▲Transfer of immigrants arriving from North Africa to the Italian island of Lampedusa [Vito Manzani].

ANALYSIS / Valeria Nadal [English version].

In late 2017, Cable News Network (CNN) published a video recorded anonymously with a hidden camera showing the sale of four men in Libya, for $400 each. It was an example of selling slaves to Libyan nationals for work or ransom, in the case of men, or as sex slaves, in the case of women. The shocking images triggered a global response; several Hollywood celebrities joined the protests calling for an end to the slave trade in Libya. France, Germany, Chad, Nigeria and other countries have urged Libya to address this serious problem through a repatriation program for migrants and the evacuation of detention camps, where many of the slave mafias operate. Circumstances, however, do not appear to have improved since the video was released, mainly because there continues to be a lack of state coordination to address the problem, along with other factors. How is it possible that a slave trade could have occurred inside Libya?

Libya is a large country located in North Africa, with a long Mediterranean coastline. Until 2011, when the Arab Spring broke out, Libya was one of the most stable countries in the region. It had one of the highest life expectancies in all of Africa, and an educational system - from primary Education to university - better than most neighboring countries. However, this status of stability and relative prosperity came to an end in February 2011, when the uprisings that began in Tunisia, and had spread to countries such as Yemen, Jordan and Egypt, reached Libya.

Unlike other states in the region, which were able to peacefully resolve the demands of the protesters, the immediate threat of civil war in Libya forced an international intervention to resolve the conflict. The United States (US) and the European Union (EU), with the support of the United Nations (UN), acted against the dictatorial regime of Muammar Gaddafi. With the capture and killing of Qaddafi by rebel troops, the war seemed to be over. However, in the absence of a viable plan for a political transition, the status deteriorated further as various political actors attempted to fill the power vacuum left by Qaddafi's demise.

Today, Libya continues to experience severe political instability and is considered a failed state. Although there is a government promoted and recognized by the UN, the Government of National Unity (GNU), it does not control the entire country and is challenged by various power groups, many of which are armed militias. Due to this lack of governmental authority, as well as its strategic location on the Mediterranean coast, Libya has become a base of operations for mafias, which take advantage of the willingness of refugees and migrants to reach Europe via the Libyan land route. The open borders policy launched by the EU in 2015 has not helped curb their activities, as it has facilitated the establishment of human smuggling routes. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that at least 400,000 people are currently held in Libyan detention centers, where migrants are an easy goal for the slave trade. The GUN has opened a formal research and has met with European and African leaders to enable emergency repatriation of refugees and migrants. However, the effectiveness of the Libyan authorities' efforts is limited. A more important issue, however, is the role that the international community can play in alleviating the problem, of which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been core topic voices in the discussion.

Testimonials (in Spanish)

Since 2015, Oxfam has reported extensively to the international community on the migration crisis in Libya, and has emphasized the need for European countries to seek and find a solution for the thousands of men, women and children suffering from this status. Documented cases of slave trafficking in Libya, carried out by smugglers and militias, have made the search for a solution even more urgent.

In the wake of this alarming status in Libya, on August 9, 2017, Oxfam published agraduate bulletin "You Are No Longer Human," in which it analyzed the facts of the status in Libya and blamed European countries for their "misguided policies aimed at preventing people from reaching Italy." To develop this report, Oxfam spoke "with men and women who have spent months being beaten, tied up like animals and sold as cheap labor in Libya's scandalous slave trade," and drew on the "...anguished testimonies of migrants who spent time in Libya before escaping to Italy."

The testimonies recount shocking scenes of sexual violence, torture and slave work ; they also recount cases of people who have been held captive because of the impossibility of paying the price demanded by the smugglers. The latter happened to Peter, an 18-year-old Nigerian: "Once we arrived in Sabah, in Libya, they took me to the 'Ghetto' (...) They gave us a phone to call our families and ask them for money. If you could not pay the 1,500 Libyan dinars [about 100 euros], you were held captive and beaten."

After hearing these testimonies, Oxfam has concluded that European policies must take into account the experiences of people forced to flee their homes, as the information they provide clearly sample that "Libya remains a country marked by systematic human rights abuses and (...) the EU's attempt to ensure that people cannot leave Libya only puts more men, women and children at risk of abuse and exploitation."

Some of the solutions Oxfam has proposed include promoting humanitarian search and rescue operations, increasing the issue of immigration applications that are accepted for processing, creating safe routes to Europe, and ending the policy that prevents migrants from leaving Libya.

Open, close borders

Another international agency that has actively denounced the inhumane status in Libya is Amnesty International. According to this organization's data , the world is facing one of the most serious cases of slavery in the 21st century. Refugees and migrants arriving on Libyan territory are detained and tortured in detention centers before being sold into slavery. Those who manage to escape such horrible conditions do not necessarily end up in better circumstances: at least 3,000 people have died trying to cross the Mediterranean.

As one of the most active organizations regarding the status in Libya, Amnesty International has order EU member states to stop closing their borders to refugees and migrants from Libya. It argues that this European policy only encourages and fuels violence and extortion on Libyan territory, making the EU complicit in this crisis.

Amnesty International recalls that, since the end of 2016, the closure of European borders has favored increased control by the Libyan Anti-Immigration department , which now oversees detention centers where refugees and migrants are not only arbitrarily and indefinitely detained, but also often sold as slaves. Moreover, according to the organization, the European inability or unwillingness to act, mistakenly believing that what happens outside European borders has no consequences for the EU's internal affairs, has allowed the Libyan Coast Guard to intercept people at sea. Instead of reaching the "promised land", migrants are forcibly taken back to Libya, where they are locked up and mistreated again in detention centers. All this is favored by the agreements reached by the EU and the local Libyan authorities, backed by armed groups, regarding the control of migratory flows to Europe.

International coordination

On December 7, 2017, the UN Securitycommittee held an emergency session to take action on the status of the slave trade in Libya. This status was described as an "abuse of human rights that may also constitute crimes against humanity", in which case the Libyan authorities and all member states of the organization should act in agreement with International Public Law by bringing those responsible before the International Criminal Court (ICC). In addition, the UN pointed to the Libyan authorities as one of the main actors complicit in the growing phenomenon of slave trafficking, due to their ineffectiveness in investigating it and administering justice. The organization has also placed particular emphasis on the need for the Libyan government to secure its borders and for its actions to be supported by various international instruments, so that human trafficking can be effectively countered. The UN has also encouraged cooperation with the EU and the African Union (AU) to ensure the protection of refugees and migrants, on the premise that success will only be achieved if all actors involved work together.

Meanwhile, the UN is already operating in the territory through the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which has helped 13,000 people to leave detention centers in Libya, and another 8,000 from those in Niger. But IOM's efforts do not end in Libya. Once refugees and migrants are safe, the organization stores their information and testimonies and offers them the possibility of returning home, ensuring IOM's attendance in the process.

Despite attempts to unify the efforts of all organizations active on the ground, the reality is that the UN today does not have a plan of action that includes all parties to end slavery in Libya and seek a common solution. According to reports from this organization, slavery in Libya could end by 2030, after 20 years of test and error. Not surprisingly, however, most NGOs have no action plans.

NGO solutions

NGOs play an important role in helping to alleviate the humanitarian problems caused by migration; however, the solutions they suggest often do not take into account the complex political realities that make reaching those solutions, if not totally impossible, at least challenging. As a result, many of the proposals offered by human rights agencies such as Oxfam and Amnesty International are too broad to be useful internship. The migration crisis, which reached its peak in the summer of 2015 with the effective invitation by several European nations for refugees to migrate to Europe-coupled with the relaxation of Dublin regulations and the opening of borders within the EU-paradoxically helped to exacerbate the problem. These measures provided an incentive for mass migration of people who did not fall into the "refugee" category, encouraging risk-taking among migrants on the premise that borders would remain open and all would be welcome.

The result has not only been the rapid backtracking on this policy by a number of countries that initially supported it, such as Austria, but also a dramatic internal and diplomatic conflict within the EU between countries that are against mass migration to the territory of the Union. The crisis also shed light on the inability of the existing laws of both the EU and its member states to find solutions to the migration problem. Thus, the policy of open borders as a solution to the problem may be well intentioned, but ineffective in providing a balanced solution to the problem.

Similarly, ensuring safe passage for migrants back to their home country is based on the assumption that there is an actual functioning government in Libya with which such efforts can be coordinated; however, no such entity exists as yet. While the GUN has a limited amount of control over certain swaths of territory, the problem remains that in other parts of Libya this government exercises no control. While assisting (limited) migration and/or repatriation and securing land and sea borders could be a first step in stemming the flow, the fact remains that political instability in Libya - as well as in other nations - is what breeds smuggling networks, one of which is the slave trade.

