[Lilia M. Schwarcz and Heloisa M. Starling, Brazil: a biographydiscussion: Madrid, 2016), 896 pp.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

Presenting the history of a vast country like Brazil in a single Issue, although extensive, is not an easy task, if you want to go deep enough. "Brazil. A Biography" (for this review we have used Penguin's English edition, from 2019, somewhat later than the publication of the work in Spain; the original in Portuguese is from 2015) is an account with the appropriate lens. "Brazil is not for beginners," say the two authors in the introduction, expressing with that quotation from a Brazilian musician the way they conceived the book: knowing that they were addressing an audience with generally little knowledge about the country, they had to be able to convey the complexity of national life (of what constitutes a continent in itself) but without making the reading agonizing.

The book follows a chronological order; however, the fact of starting with some general considerations and building the first chapters around certain social and political systems generated successively by the sugar cane plantations, the enslavement of the African population and the search for gold makes the life of Brazil advance before our eyes without having the sensation of a mere shifting of dates. Later comes a 19th century that for Hispanics has the interest of seeing the negative of the history we know with respect to the Spanish American colonies (as opposed to the Spanish case, during the Napoleonic wars the Court of Portugal moved entirely to Rio de Janeiro and independence did not result in several republics, but in a centralized monarchy of its own). And then a 20th century that in Brazil constituted a good compendium of the political vicissitudes of the contemporary world: from the Estado Novo of Getúlio Vargas, to the military dictatorship and the restoration of democracy.

The work of Schwarcz and Starling, professors at the University of São Paulo and the Federal University of Minas Gerais, respectively, focuses on political processes, but always wrapping them with the parallel social and cultural processes that occur together in any country. The Issue provides a lot of information and bibliographical references for all the historical periods of Brazil, without disregarding some in order to deal more with others, and the reader can dwell especially on those moments that are of greater interest.

Personally, I have been more interested in reading about four periods, relatively distant from each other. On the one hand, the attempts of France and Holland in the 16th and 17th centuries to set foot in Brazil (they were not permanently successful, and both powers had to settle for the Guianas). Then the emergence and consolidation in the 18th century of Minas Gerais as the third vertex of the Brazilian heartland triangle (Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Belo Horizonte). Then the description of the life of a European-style court in the circumstances of the tropical climate (the monarchy lasted until 1889). And finally the experiences of mid-20th century developmentalism, with Juscelino Kubitschek and João Goulart in a tour de force between democratic compromise, presidential personalism and the undercurrents of the Cold War.

The reading of this book provides many keys to better understand certain behaviors of Brazil as a country. On the one hand, how the immensity of the territory and the existence of areas that are difficult for the State to reach -the Amazon is a clear example-, gives an important role to the Army as guarantor of the continuity of the nation (the success, perhaps momentary, of Bolsonaro and his appeal to the Armed Forces has to do with that, although this last presidency is no longer included in the book). On the other hand, how the division of territorial power between mayors and governors generates a multitude of political parties and forces each presidential candidate to articulate multiple alliances and coalitions, sometimes incurring in a "buying and selling" of favors that generally ends up having a cost for the country's institutionality.

The book's essay was completed before the collapse of the Workers' Party governmental era. That is why the consideration of the governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff is, perhaps, somewhat complacent, as a sort of "end of history": since the end of the military dictatorship in 1985, the country would have evolved in the improvement of its democratic and social life until the time crowned by the PT. The "Lava Jato case" has shown rather that "history continues".

▲ Joe Biden and Barack Obama in February 2009, one month after arriving at the White House [Pete Souza].

COMMENTARY / Emili J. Blasco

This article was previously published, somewhat abbreviated, in the newspaper 'Expansión'.

One of the great mistakes revealed by the U.S. presidential elections is to have underestimated the figure of Donald Trump, believing him to be a mere anecdote, and to have disregarded, as whimsical, a large part of his policies. In reality, the Trump phenomenon is a manifestation, if not a consequence, of the current American moment and some of his major decisions, especially in the international arena, have more to do with national imperatives than with fickle occurrences. The latter suggests that there are aspects of foreign policy, manners aside, in which Joe Biden as president may be closer to Trump than to Barack Obama, simply because the world of 2021 is already somewhat different from that of the first half of the previous decade.

First, Biden will have to confront Beijing. Obama began to do so, but the more assertive character of Xi Jinping's China has been accelerating in recent years. In the superpower struggle, especially for dominance in the new technological era, the United States has everything at stake vis-à-vis China. It is true that Biden has referred to the Chinese not as enemies but as competitors, but the trade war was already started by the Administration of which he was Vice-President and now the objective rivalry is greater.

Nor is the withdrawal of the United States the result of Trump's madness. Basically, it has to do, to simplify somewhat, with the energy independence achieved by the Americans: they no longer need oil from the Middle East and they no longer have to be in all the oceans to ensure the free navigation of tankers. The 'America First' was somehow already started by Obama and Biden will not go in the opposite direction. So, for example, no major involvement in European Union affairs and no firm negotiations for a free trade agreement between the two Atlantic markets can be expected.

In the two main achievements of the Obama era - the nuclear agreement with Iran sealed by the United States, the EU and Russia, and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Havana - Biden will find it difficult to follow the path then defined. There may be attempts at a new rapprochement with Tehran, but there would be greater coordination against it on the part of Israel and the Sunni world, instances that now converge more. Biden may find that less pressure on the ayatollahs pushes Saudi Arabia toward the atomic bomb.

As for Cuba, the return to dissent will be more in the hands of the Cuban government than in those of Biden himself, who in the electoral loss in Florida has been able to read a rejection of any condescension with Castroism. Some of the new restrictions imposed by Trump on Cuba may be dismantled, but if Havana continues to show no real willingness to change and open up, the White House will no longer have to continue betting on political concessions to credit .

In the case of Venezuela, Biden will probably withdraw a good part of the sanctions, but there is no longer room for a policy of inaction like that of Obama. That Administration did not confront Chavismo for two reasons: because it did not want to bother Cuba given the secret negotiations it was holding with that country to reopen its embassies and because the level of lethality of the regime had not yet become unbearable. Today, international reports on human rights are unanimous on the repression and torture of the Maduro government, and also the arrival of millions of Venezuelan refugees in the different countries of the region make it necessary to take action on the matter. Here it is to be hoped that Biden can act in a less unilateral manner and, without ceasing to exert pressure, seek coordination with the European Union.

It often happens that whoever arrives at the White House takes care of national affairs in his first years and later, especially in a second term, focuses on leaving an international bequest . Because of age and health, it is possible that the new tenant will only be in office for a four-year term. Without Obama's idealism of wanting to "bend the arc of history" - Biden is a pragmatist, a product of the American political establishment - nor businessman Trump's rush for immediate gain, it is hard to imagine that his Administration will take serious risks on the international scene.

Biden has confirmed his commitment to begin his presidency in January by reversing some of Trump's decisions, notably on climate change and the Paris agreement ; on some tariff fronts, such as the outgoing administration's unnecessary punishment of European countries; and on various immigration issues, especially concerning Central America.

In any case, even if the Democratic left wants to push Biden towards certain margins, believing that they have an ally in Vice-President Kamala Harris, the president-elect can make use of his moderation staff : the fact that he has obtained better result in the elections than the party itself gives him, for the time being, sufficient internal authority. For the rest, the Republicans have held up quite well in the Senate and the House of Representatives, so that Biden arrives at the White House with less support on Capitol Hill than his predecessors. That, in any case, may help to reinforce one of the traits most valued today in the Delaware politician: predictability, something that the economies and foreign ministries of many of the world's countries are anxiously awaiting.

