[Michael E. O'Hanlon, The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War over Small Stakes. Brookings Institution Press. Washington, 2019. 272 p.]

review / Jimena Puga

After the end of the Cold War, in which it confronted the Soviet Union bloc defending the values of the Western order, the United States remained the hegemonic country in the world. Today, however, it is rivaled by Russia, which, despite its weak Economics , is struggling not to lose any more influence on the international scene, and by China, which, although still a regional power, aspires to replace the United States at the global pinnacle. The challenge is not only for Washington, but for the West as a whole, as its own values are being challenged by the advance of Moscow and Beijing's diary .

The West must respond firmly, but how far should it go, when should it say enough is enough, and is it ready for war even if the cumulative steps taken by Russia or China are themselves relatively minor or occur on the periphery? That is the question posed by Brookings Institution researcher Michael E. O'Hanlon in The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War over Small Stakes. The book addresses a series of possible scenarios in the context of a global hegemonic shift and competition for power among the world's major powers.

The scenarios put forward by O'Hanlon consist, on the one hand, of a possible annexation of Estonia or Latvia by Russia, without prior consent and by means of a military attack. On the other hand, China's military conquest of one of the larger islands that make up the Senkaku, the name Japan gives to an archipelago it administers in the vicinity of Taiwan and which Beijing calls Diaoyu. In both cases, it is difficult to assess which side would have a better military strategy or to predict which side would win a hypothetical war. In addition, there are many unknown variables about cyber vulnerabilities, submarine operations or the accuracy of missile attacks on each country's strategic infrastructure.

Thus, the author wonders whether both the United States and its allies should respond directly with a military offensive in response to an initial attack, or whether they should limit themselves to an asymmetric response, focused on preventing future attacks, combining such responses with economic retaliation and certain military actions in different scenarios. What is clear is that while remaining vigilant in the face of the possible need to strengthen their positions on the international chessboard, Western countries must remain prudent and provide proportionate responses to possible crises, aware that their values - the defense of freedom, justice and the common good - are the greatest assets of their democratic systems.

At present, Western democratic systems are under strong populist pressure, although there is nothing to suggest that countries with well-established democracies such as France, Germany or Spain will generate conflicts among themselves, much less within the European Union, which has been a guarantee of peace and stability since the 1950s. For its part, it would be advisable for the Trump Administration to react more prudently in certain situations, in order to avoid an escalation of diplomatic tension that unnecessarily increases the risks of conflict, at least regional or economic.

Neither Moscow nor Beijing today pose an immediate threat to US world hegemony, but China is the fastest growing power in the last fifty years. Such rapid growth could lead China to dispense with multilateralism and regional cooperation and to regional influence through economic or military imposition. This would make the People's Republic a threat.

Although it is true that the United States has the best military force, it is expected that around the year 2040 there will be both military and economic parity between the Middle Empire and the American country. Thus, Europe and the United States, faced with possible aggression from China - or from Russia, despite its state of gradual decline - should respond appropriately and, as the White House says, be "strategically predictable, but operationally unpredictable". And they seek to do allies at the international level and to put military pressure on the aggressor in regions where the aggressor is compromised.

As the author argues, the White House needs better and more credible options for designing an asymmetric defense based on deterrence and containment plans, with the use of force as an option. For example, article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is not the best deterrence weapon for the US and its allies, as it poses a danger to stability and leaves no room for action in the event of deterrence failure. However, with the proposed new defense subject , NATO member countries would not be obliged to "fire the first bullet", so that other collateral actions would be possible, without the need to resort to direct confrontation to stop a possible escalation of more serious hostilities.

What is clear, argues O'Hanlon, is that both China and Russia seek to challenge the international order through any subject conflict and the West must adopt strategies aimed at anticipating possible future scenarios, so that they can be prepared to face them with guarantees of success. These measures need not be solely military. For example, they will have to prepare for a long and painful economic war by means of defensive and offensive measures, while the U.S. puts the brakes on the imposition of tariffs on aluminum and steel on its allies. In addition, the US has to be careful about overusing the economic sanctions applied to financial transactions, especially the ban on access to the SWIFT banking communication system, otherwise Washington's allies will end up creating alternatives to SWIFT, which would be a disadvantage and a sample of weakness vis-à-vis Moscow and Beijing.

[Sheila A. Smith, Japan Rearmed. The Politics of Military Power. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, 2019. 239 p.]

review / Ignacio Yárnoz

Japan is currently facing a delicate national security status . To the north, the country is constantly subjected to harassment from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the form of ballistic missile tests that often land in Japanese territorial waters. To the east and southeast, Japan's sovereignty over its territorial waters, including the disputed Senkaku Islands, is threatened by a China increasingly keen to show economic and military muscle.

And as if this were not enough, Japan is already questioning the security that the United States can or will provide in the event of a possible regional conflict. If in the past Japan feared being dragged into a war because of the U.S. predisposition to use fire to resolve certain situations, now Tokyo fears that the U.S. will not join it in defending its sovereignty.

It is this national security dilemma that Japan Rearmed. The Politics of Military Power, by Sheila A. Smith, a researcher at the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations. The book gathers the different views on this issue. The Japanese government's position is that Japan should rely more on itself to maintain its own security. But this is where the biggest obstacle arises. Since its defeat in World War II and subsequent U.S. domination of the country until 1952, the national armed forces have been downgraded to "Self-Defense Forces". The reality is that the 1947 Constitution, specifically article issue 9, continues to limit the functions of Japanese troops.

Introduced directly by the U.S. command, article 9, never amended, reads: "Aspiring sincerely to international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people Withdrawal forever from war as a sovereign right of the nation and from the threat or use of force as a means of settlement of international disputes. (2) In order to carry out the desire expressed in the preceding paragraph, no land, sea or air forces or other war potential shall hereafter be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state shall not be recognized".

This article, novel at the time, was intended to open an era safe from warmongering tendencies, in which the United Nations project would be the basis for collective security and the peaceful settlement of disputes. However, history itself showed how within a few years the very architects of the Constitution called for Japan's rearmament in the context of the Korean War; it was then too late for a rethinking of the founding limitations of the new Japan.

Following the changes in Asian geopolitics over the past 30 years after the end of the Cold War, Japan has taken steps to regain its international presence, but even today it continues to stumble under the straitjacket of its Constitution. As Smith rightly describes, there are many legal hurdles that the Japan Self-Defense Forces have had to overcome since 1945. Issues such as Japan's performance abroad under the United Nations flag, its absence in the 1st Gulf War, the discussion on the resilience after a North Korean attack or Japan's performance in the 2nd Gulf War are all discussed and analyzed in this book. In addition, the author tries to explain the reasons and arguments in each of the debates concerning article 9, such as self-defense, the role of the Self-Defense Forces and the relationship with the United States, issues that confront the Japanese political elite. Several generations of political leaders have tried to resolve the dilemma of guaranteeing Japan's security and interests without limiting the capabilities of its armed forces, although so far there has been no consensus to change certain constitutional assumptions, a direction in which Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is pushing.

Japan rearmed is a 360 Degrees analysis where the reader finds a complete analysis of the main obstacles faced by the Japan Self-Defense Forces and what their future development can be. In a broader framework , the book also addresses the role of the Armed Forces in a democracy, which must make compatible its rejection of violence with the obligation to guarantee collective defense.

essay / Jairo Císcar Ruiz [English version].

In recent months, the open trade hostilities between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China have dominated the main general headlines and specialized economic publications around the world. The so-called "trade war" between these two superpowers is nothing more than the successive escalation of the imposition of tariffs and special levies on original products and manufactured goods from the countries in confrontation. This, in economic figures, means that the US imposed in 2018 special tariffs on US$250 billion of imported Chinese products (out of a total of US$539 billion), while China for its part imposed tariffs on 110 out of US$120 billion of US import products [1]. These tariffs meant an increase of US$3 billion in additional taxes for American consumers and businesses. This analysis is therefore intended to explain and show the position and future of the European Union in this trade war in a general way.

