▲Great Wall of China, near Jinshanling [Jakub Halin-Wikimedia Commons].

COMMENTARY / Paulina Briz Aceves

The Great Wall of China was completed after decades of successive efforts by different dynasties, not only as a defensive line, but also as a sign of the Chinese attitude towards the outside world. Although this wall currently has no use, other than as a tourist attraction, it has been an example for the creation of another great wall, which although not physical, has the same effects as the original: to isolate the Chinese community from the outside world and to protect itself from attacks against its sovereignty.

The "Great Firewall of China" - the government's online surveillance and censorship effort - monitors all traffic in Chinese cyberspace and allows authorities to both deny access to a variety of selected websites and disconnect all Chinese networks from the global Internet. In addition to the Great Firewall, the Chinese government has also created a domestic surveillance system called "Golden Shield," which is administered by the Ministry of Public Security and other government Departments and local agencies. The Chinese government understands how valuable and powerful technology, innovation and the Internet are, so it is cautious about information disseminated on Chinese soil, due to its constant fear of a possible challenge to the Communist Party and disruption of China's political order.

China's cyber policies and strategies are hardly known in the international world, but what is known is that China's network security priorities are motivated by the Communist Party's primary goal of staying in power. China's rulers understand that cyber is now fully integrated into society. Therefore, they consider that in order to maintain political stability they must keep an eye on their citizens and control them, leaving them in the shadows by censoring not only general information, but also sensitive issues such as the Tiananmenplace massacre or the Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong.

The filters that control what citizens see on the web have become more sophisticated. In addition, the government has employee about 100,000 people to monitor the Chinese Internet, to control information not only from the West, but even that generated in China itself. It is true that this meddling in the media has undoubtedly made the Chinese government assert its power over society, because it is clear that he who has the information definitely has the power.

It generates many of the raw materials needed for global technology production.

China not only has significant reserves of mineral resources, but also leads the world in the production of many of them. This gives it a geopolitical B as a source of essential resources for global technological production.

▲Satellite image [NASA].

article / Gabriel Ros Casis [English version] [English version].

With a vast territory like China's, it is obvious that it possesses a wealth of raw materials and natural resources. Throughout China's history, this has become a strong geopolitical asset, not only for the country's own development , but also for its trading partners through exports. Today, when we talk about these raw materials, China stands out in two main groups: base metals and technological elements.

The base metals group essentially comprises five metals from the periodic table, namely iron, copper, aluminum, magnesium and zinc (sometimes lead and tin are also included). There is no need to recall that we can find all these metals in everyday objects, and that they have been the backbone of industry for a long time. Therefore, every country needs them, placing those with the largest deposits of these metals at a strategic advantage. But a country's mineral wealth is not always given by this condition, as it can also be measured by the ease and feasibility of extracting the product. In the case of China, both arguments would be valid, since the country has the largest deposits of many of these minerals, with magnesium leading the way (79% of global extractions) followed by tin (43%) and zinc (31%).

As far as technological metals are concerned, it is important to note that they include various minerals, such as rare earths, precious metals, as well as semiconductors. From a quantitative approach , the required amount of these metals is minimal, even though their availability is crucial for the production of today's technology. For example, some of the most common technological metals include lithium, yttrium, palladium, cerium and neodymium, which can easily be found in cell phone batteries, medicines, magnets or catalysts. Once again, China leads the way with the largest deposits of several of these elements, especially tungsten (83%), followed by rare earths (78%) and molybdenum (38%).

From this we can conclude that China not only has the largest deposits, but is also the world's largest exporter. In addition to extraction, this country also refines and manufactures components with minerals such as aluminum, copper and certain rare earths, and in some cases even manufactures the final product.

Therefore, it must be taken into account that extraction brings with it certain consequences. Environmentally, extraction always has an impact on the land, perhaps less in China compared to other countries (due to the size of its territory), but equally significant. From an economic approach , these extractions entail a great cost, but which, properly managed, can generate an immense benefit. In the political scenario, they are seen as an important geopolitical advantage, creating dependence on the demand of other countries.

As a conclusion, it can be drawn from this that China has great power in terms of raw material resources, but this carries with it a great responsibility, since a substantial part of the raw materials used for almost all the world's technology production depends on this country, which provides the resources, but also manufactures them.

▲Mobilization of the Royal Thai Armed Forces in 2010 [Roland Dobbins-WC].

