[George Friedman. The Storm Before the Calm. America's Discord, the Coming Crisis of the 2020s, and the Triumph Beyond. Doubleday. New York, 2020. 235 pp.]

review / E. Villa Corta, E. J. Blasco

The degree scroll of the new book by George Friedman, the driving force behind the geopolitical analysis and intelligence agency Stratfor and later creator of Geopolitical Futures, does not reference letter to the global crisis created by the Covid-19 pandemic. When he speaks of the crisis of the 2020s, which Friedman has been anticipating for some time in his commentaries and now explains at length in this book, he is referring to deep and long-lasting historical movements, in this case confined to the United States.

Beyond the current pandemic, therefore, which is somewhat circumstantial and not addressed in the text (its composition is previous), Friedman suggests that the United States will reinvent itself at the end of this decade. Like a machine that, almost automatically, incorporates substantial changes and corrections every certain period of time, the US is preparing for a new leap. There will be a prolonged crisis, but the US will emerge triumphant from it, Friedman predicts. US decline? Quite the opposite.

Unlike his previous books, such as The Next Hundred Years or Flashpoints, Friedman this time leaves Friedman's global geopolitical analysis to focus on the United States. In his reflection on American history, Friedman sees a succession of cycles of approximate length. The current ones are already in their final stages, and the reinstatement of both will coincide in the late 2020s, in a process of crisis and subsequent resurgence of the country. In the institutional field, the 80-year cycle that began after the end of the Second World War is coming to an end (the previous one had lasted since the end of the Civil War in 1865); in the socioeconomic field, the 50-year cycle that began with Ronald Reagan in 1980 is coming to an end (the previous one had lasted since the end of the Great Recession and the arrival of Franklin D. Roosevelt to the White House).

Friedman does not see Donald Trump as the catalyst for change (his effort has simply been to restore the status created by Reagan for the working class average , affected by unemployment and loss of purchasing power), nor does he believe that whoever replaces him in the coming years will be. Rather, he places the turnaround around 2028. The change, which will take place in a time of great confusion, will have to do with the end of the technocracy that dominates American political and institutional life and with the creative disruption of new technologies. The author wants to denote America's skill to overcome adversity and take advantage of "chaos" in order to achieve fruitful growth.

Friedman divides the book into three parts: the creation of the nation as we know it, the cycles we have gone through and the prognosis for the next one. In this last part he presents the challenges or adversities that the country will have to face.

Regarding the creation of the country, the author reasons about the subject of government created in the United States, the territory in which the country is located and the American people. This last aspect is perhaps the most interesting. He defines the American people as a merely artificial construct. This leads him to see the U.S. as a machine that automatically fine-tunes its functioning from time to time. As an "invented" country, the U.S. reinvents itself when its cycles run out.

Friedman presents the training of the American people through three overlapping types: the cowboy, the inventor and the warrior. To the cowboy, who seeks to start something completely new and in an "American" way, we owe especially the social construct that is so unique to the United States. To the inventor belongs the drive for technological progress and economic prosperity. And the warrior condition has been present from the beginning.

The second part of the book deals with the aforementioned issue of cycles. Friedman considers that US growth has been cyclical, in a process in which the country reinvents itself from time to time in order to continue progressing. After reviewing the periods so far, he locates the next great change in the US in the decade that has just begun. He warns that the gestation of the next stage will be complicated due to the accumulation of events from past cycles. One of the issues that the country will have to resolve has to do with the paradox between the desire to internationalize democracy and human rights and that of maintaining its national security: "liberating the world" or securing its position in the international sphere.

The present moment of change, in which, agreement to the author, the institutional and socio-economic cycles will collide, is a time of deep crisis, but a long period of calm will follow. Friedman believes that the first "tremors" of the crisis were felt in the 2016 elections, which showed a radical polarization of American society. The country will have to reform not only its complex institutional system, but also various socio-economic aspects.

This last part of the book - dedicated to the resolution of problems such as the student debt crisis, the use of social networks, new social constructions or the difficulty in the educationalsector educationalis probably the most important. If the mechanicity and automatism in the succession of cycles determined by Friedman, or even its very existence, are questionable (other analyses could lead other authors to consider different stages), the real problems that the country has today are easily ascertainable. Thus, the presentation of proposals for their resolution has an undoubted value.

▲ Tourist population in Gjirokastër district, southern Albania [Pixabay].

ESSAY / Jan Gallemí

Last November 24, 2019, the French government of Enmanuel Macron led the veto, along with other states such as Denmark or the Netherlands, to the accession of the Balkan nations of Albania and North Macedonia to the European Union. As justified by the President of the French Fifth Republic, this is because the largest issue of economic refugees entering France is from the Balkans, specifically from the aforementioned Albania. The latter country applied to the European Union on April 28, 2009 and on June 24, 2014 it was unanimously agreed by the 28 EU countries to grant Albania candidate country status. The reasons for this rejection are mainly economic and financial.[1]. There is also a slight concern about the diversity that exists in the ethnographic structure of the country and the conflicts that this could cause in the future, not only within the country itself but also in its relationship with its neighbors, especially with the issue of Kosovo and relations with Greece and North Macedonia.[2]. However, another aspect that has also been explored is the fact that Albania's accession would mean the incorporation into the EU of the first state in which the religion with the largest issue of followers is Islamic, specifically the Sunni branch. In this essay we will proceed to analyze the impact of this aspect and observe how or to what extent Albanian values, mainly because they are primarily Islamic in religion, may combine or diverge with those on which the common European project is based.

Evolution of Islam in Albania

It is necessary to go back in history to take into account the reasons why a European country like Albania has developed a social structure in which the religion most professed by part of the population is Sunni. Because of the geographical region in which it is located, it would theoretically be more common to think that Albania would have a higher percentage of orthodox population than Sunni.[3]. The same is true for Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Originally this region was mostly Orthodox Christian in the south (like most of the Balkan states today) due to the fact that it was one of the many territories that made up the Byzantine Empire until the 13th century, when this nation gained its independence. However, the reason why Islam is so present in Albania, unlike its neighboring states, is that it was more religiously influenced by the Ottoman Empire, successor to the Byzantine Empire. This fell in 1453 and its territories were occupied by the Ottomans, a Turkish people established at that time on the Anatolian peninsula. According to historians such as Vickers, it was between the 17th and 18th centuries that a large part of the Albanian population converted to Islam.[4]The reason for this, as John L. Esposito points out, was that for the Albanian population, changing their religion meant getting rid of the higher taxes that Christians had to pay in the Ottoman Empire.[5].

