Indian trade with the region has increased twenty-fold since 2000, but is only 15% of the trade flow with China.

China's rapid trade, credit and investment spillover into Latin America in the first decade of this century suggested that India, if it intended to follow in the footsteps of its continental rival, could perhaps stage a similar landing in the second decade. This has not happened. India has certainly increased its economic relationship with the region, but it is far from that developed by China. Even the trade flows of Latin American countries are greater with Japan and South Korea, although it is foreseeable that in a few years they will be surpassed by those with India, given its potential. In an international context of confrontation between the US and China, India emerges as a non-confrontational option, also specialized in IT services, so necessary in a world that has discovered the difficulty of mobility through Covid-19.

article / Gabriela Pajuelo

Historically, India has paid little attention to Latin America and the Caribbean; the same had been true of China, apart from episodes of migration from both countries. But China's emergence as a major power and its landing in the region made the Inter-American development Bank (IDB) wonder in a 2009 report whether, after the Chinese push, India would be "the next big thing" for Latin America. Even if India's figures were to lag behind China's, could India become a core topic in the region?

The relationship between Latin American countries and New Delhi has certainly grown. Even Brazil has developed a special bond with India thanks to the BRICS club, as evidenced by Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro's January 2020 visit to his counterpart Narendra Modi. In the last two decades, India's trade with the region has increased twenty-fold, from $2 billion in 2000 to nearly $40 billion in 2018, as a new IDB report found last year.

This Issue, however, is far below the trade flow with China, of which it constitutes only 15%, because if Indian interests in Latin America have increased, Chinese interests have continued to do so to a greater extent. Investment from both countries in the region is even more disproportionate: between 2008 and 2018, India's investment was $704 million, compared to China's $160 billion.

Even the Indian trade increase has less regional imbrication than the global figures might make it appear. Of the total $38.7 billion in transactions in 2018, $22.7 billion corresponds to Latin American exports and $16 billion to imports of Indian products. Indian purchases have already surpassed imports from Latin America by Japan ($21 billion) and South Korea ($17 billion), but they are largely due to the purchase of oil from Venezuela. Adding the two directions of flow, the region's trade with Japan and Korea is still higher (around $50 billion in both cases), but the potential for growth in the trade relationship with India is clearly greater.

There is interest not only from American countries, but also from India. "Latin America has a young and skilled work , and it is an area rich in natural and agricultural resource reserves," said David Rasquinha, managing director of the Export-Import Bank of India.

Last decade

The two IDB reports cited above are a good reflection of the leap in relations between the two markets in the last decade. In the 2009 report, under the degree scroll "India: Opportunities and Challenges for Latin America", the Inter-American institution presented the opportunities offered by contacts with India. Although it was committed to increasing them, the IDB was unsure about the evolution of a power that for a long time had opted for autarky, as Mexico and Brazil had done in the past; however, it seemed clear that the Indian government had finally taken a more conciliatory attitude towards the opening up of its Economics.

Ten years later, the report graduate "The bridge between Latin America and India: Policies to deepen economic cooperation" delved into the opportunities for cooperation between both actors and noted the importance of strengthening ties to favor the growing internationalization the Latin American region, through the diversification of trade partners and access to global production chains. In the context of the Asian Century, the flow exchange trade and direct investment had increased exponentially from previous levels, largely as a result of the demand for Latin American raw materials, something that is often criticized as not fostering the region's industry.

The new relationship with India presents an opportunity to correct some of the trends in the interaction with China, which has been focused on investment by state-owned companies and loans from Chinese public banks. In the relationship with India, there is a greater participation of Asian private initiative and a commitment to new economic sectors, in addition to the hiring of indigenous staff , including at management and executive levels.

agreement to IDB Integration and Trade Sector General Manager Fabrizio Opertti, "the development of an effective institutional framework and business networks" is crucial. The IDB suggests possible governmental measures such as increasing the coverage of trade and investment agreements, development proactive and targeted trade promotion activities, boosting investments in infrastructure, promoting reforms in the logistics sector, among others.

Post-Covid context

The questioning of global production chains and, in the last written request, of globalization itself due to the Covid-19 pandemic, is not conducive to international trade. Moreover, the economic crisis of 2020 may have a long-lasting effect on Latin America. But it is precisely in this global framework that the relationship with India could be particularly interesting for the region.

Within Asia, in a context of polarization over the geopolitical interests of China and the United States, India emerges as acore topic partner , one might even say neutral; something that New Delhi could use strategically in its approach to different areas of the world and specifically to Latin America.

Although "India does not have pockets as deep as the Chinese", as Deepak Bhojwani, founder of the consulting firm Latindia[1], says in relation to the enormous public funding that Beijing manages, India can be the origin of interesting technological projects, given the variety of companies and experts in information technology and telecommunications that it has. Thus, Latin America can be the object of the "technology foreign policy" of a country that, agreement to its Ministry of Electronics and IT, has the ambition to grow its digital Economics to "one trillion dollars by 2025". New Delhi will focus its efforts on influencing this economic sector through NEST (New, Emerging and Strategic Technologies), promoting a unified Indian message on emerging technologies, such as data governance and artificial intelligence, among others. The pandemic has highlighted Latin America's need for more and better connectivity.

There are two prospects for the expansion of India's influence in the continent. One is the obvious path of strengthening its existing alliance with Brazil, within the BRICS, whose pro tempore presidency India holds this year. That should lead to a more diversified linkage with Brazil, the region's largest market, especially in scientific and technological cooperation, in the fields of IT, pharmaceuticals and agribusiness. "Both governments committed to expand bilateral trade to US$15 billion by 2022. Despite the difficulties brought by the pandemic, we are pursuing this ambitious goal," says André Aranha Corrêa do Lago, Brazil's current ambassador to India.

On the other hand, a greater effort could be made in bilateral diplomacy, insisting on pre-existing ties with Mexico, Peru and Chile. The latter country and India are negotiating a preferential trade agreement and the signature the Bilateral Investment Protection Treaty. A rapprochement with Central America, which still lacks Indian diplomatic missions, may also be of interest. These are necessary steps if, closely following in China's footsteps, India wants to be the "next big thing" for Latin America.

The increase in South Korean trade with Latin American countries has allowed the Republic of Korea to reach Japan's exchange figures with the region.

Throughout 2018, South Korea's trade with Latin America exceeded USD 50 billion, putting itself at the same level of trade maintained by Japan and even for a few months becoming the second Asian partner in the region after China, which had flows worth USD 300 billion (half of the US trade with its continental neighbors). South Korea and Japan are ahead of India's trade with Latin America (USD 40 billion).

ARTICLE / Jimena Villacorta

Latin America is a region highly attractive to foreign markets because of its immense natural resources which include minerals, oil, natural gas, and renewable energy not to mention its agricultural and forest resources. It is well known that for a long time China has had its eye in the region, yet South Korea has also been for a while interested in establishing economic relations with Latin American countries despite the spread of new protectionism. Besides, Asia's fourth largest economy has been driving the expansion of its free trade network to alleviate its heavy dependence on China and the United States, which together account for approximately 40% of its exports.