COMMENTARY / Álvaro Aramendi Baro

Terrorism is hitting Thailand harder and harder. The causes of this incipient growth are difficult to pinpoint. However, the coup d'état by the Royal Armed Forces led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha on May 22, 2014 and, obviously, the subsequent political repressions play a major role. Nor should we forget the pressure exerted by the BRN (Barisan Revolusi Nasional), which for decades has been fighting for the independence of Pattani (located in the south of Thailand) This revolutionary group is also active in northern Malaysia. This terrorist organization is currently being used by ISIS. The strategy of ISIS, as well as that of Al-Qaeda, is based on encouraging and incentivizing nationalist insurgencies in order to have easier access to the territories under its sights.

In spite of this, the jihadist influx has taken different channels from those we already know, as in Iraq or Syria. It is enough to follow the media to guess that the self-styled Islamic State prefers global media expansion to national expansion. This is not the case in Thailand. Both the targets of terrorism and its communication strategy are national and rather hidden, in the shadows. Because of this, the relationship between them is not entirely evident today.

The status is not what it should be. If there is one thing Thailand needs today, it is a period of peace in order to recover from past events. In the last century there have been at least twelve successful coups, the last one, and not counting the 2014 coup, in 2006. There is an urgent need for a quiet period in which to establish a strong foundation, and other structure, for its constitutional monarchy (similar to England's).

Perhaps the best way to resolve the conflict is to avoid falling into the mistake of other countries, such as Burma or the Philippines, and to avoid strong repression. Therefore, as Crisis Group warns, the best option would be dialogue and not the exclusion of ethnic minorities such as the Rohingya, in the case of Burma, or the Muslim community in Thailand (with a Buddhist majority). Should this happen, the terrorist pressure would become increasingly unbearable, until the pot could only explode. Annexation to groups like ISIS can occur for a variety of causes, not adding one more to the list is essential.

[Michael E. O'Hanlon and James Steinberg, A Glass Half Full: Rebalance, Reassurance, and Resolve in the US-China Strategic Relationship. The Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2017, 104 pages]

REVIEW / María Granados

This short book follows a longer book published in 2014 by the same authors, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve. In the new publication, Michael E. O'Hanlon and James Steinberg -both academics and senior policy makers- update and review the policies they suggest in order to improve the relations between China and the United States. The relationship between both countries, established in the early 1970s, has been subject to changing times, and it has suffered several crises, but it has nonetheless grown in importance in the international sphere.

The short and straight-forward strategic review of the ongoing action provides an insight into the arsenals and plans of the two powers. Moreover, through graphs and numerical tables, it depicts the current situation in terms of strength, potential threat, and the likelihood of destruction if a conflict were to arise.

It also gives an overview of the diverse security matters that need to be monitored carefully, in the realms of space, cybernetics, and nuclear proliferation. These essential matters need not to be disregarded when planning defense strategies; instead officials should cast an eye over historical tensions such as Taiwan, North Korea and the South China Sea, and remember to use the tools that have already been established in the region to prevent the use of hard power, i.e.: ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations).

Not only does the paper carefully consider the action taken by President Obama and his predecessors, but also cautiously suggests steps ahead in the path opened by Nixon four decades ago. O'Hanlon and Steinberg use bulletpoints to give directions for further developments in the Sino-American relationship, stressing the need for transparency, mutually beneficial exchanges, cooperation, and common ends in common projects.

Some of the ideas are summarised briefly in the following paragraphs:

-True rebalance moves away from mere 'containment' and into a trustworthy alliance. Joint operations that ensure cooperation and reassurance are a key aspect of that objective.

-Confidence building in the area of communications must be reinforced in order to prevent espionage and the spread of piracy, as well as other illegal tactics to gather private information.

-The neutral trend in the broad topic of space, cybernetics and nuclearisation has to advance into a firm and close cooperation, especially in view of the threat that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea poses to the global community as a whole. Intelligence and the recent accusations of Russia's manipulation through the use of the Internet and other technological means can be a target to pursue further negotiations and the signing of international treaties such as The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances.

-To abstain from any risks of escalation, the following policies must be regarded: the leveling of military budget growth, and of the development and deployment of prompt- attack capabilities, restraining modernisation, in favor of dialogue and the exchange of information, providing notice of any operation.

The authors conclude that the relationship is not free from conflict or misunderstanding; it is indeed a work in progress. However, they are positive about that progress. The overall outlook of the Sino-American relation is, as the title suggests "A Glass Half Full": there is of course work to be done, and the path has plenty of potential problems that both countries will have to face and resolve in the least damaging way to advance on the common interest; in spite of the aforementioned, half of it has already been done: both China and the US have a goal to fight for: the prevention of war, which would be short and detrimental for all international actors alike.

