Disputed ethnicity, British colonial-era grievances and fear of a 'fifth columnist' minority

The humanitarian crisis suffered in Myanmar by the Muslim minority Rohingyas also raises strategic issues. With the country surrounded by Islamic populations, certain ruling groups, especially Buddhist elements, fear that the Rohingyas, who are declared foreigners despite having been on their territory for generations, will act as fifth columnists. Fear of jihadist contamination is also invoked by a government that has not respected the human rights of this minority.

▲ Rohingya refugees [Tasnim News Agency/CC].

article / Alexia Cosmello Guisande

In August 2017, what was known as "the great exodus of the Rohingyas" took place in Myanmar; a year later, in 2018, the humanitarian catastrophe taking place in that country reappeared on the front pages of international newspapers. The international community, automatically, came out in favor of the Rohingya minority group . The media talked about the problem, and continue to do so, using populist language, trying to seek the emotion of the public.

The Rohingya story is little known to the public, who are generally unaware of the origin of the conflict and the Burmese government's motives. Currently, the Rohingyas are considered by the UN as "one of the most persecuted minorities in the world". In order to understand the core of the current problem, it is of great importance to make a brief analysis of the history of Myanmar, of the Rohingyas and of the relations between this minority and the country that hosts them.

History

The current state of Myanmar is a real mosaic of ethnicities, languages, religions and insurgent movements. There are 135 different ethnic groups recognized, but approximately 90% of the population is of Buddhist religion, so that the remaining denominations are considered as minorities in the country [1]. Specifically, the Rohingyas are of Muslim religion and more than half of the community is concentrated in the Rakhine or Arakan region, one of the poorest in the country. Here the population is roughly divided between: 59.7% Buddhists, 35.6% Muslims and the remaining 4.7% other religions.

The Muslims of Rakhine are divided into two groups, on the one hand, the Kaman who, despite being of another confession, share customs with the Buddhist population and are recognized and guaranteed citizenship in Myanmar by the Government. On the other hand, the Rohingyas, who are a mixture of different ethnic groups such as Arabs, Mughals and Bengalis. This second group has no recognized nationality or citizenship in the State, since, despite the fact that its members have been in the country for generations, they are still considered illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.

It was between 1974, when the Emergency Immigration Law was issued, and 1982, when the Citizenship Law was passed during the dictatorial period of General Ne Win, that the Rohingyas were declared by law illegal immigrants without the right to citizenship in Myanmar. This law, together with the Government's refusal to separate them into identities, is one of the reasons why the conflict between the authorities and the Rohingyas began. To the conflict must be added the involvement of the military, which tends to instigate confrontation in the region between different ethnic groups.

Because they are stateless, which is in itself a violation of human rights, they lack recognition of other basic rights such as access to work, Education or health care, as well as freedom of movement within their own country. The conflict with this minority community goes beyond religion, as it also affects the political and economic aspects of the group. They are being culturally discriminated against, economically exploited and politically marginalized.

Arguments

To understand the Myanmar government's arguments for denying them citizenship, one must understand the history of the community. In itself, their origin is unclear, which makes their status more complex and controversial. They themselves claim to be indigenous people originally from the region they now inhabit, Rakhine. History does not contradict this, but neither does it confirm it; what there is historical evidence of is that they have been living there for generations. On the one hand, a version of their origin, collected by historian Jasmine Chia, dates the first Muslim settlements in Arakan (former name of Rakhine) during the seventh century; these settlers continued to live in the region until the ninth century, but it was not until the fifteenth century when they settled definitively and formed a community. Versions of local historians contradict the previous version and date the first Rohingya settlements in the nineteenth century when the place was under the colonization of the British Empire, along with India and Bangladesh, so they argue that they were actually settled in Chittagong and with the transit of people and internal exodus migrated to Rakhine. Finally, French historian Jacques P. Leider states that the first time the term "Rohingya" was used was by a British doctor in the 18th century, so even though they were not yet settled in the area at that time, the ethnic group already existed.

World War II is considered to be the origin of the current problem. Japan wanted to invade Burma, so the British Empire decided to arm the Rohingyas to fight against the Japanese. But the group used the weapons provided by the authorities, as well as the techniques they had learned, to defend the country against them. They burned lands and temples of other ethnic groups, mainly Buddhists. In 1944 they pushed the Japanese back, for which the British, who still had control of the area, praised them [2].

In 1948 Burma gained independence from the British Empire, which gave several minorities representing 40% of today's Myanmar the opportunity to arm themselves and rebel against the new political system. Even today parts of the country are still controlled by these groups. Prior to independence, the country's Muslims formed the Muslim Liberation Organization (MLO), which after 1948 was renamed the Mujahid Party. This group is on the list of terrorist groups drawn up by the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC). The Government allowed the removal from the country's terrorist list of those groups that had signed a ceasefire with the State. This implies that the Government allows their free development and investment in these areas in need after years of isolation. In other words, these groups can now move freely around the country and participate in politics. This is not the case for the Rohingyas, who are still considered a group of foreigners and a vehicle for the spread of jihad, agreement to the view of the Myanmar government and Buddhists. In the recent period, the Islamic State has been expanding the Islamic religion narrative internationally, which is why Buddhist monks (Ashin Wirathu) have called Islam a religion that directly threatens the Myanmar state and warn that it is through the Muslim minority that such violent ideas can more easily permeate the country due to the contact of elements of that minority with international terrorist groups.

The Burmese government justifies its actions against the Rohingyas on the grounds that the conflict between the two religions since the period of British colonization may lead to further conflicts. On the other hand, there is fear on the part of the Government, Buddhists and other minorities towards the Rohingyas because of their organizations such as the Arakan Rohingha National Organization or the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, which have an almost direct connection with leaders and/or members of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda or the Taliban.

Buddhists are concerned about the rapid population growth of Muslims, which will possibly lead in the not too distant future to Muslims being in a position to issue the Buddhist community, thus ceasing to be a minority. Linked to this fear is the fact that the country is surrounded by Muslim nations, and according to Buddhists, if there were to be an unexpected invasion of Myanmar by some of these countries, the Rohingyas would fight on behalf of the invaders, as they do not feel part of the country [3].

Resentment

While this fear on the part of the Buddhists and the government itself is understandable, the human rights violations, some of which have led to real humanitarian crises, are not justifiable. In fact, behind the anti-Rohingya attitude, beyond the arguments officially invoked before the international community, there seems to be a historical resentment towards this minority for the burning of temples and land during the colonial era and a fear of open confrontation.

Clearly, a country's history marks its present and its future, and those events of decades ago explain part of what is happening in Myanmar today. While past grievances cannot be forgotten, dragging the desire for revenge from generation to generation is the best recipe for failure as a society or even tragedy. The abused Rohingya children are growing up hating the country in which they reside, which is counterproductive to the government's objectives and feeds back into the fear of one to the reaction of the other.

[1] FARZANA, Kazi Fahmida. Memories of Burmese Rohingya Refugees: Contested Identity and Belonging. "Introduction" (p. 1-40).

[2] ROGERS, Benedict. Burma: A Nation at the Crossroads. Rider Books, 2015

[3] FARZANA, K. F. op. cit. "The Refugee Problem from an Official Account" (p. 59-86).

ANALYSIS / Nerea Álvarez

Relations between Japan and Korea are not easy. The Japanese annexation of the peninsula in 1910 is still very much present in the Korean report . For its part, Japan has a distorted sense of history, the result of having assumed its guilt in the war in a forced way, forced by the punishment suffered in World War II and the US occupation, and not as a result of a process of voluntary assumption of responsibility. All this has led Japan to resist revising its history, especially that of its imperialist era.

One core topic that hinders a sincere reconciliation between Japan and the neighboring countries that were invaded by the Japanese in the first half of the 20th century are the comfort women. This group of women, from China, the Philippines, Myanmar, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam and South Korea (about 80% came from the latter country), are a consequence of Japan's expansion that began in 1910. During this period, Japanese soldiers took approximately 70,000 to 200,000 women to comfort stations where they were sexually abused. These stations continued to operate in Japan until the late 1940s. According to the testimonies of surviving women, Japanese soldiers took them away in various ways: kidnapping, deception and extortion are just a few examples.