Religion in Albania has since been shaped by events. As far as we know from programs of study such as those of Gawrych in the 19th century, the Albanian society was then mainly divided into three groups: Catholics, Orthodox and Sunnis (the latter represented 70% of the population). During this same century many of the known nationalisms of European character were born and in the Balkans began what is known as the crisis of the East. During this period many Balkan peoples revolted against the Ottomans, but the Albanians, being identified with them by their religion, initially remained faithful to the Sultan.[6]. Because of this support, Muslim Albanians began to be pejoratively referred to as "Turks."[7]. This caused Albanian nationalism to distance itself from the emerging Ottoman pan-Islamism of Sultan Abdualhmid II. From this emerged, according to Endresen, an Albanian national revival called Rilindja, which sought the support of Western European powers.[8].

Generally, the Balkan independence movements that emerged in the 19th century reinforced Christian as opposed to Muslim sentiment, but in Albania this was not the case; as Stoppel points out, both Albanian Christians and Muslims cooperated in a common national goal .[9]. This fostered the coexistence between both beliefs (already present in earlier times) and allowed the differentiation of this movement with Hellenism.[10]. It should be noted that at that time in Albania Muslims and Christians were peculiarly distributed territorially: in the north there were more Catholic Christians who were not so influenced by the Ottoman Empire and in the south there was also a predominance of Orthodox because of the border with Greece. On November 28, 1912 the Albanians, being led by Ismail Qemali, finally declared independence.

The international recognition of Albania by the Treaty of London meant the imposition of a Christian monarchy, which led to the indignation of the Muslim Albanians, who according to estimates accounted for 80% of the population, and provoked the so-called Islamic revolt. The revolt was led by Essad Pasha Toptani, who declared himself to be the "savior of Albania and Islam" and surrounded himself with disgruntled clerics. However, during the period of World War I, Albanian nationalists soon realized that religious differences could cause the fracturing of the country itself and decided to break ties with the Muslim world with the intention of being able to have "a common Albania", which led to Albania declaring itself as a country with no official religion; this allowed the training of a government with representation from the four main religious faiths: Sunni, Bektashi, Catholic and Orthodox. Albanian secularist elites programmed a reform of Islam that was more in line with Albania's traditions to make the country more distinct from Turkey, and religious institutions were nationalized. From 1923 onwards the Albanian National congress ended up carrying out the changes from a perspective very similar to that of Western liberalism. The most important reforms were the suppression of the hijab and the outlawing of polygamy, and a different way of praying was implemented, replacing the Salat ritual. But the biggest change was the substitution of Sharia law for Western-like laws.

During the Second World War Albania was occupied by fascist Italy and in 1944 a communist regime was imposed under the leadership of Enver Hoxha. This communist regime saw in the different religious beliefs of the country a danger to maintain the security of the authoritarian government, and therefore declared Albania as the first officially atheist state and proposed the persecution of the different religious practices. In this way repressive laws were imposed that prevented professing the Catholic or Orthodox faith, and prohibited Muslims from reading or possessing the Koran. In 1967, the government demolished as many as 2,169 religious buildings and transformed the rest into public buildings. Of 1,127 buildings that had some connection to Islam at the time, only about 50 remain today, and in very poor condition.[11]. It is believed that the impact of this subject of persecution was reflected in the increase of non-believers within the Albanian population. Between 1991 and 1992 a series of protests brought the regime to an end. In this new democratic Albania, Islam was again the predominant religion, but it was preferred to maintain the non-denominational nature of the state in order to guarantee harmony between the different beliefs.

Influences from the international field

Taking into account the reality of Albania as a country with a majority Islamic population, we will now analyze the impact of its accession to the European Union and to what extent the values of both contradict or combine.

To begin with, if all this is analyzed from a perspective based on the theory of "constructivism", as proposal by Helen Bull, it can be seen how Albania from the beginning of its history has been a territory whose social structure has been strongly influenced by the interaction of different international actors. During the years when it was part of the Byzantine Empire, it largely absorbed Orthodox values; when it was occupied by the Ottomans, most of its population adopted the Islamic religion. In the same way, during the de-Ottomanization of the Balkans, the country adopted currents of political thought such as liberalism due to the influence of Western European powers. This generated a desire to create a constitutionalist and parliamentary government whose vision of politics was not based on any religious morality.[12]. It can also be seen that the communist regime was imposed in a context common to that of the other Eastern European states. At the same time, it also returned to the democratic path as a consequence of the fall of the USSR, even though Albania had not maintained good relations with the Warsaw Pact since 1961.

Since Albania applied for EU membership, these liberal values have been strengthened again. In particular, Albania strives to improve its infrastructure and to eradicate corruption and organized crime. So it can be observed that Albanian society always adapts to being part of a supra-governmental organization. This is an important aspect because it means that the country is most likely to actively participate in the proposals made by the European Commission, without being driven by internal social values. However, this in turn gives a point in favor of those MEPs who claimed that the veto decision was a historical mistake. For if it does not alienate itself from the EU, Albania could alienate itself from other international actors. According to the MEPs themselves, these could be Russia or China.

However, there are two limitations to this statement. The first is that since 2012 Albania has been a member of NATO, so it is already partly alienated from the West in military terms. But a second aspect is more important, and that is that Albania already tried during the Cold War to alienate itself with Russia and China, but found that this had negative effects as it constituted a satellite state. On the other hand, and this is where Islamic values come into play, Albania today is part of organizations of an Islamic nature such as the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation). So the rejection of the EU could mean the realignment of Albania with other Islamic states, such as the Arabs or Turkey. Turkey's own government, currently led by Erdogan's party, has a neo-Ottomanist nature: it seeks to bring the states that formerly constituted the Ottoman Empire closer to its influence. Albania is being influenced by this neo-Ottomanism and a European rejection could bring it back into the bosom of this conception.[13]. In addition, if it approaches Middle Eastern Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Albania would run the risk of assimilating the Islamic values of these territories.[14]These are incompatible with those of the EU because they do not comply with many of the articles signed in the Universal Declaration of Rights of 1952.