The current president made only one visit, also in the framework the G-20, compared to the six that Bush and Obama made in their first four years.

International travel does not tell the whole story about a president's foreign policy, but it does give some clues. As president, Donald Trump has only traveled once to Latin America, and then only because the G-20 summit he was attending was being held in Argentina. It is not that Trump has not dealt with the region -of course, the policy towards Venezuela has been very present in his management, but not having made the effort to travel to other countries of the continent reflects well the more unilateral character of his policy, little focused on gaining sympathy among his peers.

▲ signature in Mexico in 2018 of the free trade agreement between the three North American countriesdepartment of State, USA].

article / Miguel García-Miguel

With only one visit to the region, the U.S. president is the one who has made the fewest official visits since Clinton's first legislature, who also visited the region only once. In contrast, Bush and Obama paid more attention to the neighboring territory, both with six visits in their first legislature. Trump focused his diplomatic campaign on Asia and Europe and reserved Latin American affairs for visits by the region's presidents to the White House or to his Mar-a-Lago resort.

In fact, the Trump Administration spent time on Latin American issues, taking positions more quickly than the Obama Administration, as the worsening Venezuelan problem required defining actions. At the same time, Trump has discussed regional issues with Latin American presidents during their visits to the United States. There has been, however, no effort at multilateralism or empathy, going out to meeting them in their home countries to discuss their problems there.

Clinton: Haiti

The Democratic president made only one visit to the region during his first term in office. After the Uphold Democracy operation to refund Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power, on March 31, 1995, Bill Clinton traveled to Haiti for the transition ceremony organized by the United Nations. The operation had consisted of a military intervention by the United States, Poland and Argentina, with UN approval, to overthrow the military board that had forcibly deposed the democratically elected Aristide. During his second term, Clinton paid more attention to regional affairs, with thirteen visits.

Bush: free trade agreements

Bush made his first presidential trip to neighboring Mexico, where he met with then-President Fox to discuss a variety of issues. Mexico paid attention to the U.S. government's attention to Mexican immigrants, but the two presidents also discussed the operation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which came into force in 1994, and joint efforts in the fight against drug trafficking. The U.S. president had the opportunity to visit Mexico three more times during his first term to attend multilateral meetings. Specifically, in March 2002, he attended the International lecture on Financing for development, organized by the United Nations and which resulted in the Monterrey Consensus; Bush also took the opportunity to meet again with the Mexican president. In October of the same year he attended the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit, which that year was held in the Mexican enclave of Los Cabos. Finally, he set foot on Mexican soil once again to attend the Special Summit of the Americas held in Monterrey in 2004.

During his first term in office, Bush promoted the negotiation of new free trade agreements with several American countries, which marked his Administration's policy in relation to the Western Hemisphere. In the framework of this policy, he traveled to Peru and El Salvador on March 23 and 24, 2002. In Peru he met with the President of that country and with the Presidents of Colombia, Bolivia and Ecuador, in order to reach an agreement to renew the ATPA (Andean Trade Promotion Act), by which the US granted tariff freedom on a wide range of exports from those countries. The matter was finally resolved with the enactment in October of the same year of the ATPDEA (Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act), which maintained tariff freedoms in compensation for the fight against drug trafficking, in an attempt to develop the region economically to create alternatives to cocaine production. Finally, in the case of El Salvador, he met with the Central American presidents to discuss the possibility of a Free Trade Agreement with the region (known in English as CAFTA) in exchange for a reinforcement of security in the areas of the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism. The treaty was ratified three years later by the U.S. congress . Bush revisited Latin America up to eleven times during his second term.

Own elaboration with data from the Office of the Historian.

Obama: two Summits of the Americas

Obama began his tour of diplomatic visits to Latin America by attendance the V Summit of the Americas, held in Port-au-Prince (Trinidad and Tobago). The Summit brought together all the leaders of the sovereign countries of the Americas except for Cuba and was aimed at coordinating efforts to recover from the recent crisis of 2008 with mentions of the importance of environmental and energy sustainability. Obama attend again in 2012 the VI Summit of the Americas held this time in Cartagena de Indias (Colombia). No representatives from Ecuador or Nicaragua attended this Summit in protest against the exclusion of Cuba to date. Neither the President of Haiti nor the Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez attended, alleging medical reasons. The summit again discussed Economics and security issues with special relevance to the war against drugs and organized crime, as well as the development of environmental policies. He also took advantage of this visit to announce, together with Juan Manuel Santos, the entrance into effect of the Free Trade Agreement between Colombia and the US, negotiated by the Bush Administration and ratified after some delay by the US congress . The Democratic president also had the opportunity to visit the region on the occasion of the G-20 meeting in Mexico, but this time the main topic revolved around solutions to curb the European debt crisis.

In terms of bilateral meetings, Obama made a diplomatic tour between March 19 and 23, 2010 to Brazil, Chile and El Salvador, meeting with their respective presidents. He used the occasion to reestablish relations with the Brazilian left that had governed the country since 2002, to reiterate his economic and political alliance with Chile and to announce a US$200 million fund to strengthen security in Central America. During his second term he made up to seven visits, including the resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba, which had been paused since the triumph of the Revolution.

Trump: T-MEC

Donald Trump only visited Latin America on one occasion to attend the G-20 meeting , a meeting that was not even regional, held in Buenos Aires in December 2018. Among the various agreements reached were the reform of the World Trade Organization and the commitment of the attendees to implement the measures adopted in the Paris agreement , with the exception of the US, since the president had already reiterated his determination to withdraw from the agreement. Taking advantage of the visit, he signed the T-MEC (Treaty between Mexico, the United States and Canada, the new name for the renewed NAFTA, whose renegotiation had been a Trump demand) and met with the Chinese president in the context of the trade war. Trump, on the other hand, did not attend the VIII Summit of the Americas held in Peru in April 2018; the trip, which was also supposed to take him to Colombia, was canceled at the last minute because the US president preferred to remain in Washington in the face of a possible escalation of the Syrian crisis.

The reason for the few visits to the region has been that Trump has directed his diplomatic campaign towards Europe, Asia and to a lesser extent the Middle East, in the context of the trade war with China and the loss of power in the US international landscape.

Own elaboration with data from the Office of the Historian.

Only one trip, but monitoring of the region

Despite having hardly traveled to the rest of the continent, the Republican candidate has paid attention to the region's affairs, but without leaving Washington, as there have been seven Latin American presidents who have visited the White House. The main focus of the meetings has been economic development and the strengthening of security, as usual. Depending on the reality of each country, the meetings revolved more around the possibility of future trade agreements, the fight against drugs and organized crime, preventing the flow of illegal immigration to the United States or the search to strengthen political alliances. Although the US government website does not list it as an official visit , Donald Trump also met at the White House in February 2020 with Juan Guaidó, recognized as president in charge of Venezuela.

Precisely, if there has been a common topic to all these meetings, it has been the status of the economic and political crisis in Venezuela. Trump has sought allies in the region to encircle and pressure the Maduro government, which is not only an example of continuous human rights violations, but also destabilizes the region. The strong civil service examination the regime served Donald Trump as propaganda to gain popularity and try to save the Latino vote in the November 3 elections, and that had its award at least in the state of Florida.