According to the testimony of Kim Bok-Dong, one of the surviving women, the Japanese soldiers claimed they had to take her to work in a uniform factory because they did not have enough staff. She was 14 years old at the time. The soldiers promised her mother to return her when she was old enough to marry, and threatened the whole family with exile if her parents did not allow her to leave. She was transported by ferry from Busan to Shimonoseki (Yamaguchi Prefecture, Japan), along with thirty other women. They then took another boat to Taiwan and then to Guangdong province. There they were met by officials, who escorted them into a building where doctors were waiting for them. They examined their bodies and escorted them to their rooms. The women were repeatedly assaulted and raped. After several weeks, many contemplated suicide: "We were much better off dead" (Kim Bok-Dong, 2018). Many died due to the conditions they were subjected to, from disease, killed by Japanese soldiers in the last years of the war, or, if they had the opportunity, by committing suicide. It is estimated that about a quarter to a third of the women survived.

Long process

After the war and despite the facts being known, this dramatic past was relegated to history, without the necessary attention being paid to it. South Korea was not prepared to help these women (and North Korea had gone into absolute isolation). During the 1960s, relations between the ROK and Japan worsened due to the anti-Japanese policies of South Korean political leaders. In 1965, Tokyo and Seoul signed the Normalization Treaty, but it became clear that economic issues were the priority. Bridges of cooperation were built between the two countries, but the emotional conflict prevented and continues to prevent further relations in fields other than economics. Japan continues to claim that the Treaty of Normalization contains the arguments to rule out that these women have the right of standing before international tribunals, even though the text does not mention them.

Things began to change in the 1970s, when the Asian Women's association was formed in Japan and began to shed light on this aspect of recent history. At first, even the Korean government ignored the problem. The main reason was the lack of evidence that the events had occurred, as the Japanese government had ordered the destruction of the compromising documents in 1945. In addition, Japan prevented the South Korean government from claiming additional reparations for damages incurred during the colonial period based on the 1965 treaty.

Southeast Asian culture played an important role in concealing the events that took place. The value of keeping up appearances in the oriental culture took precedence over denouncing situations such as those experienced by these women, who had to remain silent for decades in order not to be repudiated by their families.

When the Republic of Korea became democratic in 1987, the South Korean government began to attach importance to this issue. In 1990, President Roh Tae Woo asked the Japanese government for a list of the women's names, but the response from Tokyo was that the information did not exist because the documents had been destroyed. Socialist leader Motooka Shoji, a member of Japan's upper house of per diem expenses , demanded an investigation, but the parliament claimed that the problem had already been solved by the 1965 Normalization Treaty. In 1991, Kim Hak-Sun, one of the women who survived sexual exploitation, filed the first lawsuit and became the first victim to speak out about her experience. This marked the beginning of the struggle of a group of more than fifty Korean women who demanded recognition of the facts and an official apology from the Japanese government. Since January 8, 1992, "every Wednesday at 12 noon, the victims together with members of the Korean committee and other social groups march in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. The march consists of raising posters demanding justice and forgiveness and expressing their grievances in public".

The Tokyo government denied any involvement in the establishment, recruitment and structuring of the comfort women system from the beginning. Nevertheless, an apology had to be issued from the Cabinet administrative office in 1992, although it was vague and too generic, addressed to all women for acts committed during the war. It was not until that year that the Japanese government acknowledged its involvement in the administration and supervision of these stations. The UNHRC then determined that the Japanese government's actions represented a crime against humanity that violated the human rights of Asian women.

In 1993, Japan admitted to having coercively recruited Korean women. Coercion was a core topic to disprove previous statements that these women were voluntarily engaged in prostitution. Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono stated that "the Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of comfort stations, and in the transfer of comfort women.... who, in many cases, were recruited against their own will." The Government of Japan apologized and regretted what had happened, but there was no compensation for the victims. In 1994, the International Commission of Jurists recommended that Japan pay $40,000 to each survivor. The government wanted to structure a plan to pay the women with non-governmental funds, but the Korean committee for women abducted by Japan as sex slaves, founded in 1990 and composed of 37 institutions, did not allow it.

In 1995, Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi instructions the Asian Women's Fund, which would serve to protect women's rights in Japan and around the world. In international eyes, this organization was seen as an excuse to escape the required legal responsibilities, since public money was raised, making the government's involvement almost imperceptible. In addition, a growing minority opinion of citizens sympathetic to the Japanese right-wing began to make itself heard, calling comfort women 'prostitutes', who did not need to be compensated in any way.

However, monetary compensation is one of the issues that has mattered least to this group of women. Their priority first and foremost is to restore their dignity. The fact that the Japanese government has not become directly involved and does not silence opinions such as those of the right-wing minority is probably what affects them most. Above all, these women are fighting for Tokyo to publicly acknowledge the facts and offer an official apology for what happened.

The UN has continued to take on the role of mediator over the years. We find in several documents belonging to the UNHRC statements urging Japan to resolve the problem. In a document reviewing the organization' s first complaint (February 2, 1996) to the Human Rights committee , Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto replied: "the issue of reparations was settled by peace treaties and the Government will never pay compensation to the victims.

In the document in question, comfort stations were classified as military slavery. Japan responded by denying any subject of legal liability, given the inability to retroactively apply international law at the time, the vagueness of the definition of comfort stations, the non-existence of anti-slavery laws during World War II and the failure of international law to prohibit violations in situations of international conflict. In addition, he argued that the laws existing during the war could only apply to conduct committed by the Japanese military against citizens of a belligerent state, but not against citizens of Korea, since Korea was annexed and was part of Japanese territory.

In 1998, US attorney Gay J. McDougall submitted to the UNHRC a document concluding that the actions taken by the Japanese Armed Forces were crimes against humanity. Later that year, the UN adopted the text and changed the previous definition to rape stations.

Understanding that does not come

Over the years, the problem has only grown and Japanese policy has moved away from a possible path of improving diplomatic relations with its neighbors. This problem of revising history is the basis of the political movements we have seen in Japan since 1945. The reforms imposed by the U.S. occupation and the Tokyo courts played a major role, as did the San Francisco Treaty, signed in 1948. All this has established in the Japanese population a passive acceptance of past history and its responsibilities.

Having been judged in the 1948 courts, the responsibility and guilt that the Japanese bore was believed to have been absolved. On the other hand, the US occupation of the archipelago, taking military control, affected the pride of the citizens. The transformation of Economics, politics, defense and, above all, Education also had its repercussions. Since Japan's democratic beginnings, policy has focused on passive defense, anti-nationalist Education and foreign relations aligned with the interests of American power.

However, following the election of Shinzo Abe, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), as Prime Minister in 2012, numerous changes have been introduced in the country's foreign and domestic policy, with reforms in fields ranging from Economics to Education and defense. Regarding the latter, Abe has focused mainly on reintroducing military force in Japan through an amendment to article 9 of the 1945 Constitution. This shift is due to the party's own ideology, which wants to give Japan a greater weight in international politics. One of the core topic in his government is precisely the position on the controversial topic of comfort women.

In 2015, Shinzo Abe and the President of the Republic of Korea, Park Geun-hye, signed a treaty setting out three goals to be achieved: Japan's official apology, the donation of one billion yen to a South Korean foundation for the benefit of these women, and the removal of the statue in memory of the comfort women erected in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul. This treaty was the greatest achievement in the long process of the conflict, and was received as the solution to so many years of dispute. The first two objectives were achieved, but the controversial statue was not removed from its place. The arrival of President Moon Jae-in in 2017 complicated the full implementation of the agreement. That year, Moon openly criticized the treaty as sidelining the victims and the Korean people in general. His presidency has shifted certain of South Korea's strategic approaches and it is unknown exactly what he wants to achieve with Japan.

agreement pending

What can be concluded is that delaying the solution is not beneficial to either side. Leaving the problem open-ended is frustrating all countries involved, especially Japan. A case in point is the recent breakdown of brotherhood between the cities of San Francisco and Osaka in 2018 due to a statue in the U.S. town depicting victims of this conflict. It features three girls, a Chinese girl, a Korean girl and a Filipino girl, holding hands. Osaka Mayor Hirofumi Yoshimura and his predecessor, Toru Hashimoto, had written letters to their twin city since the resolution to build the memorial was drafted. Also, within the LDP itself, Yoshitaka Sakurada, called this group of women 'prostitutes' in 2016; shortly after the 2015 treaty on this topic was established. This has provoked a negative response to the treaty, as it is believed that Japan is not really seeking reconciliation, but rather to forget the topic without accepting responsibility for it. 