The Republic of Korea has already strong ties with Mexico, but Hong Nam-ki, the South Korean Economy and Finance Minister, has announced that his country seeks to increase bilateral trade between the regions as it is highly beneficial for both. "I am confident that South Korea's economic cooperation with Latin America will continue to persist, though external conditions are getting worse due to the spread of new protectionism", he said. While Korea's main trade with the region consists of agricultural products and manufacturing goods, other services such as ecommerce, health care or artificial intelligence would be favorable for Latin American economies. South Korean investment has significantly grown during the past decades, from USD 620 million in 2003, to USD 8.14 billion in 2018. Also, their trade volume grew from USD 13.4 billion to 51.5 billion between the same years.

Apart from having strong ties with Mexico, South Korea signed a Free Trade Agreement with the Central American countries and negotiates another FTA with the Mercosur block. South Korea would like to join efforts with other Latin American countries in order to breathe life into the Trans-Pacific Partnership, bringing the US again into the negotiations after a change of administration in Washington.

Mexico

Mexico and South Korea's exports and imports have increased in recent years. Also, between 1999 and 2015, the Asian country's investments in Mexico reached USD 3 billion. The growth is the result of tied partnerships between both nations. Both have signed an Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, an Agreement to Avoid Income Tax Evasion and Double Taxation and other sectoral accords on economic cooperation. Both economies are competitive, yet complementary. They are both members of the G20, the OECD and other organizations. Moreover, both countries have high levels of industrialization and strong foreign trade, key of their economic activity. In terms of direct investment from South Korea in Mexico, between 1999 and June 2019, Mexico received USD 6.5 billion from Korea. There are more than 2,000 companies in Mexico with South Korean investment in their capital stock, among which Samsung, LG, KORES, KEPCO, KOGAS, Posco, Hyundai and KIA stand out. South Korea is the 12th source of investment for Mexico worldwide and the second in Asia, after Japan. Also, two Mexican multinationals operate in South Korea, group Promax and KidZania. Mexico's main exports to South Korea are petrol-based products, minerals, seafood and alcohol, while South Korea's main exports to Mexico are electronic equipment like cellphones and car parts.

Mercosur

Mercosur is South America's largest trading economic bloc, integrated by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. With a GDP exceeding USD 2 trillion, it is one of the major suppliers of raw materials and agricultural and livestock products. South Korea and Mercosur launched trade negotiations on May 2018, in Seoul. Actually, the Southern Common Market and the Republic of Korea have been willing to establish a free trade agreement (FTA) since 2005. These negotiations have taken a long time due to Mercosur's protectionism, so the Asian country has agreed on a phased manner agreement to reach a long-term economic cooperation with the bloc. The first round of negotiations finally took place in Montevideo, the Uruguayan capital, in September 2018. Early this year, they met again in Seoul to review the status of the negotiations for signing the Mercosur-Korea trade agreement. This agreement covers on the exchange of products and services and investments, providing South Korean firms faster access to the Latin American market. The Asian tiger main exports to South America are industrial goods like auto parts, mobile devices and chips, while its imports consist of mineral resources, agricultural products, and raw materials like iron ore.

Among Mercosur countries, South Korea has already strong ties with Brazil. Trade between both reached USD 1.70 billion in 2019. Also, South Korean direct investments totaled USD 3.69 billion that same year. With the conclusion of the trade agreement with the South American block, Korean products exported to Brazil would benefit from tariff eliminations, as would Korean position trucks, and other products going to Argentina. It would also be the first Asian country to have established a trade agreement with Mercosur.

Central America

South Korea is the first Asian-Pacific country to have signed a FTA with Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama). According to Kim Yong-beom, South Korean Deputy Minister of Economy and Finance, bilateral cooperation will benefit both regions as state regulatory powers won't create unnecessary barriers to commercial exchange between both. "The FTA will help South Korean companies have a competitive edge in the Central American region and we can establish a bridgehead to go over to the North and South American countries through their FTA networks", said Kim Hak-do, Deputy Trade Minister, when the agreement was reached in November 2016. Also, both economic structures will be complimented by each other by encouraging the exchange between firms from both regions. They signed the FTA on February 21st, 2018, after eighth rounds of negotiations from June 2015 to November 2016 that took place in Seoul, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa and Managua. Costa Rica also signed a memorandum of understanding with South Korea to boost trade cooperation and investment. This partnership will create new opportunities for both regions. South Korean consumers will have access to high-quality Central American products like grown coffee, agricultural products, fruits like bananas, and watermelons, at better prices and free of tariffs and duties. Additionally, Central American countries will have access to goods like vehicle parts, medicines and high-tech with the same advantages. Besides unnecessary barriers to trade, the FTA will promote fair marketing, ease the exchange of goods and services, to encourage the exchange businesses to invest in Central America and vice versa. Moreover, having recently joined the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) as an extra-regional member, has reinforced the development of partner projects around the region.

Opportunity

The Republic of Korea faces challenges related to the scarcity of natural resources, there are others, such as slower growth in recent decades, heavy dependence on exports, competitors like China, an aging population, large productivity disparities between the manufacturing and service sectors, and a widening income gap. Inasmuch, trade between Latin America and the Caribbean and the Republic of Korea, though still modest, has been growing stronger in recent years. Also, The Republic of Korea has become an important source of foreign direct investment for the region. The presence of Korean companies in a broad range of industries in the region offers innumerable opportunities to transfer knowledge and technology and to create links with local suppliers. FTAs definitely improve the conditions of access to the Korean market for the region's exports, especially in the most protected sectors, such as agriculture and agroindustry. The main challenge for the region in terms of its trade with North Korea remains export diversification. The region must simultaneously advance on several other fronts that are negatively affecting its global competitiveness. It is imperative to close the gaps in infrastructure, education and labor training.

The Trump Administration concludes its assertive management of the region and passes the baton to the Biden Administration, which appears to be committed to multilateralism and cooperation.

With the world at a standstill because of Covid-19, the Asian giant has taken the opportunity to resume a whole series of operations goal at expanding its control over the territories bordering its coastline. Such activities have not left the United States indifferent, and despite its complex internal status , it has taken action. With Mike Pompeo's visits throughout the Asia Pacific, the American power is increasing the process of containment of Beijing, materialized in a quadruple alliance between the United States, Japan, India and Australia. The new executive that the White House will inaugurate in January may involve a renewal of US actions which, without breaking with the Trump Administration, will recover the spirit of the Obama Administration, i.e. guided by greater cooperation with the countries of the Asia-Pacific and a commitment to dialogue.

Airstrip installed by China on Thitu or Pagasa Island, the second largest of the Spratlys, whose administration has been internationally recognized for the Philippines [Eugenio Bito-ononon Jr].

article / Ramón Barba

During the pandemic, Beijing has taken the opportunity to resume its actions in Asia Pacific waters. In mid-April, China proceeded to designate land in the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Archipelago and Macclesfield Bank as new districts of the city of Sansha, a town on China's Hainan Island. This management assistant assignment caused the subsequent protest of the Philippines and Vietnam, who claim sovereignty over these areas. Beijing's attitude has been accompanied by incursions and sabotage of ships in the area. See the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel, which China denies, arguing that it had suffered an accident and was carrying out illegal activities.