Own elaboration with data from Office of the Historian.

COMMENTARY / Rafael Calduch Torres*.

As tradition dictates since 1845, on the first Tuesday of November, on the 3rd, the voting inhabitants of the fifty states that make up the United States will take part in the fifty-ninth Election Day, the day on which the Electoral high school is formed, which will have to choose between keeping the forty-fifth President of the United States of America, Donald Trump, or electing the forty-sixth, Joe Biden.

But the real problem facing not only the inhabitants of the USA, but also the rest of the world's population is that both Trump and Biden have their international strategy as a core topic at home, following in the wake of the change that took place in the country after the 9/11 attacks and whose fundamental result has been the absence of effective leadership of the American superpower in the last twenty years. For if there is one thing that must be clear to us, it is the fact that none of the candidates, as their predecessors did not, has a plan that would allow them to resume the international leadership that the United States enjoyed until the end of the 1990s; On the contrary, what urges them is to solve domestic problems and subordinate international issues, which a superpower of the stature of the United States must face, to the solutions adopted internally, which is one of the serious strategic errors of our era, since strong international leaderships that are coherent with the management of domestic problems have historically allowed the creation of meeting points in American society that cushion divisions and bring cohesion to the country.

However, despite these general similarities there is a clear difference between the two candidates when it comes to addressing international issues that will affect the results of the choice Americans will make on Tuesday.

"The Power of America's example". With this slogan, Biden's general proposal , much clearer and more accessible than Trump's, develops a plan to lead the democratic world in the 21st century based on using the way in which America's domestic problems will be solved as an example, binding and sustaining its international leadership; it goes without saying that the mere assumption that the internal problems of the United States are not exactly extrapolable to the rest of the international actors is not even taken into account.

Thus, the Democratic candidate , using a rather traditional rhetoric on the dignity of leadership, uses the connection between domestic and international reality to propose a program of national regeneration without specifying how this will restore the lost international leadership. This approach will be based on two main pillars: the democratic regeneration of the country and the reconstruction of the US class average which, in turn, will make it possible to underpin other international projects.

Democratic regeneration will be based on the strengthening of the educational and judicial systems, transparency, the fight against corruption or the end of attacks on the media, and is proposed as an instrument for the reestablishment of the country's moral leadership which, in addition to inspiring others, would serve for the US to transfer these US national policies to the international arena, for others to follow and imitate them through a sort of global league for democracy that seems very nebulous.

In the meantime, the reconstruction of the class average, the same to which Trump appealed four years ago, would involve greater investment in technological innovation and supposedly greater global equity in international trade, from which the United States would benefit the most.

Finally, all of the above would be complemented by a new era in international arms control through a new START treaty between the US and Russia, US leadership in the fight against climate change, an end to interventions on foreign soil, particularly in Afghanistan, and the reestablishment of diplomacy as the backbone of US foreign policy.

"Promises Made, Promises Kept!What is Trump's alternative? The current President does not reveal what his projects are, but he does propose a review of his "achievements" which, we understand, will give us an idea of what his foreign policy will be, which will revolve around the continuity of the US trade rebalancing based, as up to now, on shielding US companies from foreign investment, the imposition of new tariffs, the fight against fraudulent trade practices, especially by China, and the restoration of US relations with its allies in Asia/Pacific, the Middle East and Europe, but without specific proposals.

With regard to the area of security, treated in a differentiated manner by Trump, the recipe is the increase in defense spending, the shielding of US territory against terrorism and opposition to North Korea, Venezuela and Iran, which will be joined by the maintenance and expansion of the recent campaign of actions directed specifically against Russia, with the declared goal of containing it in Ukraine and preventing cyber-attacks.

But the reality is that both candidates will have to face global challenges that they have not considered in their programs and that will condition them decisively in their mandates, starting with the management of the pandemic and its economic effects on a global scale and including the growing competition from the European Union, especially as its common military and defense capabilities develop.

As we have just seen, none of the candidates will offer new solutions and therefore the situation is not likely to improve, at least in the short term.

* PhD in Contemporary History, graduate in Political Science and Administration. Professor at UNAV and UCJC.

WORKING PAPER / María del Pilar Cazali

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ABSTRACT

The Brexit deal has led to a shift in the UK's relationship not only with the European Union but also with other countries around the world. Africa is key in the new relationships the UK is trying to build outside from the EU due to their historical past, the current Commonwealth link, and the important potential trade deals. This article looks to answer how hard the UK will struggle with competition in the African country as an individual state, no longer member of the EU. These struggles will be especially focused on trading aspects, as they are the most important factors currently for the UK in the post-Brexit era, and it's also the strongest focus of the EU in Africa.

COMMENTARY / Juan Luis López Aranguren

If traditional diplomacy is understood as the relations exercised between official representatives of States, in recent years a new concept of diplomacy has gained popularity and has become increasingly important in relations between nations: cultural diplomacy. Assuming that culture is the vehicle through which nations communicate with each other, cultural diplomacy is the exchange of culture, ideas and information that nations around the world engage in to achieve mutual understanding that will advance the construction of a more just and stable world. In this context, the celebration of the Olympic Games is one of the most important cultural diplomacy events that a nation can achieve to project and share its culture and identity with the rest of the world. In this regard, Japan reaffirmed its position as a global benchmark for this diplomacy with its public appearance at the closing ceremony of the 2016 Rio Olympics. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe appeared in the guise of the world-famous character Mario to pick up the baton for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics. Japan thus used an icon of Japanese pop culture to project its cultural identity to the entire planet. 

In this dimension of soft power or cultural diplomacy, the Olympic Games are the greatest exponent of it. Already in their origin, in 776 B.C., the Olympic Games revealed themselves as a diplomatic tool of extraordinary strength by forcing a sacred truce between the different city-states that participated in them. Therefore, from its very origin, it was possible to achieve international political objectives by employing this cultural tool . This measure was observed to the point that if any city-state violated this truce, its athletes were expelled from the competition.

This same demonstration has been repeated in more recent times, demonstrating that the Olympics have been a diplomatic battleground throughout history. In 1980 the USA and 65 other countries boycotted the Moscow Olympics in protest against the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan. In retaliation, the USSR and 13 other states boycotted the next Olympics in 1984 in Los Angeles.

The upcoming Tokyo 2021 Olympic Games (delayed one year due to the pandemic) do not carry any controversy of this subject. Instead, they have been conceived as a historic opportunity to reinvent the country internally and globally after the Fukushima catastrophe (or Great East Japan Earthquake). To this end, C official graduate project Tokyo 2020 Action & Legacy Plan 2016 has been designed to achieve three objectives: firstly, to maximize the connection of Japanese citizens and groups with the Tokyo Olympics. Secondly, to maximize cultural projection both nationally and globally. Thirdly and finally, to ensure a bequest of value to future generations, as it was on the occasion of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics.

These three objectives set by the Japanese government will be expressed in five dimensional pillars on which action will be taken. These five pillars are articulated in the manner of Olympic rings, intertwining with each other and strengthening the domestic and international impact of these Olympic Games. These dimensions are, starting with the most immediate to the purely sporting aspect itself, the promotion of sport and health. The second, connecting with culture and Education. The third, also with great importance for its potential to reform Tokyo in particular and Japan in general, urban planning and sustainability. Not surprisingly, the Japanese government and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government have made great efforts to build ambitious infrastructure to accommodate these Olympics, to the point of relocating the famous and iconic Tsukiji fish market that has been a symbol of the city since 1935. Fourth, the Olympics will be used to revive Economics and technological innovation, just as the 1964 Tokyo Olympics did when it showcased the first Shinkansen, or bullet trains, which have become one of Japan's technological icons. Finally, fifthly, Japan saw the Olympic Games as an opportunity to overcome the crisis and trauma caused by the Fukushima disaster (a catastrophe that in Japan is referred to as the Great East Japan Earthquake).