Islam and the European Union

Another aspect would be to ask in which aspects do Islamic values contradict those of the EU? The European Union generally claims to be against polygamy, homophobia or religious practices that oppose the dignity of the person. This has generated, among other things, a powerful internal discussion of whether the hijab can be considered as an internship staff that should not be legally prevented. Many feminist groups are against this aspect as they relate it to family patriarchalism.[15]However, other EU groups claim that this is only a fully respectable individual andstaff internship and that its suppression would be a gesture of an Islamophobic nature. In any case, as mentioned above, Albania abolished both polygamy and the wearing of the hijab in 1923 as not reflecting the values of Islam in Albania.[16]. In this aspect it is observed that although Albania is a country of Islamic majority, this Islam is much more influenced by the Europeanist currents than by the Eastern ones: that is to say, an Islam adapted to the European customs and whose values are currently more similar to those of the neighboring Balkan states.

Some members of the European Parliament, generally from far-right groups, such as Ressamblement National or Alternativ für Deutschland, claim that Islamic values will never be compatible with European values because they are expansionist and radical in nature. The Dutch Geert Wilders claims that the Koran "is more anti-Semitic than Mein Kampf".[17]. In other words, they allege that those who profess Islam are incapable of maintaining good relations with other faiths because the Koran itself speaks of waging war against the infidel through Jihad. And as an example they cite the terrorist attacks that the Islamist group DAESH has provoked during the last decade, such as those perpetrated in Paris and Barcelona.[18]. But these groups should be reminded that a sacred text such as the Koran can be interpreted in many ways and that although some Muslim groups believe in this incompatibility of good relations with those who think differently, the majority of Muslims interpret the Koran in a very different way, just as happens with the Bible, although some very specific groups become irrational.

This is clearly the case in Albania, where since its democratization in 1991 there has been a national project integrating all citizens, regardless of their different beliefs. Rather, throughout its history as an independent country in Albania there has only been one period of religious persecution and this was due to the repression of communist authoritarianism. A limitation that could be given in this aspect would be the Islamic revolution that the country suffered in 1912. But it is worth noting that this revolution, despite its strong Islamic sentiment, served to overthrow a puppet government; after it no law was enforced to impose Islamic values on the rest. So it should be noted that the political model of Albania is very similar to the one exposed by Rawls in his book "Political Liberalism", because it configures a state with multiple values (although there is a predominant one), but its laws are not drafted based on any of them, but on common values among all of them based on reason.[19]. This model proposed by Rawls is one of the founding instructions of the European Union and Albania would be a state that would exemplify these same values.[20]. This is what the Supreme Pontiff Francis I said during his visit to Tirana in 2014: "Albania demonstrates that peaceful coexistence between citizens belonging to different religions is a path that can be followed in a concrete way and that produces harmony and releases the best forces and creativity of an entire people, transforming simple coexistence into true partnership and fraternity".[21]. 

Conclusions

It can be concluded that Albania's values as an Islamic majority state do not appear to be divergent from those of Western Europe and thus the European Union. Albania is a non-denominational state that respects all religious beliefs and encourages all individuals, regardless of their faith, to participate in the political life of the country (which has much merit due to the significant religious diversity that has distinguished Albania throughout its history). Moreover, Islam in Albania is extremely different from that of other regions due to the impact that European influence had on the region. Not only that, but also the country seems very willing to collaborate on common projects. The only thing that, in the field of values, would lead one to think that Albania is not suitable to join the EU would be that, just as it was influenced by the actors that have interacted with it throughout its history, it would be influenced again by Muslim states with values divergent from the European ones. But this is more likely to be the case if the European Union were to reject Albania, as it would seek the support of other allies in the international arena.

The implications of the accession of the first state with a Muslim majority to the EU would certainly be advantageous, since it would encourage the variety of religious thought within the Union and this could lead to a greater understanding between the different beliefs that make up the Union. There would be the possibility of a greater presence of Sunni deputies in the European Parliament and it would help to enhance coexistence within other EU states on the basis of what has been done in Albania, as may be the case in France, where 10% of the population is Muslim. It should also be said that Albania's exemplary multi-religious behavior would seriously weaken Euroscepticism and would also help to foster concord within the Balkan region. As Donald Tusk has argued, the Balkans must be given a European perspective and it is in the best interest of the EU that Albania becomes part of it.

Albania and North Macedonia forced to accept tougher negotiating rules, as Serbia and Montenegro reassess their options

Brexit has been absorbing the EU's negotiating attention for many months and now Covid-19 has slowed down non-priority decision processes. In October 2019, the EU decided to cool talks with the Western Balkans, under pressure from France and some other countries. Albania and North Macedonia, which had done the work that Brussels had requested in order to formally open negotiations, have seen the rules of the game changed just before the start of the game.

▲ Western Balkans meeting with EU countries held in London in 2018 [European Commission].

article / Elena López-Doriga

Since its origins, the European Community has been evolving and expanding its competencies through treaties structuring its functioning and purposes. issue membership of the organization has also expanded considerably: it began with 6 countries (France, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) and now consists of 27 (following the recent departure of the United Kingdom).

The most remarkable year of this enlargement was 2004, when the European Union undertook to integrate 10 new countries, which was a great challenge, given that these countries were mainly from Central and Eastern Europe, coming from the "iron curtain", with less developed economies coming out of communist systems and Soviet influence.

The next goal in the enlargement is the possible integration into the EU of the Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia). However, at a summit held in Brussels at the end of 2019 for the opening of accession negotiations for new members, some EU countries were against continuing the process, so for the time being the accession of the candidate countries is going to have to wait. Some EU leaders have described this postponement as a "historic mistake".

Expansion into Central and Eastern Europe

In May 1999, the European Union launched the Stabilization and association Process. The Union undertook to develop new contractual relations with Central and Eastern European countries that expressed a desire to join the Union through stabilization and association agreements, in exchange for commitments to political, economic, trade or human rights reform. As a result, in 2004 the EU integrated the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Slovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and Slovenia (the first member of the Western Balkans). In 2007 Bulgaria and Romania also joined the Union and in 2013 Croatia, the second Western Balkan country to join.

Integration of the Western Balkans

Since the end of the Yugoslav wars at the end of 2001, the EU has played a very prominent role in the Balkans, not only as an economic power subject reconstruction, but also as a guarantor of stability and security in the region. The EU's goal is in part to prevent the Western Balkans from becoming a security black hole, due to the rise of rising nationalism, the growing tension between Moscow and Washington, which fuels tensions between ethnic groups in the region, and the economic penetration of China into the area. Clearer progress towards Balkan integration was reaffirmed in the Commission's Western Balkans Strategy of February 2018 and in the Sofia Declaration following the EU-Western Balkans Summit held in the Bulgarian capital on May 17, 2018. At the Summit, EU leaders reiterated their unequivocal support for the European perspective of the Western Balkans. "I see for the Western Balkans no future other than the EU. There is no alternative, there is no plan B. The Western Balkans are part of Europe and belong to our community," said the then president of the European committee , Donald Tusk.

