[Michael E. O'Hanlon and James Steinberg, A Glass Half Full: Rebalance, Reassurance, and Resolve in the US-China Strategic Relationship. The Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2017, 104 pages]

REVIEW / María Granados

This short book follows a longer book published in 2014 by the same authors, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve. In the new publication, Michael E. O'Hanlon and James Steinberg -both academics and senior policy makers- update and review the policies they suggest in order to improve the relations between China and the United States. The relationship between both countries, established in the early 1970s, has been subject to changing times, and it has suffered several crises, but it has nonetheless grown in importance in the international sphere.

The short and straight-forward strategic review of the ongoing action provides an insight into the arsenals and plans of the two powers. Moreover, through graphs and numerical tables, it depicts the current situation in terms of strength, potential threat, and the likelihood of destruction if a conflict were to arise.

It also gives an overview of the diverse security matters that need to be monitored carefully, in the realms of space, cybernetics, and nuclear proliferation. These essential matters need not to be disregarded when planning defense strategies; instead officials should cast an eye over historical tensions such as Taiwan, North Korea and the South China Sea, and remember to use the tools that have already been established in the region to prevent the use of hard power, i.e.: ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations).

Not only does the paper carefully consider the action taken by President Obama and his predecessors, but also cautiously suggests steps ahead in the path opened by Nixon four decades ago. O'Hanlon and Steinberg use bulletpoints to give directions for further developments in the Sino-American relationship, stressing the need for transparency, mutually beneficial exchanges, cooperation, and common ends in common projects.

Some of the ideas are summarised briefly in the following paragraphs:

-True rebalance moves away from mere 'containment' and into a trustworthy alliance. Joint operations that ensure cooperation and reassurance are a key aspect of that objective.

-Confidence building in the area of communications must be reinforced in order to prevent espionage and the spread of piracy, as well as other illegal tactics to gather private information.

-The neutral trend in the broad topic of space, cybernetics and nuclearisation has to advance into a firm and close cooperation, especially in view of the threat that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea poses to the global community as a whole. Intelligence and the recent accusations of Russia's manipulation through the use of the Internet and other technological means can be a target to pursue further negotiations and the signing of international treaties such as The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances.

-To abstain from any risks of escalation, the following policies must be regarded: the leveling of military budget growth, and of the development and deployment of prompt- attack capabilities, restraining modernisation, in favor of dialogue and the exchange of information, providing notice of any operation.

The authors conclude that the relationship is not free from conflict or misunderstanding; it is indeed a work in progress. However, they are positive about that progress. The overall outlook of the Sino-American relation is, as the title suggests "A Glass Half Full": there is of course work to be done, and the path has plenty of potential problems that both countries will have to face and resolve in the least damaging way to advance on the common interest; in spite of the aforementioned, half of it has already been done: both China and the US have a goal to fight for: the prevention of war, which would be short and detrimental for all international actors alike.

▲Enrique Peña Nieto and Donald Trump at the July 2017 G20 summit in Hamburg [Presidency of Mexico].

ANALYSIS / Dania Del Carmen Hernández [English version].

Canada, the United States and Mexico are immersed in the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The trade agreement between these three countries has been somewhat controversial in recent years, especially in the United States, where its appropriateness has been questioned. During the presidential campaign, Donald Trump defended the cancellation of the treaty; later, once in the White House, he accepted that there should be a renegotiation. Trump argued that the pact has reduced US manufacturing jobs and generated a trade deficit of more than $60 billion with Mexico ($18 billion with Canada), so unless new conditions substantially reduced that deficit, the US would withdraw from the agreement.

Overall, Americans have positive views of the treaty, with 56% of the population saying NAFTA is beneficial to the country, and 33% saying it is detrimental, agreement to a November 2017 Pew Researchsurvey . Among those who have a negative opinion, the majority are Republicans, with 53% of them saying Mexico benefits the most, while Democrats mostly support the pact and only 16% view it negatively.

Regardless of public acceptance, opinion about the treaty has not always been so dubious. When President Bill Clinton ratified the treaty, it was considered one of the greatest achievements of his presidency. Just as globalization has liberalized trade around the world, NAFTA has also expanded trade very effectively and presented a great issue of opportunity for the United States, while strengthening the U.S. Economics .