In addition to these five objectives, ranging from the more specific to the more general, a sixth goal or unofficial dimension will be added in 2020: to project Japan's recovery from the COVID pandemic domestically and internationally. In this sense, the Olympic Games will not only be a symbol of overcoming a particular Japanese disaster, but may allow the Japanese country to position itself as a model in the management against the pandemic and in the promotion of economic recovery.

▲ Nicolás Maduro during a broadcasted speech [Gov. of Venezuela].

ESSAY / Isabelle León Graticola

It is no secret to anyone that Venezuela is going through the most convoluted economic and social crisis in its history, a crisis in which the creators have manipulated the existence of the people, degrading its integrity, and extinguishing everything that once characterized Venezuela.

The country holds a key geopolitical location that serves as a route for North America and the Caribbean to the rest of South America. Likewise, the country is endowed with abundant natural resources like natural gas, iron ore, diamonds, gold, and oil.1 Venezuela has the largest proven oil reserves in the world, with 302 billion barrels in January 2018, emanating an extremely rich country with astonishing potential.2 However, this crisis has not only hindered people's lives but has ironically dissipated the country's resources to consolidate the pillars of the regime to such an extent that today the government of Nicolás Maduro is importing oil from Iran. Inadequate policies that have weakened the society's sense of responsibility and nationalism, decreased foreign investment out of lack of trust, and annihilated the state-led oil production, therefore reinforcing the country's economic downfall and hyperinflation.

The Venezuelan government, headed by Nicolás Maduro, has managed its way to continue holding power despite accusations of corruption, crimes against humanity, and even drugs trafficking involvement. The perplexing partner and political crisis has created an unsustainable and violent context in which poorly informed people are manipulated by the government through speeches that take big significance on how society perceives the actual situation, as well as other countries' statements on the crisis. Up to this point, it has become difficult to understand what keeps bolstering this regime, but if the situation is analyzed from the nucleus, the well-orchestrated rhetoric of Chávez and his successor, Maduro, has contributed to support the ends and sustainment of the regime. 

Since Maduro reached power, poverty motivated violence has been rampant in Venezuela and insecurity has become a significant part of society's dynamics. Consequently, many protests against the government demanding for freedom and better living standards have taken place. Maduro's regime has been forced to employ tools such as fake news and hateful rhetoric to soften the anger of the people by manipulating them and brainwashing the armed forces to avoid uprisings. 

This article aims to analyze how Maduro's rhetoric has maintained a minority in the wrong side of history and a majority in constant battle by making erroneous accusations to third parties to justify the perturbed situation, while the government keeps enriching its wallet at the cost of the people and its smudged operations. Such feverish society gave rise to pure uncertainty, to a place where disinformation takes the form of a lethal weapon for the dangerous context in which it exists.

The background: Chávez's indoctrinated society

First, it is necessary to clarify that the focus of this article is merely on the rhetorical aspect as a pillar of the regime. However, when it comes to the background that has sustained Maduro's administration up to this day, there is a more complex reality, full of crime, death, manipulation, and corruption. Venezuela is an almost abnormal reality because, after more than twenty years, it is still tied to a group of people who have taken absolutely everything from it. From a man that portrayed nothing but hope for the poor, to one who has managed his way sticking to policies damaging to the very people they mean to help, and which, sooner or later, will make the regime collapse.

Hugo Chávez's presidency was characterized by a tremendous and persuasive oratory; he knew how to get to the people. Chávez's measures and campaigns were based on a psychological strategy that won him the admiration of the most impoverished classes of the country. Chávez arrived and gave importance and attention to the big mass of the population that previous governments had systematically neglected. People felt the time had come for them to have what they never had before. Filled with charisma and political mastery, his speeches always contained jokes, dances, and colloquial phrases that were considered indecent by the country's highest class and often misunderstood abroad.

Chávez always built a drastic separation between the ideals of the United States and Venezuela and looked for ways to antagonize the former with his rhetoric. He began to refer to George W. Bush as "Mr. Danger", an imperial literary character of one of the most famous Venezuelan novels, Doña Bárbara.3

Hugo Chávez is one of the most revolutionary characters in Venezuelan history, one who brought the convoluted situation that today perpetuates in the country. Chávez persecuted journalists and political opponents, expropriated lands, nationalized Venezuela's key industries such as telecommunications, electricity, and the refining processes of heavy crudes, and slowly degraded the society as the exercise of power was directed to hold complete control of Venezuela's internal dynamics.4

Chávez extended education and medical assistance to the least favored classes and improved the living conditions of the needy. This policy did nothing but create among these classes a culture of dependence on the government. Chávez's supporters or Chavistas were the pillars that buttressed the government, while the wealthy were cataloged as "squealing pigs" and "vampires. "5 The Chavistas admired Chavez's charismatic character and his constant gifts; he gave them fridges and TVs, gadgets that they could never afford on their own. He also constructed buildings, under the "mission statement Vivienda" initiative, to give people living in slums a 'proper' home. All of this was possible because the oil prices at the time were skyrocketing; he used the oil income to buy his support. The general standard of life, however, continued to be poor. The government knew what to give and how to manipulate to stay in power, and that is precisely what made Hugo Chávez so powerful and almost impossible to defeat despite strong opposition. 

Historically, the United States has opposed left-wing governments in Latin America, so Chávez condemned the US, by referring to them as an imperialist power, or the "Empire". He disgraced US leaders and actions and transferred that anti-imperialistic and anti-capitalist approach to the population, part of which supported him and was blindly loyal to the cause. Chávez's alliance with Cuba under Fidel Castro led to the supply of oil at cut-rate prices, all related to the desire of reducing US economic influence in South America. Chavez's populist initiatives were the tenets of his administration and controversial foreign policy. These, along with his rhetoric and opposition from the Venezuelan wealthy class, deeply polarized the society and gave rise to what Venezuela has today: a divided society that has suffered from the lack of basic necessities, disinformation, and integrity.

Currently, the spokesmen of the Government of Nicolás Maduro address citizens at all hours from public channels and social networks to stir up the disgruntlement of the population toward the external enemy.6 Despite the poorly prepared speeches, the lack of vocabulary, and the improper formulation of sentences, Maduro has kept the colloquial and unformal rhetoric that characterized Chávez, but has failed to draw the connection that the late president enjoyed. The anti-imperialist strategy has been maintained, and, as the justification of the crisis, it has become the epicenter of the regime's speech. Nicolás Maduro's rhetoric revolves around two words: the US and the "Patria", a word frequently used by Chávez.

The base of Maduro's rhetoric: the love for Chávez

Shortly before dying in March 2013, Hugo Chávez appointed Vice President Nicolás Maduro as his successor. Chávez's charisma and legacy are what somehow ensured him that Maduro would provide a smooth transition. After Chávez's passing, Maduro took advantage of the momentum and sentiment that the Chavistas revealed and ensured that if picked, he would follow the steps of his predecessor and would continue to strengthen the 'Bolivarian Revolution'. Along with the continuity with Chávez's legacy, the defense of Venezuelan sovereignty in front of the US, and the social equality became the key messages of his administration.7 Nevertheless, Maduro had little support from the elites and inherited a country that was already economically weak due to the downfall of the oil prices and corruption.