China's actions since the summer have been increasing instability in the region through military exercises near Taiwan or confrontations with India due to its border problems; on the other hand, in addition to the civil service examination the Philippines and Vietnam of Chinese moves, there is growing tension with Australia after the latter requested an investigation into the origin of the COVID-19, and the increase in maritime tensions with Japan. All this has led to a response from the United States, which claims to be the defender of free navigation in the Asia-Pacific, thus justifying its military presence and emphasizing that the People's Republic of China is not in favor of free transit, democracy or the rule of law.

US makes a move

Tensions between China and the United States in relation to the present dispute have been on the rise throughout the summer, with both increasing their military presence in the area (in addition, Washington has sanctioned 24 Chinese companies that have helped to militarize the area). All this has recently resulted in Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's visits to the Asia Pacific during the month of October. Prior to this round of visits, he had made statements in September at the ASEAN Virtual Summit urging countries in the region to limit their relations with China.

The dispute over these waters affects Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei and Malaysia, countries which, together with India and Japan, were visited by Pompeo (among others) in order to ensure greater control over Beijing's actions. During his tour, the US Secretary of State met with the foreign ministers of India, Australia and Japan to join forces against the Asian giant. Washington then signed in New Delhi a military agreement on the exchange satellite data to better track Chinese movements in the area, and paid a state visit to Indonesia. It should be recalled that Jakarta had so far been characterized by a growing friendship with Beijing and a worsening of relations with the United States due to a decrease in aid from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program. However, during Pompeo's visit , the two countries agreed to improve their relations through greater cooperation in regional, military procurement, intelligence, joint training and maritime security.

Thus, this move by Washington has implied:

• The consolidation of a quadruple alliance between India, Japan, Australia and the United States that has been materialized in the joint military exercises in the Bay of Bengal in early November. It should be recalled that this is in addition to Washington's traditional allies in the area (the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). In addition, the possibility of closer ties with Vietnam remains open.

• The expansion of its military presence in the area, increasing the flow of material sold to Taiwan, also highlighting the visits of high-ranking officials from Washington throughout July and the following months.

• Return of the destroyer USS Barry to the waters of the South China Sea with the goal of serving as a symbol of civil service examination of Chinese actions, and as a defender of freedom of navigation, peace and stability.

• Indonesia will move its Naval Combat Force (permanently based in Jakarta) to Natuna, islands bordering the South China Sea, rich in natural resources and disputed between the two countries.

• ASEAN takes a stand for peace and stability and in favor of UNCLOS 1982 (which establishes the governing legal framework for the law of the sea) during the summit held in Vietnam on November 12-15.

The ratio decidendi behind the Chinese performance

As a first approach to the ratio decidendi behind China's actions, it should be recalled that since 2012, taking advantage of the regional instability, the Asian giant alluded to its historical right over the territories of the South Sea to justify its actions, arguments dismissed in 2016 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. On the basis of the argument that Chinese fishermen once frequented the area, the appropriation of more than 80% of the territory has been justified and has since pitted Beijing against Manila.

On the other hand, Luis Lalinde, in his article China and the importance of dominating the Surrounding Sea (2017) gives a more complete view of the matter, alluding not only to historical reasons, but also to economic and geopolitical reasons. First of all, more than half of the hydrocarbons from which China is supplied transit through the Asia Pacific region, which in turn constitutes the world's main economic hub. In addition, Beijing has been deeply affected by the "century of humiliations", characterized by a lack of Chinese control over its territory due to maritime invasions. Finally, the domination of the seas, together with the already achieved continental weight, are vital for China's hegemonic projection in an area of increasing economic weight worldwide. For this reason, the so-called "string of pearls" has been established for the defense of strategic, security and energy supply interests from the Persian Gulf to the South Sea.

Lalinde's arguments justify China's actions in recent years, however, Bishop (2020), at the Council on Foreign Relations, states that the reason behind China's recent attitude is due to issues of internal instability, while a small sector of the Chinese intelligentsia sample critical and distrustful of Xi's leadership. They argue that the pandemic has weakened the Chinese Economics and the Chinese government, so that through foreign policy actions it must appear strong and vigorous. Finally, the importance of the control of the seas in relation to the Silk Road project should be taken into account. On its maritime side, China is investing heavily in Indian and Pacific ports which it does not rule out using for military purposes (see ports in Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Pakistan). Among the main opponents of this alliance are the United States, Japan and India, also against China's belligerent attitude, as we have seen.

Biden era: opportunities in a complicated scenario

Joe Biden's presidency will be marked by great challenges, both internal and external. We are facing a United States marked by a health crisis, with an increasingly polarized society and an Economics whose recovery, despite the measures adopted, raises doubts as to whether it will be a "V" or a "W". In addition, relations with Latin America and Europe have been deteriorating as a result of the measures taken by President Trump. 

The relationship between China and the US has been fluctuating in recent years. The Obama Administration, aware of the importance that the Asia-Pacific region has been gaining, coupled with the opportunity that the Silk Road presents for Beijing to expand its economic and military dominance, proposed in its second term its Pivot to Asia policy, beginning to finance and provide aid to countries in the region. During the years of the Trump Administration, the relationship with Beijing has deteriorated considerably, which puts Biden in a scenario in which he will have to face a trade war, the technological degree program in the battle for 5G, as well as regional security and human rights issues.

The countries of the region are demanding an effective response from the American giant to contain China in which Washington's promise of a free and open navigation zone is realized. However, the United States has to be cautious, since, with the exception of Vietnam, the Philippines, and partly Indonesia and Singapore, the rest of the countries in the region do not feel the need for an American intervention with any urgency. However, with the exception of Cambodia, the rest of the countries do not approve of the possibility of Chinese hegemony either.

In general, experts suggest that in the midst of this storm, the new US president will adopt a cautious but continuist attitude, to say the least. Probably, in line with the Obama Administration, he will tend to bet on multilateralism, economic subject alliances and regional integration without exercising an authoritarian attitude, lowering the aggressiveness of the Trump Administration, but being firm in his stance. All this implies looking for different areas in which to cooperate, such as climate change, the reduction of the Freedom of Navigation Missions or the increase of activities of Capacity Building.

A look into the near future

We will have to be attentive to the latest developments of the Trump Administration in relation to this conflict, as well as to the measures that Biden will adopt during his first months in office. However, everything suggests that, in this increasingly tense status , Washington will adopt a cautious stance. As we have seen, Pompeo's trips have served the United States to reaffirm its presence in the area, assuming a leadership role, providing the response that some countries such as the Philippines desire. However, although, as has been said, it will be necessary to keep an eye on the coming months, with the instructions already in place, it is most likely that Biden will continue the line of the Trump Administration but with a commitment to regional integration, multilateralism, diplomacy and economic cooperation in order to gain new support, strengthen its alliances and contain Beijing, thus justifying its presence in the area as the only power capable of bringing together regional forces to prevent a feared Chinese hegemony.