The problem lies in how these countries deal with the dispute. The Republic of Korea, under President Moon, seeks to heal past wounds with new agreements, but Japan only aims to close the issue as soon as possible. Renegotiating a treaty is not the best option for Japan: even if it seeks the best solution for both sides, it would lose out. Should President Moon succeed in reaching a new agreement with Prime Minister Abe to solve the problems of the previous treaty, it would prove that the previous negotiations and the measures taken by Japan in 2015 have failed.

No matter how many apologies the Government of Japan has issued over the years, it has never accepted legal responsibility for its actions regarding comfort women. Until this happens, future scenarios where the discussion is settled cannot be projected. President Moon will renegotiate the treaty with Japan, but the chances of it working out are slim. All indications are that Japan has no intention of renegotiating the treaty or taking a legal position . If they do not reach a solution, relations between the two countries may deteriorate due to the emotional burden of the issue.

The root of the tensions lies in the historical past and its acceptance. Both Moon Jae-in and Shinzo Abe must reevaluate the status with critical eyes in relation to their own countries. Japan must begin to engage with past actions and the ROK must maintain a consistent position and decide what its priorities are regarding comfort women. Only this can enable them to move forward in the search for the best treaty for both.

skill of the two powers to have instructions in the Indian Ocean and to be active in strategic neighboring countries

Rumors of possible future Chinese military use of the Gwadar area (Pakistan), where Beijing already operates a port, have added a great deal of attention in the last year to the rivalry between China and India to secure access to points in the region that would allow them to control the Indian Ocean. India considers this ocean as its own, while for China it is vital to ensure the security of its energy supplies from the Middle East.

▲ China's work to transform Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands into an island in 2015 [US Navy].

article / Jimena Puga

The two major Asia-Pacific powers, China and India, are vying for regional supremacy in the Indian Ocean by establishing military instructions and economic agreements with bordering countries such as Pakistan. The Indian Ocean, which borders Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Australia, is home to one of the most crucial and strategic points for international trade. Nearly 40% of the oil extracted from the sea is produced in the Indian Ocean, which also has rich mineral and fishing deposits.

Five years ago China began its major territorial reclamation in the South China Sea, and the country has established a territorial status quo in its favor without receiving any international impediments, in order to counter the US military presence in the region, established during the Cold War, and which controls the South China Sea and all goods coming from Africa, the Middle East and the Strait of Malacca. This territorial expansion of the Middle Kingdom began in December 2013; since then China has built more than average dozen more artificial islands, located in a strategic location through which a third of global maritime trade passes, and has deployed military assets on them.

However, the creation of these islands has caused great damage to the region's marine ecosystem. The coral reefs that China has destroyed in order to use them as a base for the establishment of its islands used to provide food and shelter for numerous marine species, as well as supply for Asia's most important fishing companies. However, thanks to this territorial expansion China is in a better position not only for maritime and air control of the area but also to continue to advance its power projection strategy in the Indian Ocean and part of the Pacific to satisfy its plans for power and supremacy in the region.

Neocolonization

In early 2018, some reports suggested that China plans to set up a naval base next to the port it is developing in Gwadar, in Pakistan, although Pakistani authorities deny that Beijing has requested that the facilities be put to that use. In any case, the docking of military vessels in the Gwadar area would connect that point with the country's recent military and naval base built in Djibouti - the first China has abroad - as part of a growing network of its own air and naval instructions along the Indian Ocean.

India, the greatest power among regional countries, is responding to Chinese expansion with unexpected strength. Delhi aspires to control the most strategic maritime trade points in the Indian Ocean including the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz and the Mozambique Channel. In addition, India is gaining access to the instructions of its foreign allies in the region. In 2017 it signed a logisticsagreement with the US that would mean free access to US military facilities across the regionagreement that may have something to do with the US desire to create an alternative to the Silk Belt and Road Initiative and curb the rapid growth of the Asian superpower).

In January 2018, India also announced the exchange logistics agreement with France involving free access to French military facilities in Djibouti, namely in the Red Sea and on the island of meeting, south of the Indian Ocean (perhaps to counter the Sino-European agreements). Finally, India is also building strategic relations and infrastructure near the Persian Gulf. And after years of negotiations, Delhi has managed to formalize an agreement with Iran to modernize and expand the port of Chabahar, near the Strait of Hormuz. While it is true that the vast majority of agreements are of a commercial nature, they have enough potential to increase India's access and influence in Central Asia.

In response to Beijing's military base in Djibouti, New Delhi has begun seeking access to new facilities in Seychelles, Oman and Singapore. From Tanzania to Sri Lanka, the two Asian powers are trying to increase their military and economic presence in countries along the Indian Ocean in their mission statement for regional supremacy. Finally, it is possible that India's request for drones from the US in 2017 was goal at monitoring Chinese activity in the ocean.

"My Chinese colleagues have explicitly told me that if the U.S. continues to fly over and navigate in what they self-described as 'their waters,' China will shoot down the corresponding intruder," said Matthew Kroenig, a CIA and Pentagon analyst. "Maybe it's just a bluff, but if China were to shoot down an American plane, it would be the perfect scenario for a U.S. military buildup. It's hard to see President Trump or any other American leader turn his back on this issue."

Globalization

The moves by both powers stem from the fear that the other countries will join in coalition with their opponent in the future, but they also do not want to completely abandon the expansion of economic relations with each other by altering the regional order too drastically.

This power of the weak has limitations, but it has so far worked to the benefit of both India and China. Due to globalization, particularly in the economic sphere, weaker states have adopted asymmetric strategies to extract resources from their neighboring superpowers that aspire to be leaders on the international stage. Often, these border countries had to choose a superpower to obtain resources, as was the case during the Cold War. The difference in this era of globalization is that these states can extract concessions and resources from both Beijing and Delhi without formally aligning themselves with one of them, as is the case, for example, with Vietnam. The absence of a bloc rivalry, as was the case during the Cold War, and the high levels of economic interdependence between India and China make it easier for many of the smaller states to avoid signing an alliance with one of these leaders.

India's subtle strategy involves developing entente with Japan and the member countries of the association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as with the United States. Specifically, the quadrilateral negotiations initiated between India, Japan, the US and Australia are another stabilizing mechanism vis-à-vis China.

However, the strategies of the smaller states in South Asia have limitations. Although China is offering greater economic attendance , these countries, except Pakistan, are unlikely to form military alliances with China because doing so would provoke a negative response from India, the dominant power in the region, and the United States, the international superpower that still has a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean. We are witnessing a new dynamic of diplomatic relations in the Asia-Pacific region.

This new trend of rapprochement with smaller countries translates into an inclination to use economic appeal to persuade neighbors rather than military coercion. How long this trend will continue remains to be seen. India's new strategies with other international powers may be the key to complicating the freedom of action and decision that China is having in the military realm, especially in this time of peace. What is clear is that China's aspiration for supremacy is visible by all countries that are part of the Asia-Pacific region and will not be as easy to establish as the Empire at the Center thought.

area area and adjacent territories [Wikimedia-Commons].

ANALYSIS / Emili J. Blasco

We are witnessing the effective birth of Eurasia. If that word arose as an artifice, to bring together two adjacent, unrelated geographies, today Eurasia is emerging as a reality, in a single geography. The catalyst has been above all China's westward opening: as China has begun to deal with its backside - Central Asia - and has drawn new land routes to Europe, the distances between the margins of Eurasia have also been shrinking. The maps of the Silk Belt and Road Initiative have the effect of first presenting a single continent, from Shanghai to Paris or Madrid. The trade war between Beijing and Washington and Europe's abandonment of the once American umbrella are helping China and Europe to seek each other out.