[Riordan Roett, Guadalupe Paz (Eds.). Latin America and the Asian Giants: Evolving Ties with China and India. Brookings Institution Press, 2016, 336 pages]

review / Ignacio Urbasos Arbeloa

Trade between Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region has grown during the last decade at a dizzying rate of 21% per year[1]. However, China's prominence has overshadowed and concentrated the vast majority of academic analysis, leaving other relevant actors such as India in the background. This book by Riordan Roett, Guadalupe Paz and other contributors from different parts of the world offers an interesting comparison between the two "Asian giants" in their relations with Latin American countries in a new global context. This review will focus on the rise of India in the region, although references to China are unavoidable.

Historical ties between Latin America and India, though weak, have existed since the colonial period. Today one million people[2] descendants of Indian migrants live in the Caribbean, a fact that can be considered an opportunity to generate channels of dialogue, however the magnitude of the Indian diaspora eliminates any trait of exceptionality. Another interesting element directly relates India and Brazil, two countries that share to some extent the Portuguese bequest and have been standard bearers of South-South cooperation to this day, an approach shared by Lula and Dilma as well as Modi. In the historical section , India's relevance is much greater than that of China, which lacks relevant partner references in the region.

The growing economic presence of the two Asian giants in Latin America has not gone unnoticed in the political discussion . Historically, leftist sectors have been more supportive of increased trade relations with China as a way to achieve the emancipation and independence of the continent from the United States. The right, on the contrary, has been reluctant to a greater presence of China, aligning itself in the case of the countries of the Pacific Alliance with the TPP, which until the arrival of Trump was intended to be a free trade agreement aimed at increasing the presence of the American continent in Asia-Pacific apart from China[3]. In the authors' opinion, Latin America lacks a cohesive narrative and strategy on China, thus drastically reducing its negotiating capacity and influence on the Asian country. The case of India is different, as the trade Issue is still one tenth of China's, it is a democratic country, a US ally and has a better image in the continent.

Despite the fact that the vast majority of Latin American exports to Asia are made up of commodities and imports of manufactured products, there are subtle differences that explain India's better image in the region. First, Chinese imports are much more diversified than Indian imports, generating a general perception of destruction of the industrial fabric and local jobs due to greater competitiveness due to economies of scale and the distortion of the yuan. Likewise, what India exports to Latin America are socially valued products (as in the case of generic drugs, which have reduced the price of medicines) and cheap vehicles, while Indian entrepreneurs set up information companies, which have generated 20,000 jobs in the region.

In terms of imports, both India and China concentrate their purchases on natural products, with India's profile being more energy-intensive and China's more mining-based. Both countries have a huge demand for soybeans, a product that, agreement to Riordan Roett, will gradually become increasingly important due to its versatility as food, feed and source of biofuels. It is important to note that Latin America is one of the keys to energy and food security in these countries, which face this enormous challenge due to their population size in different ways: India is betting on private investment and China on long-term purchase agreements with its public companies. A possible collision between the two Asian giants for access to these markets cannot be ruled out, with the geopolitical implications that this entails.

As for India's financial positioning in Latin America, the reality sample an almost testimonial presence compared to that of China. However, it is worth noting that Indian investment and loans are seen in a much better light than Chinese ones. In general, India acts as a transparent partner accustomed to Latin American practices, which is not the case with China, whose actors are more accustomed to dealing with a complex bureaucracy rather than a democratic system. Likewise, Chinese loans, which are increasingly present in certain economies such as Venezuela or Ecuador, have proven to be less advantageous than those of international organizations such as the IMF or IDB, as they have higher interest rates and are tied to strict conditions for the purchase of goods. All this makes India a friendlier partner for public opinion: a challenge that it will have to face as it increases its presence in the region and thus its true way of acting abroad, still an unknown quantity, can be appreciated.

final, India's role in the region is promising, although still limited in scope. The annual growth of trade between that country and Latin America was 140% between 2009-2014[4] and India has already signed the first free trade agreements (with MERCOSUR and Chile), albeit on a small scale. It should be noted that this trade is mainly of an inter-industrial nature, in which Latin American countries export primary products and natural resource-based manufactures and import manufactures of different technological intensities, which limits the potential for establishing deeper economic relations between the two regions[5] and condemns them to commodity price fluctuations. The fact that it takes 45 to 60 days for a cargo ship to reach Indian ports from the Chilean coast is a real barrier to trade, but there are many reasons to expect a greater regional presence from India, such as its excellent relations with Brazil, expectations of annual growth of over 7% of its GDP and the inescapable importance of Latin America in guaranteeing energy and food security for the growing population of the Asian country.