COMMENTARY / Juan Luis López Aranguren

If traditional diplomacy is understood as the relations exercised between official representatives of States, in recent years a new concept of diplomacy has gained popularity and has become increasingly important in relations between nations: cultural diplomacy. Assuming that culture is the vehicle through which nations communicate with each other, cultural diplomacy is the exchange of culture, ideas and information that nations around the world engage in to achieve mutual understanding that will advance the construction of a more just and stable world. In this context, the celebration of the Olympic Games is one of the most important cultural diplomacy events that a nation can achieve to project and share its culture and identity with the rest of the world. In this regard, Japan reaffirmed its position as a global benchmark for this diplomacy with its public appearance at the closing ceremony of the 2016 Rio Olympics. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe appeared in the guise of the world-famous character Mario to pick up the baton for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics. Japan thus used an icon of Japanese pop culture to project its cultural identity to the entire planet. 

In this dimension of soft power or cultural diplomacy, the Olympic Games are the greatest exponent of it. Already in their origin, in 776 B.C., the Olympic Games revealed themselves as a diplomatic tool of extraordinary strength by forcing a sacred truce between the different city-states that participated in them. Therefore, from its very origin, it was possible to achieve international political objectives by employing this cultural tool . This measure was observed to the point that if any city-state violated this truce, its athletes were expelled from the competition.

This same demonstration has been repeated in more recent times, demonstrating that the Olympics have been a diplomatic battleground throughout history. In 1980 the USA and 65 other countries boycotted the Moscow Olympics in protest against the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan. In retaliation, the USSR and 13 other states boycotted the next Olympics in 1984 in Los Angeles.

The upcoming Tokyo 2021 Olympic Games (delayed one year due to the pandemic) do not carry any controversy of this subject. Instead, they have been conceived as a historic opportunity to reinvent the country internally and globally after the Fukushima catastrophe (or Great East Japan Earthquake). To this end, C official graduate project Tokyo 2020 Action & Legacy Plan 2016 has been designed to achieve three objectives: firstly, to maximize the connection of Japanese citizens and groups with the Tokyo Olympics. Secondly, to maximize cultural projection both nationally and globally. Thirdly and finally, to ensure a bequest of value to future generations, as it was on the occasion of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics.

These three objectives set by the Japanese government will be expressed in five dimensional pillars on which action will be taken. These five pillars are articulated in the manner of Olympic rings, intertwining with each other and strengthening the domestic and international impact of these Olympic Games. These dimensions are, starting with the most immediate to the purely sporting aspect itself, the promotion of sport and health. The second, connecting with culture and Education. The third, also with great importance for its potential to reform Tokyo in particular and Japan in general, urban planning and sustainability. Not surprisingly, the Japanese government and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government have made great efforts to build ambitious infrastructure to accommodate these Olympics, to the point of relocating the famous and iconic Tsukiji fish market that has been a symbol of the city since 1935. Fourth, the Olympics will be used to revive Economics and technological innovation, just as the 1964 Tokyo Olympics did when it showcased the first Shinkansen, or bullet trains, which have become one of Japan's technological icons. Finally, fifthly, Japan saw the Olympic Games as an opportunity to overcome the crisis and trauma caused by the Fukushima disaster (a catastrophe that in Japan is referred to as the Great East Japan Earthquake).

In addition to these five objectives, ranging from the more specific to the more general, a sixth goal or unofficial dimension will be added in 2020: to project Japan's recovery from the COVID pandemic domestically and internationally. In this sense, the Olympic Games will not only be a symbol of overcoming a particular Japanese disaster, but may allow the Japanese country to position itself as a model in the management against the pandemic and in the promotion of economic recovery.

[Parag Khanna, The Future is Asian. Simon & Schuster. New York, 2019. 433 p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

Parag Khanna's book may be greeted with suspicion at the entrance because of the apparent axiomatic nature of its degree scroll. However, the blunt assertion on the cover is softened when one begins to read the pages inside. The thesis of the work is that the world is in a process of asianizationnot of chinizationMoreover, this process is presented as another coat of paint on the planet, not as a color that will be clearly predominant or definitive.

It is possible that the discussion of whether the United States is in decline and will be replaced by China as the preeminent superpower prevents seeing other parallel developments. Those watching Beijing's rise in the world order, writes Khanna, "have often been paralyzed by two views: either China will devour the world or it is on the verge of collapse. Neither is correct." "The future is Asian, even for China," he asserts.

Khanna believes that the world is moving towards a multipolar order, something that is also true in Asia, even if China's size often dazzles.

It is possible that this judgment is influenced by the author's Indian origin and also by his time living in the United States, but he offers figures to support his words. Of the 5 billion people living in Asia, 3.5 billion are not Chinese (70%): China, therefore, has only a third of Asia's population; it also accounts for slightly less than half of its GDP. Other data: half of the investments leaving the continent are non-Chinese, and more than half of foreign investments go to Asian countries other than China. Asia, therefore, "is more than China plus".

It is not just a question of size, but of wills. "A China-led Asia is no more acceptable to most Asians than the notion of a U.S.-led West is to Europeans," says Khanna. He rejects the idea that, because of China's power, Asia is heading toward a kind of tributary system like the one ruled in other centuries from Beijing. He points out that this system did not go beyond the Far East and was based mainly on trade.

The author reassures those who fear Chinese expansionism: "China has never been an indestructible superpower presiding over all of Asia like a colossus". Thus, he warns that while Europe's geographical characteristics have historically led many countries to fear the hegemony of a single power, in the case of Asia its geography makes it "inherently multipolar", as natural barriers absorb friction. In fact, the clashes that have taken place between China and India, China and Vietnam or India and Pakistan have ended in stalemates. "Whereas in Europe wars have occurred when there is a convergence in power between rivals, in Asia wars have taken place when there is a perception of advantage over rivals. So the more powerful China's neighbors like Japan, India or Russia are, the less likelihood of conflict between them."

For Khanna, Asia will always be a region of distinct and autonomous civilizations, especially now that we are witnessing a revival of old empires. The geopolitical future of Asia will not be led by the United States or China: "Japan, South Korea, India, Russia, Indonesia, Australia, Iran and Saudi Arabia will never come together under a hegemonic umbrella or unite in a single pole of power".

There will not be, then, a chinization of the world, according to the author, and the Asianization that is taking place - a shift of the planet's specific weight towards the Indo-Pacific - should not be seen as a threat to those who live elsewhere. Just as there was a Europeanization of the world in the 19th century, and an Americanization in the 20th century, in the 21st century we are witnessing an Asianization. Khanna sees this as "the most recent sedimentation substrate in the geology of global civilization," and as a "layer" he does not assume that the world Withdrawal to what came before. "Being more Asian doesn't necessarily mean being less American or European," he says.