Under NAFTA, trade in U.S. goods and services with Canada and Mexico grew from $337 billion in 1994, when the treaty entered into force, to $1.4 trillion in 2016. The impact has been even greater when taking into account cross-border investments between the three countries, which went from $126.8 billion in 1993 to $731.3 billion in 2016.

Washington's concern is that, despite this increase in the trade Issue , in relative terms the United States is not achieving sufficiently fruitful results compared to what its neighbors are getting from the treaty. In any case, Canada and Mexico accept that, after almost 25 years in force, the agreement must be reviewed to adapt it to new production and trade conditions, marked by technological innovations that, as in the case of Internet development , were not contemplated when the agreement was signed.

Round-by-round examination

The discussion of the three countries touches on numerous aspects, but there are three blocks, which have to do with certain red lines set by the different negotiating parties: the rules of origin; the desire of the United States to end the independent arbitration system, through which Canada and Mexico have the ability to end measures that violate the trade agreement (elimination of Chapter 19), and finally proposals, perhaps less decisive but equally important, aimed at the general update the treaty.

When negotiations began in August 2017, it was hoped that they could be concluded by January 2018, with six rounds of meetings planned. This issue is already being surpassed, with a seventh round at the end of February, possibly to be followed by others. Now that the initial deadline has been reached, however, it is time to review the status of the discussions. A good way to do this is to follow the evolution of the talks through the rounds of meetings held and thus be able to assess the results that have been recorded so far.

1st Round (Washington, August 16-20, 2017)

The first round of negotiations put on the table the priorities of each of the three countries; it served to set the diary for the main issues to be discussed in the future, without going into concrete measures.

First of all, Donald Trump already made it clear during his election campaign that he considered NAFTA to be an unfair agreement for the United States due to the trade deficit that the country has mainly with Mexico and, to a lesser extent, with Canada.

According to figures from the Office of the US Trade Representative, the US went from a surplus of $1.3 billion in 1994 to a deficit of $64 billion in 2016. Most of this deficit comes from the automotive industry. For the new U.S. Administration, this casts doubt on whether the agreement will have beneficial effects for domestic Economics . Mexico, less inclined to introduce major changes, insists that NAFTA has been good for all parties.

Another topic that was mentioned was the wage gap between Mexico and the United States and Canada. Mexico argues that, despite having one of the lowest minimum wages in Latin America, and having had a stagnant average wage for the last two decades, this should not be taken into account in the negotiations, as it believes that Mexican wages will gradually catch up with those of its trading partners. On the contrary, for the US and Canada it is a topic of concern; both countries warn that a wage increase would not harm the growth of the Mexican Economics

Rules of origin was one of the main topics of discussion. The United States is seeking to increase the percentage of content required to consider a product as originating so that it is not necessary to pay tariffs when moving it between any of the three countries. This was controversial in this first round, as it could negatively affect Mexican and Canadian companies. Specialists warn that the minimum national content requirement does not exist in any free trade agreement in the world.

Finally, the Trump administration hinted at its intentions to eliminate Chapter 19, which guarantees equality in resolving disputes between countries, so that it is not the national laws of each country that resolve the conflict. The United States sees this as a threat to its sovereignty and believes that conflicts should be resolved in such a way that its own democratic processes are not ignored. Canada has conditioned its continued membership in the treaty on the maintenance of this chapter. Mexico also defends guarantees of independence in conflict resolution, although so far in this discussion it was not categorical.

2nd Round (Mexico City, September 1-5, 2017)

Although considered successful by many analysts, the second round of renegotiation continued at a slow pace. Some of the issues that advanced were: wages, market access, investment, rules of origin, trade facilitation, environment, digital trade, SMEs, transparency, anti-corruption, agriculture and textiles.

Juan Pablo Castañón, President of Mexico's Business committee coordinator insisted that the wage issue was not subject to negotiation for the moment, and denied that any of the parties had any intention of leaving the agreement, despite threats to that effect from the Trump Administration. Castañón said he was in favor of Mexico supporting the maintenance of Chapter 19 or the establishment of a similar instrument for the settlement of trade disputes between the three countries.

Round 3 (Ottawa, September 23-27, 2017)

The delegates made significant progress on skill policies, digital commerce, state-owned enterprises and telecommunications. The main breakthrough was on some aspects related to SMEs.