DOC. DE work / Iñigo González Inchaurraga

SUMMARY

The main, though not the only, element of contention between the United States and China is Taiwan. While Washington maintains a one-China policy, Beijing defends the "one China" principle, proclaiming that there is only one China in the world and that both the island of Taiwan and the mainland are the same People's Republic of China. The Chinese authorities also maintain that Chinese sovereignty and territory cannot be divided. In Beijing's eyes, Taiwan is a renegade province that emerged from the Chinese civil war, so reunification is the only option for the island's future. This reunification should preferably take place peacefully, but the use of force cannot be ruled out if Taiwan were to seek de jure independence. For its part, the government of Taipei claims its status as a sovereign state. The fact is that at the end of the 2010s, it is difficult to continue asking China to comply with international law in relation, for example, to the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling and territorial disputes in the South China Sea, while Taiwan remains an anomaly that violates the same international law that Beijing must comply with in accordance with UN rules on the Law of the Sea.

download the complete document [pdf. 432k]

U.S.-China relations do not satisfy either country; they probably never will. They must try to manage them, peacefully, peacefully

meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump [White House video screebshot].

ANALYSIS / María Granados

The National Security Strategy presented in December by Donald Trump formally label China and Russia as "rivals" of the United States. It presents these two countries as actors that "challenge the power, influence and interests" of Washington and "seek to erode the security and prosperity" of Americans. Although the document also considers "rogue" states such as Iran and North Korea, and transnational organizations, both jihadist and organized crime, as threats, the arguments of the new U.S. Administration focus especially on China. The Asian nation appears as the great obstacle to the realization of the "America First" promised by Trump, because of its unfair trade and currency practices.

Thus, the first National Security Strategy document of the Trump era corroborates the speech he had maintained as a candidate. During the election campaign Trump spoke of China as a "currency manipulator" and accused it of keeping the yuan artificially low. He also threatened Beijing with starting a trade war, complaining about the economic consequences for the US of China's excessive trade surplus in bilateral relations, as well as the reduction of US manufacturing jobs. Shortly after being elected, before the inauguration of his term, Trump provoked a diplomatic friction with China by having a telephone conversation with the president of Taiwan.

However, since his arrival at the White House, Trump has taken care to iron out these differences with China. He committed to maintaining the One China Policy, retracted his criticisms, and met in Florida with President Xi Jinping, agreeing to respect each other's sphere of influence and not to intervene in the internal affairs of the other. This, together with an incipient partnership in the sanctions against North Korea, seemed to be giving birth to a rapprochement that has not materialized. In fact, the US National Security Strategy's official treatment of China as a "rival" breaks with a long period of mutual acceptance that began in the 1970s.

Nixon's opening

The United States and China had serious precedents: the Korean War (1950-1953), which pitted China and the USSR in the North against the American-supported South, of which the Vietnam War (1955-1975) was a collateral consequence; and the nuclear danger that began in 1949, the year in which the USSR carried out the first effective essay . For Washington, from an ideological and military point of view, China was an international actor that it was desirable to control. For Beijing, in alliance with the Soviet Union, it was urgent to propagate communism's speech about the "imperialist enemy", which it repeated with intensity throughout the first years of the Cold War.

In 1969, the new US president, Richard Nixon, included in his inaugural speech a reference letter against isolationism (1). From the other side of the world there were also new messages: the distancing that Mao began to establish in relation to the USSR due to their border conflicts. This disrupted the triangle of international relations existing in those years of the Cold War (China, USSR, USA), and began to create a link between Beijing and Washington.

Thus, the first signs of rapprochement began to appear. In 1971 the United States voted for Taiwan's seat on the United Nations Security committee to be taken by the People's Republic of China. In 1972, the Shanghai statement was drawn up, which established the instructions for Sino-US rapprochement and was embodied in five principles:

1. The One China Policy: establishing diplomatic relations with China meant not being able to establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and vice versa, since both claim to be the true and only China.

2. Do not support Taiwan's independence.

3. Not to support the possible invasion of Japan.

4. Peaceful resolution of the conflict with Taiwan, reducing military installations on the island.

5. The commitment to continue being peaceful allies in search of lasting cooperation.

Since the rapprochement of the 1970s, relations between the two countries have been heavily influenced by Washington and Beijing's attitude towards Taiwan and the two Koreas, in a sort of indirect Sino-American relations.

The Taiwan issue

The self-styled Republic of China had been the main obstacle to the complete normalization of relations, as seen with the Shanghai statement . Actual reunification by (mainland) China was prevented by U.S. troops.