The book analyzes the weight and fit of different Asian countries in the continent. Of Russia, he says it is strategically closer to China today than at any time since its communist pact in the 1950s. Khanna believes that geography leads to this understanding, as it invites Canada to maintain good relations with the United States; he predicts that climate change will further open up the lands of Siberia, which will integrate them more with the rest of the Asian continent.

As for India and China's relationship, Khanna believes that both countries will have to accept each other as powers more normally. For example, despite India's reluctance towards China's Silk Road and India's own regional connectivity projects, in the end the two countries' preferred corridors "will overlap and even reinforce each other," ensuring that products from Asia's interior reach the Indian Ocean. "Geopolitical rivalries will only accelerate the Asianization of Asia," Khanna sentences.

In assessing the importance of Asia, the book includes Middle East oil. Technically, this region is part of the continent, but it is such a separate chapter with its own dynamics that it is difficult to see it as Asian territory. The same is true when Israel or Lebanon are label as such. It may give the impression that the author is lumping everything together to make the figures more impressive. He argues that the Middle East is becoming less and less dependent on Europe and the United States and is looking more to the East.

Khanna is in a position to reasonably defend himself against most of the objections that can be made to his text. The most controversial, however, is the justification, close to defense, that he makes of technocracy as a system of government. Beyond the descriptive attitude of a model that in some countries has been the subject of significant economic and social development , Khanna even seems to endorse its moral superiority.

[Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo (eds). One Korea: visions of Korean unification. Routledge. New York, 2017. 234 p.]

review / Eduardo Uranga

Throughout the second half of the 20th century, tensions between superpowers in East Asia made this part of the world a hot spot in International Relations. Tensions remain today, such as the trade war that since 2018 has pitted the United States and the People's Republic of China against each other. However, over the past 70 years, one territory in particular has been affected by a continuing conflict that has several times claimed the world's attention. This region is undoubtedly the Korean peninsula.

This book, co-edited by Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo and bringing together various experts on inter-Korean relations, outlines the various possibilities of a future reunification of the two Koreas, as well as the various problems that need to be solved in order to achieve this goal. The perspectives of the various world powers on the conflict are also analyzed.

The Korean issue comes from World War II: after the country was occupied by Japan, its liberation ended up dividing the peninsula in two: North Korea (occupied by the Soviet Union) and South Korea (controlled by the United States). Between 1950 and 1953, the two halves fought a conflict, which eventually consolidated the partition, with a demilitarized zone in between known as the 38th Parallel or KDZ.

One of the formulas for Korean unification described in this book is unification through neutralization, proposal by both Koreas. However, the constant long-range nuclear missile tests conducted by North Korea in recent years present a major obstacle to this formula. In this atmosphere of mistrust, Korean citizens play an important role in promoting cooperation and friendship on both sides of the border with the goal of achieving the denuclearization of North Korea.

Another aspect that plays an important role in forcing a change in North Korea's attitude is its strategic culture. This must be differentiated from the traditional Korean strategic culture. North Korea has adopted various unification strategies over the years while maintaining the same principles and values. This strategic culture blends elements from the country's strategic position (geopolitically), history and national values. All this under the authority of the Juche ideology. This ideology contains some militaristic elements and promotes the unification of Korea through armed conflict and revolutionary actions.

As for the perspectives of the various world superpowers on a future Korean reunification, China has stated that it favors unification in the long term; a process undertaken in the short term would collide with Chinese national interests, as Beijing would first have to settle its disputes with Taiwan, or end the trade war against the United States. China has stated that it will not accept Korean unification influenced by a military alliance between the United States and South Korea.

On the other hand, the United States has not yet opted for a specific Korean unification policy. Since the 1950s, the Korean peninsula has been but one part of the overall U.S. strategic policy for the entire Asia Pacific region.

The unification of the Korean peninsula will be truncated as long as the United States, China and other powers in the region continue to recognize the status quo on the peninsula. It could be argued that perhaps an armed conflict would be the only way to achieve unification. According to the authors of this book, this would be too costly in terms of resources used and human lives lost. On the other hand, such a war could trigger a conflict on a global scale.

[John West, Asian Century on A Knife Edge: A 360 Degree Analysis of Asia's Recent Economic Development.. Palgrave Macmillan. Singapore, 2018. 329 p.]

REVIEW / Gabriela Pajuelo

The degree scroll of this book seems to contribute to the generalized chorus that the 21st century is the century of Asia. In reality, the book's thesis is the opposite, or at least it puts that statement "on the razor's edge": Asia is a continent of great economic complexity and conflicting geopolitical interests, which poses a series of challenges whose resolution will determine the region's place in the world in the coming decades. For the time being, according to John West, a university professor in Tokyo, nothing is certain.

The book begins with a preamble on the recent history of Asia, from World War II to the present. Already at the beginning of that period, economic liberalism was established as the standard doctrine in much of the world, including most Asian countries, in a process driven by the establishment of international institutions.

China joined this system, without renouncing its internal doctrines, when it joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. Since then, there have been some shocks such as the financial crisis of 2007-2008, which severely affected the U.S. economy and had repercussions in the rest of the world, or the recent tariff tensions between Washington and Beijing, in addition to the current global crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic.

The principles of protectionism and nationalism deployed by Donald Trump and an increased U.S. resource to the hard power in the region, as well as a more assertive policy of Xi Jinping's China in its geographical environment, also resorting to positions of force, as in the South China Sea, have damaged the multilateralism that had been built up in that part of the world.

The author provides some thought-provoking ideas on the challenges that Asia will face, given that the core topic factors that favored its development have now deteriorated (mainly due to the stability provided by international economic interdependence).

West examines seven challenges. The first is to obtain a better position in global value chains, since since the 1980s the manufacture of components and the production of final products has taken place in different parts of the world. Asia is heavily involved in these supply chains, in fields such as technology and apparel production, but is subject to the business decisions of multinationals whose practices are sometimes not socially responsible and allow the abuse of labor rights, which are important for middle-class development .

The second challenge is to maximize the potential of urbanization, which has grown from 27% of the population in 1980 to 48% in 2015. The region is known for densely populated megacities. This brings with it some difficulties: the population migrating to industrial centers generally moves from leave to high-productivity jobs, and health care capacity is put to the test . But it is also an opportunity to improve environmental practices or encourage innovation through green technologies, even though much of Asia today still faces high levels of pollution.

Another challenge is to give all Asians equal opportunities in their respective societies, from LGBT people to women and indigenous communities, as well as ethnic and religious minorities. The region also faces a major demographic challenge , as many populations either age (such as China's, despite the correction of the "two-child policy") or continue to expand with presumed future supply problems (as in the case of India).

West also reference letter to the barriers to democratization that exist in the region, with China's notable immobility, and to the spread of economic crime and corruption (counterfeiting, piracy, drug trafficking, human trafficking, cybercrime and money laundering).

Finally, the author speaks of the challenge for Asian countries to live together in peace and harmony, while China consolidates its position as a regional leader: if there is a Chinese commitment to thesoft powerThrough the Belt and Road initiative, there is also a more confrontational attitude on the part of Beijing towards Taiwan, Hong Kong and the South China Sea, while players such as India, Japan and North Korea want a greater role.

