogant and irresponsible president.

The authors of The Empty Throne argue that President Trump's deeds and words show how he has broken with the traditional line of U.S. foreign policy since Franklin Delano Roosevelt, based on the exercise of leadership oriented toward collective security, the opening of global markets and the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and which has result highly beneficial to the United States. Trump, they argue, would have abdicated that leadership, embracing instead another purely transactional policy, made by a simple calculation of interest.

This new way of conceiving international politics, based on the logic of competition and domination, would be justified by the Trump administration with the argument that the old one has been highly pernicious for the United States, since it has allowed friends and allies to obtain important profits at the expense of American prosperity.

Paraphrasing Trump's America First campaign slogan, the authors argue that this new policy will result, rather, in an America Alone, and will instead benefit China, assuming that it will be to China that nations will look for a new leader.

To support their thesis , the authors review the management of Donald Trump in the year and a half between his inauguration in early 2017 and the book's publication date in 2018. In their argument they review the management of the presidents the nation has had since the end of World War II, and compare it to that put in internship by the Trump administration.

An important part of the criticism is directed at the controversial presidential style displayed by Donald Trump, which has been evident even before the elections, and which is evident in facts such as the withdrawal of the usual label in the world of international relations, especially hurtful in his relations with friends and allies; the lack of interest shown in coordinating an orderly transition with the Obama administration, or the making of certain decisions against his national security team or even without consulting its members.

Not to acknowledge these facts would be to deny the evidence and question the inescapable reality of the unease that this new way of dealing with nations with which America shares so many interests and values, such as those of the European Union, or others such as Japan, Canada or Australia, firm allies of the United States for decades, produces in many people. However, there is room for some criticism of the arguments.

First of all, and leaving aside the lack of time perspective to make afinal evaluation of Trump's presidency, the authors make a comparison between the first year and a half of the current president's term and those of all his predecessors since the end of World War II to demonstrate Trump's return to the America First policy prevailing until Roosevelt. This contrast requires certain nuances because, based on the common denominator of the international leadership strategy that all of Trump's predecessors practiced, the country experienced in this time moments of greater unilateralism such as that of George W. Bush's first term, along with others of lesser global presence of the country such as, perhaps, those of the presidencies of Eisenhower, Ford, Carter and, even, Obama.

In Obama's case, moreover, the fundamental differences with Trump are not as great as they seem. Both presidents are trying to manage, in order to mitigate, the loss of relative American power caused by the long years of military presence in the Middle East and the rise of China. It is not that Trump believes that the United States should abandon the ideas of global leadership and multinational interaction; in fact, while he is accused of leaving traditional allies to their fate, he is reproached for his rapprochement, almost complicity, with others such as Saudi Arabia and Israel. Rather, what he intends is to exercise leadership, but, of course, dictating his conditions so that they are favorable to the United States. From inspirational leadership to leadership by imposition.

The question is, is it possible to maintain leadership under these conditions? According to the authors, no. In fact, as a consequence of this "abdication of American leadership", they offer two scenarios: the return to a world in which no nation leads, or the emergence of another nation - China, obviously - that will fill the vacuum created by this abdication.

The authors do not consider a third option: that of traditional allies adapting to the new style of leadership, albeit reluctantly, out of necessity, and in the confidence that one day, the Trump presidency will be history. This idea would be consistent with the premise set out in the book, and with which we concur, that American leadership remains indispensable, and with the very recognition at the end of the book that there is some substance to the grievances that Trump presents and that the president's attitude is leading many of America's friends and allies to reconsider their defense spending, to rethink the rules of international trade to make them more palatable to America, and to take a more active role in resolving major global challenges.

Time will tell which of the three options will prevail. Even considering the challenges of attention with the current White House incumbent, the United States remains bound to its traditional partners and allies by a dense network of common interests and, above all, shared values that transcend individuals and will outlast them.

essay / Jairo Císcar Ruiz [English version].

In recent months, the open trade hostilities between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China have dominated the main general headlines and specialized economic publications around the world. The so-called "trade war" between these two superpowers is nothing more than the successive escalation of the imposition of tariffs and special levies on original products and manufactured goods from the countries in confrontation. This, in economic figures, means that the US imposed in 2018 special tariffs on US$250 billion of imported Chinese products (out of a total of US$539 billion), while China for its part imposed tariffs on 110 out of US$120 billion of US import products [1]. These tariffs meant an increase of US$3 billion in additional taxes for American consumers and businesses. This analysis is therefore intended to explain and show the position and future of the European Union in this trade war in a general way.

This small reminder of the figures illustrates the magnitude of the challenge to global Economics posed by this clash between the world's two economic locomotives. It is not China that is paying the tariffs, as Trump literally said on May 9 during a meeting with journalists [2], but the reality is much more complex, and, evidently, as in the case of the inclusion of Huawei in the trade blacklist (and therefore the prohibition to purchase any item on US soil, whether hardware or software, without a prior agreement with the Administration), which may affect more than 1.200 American companies and hundreds of millions of customers globally, according to the BBC [3], the economic war may soon start to be a great burden for Economics globally. On June 2, Pierre Moscovici, European Commissioner for Economic Affairs, predicted that if the confrontation continues, both China and the USA could lose between 5 and 6 tenths of GDP, stressing in particular that "protectionism is the main threat to world growth" [4].

As can be inferred from Moscovici's words, the trade war is not only of concern to the countries directly involved in it, but is closely followed by other actors in international politics, especially the European Union.The European Union is the largest Single Market in the world, this being one of the premises and fundamental pillars of the EU's very existence. But it is no longer focused on internal trade, but is one of the major trading powers for exports and imports, being one of the main voices advocating healthy trade relations that are of mutual benefit to the different economic actors at global and regional level. This openness to business means that 30% of the EU's GDP comes from foreign trade and makes it the main player when it comes to doing import and export business. To illustrate briefly, agreement to data from the European Commission [5] in the last year (May 2018-April 2019), the EU made imports worth €2,022 billion (a growth of 7%) and exported 4% more, with a total of €1,987 billion. The trade balance is therefore a negative balance of €35 billion, which, due to the large import/export Issue and the nominal GDP of the EU (taking the figure of 18.8 trillion euros) is only 0.18% of the EU's total GDP. The USA was the main place of export from the EU, while China was the first place of import. These data are revealing and interesting: an important part of EU Economics depends on business with these two countries and a bad performance of their Economics could weigh down the EU member countries' own.

Another figure that illustrates the importance of the EU in subject of trade is that of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In 2018, 52% of global FDI came from countries within the European Union and the EU received 38.5% of total investment worldwide, leading in both indicators. Therefore, it can be said that the current trade war can pose a serious problem for the future European Economics , but, as we will see below, the Union can emerge strengthened and even benefit from this status if it manages to mediate well between the difficulties, businesses and strategies of the two countries. But let us first look at the EU's relations with both the US and China.

The US-EU relationship has traditionally been (albeit with ups and downs) the strongest in the international sphere. The United States is the European Union's main ally in defense, politics, Economics and diplomacy, and vice versa. They share the economic, political and cultural model , as well as the main world collective defense organization, NATO. However, in the so-called transatlantic relationship, there have always been clashes, accentuated in the recent times of the Obama Administration and usual with Trump. With the current Administration, not only have there been reproaches to the EU within NATO (regarding the failure of member countries to invest the required budget ; shared criticism with the United Kingdom), but a full-fledged tariff war has begun.