In Chávez's wake, Maduro appealed to the emotion of the audience. He strongly claimed that the people were there for the 'Comandante' and said that "his soul and his spirit was so strong that his body could not stand it anymore, and he was released and now through this universe expanding filling us with blessings and love". He knew what this meant for the people and a crying audience exclaimed "Chávez lives, the fight goes on".

Maduro filled his rhetoric with the love for Chávez. He acknowledged that the Chavistas worshipped him as if he was God and that for ideological reasons, support for Maduro was guaranteed. Nevertheless, others recognized that the situation in the country was not favorable and questioned Maduro's ability to fill the void left by Chávez. When Maduro took power, the country entered a period of reinforced economic decline accompanied by hyperinflation that nowadays exceeds 10 million percent.8 As it was previously stated, the conditions of poverty surpass anything seen before in the country, which is now on the brink of collapse.

Furthermore, Venezuela went through two rounds of mass protests, in 2014 and 2018, that demanded freedom and change. Unfortunately, and as was expected from the government, thousands of violations of human rights were part of the demonstration's dynamics as brutal repression and the unjust imprisonment of demonstrators took place all along. Simultaneously, Maduro managed to call for rallies on the days of the major opposition's marches and retained the populist speech based on ideological arguments and emotional appeals among the minority of supporters to consolidate his power in Venezuela. Last year, in a regime rally on February 23rd, he condemned the elites as he explained that he was certain that from the bottom of his Chavista sentiment of loyalty to this battle, he was never going to be part of one. He stated that Venezuela will continue to be Patria for more many years to come. 

The ongoing crisis has forced many to survive rather than to live, but despite all, Maduro remains in control. Maduro has kept Chávez's anti-imperialist policy and has rejected any minimum support from the United States. The government takes advantage of the hunger and the vulnerable situation of its people and makes sure that it remains as the only source of food. It does not take responsibility and instead, blames the crisis on the 'economic war' that the US has imposed on Venezuela.9 When Juan Guaidó sworn himself the legitimate president, Maduro's supporters started raising firms in a campaign called "Hands off Venezuela", while the US was trying to get humanitarian assistance into Venezuela through the Colombian border in the name of Guaidó. 

In this sense, he explained in the same concentration speech that they were defending the national territory and the right to live freely and independently. Although it may seem ironic, because the government has killed hundreds of people with its police brutality and torture, this rhetoric is what has kept him the support of the hardcore revolutionary followers. The "Hands off Venezuela", was shouted and accompanied by the worst English pronunciation -that characterizes Maduro-, and followed with insults to Guaidó.

As Maduro yelled "puppet, clown, and beggar of imperialism and Donald Trump. If he is the President, where are the economic and social measures that he has applied for the people? It is a game to deceive and manipulate, it is a game that has failed, the coup d'état has failed" as the network audience shouted, "jail him, jail him!". He drew his speech to a hardcore anti-imperialist audience and firmly stated that the US intended to invade Venezuela and enslave it. Maduro finalized his speech by shouting "wave up the flag, up the Patria, for the people in defense of the Revolution".

Recently, the US State Department released a price for the capture of Maduro and his cabinet, not only for the crimes committed against the Venezuelan population, but also because of their involvement in a huge drug-trafficking network. With this, the regime's position has become more vulnerable and simultaneously pragmatic, but as tough actions were taken against possible threats and opposing figures, Maduro's rhetoric remains to deny its status and manipulating those that still support him. In another public speech, he stated that "Donald Trump's government, in an extravagant and extreme, vulgar, miserable action, launched a set of false accusations and like a racist cowboy of the 21st century, put a price on the heads of revolutionaries that are still willing to fight them". He one more time accused the US of being the main cause of the economic crisis of Venezuela.

Nicolás Maduro's speech has always been directed to the hardcore revolutionaries, those that worship Chávez since the beginning and who firmly believe in the socialist cause. Maduro has maintained his rhetoric despite the changes in the internal situation of the country; he has held an enduring method for antagonizing the opposition, the Venezuelan upper class, and the United States. On the other hand, regarding the strategic foreign allies, the regime openly gives declarations to support them, but again to somehow antagonize the United States. Indeed, this was the case of the US assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian top commander, in which government representatives attended the Iranian embassy to give the condolences in the name of the regime and swore to avenge Soleimani's death. The administration of Nicolás Maduro has no gray areas, everything is either black or white; the opposition, the upper class, the US, and the US-influenced countries are the enemies, and the rhetoric rarely leans toward a conciliatory message, rather has always revolved around these conflicting parties.

What is left

Twenty years have passed since the Chavismo arrived in the country. Nowadays, a passionate minority of the population keeps supporting Maduro. His regime continues to train armed groups to combat discontent headed by opposition leader Juan Guaidó. The Chavismo keeps being strong, but it has been fragmented by those who believe that the revolution ended at the moment Chávez died, and the ones that are convinced that supporting Maduro means being loyal to Chávez. In the case of Juan Guaidó, he keeps doing his efforts. He still has relative support and keeps being a source of hope. Nevertheless, many criticize the fact that he let again the people cool down. A close change is expected, but no one knows what the movements behind are. Meanwhile, the people will continue suffering and trying to survive.

Upon reflection, it can be noticed that Maduro's entire argumentation revolves around a confrontational rhetoric: the US and capitalism against Venezuela; Guaidó against the Patria; the elites against the Revolution.10 Far from recognizing the reality that the country faces and taking actions to improve it, this confrontational approach simply places the blame on those who have tried to bring a change in the internal dynamics of Venezuela. The regime has managed to construct a national united front against a common foreign enemy and to demonize the opposition.

Chávez and Maduro's rhetoric has followed a tangible objective: the Revolution. Maduro's regime up to this point is searching for a way to consolidate its power and sustain itself as the best way to elude a rather somber future in jail. This never-ending nightmare should have long ago collapsed due to the economic catastrophe, hyperinflation, political repression, human rights violations, and the lack of direction for Venezuela. Behind what maintains this structure there is nothing but the exercise of power and the almost absolute control of society. The Patria that they constantly speak of is running out of fuel to keep going. Nonetheless, the rhetorical deceptions of the Bolivarian revolution, which for two decades have appealed to the popular classes, settled in the collective mindset of the Chavismo and brought space for support in the Venezuelan society.

Chávez and Maduro's presidencies have been based on educating and changing the mindset of the population as they wanted; a population that is content with one box of food a month and which, unfortunately, hunts for the easy means to achieve its goals instead of fighting to improve its lot.

Today, the regime is fed on the memory of Hugo Chávez, on his promises, on his battle. As long as it keeps generating an illusion on the supporters, Maduro will appeal to it as a pillar of his administration and of the Revolution.

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Venezuela facts and figures. 2019, https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/171.htm. Accessed 28 Nov. 2019.

2. US Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis. Venezuela. Jan. 2019, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=VEN. Accessed 28 Nov. 2019.