Official candidates: Albania and Macedonia

Albania applied for EU membership on April 28, 2009. In 2012, the Commission noted significant progress and recommended that Albania be granted candidate status, subject to the implementation of a number of outstanding reforms. In October 2013, the Commission unequivocally recommended that Albania be granted candidate status. Angela Merkel paid a visit to Tirana on July 8, 2015 and stated that the prospect of accession of the countries of the Balkan region to the European Union (EU) was important for peace and stability. He stressed that in the case of Albania the pace of the accession process depended on the completion of reforms in the judicial system and the fight against corruption and organized crime. In view of the country's progress, the Commission recommended the opening of accession negotiations with Albania in its 2016 and 2018 reports.

On the other hand, the Republic of North Macedonia (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) applied to join the Union in March 2004 and was granted candidate country status in December 2005. However, the country did not start accession negotiations because of the dispute with Greece over the use of the name "Macedonia". When it was successfully resolved through the Prespaagreement with the new name of the country - Northern Macedonia - the committee agreed on the possibility of opening accession negotiations with this country in June 2019, assuming the necessary conditions were met.

Potential Candidates: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a potential candidate country. Although it negotiated and signed a Stabilization and associationagreement with the Union in 2008, the entrance into force of this agreement was Fail mainly due to the country's failure to execute a core topic judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. In the meantime, the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not reached an agreement concerning the rules of procedure governing its meetings with the European Parliament (twice a year), as these meetings have not been held since November 2015, and this status constitutes a breach of the agreement by Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Kosovo is a potential candidate for EU membership. It declared its independence unilaterally in February 2008. All but five member states have recognized Kosovo's independence (Cyprus, Slovakia, Spain, Greece and Romania). Among the countries in the region, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have also not recognized Kosovo as an independent state. In September 2018, the European Parliament went a step further and decided to enter into inter-institutional negotiations, which are currently ongoing. However, the fact that not all member countries currently recognize its independence is a major brake.

Negotiating access: Montenegro and Serbia

Montenegro, one of the smallest states on the European continent, has been part of different empires and states over the past centuries, finally gaining independence peacefully in 2006. It applied to join the Union in December 2008; it was granted candidate country status in December 2010, and accession negotiations began in June 2012. By the end of 2018, 32 negotiating chapters had been opened, out of a total of 35.

Serbia 's process began in December 2009 when former President Boris Tadić officially submitted the membership application and also handed over to justice the war criminal Ratko Mladić, manager of the Srebrenica massacre during the Bosnian War, who was hiding in Serbian territory. However, the conflict with Kosovo is one of the main obstacles Serbia faces in achieving its accession to the European Union. It was granted candidate country status in March 2012, after Belgrade and Pristina reached an agreement on Kosovo's regional representation. The official opening of accession negotiations took place on January 21, 2014. In February 2018, the Commission published a new strategy for the Western Balkans stating that Serbia (as well as Montenegro) could join the Union by 2025, while acknowledging the "extremely ambitious" nature of this prospect. Serbia's future accession to the Union, like that of Kosovo, remains closely linked to the high-level dialogue between these two countries, held under the auspices of the Union, which should lead to a legally binding comprehensive agreement on the normalization of their relations.

A step back in the negotiations

In October 2019, a summit was held in Brussels whose goal was to structure the negotiations of the official candidates to join the EU. Both North Macedonia and Albania were convinced that a date would be set to start the long process of negotiations. However, the process reached an impasse after seven hours of wrangling, with France rejecting the entrance of both countries. France led the campaign against this enlargement, but Denmark and the Netherlands also joined the veto. They claim that the EU is not ready to take on new states. "It doesn't work too well at 28, it doesn't work too well at 27, and I'm not sure it will work any better with another enlargement. So we have to be realistic. Before enlarging, we need to reform ourselves," said French President Emmanuel Macron.

The then president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, considered that this suspension was a great historical mistake and hoped that it would only be momentary. For his part, Donald Tusk said he was "ashamed" of the decision, and concluded that North Macedonia and Albania were not to blame for the status created, as the European Commission's reports were clear that both had done what was necessary to start negotiations with the EU.

In Albania, Prime Minister Edi Rama stated that the lack of consensus among European leaders would not change Albania's future aspirations for EU membership. He assured that his government was determined to carry forward the reforms initiated, in the electoral, judicial and administrative fields, because it considered them necessary for the development of the country, not just because they were requested in Brussels.

In North Macedonia, on the other hand, the European rejection was deeply disappointing, as the country had proceeded to reform its institutions and judicial system and to fight corruption; it had also modified its Constitution, its name and its national identity. The refusal left this country, an official candidate for accession for 14 years, in a status of great uncertainty, so that Prime Minister Zoran Zaev decided to dissolve the Parliament and call elections for April 12, 2020 (later postponed due to the Covid-19 emergency). "We have fulfilled our obligations, but the EU has not. We are victims of a historical mistake that has caused a huge disappointment," Zaev assured.

A new, stricter process

Despite the fact that, according to the Commission, North Macedonia and Albania fulfilled the requirements to become accession candidates, Macron proposed to tighten the accession process. In order to unblock the status and continue with the process, which the EU claims to be a priority goal , Brussels has given in to the French president's request by setting a new methodology for integrating new countries.

The new process provides for the possibility of reopening chapters of the negotiations that were considered closed or of fail talks on any of the chapters; it even envisages paralyzing the negotiations as a whole. It is intended to give more weight to the governments and to facilitate the suspension of pre-accession funds or the suspension of the process if the candidate countries halt or reverse the reforms they have committed to. The new method will apply to Albania and North Macedonia, whose negotiations with the EU have not yet started, while Serbia and Montenegro will be able to choose whether to opt in, without having to change their established negotiating framework , according to the Commission.

Apart from China, Italy has received aid from Russia and Cuba, making a risky geopolitical move in the European context.

The global spreading of the virus is putting under stress the big ally of the Union, the United States, which is demonstrating its lack of an efficient social health care system. Furthermore, the initial refusal of Washington to send help to the EU was seen as an opportunity for countries like Russia, China and Cuba to send medical and technical support to those countries of the EU that are most affected by the virus. Italy has taken aid send by Beijing, Moscow and Havana, shaking the geopolitical understandings of the EU's foreign policy.