In barely two years we have gone from the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) negotiations, the announced basis for trade in the 21st century that finally failed in the final stages of Obama's term in the White House, to the current status extreme protectionism of the USA and the EU's response. Particularly illustrative is the succession of events that have taken place in the last year: at the stroke of Twitter, in March 2018 the US unilaterally imposed global tariffs on steel (25%) and aluminum (10%) to protect American industry [6]. These tariffs did not only affect China, they also inflicted great damage on companies in European countries such as Germany. Tariffs of 25% on European vehicles were also in the air. After a harsh climate of mutual reproaches, on July 25, Jean Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, announced with Trump an agreement to lower tariffs on agricultural products and services, and the US committed itself to review the imposition of metallurgical tariffs on the EU, as well as to support within the World Trade Organization the European calls for a reform of Intellectual Property laws, which China does not respect [7]. However, after the reiteration of the transatlantic friendship and Trump's advertisement of "we are moving towards zero tariffs" [8], soon the clattering of the cash registers began again. In April of this year, on April 9, Trump announced on Twitter the imposition of tariffs on the EU worth US$11 billion for the EU's support to Airbusskill of the American companies Boeing, Lockheed Martin...), blowing up the principle of agreement of July last year. The EU, for its part, threatened to impose tariffs of €19 billion for US state support to Boeing. As can be seen, the EU, despite its traditional conciliatory role and often subjugated to the US, has decided to fight back and not to allow any more outbursts of tone from the American side. The latest threat, in mid-July, is against French wine (and due to the European mechanism, against all wines of European origin, including Spanish wines). This threat has been described as "ridiculous" [9], since the USA consumes more wine than it produces (it is the world's largest consumer) and therefore the available supply could be considerably reduced.

It is still too early to see the real impact that the trade war is having on the US, beyond the 7.4% drop in US exports to China [10] and the damage that consumers are suffering, but the Nobel Prize winner in Economics Robert Schiller, in an interview for CNBC [11] and the president of the World Trade Organization, Roberto Azevedo, for the BBC, have already expressed their fears that if the status and protectionist policies continue as they are, we could be facing the biggest economic crisis since the end of World War II. It is difficult to elucidate what the future relationship between Europe and its main export partner , the US, will be like. All indications are that friction and escalation will continue if the US Administration does not decide to tone down its rhetoric and actions against free trade with Europe. Finally, it must be clear (and with the intention of lowering the sometimes excessively alarmist tone of the news) that between the threats (either by Twitter or spokespersons) from both sides and the actual imposition of tariffs (in the US after the relevant advertisement from the Office of the US Trade Representative; in the EU through the approval of the 28) there is a long way to go, and we must not confuse potential acts and facts. It is clear that despite the harsh tone, the negotiating teams on both sides of the Atlantic are still in contact and are trying to avoid as far as possible actions detrimental to both sides.

On the other hand, the relationship between China and Europe is frankly different from the one with the US. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (which Italy has formally joined) confirms China's bid to be the next leader in global Economics . Through this initiative, President Xi Jinping aims to redistribute and speed up trade flows to and from China by land and sea. To this end, the stability of South Asian countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan is vital, as is the ability to control vital maritime traffic points such as the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. The Asian "dragon" has an internal status that favors its growth (6.6% of its GDP in 2018 which, being the worst figure for 30 years, is still an overwhelming figure), as the relative efficiency of its authoritarian system and, especially, the great support of the State to companies boost its growth, as well as possessing the largest foreign currency reserves, especially dollars and euros, which allow a great stability of the country's Economics . The Chinese currency, the Renminbi, has been declared a world reservation currency by the IMF, which is another indicator of the good health that the Chinese Economics is expected to enjoy in the future.

For the EU, China is a competitor, but also a strategic partner and a negotiating partner [12]. China is the EU's main import partner , accounting for 20.2% of imports (€395 billion) and 10.5% of exports (€210 billion). The Issue of imports is such that, although the vast majority reach the European continent by sea, there is a railway connection that, under the BRI, links the entire Eurasian continent, from China's manufacturing capital, Yiwu, and the last stop at the southern tip of Europe, Madrid. Although some of the imports are still so-called "low-end" goods, i.e. products of basic manufacture and cheap unit price, since China's entrance the WTO in December 2001, the concept of material produced in China has changed radically: the great abundance of rare earths in Chinese territory, together with the progress in its industrialization and investment in new technologies (in which China is a leader) have meant that China is no longer thought of only as a mass producer of bazaars; on the contrary, the majority of EU imports from China were machinery and high-end, high-tech products (especially telecommunications and data processing equipment).

In the aforementioned press statement of the European Commission, China is warned to comply with the commitments made in the Kyoto Protocols and Paris Agreements regarding greenhouse gas emissions; and urges the Asian country to respect the dictates of the WTO, especially with subject to technology transfer, state subsidies and illegal practices such as dumping.

These aspects are vital for economic relations with China. At a time when most countries in the world signed or are part of the Paris Agreements for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, while the EU is making efforts to reduce its pollution (closing coal plants and mines; putting special taxes on energy obtained from non-renewable sources...), China, which totals 30% of global emissions, increased in 2018 by 3% its emissions. This, beyond the harmful effects for the climate, has industrial and economic benefits: while in Europe industries are narrowing their profit margins due to the rise in energy prices; China, which is fueled by coal, provides cheaper energy to its companies, which, without active restrictions, can produce more. An example of how the climate affects economic relations with China is the recent advertisement [13] by AcerlorMittal to reduce its total steel production in Europe by 3 million tons (out of 44 million tons of usual production) due to high electricity costs and increased imports from countries outside the EU (especially China) which, with overproduction, are lowering world prices. This internship, which is especially used in China, consists of flooding the market with an overproduction of a certain product (this overproduction is paid for with government subsidies) to lower prices. As of December 2018, in the last 3 years, the EU has had to impose more than 116 sanctions and anti-dumping measures against Chinese products [14]. Which sample that, despite the EU's attempts to negotiate on mutually satisfactory terms, China does not comply with the stipulations of the agreements with the EU and the WTO. Particularly thorny is the problem with government-controlled companies (a ban on 5G networks in Europe, controlled by Chinese providers, is being considered for security reasons), which have a virtual monopoly inside the country; and above all, the distorted reading of legality by the Chinese authorities, who try to use all possible mechanisms in their favor, making it difficult or hindering direct investment of foreign capital in their country, as well as imposing requirements (the need to have Chinese partners, etc.) that hinder the international expansion of small and medium-sized companies. However,

The biggest friction with the EU, however, is the forced transfer of technology to the government, especially by companies of strategic products such as hydrocarbons, pharmaceuticals and the automotive industry [15], imposed by laws and conditio sine qua non companies cannot land in the country. This creates a climate of unfair skill and direct attack on international trade laws. The direct investment of Chinese capital in critical industries and producers in the EU has caused voices to be raised calling for greater control and even vetoes on these investments in certain areas for Defense and Security issues. The lack of protection of intellectual rights or patents are also important points of complaint by the EU, which aims to create through diplomacy and international organizations a favorable climate for the promotion of equal trade relations between the two countries, as reflected in the various European guidelines and plans on topic.

As we have seen, the trade war is not only limited to the US and China, but third parties are suffering from it and even actively participating in it. The question arises here: can the EU benefit in any way and avoid a new crisis? Despite the pessimistic mood, the EU can derive multiple benefits from this trade war if it manages to maneuver properly and avoid as far as possible further tariffs against its products and keeps the market open. If the trade war continues and the positions of the US and China harden, the EU, as a major partner of both, could benefit from a redistribution of trade flows. Thus, to avoid the loss due to tariffs, both China and the US could sell heavily taxed products to the European market, but especially import products from Europe. If an agreement is reached with the US to lift or minimize tariffs, the EU would find itself facing a huge market niche left by Chinese products vetoed or taxed in the US. The same in China, especially in the automotive sector, from which the EU could benefit by selling to the Chinese market. Alicia Garcia-Herrero, of the Belgian think tank Bruegel, states that the benefit for Europe will only be possible if it does not lean towards any of the contenders and remains economically neutral [16]. It also stresses, like the European Commission, that China must adopt measures to guarantee its reciprocity and market access, since the European Union still has a greater business and investment Issue with the USA, so that the Chinese offer should be highly attractive for European producers to consider directing products to China instead of the USA. The UN itself estimates at US$70 billion the benefits that could be absorbed by the EU thanks to the trade war [17]. Definitely, if the right measures are taken and the 28 draw up an adequate road map, the EU could benefit from this war, without forgetting that, as the EU itself advocates, coercive measures are not the solution to the trade problem, and hopes that, due to their ineffectiveness and damage caused to both consumers and producers, the tariff war will come to an end and, if differences persist, they will be resolved in the WTO Appellate Body or in the Permanent Court of Arbitration of the United Nations.