Therefore, the European policy of helping more people by relaxing borders hardly solves the problem. At its height, the migration crisis saw hundreds of thousands of migrants crossing open borders in Europe, with no realistic plan to deal with the numbers. Moreover, the international press seems to be reporting less aggressively on the various difficulties migrants face within their new host states as a result of a utopian policy in which the sky is the limit for immigration. More importantly, the open-door policy for immigration - pushed by a number of humanitarian organizations - has also led to the proliferation of smuggling networks within Europe that have required the establishment of new work forces to deal with them, although the result of this measure could be worse as increased control may lead to the emergence of new routes and access points. Nearly 90% of migrants arriving in Europe are facilitated by the multinational smuggling business. The point is that illegal activities thrive as a result of failed policies and the inability to find determined political solutions to the migration crisis: a necessary ingredient for successful practical measures.

The primary role of the states

The lack of government control over territory in Libya, characteristic of a failed state, has made possible the proliferation of illegal and highly humiliating activities against human dignity, such as the slave trade. Images such as the one on CNN, which provided evidence of people being sold into slavery in detention centers, have raised international awareness of the problem. Numerous organizations, led by the UN, have intensified their work in recent months to try to put an end to such a disastrous status . These efforts have achieved some results, however, there is no meaningful method to improve them because they are not coordinated at the state level, and the large-scale cooperation required by all parties involved is unlikely to be possible.

Moreover, the effects of the migration crisis are not unique to Libya or Africa, and have manifested themselves in Europe as well. Although human trafficking, both in the slave trade and for other purposes, occurs on a much larger (and quite alarming) scale in the African theater, the phenomenon has similarly affected Europe as a result of its failed - or non-existent - plan of action to manage immigration, both internally and externally. The solution is necessarily political, and the reality is that, however well-intentioned and necessary, the independent, rights-based solutions advocated by NGOs will not be decisive in solving the problem. Only states, working together with various NGOs, can put an end to this misery through well thought out and coordinated solutions. And the sad reality is that not everyone can necessarily be saved in the process, nor will all migrants be able to obtain their "European dream".

[Michael Reid, Forgotten Continent: A History of the New Latin America. Yale University Press, New Haven, 2017. 425 pages]

review / María F. Zambrano

Latin America's recent history is full of progress, even if at times only a few steps backward. In addition to the important changes that have taken place since the 1980s, when the region embraced democracy, began to overcome economic protectionism and tamed the problem of inflation, more recently there has been a period of economic acceleration - known as the golden decade, due to the boom in raw materials - which between 2002 and 2012 has meant a social B : 60 million people escaped poverty in those years, so that, although great inequalities continue to exist, at least theaverage class now extends to 50% of the population. This has generated better educated societies, which have recognized the primacy of law over the paternalism of the caudillo. But the large revenues that many states obtained in that golden decade also led to negative courses.

This moderate optimism about Latin America -without ignoring the difficulties, but without ignoring the progress made- is what is conveyed in the book Forgotten Continent: A History of the New Latin America, by Michael Reid, Latin America publisher of The Economist, where he writes the Bello column. A correspondent for almost 35 years in the region, where he has lived most of this time, Reid is one of the voices with the best knowledge of the multiple continental realities. The result of that staff experience is Forgotten Continent, which Reid published in 2007 (then with the subtitle "The Battle for the Soul of Latin America") and which he now offers again in a revised and updated edition, with extensive changes with respect to the first version.

What has happened in Latin America in the last ten years to make Reid see the need for a new presentation of his book? Although there are various elements, such as the end of the commodities boom, which has brought economic difficulties to some countries, and certain changes in political orientation (Kirschner for Macri, or Temer for Rousseff), perhaps the most notable thing is that, in democratic terms, Latin America today looks less hopeful than it did a decade ago. Ten years ago, the new left-wing populism might have seemed a mere parenthesis in the progressive democratic consolidation of Latin American societies; today, Bolivarianism has certainly already shown signs of failure, but it may have greater continuity than expected when inserted with the current of populism of various kinds that is emerging in many other parts of the world.

Reid notes the failed path taken by Chávez, also followed by other neighboring leaders of the same ilk: "There are lessons for the region in the catastrophic failure of Chavismo. An accident in history -the rise in oil prices from 2001 onwards- gave for a time spurious plausibility in some places to an alternative course to which Latin Americans seemed to have turned their backs not long ago. The 'Bolivarian alternative' was based on erroneous premises (...) In its enchantment with Bolivarianism and renewed regard for Cuba, much of the left forgot the enduring lessons of the end of the Cold War: that central planning had failed and that communism was tyranny, not liberation." In any case, the Bolivarian experience has shown that Latin America did not enter an era of assured democracy at the end of its military dictatorships, as we now see that neither did the rest of the world with the fall of the Berlin Wall, despite the perception at the time. The risk in the region is perhaps greater, due to the persistence of strong social differences: as Reid says, Chavismo is "another reminder that extreme inequality provides fertile ground for populism".

Challenges ahead

In a post-Chávez and post commodity price boom era, Latin America faces a series of challenges, which are certainly long-standing but in some cases more urgent. The double goal of achieving strong institutions and sustainable economic development requires solving important challenges, among which Reid highlights several.

One of them is security. Crime and violence have become an epidemic. In 2013, eight of the ten countries and 42 of the 50 most violent cities in the world, outside theaters of war, were in the region. Reid points to the need for territorial control by the armed forces, the professionalization of police forces, closer cooperation between police and judges, and clear accountability of these bodies to society.

Another challenge is the consolidation of the new class average. There has been progress in primary and secondary Education , but the preparation of both students and teachers is far below that of their peers in developed countries. In the 2015 PISA report , Latin American 15-year-old students were in the bottom third of the world ranking. If the status does not evolve favorably with an increase in the quality of public teaching , warns Reid, private entities would become the first alternative for the new social stratum, which would even be subjected to indebtedness without quality guarantees. This is a phenomenon that also occurs in health care.

In the fight against social inequality, many governments have promoted various Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) formulas, which are social attendance programs that seek to raise attitudinal standards, such as school enrollment of children, in exchange for subsidies. Some programs have been successful in contributing to social development , but in many cases they transfer resources without achieving long-term progress, and in some countries they have become a clear cultivation of a captive vote. By having two parallel social security systems, the government is taxing the formal sector while subsidizing the informal sector.

Esperanza

To overcome these challenges, Forgotten Continent proposes the need to advance regional integration, diversify the Economics and overcome political dogmatism. Thus, true regional integration would allow for skill that would stimulate economies of scale and regional supply chains. To overcome, at least in part, the natural barriers that hinder such integration, real investment in infrastructure beyond the current 3% of GDP is needed.

Raw materials will continue to be an important economic driver in the region, but they should not be the only one. Agricultural production should provide added value, derived from the application of innovative technologies, such as the advances being made in Argentina and Brazil with "no-till farming" and "precision agriculture". This requires an increase in investment in research and development, which currently accounts for only 0.5% of GDP. Latin America also has many natural resources that are conducive to the development of tourism and the expansion of manufacturing industries.

The author proposes to break with the historical discussion between unrestricted free market and protectionism, and to stop nurturing the corporatist culture of seeing power as a staff patrimony. "To get there requires a new subject of politics: instead of the polarization and confrontation offered by populists (and sometimes by their opponents), Latin America needs consensus building, where the state, the private sector and civil society work together to set medium-term goals and hold the government accountable for their fulfillment".

These propositional elements by Reid come at the end of a book that is above all a description of the soul of Latin America. It is a continent that has not been poor or dangerous enough, nor has it grown fast enough economically, to attract international attention. Hence the degree scroll of the book. It begins by outlining the structural, geographic and cultural difficulties that the region has had to face in its attempt to establish lasting democracies and overcome its imbalances. It continues with an analysis of the political and economic cycles, from independence to the latest dictatorships. And finally concludes with a diagnosis. Although the problems of Latin America were already well diagnosed in the first edition, ten years ago, it is in this final part of the book where the author has changed more pages. His conclusion does not vary much, but the tone is slightly more somber; nevertheless, Reid prefers to end the story with the same hopeful quotation of the Argentine liberal Bautista Alberdi: "Nations, like men, have no wings; they make their journeys on foot, step by step".