▲ Russia's aid arrived in Italy in the middle of the pandemic crisis [Russian Defense Ministry].

ARTICLE / Matilde Romito

The World Health Organisation (WHO) declared Corona Virus (Covid-19) a pandemic on the 11th of March, 2020. The fast widespread of the virus pushed numerous countries around the world and especially in Europe where there is the highest number of confirmed cases, to call for a lockdown. This extreme measure is not only leading the EU and the entire world towards an unprecedented economic crisis, but it is also redefining geopolitics and the system of alliances we were used to.

The pandemic. On January 30, 2020, the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared the first outbreak of novel coronavirus a 'public health emergency of international concern'. In mid-February, numerous cases of corona virus began to be reported in northern Italy and in several European countries. Initially, the spread of the virus mainly hit Italy, which reported the biggest number of cases among the EU states. In March, Italy started with the implementation of social-distancing measures and the consequent lockdown of the country, followed by Spain, France and other European countries. On March 11, 2020, the WHO declared covid-19 a global pandemic. Currently, Europe is the region of the world with the highest number of confirmed cases. According to the WHO, on April 6, Europe reached 621,407 cases compared to the 352,600 cases in America and the 112,524 in Western Asia.

The global lockdown. At first, several major airlines suspended their flights from and to China, in order to avoid further contaminations. Now, the majority of flights in Europe and in other regions have been cancelled. The biggest areas of world are under lockdown and the economic consequences of this are becoming more and more evident. A forced social distancing seems to be the only way to contain the spread of the virus and the closing of national borders is currently at the center of states' policies to combat the virus. However, some European countries, such as Sweden, do not seem to agree on this.

Lack of solidarity

We are assisting to a global situation of 'everybody for oneself,' and this has become highly evident within the EU itself. Individual countries within the Union have shown high levels of egoism on different occasions. The North-South divide within the EU is clearer than ever, particularly between the Netherlands and Austria on the one side, and Italy, Spain, France and Greece on the other side. The former group of countries is asking for compromise and conditions to lend money to the most afflicted ones for countering the crisis, while the latter group is asking the EU to share the debts accumulated in order to save European economies (eurobonds).

The different spread-intensity of the virus in different European countries has shown more than once the fragility of the Union, which demonstrated to be led by the arrogance of the rich. On different occasions European leaders have shown a lack of European identity, solidarity and common vision. For instance, at the beginning of the crisis France and Germany attempted to 'cover with the European flag' medical products directed to Italy, by declaring them 'European products', trying to compensate the initial inaction of the EU. Another example, could be the seizure by the Czech Republic of 110,000 Chinese masks and thousands of breathing supports, which were destined to Italy (March the 21st). Moreover, the lack of unity also came from an unjustified action of protectionism undertaken by Poland, which closed its market to agricultural products coming from Italy on March 18, despite it was already known that the virus could not be spread through such products.

Nevertheless, there are some good and unexpected examples of solidarity. For instance, a good lesson on European solidarity came from the small state of Albania. The Albanian prime minister Edi Rama taught European leaders what it means to be part of the EU by sending a medical unit to the Italian region of Lombardy, despite the numerous difficulties Albania is facing, thus showing that the fight against the virus has no nationality and it cannot leave room for selfish calculations. Moreover, more recently Germany has accepted to receive and take care of numerous patients coming from Italy, where the majority of health infrastructures are saturated.

Overall, little comprehension and solidarity has been shown between European member states, thus being criticised by the European Commission president, Ursula Von Der Leyen.

Geopolitical tensions

The EU is going through numerous changes in the relations between its members. The closing up of individual countries poses a big challenge to the EU itself, which is founded on freedom of movement of people and goods.

Currently, sending masks and medicines seems to have become the main means for countries to exert influence in global affairs. The global spreading of the virus is putting under stress the big ally of the Union, the United States (US), which is demonstrating its lack of an efficient social health care system. Furthermore, the initial refusal of Washington to send help to the EU was seen as an opportunity for countries like Russia, China and Cuba to send medical and technical support to those countries of the EU that are most affected by the virus, like Italy and Spain. After having seen its hegemonic position in Europe under threat, the US decided to send monetary help to some European countries, such as 100 million dollars to Italy, in order to help in countering the emergency.

At the end, the EU seems to start standing all together. But, did the European countries take action on time? Generally, countries, like human beings, are more likely to remember one bad impression better than numerous good ones. Therefore, are countries like Italy going to 'forgive' the EU and its initial inactivity? Or are they going to fall back on countries like Russia and China, which have shown their solidarity since the beginning?

Furthermore, did the EU take action because of an inherent identity and solidarity? Or was it just a counteraction to the Chinese and Russian help? It seemed that specifically Germany's mobilisation followed the exhortation of the former president of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi. He accused Germany and other countries of taking advantage of the virus for imposing a 'conditionality' to the countries that were asking for help. Moreover, in an interview on the Financial Times he called for an exceptional investment in the economies and for a guarantee of the debts, in order to jointly face the crisis, because no country can face this unprecedented threat alone. Now, anti-virus economic action turned into a matter of urgency for Europe and the European Commission is working on a common European response to the crisis.

Future perspectives

Probably, after the end of the virus spread, the world will assist to important changes in the global dynamics of alliances. Russia and China will most likely have one or more European allies to advance their interests in the EU. On the one side, this could lead to a further weakening of the EU governance and to the re-emergence of nationalism on states' behavior within the Union. And on the other side, it could lead to the development of further mechanisms of cooperation among the EU members, which will go beyond the eurobonds and will probably extend to the sanitary dimension.

To preserve its unity, the European political-economic-cultural area will need to be strengthened, by fighting inequalities with a new model of solidarity. Its future prosperity will most likely depend on its internal market.

Nevertheless, for now the only thing we can be sure about is that the first impression on the EU was very bad and that this situation is going to lead all of us towards an unprecedented economic crisis, which most probably will redefine the political relationships between the world's biggest regions.

The Trump Administration's Newest Migration Policies and Shifting Immigrant Demographics in the USA

New Trump administration migration policies including the "Safe Third Country" agreements signed by the USA, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have reduced the number of migrants from the Northern Triangle countries at the southwest US border. As a consequence of this phenomenon and other factors, Mexicans have become once again the main national group of people deemed inadmissible for asylum or apprehended by the US Customs and Border Protection.

▲ An US Border Patrol agent at the southwest US border [cbp.gov].