This trade war is a highly complex and nuanced topic ; this analysis has attempted to address many of the aspects, data and problems faced by the European Union in this trade war. It has been generally analyzed what the trade war consists of, as well as the relations between the EU, China and the USA. We are facing a gray future, with the possibility of multiple and quick turns (especially on the part of the US, as seen after the G20 summit in Osaka, after which it has allowed the sale of components to Huawei, but has not removed the company from its blacklist) and from which, if the requirements and conditions set out above are met, the EU will definitely benefit, not only economically, but if it remains united and making a common front, it will be an example of negotiation and economic freedom for the whole world.

REFERENCES

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6. Pozzi, S. (2-3-2018) Trump reaffirms protectionism by raising tariffs on imported steel and aluminum. El País (New York correspondent)Retrieved from.

7. Inchaurraga, I. G. (2013). China and GATT (1986-1994): Causes and consequences of the failure of a negotiation. Cizur Menor, Navarra: Aranzadi. pp. 204-230.

8. Tejero, M. (25-7-2018) EU-USagreement : "zero tariffs" on industrial goods; more soybeans and liquefied gas. El Confidencial. Retrieved from

9. Pardo,P. & Villaécija, R. (17-6-2019) Trump threatens Spanish wine. El Mundo. Retrieved from.

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11. Rosenfeld, E. & Soong, M. (25-3-2018) Nobel-winner Robert Shiller warns of an 'economic crisis' from trade war threats. CNBC. Retrieved from.

12. EU reviews relations with China and proposes 10 actions(12-3-2019) European Commission- Press statement .

13. Asturias takes 23% of Arcelor's new EU production cut(6-5-2019) 5 Días Retrieved from.

14. Morales, R. (26-12-2018) EU increased 28.3% its antidumping measures in 3 years: WTO. El Economista Mexico. Retrieved from

15. Warning about forced technology transfer to Chinese government.(20-5-2019) Infobae. Retrieved from

16. García-Herrero, A.; Guardans, I. & Hamilton, C. (28-6-2018) Trade War Trinity: analysis of global consequences. Bruegellecture). Retrieved from.

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[Condoleezza Rice, Amy B. Zegart, Political Risk: How Businesses and Organizations can Anticipate Global Insecurity. Hachette Book Group. New York, May 2019]

REVIEW / Rossina Funes Santimoni

Every year Stanford Graduate School of Business offers their students a seminar in Political Risk. The classes are taught by former U.S Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the renowned academic Amy B. Zegart. Motivated by their students, they decided to turn their classes into a book in order to allow more people and organizations to navigate the waters of political risk.

The work entitled Political Risk: How Businesses and Organizations can Anticipate Global Insecurity is divided into ten chapters. The authors start by explaining the contemporary concept of political risk. Consequently, theoretical framework is added as they advance in the explanation, in this way making it useful for the reader in order to understand, analyze, mitigate and answer efficiently to political risks. Their ultimate objective is to provide functional framework that can be utilized in any organization or by any person to improve political risk management. 

Rice and Zegart define the twenty-first-century political risk as the probability that a political action could significantly affect a company's business. Nowadays, the public and the private sphere are constantly changing and evolving. Everything is more complex and intertwined. Governments are no longer the only ones playing an important role in business decisions. The authors emphasize how companies need to efficiently deal with the political risks spawn by an increasing diversity of actors, among which is anyone with access to social average. In order to illustrate the latter, the authors make use of real-life examples, for instance the Blackfish Effect. It is named after a low-budget investigative documentary with the same title that depicted how SeaWorld Entertainment's treatment of killer whales harmed both the animals and their human trainers. The film that started with one woman reading a story about orcas triggered political action at the grassroots, state and federal levels, ending up with devastating consequences from which the company has still not recovered up to now. These cascading repercussions of the film have been denominated the Blackfish Effect. 

The work is well equipped with more examples about distinguished companies' experience. Among the organizations cited are Lego Company Group, FedEx, Royal Caribbean and Nike. Some have excelled in dealing with political risk and some have failed. However, both sides of the coin are useful to learn and to understand how the convoluted world of political risks management work.

Nowadays, risk generators perform at five intersecting levels including individuals, local organizations and governments, national governments, transnational organizations, and supranational and international institutions. Therefore, today's risks are different from the old ones, even if those still persist. With this in mind, Rice and Zegart shed a light on these days' top ten political risks: geopolitics, internal conflict, policy change, braches of contract, corruption, extraterritorial reach, natural resource manipulation, social activism, terrorism and cyber threats.

Nevertheless, even if the theory is laid out, the question still haunts us: Why is good political risk management so hard? The authors dedicate a whole chapter investigating it and conclude that there are "Five Hards". Political risk is hard to reward, hard to understand, hard to measure, hard to update, and hard to communicate. Therefore, in order to succeed at its management, one must get right the four basics: understanding, analyzing, mitigating and responding to risks. Rice and Zegart devote the remaining four chapters of the book expanding on each basic and, again, employing examples to better illustrate their knowledge.

The thing about political risks is that they are always there. They are imminent and we can do nothing more than try to prevent them and learn from them, to use the present in order to make the best of it for the future. It is not about predicting the future, which is impossible. "No one ever builds a disaster recovery plan that allows for the destruction of everybody in the office at 8:45 am. That is never the plan," assures Howard W. Lutnick, CEO at Cantor Fitzgerald on how the company dealt with the 9/11 terrorist attack aftermath. Paradoxically, Rice and Zegart maintain that the best way to deal with crises is not having them. Henceforth, they dedicate a whole chapter to providing key takeaways in order to better respond to crises. Politics has always been an unpredictable business. There is no one that can discern accurately how human history is going to unfold. However, the authors are convinced that managing political risks does not have to be pure guesswork and that being prepare is essential and can improve companies performances in a great deal.

Political Risk: How Businesses and Organizations can Anticipate Global Insecurity completely revamps the way we reflect on the topic. It is easy to notice both authors proficiency in the field. On one hand, the past experiences of former U.S Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice serve as anecdotes to elucidate the build-up of the theoretical framework. It is valuable to have such a person to act as a primary source that has lived among other high-end characters and important people in history. On the other hand we have Professor Amy B. Zegart, who with her natural eloquence excels in conveying the importance of political risk management nowadays. Consequently, everyone can get a precious lesson from this book, ranging from students that are interested in navigating the sphere, to everyday workers, company owners and public servants.

[Winston Lord, Kissinger on Kissinger. Reflections on Diplomacy, Grand Strategy, and Leadership. All Points Books. New York, 2019. 147 p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

At the age of 96, Henry Kissinger sees another book published that is largely his own: the transcription of a series of lengthy interviews regarding the main foreign actions of the Nixon Administration, in which he served as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. Although he himself has already left extensive writings on those moments and has provided documentation for others to write about them - as in the case of Niall Ferguson's biography, the first volume of which appeared in 2015 - Kissinger has wanted to return to that period from 1969-1974 to offer a synthesis of the strategic principles that motivated the decisions then adopted. No news is provided, but there are details that may be of interest to historians of that period.