This small reminder of the figures illustrates the magnitude of the challenge to global Economics posed by this clash between the world's two economic locomotives. It is not China that is paying the tariffs, as Trump literally said on May 9 during a meeting with journalists [2], but the reality is much more complex, and, evidently, as in the case of the inclusion of Huawei in the trade blacklist (and therefore the prohibition to purchase any item on US soil, whether hardware or software, without a prior agreement with the Administration), which may affect more than 1.200 American companies and hundreds of millions of customers globally, according to the BBC [3], the economic war may soon start to be a great burden for Economics globally. On June 2, Pierre Moscovici, European Commissioner for Economic Affairs, predicted that if the confrontation continues, both China and the USA could lose between 5 and 6 tenths of GDP, stressing in particular that "protectionism is the main threat to world growth" [4].

As can be inferred from Moscovici's words, the trade war is not only of concern to the countries directly involved in it, but is closely followed by other actors in international politics, especially the European Union.The European Union is the largest Single Market in the world, this being one of the premises and fundamental pillars of the EU's very existence. But it is no longer focused on internal trade, but is one of the major trading powers for exports and imports, being one of the main voices advocating healthy trade relations that are of mutual benefit to the different economic actors at global and regional level. This openness to business means that 30% of the EU's GDP comes from foreign trade and makes it the main player when it comes to doing import and export business. To illustrate briefly, agreement to data from the European Commission [5] in the last year (May 2018-April 2019), the EU made imports worth €2,022 billion (a growth of 7%) and exported 4% more, with a total of €1,987 billion. The trade balance is therefore a negative balance of €35 billion, which, due to the large import/export Issue and the nominal GDP of the EU (taking the figure of 18.8 trillion euros) is only 0.18% of the EU's total GDP. The USA was the main place of export from the EU, while China was the first place of import. These data are revealing and interesting: an important part of EU Economics depends on business with these two countries and a bad performance of their Economics could weigh down the EU member countries' own.

Another figure that illustrates the importance of the EU in subject of trade is that of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In 2018, 52% of global FDI came from countries within the European Union and the EU received 38.5% of total investment worldwide, leading in both indicators. Therefore, it can be said that the current trade war can pose a serious problem for the future European Economics , but, as we will see below, the Union can emerge strengthened and even benefit from this status if it manages to mediate well between the difficulties, businesses and strategies of the two countries. But let us first look at the EU's relations with both the US and China.

The US-EU relationship has traditionally been (albeit with ups and downs) the strongest in the international sphere. The United States is the European Union's main ally in defense, politics, Economics and diplomacy, and vice versa. They share the economic, political and cultural model , as well as the main world collective defense organization, NATO. However, in the so-called transatlantic relationship, there have always been clashes, accentuated in the recent times of the Obama Administration and usual with Trump. With the current Administration, not only have there been reproaches to the EU within NATO (regarding the failure of member countries to invest the required budget ; shared criticism with the United Kingdom), but a full-fledged tariff war has begun.

In barely two years we have gone from the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) negotiations, the announced basis for trade in the 21st century that finally failed in the final stages of Obama's term in the White House, to the current status extreme protectionism of the USA and the EU's response. Particularly illustrative is the succession of events that have taken place in the last year: at the stroke of Twitter, in March 2018 the US unilaterally imposed global tariffs on steel (25%) and aluminum (10%) to protect American industry [6]. These tariffs did not only affect China, they also inflicted great damage on companies in European countries such as Germany. Tariffs of 25% on European vehicles were also in the air. After a harsh climate of mutual reproaches, on July 25, Jean Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, announced with Trump an agreement to lower tariffs on agricultural products and services, and the US committed itself to review the imposition of metallurgical tariffs on the EU, as well as to support within the World Trade Organization the European calls for a reform of Intellectual Property laws, which China does not respect [7]. However, after the reiteration of the transatlantic friendship and Trump's advertisement of "we are moving towards zero tariffs" [8], soon the clattering of the cash registers began again. In April of this year, on April 9, Trump announced on Twitter the imposition of tariffs on the EU worth US$11 billion for the EU's support to Airbusskill of the American companies Boeing, Lockheed Martin...), blowing up the principle of agreement of July last year. The EU, for its part, threatened to impose tariffs of €19 billion for US state support to Boeing. As can be seen, the EU, despite its traditional conciliatory role and often subjugated to the US, has decided to fight back and not to allow any more outbursts of tone from the American side. The latest threat, in mid-July, is against French wine (and due to the European mechanism, against all wines of European origin, including Spanish wines). This threat has been described as "ridiculous" [9], since the USA consumes more wine than it produces (it is the world's largest consumer) and therefore the available supply could be considerably reduced.

It is still too early to see the real impact that the trade war is having on the US, beyond the 7.4% drop in US exports to China [10] and the damage that consumers are suffering, but the Nobel Prize winner in Economics Robert Schiller, in an interview for CNBC [11] and the president of the World Trade Organization, Roberto Azevedo, for the BBC, have already expressed their fears that if the status and protectionist policies continue as they are, we could be facing the biggest economic crisis since the end of World War II. It is difficult to elucidate what the future relationship between Europe and its main export partner , the US, will be like. All indications are that friction and escalation will continue if the US Administration does not decide to tone down its rhetoric and actions against free trade with Europe. Finally, it must be clear (and with the intention of lowering the sometimes excessively alarmist tone of the news) that between the threats (either by Twitter or spokespersons) from both sides and the actual imposition of tariffs (in the US after the relevant advertisement from the Office of the US Trade Representative; in the EU through the approval of the 28) there is a long way to go, and we must not confuse potential acts and facts. It is clear that despite the harsh tone, the negotiating teams on both sides of the Atlantic are still in contact and are trying to avoid as far as possible actions detrimental to both sides.

On the other hand, the relationship between China and Europe is frankly different from the one with the US. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (which Italy has formally joined) confirms China's bid to be the next leader in global Economics . Through this initiative, President Xi Jinping aims to redistribute and speed up trade flows to and from China by land and sea. To this end, the stability of South Asian countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan is vital, as is the ability to control vital maritime traffic points such as the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. The Asian "dragon" has an internal status that favors its growth (6.6% of its GDP in 2018 which, being the worst figure for 30 years, is still an overwhelming figure), as the relative efficiency of its authoritarian system and, especially, the great support of the State to companies boost its growth, as well as possessing the largest foreign currency reserves, especially dollars and euros, which allow a great stability of the country's Economics . The Chinese currency, the Renminbi, has been declared a world reservation currency by the IMF, which is another indicator of the good health that the Chinese Economics is expected to enjoy in the future.

For the EU, China is a competitor, but also a strategic partner and a negotiating partner [12]. China is the EU's main import partner , accounting for 20.2% of imports (€395 billion) and 10.5% of exports (€210 billion). The Issue of imports is such that, although the vast majority reach the European continent by sea, there is a railway connection that, under the BRI, links the entire Eurasian continent, from China's manufacturing capital, Yiwu, and the last stop at the southern tip of Europe, Madrid. Although some of the imports are still so-called "low-end" goods, i.e. products of basic manufacture and cheap unit price, since China's entrance the WTO in December 2001, the concept of material produced in China has changed radically: the great abundance of rare earths in Chinese territory, together with the progress in its industrialization and investment in new technologies (in which China is a leader) have meant that China is no longer thought of only as a mass producer of bazaars; on the contrary, the majority of EU imports from China were machinery and high-end, high-tech products (especially telecommunications and data processing equipment).