After 1973 there were two important documents: the so-called Taiwan Relations Act, by which the US recognized the island as having the same privileges as before, but not as a sovereign nation, and the Joint statement (sometimes known as the "Second Shanghai statement "), which drastically cut arms sales to Taiwan. In 1979, Washington and Beijing exchanged ambassadors and the Americans ceased formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Around 1980, the policy advocated by the mainland Chinese government was "one country, two systems", offering Formosa the exceptionality of a different and economically independent political system, but being part of the one China. However, this formula did not meet the 23rd province's desire for independence. By 1985, the island's government was moving steadily towards democracy (2).

In the late 1990s, Beijing threatened Taiwan with military exercises in the surrounding waters, in which missiles were deployed, prompting a forceful response from the United States: the dispatch of two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region; with this Washington showed a clear decision to protect the former ally because of its strategic importance.

The current status remains complex. No direct courier or telecommunications links have been established between China and its rebel province; no postal or parcel shipments are sent, and there is no direct flight connection. Face-to-face meetings between delegates have been infrequent and not very productive.

The North Korea problem

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for its part, constitutes a particularly critical point in Sino-American relations, which also affects South Korea and Japan, both US allies Pyongyang has already conducted six subway nuclear tests and continues with its missile launches over the Sea of Japan.

China is North Korea's only ally: it is its largest trading partner and its main source of food and energy. Beijing has historically opposed tough international sanctions against its neighbor. The desire for the survival of communism is essential to understand the close relationship between the sui generis Korean dictatorship and China. It is easy to guess why: if Kim Jong-Un's regime falls, Xi Jinping's regime could be destabilized. A refugee crisis, with thousands of North Koreans crossing the 1,400-kilometer border between the two countries, would have serious effects on the Asian giant. Although they continue to be strongly linked to Pyongyang, the Chinese have pushed for the resumption of the Six-Party Dialogue and have accepted the application of certain international sanctions.

Trump's blunt assertion that "if China won't solve the North Korean problem, we will" does not really dispel doubts about what might happen if Pyongyang crosses the threshold of nuclear capability. Certainly as the Kim Jong-Un regime has moved closer to that threshold, Beijing has increased its diplomatic, financial and trade pressures on its neighbor (3). But the possibility that North Korea is already on the verge of reaching its strategic goal leaves the United States with the choice of military action, which can hardly be both effective and limited, or having to settle for a policy of containment.

Over the years, Washington has tried to encourage North Korea to irreversibly abandon its nuclear program, offering in return a reward in the form of financial aid, diplomatic advantages and normalization of relations. At the same time, South Korea hosts 29,000 U.S. military personnel. In March 2017, executive orders from the US President and congress went beyond sanctions: a defense system known as THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) (4) was programmed as a preventive measure against a possible attack from the North and with the goal of ensuring the stability of the region.

The THAAD battery is particularly interesting to analyze because of the dual perspective it presents. Because of its limited range and capability, it should not be of concern to China, as the interceptors would not be able to reach Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles at any point along the trajectory from almost any of the possible launch locations. Thus, neither Washington nor Seoul should portray the system as a form of retaliation against Beijing for its failed sanctions on North Korea. Unfortunately, U.S. and South Korean officials suggest that the purpose of installing the THADD system is to send a warning message to China. This is counterproductive, as it only offers reasons to justify the nuclearization of the Asian hegemon in the face of the apparent degradation of its medium-range,second-strike capability Degree

Mutual dissatisfactions

If issues relating to Taiwan and North Korea have occupied much of the bilateral diary , the question of China's economic transformation, since its impetus by Deng Xiaoping, has been central to the direct relationship between China and the United States.

The Gǎigé kāifàng (reform and opening up) emphasized modernization and economic and political reform. This led to normalized diplomatic relations and the development bilateral trade and investment. Political, economic and security cooperation with the former "American imperialists" was based on subject prevention of terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation, and the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula.

However, there are still unresolved issues. U.S. dissatisfaction is due to China's human rights policy and its financial moves to devalue its currency as a means of controlling inflation. These currency movements call into question the control of the market by the American hegemon, which currently has greater weight and primacy, among other things, because the dollar is the international currency of exchange (it could thus "export its inflation" to Beijing). Also of concern in Washington is the dependence of the United States on imports from China, which generates a large bilateral trade deficit for the Americans. Another potential problem is the sale of missiles and nuclear technology to third states in the Middle East and Asia.

From the Chinese perspective, their dissatisfaction is due to US arms sales to the rogue province (Taiwan), the defense system established in South Korea (both the THAAD system and the military financial aid ), and a US international policy that Beijing describes as threatening, imperialist and domineering.