DOC. DE work / Iñigo González Inchaurraga

SUMMARY

The main, though not the only, element of contention between the United States and China is Taiwan. While Washington maintains a one-China policy, Beijing defends the "one China" principle, proclaiming that there is only one China in the world and that both the island of Taiwan and the mainland are the same People's Republic of China. The Chinese authorities also maintain that Chinese sovereignty and territory cannot be divided. In Beijing's eyes, Taiwan is a renegade province that emerged from the Chinese civil war, so reunification is the only option for the island's future. This reunification should preferably take place peacefully, but the use of force cannot be ruled out if Taiwan were to seek de jure independence. For its part, the government of Taipei claims its status as a sovereign state. The fact is that at the end of the 2010s, it is difficult to continue asking China to comply with international law in relation, for example, to the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling and territorial disputes in the South China Sea, while Taiwan remains an anomaly that violates the same international law that Beijing must comply with in accordance with UN rules on the Law of the Sea.

download the complete document [pdf. 432k]

U.S.-China relations do not satisfy either country; they probably never will. They must try to manage them, peacefully, peacefully

meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump [White House video screebshot].

ANALYSIS / María Granados

The National Security Strategy presented in December by Donald Trump formally label China and Russia as "rivals" of the United States. It presents these two countries as actors that "challenge the power, influence and interests" of Washington and "seek to erode the security and prosperity" of Americans. Although the document also considers "rogue" states such as Iran and North Korea, and transnational organizations, both jihadist and organized crime, as threats, the arguments of the new U.S. Administration focus especially on China. The Asian nation appears as the great obstacle to the realization of the "America First" promised by Trump, because of its unfair trade and currency practices.

Thus, the first National Security Strategy document of the Trump era corroborates the speech he had maintained as a candidate. During the election campaign Trump spoke of China as a "currency manipulator" and accused it of keeping the yuan artificially low. He also threatened Beijing with starting a trade war, complaining about the economic consequences for the US of China's excessive trade surplus in bilateral relations, as well as the reduction of US manufacturing jobs. Shortly after being elected, before the inauguration of his term, Trump provoked a diplomatic friction with China by having a telephone conversation with the president of Taiwan.

However, since his arrival at the White House, Trump has taken care to iron out these differences with China. He committed to maintaining the One China Policy, retracted his criticisms, and met in Florida with President Xi Jinping, agreeing to respect each other's sphere of influence and not to intervene in the internal affairs of the other. This, together with an incipient partnership in the sanctions against North Korea, seemed to be giving birth to a rapprochement that has not materialized. In fact, the US National Security Strategy's official treatment of China as a "rival" breaks with a long period of mutual acceptance that began in the 1970s.

Nixon's opening

The United States and China had serious precedents: the Korean War (1950-1953), which pitted China and the USSR in the North against the American-supported South, of which the Vietnam War (1955-1975) was a collateral consequence; and the nuclear danger that began in 1949, the year in which the USSR carried out the first effective essay . For Washington, from an ideological and military point of view, China was an international actor that it was desirable to control. For Beijing, in alliance with the Soviet Union, it was urgent to propagate communism's speech about the "imperialist enemy", which it repeated with intensity throughout the first years of the Cold War.

In 1969, the new US president, Richard Nixon, included in his inaugural speech a reference letter against isolationism (1). From the other side of the world there were also new messages: the distancing that Mao began to establish in relation to the USSR due to their border conflicts. This disrupted the triangle of international relations existing in those years of the Cold War (China, USSR, USA), and began to create a link between Beijing and Washington.

Thus, the first signs of rapprochement began to appear. In 1971 the United States voted for Taiwan's seat on the United Nations Security committee to be taken by the People's Republic of China. In 1972, the Shanghai statement was drawn up, which established the instructions for Sino-US rapprochement and was embodied in five principles:

1. The One China Policy: establishing diplomatic relations with China meant not being able to establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and vice versa, since both claim to be the true and only China.

2. Do not support Taiwan's independence.

3. Not to support the possible invasion of Japan.

4. Peaceful resolution of the conflict with Taiwan, reducing military installations on the island.

5. The commitment to continue being peaceful allies in search of lasting cooperation.

Since the rapprochement of the 1970s, relations between the two countries have been heavily influenced by Washington and Beijing's attitude towards Taiwan and the two Koreas, in a sort of indirect Sino-American relations.

The Taiwan issue

The self-styled Republic of China had been the main obstacle to the complete normalization of relations, as seen with the Shanghai statement . Actual reunification by (mainland) China was prevented by U.S. troops.

After 1973 there were two important documents: the so-called Taiwan Relations Act, by which the US recognized the island as having the same privileges as before, but not as a sovereign nation, and the Joint statement (sometimes known as the "Second Shanghai statement "), which drastically cut arms sales to Taiwan. In 1979, Washington and Beijing exchanged ambassadors and the Americans ceased formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Around 1980, the policy advocated by the mainland Chinese government was "one country, two systems", offering Formosa the exceptionality of a different and economically independent political system, but being part of the one China. However, this formula did not meet the 23rd province's desire for independence. By 1985, the island's government was moving steadily towards democracy (2).

In the late 1990s, Beijing threatened Taiwan with military exercises in the surrounding waters, in which missiles were deployed, prompting a forceful response from the United States: the dispatch of two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region; with this Washington showed a clear decision to protect the former ally because of its strategic importance.

The current status remains complex. No direct courier or telecommunications links have been established between China and its rebel province; no postal or parcel shipments are sent, and there is no direct flight connection. Face-to-face meetings between delegates have been infrequent and not very productive.

The North Korea problem

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for its part, constitutes a particularly critical point in Sino-American relations, which also affects South Korea and Japan, both US allies Pyongyang has already conducted six subway nuclear tests and continues with its missile launches over the Sea of Japan.

China is North Korea's only ally: it is its largest trading partner and its main source of food and energy. Beijing has historically opposed tough international sanctions against its neighbor. The desire for the survival of communism is essential to understand the close relationship between the sui generis Korean dictatorship and China. It is easy to guess why: if Kim Jong-Un's regime falls, Xi Jinping's regime could be destabilized. A refugee crisis, with thousands of North Koreans crossing the 1,400-kilometer border between the two countries, would have serious effects on the Asian giant. Although they continue to be strongly linked to Pyongyang, the Chinese have pushed for the resumption of the Six-Party Dialogue and have accepted the application of certain international sanctions.

Trump's blunt assertion that "if China won't solve the North Korean problem, we will" does not really dispel doubts about what might happen if Pyongyang crosses the threshold of nuclear capability. Certainly as the Kim Jong-Un regime has moved closer to that threshold, Beijing has increased its diplomatic, financial and trade pressures on its neighbor (3). But the possibility that North Korea is already on the verge of reaching its strategic goal leaves the United States with the choice of military action, which can hardly be both effective and limited, or having to settle for a policy of containment.

Over the years, Washington has tried to encourage North Korea to irreversibly abandon its nuclear program, offering in return a reward in the form of financial aid, diplomatic advantages and normalization of relations. At the same time, South Korea hosts 29,000 U.S. military personnel. In March 2017, executive orders from the US President and congress went beyond sanctions: a defense system known as THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) (4) was programmed as a preventive measure against a possible attack from the North and with the goal of ensuring the stability of the region.

The THAAD battery is particularly interesting to analyze because of the dual perspective it presents. Because of its limited range and capability, it should not be of concern to China, as the interceptors would not be able to reach Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles at any point along the trajectory from almost any of the possible launch locations. Thus, neither Washington nor Seoul should portray the system as a form of retaliation against Beijing for its failed sanctions on North Korea. Unfortunately, U.S. and South Korean officials suggest that the purpose of installing the THADD system is to send a warning message to China. This is counterproductive, as it only offers reasons to justify the nuclearization of the Asian hegemon in the face of the apparent degradation of its medium-range,second-strike capability Degree

Mutual dissatisfactions

If issues relating to Taiwan and North Korea have occupied much of the bilateral diary , the question of China's economic transformation, since its impetus by Deng Xiaoping, has been central to the direct relationship between China and the United States.

The Gǎigé kāifàng (reform and opening up) emphasized modernization and economic and political reform. This led to normalized diplomatic relations and the development bilateral trade and investment. Political, economic and security cooperation with the former "American imperialists" was based on subject prevention of terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation, and the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula.

However, there are still unresolved issues. U.S. dissatisfaction is due to China's human rights policy and its financial moves to devalue its currency as a means of controlling inflation. These currency movements call into question the control of the market by the American hegemon, which currently has greater weight and primacy, among other things, because the dollar is the international currency of exchange (it could thus "export its inflation" to Beijing). Also of concern in Washington is the dependence of the United States on imports from China, which generates a large bilateral trade deficit for the Americans. Another potential problem is the sale of missiles and nuclear technology to third states in the Middle East and Asia.