Canadian Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland complained that the United States had not made any formal or written proposals in the most complex areas, which in her opinion demonstrates a passive attitude on the part of that country in the context of the negotiations.

U.S. Trade Secretary Robert Lighthizer said that his country is interested in increasing wages in Mexico, under the logic that this is an unfair skill , as Mexico has attracted factories and investments with its low wages and weak union rules. However, Mexican business and union leaders are resisting such pressures.

Canada stood firm on its position on Chapter 19, which it considers one of the great achievements of the current agreement. "Our government is absolutely committed to defending it," Freeland said. Washington raised, although without presenting a formal proposal , the modification of the rules of origin to make them stricter and prevent imports from other nations from being considered "made in North America", just because they were assembled in Mexico.

This round took place while the United States imposed a tariff of almost 220% on C Series aircraft from Canadian manufacturer Bombardier, considering that the business had used a government subsidy to sell its aircraft to the United States at artificially low prices.

Round 4 (Virginia, October 11-17, 2017)

The United States presented its formal proposal to raise the rules of origin for the automotive industry and its suggestion to introduce a sunset clause in the agreement.

The United States proposed raising from 62.5% to 85% the percentage of components of national origin from one of the three countries in order for the automotive industry to benefit from NAFTA, and that 50% be of U.S. production. The Mexican Automotive Industry association (AMIA) rejected the proposal.

Washington's interest in weakening the dispute settlement system within the treaty (Chapter 19) was also debated, without a rapprochement of positions.

Finally, there was talk of including a sunset clause, which would cause the agreement to cease to exist after five years, unless the three countries decide to renew it. This proposal was widely criticized, warning that this would go against the essence of the agreement and that every five years it would generate uncertainty in the region, as it would affect companies' investment plans.

These proposals add to the tough negotiating climate, as already in the third round the United States had begun to defend difficult proposals, on issues such as lawsuits for dumping (selling a product below its normal price) in the importation of perishable Mexican products (tomatoes and berries), government purchases and the purchase of textiles.

Round 5 (Mexico City, November 17-21, 2017)

The fifth round took place without much progress. The U.S. maintained its demands and this generated great frustration among the representatives of Mexico and Canada.

The United States received no alternatives to its proposal to increase the regional composition from 62.5% to 85%, with at least 50% being U.S.-based. On the contrary, its trading partners put on the table data showing the damage this proposal would cause to the three economies.

Faced with the U.S. desire to limit the issue of concessions that its federal government offers to Mexican and Canadian companies, Mexican negotiators responded with a proposal to limit the country's government contracts to the issue of contracts reached by Mexican companies with other governments under NAFTA. Since the issue of these contracts is quite small, U.S. companies would be restricted in their contracting.

At the end of this fifth round, the most advanced issues are the regulatory improvement of telecommunications and the chapter on sanitary and phytosanitary measures. With the latter, the Americans are seeking to establish new transparent and non-discriminatory rules that will allow each country to establish the Degree of protection it deems appropriate.

Round 6 (Montreal; January 23-29, 2018)

The sixth negotiation showed some progress. The chapter on corruption was finally Closed , and there was progress in other areas. Some of the important issues that had been left out of the previous negotiations were discussed. Progress is slow, but seems to be making headway.

Robert Lightizer rejected the compromise on rules of origin that Canada had previously proposed. The framework was based on the idea that rules of origin should be calculated to include the value of software, engineering and other high-value work, facets that today are not taken into account with a view to the regional content goal

As a form of pressure, Canada threatened to reserve the right to treat its neighboring countries worse than other countries if they enter into agreements. One of them could be China. The proposal was not considered, as the United States and Mexico found it unacceptable.

Beyond the deadline

After more than seven months of meetings, as reflected in this round-by-round review of the talks, the negotiations between the three countries have still not reached the threshold of a pre-agreement that, while awaiting the resolution of more or less important points, would confirm the shared will to continue NAFTA. The tough positions of the United States and the pressure from Canada and Mexico to save the treaty have so far resulted in a "tug of war" that has allowed some partial, but not decisive, result . Thus, it remains to be determined whether the treaty has actually reached its expiration date or whether it can be reissued. For the time being, the three countries agreement to continue working towards a renewed treaty.

From what has been seen so far in the negotiations, it is difficult to determine which country will be more willing to yield to the pressure exerted by the others. The most controversial issues have hardly been addressed until recently, so it is not possible to say what each country has achieved in this negotiating process.