One consequence of the crossed gaze from the two ends of the supercontinent, whose meeting constructs this new mental map of a continuous territory, is that the world axis has shifted to the Indian Ocean. It is no longer in the Atlantic, as it was when the United States took over the banner of the West from Europe, nor is it in the Pacific, where it had moved with the emerging phenomenon of East Asia. What seemed to be the location of the future, the Asia-Pacific, is giving way to the Indo-Pacific, where China is certainly not losing prominence, but is more subject to the Eurasian balance of power. The irony for China is that in its desire to regain its former position as the Middle Kingdom, its expansionary plans end up giving centrality to India, its veiled nemesis.

Eurasia shrinks

The idea of a shrinking of Eurasia, which reduces its vast geography to the size of our visual field, gaining in its own entity, was expressed two years ago by Robert Kaplan in an essay that he has later collected in his book The Return of framework Polo's World (2018)[1]. It is precisely the revival of the Silk Road, with its historical reminiscences, that has ended up putting Europe and the East on the same plane in our minds, as in a few centuries when, unknown to America, nothing existed beyond the surrounding oceans. "As Europe disappears," says Kaplan in reference letter to Europe's increasingly vaporous borders, "Eurasia is cohesive. "The supercontinent is becoming a fluid, global unit of trade and conflict," he says.

For Bruno Maçães, author of The Down of Eurasia (2018)[2], we have entered a Eurasian era. Despite what might have been predicted just a couple of decades ago, "this century will not be Asian," Maçães assures. Nor will it be European or American, but we are as we were at the end of World War I, when we went from talking about Europe to talking about the West. Now Europe, detached from the United States, according to this Portuguese author, is also becoming part of something bigger: Eurasia.

In view of this movement, both Kaplan and Maçães predict a dissolution of the West. The American emphasizes Europe's shortcomings: "Europe, at least as we have known it, has begun to disappear. And with it the West itself"; while the European points rather to the disinterest of the United States: "One has the feeling that the American universalist vocation is not to guarantee the global preeminence of Western civilization, but to continue as the only global superpower".

Changes the axis of the world

Following the Spanish finding America, the 16th century saw the crowning of a gradual transfer of hegemony and civilization in the world to the West. "The empires of the Persians and Chaldeans had been replaced by those of Egypt, Greece, Italy and France, and now by that of Spain. Here would remain the center of the world," writes John Elliott quoting a writing of the time, by the humanist Pérez de Oliva[3]. The idea of final station was also held when the specific weight of the world was placed in the Atlantic, and then in the Pacific. Today we are once again pursuing this shift towards the West, to the Indian Ocean, perhaps without much encouragement to consider it definitive, even if the turn is completed, the beginnings of which were theorized by the Renaissance.

After all, there have also been shifts in the center of gravity in the opposite direction, if we consider other parameters. In the decades after 1945, the average location of economic activity between different geographies was in the center of the Atlantic. With the turn of the century, however, the center of gravity of economic transactions has been located east of the borders of the European Union, according to Maçães, who predicts that in ten years the midpoint will be on the border between Europe and Asia, and in the middle of the 21st century between India and China, countries that are "destined to develop the largest trade relationship in the world". With this, India "can become the central node between the extremes of the new supercontinent". Moving to one side of the planet, we have arrived at the same point - the Indian Ocean - as in the opposite direction.

Island world

Unlike the Atlantic and the Pacific, oceans that extend vertically from pole to pole, the Indian Ocean spreads out horizontally and, instead of having two shores, has three. This means that Africa, at least its eastern part, is also part of this new centrality: if the speed of navigation brought about by the monsoons has already historically facilitated close contact between the Indian subcontinent and the East African coast, today the new maritime silk routes can further increase exchanges. This and the growing arrival of sub-Saharan migrants in Europe reflect a centripetal phenomenon that even gives rise to talk of Afro-Eurasia. So, as Kaplan points out, referring to the island world as Halford Mackinder once did "is no longer premature". Maçães recalls that Mackinder saw as a difficulty in perceiving the reality of that island world the fact that it was not possible to circumnavigate it completely. Today that perception should be easier, when the Arctic route is opening up.

In the framework of Halford Mackinder's and Nicholas Spykman's complementary theories -verse and reverse- on the Heartland and the Rimland, respectively, any centrality of India has to translate into maritime power. With its access to the interior of Asia Closed by the Himalayas and by an antagonistic Pakistan (it is left with the unique and complex passage of Kashmir), it is at sea that India can project its influence. Like India, China and Europe are also in the Eurasian Rimland, from where all these powers will dispute the balance of power among themselves and also with the Heartland, which is basically occupied by Russia, although not exclusively: in the Heartland there are also the Central Asian republics, which have a special value in the skill for space and resources of a shrinking supercontinent.

Pivot to Eurasia

In this Indo-Pacific, or Greater Indian Ocean region, which stretches from the Persian Gulf and the coasts of East Africa to the second island chain of the Asia-Pacific, the United States has an external role to play. As the island world becomes more cohesive, the U.S. satellite character becomes more pronounced. The grand strategy of the United States then becomes what has been the traditional imperative of the United Kingdom with respect to Europe: to prevent one power from dominating the continent, something that is most easily achieved by supporting one or another continental power to weaken whichever is stronger at the time (France or Germany, depending on the historical period; today Russia or China). Already in the Cold War, the United States tried to prevent the USSR from becoming a hegemon by controlling Western Europe as well. Eurasia enters into a presumably intense game of balance of power, as was the European scenario between the 19th and 20th centuries.

For this reason, Kaplan says that Russia can be contained much more by China than by the United States, just as Washington should take advantage of Russia to limit China's power, as suggested by Henry Kissinger. To this end, the Pentagon should extend its strategic presence in the Western Pacific to the West: if as an external and maritime power it cannot access the continental center of Eurasia, it can take up a position in the very bowels of that great region, which is the Indian Ocean itself.

"If Obama pivoted to Asia, then Trump has pivoted to Eurasia. Decision-makers in the United States seem increasingly aware that the new center of gravity in world politics is neither the Pacific nor the Atlantic, but the Old World between the two," Maçães has written in an essay following his book[4].

Alliances with India

The shift in focus from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific by the United States was formally expressed in the National Security Strategy published in December 2017, the first of that subject of documents produced by the Trump Administration. Consequently, the United States has renamed its Pacific Command the Indo-Pacific Command.

Washington's strategy, like that of other leading Western countries in the region, especially Japan and Australia, involves a coalition of some subject with India, given India's centrality and as the best way to contain China and Russia.

The desirability of an enhanced relationship with New Delhi was already outlined by Trump during the visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Washington in June 2017, and then by then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in October 2017. The latter's successor, Mike Pompeo, addressed a more defined framework in July 2018, when he announced $113 million in aid for projects aimed at achieving greater connectivity in the region, from digital technologies to infrastructure. The advertisement was understood as the U.S. desire to confront the Silk Belt and Road Initiative launched by China.

The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy is sometimes presented in association with the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP), which is the name given by Japan to its own cooperation initiative for the region, already outlined ten years ago by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Both coincide in counting on India, Japan, Australia and the United States as the main guarantors of regional security, but there are two main divergences. One is that for Washington the Indo-Pacific stretches from India's eastern seaboard to the U.S. west coast, while in the Japanese initiative the map runs from the Persian Gulf and the African coast to the Philippines and New Zealand. The other has to do with the way China is perceived: the Japanese proposal seeks Chinese cooperation, at least at the declarative level, while the US purpose is to confront the "risks of Chinese dominance", as stated in the National Security Strategy.

India has also developed its own initiative, presented in 2014 as Act East Policy (AEP), with the aim of promoting greater cooperation between India and Asia-Pacific countries, especially ASEAN. For its part, Australia presented its Policy Roadmap for the region in 2017, which builds on the security already provided by the United States and advocates a continued understanding with the "Indo-Pacific democracies" (Japan, South Korea, India and Indonesia).