ARTICLE / Alexandria Casarano Christofellis

On March 31, 2018, the Trump administration cut off aid to the Northern Triangle countries in order to coerce them into implementing new policies to curb illegal migration to the United States. El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala all rely heavily on USAid, and had received 118, 181, and 257 million USD in USAid respectively in the 2017 fiscal year.

The US resumed financial aid to the Northern Triangle countries on October 17 of 2019, in the context of the establishment of bilateral negotiations of Safe Third Country agreements with each of the countries, and the implementation of the US Supreme Court's de facto asylum ban on September 11 of 2019. The Safe Third Country agreements will allow the US to 'return' asylum seekers to the countries which they traveled through on their way to the US border (provided that the asylum seekers are not returned to their home countries). The US Supreme Court's asylum ban similarly requires refugees to apply for and be denied asylum in each of the countries which they pass through before arriving at the US border to apply for asylum. This means that Honduran and Salvadoran refugees would need to apply for and be denied asylum in both Guatemala and Mexico before applying for asylum in the US, and Guatemalan refugees would need to apply for and be denied asylum in Mexico before applying for asylum in the US. This also means that refugees fleeing one of the Northern Triangle countries can be returned to another Northern Triangle country suffering many of the same issues they were fleeing in the first place.

Combined with the Trump administration's longer-standing "metering" or "Remain in Mexico" policy (Migrant Protection Protocols/MPP), these political developments serve to effectively "push back" the US border. The "Remain in Mexico" policy requires US asylum seekers from Latin America to remain on the Mexican side of the US-Mexico border to wait their turn to be accepted into US territory. Within the past year, the US government has planted significant obstacles in the way of the path of Central American refugees to US asylum, and for better or worse has shifted the burden of the Central American refugee crisis to Mexico and the Central American countries themselves, which are ill-prepared to handle the influx, even in the light of resumed US foreign aid. The new arrangements resemble the EU's refugee deal with Turkey.

These policy changes are coupled with a shift in US immigration demographics. In August of 2019, Mexico reclaimed its position as the single largest source of unauthorized immigration to the US, having been temporarily surpassed by Guatemala and Honduras in 2018.

US Customs and Border Protection data indicates a net increase of 21% in the number of Unaccompanied Alien Children from Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador deemed inadmissible for asylum at the Southwest US Border by the US field office between fiscal year 2019 (through February) and fiscal year 2020 (through February). All other inadmissible groups (Family Units, Single Adults, etc.) experienced a net decrease of 18-24% over the same time period. For both the entirety of fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2020 through February, Mexicans accounted for 69 and 61% of Unaccompanied Alien Children Inadmissible at the Southwest US border respectively, whereas previously in fiscal years 2017 and 2018 Mexicans accounted for only 21 and 26% of these same figures, respectively. The percentages of Family Unit Inadmisibles from the Northern Triangle countries have been decreasing since 2018, while the percentage of Family Unit Inadmisibles from Mexico since 2018 has been on the rise.

With asylum made far less accessible to Central Americans in the wake of the Trump administration's new migration policies, the number of Central American inadmisibles is in sharp decline. Conversely, the number of Mexican inadmisibles is on the rise, having nearly tripled over the past three years.

Chain migration factors at play in Mexico may be contributing to this demographic shift. On September 10, 2019, prominent Mexican newspaper El discussion published an article titled "Immigrants Can Avoid Deportation with these Five Documents." Additionally, The Washington Post cites the testimony of a city official from Michoacan, Mexico, claiming that a local Mexican travel company has begun running a weekly "door-to-door" service line to several US border points of entry, and that hundreds of Mexican citizens have been coming to the municipal offices daily requesting documentation to help them apply for asylum in the US. Word of mouth, press coverage like that found in El discussion, and the commercial exploitation of the Mexican migrant situation have perhaps made migration, and especially the claiming of asylum, more accessible to the Mexican population.

US Customs and Border Protection data also indicates that total apprehensions of migrants from Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador attempting illegal crossings at the Southwest US border declined 44% for Unaccompanied Alien Children and 73% for Family Units between fiscal year 2019 (through February) and fiscal year 2020 (through February), while increasing for Single Adults by 4%. The same data trends show that while Mexicans have consistently accounted for the overwhelming majority of Single Adult Apprehensions since 2016, Family Unit and Unaccompanied Alien Children Apprehensions until the past year were dominated by Central Americans. However, in fiscal year 2020-February, the percentages of Central American Family Unit and Unaccompanied Alien Children Apprehensions have declined while the Mexican percentage has increased significantly. This could be attributed to the Northern Triangle countries' and especially Mexico's recent crackdown on the flow of illegal immigration within their own states in response to the same US sanctions and suspension of USAid which led to the Safe Third Country bilateral agreements with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.

While the Trump administration's crackdown on immigration from the Northern Triangle countries has effectively worked to limit both the legal and illegal access of Central Americans to US entry, the Trump administration's crackdown on immigration from Mexico in the past few years has focused on arresting and deporting illegal Mexican immigrants already living and working within the US borders. Between 2017 and 2018, ICE increased workplace raids to arrest undocumented immigrants by over 400% according to The Independent in the UK. The trend seemed to continue into 2019. President Trump tweeted on June 17, 2019 that "Next week ICE will begin the process of removing the millions of illegal aliens who have illicitly found their way into the United States. They will be removed as fast as they come in." More deportations could be leading to more attempts at reentry, increasing Mexican migration to the US, and more Mexican Single Adult apprehensions at the Southwest border. The Washington Post alleges that the majority of the Mexican single adults apprehended at the border are previous deportees trying to reenter the country.

Lastly, the steadily increasing violence within the state of Mexico should not be overlooked as a cause for continued migration. Within the past year, violence between the various Mexican cartels has intensified, and murder rates have continued to rise. While the increase in violence alone is not intense enough to solely account for the spike that has recently been seen in Mexican migration to the US, internal violence nethertheless remains an important factor in the Mexican migrant situation. Similarly, widespread poverty in Mexico, recently worsened by a decline in foreign investment in the light of threatened tariffs from the USA, also plays a key role.

In conclusion, the Trump administration's new migration policies mark an intensification of long-standing nativist tendencies in the US, and pose a potential threat to the human rights of asylum seekers at the US-Mexico border. The corresponding present demographic shift back to Mexican predominance in US immigration is driven not only by the Trump administration's new migration policies, but also by many other diverse factors within both Mexico and the US, from press coverage to increased deportations to long-standing cartel violence and poverty. In the face of these recent developments, one thing remains clear: the situation south of the Rio Grande is just as complex, nuanced, and constantly evolving as is the situation to the north on Capitol Hill in the USA.