The work does not respond to a last-minute desire on Kissinger's part to influence a particular reading of his bequest. In fact, the initiative to keep the dialogues transcribed here did not come from him. It is, however, part of a wave of vindication of the presidency of Richard Nixon, whose strategic vision in international politics was tarnished by Watergate. The Nixon Foundation promoted the realization of a series of videos, which included several interviews with Kissinger, conducted throughout 2016. These were conducted by Winston Lord, Kissinger's close partner during his time at the White House and at the State department , together with K. T. McFarland, then an official under him (and, for a few months, issue two of the National Security committee with Donald Trump). More than two years later, this conversation with Kissinger is now published in a small, short book. His last books were "China" (2011) and "World Order" (2014).

Kissinger's oral account here deals with a few issues that were at the center of his activity as the great architect of U.S. foreign policy: the opening to China, détente with Russia, the end of the Vietnam War and greater involvement in the Middle East. Although the conversation goes into detail and provides various anecdotes, what is substantial is what can be extracted beyond these specifics: the "reflections on diplomacy, grand strategy and leadership" indicated in the book's subtitle. It could be tiresome to read again the intrahistory of a diplomatic performance on which the protagonist himself has already been prolific, but on this occasion reflections are offered that transcend the specific historical period, which for many may already be far away, as well as interesting recommendations on decision-making processes in leadership positions.

Kissinger provides some clues, for example, as to why the National Security committee has been consolidated in the United States as an instrument of the President's foreign action, with an autonomous -and sometimes conflictive- life with respect to the State department . The Nixon Administration was the driving force behind it, following the suggestion of Eisenhower, whose vice-president Nixon had been: interdepartmental coordination in foreign policy could hardly be done from a department -the administrative office of State-, but had to be carried out from the White House itself. While the National Security Advisor can concentrate on those actions that are of most interest to the President, the Secretary of State is obliged to be more dispersed, having to attend to a multitude of fronts. Moreover, unlike the Defense department 's greater readiness to follow the commander in chief, the State department apparatus, accustomed to elaborating multiple alternatives for each international issue, may take time to fully assume the direction imposed from the White House.

In terms of negotiating strategy, Kissinger rejects the idea of privately setting a maximum goal and then cutting it little by little, like slices of salami, as the end of the negotiation is reached. Instead, he proposes setting from the outset the basic goals that one would like to achieve - perhaps adding 5%, since something will have to be conceded - and spending a long time explaining them to the other party, with a view to reaching a conceptual understanding. Kissinger advises understanding what moves the other party and what their own objectives are, because "if you impose your interests without linking them to the interests of the others, you will not be able to sustain your efforts", given that at the end of the negotiation the parties must be willing to support what has been achieved.

As on other occasions, Kissinger does not claim sole credit for the diplomatic successes of the Nixon Administration. While the press and some in academia have given greater credit to the former Harvard professor, Kissinger himself has insisted that it was Nixon who decisively shaped the policies, the maturation of which the two had previously pursued separately before collaborating in the White House. However, it is perhaps in this book where Kissinger's words most praise the former president, perhaps because they were made in the framework of an initiative born from the Nixon Foundation.

 "Nixon's fundamental contribution was to establish a patron saint of foreign policy thinking that is seminal," Kissinger says. According to him, the traditional way of approaching U.S. foreign action had been to segment issues in an attempt to solve them as individualized problems, making their resolution the issue itself. "Nixon was - leaving aside the Founding Fathers and, I would argue, Teddy Roosevelt - the American president who thought of foreign policy as grand strategy. For him, foreign policy was the structural improvement of the relationship between countries so that the balance of their self-interest would promote global peace and U.S. security. And he thought about this in relatively long-range terms."

Those who have little sympathy for Kissinger -a character of passionate defenders but also of staunch critics- will see in this work another exercise of self-complacency and exaltation typical of the former advisor. To remain at that stage would be to waste a work that contains interesting reflections and I believe it completes well the thinking of someone of such relevance in the history of international relations. What staff affirmation the publication may have refers rather to Winston Lord, who is claimed here as Kissinger's right-hand man at the time: in the first pages there is a complete photo of the interview between Nixon and Mao, whose margins were cut off at the time by the White House so that Lord's presence would not bother the Secretary of State, who was not invited to the historic trip to Peking.

Evolution of U.S. space strategy in the face of growing rivalry with China and Russia.

The prospect of engaging in battles in space, as an extension of wars that may be fought on Earth, seeking to interfere with the capabilities provided by satellites, has led the Trump Administration to promote a specific division of the US Armed Forces dedicated to this domain, the US Space Force. Although its constitution has yet to be approved by congress, the new Pentagon component will already have its budget.

▲ The X orbital vehicle in test operations in 2017, at Kennedy Space [US Air Force].

article / Ane Gil

More than 1,300 active satellites envelop the globe today, providing worldwide communications, GPS navigation, weather forecasting and planetary surveillance. The need to protect them against any attack, which could seriously disrupt the national security of countries, has become a priority for the major powers.

Since he arrived at the White House, Donald Trump has insisted on his idea of creating a Space Force, giving it the same rank as the five existing branches of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, Coast Guard). Trump signed last February 19 the directive for the creation of the US Space Force, whose final approval must still be given in congress. It would be the first military branch to be created in the United States since 1947, when the Air Force was launched. The Pentagon expects it to be operational by 2020.

As already announced almost a year ago by U.S. Vice President Mike Pence, this new Space Force will have its own facilities, although for the time being it will draw on the support and resources of the Air Force. According to Pence, the goal of the Space Force is to confront the alleged threats from Russia, China, North Korea and Iran in space. Although its ultimate goal is specifically to contain Russia and China, who for some years now have been developing their own methods to conquer space.

Obama-era strategic reports

The Trump Administration has called for such military specialization in space in the face of China's and Russia's skill in the same domain, which during the Obama Administration was still embryonic. However, although during Barack Obama's presidency the White House placed less emphasis on military developments in space capabilities, it also sought to promote the U.S. presence in space.

In the document National Space Policy of 2010, in a rather inclusive essay , the United States defended the right of all nations to explore space and called for all countries to work together to ensure respectful and manager space activity within a framework of international cooperation. The policy that was then being set looked primarily to the commercial and civilian dimension of space, in which the United States aspired to strengthen its leadership.

The document included, however, a section on security. Thus, it reference letter to the need to develop and operate information systems and networks that would provide national security coverage, facilitating defense and intelligence operations both in times of peace and in times of crisis and conflict. It also called for the development and implementation of plans, procedures, techniques and capabilities to ensure critical national security missions, using space assets and at the same time taking advantage of the non-space capabilities of allied countries or private companies.

What was presented there in a more generic way, the Obama Administration fleshed out in a subsequent strategy document, the National Security Space Strategy (NSSS). National Security Space Strategy of 2011, in which space was presented as a vital area for U.S. national security. The text warned that space is "increasingly congested, contested and competitive", which urged the U.S. to try to maintain its leadership, but without neglecting the international partnership to make space a safe, stable and secure place.

The document then set out strategic objectives and approaches. Specifically, the US proposed to "provide enhanced space capabilities" in order to improve system procurement, reduce the risk of mission failure, increase launch success and system operability, and train national security professionals to support all these space activities.

Another of the stated objectives was to "prevent and deter aggression against the space infrastructure that supports US national security", which as a central element included denying adversaries the significant benefits of an attack by strengthening the resilience of their systems architecture. However, the document specified that the US retains the right to respond in self-defense if deterrence fails.

Precisely in the latter case, the strategic text called for preparing one's capabilities to "defeat attacks and operatives in a degraded environment." It indicated that military and intelligence capabilities must be prepared to "combat" and defeat attacks directed at their space systems and support infrastructure. 