Other consequences

Some other consequences of the birth of Eurasia, of different order and importance, are:

-The European Union is not only ceasing to be attractive as a political and even economic project for its neighbors, due to its internal convergence problems, but the reality of Eurasia reduces it to a peninsula on the margins of the supercontinent. For example, the old question of whether or not Turkey is part of Europe loses any interest: Turkey will have a better position on the chessboard.

-The corridors that China wants to keep open towards the Indian Ocean (Myanmar and, above all, Pakistan) are gaining in importance. Without being able to regain the millenary status of Middle Kingdom, China will value even more having the province of Xinjiang as a way of being less slanted on one side of the supercontinent and as a platform for a greater projection towards the interior of the same.

-The U.S. pivot to Eurasia will force Washington to spread its forces over a larger expanse of sea and its shores, with the risk of losing deterrent or intervention power in certain places. Looking after the Indian Ocean may unintentionally lead it to neglect the South China Sea. One way of gaining influence in the Indian Ocean without much effort could be to move the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet from Bahrain to Oman, also a stone's throw from the Strait of Hormuz, but outside the Persian Gulf.

-Russia has traditionally been seen as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and has had some proponents of a Eurasianism that presented Eurasia as a third continent (Russia), with Europe and Asia on either side, and reserved the name Greater Eurasia for the supercontinent. As the supercontinent shrinks, Russia will benefit from the greater connectivity between one end and the other and will be more on top of its former Central Asian republics, although these will have contact with a greater issue of neighbors.

(1) Kaplan, R. (2018) The Return fo framework Polo's World. War, Strategy, and American Interests in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Random House

(2) Maçães, B. (2018) The Dawn of Eurasia. On the Trail of the New World Order. Milton Keynes: Allen Lane

(3) Elliott, J. (2015) The Old World and the New (1492-165). Madrid: Alianza publishing house

(4) Maçães, B. (2018). Trump's Pivot to Eurasia. The American Interest. 21 August 2018.

▲Kim Jung-un and Moon Jae-in met for the first time in April, 2018 [South Korea Gov.]

ANALYSIS / Kanghun Ji

North Korea has always utilized its nuclear power as a leverage for negotiation in world politics. Nuclear weapons, asymmetric power, are the last measure for North Korea which lacks absolute military and economic power. Although North Korea lags behind the United States and South Korea in military/economic power, its possession of nuclear weapons renders it a significant threat to other countries. Recently, however, they have continued to develop their nuclear power in disregard of international regulations. In other words, they have not used nuclear issue as a leverage for negotiation to induce economic support. They have rather concentrated on completing nuclear development, not considering persuasion from peripheral countries. This attitude can be attributed to the fact that the development of their nuclear power is almost complete. Many experts say that North Korea judges the recognition of their nation with nuclear power to be a more powerful negotiation tool (Korea times, 2016).

In this situation, South Korea has been trying many different kinds of strategies to resolve the nuclear crisis because security is their main goal: United States-South Korea joint military exercises and United Nations sanctions against North Korea are some of those strategies. Despite these oppressive methods using hard power, North Korea has refused to participate in negotiations.

Most recently, however, North Korea has discarded its previous stance for a more peaceful and amicable position following the PyeongChang Olympics. Discussions about nuclear power are proceeding and the nation has even declared that they will stop developing nuclear power.

Diverse causes such as international relations or economic needs influence their transition. This essay would argue that the soft power strategies of South Korea are substantially influencing North Korea. Therefore, an analysis of South Korea's soft power strategies is necessary in order to figure out the successful way to resolve the nuclear crisis.

Importance of soft-power strategies in policies against North Korea

North Korea has justified its dictatorship through the development of its 'Juche' ideology which is very unique. This ideology is established on the theory of 'rule by class' which stems from Marxism-Leninism. In addition, the regime has combined it with Confucianism that portrays a dictator as a father of family (Jung Seong Jang, 1999). Through this justification, a dictator is located at the top of class, which would complete the communist ideal. People are taught this ideology thoroughly and anyone who violates the ideology is punished. To open up this society which has formerly been ideologically closed, their ideology should be undermined by other attractive ideology, culture, and symbol.

However, North Korea has effectively blocked it. For example, recently, many people in North Korea have covertly shared TV shows and music from South Korea. People who are caught enjoying this culture are severely punished by the government. In these types of societies, oppression through hard power strategies doesn't affect making any kind of change in internal society. It rather could be used to enhance internal solidarity because the potential offenders such as United States or South Korea are postulated as certain enemies to North Korea, which requires internal solidarity to people. North Korea has actually depicted capitalism, United States and South Korea as the main enemies on average. It intends to induce loyalty from people.

As a result, the regime has developed nuclear weapons successfully under strong censorship. Nuclear power is the main key to maintain the dictatorship. The declaration of 'Nuclear-Economy parallel development' from the start of Kim Jung-Eun's government implies that the regime would ensure nuclear weapon as a measure to maintain its system. In this situation, sending the message that its system can coordinately survive alongside South Korea in world politics is important. Not only oppressive strategies but also appropriate strategies which attract North Korea to negotiate are needed.

Analysis of South Korea Soft Power Strategies

In this analysis, I will employ a different concept of soft power compared from the one given by Joseph Nye. Nye's original concept of soft power focuses on types of behavior. In terms of his concept, co-optive power such as attraction and persuasion also constitutes soft power regardless of the type of resource (Joseph Nye, 2013). However, the concept of soft power I will use focuses on what types of resources users use regardless of the type of behaviors. Therefore, any kinds of power exerted by only soft resources such as images, diplomacy, diary and so on could be soft power. It is a resource-based concept compared to Nye's concept which is behavior based (Geun Lee, 2011).

I use this concept because using hard resources such as military power and economic regulation to resolve the nuclear problem in North Korea has been ineffective so far. Therefore, using the concept of soft power which is based on soft resources makes it possible to analyze different kinds of soft power and find ways to improve it.

According to the thesis by Geun Lee (2011: p.9) who used the concept I mentioned above, there are 4 categories of Soft Power. I will use these categories to analyze the soft power strategies of South Korea.

1. Oppression through diplomacy: Two-track diplomacy

South Korea takes advantage of soft power strategies that request a global mutual-assistance system in order to oppress North Korea. Based on diplomatic capabilities, South Korea has tried to make it clear that all countries in world politics are demanding a solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis. Through these strategies, it wants to provoke fear in North Korea that it would be impossible to restore its relationship with the world. These strategies have been influential because they are harmonized with United Nations' Security Council resolutions. Especially, the two-track diplomacy conducted by the president Moon-jae-in in the United Nations general assembly in 2017 is evaluated to be successful. He gave North Korea two options in order to attract them to negotiate (The fact, 2017). The president Moon-jae-in stressed the importance of cooperation about nuclear crisis among countries in his address to the general assembly. Moreover, he discussed the issue with the presidents of United States and Japan and pushed for a firm stance against the North Korea nuclear problem. However, at the same time, he declared that South Korea is ready for peaceful negotiation and discussion if North Korea wish to negotiate and stop developing its nuclear power. By offering two options, South Korea not only aimed to incite fear in North Korea but also left room for North Korea to appear at the negotiation tables.

Strategies using diplomatic capabilities are valuable because they can induce coercive power through soft resources. However, it would be difficult to judge the effectiveness if North Korea didn't show any reaction to these strategies. Moreover, the cooperation with Russia and China is very important to persuade North Korea because they are maintaining amicable relationships with North Korea against United States and Japan. In the situation that North Korea has aimed to complete development of nuclear weapons for negotiation, diplomatic oppression is not effective itself for making change.

2. Sports and culture: Peaceful gesture

The attempt to converse through sports and culture is one of the soft power strategies used by South Korea in order to solve the nuclear crisis. This strategy intends to obtain North Korea's cooperation in non-political areas which could then spread to political negotiations. As a result of this strategy, South Korea and North Korea formed a unified team during the last Olympics and Asian games (Yonhapnews, 2018). However, for it to be a success, their cooperation should not be limited to the non-political area, but instead should lead to a constructive conversation in politics. In these terms, South Korea's peaceful gesture in the PyeongChang winter Olympic is seen to have brought about positive change. Before the Olympics, many politicians and experts were skeptical to the gesture because North Korea conducted the 6th nuclear test in 2017, ignoring South Korea's message (Korea times, 2018). In extension of the two-track diplomacy strategy, nevertheless, the South Korea government has continually shown a desire to cooperate with North Korea. These strategies focus on cooperation only in soft power domains such as sports, culture, and music rather than domains that expose serious political intent.