Cooperation channels

The U.S. view of China as a "rival," as reflected in the Trump Administration's first National Defense Strategy document, stems from the realization that the Chinese regime is not moving toward democracy as many in the rest of the world had hoped. "For decades, US policy was based on the belief that supporting China's rise and integration into the post-war international order would liberalize that country," the document says, noting that Beijing is not sliding towards a regime of political freedoms and respect for human rights, so Washington can no longer be as condescending to Beijing as it used to be.

Probably, without China's assumption of the values and principles that give meaning to the United States, a real and confident rapprochement between the two superpowers is impossible. Still, for the survival of both, extensive cooperation between them is necessary.

Although a war between the United States and China is not impossible, it is unlikely for a number of reasons, as Steinberg and O'Hanlon argue in Strategic Reassurance and Resolve (2015):

-The common goals of economic prosperity, trade exchange and interdependence at the stock market, financial and business levels make a warlike confrontation very damaging for both countries. In addition, China has progressively adopted measures against fraud and destabilization by computer manipulation, at the request of the United States; the issue of cyber espionage, although it continues to provoke mutual disagreements, is regularly addressed by both countries in their bilateral meetings, aware that it is likely to become more important over the years.

-The South China Sea is a trade route that has never been closed, although it is a source of disputes to be taken into account, as they remain unresolved even though they have been brought before the Court dealing with the Law of the Sea (following the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). The United States has strategic and commercial interests in the region that link it to its allies (Japan and South Korea), so this could be a source of tension. In any case, at present it does not seem that China wishes to provoke a military escalation in the area, even though it has established instructions on artificial islands and moved troops.

-ASEAN's code of conduct for the South China Sea, which precludes the use of force, may cause Beijing to rethink increasing its aggressiveness in the region. That ASEAN's push for China to stop claiming maritime sovereignty that has been rejected by the international community are points against war.

-There are several joint operations in the fight against terrorism (ISIS) and in the prevention of piracy, in which the two superpowers are involved.

-China has increased its humanitarian financial aid and its support to UN peacekeeping missions.

In a scenario of non-understanding between Beijing and Washington, but at the same time of non-armed confrontation, the following actions may be suggested:

-A negotiation that would include reduced U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in exchange for increased coastal security, and a commensurate reduction by China of threats to the island.

-Greater cooperation and transparency in arms and troop movements, militarization, restructuring of the armed forces and military exercises in the Pacific.

-Creation of joint organizations to fight organized crime and cyber-attacks, especially against threats to civilian infrastructure.

-Support and consistency in preventing nuclear escalation. Negotiation in reaching a firm conclusion on how to weaken the Pyongyang regime. Serious and consistent criticism, knowing the impossibility (as well as harm) of its direct overthrow.

-----------------------------------------

(1) "We seek an open world--open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people--a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation.
We cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy". Inaugural Address (January 20, 1969)

(2) It was the first time that the Democratic Progressive Party succeeded in pushing through the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan elections and forming a unified coalition against the Kuomintang. In 1992 the first free legislative elections took place in Taiwan.

(3) "China will be most likely to put diplomatic and financial pressure on North Korea if it believes that failing to do so will lead the United States to destabilize the regime," write Joshua Stanton, Sung- Yoon Lee, and Bruce Klingner in Foreign Affairs.

(4) The system typically has between 48 and 62 interceptor missiles with ranges of up to 200 kilometers, supported by radar with a range of up to about 1,000 kilometers.

One Belt-One Road' project aims to consolidate China's rise as a superpower

The ambitious initiative launched by Xi Jinping to connect China with the rest of the Eurasian continent may prove costly and difficult. But unlike the overland route through the Central Asian republics, the sea route may not take long to become a reality on certain stretches, as China has already built some ports on part of the route.

▲The land and sea lanes of the Chinese initiative [yourfreetemplates].

article / Jimena Puga Gómez [English version].

Following Chinese President Xi Jinping's 2013 speech on the revitalization of the ancient Silk Road, the initiative that started out as just an idea has become the Beijing government's biggest economic challenge: a revolution that, if carried out, will change the Asian continent's passenger, freight and hydrocarbon transport infrastructure, as well as high-tech. Dubbed OBOR-OneBelt-One Road, the plan is intended to be the core topic of China's rise as a regional superpower.

The OBOR initiative is a grand plan to redesign China's strategic environment, project Beijing's economic power, secure the communist country's access to energy and mineral supplies, and boost economic growth in the west of the People's Republic. OBOR seeks to achieve these goals by fostering greater and faster connectivity between China and Europe through intermediate points in Central, West and South Asia, as well as with Russia.

For its part, the maritime route that will form one of the core topic of the OBOR initiative, also known as the Silk Road of the 21st century, counts on the fact that seven of the ten largest ports in the world are in China and, as is well known, these infrastructures make the Asian giant an important exporter of port management services. 