China-Russia rivalry in the Trump era

Donald Trump became president of the United States with his "America First" slogan, which he has also applied to space strategy, prioritizing his country's interests in a context of increased rivalry with Beijing and Moscow. His space policy emphasizes the dynamic and cooperative interaction between the military, civilian and commercial interests, respectively, of the Pentagon, NASA and private companies interested in extra-atmospheric flights. 

The first national security strategy document of the Trump era is the National Security Strategy (NSS) of December 2017. Although the report makes little reference letter to space, the text declares China and Russia to be "rivals", giving the US the opportunity to confront the opposing interests of these countries, also outside the Earth. The NSS proclaims that the US must maintain its "leadership and freedom of action in space", and warns of the risk of "other actors" achieving the capability to attack US space assets and thus gaining an "asymmetric advantage". "Any harmful interference or attack against critical components of our space architecture that directly affects this vital US interest will be met with a deliberate response in the time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing," the document warns.

Some of these military issues get further elaboration in the report months later produced by the Pentagon. In the April 2018 Space Operations document, the military leadership notes that several nations are making significant advances in offensive space control capabilities, with the intention of challenging the use of space by the U.S. and its allies, threatening their space assets. Therefore, it defends the importance of off-ground operations, which have the goal of securing and defending space capabilities against the aggressive activities of others.

"Our adversaries' progress in space technology," the report states, "not only threatens the space environment and our space assets, but may also deny us an advantage if we lose space superiority." To mitigate those risks and threats, the U.S. is engaged in "planning and conducting defensive and offensive operations."

The broad outlines of Trump's policy on space are set out in the document National Space Strategy of March 2018. It is a policy based on four pillars: reinforcing space architectures; strengthening deterrence and warfighting options; improving foundational capabilities, Structures and processes; and fostering enabling domestic and international environments.

Directives and budget

In addition to the security aspects already noted, the Trump Administration has also expressed a desire to "promote space commerce," for which it will "simplify and update regulations for commercial activity in space to strengthen competitiveness."

For oversight of these activities, which open up the space business to U.S. private companies and at the same time mark a horizon of mineral exploitation of asteroids and planets, Trump revived in June 2017 the National Space committee , under the White House, 24 years after it had been disbanded. In December 2017 Trump signed Space Police Directive-1, which ordered NASA to send US astronauts to the Moon once again, and in June 2018 he signed a directive on space traffic management (Space Policy Directive-3). The fourth directive is the one signed in February 2019 for the creation of the Space Force.

Trump's new policy has not been immune to criticism, as it is argued that erecting the Space Force as just another division of the Armed Forces could weaken the resources of the other divisions, putting the country at risk in the face of a possible attack or emergency on Earth. In fact, General James Mattis, Secretary of Defense during 2017 and 2018, publicly expressed some reluctance at first, although he later began to execute the president's plans.

agreement to the data provided following the recent presentation the budgets for the next fiscal year, the Space Force could have a staff of 830 people (divided between the Headquarters, the Space development Agency and the Space Command, which will require $300 million for its installation) and a budget of about $2 billion during the first five years. At the end of those five years, it could have a payroll of 15,000 people.

The positive consequences of the free trade agreement will derive more from the end of uncertainty than from the new provisions introduced.

After a year and a half of negotiations, the new Treaty between the United States, Canada and Mexico (this country has named it T-MEC, the other two speak of USMCA) is still pending approval by the legislative chambers of each country. In Washington, the political discussion should begin shortly; it will be important what effects are foreseen for the US Economics and that of its two neighbors. The first programs of study disagree on some aspects, although they agree that the changes introduced in the renegotiation of the agreement that existed since 1994 will not have a special impact.

▲ signature of the free trade agreement between the U.S., Mexico and Canada, in the framework the G-20, in November 2018 [Shealah Craighead-White House].

article / Ramón Barba

The renegotiation of the formerly North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), now known as the Treaty of the United States, Mexico and Canada (T-MEC or, in its English version, USMCA), has been one of the main points in the Trump Administration's diary . C by the three negotiating parties at the end of 2018, the treaty is now pending ratification by the legislative chambers of each country.

Put in place in 1994, the agreement had been described by Trump as "the worst trade agreement in history". Since the beginning of his presidency, Trump has proposed to modify some aspects of the agreement to reduce the large trade deficit with Mexico (about $80 billion, twice the deficit that the US has with Canada), and at the same time to refund activity and jobs to the US Rust Belt, where the echo of his promises had been decisive for his electoral victory.

What has each country gained and lost in the renegotiation of the treaty? And, above all, what effects will it have on the Economics of each country? Will the United States improve its trade balance? Will Mexico or Canada be negatively affected by some of the modifications introduced? We will first examine how the claims of each of the partners were left at the end of the negotiations, and then we will look at the possible economic effect of the new version of the treaty in the light of two recent programs of study, one by an independent body of the U.S. Administration and the other by the IMF.

Tug of war

In the negotiations, which dragged on for almost a year and a half, Mexico and Canada managed to "maintain the status quo in many important areas", but while the actual changes were modest, as analyzed by the Brookings Institution, they "went almost uniformly in the direction of what the United States wanted". "Trump's aggressive and threatening approach ," which he challenged with breaking the treaty for good, "succeeded in obtaining modest concessions from his partners."

On the core topic of the automotive industry, the US managed to increase from 62.5% to 75% the proportion of car production that must be made within the free trade area , to force 30% of the work needed to manufacture a car to have a wage of $16/hour (40% as of 2023) -a measure aimed at appeasing US unions, since in Mexico the average wage of an automotive worker is currently $4/hour-, and to set a tariff of 25% for cars coming from abroad.

Mexico and Canada were satisfied in their demand that an autonomous termination clause not be introduced after five years if there was no prior consensus on the renewal of the agreement, which had been put on the table by Washington. In the end, the T-MEC will last for 16 years, renewable, with a review in the sixth year.

Justin Trudeau's government had to make some concessions to the U.S. dairy sector, but preserved what had been its main red line from the beginning: the validity of Chapter 19, concerning the settlement of disputes through independent binational arbitration.

Mexico, for its part, gained the peace of mind that comes with the survival of the agreement, avoiding future uncertainty and guaranteeing close trade relations with the large U.S. market. However, the labor conditions of Mexican workers can be a double-edged sword for the Aztec Economics , since on the one hand it can favor an improvement in the standard of living and encourage consumption, but on the other hand it can affect the location of companies due to less competitive salaries.

Regardless of these changes in one direction or the other, the treaty update was necessary after 25 years of an agreement that was signed before the Internet revolution and the digital Economics that it brought. On the other hand, the change of name of the treaty was a "trick" devised by Trump to sell to his electorate the renewal of an agreement whose previous name was associated with criticisms made over the last two decades.

The discussion on the text will take place in the fall in the US congress , where Democrats will insist on reinforcing guarantees that Mexico will implement the committed labor measures. Before the vote the US will have to apply an exemption to Canada and Mexico from the steel and aluminum tariffs that the Trump Administration has imposed internationally.

Economic effect

The United States International Trade Commission (USITC), an independent body that has the status of a government agency, considers that the T-MEC will have a limited but positive impact on the US Economics . Thus, in a report published in April, it estimates that the entrance into force of the reformulated agreement will increase US production by 0.35%, with an increase in employment of 0.12%, figures somewhat lower than those forecast when NAFTA came into force in 1994, when the US expected a 0.5% increase in its Economics and a 1% rise in employment.

In any case, this timid impact would not be so much due to the content of the agreed text, but to its mere existence, since it eliminates uncertainties about US trade relations with its two neighbors.

The report believes that the T-MEC will lead to an increase in the production of automotive accessories in the U.S., boosting employment in that country, but causing a rise in the price of products and, therefore, negatively affecting exports. The report also predicts that maintaining the current arbitration system, as demanded by Mexico and Canada, will discourage US investments in the Mexican market and boost them in the US.