In the United Nations general assembly which adopted a truce for the PyeongChang Olympics, gold medalist Kim-yun-a required North Korea to participate in Olympics on her address (Chungang, 2017). Moreover, in the event for praying successful Olympics, the president Moon-jae-in sent another peaceful gesture mentioning that South Korea would wait for the participation of North Korea until the beginning of Olympics (Voakorea, 2017). This strategy ended up having successfully attracted North Korea. As a result, they composed a unified ice hockey team and diplomats were dispatched from North Korea during the Olympics to watch the game with South Korean government officials. And then, they exchanged cultural performances in PyeongChang and Pyeong-yang. Finally, the efforts led to the summit meeting between South-North Korea, and North Korea even declared that it would stop developing nuclear power and establish cooperation with South Korea.

It is too early to judge whether North Korea will stop developing their nuclear influence. However, it is a success in the sense that South Korea has attracted North Korea into conversations. Especially, South Korea has effectively taken advantage of the situation that all countries in international relations pay attention to the nuclear crisis of North Korea. They continuously pull North Korea into the center of world politics and leave North Korea without alternative option. Continuous diary and issue making has finally attracted North Korea.

3. diary and framing

It is important to continuously set agendas about issues which are related to North Korea's violations concerning the nuclear crisis and human rights. Although North Korea is isolated from world politics, it can't operate its system if it refuses to cooperate or trade with other countries. As a result, it do not want to be in constant conflict with world politics. Therefore, the focal point of diary South Korea should impress is the negative effects of nuclear policies and dictatorship of North Korea. Moreover, South Korea should recognize that the goal of developing nuclear influence of North Korea is not to declare war but to ensure protection for their political system. South Korea needs to continuously stress that political system of North Korea would be insured after nuclear dismantlement. These strategies change thoughts of North Korea and induce it to participate in negotiations.

However, South Korea has not been effectively employing this strategy. diary which might arouse direct conflict with North Korea could aggravate their relationship. This explains its unwillingness to resort to this strategy. On the other hand, the United States show effective diary which relates to the nuclear crisis mentioning Iran as a positive example of a successful negotiation.

South Korea needs to set and frame the diary about similar issues closely related to North Korea. For example, the rebellion against the dictatorship in Syria and the resulting death of the dictator in Yemen which stem from tyrannical politics could be a negative precedent. Also, the agreement with Iran that acquired economic support by abandoning nuclear development could be a positive precedent. Through this diary setting, South Korea should change the thought of North Korea about their nuclear policies. If this strategy succeeds, North Korea will obtain a new interpretative framework, which could lead them to negotiate.

4. Competition of system: North Korea defector and Korean wave

The last type of soft power strategy is a fundamental solution to provoke change. While the strategies I mentioned above directly targets the North Korea government, this strategy mainly targets the people and the society of North Korea. Promoting economic, cultural superiority could influence the North Korean people and then it could lead to movements which would require a transition from the current society. There are many different kinds of way to conduct this strategy and it is abstract in that we can't measure how much it could influence society. However, it could also be a strategy which North Korea fears the most in the sense that it could provoke change from the bottom of the society. In addition to this, it could arouse fundamental doubt about the 'Juche' ideology or nuclear development which is maintained by an exploitative system.

One of these strategies is the policy concerning defectors. South Korea has been implementing policies which accept defectors and help them adjust to the South Korea society. These defectors get a chance to be independent through re-socialization. And then, some of them carry out activities which denounce the horrible reality of the internal society of North Korea. If their voice became influential in world politics, it could become a greater threat to the North Korea system. In 2012, some defectors testified against the internal violation of human rights in UNCHR to gain attention from the world (Newsis, 2016).

In addition, recently, Korean dramas and music are covertly shared within the North Korea society (Daily NK, 2018). It could also provoke a social movement to call for change. Because the contents reflect a much higher standard of living, it triggers curiosity and admiration from North Korean people. These strategies lead society of North Korea to socialize with the co-optive power in the recipients. Ultimately, long term soft power could threaten North Korea itself.

Limits and conclusion

This essay has analyzed the strategies South Korea has used in order to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. South Korea threatens North Korea utilizing consensus among countries. Strategies its government has shown such as the speech of the president Moon-jae-in in the United Nations general assembly, the winter Olympics which reflected a desire for peace and the two-track diplomacy are totally different from the consistently conservative policies that the previous governments showed during the last ten years. In addition, the declaration of the Trump's administration that they would continuously pressure North Korea about nuclear issues offered the opportunity to react to North Korea's nuclear policies. In this process, active joint response among South Korea, United States and Japan is also necessary.

However, it is true that there are some drawbacks. In order for North Korea to eventually accept nuclear disarmament, South Korea absolutely needs to cooperate with Russia and China which are not only in a good relationship with North Korea but also in a comparatively competitive relationship with the United States and Japan. If South Korea will succeed in gaining their support, the process of reaching an agreement concerning nuclear issues would be much easier.

Eventually, in contrast with the hard power strategies with hard resources, soft power strategies with soft resources can only be effective when South Korea offers the second attractive option. The options are diverse. The main point is that North Korea should recognize the positive effects of abandoning nuclear.

Also, South Korea should recognize that the effect of soft power strategies is maximized when it coexists with economic / military oppression through hard power. In other words, South Korea must take into account Joseph Nye's smart power to solve the nuclear crisis.

In this process, the most important thing is to persuade North Korea by offering an attractive choice. The reason why North Korea desires to have a summit meeting with South Korea and the United States is because they judge that the choice would be more profitable. Therefore, the South Korean government needs to reflect upon what objectives North Korea has when they accept to negotiate. For example, China's economic opening is an example of a good precedent that North Korea could follow. South Korea needs to give North Korea a blue print such as the example of China and lead the agreement about the nuclear problem.

Lastly, it is difficult to apprehend the effectiveness of soft power strategies with soft resources, mentioned by Geun Lee, in the sense that the data and the figures about this strategy are not easy to measure in contrast with hard power strategies. Also, many causes exist concerning change of North Korea. Therefore, further research needs to establish a system to get concrete and scientific data in order to apprehend the complex causes and effects of this strategy such as that stem from smart power strategies.

References

Geun Lee (2009) A theory of soft power and Korea's soft power strategy, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 21:2, 205-218, DOI: 10.1080/10163270902913962

Joseph S. Nye. JR. (2013) HARD, SOFT, AND SMART POWER. In: Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur(eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, pp.559-574.

Jung Seong Jang.(1999) Theoretical Structure and Characteristics of the Juche Ideology. 북한연구학회보, 3:2, 251-273.

Chungang ilbo, (2017) 김연아, 평화올림픽 위해 UN에서 4분 영어연설 [Online] Available.

DAILY NK. (2018) 어쩔 수 없이 인도영화를 처벌강화에 南드라마 시청 주춤 [Online] Available.

Korea Times. (2018) 북한, 평창올림픽 참가 놓고 정치권 장외설전 가열 [Online] Available.

Korean Times. (2016) 왜 북한은 핵개발을 멈추지 않는가? [Online] Available.

Newsis. (2016) 탈북자들, 유엔 인권위에서 강제낙태와 고문 등 증언 [Online] Available.

The Fact. (2017) 文대통령'데뷔전' UN본부 입성... '북핵 파문' NYPD '긴장' [Online] Available.

Voakorea. (2017) 문재인 한국 대통령 "북한 평창올림픽 참가 끝까지 기다릴 것" [Online] Available.

Yonhapnews. (2018) 27년 만에 '남북 단일팀' 출범 임박... 올림픽은 사상 최초 [Online] Available.

Central Asian republics dispute scarce water resources in the Aral Sea Basin

The lack of effective cooperation between the republics through which the two main rivers of Central Asia, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, which have historically fed the Aral Sea, flow, is preventing the region's water problems from being solved. Short-term objectives, such as hydroelectric exploitation or oil exploration, hinder understanding, although recent initiatives point in the right direction.