The Eastbound Maritime Silk Road will start in Fujian province and pass through Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan, before heading south to the Strait of Malacca. From Kuala Lumpur, the Route will continue to Kolkata and Colombo, then cross the rest of the Indian Ocean towards Nairobi. From there, it will travel along the Horn of Africa, seeking to cross the strategic Gulf of Aden until it reaches the Red Sea. Beijing's plan aims to create sufficient infrastructure to enable Chinese ships to safely reach the Mediterranean after sailing through the Suez Canal. But the ambition of the People's Republic does not stop at the gates of the European Union, since China wants to reach Athens by sailing the Aegean and from there to Venice, where it will look for land routes that will make it possible to move its goods throughout the Union. Chinese investment has focused, among other things, on the port of Piraeus, with a new logistics center, and on the development of a network of logistics infrastructures through the Balkans and Hungary.

The South Pacific has also been included in this strategic map of routes devised in Beijing. Thus, the maritime Silk Road has two routes. The first, as mentioned above, originates on the east coast of China and, via the South China Sea, aims to establish strategic control of the Spratley Islands, the Strait of Malacca and the entire Indo-Pacific area, including the Bay of Bengal, in order to reach the heart of Europe. The second sea route will also cross the South China Sea to direct its ships to the coastal ports of the South Pacific. With this, China would also control the routes of the essential raw materials that come from Latin American countries.

Although this is a long-term economic project , the Chinese government has already begun the construction of certain infrastructures and the necessary negotiations with various countries. A clear example is Germany. The European Union is China's largest trading partner , while the People's Republic is the Union's second-largest provider . Germany, for sample , not only enjoys an excellent reputation as a reliable partner for China, but is also regarded as "Europe's trade gateway". test of this is that, at a meeting in Duisburg, the world's largest inland port and an important transport and logistics hub in Europe, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed to Germany "to work together to realize the ambitious project of the revival of the economic belt of the new Silk Road of the 21st century". Germany and China are currently connected by the Chongqing-Xinjiang-Duisburg international railroad line.

The ports built by China at Hambantota and Colombo in Sri Lanka; the China-Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone in Egypt; Kazakhstan's negotiation of the right to clear its imports and exports through the Chinese port of Lianyungang; and a new alliance between ports in China and Malaysia are additional examples of China's ability to leverage its newfound skill as a port modernizer and manager to support its strategy.

The New Silk Road initiative is a project that will require multi-billion dollar investments in order to build smooth, safe and efficient transport infrastructures. The effects of this economic network ensure benefits not only for China, the leader of the OBOR initiative, but also for all the countries affected by it. However, the financing of the project is still an unknown quantity that should be clarified.

▲Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force H6K in flight over the Pacific.

COMMENTARY / Ignacio Cristóbal Urbicain* [English version].

Only three countries in the world have strategic or long-range bombers (USA, Russia and China). The mission statement of this subject of weapon is to project force over very long distances, normally within enemy airspace, in order to destroy, with its important armament load, strategic targets, i.e. industry, infrastructure, logistics, etc. It is also an important deterrent weapon.

In the case of China, its strategic aviation has mainly the latter mission statement regarding the defense of its interests by projecting a threat at very far distances, i.e. to prevent the approach and entrance of US Navy battle groups (aircraft carriers and attack cruisers) to the South China Sea.

For this task, China has the Xian H-6. This aircraft is a derivation of the Russian Tupolev Tu-16 developed 60 years ago. In 2007, the Chinese upgraded their H-6 by replacing the old engines to achieve a longer range (3,500 km). Again Russian engines were chosen, although there are sources that have said that a new Chinese engine (WS-18) is being developed. A general electronic and air-to-surface radar modernization was also carried out. Its targeting capability is unknown. The bomb bay was reduced to accommodate another interior fuel tank and modified to accommodate the 2,200 km range CJ-10th Wayside Cross CJ-10th missiles. This created the H-6K, considerably more modern than the previous version, which retains the ability to carry nuclear armament, as well as the YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship missiles.

A squadron of 15 of these aircraft (this is the issue Jane's Defence thinks are in service) can fire around a hundred missiles, creating a major problem for a naval group with bad intentions. Note also that in recent weeks the H-6Ks have been seen for the first time with bombs on their external wing mounts.

The future

In December 2016, Chinese Defense Ministry sources confirmed rumors about the development of a new long-range bomber. This new project is likely to be stealthy (very leave detectability to radar), long-range ("second line of islands" - from central Japan to eastern Indonesia, crossing the island of Guam, USA) , as well as able to carry a large amount of conventional armament in an internal hold, which will improve stealthiness against enemy radars.    