3. Livingstone, G. (2013, March 10). The secret of Hugo Chavez's hold on his people. Retrieved March 17, 2020, from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/the-secret-of-hugo-chavezs-hold-on-his-people-8527832.html

4. El País. (2007, January 08). Chávez announces the nationalization of the electric service and telecommunications. Retrieved July 01, 2020, from https://elpais.com/internacional/2007/01/08/actualidad/1168210811_850215.html

5. The Guardian (2012, October 08). Hugo Chávez: A victory of enduring charisma and political mastery. Retrieved March 17, 2020, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/08/hugo-chavez-victory-political-venezuela

6. Twitter, F., & Miraflores, P. (2017, July 23). Maduro, his ministers and the corruption of language. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/07/22/opinion/1500746848_239358.html

7. Grainger, S. Hugo Chávez and Venezuela Confront his Succession. Dec. 2012. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20678634. Accessed 29 Nov. 2019.

8. Sánchez, V. Venezuela hyperinflation hits 10 million percent. 'Shock therapy' may be only chance to undo economic damage. Aug. 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/02/venezuela-inflation-at-10-million-percent-its-time-for-shock-therapy.html. Accessed 29 Nov. 2019.

9. TVVenezuela. CLAP boxes no longer have what to feed Venezuelans. youtube Sept. 2019. Accessed 30 Nov. 2019.

10. Delgado, A., & Herrero, J. (2019, February 12). Venezuela rhetorics on Twitter: Guaidó vs. Maduro. Retrieved March 18, 2020, from https://beersandpolitics.com/retoricas-de-venezuela-en-twitter-guaido-vs-maduro

Faced with the biggest economic crisis since World War II, the EU itself has decided to borrow to help its member states.

▲ Commission President Von der Layen and European committee President Charles Michel after announcing the agreement in Julycommittee Europeancommittee ].

ANALYSIS / Pablo Gurbindo Palomo

"Deal!With this "tweet" at 5:30 in the morning of July 21, the president of the European committee , Charles Michel, announced the achievement of an agreement after the longest meeting in its history (more than 90 hours of negotiations). 

After the failed summit in February, the European countries were aware of the importance of reaching an agreement, but certain countries saw it as more urgent than others to finalize the Multiannual Financial framework (MFF) for the next seven years. But as with everything else, the Covid-19 pandemic has overturned this lack of urgency, and has even forced the Member States to negotiate, in addition to the budget, aid to alleviate the effects of the pandemic on the 27.

The agreement consists of an MFF of 1.074 trillion euros. A figure lower than that demanded in February by the so-called friends of cohesion (a conglomerate of countries from southern and eastern Europe) and the Commission itself, but also higher than the figure that the frugals (the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark and Sweden) were willing to accept. But it was not this figure that was the subject of the discussion, but how much and how the post-pandemic recovery fund was to be set up to help the countries most affected by the pandemic. The agreed Fund was 750 billion, divided into 390 billion to be given to the Member States in the form of grants, and the remaining 360 billion to be given in the form of a 70% loan to be disbursed between 2021 and 2022.

The figures are dizzying, and based on the February negotiations, where some of the members preferred something more austere, one might ask: How did we reach this agreement?

The Hamilton moment

With the arrival of Covid-19 in Europe and a considerable paralysis of all the world's economies, the European capitals quickly realized that the blow was going to be significant and that a strong response was going to be necessary to soften the blow. Proposals at the European level were not long in coming. For example, the European Parliament proposed a recovery package of 2 trillion euros on May 15, to be included in the MFF 2021-2027.

The most noteworthyproposal was presented on May 18 by French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. And not only because it was driven by the two main economies of the Union, but also because of its historic content.

There has been talk of Hamilton momentin allusion to Alexander Hamilton, one of the founding fathers of the United States and the first Secretary of the Treasury of the newly founded republic. In 1790 the thirteen states that made up the young American nation were heavily indebted due to the war effort of the Revolutionary War, which had ended only seven years earlier. To solve this problem, Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury, succeeded in convincing the federal government to assume the states' debt by "mutualizing" it. This event marked the strengthening of the American federal government and served to create the instructions of the U.S. national identity. 

It seems that with the Franco-German proposal , the Hamilton moment has arrived. The proposal is based on four pillars: 

1. European health strategy, which may include a joint reservation of medical equipment and supplies, coordination in the acquisition of vaccines and treatments. In turn, epidemic prevention plans shared among the 27 and common methods for registering the sick.

2. A boost to the modernization of European industry, supported by an acceleration of the ecological and digital transition.

3. Strengthening the European industrial sector, supporting production in the Old Continent and diversification of supply chains to reduce global dependence on European Economics .

4. 500 billion reconstruction fund for the regions most affected by the pandemic based on EU budgetary programs.

It is this fourth pillar which we can call "Hamiltonian" and which is historic as it would allow for the first time in history the EU itself to issue debt to finance this fund. This proposal has broken years of a German stance against any subject collective indebtedness. "We are experiencing the biggest crisis in our history... Due to the unusual nature of the crisis we are choosing unusual solutions," Merkel said in the joint video conference with Macron.  

According to this proposal , the funds would not be reimbursed directly by the countries but by the Community funds in the long term, either through its usual resources or through new sources of income. It should also be pointed out that the proposal referred to the submission of this fund in the form of subsidies, i.e., without any subject of interest for the recipient countries.

Among the reactions to this proposal were those of the frugal, who rejected that the funds should be provided in the form of subsidies. "We will continue to show solidarity and support for the countries most affected by the coronavirus crisis, but this should be in the form of loans and not subsidies," said Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz. The frugal proposal is that financial aid raised on the debt markets should be submit to the states at low interest rates, i.e. as a loan, and conditional on a reform program.

On May 27, the Commission announced its proposalproposal, very similar to the Franco-German one, but extended. The proposal consists of a 1.1 trillion euro MFF and a 750 billion euro recovery plan called Next Generation EU. This recovery plan is based on three pillars financed with new instruments but within pre-existing headings:

The first pillar covers 80% of the recovery plan. It deals with support to Member States in their investments and reforms following the Commission's recommendations. For this purpose, the pillar has the following instruments:

• Recovery and Resilience Mechanism (the most important part of the proposal): financial support for investments and reforms of the States, especially those related to the ecological and digital transition and the resilience of national economies, linking them to EU priorities. This mechanism would be composed of 310 billion in grants and 250 billion in loans.

• React-EU Fund within the cohesion policy with 55 billion. 

• Increase in the Just Transition Fund: this fund is intended to support States in undertaking the energy and ecological transition, to move towards a policy of climate neutrality. It would be increased to 40 billion.

• Increase in the European Agricultural Fund for Rural development : to support rural areas to comply with the European Green agreement . It would be increased by 15 billion.

The second pillar covers 15% of the plan. It focuses on boosting private investment, and its funds would be managed by the European Investment Bank (EIB):

• 31 billion Solvency Support Facility

• EU-Invest program increased to $15.3 billion

• New Strategic Investment Fund to promote investment in European strategic sectors 

The third pillar comprises the remaining 5%. It includes investments in aspects that have result key to the coronavirus crisis:

• EU4Health program to strengthen health cooperation. With a budget of 9.4 billion.

• Strengthening of rescEU, the European Union's Civil Protection Mechanism, by 2 billion.

• Horizon Europe project for the promotion of research and innovation worth 94.4 billion.

• 16.5 billion in support for foreign humanitarian financial aid .

To obtain the financing, the Commission would issue its own debt on the market and introduce new taxes of its own, such as a border carbon tax, emission rights, a digital tax or a tax on large corporations.