27% of Latin America's total private wealth is deposited in territories offering favorable tax treatment

Latin America is the world region with the highest percentage of private "offshore" wealth. The proximity of tax havens, in various countries or island dependencies in the Caribbean, can facilitate the arrival of these capitals, some generated illicitly (drug trafficking, corruption) and all evaded from national tax institutions with little supervisory and coercive force. Latin America missed out on taxes in 2017 to the tune of $335 billion, which represented 6.3% of its GDP.

▲ Caribbean beach [Pixabay].

article / Jokin de Carlos Sola

The natural wealth of Latin American countries contrasts with the precarious economic status of most of their societies. Lands rich in oil, minerals and primary goods sometimes fail to feed all their citizens. One of the reasons for this deficiency is the frequency with which companies and leaders tend to evade taxes, driving capital away from their countries.

One of the reasons for the tendency to evade taxes is the large size of the underground Economics and the shortcomings of the States to implement tax systems. Another is the close presence of tax havens in the Caribbean, basically linked historically to the United Kingdom. These territories with beneficial tax characteristics have attracted capital from the continent.

History

The history of tax evasion is long. Its relationship with Latin America and the British Caribbean archipelagos, however, has its origins in the fall of the British Empire.

Beginning in 1945, Britain gradually began to lose its colonial possessions around the world. The financial effect was clear: millions of pounds were lost or taken out of operations throughout the empire. To cope with this status and to be able to maintain their global financial power, the bankers of the City of London thought of creating fields of action outside the jurisdiction of the Bank of England, from where bankers from all over the world (especially Americans) could also operate in order to avoid their respective national regulations. A new opportunity then arose in the British overseas territories, some of which did not become independent, but maintained their ties, albeit loose, with the United Kingdom. This was the case of the Caribbean.

In 1969 the Cayman Islands created the first banking secrecy legislation. It was the first overseas territory to become a tax haven. From offices established there, the City banks were generating networks of operations unregulated by the Bank of England and with hardly any local supervision. Soon other Caribbean jurisdictions followed in the same footsteps.

Tax havens

The main tax havens in the Caribbean are British overseas territories such as the Cayman Islands, the Virgin Islands and Montserrat, or some former British colonies that later became independent, such as the Bahamas. These are islands with small populations and small Economics . Many of the politicians and legislators in these places work for the British financial sector and ensure secrecy within their territories.

Unlike other locations that can also be considered tax havens, the British-influenced islands of the Caribbean offer a second level of secrecy in addition to the legal one: the trust. Most of those who hold assets in companies established in these territories do so through the figure of the trust. Under this system the beneficiary holds his assets (shares, properties, companies, etc.) in a trust which is administered by a trustee. These elements (trust, beneficiary, trustee, shell companies, etc.) are distributed in different Structures linked to different Caribbean jurisdictions. Thus, a trust may be established in one jurisdiction, but its beneficiaries may be in a different one, the trustee in a third and the shell companies in a fourth. This is a subject of Structures that are almost impossible for governments to dismantle. Therefore, when overseas governments undertake to share banking information, under pressure from Washington or Brussels, it is of little use because of the secrecy structure itself.

Impact in Latin America

Bank secrecy legislation arose in Latin America with the goal of attracting capital obtained in a licit manner. However, during the 1970s and 1980s, this protection of current account data also attracted capital obtained through illicit means, such as drug trafficking and corruption.

During those years, drug lords such as Pablo Escobar used the benefits of the Cayman Islands and other territories to hide their fortunes and properties. On the other hand, several Latin American dictatorships also used these mechanisms to hide the enrichment of their leaders through corruption or even drugs, as happened with Panama's Manuel Noriega.

Over time, the international community has increased its pressure on tax havens. In recent years the authorities in the Cayman Islands and the Bahamas have made efforts to ensure that their secrecy Structures are not used to launder money for organized crime, but not all territories considered tax havens have done the same.

These opaque networks are used by a considerable part of Latin America's great fortunes. Twenty-seven percent of Latin America's total private wealth is deposited in countries that offer favorable tax treatment, making it the region in the world with the highest proportion of private capital in those places, agreement to a 2017 Boston Consulting Group study. According to this consulting firm, this diversion of private wealth is greater in Latin America than in the Middle East and Africa (23%), Eastern Europe (20%), Western Europe (7%), Asia-Pacific (6%) and the United States and Canada (1%). 

Tax havens are the destination of a difficult-to-precise part of the total of 335 billion dollars subject to tax evasion or avoidance that there was in the region in 2017, a figure that constituted 6.3% of Latin American GDP (4% left out of income tax for individuals and 2.3% in VAT), as specified in ECLAC'sFiscal Panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean 2019 report . This UN economic commission for the region highlights that on average Latin American countries lose more than 50% of their income tax revenues.

The connection with London

There have been several theories about the role played by London in relation to tax havens. These theories coincide in presenting a connection of interests between the opaque companies and the City of London, in a network of complicity in which even the Bank of England and the British government could have participated.

The most important one was expressed by the British author Nicholas Shaxson in the book Treasure Island. The thesis was later developed by the documentary film Spiders Web, produced by the Tax Justice Network, whose founder, John Christiansen, worked as an advisor to the government of Jersey, which is a special jurisdiction.

The City of London has a separate administration, elected by the still existing guilds, which represent the commercial and banking class of the city. This allows financial operations in this area of the British capital to partially escape the control of the Bank of England and government regulations. A City that is attractive to foreign capital and prosperous greatly benefits British Economics , since its activity accounts for 2.4% of the country's GDP.

British sovereignty over the overseas territories that serve as tax havens sometimes leads to accusations that the United Kingdom is complicit with these financial networks. Downing Street responds that these are territories that operate with a great deal of autonomy, even though London sets the governor, controls foreign policy and has veto power over legislation passed in these places.

In addition, it is true that the UK government has in the last decade supported greater international coordination to increase scrutiny of tax havens, forcing the authorities there to submit relevant tax information, although the structure of the trusts still works against transparency.

Correcting the status

Latin America's problems with tax evasion may be more related to the fragility of its own fiscal institutions than to the presence of tax havens close to the American continent. At the same time, some tax havens have benefited from political instability and corruption in Latin America.

The effects of the flight of national capital to these places with special tax regimes are clearly negative for the countries of the region, as it deprives them of greater economic activity and revenue-raising possibilities, thus hindering the State's capacity to undertake the necessary improvement of public services.