Overall, the book offers a comprehensive analysis of Asia's economic and social development and the challenges ahead. In addition, the author offers some thought-provoking ideas, arguing that a so-called "Asian century" is unlikely due to the region's lagging economic development , as most countries have not caught up with their Western counterparts in terms of GDP per capita and technological sophistication. Nevertheless, it leaves the future open: if the challenges are successfully met, the time may indeed come for an Asian Century.

▲ Rice field terraces in Vietnam [Pixabay].

COMMENT / Eduardo Arbizu

The combination of a market Economics and an authoritarian regime dominated by the Communist Party of Vietnam (VCP) has led Vietnam, a country of more than 90 million people, to become a key player in the future of Southeast Asia.

The current Vietnam is the consequence of a confusing and contradictory process of change that has transformed not only the country's Economics , but has also had a profound impact on social life, urban configuration, environment, domestic and foreign policies and whose final effects will be seen in the long term.

An impressive economic turnaround

The transformation of the economic model in Vietnam derives formally from the decision adopted at the sixth VCP congress in December 1986 to open the country to market Economics , but its roots lie earlier, in the economic crisis that followed the war, in the collapse of agricultural production that the radical implementation of a communist model provoked in 1979. This debacle forced to allow the private trade of any production surplus that exceeded the targets set by the State for enterprises or public lands. This sort of state capitalism paved the way for the liberalization that followed the death of the Stalinist leader, Le Duan, in 1986. The approval of the do-moi or renovation policy meant the withdrawal of planning and the option for the free market. It was not an ideological decision but an instrumental one. If the CP wanted to maintain control of the country, it needed to generate one million work a year, guarantee food for 90 million inhabitants and reduce poverty.

It has been an economic and social success: per capita income has increased dramatically and the population below the poverty line has been reduced from 60% to 20%. The US embargo ended in 1993 and in 1997 the two countries signed a new trade agreement . In 2007, Vietnam was admitted to the WTO. In this context of openness, more than 150,000 new enterprises were created under the new enterprise law and large international companies such as Clarks, Canon, Samsung and Intel set up production centers in Vietnam.

The achievements of the process, however, should not hide its weaknesses: an Economics controlled by the State through joint ventures and state-owned companies, a fragile rule of law, massive corruption, a network of families loyal to the PCV that accumulate wealth and own most of the private businesses, growing inequality and a deep ecological deterioration.

Agriculture has evolved from the sudden drop in production that followed communist collectivization to the current status where Vietnam is the second largest exporter of rice in the world, a crop that accounts for 20% of its exports. The industrialization of Economics has meant that agriculture, which used to account for 40% of GDP, is now only 20%. Life continues to depend on rice cultivation, still the main source of income for rural households, where half of the population lives. Rice exports are managed by a combination of free market and corrupt officialdom, with the negative consequences experienced in the speculative crisis of 2008. There has been an intense migration from the countryside to the big cities where wages are five times higher. The pressure in search of wealth is converting agricultural land into residential or industrial plots. Every year, 10,000 new hectares are requalified. The transformation of the rural world is pushing away the old Structures that provided security, meaning and purpose and it remains to be seen how it affects future stability.

Social and environmental change

The construction of proletarian cities after the war, under the communist housing program, has not prevented overpopulation or the continuation of communal life. Migrants continue to arrive in search of work, money and protection. Tons of industrial waste remains untreated; the rivers around Ho Chi Min City are biologically dead and pollution in Hanoi is well above internationally accepted levels. Problems such as prostitution, with more than 1% of women working in illicit sex trafficking, or abandoned children on the streets are a reality. However, while doubling or tripling its urban population, Vietnam has managed these problems better than its neighboring countries, avoiding to a greater extent the ghost cities and their problems of crime, extreme poverty and drug addiction so common in the rest of Asia.

Commercial and urban dynamism is reflected in thousands of illegal street food businesses and small enterprises, pioneers of small-scale capitalism, which today constitute a tourist symbol of Vietnam. In cities full of young people who identify freedom with a polluting motorcycle, youth rebels against years of communist austerity but not against family traditions.

Vietnam is a country where a natural wonder like Ha Long Bay, one of the country's iconic images, is simultaneously a tourist attraction and an environmental disaster. It is also one of the areas most exposed to the effects of climate change, due to its low altitude and reliance on agricultural production in the Mekong Delta and tourism. Respect for wildlife and the environment are issues of leave priority for the authorities.

PCV remains in control

There are issues that have not changed with the same intensity. Vietnam still lives under a "natural system of control", the deep surveillance system put in place by the communist regime to control the values and behavior of its people. A system in which one out of six Vietnamese ended up working in the security forces and which resulted in a control of "cultivated families", those who behave in agreement with the values set by the party. Although it has proven its effectiveness in crises such as the avian flu and now partly in the Covid-19 crisis, the system is now controversial due to the spread of the Internet and social networks and radical social changes that call for more freedom. Despite this control, corruption is widespread and is damaging the country's future.

The VCP is still in power. Maintaining its Leninist roots, it is now an elitist and intelligent organization in search of its own survival. A new mandarinate that has evolved from a centralized power present in all aspects of public and social life to a fragile and partial control; from a "meaningless legal system", where decisions were taken directly by the VCP and their compliance with the law was irrelevant, to a "State based on the Law", where the rules are the tool to supervise entrepreneurs and investors, allowing them to create wealth and employment but simultaneously comply with the expectations of the VCP. Similarly, the party controls the legislature, the courts and indirectly the press, media and news coverage, which prevents Vietnam from being considered a truly free country.

Life has been difficult and lonely for those few who tried to oppose the regime and promote real democracy. The name of the Catholic priest Father Ly and his followers, brutally repressed, tried and convicted in March 2007, once the country was admitted to the WTO, overshadows the hope for a transition to effective political freedom.

Foreign policy and future

Vietnam's foreign policy seeks to strike a balance in its relations with two major players: the United States and China, counterbalanced by a set of alliances with third countries. Overcoming war wounds and establishing trusting cooperation on security subject is the goal of the policy of rapprochement with the United States, which is already a significant investor in the country. The special relationship with China, the largest importer of Vietnamese products, an industrial giant and the largest army in Asia, is the other axis of its policy despite old territorial conflicts.

The overexploited environment, inequality, the entrenchment of the elites and, above all, uncertainty about the evolution of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the political system are aspects that are weighing on the outlook. However, a young and well-educated population, as well as the inflow of foreign investment, are reasons for optimism about further liberalization of the country, including political liberalization.

▲ The British Raj in 1909 showing Muslim majority areas in green

ESSAY / Victoria Paternina and Claudia Plasencia

Pakistan's partition from India in 1947 marked the beginning of a long road of various territorial disputes, causing different effects in the region. The geopolitics of Pakistan with India are often linked when considering their shared history; and in fact, it makes sense if we take the perspective of Kashmir as the prominent issue that Islamabad has to deal with. However, neither the history nor the present of Pakistan can be reduced to New Delhi and their common regional conflict over the Line of Control that divides Kashmir.