It should also be noted that both access to MFF and Next Generation EU aid would be conditional on compliance with the rule of law. Something that did not please countries such as Hungary or Poland, which, among others, consider that it is not clear and that it is a form of interference by the EU in their internal affairs.

Negotiation at the European Summit

With this proposal on the table, the heads of state and government of the 27 met on July 17 in Brussels amid great uncertainty. They did not know how long the summit would last and were pessimistic that an agreement would be reached.

The hot points of the negotiation were mainly the amount and form of the Reconstruction Fund. Countries such as Spain, Italy and Portugal wanted the aid to come in the form of subsidies in full and without any subject . On the other hand, the frugal countries, led at the summit by Mark Rutte of the Netherlands, wanted the reconstruction fund to be reduced as much as possible, and in any case to be provided in the form of loans to be refund and as an "absolute precondition". "Any financial aid from the North means reforms in the South. There is no other option," said Rutte at a press conference in The Hague.

As in any negotiation, positions were loosening. It was already clear that neither of the two positions was going to remain unscathed and that a mixed solution with both subsidies and loans was going to be the solution. But in what percentage? And with reform conditionality?

For Spain, Italy and Portugal, the subsidies could not be less than 400 billion, which was already a concession of the 500 billion from which they had started. For the frugal, who were joined by Finland, this figure could not exceed 350 billion, which would reduce the total Fund to 700 billion. This was a major concession by the frugal members, who went from talking about zero subsidies to accepting them as 50% of the amount. Michel's final proposal was 390 billion in subsidies and 360 billion in loans to try to convince all parties.

The big stumbling block, apart from the percentage, was the conditionality of reforms for the submission aid defended by the frugal. The ghost of the Troika imposed after the 2008 crisis was beginning to appear, to the disgrace of countries such as Spain and Italy. Rutte demanded that the national plans that countries had to submit to the Commission in order to receive the Fund should also pass through the committee of the 27 and that unanimous approval was necessary. This formula basically allowed any country to veto the national plans. Germany, for its part, did not go as far as the required unanimity, but did ask for some control by the committee.

Rutte's stance angered many countries that saw the proposal as a way to force reforms that have nothing to do with economic recovery.

The president of the committee presented a proposal to bring the parties closer together: the "emergency brake". According to Michel's proposal , countries will have to submit their reform plan to the committee and it will have to be approved C qualified majority. After its approval, any country is allowed to submit to the committee its doubts about the fulfillment of the plans presented by a State; in this case, the committee would have a maximum period of three months to make a pronouncement. The country would not receive aid until a decision is received.

For those who may be surprised by the large concessions of the frugal, we must mention the figure of the "rebates" or compensatory checks. These are rebates on a country's contribution to the budget and were introduced in 1984 for the United Kingdom. The British were one of the main net contributors to the European budget , but they hardly benefited from its aid, 70% of which was earmarked for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Cohesion Fund. It was therefore agreed that the British would have a permanent discount on their contribution. Since then, other net contributor countries have been receiving these checks. Although in these cases they had to be negotiated with each MFF and were partial on a specific area.

It is a very controversial figure for many countries, and an attempt was already made to remove it in 2005. But what is undeniable is that it is a great bargaining chip. The frugal countries have wanted to keep it from the beginning, and even strengthen it. And faced with the difficulties of negotiation, the rest of the Member States have seen that it is an "affordable" and not very elaborate way of convincing the "hawks of the north". After an initial stance, they ended up increasing it: Denmark will receive 377 million (considerably higher than the initial 222 million); Austria will double its initial amount to 565 million; Sweden will receive 1,069 million (higher than the initial 823 million); and the Netherlands will receive 1,575 million. Germany, as the largest net contributor, will receive 3.671 billion.

The last important negotiation point to be addressed is the conditionality of compliance with the rule of law in order to receive the various funds and aid. Hungary and Poland, for example, have an open transcript for possible violation of article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which allows a Member State to be sanctioned for violating basic values of the Union such as respect for human rights or the rule of law. Many countries have pressed the issue, but given the difficulty in negotiations and a possible risk of vetoing the agreement depending on the vocabulary used by the Hungarian President Viktor Orban, this clause has come to nothing.

To recapitulate, and as stated at the beginning of the article, the agreement ended up with an MFF of 1.074 trillion euros; and a post-pandemic reconstruction fund, the Next Generation EU, of 750 billion, divided into 390 billion in the form of subsidies and 360 billion in the form of loans. To this must be added Michel's "emergency brake" for the submission aid and the significant sum of the "rebates".

The cutbacks

Yes, there have been. Apart from the already explained rule of law clause, there have been several cuts in several of the items proposed by the Commission. Firstly, a significant cut in the Just Transition Fund, which has been reduced from the initial proposal of 40 billion to 10 billion, to the anger of Poland in particular. Secondly, the rural development funds are reduced from 15 billion to 7 billion. Thirdly, the 16.5 billion fund to support external humanitarian financial aid , the 31 billion solvency support instrument ( proposal by the Commission) and the 9.4 billion EU4Health program have come to nothing. And finally, the Horizon Europe project would drop from the 94.4 billion proposed by the Commission to barely 5 billion.

Winners and losers?

It is difficult to speak of winners and losers in a negotiation where all parties have yielded a great deal in order to reach an agreement. Although it remains to be seen whether the positions of the countries were truly immovable from the beginning or whether they were simply used as an instrument of pressure in the negotiation.

The countries most affected by the pandemic, such as Italy and Spain, can be happy because they will receive a very large sum in the form of subsidies, as they wanted. But this conditionality that they were not going to accept in any way, in a way, is going to come to them softened in the form of Michel's "emergency brake". And the reforms they did not want to be forced to make, they will have to carry out in agreement the recovery plan they send to the committee, which, if not sufficient, may be rejected by the latter.  

The frugal have succeeded in getting conditional aid, but more than half of it will be in the form of subsidies. And as a rule, the monetary limits they advocated have been exceeded.

Countries such as Poland or Hungary have succeeded in making the conditionality of the rule of law ineffective in the end, but on the other hand they have received considerable cuts in funds, such as Just Transition, which are important especially in Central Europe for the energy transition.

But, in the final, each Head of State and Government has returned to his country claiming victory and assuring to have accomplished his goal, which is what a politician has to do (or appear to do) in the end.

For both the MFF 2021-2027 and Next Generation EU to go ahead, the European Parliament's ratification is still pending. Although the Parliament has always advocated for a more ambitious package than the one agreed, there is no fear that it will block it.

Conclusion

As I have said, this agreement can be described as historic for several reasons. Apart from the obvious extension of the European committee or the Covid-19 pandemic itself, it is historic because of the Hamilton moment that seems to be about to take place.

It seems that the Member States have learned that the formula used after the crisis in 2008 did not work, that crises affect the entire Union as a whole and that no one can be left behind. Cases such as Brexit and the rise of Eurosceptic movements throughout the continent set a dangerous precedent and could even jeopardize the continuity of the project.

The "mutualization" of debt will allow already heavily indebted countries, which would have problems to finance themselves due to their high risk premium, to get out of the crisis sooner and better. This decision will obviously cause problems that remain to be seen, but it shows that the 27 have realized that a joint financial aid was necessary and that they cannot go to war on their own. As Merkel said when presenting her plan after the pandemic together with Macron: "It is the worst crisis in European history", and she added that, in order to emerge "stronger", it is necessary to cooperate.