In the aforementioned press statement of the European Commission, China is warned to comply with the commitments made in the Kyoto Protocols and Paris Agreements regarding greenhouse gas emissions; and urges the Asian country to respect the dictates of the WTO, especially with subject to technology transfer, state subsidies and illegal practices such as dumping.

These aspects are vital for economic relations with China. At a time when most countries in the world signed or are part of the Paris Agreements for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, while the EU is making efforts to reduce its pollution (closing coal plants and mines; putting special taxes on energy obtained from non-renewable sources...), China, which totals 30% of global emissions, increased in 2018 by 3% its emissions. This, beyond the harmful effects for the climate, has industrial and economic benefits: while in Europe industries are narrowing their profit margins due to the rise in energy prices; China, which is fueled by coal, provides cheaper energy to its companies, which, without active restrictions, can produce more. An example of how the climate affects economic relations with China is the recent advertisement [13] by AcerlorMittal to reduce its total steel production in Europe by 3 million tons (out of 44 million tons of usual production) due to high electricity costs and increased imports from countries outside the EU (especially China) which, with overproduction, are lowering world prices. This internship, which is especially used in China, consists of flooding the market with an overproduction of a certain product (this overproduction is paid for with government subsidies) to lower prices. As of December 2018, in the last 3 years, the EU has had to impose more than 116 sanctions and anti-dumping measures against Chinese products [14]. Which sample that, despite the EU's attempts to negotiate on mutually satisfactory terms, China does not comply with the stipulations of the agreements with the EU and the WTO. Particularly thorny is the problem with government-controlled companies (a ban on 5G networks in Europe, controlled by Chinese providers, is being considered for security reasons), which have a virtual monopoly inside the country; and above all, the distorted reading of legality by the Chinese authorities, who try to use all possible mechanisms in their favor, making it difficult or hindering direct investment of foreign capital in their country, as well as imposing requirements (the need to have Chinese partners, etc.) that hinder the international expansion of small and medium-sized companies. However,

The biggest friction with the EU, however, is the forced transfer of technology to the government, especially by companies of strategic products such as hydrocarbons, pharmaceuticals and the automotive industry [15], imposed by laws and conditio sine qua non companies cannot land in the country. This creates a climate of unfair skill and direct attack on international trade laws. The direct investment of Chinese capital in critical industries and producers in the EU has caused voices to be raised calling for greater control and even vetoes on these investments in certain areas for Defense and Security issues. The lack of protection of intellectual rights or patents are also important points of complaint by the EU, which aims to create through diplomacy and international organizations a favorable climate for the promotion of equal trade relations between the two countries, as reflected in the various European guidelines and plans on topic.

As we have seen, the trade war is not only limited to the US and China, but third parties are suffering from it and even actively participating in it. The question arises here: can the EU benefit in any way and avoid a new crisis? Despite the pessimistic mood, the EU can derive multiple benefits from this trade war if it manages to maneuver properly and avoid as far as possible further tariffs against its products and keeps the market open. If the trade war continues and the positions of the US and China harden, the EU, as a major partner of both, could benefit from a redistribution of trade flows. Thus, to avoid the loss due to tariffs, both China and the US could sell heavily taxed products to the European market, but especially import products from Europe. If an agreement is reached with the US to lift or minimize tariffs, the EU would find itself facing a huge market niche left by Chinese products vetoed or taxed in the US. The same in China, especially in the automotive sector, from which the EU could benefit by selling to the Chinese market. Alicia Garcia-Herrero, of the Belgian think tank Bruegel, states that the benefit for Europe will only be possible if it does not lean towards any of the contenders and remains economically neutral [16]. It also stresses, like the European Commission, that China must adopt measures to guarantee its reciprocity and market access, since the European Union still has a greater business and investment Issue with the USA, so that the Chinese offer should be highly attractive for European producers to consider directing products to China instead of the USA. The UN itself estimates at US$70 billion the benefits that could be absorbed by the EU thanks to the trade war [17]. Definitely, if the right measures are taken and the 28 draw up an adequate road map, the EU could benefit from this war, without forgetting that, as the EU itself advocates, coercive measures are not the solution to the trade problem, and hopes that, due to their ineffectiveness and damage caused to both consumers and producers, the tariff war will come to an end and, if differences persist, they will be resolved in the WTO Appellate Body or in the Permanent Court of Arbitration of the United Nations.

This trade war is a highly complex and nuanced topic ; this analysis has attempted to address many of the aspects, data and problems faced by the European Union in this trade war. It has been generally analyzed what the trade war consists of, as well as the relations between the EU, China and the USA. We are facing a gray future, with the possibility of multiple and quick turns (especially on the part of the US, as seen after the G20 summit in Osaka, after which it has allowed the sale of components to Huawei, but has not removed the company from its blacklist) and from which, if the requirements and conditions set out above are met, the EU will definitely benefit, not only economically, but if it remains united and making a common front, it will be an example of negotiation and economic freedom for the whole world.

REFERENCES

Thomas, D. (14-5-2019) Who loses in the China-US trade war. BBC. Retrieved from.

Blake, A. (9-5-2019) Trump's rambling, disappointing Q&A with reporters, annotated. The Washington Post. Retrieved from.

3. Huawei: US blacklist will harm billions of consumers (29-5-2019) BBC. Retrieved from

4. EU warns China and the US: a trade war would subtract 0.6 points of GDP(3-6-2019) El Confidencial. Retrieved from

5. European Union Trade Statistics. (18-6-2019) European Commission.Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/eu-position-in-world-trade/statistics/

6. Pozzi, S. (2-3-2018) Trump reaffirms protectionism by raising tariffs on imported steel and aluminum. El País (New York correspondent)Retrieved from.

7. Inchaurraga, I. G. (2013). China and GATT (1986-1994): Causes and consequences of the failure of a negotiation. Cizur Menor, Navarra: Aranzadi. pp. 204-230.

8. Tejero, M. (25-7-2018) EU-USagreement : "zero tariffs" on industrial goods; more soybeans and liquefied gas. El Confidencial. Retrieved from

9. Pardo,P. & Villaécija, R. (17-6-2019) Trump threatens Spanish wine. El Mundo. Retrieved from.

10. A quick guide to US-China Trade War (14-5-2019) BBC. Retrieved from

11. Rosenfeld, E. & Soong, M. (25-3-2018) Nobel-winner Robert Shiller warns of an 'economic crisis' from trade war threats. CNBC. Retrieved from.

12. EU reviews relations with China and proposes 10 actions(12-3-2019) European Commission- Press statement .

13. Asturias takes 23% of Arcelor's new EU production cut(6-5-2019) 5 Días Retrieved from.

14. Morales, R. (26-12-2018) EU increased 28.3% its antidumping measures in 3 years: WTO. El Economista Mexico. Retrieved from

15. Warning about forced technology transfer to Chinese government.(20-5-2019) Infobae. Retrieved from

16. García-Herrero, A.; Guardans, I. & Hamilton, C. (28-6-2018) Trade War Trinity: analysis of global consequences. Bruegellecture). Retrieved from.

17. European Union, the big beneficiary of the trade war between China and the U.S.(4-2-2019) UN News . Retrieved from

[Bruno Maçães, Belt and Road. A Chinese World Order. Penguin. Gurgaon (India), 2019. 227p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

Having covered the moment of literature devoted to present the novelty of the Chinese New Silk Road project , Bruno Maçães leaves aside many of the specific concretions of the Chinese initiative to deal with its more geopolitical aspects. This is why Maçães uses the name Belt and Road throughout the book, instead of its acronyms - OBOR (One Belt, One Road) or the more recently used BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) - because he is not so much referring to the layout of the transport connections as to the new world order that Beijing wants to shape.