The turbulent and mistrustful relations between India and Pakistan go beyond Kashmir, with the region of Punjab divided in two sides and no common ground between New Delhi and Islamabad. In the same way, the bitter ties between Islamabad and a third country are not exclusively with India. Once part of Pakistan, Bangladesh has a deeply rooted hatred relationship with Islamabad since their split in 1971. Looking beyond Kashmir, Punjab and Bangladesh show a distinct aspect of the territorial disputes of the past and present-day Pakistan. Islamabad has a say in these issues that seem to go unnoticed due to the fact that they stand in the shadow of Kashmir.

This essay tries to shed light on other events that have a solid weight on Pakistan's geopolitics as well as to make clear that the country is worthy of attention not only from New Delhi's perspective but also from their own Pakistani view. In that way, this paper is divided in two different topics that we believe are important in order to understand Pakistan and its role in the region. Punjab and Bangladesh: the two shoved under the rug by Kashmir.

Punjab

The tale of territorial disputes is rooted deeply in Pakistan and Indian relations; the common mistake is to believe that New Delhi and Islamabad only fight over Kashmir. If the longstanding dispute over Kashmir has raised the independence claims of its citizens, Punjab is not far from that. On the edge of the partition, Punjab was another region in which territorial lines were difficult to apply. They finally decided to divide the territory in two sides; the western for Pakistan and the eastern for India. However, this issue automatically brought problems since the majority of Punjabis were neither Hindus nor Muslims but rather Sikhs. Currently, the division of Punjab is still in force. Despite the situation in Pakistan Punjab remains calm due to the lack of Sikhs as most of them left the territory or died in the partition. The context in India Punjab is completely different as riots and violence are common in the eastern side due to the wide majority of Sikhs that find no common ground with Hindus and believe that India has occupied its territory. Independence claims have been strengthened throughout the years on many occasions, supported by the Pakistani ISI in order to destabilize India. Furthermore, the rise of the nationalist Indian movement is worsening the situation for Punjabis who are realizing how their rights are getting marginalized in the eyes of Modi's government.

Nonetheless, the question of Punjabi independence is only a matter of the Indian side. The Pakistan-held Punjab is a crucial province of the country in which the wide majority are Muslims. The separation of Punjab from Islamabad would not be conceived since it would be devastating. For Pakistan, it would mean the loss of 72 million inhabitants; damaging the union and stability of the country. All of this taking into account that Punjab represents a strong pillar for the national economy since it is the place where the Indus river - one of the most important ones - flows. It can be said that there is no room for independence of the Pakistani side, nor for a rapprochement between both parts of the former Punjab region. They have lost their main community ties. Besides, the disagreements are between New Delhi and Eastern Punjab, so Islamabad has nothing to do here. According to that, the only likely long-term possibility would be the independence of the Indian side of the Punjab due to the growth of the hatred against New Delhi. Additionally, there are many Sikhs living abroad in UK or Canada who support the independence of Punjab into a new country "Khalistan" strengthening the movement into an international concern. Nevertheless, the achievement of this point would probably increase the violence in Punjab, and in case they would become independent it would be at the expense of many deaths.

There is a last point that must be taken into account when referring to India-Pakistan turbulent territorial relations. This is the case of the longstanding conflict over water resources in which both countries have been increasing tensions periodically. Considering that there is a scarcity of water resources and a high demand of that public good, it is easy to realize that two enemies that share those resources are going to fight for them. Furthermore, if they both are mainly agrarian countries, the interest of the water would be even harder as it is the case of Pakistan and India. However, for more than five decades both Islamabad and New Delhi have maintained the Indus Waters Treaty that regulates the consumption of the common waters. It divides the six rivers that flow over Pakistan and India in two sides. The three western ones for Pakistan, and the other three of the eastern part for India. Nevertheless, it does not mean that India could not make any use of the Pakistani ones or vice versa; they are allowed to use them in non-consumptive terms such as irrigation, but not for storage or building infrastructures[1]. This is where the problem is. India is seemed to have violated those terms by constructing a dam in the area of the Pakistani Indus river in order to use the water as a diplomatic weapon against Islamabad.

This term has been used as an Indian strategy to condemn the violence of Pakistan-based groups against India undermining in that way the economy of Pakistan which is highly dependent on water resources. Nevertheless, it is hard to think that New Delhi would violate one of the milestones treaties in its bilateral relations with Pakistan. Firstly, because it could escalate their already existent tensions with Pakistan that would transform into an increase of the violence against India. Islamabad's reaction would not be friendly, and although terrorist activities follow political causes, any excuse is valid to lead to an attack. Secondly, because it would bring a bad international image for PM Modi as the UN and other countries would condemn New Delhi of having breached a treaty as well as leaving thousands of people without access to water. Thirdly, they should consider that rivers are originated in the Tibet, China, and a bad movement would mean a reaction from Beijing diverting the water towards Pakistan[2]. Finally, India does not have enough infrastructure to use the additional water available. It is better for both New Delhi and Islamabad to maintain the issue over water resources under a formal treaty considering their mutual mistrust and common clashes. Nevertheless, it would be better for them to renew the Indus Waters Treaty in order to include new aspects that were not foreseen when it was drafted as well as to preserve the economic security of both countries.

Bangladesh

Punjab is a territory obligated to be divided in two between India and Pakistan, yet Bangladesh separated itself completely from Pakistan and finds itself in the middle of India. Bangladesh, once part of Pakistan, after a tumultuous war, separated into its own country. While India did not explicitly intervene with Bangladesh and Pakistan's split, it did promote the hatred between the two for its own diary and to increase in power. The scarring aspect of the split of Bangladesh from Pakistan is the bloody war and genocide that took place, something that the Bengali people still have not overcome to this day. The people of Bangladesh are seeking an apology from Pakistan, something that does not look like it is going to come anytime soon.

Pakistan and Bangladesh share a bitter past with one another as prior to 1971, they were one country which separated into two as a result of a bloody war and emerging political differences. Since 1971 up to today, India and the Awami league have worked to maintain this hatred between Bangladesh and Pakistan through propagandist programs and different techniques. For example, they set up a war museum, documentaries and films in order to boast more the self-proclamation of superiority on behalf of India against Bangladesh and Pakistan. India and the Awami League ignore the fact that they have committed atrocities against the Bengali people and that in large part they are responsible for the breakup between Pakistan and Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) worked to improve relations with Pakistan under the governments of Ziaur Rahman, Begum Khaldia Zia, and Hossain Mohammad Ershad in Bangladesh, who had maintained distance from India. Five Pakistani heads of government have visited Bangladesh since 1980, along with signing trade and cultural agreements to improve relations between the two nations.[3] While an alliance between Pakistan and Bangladesh against India is not a realistic scenario, what is important for Pakistan and Bangladesh for the next decade to come is attempt to put their past behind them in order to steer clear of India and develop mutually beneficial relations to help improve their economies. For example, a possible scenario for improving Pakistan and Bangladesh relations could be to join the CPEC to better take advantage of the trade opportunities offered within South Asia, West Asia, Central Asia, and China and Russia.[4] The CPEC will be a key player in this process.