The two neighbors of the United States, but especially Canada, continue to warn of the risk of Trump wanting to kill the treaty. An acceleration of the negotiations could help the positive resolution of the process, but the electoral calendar rather threatens postponements. On March 30, campaigning begins for Mexico's presidential election, which will take place on July 1. In September, the U.S. will begin to look more closely at the November congressional elections. A substantial breakthrough before the Mexican presidential elections could put the agreement back on track, even if some issues remain to be closed, but if the next meetings fail to take that big step, the three countries could start to get used to the idea of the end of NAFTA, which would weigh down the negotiations.

U.S.-China relations do not satisfy either country; they probably never will. They must try to manage them, peacefully, peacefully

meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump [White House video screebshot].

ANALYSIS / María Granados

The National Security Strategy presented in December by Donald Trump formally label China and Russia as "rivals" of the United States. It presents these two countries as actors that "challenge the power, influence and interests" of Washington and "seek to erode the security and prosperity" of Americans. Although the document also considers "rogue" states such as Iran and North Korea, and transnational organizations, both jihadist and organized crime, as threats, the arguments of the new U.S. Administration focus especially on China. The Asian nation appears as the great obstacle to the realization of the "America First" promised by Trump, because of its unfair trade and currency practices.

Thus, the first National Security Strategy document of the Trump era corroborates the speech he had maintained as a candidate. During the election campaign Trump spoke of China as a "currency manipulator" and accused it of keeping the yuan artificially low. He also threatened Beijing with starting a trade war, complaining about the economic consequences for the US of China's excessive trade surplus in bilateral relations, as well as the reduction of US manufacturing jobs. Shortly after being elected, before the inauguration of his term, Trump provoked a diplomatic friction with China by having a telephone conversation with the president of Taiwan.

However, since his arrival at the White House, Trump has taken care to iron out these differences with China. He committed to maintaining the One China Policy, retracted his criticisms, and met in Florida with President Xi Jinping, agreeing to respect each other's sphere of influence and not to intervene in the internal affairs of the other. This, together with an incipient partnership in the sanctions against North Korea, seemed to be giving birth to a rapprochement that has not materialized. In fact, the US National Security Strategy's official treatment of China as a "rival" breaks with a long period of mutual acceptance that began in the 1970s.

Nixon's opening

The United States and China had serious precedents: the Korean War (1950-1953), which pitted China and the USSR in the North against the American-supported South, of which the Vietnam War (1955-1975) was a collateral consequence; and the nuclear danger that began in 1949, the year in which the USSR carried out the first effective essay . For Washington, from an ideological and military point of view, China was an international actor that it was desirable to control. For Beijing, in alliance with the Soviet Union, it was urgent to propagate communism's speech about the "imperialist enemy", which it repeated with intensity throughout the first years of the Cold War.

In 1969, the new US president, Richard Nixon, included in his inaugural speech a reference letter against isolationism (1). From the other side of the world there were also new messages: the distancing that Mao began to establish in relation to the USSR due to their border conflicts. This disrupted the triangle of international relations existing in those years of the Cold War (China, USSR, USA), and began to create a link between Beijing and Washington.

Thus, the first signs of rapprochement began to appear. In 1971 the United States voted for Taiwan's seat on the United Nations Security committee to be taken by the People's Republic of China. In 1972, the Shanghai statement was drawn up, which established the instructions for Sino-US rapprochement and was embodied in five principles:

1. The One China Policy: establishing diplomatic relations with China meant not being able to establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and vice versa, since both claim to be the true and only China.

2. Do not support Taiwan's independence.

3. Not to support the possible invasion of Japan.

4. Peaceful resolution of the conflict with Taiwan, reducing military installations on the island.

5. The commitment to continue being peaceful allies in search of lasting cooperation.

Since the rapprochement of the 1970s, relations between the two countries have been heavily influenced by Washington and Beijing's attitude towards Taiwan and the two Koreas, in a sort of indirect Sino-American relations.

The Taiwan issue

The self-styled Republic of China had been the main obstacle to the complete normalization of relations, as seen with the Shanghai statement . Actual reunification by (mainland) China was prevented by U.S. troops.