From the Chinese perspective, their dissatisfaction is due to US arms sales to the rogue province (Taiwan), the defense system established in South Korea (both the THAAD system and the military financial aid ), and a US international policy that Beijing describes as threatening, imperialist and domineering.

Cooperation channels

The U.S. view of China as a "rival," as reflected in the Trump Administration's first National Defense Strategy document, stems from the realization that the Chinese regime is not moving toward democracy as many in the rest of the world had hoped. "For decades, US policy was based on the belief that supporting China's rise and integration into the post-war international order would liberalize that country," the document says, noting that Beijing is not sliding towards a regime of political freedoms and respect for human rights, so Washington can no longer be as condescending to Beijing as it used to be.

Probably, without China's assumption of the values and principles that give meaning to the United States, a real and confident rapprochement between the two superpowers is impossible. Still, for the survival of both, extensive cooperation between them is necessary.

Although a war between the United States and China is not impossible, it is unlikely for a number of reasons, as Steinberg and O'Hanlon argue in Strategic Reassurance and Resolve (2015):

-The common goals of economic prosperity, trade exchange and interdependence at the stock market, financial and business levels make a warlike confrontation very damaging for both countries. In addition, China has progressively adopted measures against fraud and destabilization by computer manipulation, at the request of the United States; the issue of cyber espionage, although it continues to provoke mutual disagreements, is regularly addressed by both countries in their bilateral meetings, aware that it is likely to become more important over the years.

-The South China Sea is a trade route that has never been closed, although it is a source of disputes to be taken into account, as they remain unresolved even though they have been brought before the Court dealing with the Law of the Sea (following the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). The United States has strategic and commercial interests in the region that link it to its allies (Japan and South Korea), so this could be a source of tension. In any case, at present it does not seem that China wishes to provoke a military escalation in the area, even though it has established instructions on artificial islands and moved troops.

-ASEAN's code of conduct for the South China Sea, which precludes the use of force, may cause Beijing to rethink increasing its aggressiveness in the region. That ASEAN's push for China to stop claiming maritime sovereignty that has been rejected by the international community are points against war.

-There are several joint operations in the fight against terrorism (ISIS) and in the prevention of piracy, in which the two superpowers are involved.

-China has increased its humanitarian financial aid and its support to UN peacekeeping missions.

In a scenario of non-understanding between Beijing and Washington, but at the same time of non-armed confrontation, the following actions may be suggested:

-A negotiation that would include reduced U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in exchange for increased coastal security, and a commensurate reduction by China of threats to the island.

-Greater cooperation and transparency in arms and troop movements, militarization, restructuring of the armed forces and military exercises in the Pacific.

-Creation of joint organizations to fight organized crime and cyber-attacks, especially against threats to civilian infrastructure.

-Support and consistency in preventing nuclear escalation. Negotiation in reaching a firm conclusion on how to weaken the Pyongyang regime. Serious and consistent criticism, knowing the impossibility (as well as harm) of its direct overthrow.

-----------------------------------------

(1) "We seek an open world--open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people--a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation.
We cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy". Inaugural Address (January 20, 1969)

(2) It was the first time that the Democratic Progressive Party succeeded in pushing through the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan elections and forming a unified coalition against the Kuomintang. In 1992 the first free legislative elections took place in Taiwan.

(3) "China will be most likely to put diplomatic and financial pressure on North Korea if it believes that failing to do so will lead the United States to destabilize the regime," write Joshua Stanton, Sung- Yoon Lee, and Bruce Klingner in Foreign Affairs.

(4) The system typically has between 48 and 62 interceptor missiles with ranges of up to 200 kilometers, supported by radar with a range of up to about 1,000 kilometers.

[Enrique Serrano, ¿Por qué fracasa Colombia? Delirios de una nación que se desconoce a sí misma, Planeta, Bogotá 2016, 273 pages].

review / María Oliveros [English version] [English version].

Colombia's history has often been classified as one of the most violent. The long chapter of FARC terrorism or the confrontation of drug cartels are well present, but before that there were violent events in Colombia such as the Revolt of the Comuneros, the Thousand Days War or the Banana Plantation Massacre. A succession of events that has led most Colombians to believe that violence has characterized the country's history and that perhaps they can do little to avoid it.

That belief is challenged by Colombian communicator, philosopher and writer Enrique Serrano in ¿Por qué fracasa Colombia? Delusions of a nation that does not know itself. The purpose of the book is to analyze why Colombia has not prospered more as a country. To answer that question, Serrano reviews in short chapters the Colombian mentality since the beginnings of the nation; there he finds reasons why Colombia is a country that has had a hard time getting ahead, growing in progress and being able to develop to the maximum.

¿Por qué fracasa Colombia? is a risky book, which combats thoughts that have long remained in the minds of Colombians. Against that central belief that violence has characterized the country's history, Serrano warns from the very first pages: "It is also presumed that this is a nation plagued by the most vicious violence, from its beginnings to the present day. However, it has been more peaceful than violent, at least during most of its slow training , and although the importance of violence cannot be denied, it is episodic, recent, similar to that of other peoples in transition".

Serrano tries to expose the history of a country that does not begin in 1810 with the independence, but its origins go much further back, to the moment when the Spaniards arrived in America and settled in Colombia. All this in order to show the reader that during the three hundred years that followed the arrival of the first conquistadors, Colombia was a peaceful and measured nation.

Serrano's main premise is that those who arrived in Colombia were mostly new Christians, descendants of Arabs and Jews from southern Spain, who were looking for a provisional place to settle and avoid the religious conflicts that were occurring in Spain at the time. The newcomers settled in small urbanizations, some far from others, not only because that was what the country's geography allowed, but also because the last thing they wanted was to come into conflict with other settlers, both European and indigenous, according to Serrano.

In fact, it is questionable whether the new settlers were dominated by a refractory private religious approach or whether the search for refuge for their consciences motivated, in most cases, their departure to America. It seems that the author adjusts the starting point thinking of those later aspects that he wants to explain.

The author also defends the thesis that in Colombia there was a racial miscegenation, but not a cultural miscegenation, because the indigenous culture was very weak, which contributed to the assumption of the religion brought by the Spaniards. In the culture that the Spaniards transmitted to the new generations were ideas such as provisionality or even getting used to failure: "They also had to react in a peaceful, non-violent way when events were unfavorable and they could not fulfill their desires. Therefore, a relative tolerance and awareness that the frustration of the achievement of desires is something probable, is in the old patterns of upbringing of the Colombian nation".

Serrano suggests that this mentality, which originated centuries ago, is still present in Colombia: the idea of not making the maximum effort, of not taking too many risks for fear of failure, of doing things half-heartedly so as not to lose too much in case they go wrong. This mentality that was created over the years probably explains why urbanization projects in the country do not progress properly, why the subway project in the Colombian capital has not been able to materialize, or why it has cost the country so much to exploit its resources to the maximum.

Although the book touches on other aspects such as language, body hygiene and social classes, history is undoubtedly the fundamental component. Referring to historical events of the Colombian past, Serrano proposes a vision of national history far from the usual one. Thus, as has been said, his story does not begin with the cry for independence of 1810, but explains the Spanish society of the 15th and 16th centuries, in order to understand the mentality of the first men, women and families who arrived in America. It is an optimistic vision that seeks to share the idea that not everything has been suffering in Colombian history. 

It is a fact that the country's history is not lived or remembered with much enthusiasm by Colombians. Remembering the past is for many a way of recalling the violence, wars and national polarization that began with the training of the two major parties, Liberals and Conservatives, in the mid-nineteenth century. Knowing the past well, in any case, is paramount for progress; that is what the new law enacted on January 1, 2018, which requires all schools in the country to teach Colombian history class , seeks to do. 

The book concludes with a series of suggestions about the present and the future. The last chapter, graduate Where can such a nation go, tries to transmit a feeling of hope, while at the same time it is a call to high responsibility. According to the author, knowing the past and not running away from it, but accepting it in order to improve mentalities and habits, is what will give the country the basis for not failing. 

[Mai'a K. Davis Cross, The Politics of Crisis in Europe. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. 2017. 248 pages]

review / Mª Teresa La Porte [English version].