Through this economic integration, according to Maçães, China could project power over two thirds of the world, including Central and Eastern Europe, in a process of geographic cohesion of Eurasia to which this Portuguese politician and researcher has already dedicated his previous work.

Compared to other essays on the New Silk Road, this one focuses a lot on India (this is the case in its general content, but also in this review we have used a special edition dedicated to that country, with a particular introduction).

Maçães grants India the role of core topic in the Eurasia integration project . If India decides not to participate at all and, instead, to go for the alternative promoted by the United States, together with Japan and Australia, then the Chinese design will not reach the dimension desired by Beijing. "If India decides that life in the Western order will be better than under alternative arrangements, the Belt and Road will have difficulty achieving its original ambition," the author says.

Maçães believes, however, that the West is not all that attractive to the subcontinent. In that Western order, India can only aspire to a secondary role, while the rise of China "offers it the exciting possibility of a genuinely multipolar, rather than merely multilateral, world in which India can legitimately hope to become an autonomous center of geopolitical power," at least on a par with a declining Russia.

Despite these apparent advantages, India will not go all the way to either side, Maçães predicts. "It will never join the Belt and Road because it could only agree to join China in a project that was new. And it will never join a US initiative to rival the Belt and Road unless the US makes it less confrontational." So, "India will keep everyone waiting, but it will never make a decision on the Belt and Road".

Without Delhi's participation, or even more, with resistance from the Indian leadership, neither the US nor China's vision can be fully realized internship, Maçães continues to argue. Without India, Washington may be able to preserve its current model of alliances in Asia, but its ability to compete on the scale that the Belt and Road does would collapse; for its part, Beijing is realizing that it alone cannot provide the financial resources needed for the ambitious project.

Maçães warns that China has "ignored and disdained" India's positions and interests, which may end up being "a major miscalculation". He believes that China's impatience to start building infrastructure, because of the need to demonstrate that its initiative is a success, "may become the worst enemy".

He ventures that the Chinese may correct the shot. "It is likely - perhaps even inevitable - that the Belt and Road will grow increasingly decentralized, less China-centric," he says, commenting that in the end such a new Chinese order would not be so different from the structure of the existing Washington-led world order, where "the US insists on being recognized as the state at the apex of the hierarchy of international power" and leaves some autonomy to each regional power.

While Maçães places India in a non-aligned status plenary session of the Executive Council, he does foresee an unequivocal partnership between India and Japan. In his view it is a "symbiotic" relationship, in which India sees Japan as its first source of technology, while Japan sees the Indian navy as "an indispensable partner in its efforts to contain Chinese expansion and safeguard freedom of navigation" in the region's seas.

As for Europe, Maçães sees it in the difficult position "of not being able to oppose an international economic integration project , while being equally incapable of joining as a mere participant" in the Chinese initiative, in addition to the germ of division that the project has already introduced into the European Union.

From Bangladesh to Pakistan and Djibouti

Despite the differences indicated above, Maçães believes that the relationship between China and India can develop positively, even if there is some element of latent conflict, encouraged by a certain mutual distrust. The commercial linkage of two such immense markets and production centers will generate economic ties "called to dominate" world Economics by the middle of this century.

This movement of goods between the two countries will make Bangladesh and Myanmar the center of a major trade corridor.

For its part, Pakistan, in addition to being a corridor for the exit to the Indian Ocean from western China, will be increasingly integrated into the Chinese production chain. In particular, it can supply raw materials and basic manufactures to the textile industry that China is developing in Xinjiang, its export gateway to Europe for goods that can optimize rail transport. The capital of that province, Urumqi, will become the fashion capital of Central Asia in the next decade, agreement to Maçães' forecast.

Another interesting observation is that the shrinking of Eurasia and the development of internal transport routes between the two extremes of the supercontinent may lead to the North Sea container ports (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hamburg) losing weight in the trade between Europe and China at the expense of a greater transit of those in the Mediterranean (Piraeus, in particular).

The author also ventures that Chinese infrastructure works in Cameroon and Nigeria can help facilitate connections between these countries and Doralé, the port that China manages in Djibouti, which, through these trans-African routes, could become "a serious rival" to the Suez Canal.

If in Djibouti China has its first, and for the moment only, military base outside its territory, it should be kept in mind that Beijing can give a possible military use to other ports whose management it has assumed. As Maçães reminds, China approved in 2016 a legal framework that obliges civilian companies to support military logistics operations requested by the Chinese Navy.

All these are aspects of a suggestive book that does not allow itself to be carried away by the determinism of China's rise, nor by an antagonistic vision that denies the possibility of a new world order. The work of a European who, although he served in the Portuguese Foreign Ministry as director General for Europe, is realistic about the weight of the EU in the design the world.

▲ The Forbidden City, in Beijing [MaoNo].

ESSAY / Jakub Hodek

To fully grasp the complexities and peculiarities of Chinese domestic and foreign affairs, it is indispensable to dive into the underlying philosophical ideas that shaped how China behaves and understands the world. Perhaps the most important value to the Chinese is stability. Particularly when one considers the share of unpleasant incidents they have fared.

Climatic disasters have resulted in sub-optimal harvest and could also entail the loss of important infrastructure costing thousands of lives. For instance, the unexpected 2008 Sichuan earthquake resulted in approximately 80,000 casualties. Nevertheless, the Chinese have shown resilience and have been able to continue their day-to-day with relative ease.[1] Still, nature was not the only enemy. Various nomadic tribes such as the Xiong Nu presented a constant threat to the early Han Empire, who were forced to reinvent themselves to protect their own. [ 2] These struggles only amplified their desire for stability.

All philosophical ideologies rooted in China highlight the benefits of stability over the evil of chaos.[3] In fact, Legalism, Daoism and Confucianism still shape current social and political norms. This is unsurprising as the Chinese interpret stability as harmony and the best means to achieve development. This affirmation is cultivated from birth and strengthened on all societal levels.

Legalism affirms that "punishment" trumps "rights". Thus, the interest of few must be sacrificed for the good of the many.[4] This translates to phenomenons present in modern China such as censorship of average outlets, autocratic teachers, and rigorous laws to protect "state secrets". Daoism attests to the existence of a cosmological order that determines events.[5] Manifestations of this can be seen in fields of Chinese traditional medicine that deals with feng shui or the flows of energy. Confucianism puts stability as an antecedent of a forward momentum and regulates the relationship between the individual and society.[6] From the Confucianism stems a norm of submission to parental expectations, and the subjugation and blind faith to the Communist Party.

It follows that non-Sino readers of Chinese affairs must consider these philosophical roots when analyzing current Chinese events. Seen through that lens, actions such as Xi Jinping declaring stability as an "absolute principle that needs to be dealt with using strong hands[7]," initiatives harshly targeting corrupt Party members, increased censorship on average outlets and the widespread reinforcement of nationalism should not come as a surprise. One needs power to maintain stability.

Interestingly, it seems that this level of scrutiny over the daily lives of average Chinese people has not incited negative feelings towards the Communist Party. One of the explanations behind these occurrences might be attributed to the collectivist vision of society that the Chinese individuals possess. They strongly prefer social harmony over their own individual rights. Therefore, they are willing to trade their privacy to obtain heightened security and homogeneity.  

Of course, this way of living contrasts starkly with developed Western societies who increasingly value their individual rights. Nonetheless, the Chinese in no way fell their values to be inferior to the Western ones. They are prideful and portray a sense of exceptionalism when presenting their socioeconomic developments and societal order to the rest of the world. This is not to say that, on occasion, the Chinese have been known to replicate certain foreign practices in an effort to boost their geopolitical presence and economic results. 