▲Satellite image of the Aral Sea, with north below [NASA].

article / Roberto Ramírez Millán

source of life, food for crops, means of navigation... There are many functions that water fulfills as a human resource . It is indispensable and necessary for the maintenance and development of any nation. Today this resource is being depleted due to the great industrial expansion of the last centuries, mass population growth and climate change. The dispute over fresh water, given its economic, geopolitical and geostrategic importance, is triggering conflicts between different countries, known as "water wars". This is happening in the Asia-Pacificarea and particularly in the case of the Central Asian region, in the Aral Sea Basin.

Due to the drought that characterizes this area, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers are under particular stress as the main suppliers of fresh water to the countries of Central Asia. Since the collapse of the USSR, together with its organizations for the negotiation of the waters of this basin, and the independence of the countries located in this region, the lack of an effective international organization to regulate the use of this resource among the States has led to a series of international conflicts due to inequalities of access to water.

In 1993 the Kyrgyz Republic began using the Naryn waterfall as a source of hydroelectric power, with the intention of making up for the lack of organic fuel. With this new use of infrastructure, which entailed high water retention during the summer, the Kyrgyz Republic took the opportunity to sell electricity at exorbitant prices in exchange for gas and coal, which it lacks, to countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The states' pursuit of their own profit and the lack of cooperation between them made it impossible to reach any agreement. 

Furthermore, in 1997, Kyrgyzstan declared that the Syr Darya River would no longer be a common good for legal purposes. To this end, it remodeled and restricted the right to its use and demanded financial aid from the States benefiting from this basin to maintain the freshwater reserves available on their territory. Not content with this, it remarked that, if Uzbekistan did not pay, it would sell a large part of this water to China, thus damaging attempts to reach an agreement between the two.

These events have not been the only ones that have hindered cooperation between these countries, but also the sharp global drop in prices for irrigated agriculture, Uzbek cotton crops that require large amounts of water, and the problems resulting from climate change, among others.

Aral Sea

In addition, the current status of the Aral Sea must also be taken into account. Once one of the four largest lakes in the world and providing economic sustainability to the region, the Aral Sea has been in a state of continuous drought since 1960. Due to the aforementioned operations on the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers, the Aral Sea was divided into two parts, the northern and southern lakes, with the eastern part of the southern lake completely evaporating. In the past, the Aral Sea provided between 20,000 and 40,000 tons of fish per year; however, it can now supply only about 1,000 tons.

To deal with drought problems Kazakhstan developed the project "Regulation of the Darya river bed and preservation of the northern part of the Aral Sea". This included the construction of the Kokaral dam on the southern shore of the northern lake, thanks to the support of the World Bank. The dam ensured the growth of the lake by 20%. The project also provided for the Building of a fish hatchery, which promoted the production of 10,000 to 12,000 tons of fish per year.

However, these measures in favor of Aral Sea development are at the same time being counteracted by Uzbekistan's actions. If previously the Uzbek part of the Aral Sea was damaged by high irrigation of cotton crops, it is now oil extraction that is damaging the southern lake. Soil drilling in the Amu Darya River delta and at the bottom of the Aral Sea plays a negative role. In the dilemma between the development of the oil and gas industry and saving its part of the Aral, Uzbekistan is showing which is its priority, given the benefits of hydrocarbon development .

Effective cooperation

Researchers and experts in the region are aware that cooperation among the six countries is indispensable for their development, which is why the Regional Environmental Center for Central Asia (CAREC), a non-governmental organization charged with addressing environmental and sustainability challenges in Central Asia and Afghanistan, was created in 2001. This organization has denounced that the region is losing $4.5 billion annually due to "the lack of effective mutual cooperation between the countries", as indicated by its executive director , Iskandar Abdullayev.

For this reason, on June 8, CAREC hosted the launching ceremony of the Innovation and Scientific research Cluster in the field of water management , the first in Central Asia, whose goal is to "ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of developmentprojects". These and similar initiatives are the first steps towards creating a prosperous and sustainable future, avoiding retaliation and preventing possible "water wars".

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Bernauer, T., & Siegfried, T. (2012). Climate change and international water conflict in Central Asia. Journal of Peace Research, 49(1), 227-239.

Dukhovny, V. A., & Sokolov, V. (2003). Lessons on cooperation building to manage water conflicts in the Aral Sea Basin. Paris: Unesco, 7-16

Karaev, Z. (2005). Water Diplomacy in Central Asia. Middle East Review of International Affairs, 9(1), 63-69.

Sievers, E. W. (2001). Water, conflict, and regional security in Central Asia. NYU Envtl. LJ, 10, 356.

Swain, A. (2004). Managing water conflict: Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Routledge.

Tishkov, V. (1997). Ethnicity, nationalism and conflict in and after the Soviet Union: the mind aflame (Vol. 15). Sage.

[Omar Jaén Suárez, 500 años de la cuenca del Pacífico. Towards a global history. Ediciones Doce Calles, Aranjuez 2016, 637 pages]

review / Emili J. Blasco

In just thirty years, between Columbus' arrival in America in 1492 and Elcano's return to Cadiz after his round-the-world voyage in 1522, Spain added to its domain not only a new continent, but also a new ocean. We all know about Spain's Atlantic dimension, but we often disregard its peaceful dimension. During the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the Pacific Ocean was primarily under Spanish dominion. Spain was the European power present for the longest time and with the greatest weight in the entire basin of what began to be called the South Sea. Spain was the first navy that regularly patrolled its waters - the Armada del Sur, based in El Callao, Peru - and Spain was the first trade route that periodically crossed it from side to side - the Manila galleon, between the Philippines and Mexico.

In "500 years of the Pacific Basin. Toward a global history", Panamanian diplomat and historian Omar Jaén Suárez does not limit himself to documenting that Spanish and then Hispanic presence in a vast space -one third of the Earth's sphere and half of its waters- whose eastern margin is the coast of Spanish America. As the degree scroll indicates, his is a global history. But approaching the last half millennium means starting from the fact of the finding of the Pacific by the Spaniards and that determines the approach of the narration.

If Anglo-Saxon historiography would have perhaps used another prism, this book emphasizes the development of the entire Pacific account from the arrival of the first Europeans, with Nuñez de Balboa at the head. Without forgetting the colonizing actions of other powers, the author details aspects that we Spaniards do forget, such as the permanent base that Spain had in Formosa (today Taiwan), the Crown's attempts to keep Tahiti or the voyages through Alaska in search of a sea passage to the north of America, which had as a logistic point the island of Quadra and Vancouver, the great Canadian city today known only by the second part of that name (in fact, Spain neglected to populate Oregon, more interested in the Philippines and trade with the Moluccas): quite a pioneering "turn to Asia").

Being from Panama gives Omar Jaén, who has also lived in Spain, a special sensitivity for his subject of study. The Panamanian isthmus has always been the key to the South Sea for the Old World; with the construction of the canal, Panama is also a transit point between East and West.

The careful edition of this work adds an indisputable value. Almost eight hundred maps, graphs, engravings and photographs make it especially visual. The quantity of illustrations, many in full color, and the good weight of the paper make the volume a luxury for anyone interested in the Pacific. Ediciones Doce Calles has taken great care with this first degree scroll of a new collection, Pictura Mundi, dedicated to celebrating travels, explorations and geographical discoveries.

Taiwan imports up to four times more than China from Central American countries that recognize it as a state.

Of the almost two hundred countries in the world, only 19 have diplomatic relations with Taiwan (and therefore do not have diplomatic relations with China). Of these, five are in Central America and four in the Caribbean. The recognition of Taipei has some advantages for these countries, although they have been neutralized by China's commercial weight. Panama established relations with Beijing in 2017 and the Dominican Republic has just done so now. Here we examine the interest that preference for Taiwan still holds for certain Central American countries.

article / Blanca Abadía Moreno

Taiwan's special relationship with Central America dates back to the period following Taiwan's 1971 departure from the United Nations, where Nationalist China was displaced by the People's Republic of China. Several Latin American countries had established relations with Taiwan in the 1960s, but most of them gradually came to recognize Beijing after the UN change. Taiwan retained, however, the support of the Central American nations and in the 1980s also gained the support of small Caribbean islands that then became independent.