The main thesis of the extensive research presented in this work is condensed in one of its last conclusions: 'Indeed, what the crisis over Iraq, the constitution, and the Eurozone have revealed is that even in the face of extreme adversity, and even when the easy route of freezing or rolling back integration is on the table before them, Europeans routinely choose more Europe, not less' (p. 235). The author justifies this assertion by arguing that the perception of existential crisis that periodically plagues the European Union is a social construct, initiated and orchestrated by the media and public opinion shapers who control the elaboration of narratives and determine public perception of the facts. Media coverage amplifies a problem that, although undeniable, does not question the existence of the European Union. This negative vision provokes in citizens what Cross calls 'integrational panic', generating a feeling of catastrophe that is multiplied through political discourse. The absence of a 'real crisis' would be demonstrated by the fact that, after these apparent catastrophes, there is a noticeable advance in European integration and a renewed desire to find a consensus.

The book presents an analysis of three recent 'crises' that the European Union has gone through: the dispute over participation in the Iraq war (2003), the discussion around the European Constitution (2005) and the economic crisis in the Eurozone (2010-12). Each of the cases comprises a qualitative and quantitative study of the content of leading international media, an examination of public opinion reaction and a monitoring of political decision-making. Despite the difference between the case studies, the author finds a patron saint common to all of them that allows for comparative study and is developed as follows: emergence of the conflict that provokes the discussion, negative reaction of the social instigators elaborating alarming narratives, perception of existential crisis by the citizenry, state of 'catharsis' (catharsis) in which tensions relax and a serene reflection on the events takes place, and, finally, the resolution phase in which political measures are adopted that reinforce European integration (European Security Strategy, 2003 (European Security Strategy); Lisbon Treaty, 2009 (Lisbon Treaty); European Fiscal Compact, 2012 (Fiscal Compact)).

The European Union is understood as a project in the process of development: 'a work in progress, a project that is perennially in the middle of its evolution, with no clearly defined end goal' (p.2). The disagreements between the member states, in relation to foreign policy or to the Degree integration, are typical of an ambitious initiative, which is in the process of maturing and which is always moving forward with the agreement of each and every one of its members. However, the study does not underestimate the real difficulties faced by the Community institution, which are present throughout the research.

Of particular interest is the close monitoring of the social dynamics generated by the interpretation of the 'crises of existence' of the European Union. The processes of elaboration of narratives by the media, the multiplier effect through the discourses of political actors and experts, and the reaction of European and global public opinion provide knowledge on the political impact of social behavior that should be given greater consideration in the discipline of international relations. The study devotes special attention to the resolution of the crisis and the phenomenon of 'catharsis' that occurs as a consequence of political reflection. This stage would begin when the options are broadened and different solutions begin to be assessed, the political elites recover their decision-making power and the consideration of potential opportunities to generate consensus and advance integration begins. As the author points out, catharsis does not eliminate tensions, but allows for an open discussion that concludes with a positive proposal .

It is also a positive contribution to the scientific review of the concept of 'crisis' in the main intellectual perspectives of the subject: the systemic, behavioral and sociological views. Based on the previous production, the author contributes a new concept 'integrational panic' which she defines as 'a social overreaction to a perceived problem'.

The criticism coming from the academic world, while not failing to underline the interest of the work's approach , considers the political analysis of each of the conflicts analyzed to be insufficient and claims that the book does not properly reflect the complexity of the problems facing Europe. In particular, she questions whether the Brexit crisis and the rise of Eurosceptic parties do not dismantle the argumentation set out in these pages. The author includes a brief commentary on both issues (the British referendum coincides with the publication of the book) arguing that both problems respond to a national and not a European policy conflict, but the review considers it incomplete.

In any case, the relevance of the work is justified for several reasons. Firstly, its novelty: although the crises that the European Union has gone through have been studied before, very few works have done so in a comparative way and concluded common behaviors. Secondly, and although it is a debatable thesis , the analysis of the effect of the media and public opinion leaders on the existential crisis of the EU contributes to a more accurate and realistic political evaluation of the phenomenon. Finally, the research favors a better management of these periods of turbulence, allowing to reduce the wearing effects of a constant discussion on the survival of the institution inside and outside Europe.

essay / Andrea Pavón-Guinea [English version] [English version].

1. Introduction

The combination of terrorist attacks on European soil, the rise of the Islamic State, the Syrian civil war and the refugee crisis have highlighted the importance of intercultural dialogue between the European Union and the Islamic world. In this context of asymmetric warfare and non-traditional security challenges, the European Union is focusing its resources on soft power-based civil society initiatives that can contribute to the prevention of radicalization. Through the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation for intercultural development , the European Union has a unique instrument to bring civil societies on both shores of the Mediterranean closer together and contribute to the improvement of Euro-Mediterranean relations.  

2. Euro-Mediterranean relations and intercultural dialogue 

Relations between the European Union and the Southern Mediterranean began[1] to be formally regulated with the creation of the Barcelona Process in 1995[2].

The Barcelona Declaration would give rise to the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean association ; a forum for multilateral relations which, 'based on a spirit of association', aims to turn the Mediterranean basin into an 'area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity'. The Barcelona Process would thus bring to mind one of the founding principles of the European Union, that of achieving common objectives through a spirit of co-responsibility (Suzan, 2002). The Declaration pursues three fundamental objectives: first, the creation of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of security and political dialogue (the so-called 'political basket'); second, the construction of a zone of shared prosperity through economic and financial association ('economic and financial basket'); and third, the promotion of understanding between cultures through civil society networks: the so-called intercultural dialogue ('social, cultural and human affairs' basket). 

More than twenty years after the Declaration, the claims of today's politics in the Southern Mediterranean underline the importance of the development of intercultural dialogue for European security. Although European politicians rejected Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis when it was first articulated, it would nevertheless become a scenario to be considered after the September 11 attacks: a scenario, however, that could be avoided through cooperation in the 'third basket' of the Euro-Mediterranean association , i.e. through enhanced dialogue and cultural cooperation (Gillespie, 2004).

3. Countering radicalization through intercultural dialogue: The Anna Lindh Foundation 

Thus, emphasizing that dialogue between cultures, civilizations and religions throughout the Euro-Mediterranean region is more necessary than ever to promote mutual understanding, the Euro-Mediterranean partners agreed during the fifth Euro-Mediterranean lecture of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in Valencia in 2002, to establish a foundation whose goal would be the development of intercultural dialogue. Thus was born the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures which, with its headquarters in Alexandria, would start operating in 2005.

It should be noted that Anna Lindh is unique in its representation and configuration, as it brings together all Euro-Mediterranean partners in the promotion of intercultural dialogue, which is its sole goal. To this end, it relies on the coordination of a regional network of more than 4,000 civil society organizations, both European and Mediterranean.

Although it has been in operation for more than ten years now, its work is currently focused on the development of intercultural dialogue in order to prevent radicalization. This emphasis has been continuously highlighted in recent years, for example at the Anna Lindh Foundation's Mediterranean Forum held in Malta in October 2016, its mandate on intercultural dialogue contained in the new European Neighborhood Policy (18.11.2015) and in High Representative Mogherini's strategy for the promotion of culture in international relations.

However, it has been the recent terrorist attacks in Europe that have highlighted the urgent need to address the phenomenon of radicalization[3], which can written request lead to violent extremism and terrorism. In this sense, the prevention of radicalization[4] is a core topic in the fight against terrorism, as highlighted by the European Security diary in 2015[5]. This is so because most of the terrorists suspected of attacks on European soil are European citizens, born and raised in EU member states, where they have undergone radicalization processes that would culminate in acts of terrorist violence. This fact evidences 'the transnational dimension of Islamist terrorism' (Kaunert and Léonard, 2011: 287), as well as the changing nature of the threat, whose drivers are different and more complex than previous radicalization processes: 'Today's radicalization has different foundations, operates on the basis of different recruitment and communication techniques and is marked by globalized and mobile targets inside and outside Europe, growing in diverse urban contexts'[6]. The following map sample the issue of arrests for suspected jihadist terrorism in Europe in 2016.

Consequently, the Anna Lindh Foundation can be understood as an alternative and non-confrontational response to the speech of the clash of civilizations and the war against terrorism led by the United States (Malmvig, 2007). Its main goal of creating 'a space of prosperity, coexistence and peace' by 'restoring confidence in dialogue and reducing stereotypes' is based on the importance given by the European Union to the development of intercultural dialogue between civilizations as a crucial element of any political and strategic program aimed at neighboring Mediterranean countries (Rosenthal, 2007). In other words, the creation of an area of dialogue, cooperation and exchange in the southern Mediterranean is a core topic priority of the European Union's foreign policy. Moreover, with the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation, the European Union is recognizing that for the Euro-Mediterranean association to work, dialogue between civil society organizations, and not only between political elites, is essential.