These conclusions do not coincide with the International Monetary Fund's assessment, although both bodies agreement in ruling out major effects of the agreement. Thus, an IMF study published in March believes that, at the aggregate level, the effects of the new wording "are relatively small". The new provisions "could lead to less economic integration of North America, reducing trade among the three North American partners by more than $4 billion (0.4%), while giving their members a combined gain of $538 million". He adds that the effects on real GDP of the free trade area are "negligible," and qualifies that many of the benefits "would come from trade facilitation measures that modernize and integrate customs procedures to further reduce trade costs and border inefficiencies."

The result the study sample that the more demanding rules of origin in the automotive sector and labor value content requirements, issues that especially concern the US-Mexico relationship, "would not achieve their desired consequences". According to the IMF, "the new rules lead to a decline in vehicle and parts production in the three North American countries, with shifts toward increased sourcing of vehicles and parts from outside the region. Consumers will find higher vehicle prices and will respond with lower quantity demand".

As for Canada's dairy market, an issue of particular relevance in the US-Canada trade relationship, the effects of increased US access "would be very small and macroeconomically insignificant".

This disparity in forecasts between the USITC and the IMF is due to the fact that several variables are undetermined, such as the future of the Trans-Pacific agreement , in which Canada and Mexico are involved, or the ongoing trade discussions between the US and China. A sample in which the ground is especially shaky is the fact that in January and February 2019, Mexico became the first trading partner of the USA (an exchange of 97.4 billion dollars), ahead of Canada (92.4 billion) and China (90.4 billion). That raised the US trade deficit with Mexico by $3 billion, just in the opposite direction of the Trump Administration's pretensions.

Strategic bombers will continue to matter in the geopolitical balance as "weapons of mass deterrence."

The U.S. B-52 bomber fleet is to receive a series of upgrades that will boost its active life at least through the 2050s. By then, the B-52 will have been flying for nearly 90 years, since its liftoff in the Eisenhower presidency. This will make it by far the longest-flying aircraft model with its primary operator, in this case the USAF.

▲ A B-52G when it was in service [USAF].

article / Jairo Císcar Ruiz

The words "strategic bomber" may sound like the Cold War, the Soviet Union and spy planes, but today it is a concept that is on the agenda despite sounding very distant. It is true that the current status of strategic aviation is limited by the 2010 Prague agreement (START III), which restricts deployed nuclear weapon delivery vehicles to 700. These delivery vehicles include strategic bombers, ICBMs (intercontinental missiles) and SLBMs (submarine launched). Although both Russia and the US have now significantly reduced the issue of their bombers (the US has "only" 176), strategic weapons (and thus bombers) will continue to be a fundamental part of the geopolitical balance in international relations.

There are only 3 countries in the world that have strategic bombers in their arsenal, the USA, Russia and China (although the Chinese Xian H-6 is far behind its Russian and American counterparts), and this scarcity of aircraft makes them so precious and a differentiating element on the battlefield. But it is not only on the battlefield that these aircraft cause an imbalance, they especially stand out in the field of international relations as "weapons of mass deterrence".

A strategic bomber is an aircraft designed not for the battlefield directly, but to penetrate enemy territory and attack both strategic targetsinstructions militaryinstructions , headquarters, bunkers...) and critical places for a country's war effort. The fact that a country has such an aircraft in its aircraft fleet is clearly a deterrent to potential enemies. Both Russia and the US -especially the latter- are capable of keeping their bombers permanently in the air (thanks to in-flight refueling) loaded with up to 32 tons of weaponry, with a flight duration only restricted to the endurance capacity of the crew. In this "diplomacy of fear", strategic bombers will continue to play a prominent role in geo-strategy and the global balance of power. The US is fully aware of this and is therefore embarking on a series of ambitious plans to continue to enjoy air and geostrategic superiority. One of the newest and perhaps most eagerly awaited of these plans is the advertisement that American B-52s will continue to fly until at least 2050.

Although it was assumed that this would be the case, the confirmation given by the US Air Force is no less surprising: the active B-52 fleet is to receive a series of upgrades that will boost its service life until at least the 2050s. This would not be too much B news considering that it is common to approve upgrade packages, either avionics or software, to increase the service life of in-service aircraft, but the fact is that the last B-52 Stratofortress left Boeing's assembly plant in Wichita (Kansas) in 1962. In other words, by 2050 the entire fleet would have been flying for nearly 90 years, making it by far the longest flying aircraft model with its main operator, in this case the USAF.

Versatility, deterrent effect and lower operating cost

But can an aircraft that was put into service in 1955, with Eisenhower as president, stand up to the new bomber models, such as the B-2 or the future B-21 Raider? Is the huge outlay that the U.S. congress intends to make justifiable? It is estimated that it could spend 11 billion on engines alone; almost 300 million are approved for fiscal year 2019.

The answer is yes. Because of its strategic versatility, its deterrent effect and its comparatively low operational cost, the B-52 is a vital aircraft for the United States.

Its combat versatility has long been proven, since its "debut" in the Vietnam War, where it was the protagonist of carpet bombing (it is capable of dropping more than 32 tons of explosives). As time progressed, it proved that it could not only drop bombs, but also long-range missiles such as the AGM-158 JASSM or the Harpoon anti-ship. Its great armament capacity makes it one of the flagship long-range attack aircraft of the United States. This has been attested in the internationalmission statement against Daesh, in which, until being relieved by the B-1, the B-52 performed 1,850 combat missions, dropping some 12,000 bombs, something that was fundamental for the victory over Daesh in Mosul.

It is precisely when talking about long distance that the B-52 excels: without refueling, a B-52 can fly more than 15,000 km, even flying 20,000 km in extraordinary situations. This offers a global attack capability, since in the event of refueling, only the crew's own endurance would prevent them from flying indefinitely. This capability makes them ideal not only to carry out bombing raids from instructions far from the enemy, but also to participate in search tasks, being able to perform between two aircraft a "scan" of 364,000 km2 in two hours. This is vital for use by the US Navy in anti-submarine or enemy navy detection missions.

The same parameters and advantages apply to the use of the B-52 as a weapon of "mass" deterrence. Initially created to permanently have a squadron in flight armed with nuclear bombs, and thus guarantee an immediate response to any aggression, the aircraft stationed in Guam are currently used as part of the U.S. tactic of free passage through the international waters of the China Sea. They have also been employee as permanent air support in high-risk areas such as the Korengal Valley in Afghanistan or, at the beginning of the war itself, in Tora Bora. By having a B-52 on standby, troops could have air support available at short notice (and for a long time) that would otherwise take a long time to arrive.

Another indisputable advantage of these aircraft is their relatively low cost in proportion to the other bombers of the U.S. fleet. First it is necessary to clarify that the cost per flight hour is not only the fuel used, but also the cost of maintenance, spare parts... It is true that these theoretical prices do not include the cost of ammunition (which can amount to tens of millions) or other variables such as the salaries of pilots, mechanics, insurance costs, car park costs in hangars or other variables that are classified, but they do serve to give us an overall view of their operating cost. B-52s cost the U.S. taxpayer about $70,000 per hour. It may seem an extraordinarily high price, but its "brother" the B-2 reaches $130,000 per hour. Despite being exorbitant prices for an army like the Spanish one (the Eurofighter costs about 15,000 dollars per hour), for the US Defense budget it is not significant (Trump intends to reach 680,000 million dollars in budget).