After 1973 there were two important documents: the so-called Taiwan Relations Act, by which the US recognized the island as having the same privileges as before, but not as a sovereign nation, and the Joint statement (sometimes known as the "Second Shanghai statement "), which drastically cut arms sales to Taiwan. In 1979, Washington and Beijing exchanged ambassadors and the Americans ceased formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Around 1980, the policy advocated by the mainland Chinese government was "one country, two systems", offering Formosa the exceptionality of a different and economically independent political system, but being part of the one China. However, this formula did not meet the 23rd province's desire for independence. By 1985, the island's government was moving steadily towards democracy (2).

In the late 1990s, Beijing threatened Taiwan with military exercises in the surrounding waters, in which missiles were deployed, prompting a forceful response from the United States: the dispatch of two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region; with this Washington showed a clear decision to protect the former ally because of its strategic importance.

The current status remains complex. No direct courier or telecommunications links have been established between China and its rebel province; no postal or parcel shipments are sent, and there is no direct flight connection. Face-to-face meetings between delegates have been infrequent and not very productive.

The North Korea problem

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for its part, constitutes a particularly critical point in Sino-American relations, which also affects South Korea and Japan, both US allies Pyongyang has already conducted six subway nuclear tests and continues with its missile launches over the Sea of Japan.

China is North Korea's only ally: it is its largest trading partner and its main source of food and energy. Beijing has historically opposed tough international sanctions against its neighbor. The desire for the survival of communism is essential to understand the close relationship between the sui generis Korean dictatorship and China. It is easy to guess why: if Kim Jong-Un's regime falls, Xi Jinping's regime could be destabilized. A refugee crisis, with thousands of North Koreans crossing the 1,400-kilometer border between the two countries, would have serious effects on the Asian giant. Although they continue to be strongly linked to Pyongyang, the Chinese have pushed for the resumption of the Six-Party Dialogue and have accepted the application of certain international sanctions.

Trump's blunt assertion that "if China won't solve the North Korean problem, we will" does not really dispel doubts about what might happen if Pyongyang crosses the threshold of nuclear capability. Certainly as the Kim Jong-Un regime has moved closer to that threshold, Beijing has increased its diplomatic, financial and trade pressures on its neighbor (3). But the possibility that North Korea is already on the verge of reaching its strategic goal leaves the United States with the choice of military action, which can hardly be both effective and limited, or having to settle for a policy of containment.

Over the years, Washington has tried to encourage North Korea to irreversibly abandon its nuclear program, offering in return a reward in the form of financial aid, diplomatic advantages and normalization of relations. At the same time, South Korea hosts 29,000 U.S. military personnel. In March 2017, executive orders from the US President and congress went beyond sanctions: a defense system known as THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) (4) was programmed as a preventive measure against a possible attack from the North and with the goal of ensuring the stability of the region.

The THAAD battery is particularly interesting to analyze because of the dual perspective it presents. Because of its limited range and capability, it should not be of concern to China, as the interceptors would not be able to reach Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles at any point along the trajectory from almost any of the possible launch locations. Thus, neither Washington nor Seoul should portray the system as a form of retaliation against Beijing for its failed sanctions on North Korea. Unfortunately, U.S. and South Korean officials suggest that the purpose of installing the THADD system is to send a warning message to China. This is counterproductive, as it only offers reasons to justify the nuclearization of the Asian hegemon in the face of the apparent degradation of its medium-range,second-strike capability Degree

Mutual dissatisfactions

If issues relating to Taiwan and North Korea have occupied much of the bilateral diary , the question of China's economic transformation, since its impetus by Deng Xiaoping, has been central to the direct relationship between China and the United States.

The Gǎigé kāifàng (reform and opening up) emphasized modernization and economic and political reform. This led to normalized diplomatic relations and the development bilateral trade and investment. Political, economic and security cooperation with the former "American imperialists" was based on subject prevention of terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation, and the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula.

However, there are still unresolved issues. U.S. dissatisfaction is due to China's human rights policy and its financial moves to devalue its currency as a means of controlling inflation. These currency movements call into question the control of the market by the American hegemon, which currently has greater weight and primacy, among other things, because the dollar is the international currency of exchange (it could thus "export its inflation" to Beijing). Also of concern in Washington is the dependence of the United States on imports from China, which generates a large bilateral trade deficit for the Americans. Another potential problem is the sale of missiles and nuclear technology to third states in the Middle East and Asia.