Thus, Anna Lindh, as a network organization of civil society networks, becomes a crucial instrument to address the prevention of radicalization. Along these lines, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation work [7] has argued that the state alone does not have the resources to combat terrorist radicalization, and therefore needs to cooperate with partners of a different nature to carry out this task. The involvement of civil society and local communities would thus serve to increase trust and social cohesion, even becoming a means of reaching out to certain segments of society with which governments would find it difficult to interact. The nature of local actors, as highlighted by the European Union through the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation, would be the most successful in preventing and detecting radicalization in both the short and long term[8].

Conclusion

In this way, intercultural dialogue constitutes a tool to address the phenomenon of radicalization in the Southern Mediterranean region, where the legacies of a colonial past demand that 'more credible interlocutors be found among non-governmental organizations' (Riordan, 2005: 182). With the goal of preventing terrorist radicalization inside and outside Europe, and assuming that practices based on dialogue and mutuality can offer a suitable framework for the development and improvement of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the European Union should move towards real partnerships aimed at building trust between people and reject any unilateral action program that would entail a reproduction of the clash of civilizations speech (Amirah and Behr, 2013: 5). 

High levels of corruption and impunity in the region make it difficult to eradicate millionaire bribes in public procurement contracts

The confession of the construction and engineering company Odebrecht, one of the most important in Brazil, of having delivered large sums as bribes to political leaders, parties and public officials for the awarding of works in several countries in the region has been the biggest corruption scandal in the history of Latin America. The budget B during the "golden decade" of raw materials occurred in a framework of little improvement in the effectiveness of the rule of law and control of corruption, which led to high levels of illicit deviations in public contracts.

article / Ximena Barría [English version].

Odebrecht is a Brazilian company that conducts business in multiple industries through several operating sites. It is engaged in areas such as engineering, construction, infrastructure and energy, among others. Its headquarters in Brazil are located in the city of Salvador de Bahia. The business operates in 27 countries in Latin America, Africa, Europe and the Middle East. Over the years, the construction company has participated in public works contracts in most Latin American countries.

In 2016, the U.S. department Justice published an research alleging that the Brazilian company had bribed public officials in twelve countries, ten of them Latin American: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Dominican Republic and Venezuela. The research was developed from the confession made by Odebrecht's top executives themselves once they were discovered.

The company provided officials in these countries with millions of dollars in exchange for obtaining public works contracts and benefiting from the payment for their execution. The business agreed to submit millions of dollars to political parties, public officials, public candidates or persons related to the government. Its purpose was to have a competitive advantage that would allow it to retain public business in different countries. 

In order to cover up these illicit capital movements, the business created fictitious corporations in places such as Belize, the Virgin Islands and Brazil. The business set up a secret financial structure to cover up these payments. The research by the U.S. department Justice established that the bribes in the aforementioned countries totaled US$788 million (almost half in Brazil alone). Using this illegal method, contrary to all business and political ethics, Odebrecht obtained the commission of more than one hundred projects, which generated profits of US$ 3,336 million.

Lack of an effective judiciary

This matter, known as the Odebrecht case, has created consternation in Latin American societies. Its citizens consider that in order for acts of this subject not to go unpunished, countries must have greater efficiency in the judicial sphere and take more accelerated steps towards a true rule of law. 

agreement World Bank indicators, none of the ten Latin American countries affected by this bribery network reaches 60% of effectiveness of the rule of law and corruption control. This would explain the success of the Brazilian construction company in its bribery policy.

Judicial independence and its effectiveness is essential for the resolution of facts of these characteristics. The proper exercise of justice shapes a proper rule of law, preventing the occurrence of illicit acts or other political decisions that may violate it. Although this is the ideal, the countries involved in the Odebrecht case do not fully comply with this due judicial independence.

Indeed, according to the Global Competitiveness Report for 2017-2018, most of the affected countries obtain a leave grade with respect to the independence of their courts, which indicates that they lack an effective judiciary to judge those allegedly involved in this case. This is the case, for example, with Panama and the Dominican Republic, ranked 120th and 127th, respectively, in terms of judicial independence, out of a list of 137 countries.

One of the problems that the Judicial Branch of the Republic of Panama suffers from is the high issue of cases handled by the Supreme Court of Justice. This congestion makes it difficult for the Supreme Court to work effectively. The high number of processed files doubled between 2013 and 2016: the Criminalconference room of the Court processed 329 files in 2013; in 2016 there were 857. Although the Panamanian Judiciary has improved its budget, this has not represented a qualitative increase in its functions. These difficulties could explain the Court's decision to reject an extension of the research, although this could mean a certain impunity. In 2016, only two people were arrested in the Odebrecht case. In 2017, of the 43 defendants who could have been involved in the acceptance of bribes valued at US$60 million, only 32 were prosecuted.

The Dominican Republic is also in a similar status . According to a survey of 2016, only 38% of Dominicans trust the judicial institution. This low percentage may have been contributed to by the fact that active members of political parties were elected to serve as Supreme Court judges, something that tarnishes the credibility of the judiciary and its independence. In 2016, the Dominican courts only inquired about one person, when the US Supreme Court estimated that the Brazilian business had given US$92 million in political bribes, one of the highest amounts outside Brazil. In 2017, the Supreme Court of the Dominican Republic ordered the release from prison of 9 of 10 allegedly implicated in the case due to insufficient evidence.

Need for greater coordination and reform

In October 2017, public prosecutors from Latin America met in Panama City to share information on money laundering, especially in relation to the Odebrecht case. Officials expressed the need to leave no case unpunished, thereby contributing to solving one of the biggest political, economic and judicial problems in the region. Some prosecutors reported having suffered threats in their investigations. All of them valued the meeting positively, as it highlighted the need for greater fiscal coordination and legislative harmony in Latin America. However, it is important to note that the Dominican Republic was absent from the meeting.

Any awareness of Latin American public ministries is essential given the correlation observed between the countries affected by Odebrecht's bribes and their poor ranking in indexes provided by different international organizations and research centers. The ineffective rule of law and the lack of control of corruption allow companies like Odebrecht to succeed in their bribery policy to gain a competitive advantage. 

The shortcomings of the judicial systems in countries such as Panama and the Dominican Republic, in particular, may make it possible for public officials to go unpunished for crimes committed. In addition, the Odebrecht case, of great magnitude in the region, could further congest judicial activity if effective reforms are not made in each country. 

essay / Marianna McMillan [English version].

I. Introduction

On March 31, 2016, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini presented the new cultural diplomacy platform, whose goal is to enhance visibility and understanding towards the Union through intercultural dialogue. The fact that all influential actors are committed to this platform (from a vertical, bottom-up perspective), makes us reconsider three factors of the EU: (1) the context in which it operates; (2) the internal constraints it has to address; and (3) the foreign policy to which it aspires. However, the EU wants to give a single cultural image, with a single voice and coherent with its policies; that is why, first and foremost, the EU must defend its motto "unity in diversity". This motto means the integration of national cultures in other countries, without this integration jeopardizing the different national identities of the member states. Consequently, in its status as an international actor and regional organization, the EU is lacking when it comes to intercultural dialogue and negotiation between identities (European External Action Service, 2017). It must therefore strive in both the one and the other (intercultural dialogue and the negotiation between identities) to address threats to European security such as terrorism, cyber insecurity, energy insecurity or identity ambiguity.

The goal of this analysis is, on the one hand, to understand the importance of culture as an instrument of soft power, and on the other hand, to reflect on the influence of culture as a theoretical foundation of the new European cultural platform.

II. Unity in diversity through the New Platform for Cultural Diplomacy

If the European Union aspires to be a liberal order founded on cooperation, then to what extent can the EU be globally influential? What is undeniable is that it lacks a single voice and a coherent common foreign policy.

The fact that the EU lacks a single voice is the result of the course of integration throughout history, an integration that has been based more on diversity than on equality. On the other hand, the statement on the incoherence of the common foreign policy reference letter to all those cases in which, faced with a coordination problem, what was agreed in the Maastricht Treaty 1992 takes precedence (Banús, 2015: 103-105 and Art. 6, TFEU): the competences may be of the member states, of the EU or may be shared competences.