Engine overhaul

We have seen that the B-52, that Big Ugly Fat Fellow as it is affectionately nicknamed by its crews, may remain a vector to be reckoned with in the air for years to come, but the USAF does not want it to become a bit player, but to remain a major player. To this end, it has created the Commercial Engine Reengining Program (CERP) to replace the old original engines. The TF33s are now more than 50 years old, and in the last 20 years their cost has doubled, due to the lack of spare parts (they currently have to cannibalize parts from retired engines) and their inefficient consumption. It should not be forgotten that it has 8 engines, so consumption is not a trivial issue. To replace them, the USAF has opened a tender that should be adjudicated from mid-2019. At the moment, the USAF specifications aim, at least, to achieve engines 25% more efficient and that take 5 times longer to need repair, which would mean a 30-year savings (until 2050) of about 10 billion dollars. With a very juicy contract (there is talk of the order of $11 billion to replace the 650 engines in the B-52 fleet), the big military aviation companies have begun to submit their proposals, including Pratt&Whitney (with the PW815), General Electric (with the new Passport Advanced Turbofan) and Rolls-Royce (with the Pearl or the BR735). Other names in the aerospace industry have yet to submit their proposals.

But it is not only the engines that will benefit from the improvements and the investment, but also the purchase of new engines will require a change in the cockpit instrumentation: in this way, they will also take advantage of the remodeling to change the old analog gauges and cathode ray displays for the modern multifunctional displays that we see in any fighter nowadays. USAF assistant secretary for procurement, William Roper, has also commented that new ejector seats are being considered.

Beyond speculation, it is certain that within the framework of the Radar Modernization Program (RMP), 817 million dollars will be invested between fiscal years 2019 and 2023 in the purchase of new radar systems to replace the APQ-166, from the 1960s. New data Link 16 tactical software will also be purchased, as it is the only USAF aircraft that does not have it built in and is vital for conducting joint operations, both within the U.S. military and with European NATO armies.

In the future, the software and the aircraft itself will be adapted to increase its offensive capabilities, as was already done with the IWBU program, which increased its cargo capacity in the hold by 67%. One of the main objectives of the offensive trimming refurbishment is to be able to carry at least one GBU-43/b (or MOAB; Mother of all Bombs; the most powerful non-nuclear bomb in the world). To this end, a new wing pylon is being designed that can support 9,000 kilos of weight. Looking ahead, the B-52 will be able to carry hypersonic missiles, but that will not be seen until the mid-2020s at the earliest.

In this way, the USAF intends to keep the B-52 Stratofortress as the A option in its fleet when it comes to heavy bombing. Therefore, the B-52 will continue to be a fundamental strategic-military factor in understanding international relations for years to come. No one would have claimed in 1955 that that aircraft, however good it was, could still be flying a hundred years later. There are still 31 years to go, but we will see what the B-52 has in store for us, that "big, fat, ugly subject " that has become, thanks to its magnificent design and construction, the Dean of bomber aircraft: the B-52 (possibly) the best bomber in the world.

Washington warns of increase in transnational violent gangs and estimates MS-13 membership at 10,000 members

The Trump Administration has called attention to an increase in violent transnational gangs in the United States, particularly Mara Salvatrucha or MS-13, which is related to gang members from the Central American Northern Triangle. Although Trump has invoked this issue in a demagogic manner, criminalizing immigration and forgetting that the Central American maras were born in Los Angeles, the FBI finds that these organizations are recruiting more youth than ever before and demanding greater violence from their members. U.S. authorities estimate that these gangs are governed to some extent from El Salvador, but that hierarchy is not so clear.

▲ Mara Salvatrucha graffiti [Wikimedia Commons].

article / Lisa Cubías[English version] [English version].

Never before has the word "animal" probably caused so much controversy in the United States as when President Donald Trump used it to refer to members of the Marasalvatrucha, or MS 13, on May 16. Initially it seemed that he was referring to all undocumented immigrants, which provoked widespread rejection; he later specified that the label was intended to be applied to gang members who come to the United States illegally to commit acts of violence. Trump placed his war on gangs in the framework his zero-tolerance immigration policy and the strengthening of national agencies such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement in order to reduce migration flows from Latin America to the United States.

The description of the Latino youth gang phenomenon as an immigration problem had already come up in Trump's State of the Union speech on January 28. Before the US congress , Trump told the story of two teenagers, Kayla Cuevas and Nisa Mickens, who had been brutally murdered by six MS-13 members as they were returning home. He asserted that criminals had taken advantage of loopholes in immigration law to live in the United States and reiterated that congress must act to close them and prevent gang members from using them to enter the country.

Despite Trump's demagogic oversimplification, the truth is that Latino gangs are a product of the United States. They are, as The Washington Post has put it, "as American-made as Google." They were born in Los Angeles, first from children of Mexican immigration and then fueled by the arrival of migrants and refugees fleeing armed conflicts in Central America. Thus, El Salvador saw the emergence of a twelve-year civil war between the government and leftist guerrillas during the 1980s. The length and brutality of the conflict, coupled with the political and economic instability the country was experiencing, fueled the exodus of Salvadorans to the United States. The influx of young people from El Salvador, and also from Honduras and Guatemala, led to the emergence of the Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 maras, both related to the pre-existing Mexican Mafia (La M).

When peace came to Central America in the 1990s, many of these young people returned to their countries, following their families or expelled by U.S. authorities because of their criminal activities. Thus, the maras began to operate in the Northern Triangle, where they constitute a serious social problem.

Transnationality

According to the Justice department , there are some 33,000 violent street gangs in the United States, with a total of 1.4 million members. MS-13, with around 10,000 enlisted youths, accounts for only 1% of that total and in 2017 only 17 of its members were prosecuted, yet it deserves the full attention of the White House. Regardless of possible political interests of the Trump Administration, the truth is that US authorities have been highlighting its increase and its dangerousness, in addition to warning that certain orders are issued from El Salvador. This transnationality is viewed with concern.

The United States does not recognize MS-13 as a terrorist organization, and therefore has not included it in its National Counterterrorism Strategy released in October 2018. Instead, it is classified as a transnational criminal organization, as described in an April 2017 Justice department document. According to the document, several of the gang leaders are imprisoned in El Salvador and are sending representatives to cross illegally into the United States in order to unify the gangs operating in US territory, while forcing the MS-13 organization in the United States to send their illegal earnings to the group 's leaders in El Salvador and to exert more control and violence over their territories.

The FBI claims that MS-13 and Barrio 18 "continue to expand their influence in the United States. These transnational gangs "are present in nearly every state and continue to grow in membership issue , targeting younger recruits than ever before. As indicated in the aforementioned Justice department grade , the Attorney General warned that "in the last five years alone" the issue of gang members "has risen significantly". "Transnational criminal organizations like MS-13 present one of the most serious threats to the security of the United States," he said.

Stephen Richardson,attachment director of the FBI's criminal research division, told congress in January 2018 that the mass arrests and incarceration of MS-13 members and mid-level leaders over the past year in the United States have caused frustration for MS-13 leaders in El Salvador. "They are very interested in sending younger, more violent criminals through their channels into this country to be gang thugs," he told the House Homeland Security committee .

The transnational character of the MS-13 is questioned by expert Roberto Valencia, author of articles and books on the maras. He works as a journalist for El Faro, one of El Salvador's leading digital media outlets; his latest book, graduate Carta desde Zacatraz, was published a few months ago.

"Initially, the Los Angeles gangs served as moral guides for those who migrated to El Salvador during the 1990s. Some of the veteran leaders now living in El Salvador grew up in Los Angeles and have maintained personal and emotional ties to the gang Structures to which they belonged," Valencia tells Global Affairs. "However," he adds, "that does not imply an international connection: everyone, no matter where they live, believes they are the essence of the gang and are not subordinate to the organization in another country." "Some leaders in El Salvador share a very staff relationship with the organization they started in the United States, and that is not so easily dissolved, but the link as a single organization was broken a long time ago," he says.