In relation to this subtle sense of superiority shared by the Chinese, it is important to analyze the political conditionality of engaging with the People's Republic of China (PRC) through economic or diplomatic relations. Although the Chinese government representatives have stated numerous times that, when they establish ties with foreign countries, they do not wish to influence partner realities of their recent partner, there are numerous examples that point to the contrary. One only has to look at their One China policy which has led many Latin American countries to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. In a way, this is understandable as most countries zealously protect their vision of the world. As such, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) strategically establishes economic ties with countries harbouring resources they need or that are in need of infrastructure that they can provide. The One Belt One Road initiative represents the economic arm of this vision while their recent increased diplomatic activity, especially in Africa and Latin America, the political one. In short, the People's Republic of China wants to be at the forefront of geopolitics in a multipolar world lacking clear leadership and certainty, at least in the opinion various experts.

One explanation behind this desire for being at the centre stage of international politics hides in the etymology of their own country's name. The term "Middle Kingdom" refers to the Chinese "Zhongguó", where the first character "zhong" means "center" or "middle" and "guó" means "country", "nation" or "kingdom".[8] The first record of this term, "Zhongguó," can be found in the Book of Documents ("Shujing"), which is one of the Five Classics of ancient Chinese literature. It is a piece which describes ancient Chinese figures and, in some measure, serves as a basis of the Chinese political philosophy, especially Confucianism. Although the Book of Documents dates back to 4th Century A.D., it wasn't until the beginning of the 20th Century when the term "Zhongguó" became the official name of China.[9] While it is true that the Chinese are not the only country that believes they have a higher calling to lead others, China is the only nation whose name uses such a concept.

Such deep-rooted concepts as "Zhongguó", strongly resonates within the social fabric of Chinese modern society and implies a vision of the world order where China is at the center and leading countries both to the East and West. This vision is embodied in Xi Jinping, the designated "core" leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), who is decisively dictating the tempo of China's effort to direct the country on the path of national rejuvenation. In fact, at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2017, Xi Jinping's speech was centered around the need for national rejuvenation. An objective and a date were set out: "By 2049, China's comprehensive national power and international influence will be at the forefront."[10] In other words, China aims to restore its status as the Middle Kingdom by the year 2049 and become a leading world power.

The full-fleshed grand strategy can be found in "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in a New Era," a document that is now part of China's constitution and it's as important of a doctrine as Mao Zedong's political theories or anything the CCP's has previously put forth. The Chinese are approaching these objectives promptly and efficiently and, as they have proven in the past, they are capable of great achievements when resources are available. Sure enough, the world is already experiencing Xi Jinping's policies. Recently, Beijing has opted to invest in increased international presence to exert their influence and vision. Starting with continued emphasis on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), massive modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and aggressive foreign policy.

The migration and political crisis in Europe and Trump's isolationism have given China sufficient space to jump on the international stage and set in motion a new global order, albeit without the will to dynamite the existing one. Xi Jinping managed to renew a large part of the members of CCP's executive bodies and left the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China notably reinforced. He did everything possible to have political capital to push the economic and diplomatic reforms to drive China to the promised land.

Another issue that is given China an opportunity to steal the spotlight is climate change. Especially, after the United States pulled out from the Paris Agreement in June 2017. Last January, Xi Jinping chose the Davos World Economic Forum to show that his country is a solid and reliable partner. Leaning on an economy with clear signs of stability and growth of around 6.7%, many who had predicted its spiralling fall had to listen as the President presented himself as a champion of free trade and the fight against global warming. After expressing his full support for the agreements reached against the emissions of gases at the climate summit held in Paris in 2016, Xi announced the will of "the Middle Kingdom" to guide the new economic globalization.

President Xi plans to achieve his vision with a two-pronged approach. First, a wide-ranging promotion abroad of "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in a New Era." This is an unknown strategy to the Chinese as there is no precedent of the CCP's ideas being promoted abroad. However, Xi views Western liberal democracy as an impediment to China's rise and wants to offer an alternative in the form of Chinese socialism, which he perceives as practically and theoretically superior. The Chinese model of governing provides a way to catch up with the developed nations and avoid the regression to modern age colonialism.[11] This could turn out to be an attractive proposal to developing nations who might just be lured by China's "benevolent" governance and "generosity" in the form of low-interest loans. Second, Xi wants to further develop and modernize the PLA so that it is capable to ensure national security and maintain Chinese positions in areas where their foreign policy has become more assertive (not to say aggressive) such as in the South China Sea.[12] Confirming that both strong military and economic sustainability are essential to achieve the strategic goal of becoming the centre of their proposed global order by 2049.

If one desires to understand China today, one must look carefully at its origin. What started off as an isolated nation turned out to be a dormant giant that was only waiting to get its home affairs in order before it went for the rest of the world. If there is any lesson behind recent Chinese actions across the political and socioeconomical spectrum is that they want to live up to their name and be at the forefront of the world. This is not to say that they wish an implosion of the current world order although it is clear they are willing to use force if need be. It merely implies that they believe their philosophical ideologies to be at least as good as those shared in Western societies while not forgoing what they find useful from them: free trade, service-based economy, developed financial markets, among other things. As things stand, China is sure to make some friends along the way. Especially in developing regions that might be tempted by their tremendous economic success in the last decades and offers of help "with no strings attached." These realities imply that we live in a multipolar which is increasingly heterogenous in connection to values and references that rule it. Therefore, understanding Chinese mentality will prove essential to understand the future of geopolitics.  

After four years of military board , the upcoming elections open the possibility of returning to a legitimacy that has been too often interrupted by coups d'état.

Thailand has known several coups d'état and attempts to return to democracy in its recent history. The military board that seized power in 2014 has called elections for March 24. The unsuccessful desire of King Maha Vajiralongkorn's sister to run for the prime minister's post has drawn global attention to a political system that fails to address the political aspirations of Thais. 

▲ Bangkok street scene [Pixabay].

article / María Martín Andrade

Thailand is one of the fastest developing ASEAN countries in economic terms. However, this progress is encountering a difficult obstacle: the political instability that the country has been dragging along since the beginning of the 20th century and that opens a new chapter now, in 2019, with the elections that will take place on March 24. These elections mark a before and after in recent Thai politics, after in 2014, General Prayut Chan-Ocha staged a coup d'état and became Prime Minister of Thailand heading the NCPOcommittee Nationalcommittee for Peace and Order), the governing board constituted to run the country.

However, there are many who are skeptical about this new entrance of democracy. To begin with, the elections were initially set for February 24, but shortly thereafter the government announced a change of date and called them for a month later. Some have expressed suspicions about a strategy to prevent the elections from taking place, since, according to the law, they cannot be held after one hundred and fifty days from the publication of the last ten organic laws. Others fear that the NCPO has given itself more time to buy votes, while commenting on concerns that the Election Commission, which is an independent administration, may be manipulated to achieve a success that the military board will find difficult to ensure.

Focusing this analysis on what the future holds for Thai politics, it is necessary to look back at its trajectory over the last century to realize that it follows a circular path.

Coups d'état are nothing new in the country (1). There have been twelve since the first Constitution was signed in 1932. Everything responds to a never-ending struggle between the "military wing", which sees constitutionalism as a Western import that does not fit in with the Thai Structures (it also defends nationalism and venerates the image of the king as a symbol of the nation), and the "leftist orbit", which sees constitutionalism as a Western import that does not fit in with the Thai Structures (it also defends nationalism and venerates the image of the king as a symbol of the nation, Buddhist religion and ceremonial life), and the "leftist orbit", originally composed of Chinese and Vietnamese emigrants, which perceives the institutionalism of the country as similar to that of "pre-revolutionary China" and which throughout the 20th century expressed itself through guerrilla warfare. To this latter ideology must be added the student movement, which since the early 1960s has criticized "Americanization", poverty, the traditional order of society and the military regime.