As a consequence of the acceleration of globalization, the increase of non-traditional security threats (international terrorism, energy vulnerability, irregular migration flows, cyber threats or climate change) the idea of a common foreign policy between member states and the EU is challenged. Such threats demand not only a new security paradigm, but also a new paradigm of coexistence. This paradigm shift would allow the EU to have a greater capacity to reduce radicalization and to steer coexistence towards the needs of civil societies (see European Commission, 2016). By way of illustration about the new paradigm, we can name the promotion of narratives of a shared cultural heritage that financial aid to the regional integration process. However, at the same time that initiatives such as the above are being implemented, skepticism towards immigrants is growing and narratives contrary to the community narrative projected by the EU are being promoted. These institutional and structural constraints - diversity and shared competences - reflect the dynamics of the cultural landscape and its unintended consequences within the EU. They also give a vision of the European project as a process of integration (unity in diversity) and European identity as a single voice. Therefore, the EU as an international actor and as a regional organization, based on unity in diversity, has a need to establish an intercultural dialogue and a negotiation of shared identities from within its organization (EEAS, 2017). This would serve not only to establish favorable conditions for Brussels policies, but also as an instrument or means for the EU to counter non-traditional and external threats, such as terrorism, populist narratives, cyber threats, energy insecurity and identity ambiguity.

Regarding the difficulty in distinguishing internal constraints and external threats, Federica Mogherini established the New Platform for Cultural Diplomacy (NPC) in 2016.

In goal to clarify the terminology used above, 'cultural diplomacy' is understood as a "balance of power" according to the realist approach and as a "reflexive balance" from a conceptual approach (Triandafyllidou and Szucs, 2017). On the one hand, the realist approach understands cultural diplomacy as a subject of dialogue that serves to advance and protect national interests abroad (e.g., joint European cultural events or bilateral programs, such as film festivals, support for the strengthening of Tunisia's cultural sector, the creation of European cultural houses, the Culture and Creativity program, Communication and Culture for development in the Southern Mediterranean region, and the NPC). On the other hand, the conceptual approach , more reflective, understands cultural diplomacy as a policy in itself. It promotes the potential of the synergies of culture for sustainable social and economic development through individuals (e.g. cultural exchanges such as Erasmus Plus, the development and Cooperation Instrument and its sub-programs, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the ENI Cross Border Cooperation and the Civil Society Facility). The application of cultural diplomacy to the EU seeks to have global visibility and influence, and on the other hand, it seeks to promote economic growth and social cohesion through civil societies (Trobbiani, 2017: 3-5).

Despite being funded by the Partnership Instrument (PI), which goal to foster visibility and understanding of the EU, the NPC is a balance between the realist approach and the conceptual approach of cultural diplomacy (European Commission, 2016b). Consequently, it is a resilience strategy that responds to a new reality (resilience is understood in terms of inclusiveness, prosperity and security of society). In this reality, non-traditional security threats have emerged and in which there has been a change in the position of citizens, who have gone from being independent observers, to active participants demanding a constructive dialogue involving all stakeholders: national governments, international organizations and civil societies (Higgot, 2017:6-8 and EU, 2016).

The 2016 Global Strategy seeks pluralism, coexistence and respect for "deepening work in Education, culture and youth" (EU, 2016). In other words, the platform invests in creative Structures , such as think tanks, cultural institutes or local artists, to preserve a cultural identity, advance economic prosperity and enhance soft power.

In seeking global understanding and visibility, one sees how the EU's interest in international cultural relations (ICR) and cultural diplomacy (CD) has grown. This, in turn, reflects the EU's internal need for a single voice and a common foreign policy. This effort demonstrates the fundamental role of culture in soft power, thus creating a connection between culture and external power. Perhaps the more appropriate question is: to what extent can Mogherini's NCP turn culture into a tool of soft power? And are the strategies-ICR and NCP-an effective communication and coordination model in the face of internal and external security threats, or will it inevitably undermine its narrative of unity in diversity?

III. Culture and Soft Power

The change in the concept of security requires revisiting the concept of soft power. In this case, cultural diplomacy must be understood in terms of soft power, and soft power must be understood in terms of attractiveness and influence. Soft power, agreement to Joseph Nye's notion of persuasion, arises from "intangible power resources": "such as culture, ideology and institutions" (Nye, 1992:150-170).

The EU as a product of cultural dialogues is a civil power, a normative power and a soft power. The EU's persuasive power depends on its legitimacy and credibility in its institutions (EU, 2016a and Michalski, 2005:124-141). For this reason, coherence between the identity the EU wishes to display and the practices it will follow is fundamental to the projection of itself as a credible international actor. This coherence will be necessary if the EU is to fulfill its goal of "strengthening unity in diversity". Otherwise, its liberal values would be contradicted and populist prejudices against the EU would be solidified. Therefore, internal legitimacy and credibility as sources of soft power ultimately depend written request the consistency between the EU's narrative identity and the democratic values reflected in its practices (EU, 2016).

Cultural diplomacy responds to incoherence by demanding reflection, on the one hand, and enhancing that identity, on the other. For example, optimizing Europe's image through the European Neighborhood and association Instrument (ENPI) communication program helps to promote specific geopolitical interests, creating more durable conditions for cooperation with countries such as Algeria, Libya and Syria to the south, and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to the east. This is relevant in relation to what Nye coined as "co-optive power": "the ability of a country to manage a status in such a way that other countries develop certain preferences or define their interests in agreement with its own" (Nye, 1990:168). Soft power applied to culture can function indirectly or directly. It works indirectly when it is independent of government control (e.g., popular culture) and directly through cultural diplomacy (e.g., PCN). Foreign policy actors can act as advocates for domestic culture, both consciously (e.g., politicians) and unconsciously (e.g., local artists). In doing so they serve as agents for other countries or channels of soft power.

IV. Culture and foreign policy

Considering soft power as an emergence of culture, values and national policies, we can affirm that culture is both a foundation and a resource of foreign policy (Liland, 1993:8). Foreign policy, in turn, operates within the cultural framework of any society that interacts at the international level. Therefore, a European cultural context capable of influencing globally is necessary (e.g., the difference in accession negotiations between Croatia and Turkey and the attractiveness of economic integration or the ability to adjust human rights policies). Culture is in turn a resource, as the cultural exchange empowers the EU. This new capacity of the EU allows it to learn new popular attitudes, feelings and images that are capable of influencing foreign policy, domestic politics and social life (Liland, 1993:9-14 and Walt, 1998). Another function to highlight of culture is that of information dissemination and its ability to elicit favorable opinions in the foreign nation (Liland, 1993:12-13).

Thus, cultural diplomacy is at the forefront of European foreign policy; however, this does not mean that the use of culture can replace traditional foreign policy objectives - geography, power, security, politics and economics - but rather that the use of culture serves to support and legitimize them. In other words, culture is not the primary agent in the foreign policy process, but is the rationale that reinforces, contradicts, or explains its content - thus, Wilson's idealism in the 1920s can be linked to a domestic culture of "manifest destiny" (Liland, 1993 and Kim, 2011:6).

V. Conclusions

The purpose of this article has been to highlight the importance of culture in relation to soft power and foreign policy, as a theoretical foundation for understanding the logic of the EU's new Cultural Diplomacy platform. By identifying the role of culture as a fundamental part of social cohesion within the EU, we can conclude that culture has made the EU a more influential global actor. Culture, likewise, has been identified as a source soft power and as an instrument of foreign policy. But the sources of soft power -culture, political values and foreign policy- depend on three factors: (1) a favorable context; (2) credibility in values and internship, and (3) the perception of legitimacy and moral authority (see Nye, 2006). The EU has to first legitimize itself as a coherent actor with moral authority in order to be able to deal effectively with its existential crisis (European Union, 2016a:9 and Tuomioja, 2009).

To do so, the EU must overcome its institutional and structural limits by collectively confronting its non-traditional external security threats. This requires a strategy of resistance in which the EU is not identified as a threat to national identity, but as a cultural, economic and legislative entity.

This article has discussed various issues related to culture, soft power, EU foreign policy and its internal dynamics; however, it has not analyzed in depth the impact of a "uniform cultural system" and how foreign policy can influence the culture of a society. Culture is not an end in itself, nor are intercultural dialogues and the development of cultural diplomacy.

The Union must avoid the risk of evolving into a dehumanizing bureaucratic structure that favors a standard culture to counter its internal constraints and non-traditional external security threats. According to Vaclav Havel, the EU can avoid this phenomenon by supporting cultural institutions that work for plurality and freedom of culture. These institutions are fundamental to preserving the national identity and traditions of each nation. In other words, culture should be subsidized to better accommodate its plurality and freedom as is the case with national heritages, libraries, museums and public archives - or the witnesses of our past (Havel, 1992).