This step of some fiscal unity can be seen as a rapprochement to the Federal Europe, at least in the Eurozone, that has been discussed for decades now. Whether this is a path with or without return remains to be seen.

[Parag Khanna, The Future is Asian. Simon & Schuster. New York, 2019. 433 p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

Parag Khanna's book may be greeted with suspicion at the entrance because of the apparent axiomatic nature of its degree scroll. However, the blunt assertion on the cover is softened when one begins to read the pages inside. The thesis of the work is that the world is in a process of asianizationnot of chinizationMoreover, this process is presented as another coat of paint on the planet, not as a color that will be clearly predominant or definitive.

It is possible that the discussion of whether the United States is in decline and will be replaced by China as the preeminent superpower prevents seeing other parallel developments. Those watching Beijing's rise in the world order, writes Khanna, "have often been paralyzed by two views: either China will devour the world or it is on the verge of collapse. Neither is correct." "The future is Asian, even for China," he asserts.

Khanna believes that the world is moving towards a multipolar order, something that is also true in Asia, even if China's size often dazzles.

It is possible that this judgment is influenced by the author's Indian origin and also by his time living in the United States, but he offers figures to support his words. Of the 5 billion people living in Asia, 3.5 billion are not Chinese (70%): China, therefore, has only a third of Asia's population; it also accounts for slightly less than half of its GDP. Other data: half of the investments leaving the continent are non-Chinese, and more than half of foreign investments go to Asian countries other than China. Asia, therefore, "is more than China plus".

It is not just a question of size, but of wills. "A China-led Asia is no more acceptable to most Asians than the notion of a U.S.-led West is to Europeans," says Khanna. He rejects the idea that, because of China's power, Asia is heading toward a kind of tributary system like the one ruled in other centuries from Beijing. He points out that this system did not go beyond the Far East and was based mainly on trade.

The author reassures those who fear Chinese expansionism: "China has never been an indestructible superpower presiding over all of Asia like a colossus". Thus, he warns that while Europe's geographical characteristics have historically led many countries to fear the hegemony of a single power, in the case of Asia its geography makes it "inherently multipolar", as natural barriers absorb friction. In fact, the clashes that have taken place between China and India, China and Vietnam or India and Pakistan have ended in stalemates. "Whereas in Europe wars have occurred when there is a convergence in power between rivals, in Asia wars have taken place when there is a perception of advantage over rivals. So the more powerful China's neighbors like Japan, India or Russia are, the less likelihood of conflict between them."

For Khanna, Asia will always be a region of distinct and autonomous civilizations, especially now that we are witnessing a revival of old empires. The geopolitical future of Asia will not be led by the United States or China: "Japan, South Korea, India, Russia, Indonesia, Australia, Iran and Saudi Arabia will never come together under a hegemonic umbrella or unite in a single pole of power".

There will not be, then, a chinization of the world, according to the author, and the Asianization that is taking place - a shift of the planet's specific weight towards the Indo-Pacific - should not be seen as a threat to those who live elsewhere. Just as there was a Europeanization of the world in the 19th century, and an Americanization in the 20th century, in the 21st century we are witnessing an Asianization. Khanna sees this as "the most recent sedimentation substrate in the geology of global civilization," and as a "layer" he does not assume that the world Withdrawal to what came before. "Being more Asian doesn't necessarily mean being less American or European," he says.

The book analyzes the weight and fit of different Asian countries in the continent. Of Russia, he says it is strategically closer to China today than at any time since its communist pact in the 1950s. Khanna believes that geography leads to this understanding, as it invites Canada to maintain good relations with the United States; he predicts that climate change will further open up the lands of Siberia, which will integrate them more with the rest of the Asian continent.

As for India and China's relationship, Khanna believes that both countries will have to accept each other as powers more normally. For example, despite India's reluctance towards China's Silk Road and India's own regional connectivity projects, in the end the two countries' preferred corridors "will overlap and even reinforce each other," ensuring that products from Asia's interior reach the Indian Ocean. "Geopolitical rivalries will only accelerate the Asianization of Asia," Khanna sentences.

In assessing the importance of Asia, the book includes Middle East oil. Technically, this region is part of the continent, but it is such a separate chapter with its own dynamics that it is difficult to see it as Asian territory. The same is true when Israel or Lebanon are label as such. It may give the impression that the author is lumping everything together to make the figures more impressive. He argues that the Middle East is becoming less and less dependent on Europe and the United States and is looking more to the East.

Khanna is in a position to reasonably defend himself against most of the objections that can be made to his text. The most controversial, however, is the justification, close to defense, that he makes of technocracy as a system of government. Beyond the descriptive attitude of a model that in some countries has been the subject of significant economic and social development , Khanna even seems to endorse its moral superiority.

Three visions

However, the desire to create a cooperative body within the Weimar Triangle is a challenge, as each country represents, in one way or another, one of the three foreign policy agendas that divide Europe.

At one end of the spectrum is French Gaullism, which advocates an independent Europe and is wary of the presence of the United States in Europe, as it should be remembered that France already has a strong army. Paris abandoned this perspective for the Atlanticist one in 2007 under Sarkozy, but it has been regained by Macron. This means that Macron's rhetoric could lead to clashes with the Americans, while he also seeks to set his own profile vis-à-vis Moscow and Beijing.

In the middle is German pragmatism: Germany does not want to increase conflicts and prefers to focus on its Economics. On the one hand it is negotiating with the Russians to receive gas for its industrial activity and on the other hand it wants US troops to remain on its territory, as their departure would force it to increase its security expense . In the European plans for recovery after the Covid-19 pandemic, Germany has been clearly more absent and Macron has been the one who has taken the initiative.

Finally we find Polish Atlanticism. Poland is perhaps the most Atlanticist country in the EU. Even under the Trump Administration there has been a high level of pro-Americanism among the population and the political class . The government has bid to succeed in hosting a U.S. base, and Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak has enthusiastically praised the U.S. role as a defender of the free world. This is not new, as already the 2003 invasion of Iraq was supported by Poland, in the face of French and German rejection. Poland continues to see Russia as its greatest threat and the United States and NATO as guarantors of protection.

The Triangle returns

Its geographical status explains Poland's position and it is not going to stop wanting NATO instructions on its territory. However, it understands that it needs close allies with greater internal stability - hence its rapprochement with Germany and France - than that offered by the Trump Administration, whose international image is badly damaged, or a United Kingdom more occupied with managing Brexit than security issues.

On the other hand, Macron wants to prevent Poland from replacing the United Kingdom as the representative of US policy in Europe, so he has changed his strategy to avoid alienating it by criticizing its judicial reforms. Macron did not mention them during his visit to Warsaw in February this year and only encouraged to "respect European values". Somehow Macron understands that after Brexit he will need Poland to advance his European foreign policy plans and that is why it is important to bring it into the command conference room . Macron went so far as to say in Warsaw that Poland, Germany and France should lead the post-Brexit Union. He also announced the dispatch of 600 more men to Poland, which will bring the number of French soldiers in Poland to 5,100.

At this meeting, the two leaders agreed to meet with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, although the constraints imposed by the coronavirus pandemic have slowed down some contacts, while waiting for Economics to start to recover. The newly inaugurated German presidency of the committee , moreover, discourages Berlin from appearing overly aligned with a certain European vector. There may therefore be a certain temporary hibernation of the Weimar Triangle; in any case, although it is a risky formula, if coordinated with the Parliament and the Commission, its consolidation could represent a step forward in European cohesion and governance.