Valencia firmly rejects any interference by the US MS-13 in El Salvador's MS-13. He admits, on the other hand, that there may be some subject of influence the other way around, as Salvadoran gang members in the United States "can be deported to El Salvador and end up in Salvadoran jails, where they can be punished by the prison mafia.

Migrants: cause or consequence?

Roberto Valencia also speaks out about Donald Trump's references to gangs: "Trump talks about MS-13 to win votes under the premise of an immigration policy that ends up criminalizing all immigrants. It is outrageous that Trump presents them as the cause, when gangs started in the United States. In fact, the vast majority of migrants from the Northern Triangle come to the United States escaping gangs."

In Central America, the control that gangs exert over a society that is poor ranges from demanding "rent" (extortion) from companies and people who own small businesses to forcing older women to take care of babies that gang members have had, and "asking" young girls to become girlfriends of the gang's main leader if they do not want to be killed themselves and their families. The application young girls is an extremely common cause of migration, which is also indicative of the misogynistic culture in rural areas of Latin American countries.

In most of his comments, Trump has described MS-13 as a threat to public safety and the stability of American communities. However, the Center for Immigration programs of study , a leading independent, non-profit research organization, conducted research on the impact of MS-13 in the United States and addressed immigration measures the Administration should take to control its presence. It found that MS-13 and other gangs are indeed a threat to public safety, thus sharing Trump's view, but disagreed with Trump by not linking immigration to the impact of gangs.

U.S. attorney Greg Hunter, who has been a member of the Criminal Justice Act panel in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia since 2001 and has worked on gang-related matters, says that shoplifting and illegal immigration cases are far more frequent than those that can be categorized as threats to public safety or the "American community," such as drug trafficking and murders. He also alludes to the fact that these organizations are not centralized and, although they operate under the same identity, they do not follow the same orders. He asserts that the gangs have made efforts to centralize operations, but have result ineffective.

It is crucial to take into account the statistics on the influx of migrants when assessing the recent migrant caravans from the Northern Triangle that Trump has sought to link to gangs. The US president said these migrants were "stone-cold criminals."

However, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection record does not suggest this. In its 2017 Securityreport it counts a total of 526,901 illegal immigrants who were denied entrance, of which 310,531 were detained and 31,039 arrested; of the latter only 228 belonged to MS-13 and as many were members of other maras (61 of them from Barrio-18).

The US will pull out of the treaty if Russia doesn't 'return to full compliance'. Putin has taken the dispute to the UN

With all the conflicts and issues threatening worldwide security, the last thing the world needs is a new arms race, or what many are calling a new Cold War. European countries in particular are worried that US President Donald Trump pulling out of the INF Treaty might lead to exactly that. United States, supported by NATO, accuses Moscow of cheating on the missile treaty. At the beginning of December, the Trump administration gave 60 days to Russia to "return to full and veritable compliance". President Vladimir Putin has taken the issue to the United Nations.

▲ Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan at the signing of the INF Treaty, in 1987 [Reagan Presidential Library] [Reagan Presidential Library].

ARTICLE / Nicole Davalos

To understand what the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty is about and why the possible US withdrawal concerns most of the international community, we have first to understand why it was created and what its purpose is. The INF Treaty was signed in 1987 following the deployment by the Soviet Union of missile SS-20 in Europe, which was retaliated by American cruise missiles and their Pershing II missiles. The issue with intermediate-range missiles back then was that their flying time was as little as 10 minutes, which was seen as a possible trigger to nuclear war. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and US President Ronald Reagan signed the deal, prohibiting land-based cruise or ballistic missiles with ranges between 311 and 620 miles (500-1,000 kilometers, short-range) and between 620 and 3,420 miles (1,000-5,500 kilometers, intermediate-range).

It is important to note, however, that the treaty does not cover air or sea-launched weapons even though they can potentially fly the same distances. Russia's 3M-54 Kalibr, a sea-launched missile, is an example. The following charts retrieved from the official website of the US Department of State outline the affected missiles specified under the elimination protocol of the treaty:

The INF Treaty has helped not only to solve the problems of its time towards the end of the Cold War but also serves still to this day as an umbrella of protection for US's allies in Europe. The INF provides a measure of strategic stability on the European continent.

According to the Stockholm National Peace Institute, by 1991, 2,692 missiles had been eliminated thanks to the treaty; 846 owned by the US and 1,846 owned by the USSR. The treaty also allows both parties to inspect each other's progress in eliminating the missiles to maintain transparency. So, if so much progress has been made as a result of the INF, then why is it that President Trump now insists on a US withdrawal?

President Trump has accused Russia of repeatedly violating the treaty. In fact, former President Obama first accused Russia of violations in 2014 during the Ukraine crisis, when Moscow allegedly deployed a prohibited missile. "I don't know why President Obama didn't negotiate or pull out" were the words of the current president, "...we're not going to let them violate a nuclear agreement and go out and do weapons and we're not allowed to...so we're going to terminate the agreement. We're going to pull out." Recently, the NATO confirmed Russia's violations. Jens Stoltenberg, NATO's Secretary General, urged Russia to address these concerns in a "substantial and transparent manner."

These accusations have truly created tensions between both parties of the treaty. Kremlin spokesman Dimitri Peskov has repeatedly denied the violations. He even went as far as claiming that it was, in fact, the US who first violated the treaty, with "armed US drones" that "fly within the ranges prohibited by the treaty". As for the president, Vladimir Putin, he has replied with questionable threats such as "revenge is inevitable and they will be destroyed. And we, as victims of aggression, will go straight to heaven as martyrs while they will just croak." In general, the Kremlin sees a US withdrawal as a confirmation of how "unreliable" a partner the United States is when it comes to other countries' interests since it would be acting completely unilaterally and pulling out implies security concerns for many other countries, especially European countries.

Europe shows the most concern for the possible dissolution of the INF Treaty since it is believed that Russia's intermediate range missiles would pose the biggest threat to them. Many analysts agree that this is a particularly bad time for the US to make a decision that would further raise tensions within Europe since security-related tensions such that of immigration exist in the region already. EU spokeswoman for foreign affairs and security policy Maja Kocijancic stated that the United States and Russia should definitely engage in dialogue and try to preserve the treaty, since "the world doesn't need a new arms race."

The most unexpected and interesting role in all of this, however, is China's. It is no secret to anyone that what displeases President Trump the most about the INF Treaty is that China is not a signatory. If Russia is violating the treaty, and China, on the other hand, is not part of such an agreement that restricts its missile force, then the US seems to be at a disadvantage. "If Russia's doing it and if China's doing it and we're adhering to the agreement, that's unacceptable," stated President Trump last October. In fact, according to Admiral Harry Harris, head of the US Pacific Command, if China were part of the INF Treaty right now, around 95% of its missile force would be violating it. When it comes to China's reaction to the White House's desire to withdraw, to "think twice" is what Beijing wishes Washington would do. Hua Chunying, a foreign ministry spokeswoman, said US withdrawal would lead to a "multitude of negative effects."

What's now left to be seen is whether President Trump will, in fact, pull out from the treaty. Presidents Putin and Trump both met in Paris in November, but although many different issues were discussed, a potential meeting to formally discuss the future of the INF Treaty was not part of the conversation. But if the US does withdraw, will that really mean a new Cold War? According to many analysts, an arms race like the one the world was experiencing back when the treaty was originally signed, might definitely become a reality. The Kremlin has also hinted several times at the possibility of a new arms race; the Russians would be "forced to develop weapons" to "restore balance in the sphere" if the US were to pull out.

For now, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced on December 4 that the US "will suspend its obligations as a remedy effective in 60 days unless Russia returns to full and veritable compliance". Ten days later, Russia submitted a draft of resolution to the UN General Assembly in support of the INF Treaty calling on all sides to fulfill their obligations. It seems to be a move towards a bilateral negotiation, but 2019 will begin with uncertainty in a matter so critical as this.