As a final and historical reflection, cultural diplomacy promotes shared narratives about cultural identities. To do otherwise would not only solidify populist rhetoric and internal prejudices against the Union, but would also make cultural totalitarianism, or worse, cultural relativism, endemic. To aspire to a "uniform system of culture" through an agreed European narrative would be to negotiate away pluralism and freedom and, consequently, contradict firstly the nature of culture and, secondly, the liberal values on which the Union was founded.

bibliography

Banus E. (2015). Culture and Foreign Policy, 103-118. 

Arndt, R. T. (2013). culture or propaganda? Reflections on half a century of U.S. cultural diplomacy. Mexican Journal of Foreign Policy, 29-54.

Cull, N. J. (2013). Public diplomacy: Theoretical considerations. Mexican Journal of Foreign Policy, 55-92.

Cummings, Milton C. (2003) Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey, Washingotn, D.C.. Center for Arts and Culture.

European Commission (2016). A new strategy to put culture at the heart of EU international relations. Press release.

European Commission (2016b). Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council.

European External Action Service (2017). Culture - Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations. Joint Communication.

European Union (2016). From Shared Vision to Common Action: The EU's Global Strategic Vision.

European Union (2016b). Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council.

European Union (2017) Adminstrative Arrangements developed by the European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) in partnership with the European Commission Services and the European External Action Service, 16 May (https:// eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2017-05-16_admin_arrangement_eunic.pdf).

Havel, Vaclav (1992) "On Politics, Morality and Civility in a Time of Transition."Summer Meditations, Knopf.

Higgot, R. (2017). Enhancing the EU's Internatioanl Cultural Relations: The Prospects and Limits: Cultural Diplomacy. Institute for European Studies.

Howard, Philip K. (2011). Vaclav Havel's Critique of the West. The Atlantic.

Kim, Hwajung. (2011) Cultural Diplomacy as the Means of Soft Power in an Information Age.

La Porte and Cross (2016). The European Union and Image Resilience during Times of Crisis: The Role of Public Diplomacy. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 1-26.

Liland, Frode (1993). Culture and Foreign Policy: An Introduction to Approaches and Theory. Institutt for Forsvarstudier, 3-30.

Melissen, J. (2005). The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice.

Melissen, J. (2005). The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice. In The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (pp. 3-30). Basinggstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.

Michalski, Anna (2005). The EU as a Soft Power: The Force of Persuasion. In J. Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (pp. 124-141). New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan.

Nye, Joseph S. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. New York: Oublic Affairs.

Nye, Joseph S., (1992) Soft Power, Foreign Policy, Fall, X, pp. 150-170 1990.

Nye, Joseph. S. (2006) Think Again: Soft Power, Foreign Policy.

Richard Higgot and Virgina Proud (2017). Populist Nationalism and Foreign Policy: Cultural Diplomacy and Resilience. Institut fur Auslandsbeziehungen.

Rasmussen, S. B. (n.d.). Discourse Analysis of EU Public Diplomacy: Messages and Practices.

Triandafyllidou, Anna and Tamas Szucs (2017). EU Cultural Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities. European University Institute.

Trobbiani, Riccardo (2017). EU Cultural Diplomacy: time to define strategies, means and complementarity with Member States. Institute for European Studies.

Tuomioja, Erkki (2009) The Role of Soft Power in EU Common Foreign Policy. International Symposium on Cultural Diplomacy. Berlin.

Walt, Stephen M. (1998) International relations: One world, many theories. Foreign Policy. Washington; Spring, pp. 29-35.

essay / Celia Olivar Gil [English version].

The global context continues to pose new challenges to European collective action subject development, the most important of which is migration from the Southern Mediterranean and the difficulty of articulating a well-articulated joint reaction. Aware of the urgency of the status, the European Union is trying to offer a new and ambitious response in the form of the New Consensus on development (hereafter 'Consensus') which also coincides with the review of the Millennium development Goals by the United Nations.

The Consensus is a 'framework for action' to promote the integration and coherence of the development cooperation of the European Union and its member states. This framework calls for the adoption of the necessary changes to ensure that both EU and national legislation complies with the 2030 diary for Sustainable development proposal by the United Nations and with the Paris agreement on climate change.

The Consensus maintains the eradication of poverty as its main goal , but includes a novel vision, proposing that poverty be addressed from a triple economic, social and environmental perspective. In addition to the eradication of poverty, the Consensus aims to achieve the 2030 diary , and to this end articulates its five pillars: population, planet, prosperity, peace and cooperation. To this articulation, the Consensus adds some novel and cross-cutting elements, which are: emphasis on youth (meeting the basic needs of young people such as employment); gender equality; good governance (achieving a rule of law that guarantees human rights, promoting the creation of transparent institutions, participatory decision-making and independent and impartial courts); mobilization and migration; sustainable energy and climate change; Investment and trade; innovative engagement with the most advanced development countries (creating new partnerships with these countries to implement the 2030 diary here); mobilization and use of domestic resources (effective and efficient use of resources through the "raise more, spend better" initiative).

In order to achieve all the initiatives and objectives set out above, the application of the Consensus extends to both the policies of the European Union and those of all its member states. In addition, it emphasizes that the Consensus should also be applied in new, more tailored and more multilateral partnerships involving civil society and greater participation of partner countries. The means of implementation combine traditional financial aid with more innovative forms of financing for development, such as private sector investments and mobilization of additional domestic resources for development. In terms of follow-up, the new consensus will have a regular monitoring mechanism, including accountability through the European Parliament and national parliaments and reporting obligations.

Initial assessments of the new consensus agree that it is a good synthesis of international development concerns. However, it raises some criticisms regarding its effective capacity to address these concerns.

First of all, as the Overseas Development Institute points out, it is not a real strategic plan, but a set of unconnected priorities. For it to be a real strategy, the roles of the Commission and the member states would need to be determined, thematic, sectoral and geographic priorities defined (the seventeen Sustainable development Goals (SDGs) contained in the 2030 diary are treated with equal importance), and new European institutions built or existing ones (such as the International Climate Fund) used to coordinate national funds more effectively. Likewise, the Consensus should determine the form and content of cooperation with average income countries, establishing horizontal, vertical and sectoral coordination. At the same time, this coordination would require the establishment of a division of tasks within the EU to achieve a better use of resources.

Secondly, agreement to James Mackie (head of the learning and quality department of the European Center for development), it is difficult to see who is being targeted and what exactly they are demanding. The fact that the geographic and sectoral priorities remain undetermined leaves the Degree of commitment of the member states uncertain and, if there is commitment, it will be tactical rather than explicit.

The third criticism is related to its implementation. Although the consensus is ambitious in its objectives, it lacks an adequate institutional framework and an efficient mechanism to implement its new proposals. Moreover, it gives the private sector a very important role, without providing it with transparency in cases of human rights abuses or environmental damage, as Marta Latek, researcher at the EPRS (European Parliamentary Research Service), explained

In terms of its objectives, many influential actors such as CARE (the international development confederation) agree that it focuses too much on migration control and does not prioritize the needs of the poor. This can be seen in the fact that both the cooperation framework with other non-EU countries and the external investment plan prioritize the EU's security and trade interests before helping the population out of poverty.

A fifth criticism reference letter to the political dimension. The new Consensus should integrate a holistic as well as a sustainable security concept to connect the problems of stability and democracy with those of security in EU foreign affairs. A holistic concept of development means a vision of lasting sustainability, encompassing aspects such as the condition of sustainability, social justice or democracy (Critique according to Henökl, Thomas and Niels Keijzer of the German Development Institute).

Finally, as far as financing is concerned, the European Parliament continues to ask member states to donate 0.7% of their annual budget to development cooperation. Since very few of them are able to provide this 0.7%, the consensus is that private sector participation via the European External Investment Plan is important.

In conclusion, this document reflects the needs of the current global context but requires a series of changes in order to be fully effective and a true strategy. These changes are necessary to prevent the Consensus from remaining only theoretical.

REFERENCES

Q&A: New European Consensus on development http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1505_es.pdf 

New European Consensus on development: EU and Member States sign joint strategy to eradicate poverty: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1503_es.htm

The proposed new European Consensus on Development Has the European Commission got it right? https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11263.pdf

New European consensus on development Will it be fit for purpose? http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599434/EPRS_BRI(2017)599434_EN.pdf

Seven critical questions for review of 'European Consensus on Development ' https://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/opinion/sevencritical-questions-for-review-of-european-consensus-on-development/

The Future of the "European Consensus on Development" average

European Union Development Policy: Collective Action in Times of Global Transformation and Domestic Crisis http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dpr.12189/full