From the Chinese perspective, their dissatisfaction is due to US arms sales to the rogue province (Taiwan), the defense system established in South Korea (both the THAAD system and the military financial aid ), and a US international policy that Beijing describes as threatening, imperialist and domineering.

Cooperation channels

The U.S. view of China as a "rival," as reflected in the Trump Administration's first National Defense Strategy document, stems from the realization that the Chinese regime is not moving toward democracy as many in the rest of the world had hoped. "For decades, US policy was based on the belief that supporting China's rise and integration into the post-war international order would liberalize that country," the document says, noting that Beijing is not sliding towards a regime of political freedoms and respect for human rights, so Washington can no longer be as condescending to Beijing as it used to be.

Probably, without China's assumption of the values and principles that give meaning to the United States, a real and confident rapprochement between the two superpowers is impossible. Still, for the survival of both, extensive cooperation between them is necessary.

Although a war between the United States and China is not impossible, it is unlikely for a number of reasons, as Steinberg and O'Hanlon argue in Strategic Reassurance and Resolve (2015):

-The common goals of economic prosperity, trade exchange and interdependence at the stock market, financial and business levels make a warlike confrontation very damaging for both countries. In addition, China has progressively adopted measures against fraud and destabilization by computer manipulation, at the request of the United States; the issue of cyber espionage, although it continues to provoke mutual disagreements, is regularly addressed by both countries in their bilateral meetings, aware that it is likely to become more important over the years.

-The South China Sea is a trade route that has never been closed, although it is a source of disputes to be taken into account, as they remain unresolved even though they have been brought before the Court dealing with the Law of the Sea (following the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). The United States has strategic and commercial interests in the region that link it to its allies (Japan and South Korea), so this could be a source of tension. In any case, at present it does not seem that China wishes to provoke a military escalation in the area, even though it has established instructions on artificial islands and moved troops.

-ASEAN's code of conduct for the South China Sea, which precludes the use of force, may cause Beijing to rethink increasing its aggressiveness in the region. That ASEAN's push for China to stop claiming maritime sovereignty that has been rejected by the international community are points against war.

-There are several joint operations in the fight against terrorism (ISIS) and in the prevention of piracy, in which the two superpowers are involved.

-China has increased its humanitarian financial aid and its support to UN peacekeeping missions.

In a scenario of non-understanding between Beijing and Washington, but at the same time of non-armed confrontation, the following actions may be suggested:

-A negotiation that would include reduced U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in exchange for increased coastal security, and a commensurate reduction by China of threats to the island.

-Greater cooperation and transparency in arms and troop movements, militarization, restructuring of the armed forces and military exercises in the Pacific.

-Creation of joint organizations to fight organized crime and cyber-attacks, especially against threats to civilian infrastructure.

-Support and consistency in preventing nuclear escalation. Negotiation in reaching a firm conclusion on how to weaken the Pyongyang regime. Serious and consistent criticism, knowing the impossibility (as well as harm) of its direct overthrow.

-----------------------------------------

(1) "We seek an open world--open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people--a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation.
We cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy". Inaugural Address (January 20, 1969)

(2) It was the first time that the Democratic Progressive Party succeeded in pushing through the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan elections and forming a unified coalition against the Kuomintang. In 1992 the first free legislative elections took place in Taiwan.

(3) "China will be most likely to put diplomatic and financial pressure on North Korea if it believes that failing to do so will lead the United States to destabilize the regime," write Joshua Stanton, Sung- Yoon Lee, and Bruce Klingner in Foreign Affairs.

(4) The system typically has between 48 and 62 interceptor missiles with ranges of up to 200 kilometers, supported by radar with a range of up to about 1,000 kilometers.

Continental U.S. neighbors are having a hard time interpreting the first year of the new Administration.

Donald Trump arrives at his first anniversary as president having sparked some recent fires in Latin America. His rude disregard for El Salvador and Haiti, for the Issue of refugees welcomed in the United States, and his intemperate attention to Colombia for the increase in cocaine production worsen relations that, although already complicated in the case of Mexico, have had some good moments throughout the year, such as the dinner of presidents that Trump convened in September in New York in which a united action on Venezuela was outlined.

▲Trump, on completing 100 days as president [White House].

article / Garhem O. Padilla [English version].