The designation is currently X, although Jane's Defense is already calling it H-20. Apparently the bomber will not be capable of carrying nuclear weapons, as China has a "no first strike" nuclear policy, which means that it will not be the one to initiate a conflict with nuclear weapons. For all that, it has a nuclear arsenal tied to the idea that the country would survive a first strike and be able to refund the blow.

The role of this new bomber will be to prevent a U.S. carrier force with its battle group from getting any closer than it should to its areas of interest. These aircraft carrying long-range air-to-surface missiles against such well-defended naval groupings will be one of the three legs of the Chinese deterrent. The other two are attack submarines and ballistic missiles.

Its design, commissioned to Xian Aircraft Corporation, will probably be similar to the American B-2 bomber, following the Chinese tradition of practically copying Western models (the J-20 fighter is similar to the American F-22) and its first flight could be in 2025. Another question is when it will be operational, but considering the cost of the first flight of the J-20 and its operability, it seems a long way off. Hence the modernization of the H-6 mentioned at the beginning of the article.

Combat aircraft are very complex weapon systems and it is not enough for them to fly. They must do so with the characteristics for which they are designed. In this case China has historically been very dependent on Russian engines. Theirs have not performed as expected. Not to mention electronics, in this field the US still beats them by a long way.

*Professor, School of Economics and Business Administration, Universidad de Navarra

The busy passage, decisive in the strategies of the two countries to counteract each other

The Strait of Malacca, a core topic for the connection between the northern part of the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific region, will be a thermometer for measuring the future balance of power between China and India. India is responding to the further expansion of Chinese maritime interests, which are forcing Beijing to pay close attention to Malacca, by advancing its positions towards the western mouth of the strait.

▲Map of the Indo-Pacific [US DoD].

article / Alejandro Puigrefagut [English version].

Maritime routes are the basis for trade and communication between more than 80% of the world's countries. This fact makes the natural geographic location of states of great strategic importance. A particularly important point for maritime traffic is the Strait of Malacca, a core topic for trade in the most populated region of the world.

The Strait of Malacca, which links the South China Sea with the Burma Sea en route to the Bay of Bengal, is the busiest commercial passage in the world and is therefore a strategic location. Approximately 60% of the world's maritime trade passes through this corridor that surrounds the western coast of the Malaysian peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, with more than 150 ships per day, and it is the main oil supply route for two of Asia's main consumers: the People's Republic of China and Japan. This geographical point is a core topic for the entire Indo-Pacific region, so ensuring the free movement of ships is strategic. This is why many states in the region, including China and the United States, see the protection of this passage as necessary in order to be able to supply themselves, export their goods and not be blocked by the control of a third country over this area.

With regard to China, it is not easy to imagine that a blockade of its supplies due to problems in the Strait of Malacca would happen. For this to happen, an armed conflict of extraordinary dimensions would have to be generated, leading to such a blockade by a subject that could control -and potentially interrupt- the passage to the other countries in the region. This potential risk, which today can only be generated by the US Navy, forces China to be alert and to develop sufficient military capabilities to protect what it considers its territories in the South China Sea and, by extension, the supply of vital resources that must necessarily cross the Strait of Malacca.

The Asian giant's positions and presence in the South China Sea and in the areas around the Strait of Malacca have increased in recent years in order to increase its influence over the states in the region. Moreover, in order to defend its oil and natural gas supplies (from the Persian Gulf), China has extended its presence as far as the Indian Ocean, although this is not enough. The reality is that in this area there is a great skill between two of the most influential Asian powers in the region: China and India. Due to the growing presence and influence of the People's Republic in the Indian Ocean, India has been forced to take proactive steps to enhance peace and stability in the region by mobilizing and expanding its presence from its east coast to the vicinity of the Strait in order to rebalance the regional balance of power. In this way, India can dominate the western access to the Strait and, consequently, have greater reaction time to maneuver in the Indian Ocean as well as in the Strait itself and even gain more agile access to the waters of the South China Sea.

At the same time, India's growing closeness to the South China Sea is viewed with concern in Beijing, and some analysts even see India as a threat in the event of a hypothetical conflict between the two regional powers and India blocking the Strait and, therefore, China's access to certain raw materials and other resources. For this reason, over the past three years China has carried out various military maneuvers jointly with third states in the Strait of Malacca, especially with Malaysia. During the first exercises in the area, the Ministry of Defense of the People's Republic of China concluded that bilateral relations with Malaysia in terms of security and defense cooperation were strengthened and that "joint response capability to security threats was enhanced". Moreover, for China the protection of the Strait is a priority because of its great strategic value and because countries such as the US and Japan also wish to control it.