Despite decades of improving trade and military links, especially as a defense against Indian supremacy in the region, the two countries continue to be divided by the question of genocide. Bangladesh wants Pakistan to recognize the genocide and its atrocities and teach them as a part of its history. However, Pakistan has refused to do so and has even referred to militant leader executed for war crimes as being killed for his loyalty to Pakistan.[5] Bangladesh is a country with a long history of genocide.

Even though India supported Bangladesh in its independence from Pakistan, Bangladesh thinks that India is self-serving and that they change ideas depending on their own convenience.[6] An alliance of Pakistan and Bangladesh, even though it is against a common enemy, India, is not realistic given the information recently provided. India is a country that yes, even though they helped Bangladesh against Pakistan, they are always going to look out for themselves, especially in search to be the central power in the region. India sees still a lot of potential for their power in the coming decades. Indian PM Narendra Modi is very keen on making strategic choices for the country to transform and increase its global leadership position.[7] India's strategy for the next few years has been to make the right choices for the future.

The hostile relations between Pakistan and India find their peak in its longstanding conflict over Kashmir, but Punjab and Bangladesh must not be put in the shadow. The further directions of both PM Imran Khan and PM Modi could have consequences that would alter the interests of Punjab and Bangladesh as different actors in the international order. In the case of Punjab their mutual feelings of mistrust could challenge the instability of a region far from being calm. It is true that independence claims is not an issue for Pakistan itself since both Islamabad and Pakistan-held Punjab would lose in that scenario, and they both know it. Nonetheless, Indian Punjabis' reality is different. They have crucial problems within New Delhi, again as a historical matter of identity and ethnicity that is still present nowadays. Sikhs have not found common ground with Hindus yet and it does not seem that it will happen in a near future. In fact, tensions are increasing, posing a threat for two nations with their views on Kashmir rather than on Punjab. In the case of Bangladesh, its relations with Pakistan did not have a great start. Bangladesh gained freedom with help from India and remained under its influence. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh took a long time to adjust to the shock of separation and their new reality, with India in between them.

In conclusion, Punjab and Bangladesh tend to be the less important territorial issues, and not a priority neither for Islamabad nor for New Delhi that are more engaged in Kashmir. However, considering the magnitude of both disputes, we should appreciate how the Sikhs in the Indian-held territory of Punjab as well as the Bengali people deserve the same rights as the Kashmiris to be heard and to have these territorial disputes settled once and for all.

BIBLIOGRAPHY .

Ayres, Alyssa. "India: a 'Major Power' Still below Its Potential." Lowy Institute, July 24, 2018.

Iftikhar, Momin. "Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations." The Nation. The Nation, December 15, 2018.

"Indus Water Treaty: Everything You Need to Know". ClearIAS.

Muhammad Hanif, Col. "Keeping India out of Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations." Daily Times, March 6, 2018.

Sami, Shafi. "Pakistan Bangladesh Relations In the Changing International Environment." JSTOR. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 2017.

Shakoor, Farzana. "Pakistan Bangladesh Relations Survey." JSTOR. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 2017.

[A. Patanru, M. Pangestu, M.C. Basri (eds), Indonesia in the New World: Globalisation, Nationalism and Sovereignty. ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute. Singapore, 2018. 358 p.]

review / Irati Zozaya

The book consists of fifteen articles, written by different experts, on how Indonesia has dealt with globalization and what effect it has had on the country. The texts have been coordinated by Arianto A. Patunru, Mari Pangestu and M. Chatib Basri, Indonesian academics with experience also in public management , having served as ministers in different governments. The articles combine general approaches with specific aspects, such as the consequences of the opening up to international trade and investment in the mining industry or the nationalization of foodstuffs.

To explain Indonesia's current status , the book occasionally recapitulates periods of its history. Precisely one of the concepts that comes up frequently in the book is that of nationalism: it could be said, according to the authors, that this is what has most marked Indonesia's relationship with the world, regardless of who has led this country of 260 million inhabitants at any given time.

The first part of the book reference letter more generally to Indonesia's experience with globalization, nationalism and sovereignty. They begin by showing the colonial era and how, due to the imposition by Holland and Great Britain of an opening to the world, a strong nationalist sentiment begins to emerge. After the occupation by Japan during the Second World War, a total autarchy was implemented, thus leading the citizens to a problem that is still very present in Indonesia today: the internship of smuggling. In 1945 the country achieved its long-awaited independence under the presidency of Sukarno, who closed Indonesia to the rest of the world to focus on reaffirming national identity and developing its capabilities. This led to the deterioration of the Economics and the consequent hyperinflation, which ushered in a new era: the New Order.

In 1967, with Suharto's accession to the presidency, a cautious opening to foreign trade and investment flows began. However, Suharto repressed political activity and during his tenure the military gained much influence and the government retained control over Economics. In addition, the end of his presidency coincided with the Asian financial crisis (1997-1998), which led to a fall in the country's economic growth and a slowdown in poverty reduction, and consequently a growth in inequality. The financial crisis undermined confidence in the president and culminated in the collapse of the New Order.

The next period addressed is the Reformasi, an era that marked the beginning of a more open and democratic political climate. The next two presidents, Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) and Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001-2004), were more concerned with economic recovery and democratic consolidation and a protectionist system regarding Economics endured. The book does not focus much on the next president, Yudhoyono (2004-2014), remarking only that he was an internationalist who maintained a more cautious and ambivalent stance on economic issues.

Finally, in the 2014 elections, Joko Widodo came to power and holds the position of president today. Under him, Indonesia has returned to the path of economic growth and has stabilized as a reasonably successful democracy. As the president, commonly known as Jokowi, has taken new steps to emphasize political sovereignty and promote economic autarky and national cultural revival, his term has been characterized as 'new nationalism'. In his political speech , Jokowi puts Indonesia as a goal of foreign conspiracies and calls to be on guard against such threats. However, the country maintains an ambivalent stance towards international openness and cooperation since, although trade restrictions have increased again in recent decades, Jokowi emphasizes global engagement and has reactivated regional negotiations.

All this has led to public dissatisfaction with globalization, with up to 40% of citizens believing that globalization threatens national unity. One of the most negative and important effects in Indonesia is that of workers who have been forced to migrate and work abroad under very poor conditions. However, the later parts of the book also show the positive consequences that globalization has had in Indonesia, manifesting itself in higher productivity, increased wages or economic growth, among others. The authors therefore emphasize the importance of constructing a narrative that can generate public and political support for the opening up of the country and counteract the growing anti-globalization sentiment.

As it happens in a book that is the sum of articles by different authors, its reading can be somewhat heavy due to a certain reiteration of contents. However, the variety of signatures also implies a plurality of approaches that undoubtedly provides a wealth of perspectives for the reader.