One year after the arrival of the 45th President of the United States of America, Donald John Trump, to the White House -the inauguration ceremony was on January 20-, controversy dominates the balance of the new Administration, both in its domestic and international performance. The continental neighbors of the U.S., in particular, show bewilderment over Trump's policies toward the hemisphere. On the one hand, they regret the U.S. disinterest in commitments to economicdevelopment and multilateral integration; on the other, they note some activity in relation to some regional problems, such as Venezuela. The balance for the moment is mixed, although there is unanimous agreement that Trump's language and many of his manners rather threaten relations.

From TPP to NAFTA

In the economic field, the Trump era began with the final withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (TPP) on January 23, 2017. This made it impossible for the TPP to entrance into force, as the United States was the market for which the agreement emerged, which has affected the prospects of the Latin American countries that participated in the initiative.

The renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), demanded by Trump, was immediately opened. Doubts about the future of NAFTA, signed in 1994 and which Trump has described as a "disaster", have been prominent so far in his administration. Some of his demands, which Mexico and Canada oppose, are to increase the quota for products manufactured in the United States and the "sunset" clause, which would oblige the treaty to be reviewed methodically every five years and would cause it to be suspended if any of its three members were not in agreement. All of this stems from the U.S. president's idea of fail the treaty if it is not favorable to his country. 

Cuba and Venezuela

If the quarrels with Mexico have not yet reached a conclusion, in the case of Cuba Trump has already retaliated against the Castro regime, with the expulsion in October of 15 Cuban diplomats from the Cuban embassy in Washington as a response to the "sonic attacks" that affected 24 U.S. diplomats on the island. The White House has also reversed some of the Obama Administration's conciliatory measures, when it realized that Castroism is not responding with open-minded concessions.

As far as Venezuela is concerned, Trump has made forceful efforts to introduce measures and sanctions against corrupt officials, in addition to addressing the political status with other countries, so that they support those efforts aimed at eradicating the Venezuelan crisis, thus generating multilateralism among American countries. However, this policy has its detractors, who believe that the sanctions are not intended to achieve a long-term goal , and it is unclear how they would promote Venezuelan stability.

Although in these actions on Cuba and Venezuela Trump has alluded to the democratic principles violated by the rulers of Havana and Caracas, his Administration has not particularly insisted on the commitment to human rights, democracy and moral values, as had been usual in the argumentation of U.S. foreign policy. Some critics point out that the Trump Administration is willing to promote human rights only when they fit its political objectives.  

This could explain the worsening opinion in Latin America about the United States and relations with that country. agreement to theLatinobarómetro 2017 survey , the favorable opinion has fallen to 67%, seven points below the 74% at the end of the Obama Administration. This survey sample a relevant difference for Mexico, one of the countries that, without a doubt, has the worst levels of favorable opinion towards the Trump Administration: in 2017 it was 48%, a drop of 29 points compared to 2016, when it was 77%.

Immigration, withdrawal, decline

The restrictive immigration policies applied would also explain the rejection of the Trump Administration by Latin American public opinion. In the immigration section , the most recent is the decision not to renew the authorization to stay in the United States of thousands of Salvadorans and Haitians, who once arrived fleeing calamities in their countries.

It is also worth mentioning Trump's efforts to achieve one of his main objectives since the beginning of his political campaign: to build a border wall with Mexico. The U.S. president has not been very successful so far in this goal, since despite having sought ways to finance it, what he has managed to introduce in the budgets is very insignificant in relation to the estimated costs. On the other hand, his decision

Trump's protectionism entails a retreat that may be accentuating the decline of the United States as a leader in Latin America, especially vis-à-vis other powers. China has been increasing its economic and political engagement in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Venezuela. Russia, for its part, has strengthened its diplomatic and security relations with Cuba. It could be said that, taking advantage of the conflicts between the island and the United States, Moscow has sought to keep it in its orbit through a series of investments.

Security threats

This brings us to the new US National Security Strategy, announced in December. The document, presented by Trump, addresses the rivalry with China and Russia, and also refers to the challenge posed by the Cuban and Venezuelan regimes, because of the alleged security threats they pose and the Russian support they receive. Trump expressed his strong desire to see Cuba and Venezuela join in "shared freedom and prosperity" and called for "isolating governments that refuse to act as responsible partners in advancing hemispheric peace and prosperity.