The emergence of China as a major international trading partner has been subtracting diplomatic recognition from Taiwan. Costa Rica established full ties with China in 2007, Panama in 2017 and the Dominican Republic last May 1. Even so, of the 19 countries that continue to opt for Taipei over Beijing, five are in Central America: Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua (this country with a five-year hiatus, from 1985-1990). Four others are in the Caribbean: Haiti and three tiny nations in the Lesser Antilles. If one takes into account that the rest of the countries that recognize Taiwan are of little commercial importance, except for Paraguay (they are the Vatican, Burkina Faso, Swaziland and six Polynesian microstates), it is understandable that Central America absorbs Taiwan' s diplomatic interest.

Since the constitutive theory of statehood defines a state as a person under international law if, and only if, it is recognized as sovereign by others, Taiwan strives to ensure that those countries continue to recognize it as a subject of plenary session of the Executive Council right in the concert of nations; losing their support would directly affect the legitimacy of its claims as a sovereign state.

To this end, Taipei encourages trade relations with them, procures investments and uses what is called "checkbook diplomacy": the submission of gifts (and bribes) to maintain these relations. Central American countries receive an average of US$50 million annually in declared non-reimbursable cooperation. Taiwan directs financial aid to its Latin American partners through the International Cooperation and development Fund(ICDF), with programs ranging from infrastructure construction to coffee production. Taiwan has financed and constructed several government buildings in Nicaragua and El Salvador.

In addition, the Asian nation contributes to programs of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) and is an observer country in the Central American Parliament and other regional organizations.

This effort, however, has not prevented in recent years there have been casualties among Central American countries that saw him giving diplomatic recognition. Costa Rica's economic development led the country in 2007 to want to improve its trade figures through a rapprochement with China, which involved the opening of an embassy in Beijing and the closure of the one it had in Taipei. For the same reason, Panama also opted in 2017 to break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan, stating that China, a prominent Username of the Panamanian Canal, "has always played a relevant role in Panama's Economics " and any restrictions preventing it from remaining so had to be removed.

Business relationships

Trade relations between Taiwan and the Central American countries that recognize it as a State increased significantly thanks to the opening of the Central American Trade Office(CATO) in Taiwan in 1997, the incorporation of this country into CABEI and the entrance into force of several trade agreements. Taiwan signed free trade agreements with Guatemala (2006), with Honduras and El Salvador (2006) and with Nicaragua (2008).

These treaties have especially facilitated Central American exports to Taiwan. As is the case with most Latin American countries, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua have China as one of the main origins of their imports (the first is still the United States). Their political alignment with Taiwan does not prevent them from being customers of Chinese production. Thus, in 2016, China ranked between 2nd and 3rd as a source market, while Taiwan ranked far down the table (between 14th and 23rd). However, the special relationship with Taipei means that Taiwan equals or surpasses China as a destination for the exports of the four Central American countries mentioned. This is the commercial benefit they obtain from the diplomatic recognition of the Asian island.

Of this group of countries, Nicaragua exported the most to Taiwan in 2016 (US$83.7 million) compared to exports to China (US$21.5 million), a ratio of four to one. The main Nicaraguan products exported were shrimp, sugar, beef and coffee.

Honduras exported US$24.7 million to Taiwan -mainly textiles, coffee and aluminum- compared to US$18.5 million to China. El Salvador sent 53.3 million dollars worth of cargo to Taiwan -mainly sugar- and 46.5 million to China. Guatemala, whose Economics has a larger Issue , was the only country to sell more to China (75.5 million), but in figures very similar to those of Taiwan (74 million), to which it sent mainly coffee, paper and cardboard.

With these diplomatic and commercial relations Taiwan intends to show the international community that it is a capable ally and manager for international cooperation. It also wants to show the world that Taiwanese diplomacy exists despite China's attempts to isolate it. The fact that China has a special interest in markets that facilitate access to raw materials makes the Asian giant more attentive to relations with various South American countries, rich in minerals; it is there where Beijing concentrates its Latin American investments.

Central America, with less extractive activity, thus escapes China's priority (the interest in the Panama Canal is a case apart), and is left for the time being to Taiwan's action. However, the increasingly residual nature of support for the island and the very weight of relations with China suggest that the Central American countries will continue to leave this particular club, one after the other.

▲Flags of the United States and Japan at a ceremony welcoming the U.S. vice president in Tokyo in February 2018 [White House].

COMMENTARY / Gabriel de Lange [English version].

In recent decades, China has grown in economic and political strength. The inclusion of the document "Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" in the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), carried out during the 19th congress of that party in October 2017, and the amendment of the country's Constitution to eliminate the limit of two consecutive presidential terms, approved by the plenary session of the Executive Council the People's Congress of China in March 2018, have meant the consolidation of power of the current Chinese leader.

For its part, the United States has been criticized on multiple fronts for its relations in Asia. Authors critical of the Trump Administration believe that its policies toward North Korea, China and the region in general are "damaging US interests" in the Asia-Pacific. Withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific agreement (TPP)has"undermined the influence" of the U.S. to shape the regional future, giving China the opportunity to do so on its own terms. The withdrawal from the TPP has left many Asian countries wondering what Washington brings to the table in economic terms and looking to China to fill the void.

One of the main factors that lead Asian countries to maintain a certain distance from China and closer proximity to the United States are the problems in the South China Sea. As in the case of the Philippines with the Spratly Islands or Vietnam with the Paracel Islands. The concern of those countries about Chinese intentions has pushed them to a rapprochement with the US. Unfortunately for Washington, that rapprochement depends on China's own decision whether or not to insist on its claims to particular islands. The Xi Administration may decide that the benefits of stronger relations with its neighbors are more important than these disputed territories.

The question now is: who will the other Asian countries, especially the members of ASEANassociation of Southeast Asian Nations), look to as a political ally? With signs of steady, stable and enduring power under the consolidated authority of Xi Jinping, compared to a seemingly unpredictable, divided and internationally criticized Trump Administration, no one can be surprised that regional neighbors may lean more towards China in the near future.

China, India and Japan are investing in their respective air forces with an eye on their neighboring

North Korea is the one filling the headlines about space-faring weaponry, but it is the great powers of Asia - China, India and Japan - that are striving for full air potential.

▲Chinese stealth fighter J-20

article / Sebastián Bruzzone

North Korea is not the most powerful military air power in Asia. The exuberant parades and frequent ballistic missile launches by this nation are certainly far from their real arms power, although they invest approximately 15% of their GDP in it. Military air hegemony is mainly in three center-states:

Japan. The Japanese air force, established in 1954, combines its level of technique and sophistication with U.S. aircraft. Both countries, together with South Korea, practice in the airspace of the Pacific Ocean. Its aviation fleet varies from generation to generation. It has modern F-15 and F-2 aircraft manufactured by Mitsubishi Industries (Japanese company, national) and Lockheed Martin (U.S. company), and older aircraft such as the Phantom F-4. Likewise, it has an early warning and immediate attendance team, and another team of air tankers to keep the rest of the aircraft in the air for as long as possible.

India. The Indian Air Force possesses Soviet and national technology, as well as a training and management system from the British Royal Air Force. Its fleet has 300 state-of-the-art fighters complemented by older MiG-21s. In addition, 200 offensive ground attack aircraft and C-17 Globemaster in the field of logistics to ensure cargo transport and immediate refueling and warning.

China. Since the end of World War II, the Chinese government has invested in its air armament to become the main military power on the continent. Today, it has 600 Generation 4 and 4.5 fighters, as well as aircraft from the aforementioned countries. Unlike Japan and India, the main manufacturer of its equipment is the country itself and it has not been imported from any other nation. What stands out most about the Chinese Air Force is the evolution in recent years. It has gone from having a very large and poorly trained fleet to being made up of pilots who can spend more than 24 hours in an aircraft. However, the Chinese aviation industry still has engine quality problems. Still, we may be talking about the most important air power in Asia.