With the urban boom that began in the 1970s, the gross domestic product increased fivefold and the industrial sector became the fastest growing sector, thanks to the production of technological goods and the investments that Japanese companies began to make in the country. During this period there were coups d'état, such as the one in 1976, and numerous student demonstrations and guerrilla actions. After the 1991 coup and new elections, a discussion was opened on how to create an efficient political system and a society adapted to globalization.

These efforts were cut short when the economic crisis of 1997 came along, which generated divisions and aroused rejection of globalization as the evil force that had brought the country to misery. It is at this point that someone entered the scene who has since been a core topic in Thai politics and who will undoubtedly mark the March elections: Thaksin Shinawatra.

Shinawatra, an important businessman, created the Thai Rak Thai (Thai ama Thai) party as a nationalist reaction to the crisis. In 2001 he won the elections and bet on economic growth and the creation of large companies, but at the same time exercised intense control over the media, attacking those who dared to criticize him and allowing only positive news to be published. In 2006 there was a coup to overthrow Shinawatra, who was accused of serious corruption offenses. However, Shinawatra won the elections again in 2007, this time with the People Power Party.

In 2008 there was another uprising, but the Shinawatra brand, represented by the sister of the former Prime Minister, won the elections in 2011, this time with the Pheu Thai party. Yingluck Shinawatra thus became the first woman to preside over the Thai government. In 2014 another coup removed her and installed a board that has ruled until now, with a speech based on the fight against corruption, the protection of the monarchy, and the rejection of electoral politics, considered as the national epidemic.

In this context, the entire effort of the board, which is running in March under the name of the Palang Pracharat party, has been focused on weakening Pheu Thai and thus wiping any remaining traces of Shinawatra off the map. To achieve this, the board has proceeded to reform the electoral system (in 2016 a new Constitution replaced the 1997 one), so that the Senate is no longer elected by the citizens.

In spite of all the efforts made in vote buying, the possible manipulation of the Election Commission and the reform of the electoral system, it is felt that Thai society can make its voice heard as it is tired of the military government, which is also losing support in Bangkok and in the south. Added to this is the collective conviction that, rather than pursuing economic growth, the board has focused on achieving stability by making Thailand' s Economics more unequal, according data Credit Suisse. For the same reason, the other parties running in these elections, Prachorath, Pheu Thai, and Bhumjaithai, agree that Thailand has to be re-integrated into the global skill and that the capitalist market has to grow.

At the beginning of February the context became even more complicated when Princess Ulboratana, the sister of the current king, Maha Vajiralongkorn, presentation her candidacy in the elections as a representative of the Thai Raksa Chart party, allied with Thaksin Shinawatra. This news was a great anomaly, not only because of the fact that a member of the monarchy showed his intention to participate actively in politics, something that had not happened since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932, but also because all the coups that have taken place in the country have had the backing of the royal family. The last one, in 2014, had the blessing of the then King Bhumibol. Likewise, the royal family has always had the support of the military board.

In order to avoid a confrontation that would damage the monarchy, the king reacted quickly and publicly rejected his sister's candidacy; finally the Electoral Commission decided to withdraw her from the election process.

Poor governance

In recent years, the military board has been a manager of bad governance, of the country's weak institutional framework and of an Economics threatened by international sanctions that seek to punish the lack of internal democracy.

To begin with, following article 44 of the Constitution proclaimed in 2016, the NCPO has legitimacy to intervene in the legislative, judicial and executive branches under the pretext of protecting Thailand from threats to public order, the monarchy or Economics. This not only precludes any possibility of effective interaction and conflict resolution with other actors, but is an unmistakable feature of an authoritarian system.

It is precisely its characteristics of authoritarian regime, which is how its governmental system can be described, that have made the international community react since the 2014 coup, imposing various sanctions that may seriously affect Thailand. The United States suspended 4.7 million dollars of financial attendance , while Europe has objected to the negotiation of a free trade agreement , because, as Pirkka Tappiola, EU representative to Thailand, has indicated, it will only be possible to establish such an agreement with a democratically elected government. In addition, Japan, the main investor in the country, has started to look for alternative ways, setting up factories in other parts of the region such as Myanmar or Laos.

Faced with the questioning of its management, the board reacted by devoting US$2.7 billion to programs aimed at the poorest sectors of the population, especially farmers, and by investing nearly US$30 billion in the construction of infrastructure in undeveloped areas.

Given that exports account for 70% of Thailand's GDP, the government cannot afford to have the international community at loggerheads. This explains why the board set up a committee to deal with human rights problems reported from abroad, although the goal of the initiative seems to have been more of a publicity stunt.

In the face of a new democratic phase, the board has a strategy. Having put most of its efforts into the creation of new infrastructure, it hopes to open an economic corridor, the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC), with which to turn the three main coastal provinces (Chonburi, Rayong, and Chachoengsao) into special economic zones where industries such as automobiles and aviation will be boosted, and which will be attractive to foreign investment once democratic legitimization has been cleared.

It is difficult to predict what will happen in Thailand in the March 24 elections. Although almost everything speaks of a return to democracy, it remains to be seen how the party created by the military (Pralang Pracharat) will result and how firm it will be in its commitment to a truly honest institutional game. If Thailand wants to continue to grow economically and attract foreign investors again, the military should soon give way to a fully civilian process. It may not be a smooth ride, as democracy is a dress that has so far been a bit of a tight fit for the country.

(1) Baker, C. , Phongpaichit, P. (2005). A History of Thailand. Cambridge, Univeristy Press, New York.

From Soviet aid to degree program with the U.S. to tap asteroid mineral wealth

The arrival of a Chinese spacecraft on the far side of the Moon has brought world public opinion to take a closer look at the Chinese space program, which is more developed than many had imagined. Aided by the Soviets at the beginning, the Chinese have taken the lead in some programs (probably more apparent than real, given certain setbacks), such as the development of a permanent space station of their own, and are competing with the United States in the desire to exploit the mineral wealth of asteroids.

▲ Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center [CNSA].

article / Sebastián Bruzzone [English version] [English version].

The origin of the Chinese space program1 dates back to the beginning of the Cold War, at the height of the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union for the control of international politics. Since 1955, Chairman Mao Zedong had been seeking the respect of the world powers and decided to follow in the footsteps of the neighboring country, the USSR. In March of the following year, the Fifth Academy of the Ministry of National Defense began the development of the first ballistic missile (Chinese Twelve-Year Aerospace Plan). After the launch of Sputnik 1 by the Soviet Union in 1957, Mao turned to the development of a Chinese artificial satellite that would be active in space two years laterproject 581), in an effort materially and financially supported by the Soviet Union. However, in the early 1960s, the USSR withdrew all its economic and technological attendance following Beijing's accusation that the first secretary of the CPSU Central committee , Nikita Khrushchev, was a revisionist and wanted to restore capitalism.

The China National Space Administration (CNSA) is the manager of space programs. The first Chinese manned space flight took place in 2003, with Yang Liwei aboard the Shenzhou 5 spacecraft, which docked with the Tiangong-1 space station. In this way, China became the third nation to send men out of the Earth. The main goal of the Shenzhou missions is the establishment of a permanent space station. To date, nine Chinese men and seven women have gone into space. 


Since 2007, China has shown a special interest in Luna. China's lunar exploration program consists of four phases. In the first (Chang'e 1 and 2), carried out with CZ-3A, two unmanned lunar orbital probes were launched. In the second (Chang'e 3 and 4), in 2013, with CZ-5/E, the first lunar landing of two rovers took place. The third (Chang'e 5 and 6) was executed in 2017 with CZ-5/E, consisting of lunar landing and sample return. The fourth, with CZ-7, is planned for 2024; it will consist of a manned mission statement and the implantation of permanentinstructions on the lunar surface.