Similarly, the new U.S. Security Strategy alludes to other challenges in the region, such as transnational criminal organizations, which impede the stability of Central American countries, especially Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador. However, the document devotes only one page to Latin America, in line with Washington's traditional focus on the areas of the world that most affect its interests and security.

An opportunity for the United States to get closer to Latin American countries will be the Summit of the Americas, to be held next March in Lima. However, nothing is predictable given the President's characteristic attitude, which leaves a great deal of room for possible surprises.

[Graham Allison, Destined for War. Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Boston, 2017. 364 pages]

review / Emili J. Blasco [English version].

It is what has been called the Thucydides trap: the dilemma faced by a hegemonic power and a rising power that threatens that hegemony. Is war inevitable? When Thucydides narrated the Peloponnesian War, he wrote of the inevitability for dominant Sparta and rising Athens to think of armed confrontation as a means of settling the conflict.

That these two Greek polis necessarily thought of war, and eventually came to it, does not mean that they had no other options. History has shown that there are: when Wilhelmine Germany threatened to overtake Britain's naval strength, the attempted sorpasso (accompanied by various circumstances) led to World War I, but when Portugal was overtaken by Spain in overseas possessions in the 16th century, or when the United States replaced Britain as the world's leading power in the late 19th century, the handover was peaceful.

The call for Washington and Beijing to do all they can to avoid falling into the trap described by the Greek historian is made by Graham Allison in Destined for War. Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? The founding Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government reviews in his book several historical precedents. The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs of the same University, of which Allison is director, has researched these precedents in a program called Thucydides's Trap.

This concept is defined by Allison as "the strong structural stress caused when an emerging power threatens to unseat a reigning power. In such a status, not only extraordinary or unexpected events, but even ordinary hotspots of tension in international affairs can trigger large-scale conflicts".

This structural stress is produced by the clash of two profound sensitivities: the emerging power syndrome ("the reinforced sense that an emerging state has of itself, its interests and its right to recognition and respect"), and its inverse image, the reigning power syndrome ("the established power exhibits a heightened sense of fear and insecurity as it faces signs of decline").

Alongside the syndromes both rival powers also experience a security dilemma: "a rising power may disregard the fear and insecurity of a leading state because it knows that it itself is well-intentioned. Meanwhile, its opponent misinterprets even positive initiatives, taking them as excessively demanding or even threatening".

The use of military force

Allison starts from the fact that China is already catching up with the US as a power. It has done so in terms of its Economics Issue (China has already surpassed the U.S. in Purchasing Power Parity) and in relation to some aspects of military strength (a Rand Corporation report predicted that in 2017 China would have "advantage" or "rough parity" in 6 of 9 areas of conventional capability. The author's assumption is that China will soon be in a position to wrest the scepter of major superpower from the United States. Faced with this status, how will both countries react?

In the case of China, its millennial perspective will probably lead it to an attitude of patience, provided that there is some small progress in its purpose to increase its specific world weight. Since 1949, China has resorted to force in only three out of 33 territorial disputes. In those cases, China's leaders waged war - limited wars, conceived as notice to their opponents - despite the fact that the enemy was equal or greater, urged on by a domestic unrest status .

For Allison, "as long as events in the South China Sea generally move in China's favor, it seems unlikely that China will use military force. But if trends in the correlation of power were to turn against it, particularly at a time of domestic political instability, China would initiate a limited military conflict against an even larger and more powerful state such as the United States.

For its part, the United States can opt for several strategies, according to Allison: adapt to the new reality, undermine Chinese power (trade war, encourage provincial separatism), negotiate a lasting peace and redefine the relationship. The author does not give a firm committee , but seems to suggest that Washington should move between the last two options.

He recalls how Great Britain realized that it could not compete with the United States in the Western Hemisphere, and how this led to a partnership between the two countries, which became evident in the First and Second World Wars. This would have to involve accepting that the South China Sea is an area of Chinese influence. And this is not out of mere condescension, but because the United States is proceeding with a real clarification of its vital interests.

Despite its positive tone, Destined for War is one of the essays of the American establishment that most openly announces the end of the American era and the passing of the baton to China (it does not seem to envision a multipolar or bipolar world, but rather the primacy of the Asian power). It is also one of those that places less emphasis - certainly less than it should - on the strengths of the United States and the problems that could undermine China's coronation.