The Chang'e 4 mission statement was launched on December 8, 2018, and landed on the lunar surface on January 3, 2019, in the Von Kárman crater (186 kilometers in diameter), in the southern hemisphere of the satellite's hidden side. Images transmitted by the Yutu-2 rover showed that this never-before-explored lunar surface is densely perforated by impact craters and that its crust is thicker than the visible side. As part of a biological essay , a cotton seed could have been sprouted, but high radiation levels, lower-than-Earth gravity, and abrupt temperature changes caused the cotton plant to succumb a few days later. Astronomers believe that the hidden side is shielded from interference from Earth, so it would be possible to better study the evolution of stars and galaxies from there.

In mid-2017, Chinese intentions to search for Earth-scarce minerals on the surface of asteroids, and if possible in their interior, were made public. Within China's space program, this particular topic occupies an important place. agreement to Ye Peijan, top manager of the lunar exploration program, his country has been studying in recent years the possibility of executing a mission statement to capture an asteroid to place it in the Moon's orbit, and thus be able to exploit it for minerals, or even use it as a permanent space station, according to the South China Morning Post. The same manager has pointed out that in the Solar System and near our planet there are asteroids and stars with a large amount of precious metals and other materials. This plan will be implemented starting in 2020. For this purpose, the CNSA will use Tianzhou cargo ships, as opposed to the manned Shenzhou exploration ships, whose main goal to establish a permanent space station, or the Chang'e lunar missions.

The cost of this futuristic plan would be extremely high, as it would involve the organization of complex and high-risk missions, but interest will not wane, as it could be very profitable in the long term and would yield billion-dollar benefits. According to Noah Poponak, an analyst at Goldman Sachs, a single asteroid could have more than $50 billion in platinum, as well as other precious metals and water.

Capturing an asteroid requires, first, that a spacecraft land on its surface, to anchor itself. The spacecraft must have extremely powerful engines so that, when anchored, it will be able to drag the entire asteroid into the Moon's orbit. Such thrusters, powerful enough to move a rock weighing thousands of tons, do not yet exist. Ye Peijan has warned that this technology needed for such a space experience could take 40 years or so to develop. For the time being, in March 2017 China communicated in the official press that it intended to send probes into the cosmos to study trajectories and characteristics of some asteroids. With this, it enters in direct skill with NASA, which is also developing a program aimed at an asteroid.

Tiangong-1 was the first space laboratory that China put into orbit, in 2011, with a length of 10.5 meters, a diameter of 3.4 meters and a weight of 8.5 tons. Its goal was to conduct experiments within the Chinese space program and to launch the permanent station that the CNSA seeks to have in orbit by 2023. Against all odds, in 2016 the digital control of the spacecraft was lost and it ended up destroyed in pieces over the Pacific Ocean, northwest of New Zealand. In the same year of 2016, a second module, Tiangong-2, was launched with the same objectives. On the other hand, China is making progress on the plan to establish a permanent space station. According to Yang Liwei, the central capsule will be launched in 2020 and the two experimental modules in the following two years, with manned missions and cargo spacecraft.

[Bruno Maçães, The Dawn of Eurasia. On the Trail of the New World Order. Allen Lane. Milton Keynes, 2018. 281 pp]

review / Emili J. Blasco

The discussion on the emergence of Eurasia as an increasingly compact reality, no longer as a mere geographical description that was conceptually a chimera, owes much to the contribution of Bruno Maçães; particularly to his book The Dawn of Eurasia, but also to his continuous proselytizing to different audiences. This Portuguese diplomat with research activity in Europe notes the consolidation of the Eurasian mass as a single continent (or supercontinent) to all intents and purposes.

"One of the reasons we have to start thinking about Eurasia is because this is how China is increasingly looking at the world (...) China is already living a Eurasian age," says Maçães. What is new about it, he says, "is not that there are such connections between continents, but that, for the first time, they work both ways. Only when the influence flows in both directions can we speak of an integrated space." The Silk Belt and Road Initiative, especially its overland route, sample that China is no longer looking only to the Pacific, but is also contemplating new routes to Europe.

Maçães urges Europe to adopt a Eurasian perspective, for three reasons: because Russia and China have one; because most of the big foreign policy issues of our time have to do with how Europe and Asia are connected (Ukraine, refugee crisis, energy and trade); and because all the security threats of the coming decades will play out in a Eurasian context. Maçães adds a final reason why Europe should become more actively involved in the Eurasian integration project : it is the way to combat the forces of disintegration that exist within Europe itself.

From the various considerations included in the book, some suggestive ideas could be highlighted. One is that Russia's historical identity problems, straddling Europe and Asia - to see itself as different from the Europeans and at the same time being attracted by the modernity of the West - are now being replicated in the East, where China is on its way to creating a second pole of economic growth and integration in the supercontinent. If Europe is one of the poles and Asia (China and the other successful countries of the Far East) the other, then what is Russia, if it does not fully respond to the European and Asian identities?

The Silk Belt and Road Initiative gives geopolitical importance to Central Asia, as Maçães reviews. Thus, China needs a clear dominance of Xinjiang, its westernmost province and the gateway to the Central Asian republics. The land route to Europe cannot exist without the Xinjinag segment, but at the same time the exhibition of this Uyghur-majority territory to trade and modernization could accentuate its separatist aspirations. Just northwest of Xinjiang is the ex-Soviet republic of Kazakhstan, a vast country of great agricultural value, where Chinese attempts to buy land are being viewed with high suspicion from its capital, Astana. Maçães estimates that if Russia were to try to reintegrate Kazakhstan into its sphere of influence, with the same vehemence it has done with Ukraine, "China would not stand aside."

Not only are the East Coast (European peninsula) and the West Coast (Pacific coast) moving closer together, but the connections between the two also improve logistical conditions in the interior of the supercontinent. This is precisely one of the objectives of the Silk Belt and Road Initiative: as Chinese companies have moved away from coastal business hubs to lower labor costs, they are moving further away from ports and therefore need better land connections, thus contributing to the shrinking of Eurasia.

Beijing accelerates its change of economic strategy as Germany tries to reinvent itself as a manufacturing powerhouse with its 'Industry 4.0'.

From being the big factory of the lowest products in the global price chain to becoming a manufacturing powerhouse appreciated for the added value that China can bring to its production. The 'Made in China 2025' plan is underway with the purpose of bringing about change in a few decades. The Chinese push aims to be countered by Germany with its 'Industry 4.0', to preserve the international recognition of what is produced by German industry.

▲ Huawei booth at Mobile World Congress 2017 [Huawei].

article / Jimena Puga

"Made in China 2025" is a political-economic plan presented by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in May 2015. The main goal of this initiative is to grow China's industry, while encouraging industrial development in China's poorest inland areas, such as Qinghai, Sinkiang and Tibet provinces. One of the goals is to increase the domestic content of basic materials to 40% by 2020 and 70% by 2025.

But what does the People's Republic want to achieve with this initiative? As Mu Rongping, director general of the Innovation and development Center of the Chinese Academy of Science, announced, "I do not believe that the Made in China 2025 plan and other industry-related plans pose a threat to global Economics and innovation. These industrial policies stem from traditional Chinese culture. In China, whenever we establish a new political or economic measure, we always have high expectations. So if we get only half of it, we will be satisfied. This point of view has led China to change and to some extent, to innovation.

Chinese economic development

In 1978 Deng Xiaoping came to power and changed all Maoist Structures . Thus, from an economic perspective, law has become a decisive element in resolving conflicts and maintaining social order in China. Deng tried to establish a socialist system, but with "Chinese characteristics". This justified a free market Economics and, consequently, the obligation to develop new rules and Structures. In addition, the president introduced the concept of democracy as a necessary instrument for the new socialist China. The most important legal reform was the possibility to set up private businesses. In 1992 the expression of a "socialist marketEconomics " was adopted, a label to hide real capitalism (1).

The current president of the People's Republic, Xi Jinping, has said he is against economic protectionism and in favor of balancing globalization to "make it more inclusive and equitable". He also added an increase in the study of current capitalism and the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics proper to the country, since if the party were to abandon Marxism it would lose "its soul and direction", in addition to describing it as "irreplaceable for understanding and transforming the world".

Made in China 2025 and Industry 4.0 plan

Over the past decade, China has emerged as one of the most significant manufacturing miracles in history since the Industrial Revolution began in Britain in the 18th century. By the end of 2012, China became a global leader in manufacturing operations and the world's second largest economic powerhouse over Germany. The Made in China paradigm has been evidenced by products made in China, from high-tech products such as computers or cell phones to consumer goods such as air conditioners. The Center Empire's goal is to extend this plan to three phases. In the first, from 2015 to 2025, China aims to be on the list of global manufacturing powers. In the second, from 2026 to 2035, China plans to position itself in the middle tier in terms of global manufacturing power. And finally, in the third phase, from 2036 to 2049, when the People's Republic will celebrate its 100th anniversary, China wants to become the world's leading manufacturing country.

In 2013, Germany, a world-leading country in terms of industrialization, published its Industry 4.0 strategic plan. Known for its prestigious brands such as Volkswagen or BMW, the country's leading industries have emphasized their innovative strength that allows them to reinvent themselves again and again. The Industry 4.0 plan is another example of the German country's manufacturing strategy to compete in a new industrial revolution based on industrial integration, the integration of industrial information, the Internet and artificial intelligence. Germany is known worldwide for the design and quality of its products. The Industry 4.0 plan, presented in 2013 by the German government, focuses on the smart factory, i.e. making the factories of the future more sustainable and intelligent; on cyber-physical systems, which integrate advanced technologies such as automotive, data exchange in manufacturing technology and 3D printing; and on goods and people.

Both Industry 4.0 and Made in China 2025 focus on the new industrial revolution and employ elements of manufacturing digitalization. The core of the German plan is the cyber-physical system, i.e. a mechanism controlled or monitored by algorithms closely linked to the Internet and its users, and integration into dynamic value creation mechanisms. The Chinese plan, in addition to the "Internet Plus Industry" action plan, has a special goal on consolidating existing industries, promoting diversity and expanding the scope of many industries, enhancing regional cooperation through the use of the Internet for borderless manufacturing, new product innovation and product quality improvement.

By 2020, the United States will be the most competitive manufacturing country in the world, followed by China, Germany, Japan, India, South Korea, Mexico, Taiwan, Canada and Singapore. Of these ten countries, six are Asian countries, one is European and the remaining three are members of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement).

This new shift in industrial strategy translates into the world's anticipation of a fourth industrial revolution driven by technological advances. China will undoubtedly be one of the international leaders of this revolution thanks to the Made in China 2025 and One Belt One Road plans, however, new emerging economies such as South Africa, Vietnam or Hungary that have contributed to global Economics in recent years will require more attention.

(1) Vid. ARANZADI, Iñigo González Inchaurraga, Derecho Chino, 2015, p. 197 et seq.

▲ Buddhist sculpture 'Hands from Hell', from the Watrongkhun White Temple, Thailand [Pixabay].

COMMENTARY / María Martín Andrade

Human trafficking is a global phenomenon affecting the entire planet. However, with 11.7 million victims, Asia-Pacific is currently the main hub of operations for organized crime groups that trade in people. Thanks to favorable conditions - natural disasters and migrant and refugee crises, result in a large issue of displacements across the geography of South Asia - criminal groups are in the best status to operate.

Despite ASEAN's efforts to foster international cooperation among its member countries for an effective fight, regional differences and corruption often prevail over other factors. At other times, it is the governments themselves that benefit from migration flows by facilitating forced labor situations, thus contributing to the fact that Southeast Asia continues to have the highest numbers of victims of sexual and labor exploitation. Most migration in ASEAN countries is intra-regional, with Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand being the main destinations for migrants.

Focus on Thailand

In Thailand, 72% of immigration in 2010 was illegal, and is now estimated to exceed 1 million people, with the majority being from Myanmar and other neighboring countries such as Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. The explanation why Thailand has become a major destination for migrants, and therefore an important playground for human trafficking organizations, lies in the combination of slow population growth, compared to other countries in the region, and high economic development that began to be experienced from the 1990s onwards. According to the ASEAN PostThailand has one of the fastest growing markets among ASEAN members, which has prompted the government to continue working on development its infrastructure, for which immigration is key.

At the beginning of the boom, Thailand recruited immigrants without having legislation to deal with the phenomenon, which resulted in their promoters taking advantage of the status to exploit those who arrived without knowledge of Thai language and laws. It was not until the arrival of the government of businessman Thaksin Shinowatra that a registration system granting temporary permits was introduced. However, when their validity expired, many of these permits were not renewed, thus leaving thousands of workers exposed to illegality and, thus, to sexual exploitation and other class of forced labor in sectors such as agriculture, fishing, domestic services or industry.

On the other hand, the lack of legal regulation of recruitment agencies, to which the Thai government has paid no particular attention, has allowed these agencies to dispose of migrants as they wish without suffering any reprisals. Weak legislation combined with minimal safety conditions for the victims, with only extreme physical abuse being punishable as a criminal offense, creates a status of almost total helplessness for the exploited, who also feel unable to turn to the authorities for fear of being deported.

Human trafficking: challenges and international cooperation

Organized crime in Southeast Asia cannot be tackled without first confronting corruption in the countries themselves, as many officials benefit from facilitating the crossing of their borders by such organizations and illegal immigrants. In addition, the lack of information and intelligence analysis by the law enforcement agencies themselves, together with the difficulties offered by a complicated orography with vast forested and jungle areas that are very difficult to control, hinder investigations and cause the authorities to operate blindly.

With the intention of establishing a common legal basis, several countries in the region have signed the United Nations International Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, with the goal of eliminating legislative differences and providing a means to combat organized crime. However, although Thailand has signed it, along with Singapore and Brunei, it has not yet ratified it. Other solutions have also been proposed by ASEAN, with the creation of Heads of Specialist Strategic Units, whose intention is to promote partnership and cooperation between countries by exchanging information. In addition, a Regional Support Office has been set up to establish guidelines for the prevention, arrest and protection of victims.

Despite the apparent interest of the international sphere, Asia-Pacific countries prefer to be governed by bilateral relations that allow them to be selective in the rules they choose to apply, and cooperation is not possible if the interests of each state are paramount. They will continue to be willing to sign agreements as long as they are not strictly bound by them because, as in the case of Thailand, the concern coming from outside is greater than that perceived domestically.

The fight against human trafficking in Asia-Pacific has a long way to go. The measures adopted cannot be effective if there is no firm intention on the part of the countries involved to put an end to this problem. Human trafficking is the profitability of a harm, a business from which certain dominant sectors benefit, so in order to achieve fruitful international cooperation, the South Asian states would have to perceive it as the scourge it is for their society.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kranrattanasuit, N. (2014). ASEAN and Human Trafficking: Case Studies of Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam. International Studies in Human Rights, Volume:109, 4-104.

Henry, N. (2018). Asylum, Work, and Precarity: Bordering the Asia-Pacific. University of Warwick.

Sansó-Rubert, D. (2011). Transnational Organized Crime in Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional and International Security. University of Santiago de Compostela-CESEDEN, 159-189.