It is therefore imperative that certain corrective policies be established. In the field of national policies, mechanisms should be created to prevent tax evasion and avoidance. At the same time, at the international level, diplomatic initiatives should be set up to put an end to the Structures of the trusts. The OAS offers, in this sense, an important negotiating framework not only with certain overseas territories, but also with its own metropolises, since these, as is the case of the United Kingdom, are permanent observer members of the hemispheric organization.

The always complicated negotiations are made even more difficult by the 75 billion euros that the United Kingdom is no longer contributing to the negotiations.

ANALYSIS / Pablo Gurbindo Palomo

The negotiations for the European budget for the period 2021-2027 are crucial for the future of the Union. After the failure of the extraordinary summit of February 20 and 21, time is running out and the Member States must put aside their differences in order to reach an agreement before December 31, 2020.

The negotiation of a new European Multiannual Financial framework (MFF) is always complicated and crucial because the ambition of the Union depends on the amount of money that the Member States are willing to contribute. But the negotiation of this new budget heading, for the period 2021-2027, has an added complication: it is the first without the United Kingdom after Brexit. This complication does not lie in the absence of the British in the negotiations (for some that is more of a relief) but in the 75 billion euros they have stopped contributing.

What is MFP?

The Multiannual Financialframework (MFF ) is the EU's long-term budgetary framework and sets the expense limits for the Union, both as a whole and in its different areas of activity, for a period of not less than 5 years. In addition, the MFF includes a number of provisions and "special instruments" beyond that, so that, even in unforeseen circumstances such as crises or emergencies, funds can be used to address the problem. This is why the MFF is crucial, as it sets the political priorities and objectives for the coming years.

This framework is initially proposed by the Commission and, on this basis, the committee (composed of all member states) negotiates and has to reach a unanimous agreement . The proposal is then sent to the European Parliament for approval.

The amount allocated to the MFF is calculated on the basis of the Gross National Income (GNI) of the member states, i.e. the sum of the remuneration of the factors of production of all members. But customs duties, agricultural and sugar levies and other revenues such as VAT are also part of it.

Alliances for war

In the EU there are countries that are "net contributors" and others that are "net receivers". Some pay more to the Union than they receive in return and others, on the other hand, receive more than they contribute. This is why the positions of the countries are flawed when they face these negotiations: some want to pay less money and others do not want to receive less.

Like any self-respecting European war, alliances and coalitions have been formed beforehand.

The Commission 's proposal for the MFF 2021-2027, made on May 2, 2018, already made many European capitals nervous. The proposal was for 1.11% of GNI (already excluding the UK). It provided for budget increases for border control, defense, migration, internal and external security, development cooperation and research, among other areas. On the other hand, however, cuts were envisaged in the Cohesion Policy (aid to help the most disadvantaged regions of the Union) and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

The Parliament presented a report provisional on this proposal in which it called for an increase to 1.3% of GNI (corresponding to a 16.7% increase from the previous proposal ). In addition, the parliamentarians asked, among other things, that the funds for cohesion and agriculture be maintained as in the previous budgetary framework .

On February 2, 2019, the Finnish committee presidency proposed a negotiation framework starting at 1.07% of GNI.

This succession of events led to the emergence of two antagonistic blocs: the frugal club club of the frugal and the friends of cohesion.

The frugal club is composed of four northern European countries: Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria. These countries are all net contributors and advocate a budget of no more than 1% of GNI. On the other hand, they ask that cuts be made in items they consider "outdated" such as cohesion funds or the CAP and want to increase the budget in others such as research and development, defense and the fight against immigration or climate change.

Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz has already announced that he will veto in committee any proposal exceeding 1 % of GNI.

The friends of cohesion include fifteen countries from the south and east of the Union: Spain, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. All these countries are net recipients and are demanding that CAP and cohesion policy funds be maintained, and that the Community budget be based on between 1.16 and 1.3% of GNI.

This large group met on February 1 in the Portuguese town of Beja. There, they tried to show an image of unity before the first days of MFF discussion , to be held in Brussels on the 20th and 21st of the same month. They also announced that they will block any subject cuts.

It will be curious to see whether, as the negotiations progress, the blocs will remain strong or whether each country will move towards what suits it best.

Outside of these two groups, the two big net contributors stand out, pulling the strings of what happens in the EU: Germany and France.

Germany is closer to the frugal in wanting a more austere budget and to allocate more money to more modern items such as digitalization or the fight against climate change. But first and foremost it wants a quick agreement .

France, for its part, is closer to the friends of cohesion in wanting to maintain a strong CAP, but also wants greater defense expense .

The problem of "rebates

And if all these variables were not enough, it is necessary to add the figure of compensatory checks, or "rebates". These are discounts to a country's contribution to the budget. This figure was created in 1984 for the United Kingdom, during the presidency of the conservative Margaret Thatcher. For the "Iron Lady", the amount contributed by her country to the budget was excessive, since most of the amount (70%) went to the CAP and the Cohesion Funds, from which the United Kingdom hardly benefited. It was therefore agreed that the UK would have certain discounts on its budget contribution on a permanent and full basis.

These compensatory checks have since been provided to other net contributor countries, but these had to be negotiated with each MFF and were partial on a specific area such as VAT or contributions. An unsuccessful attempt was already made to eliminate this figure in 2005.

For the frugal and Germany these checks should be maintained, in civil service examination to the friends of cohesion and especially France, who want them to disappear.

Sanchez seeks his first victory in Brussels

The Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, is staking much of his credibility both in Europe and in Spain on these negotiations.

In Europe, for many he failed in the negotiations for the new Commission. Sánchez started in a position of strength as the leader of the fourth largest Economics in Europe, after the exit of the United Kingdom. In addition, he was the strongest member of the socialist parliamentary group , in the doldrums in recent years at the European level, but second force in the elections to the European Parliament. Therefore, for many, the election of the Spaniard Josep Borrell as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with no other Socialist in key positions, was seen as a failure.

Sánchez has the opportunity in the negotiations to show himself as a strong and reliable leader so that the Franco-German axis can count on Spain to carry out the important changes that the Union has to make in the coming years.

On the other hand, in Spain, Sanchez has the countryside up in arms over the prospects of reducing the CAP. And much of his credibility is at stake after his victory in last year's elections and the training of the "progressive coalition" with the support of Podemos and the independentistas. The Spanish government has already taken a stand with the farmers, and cannot afford a defeat.

Spanish farmers are highly dependent on the CAP. According to the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food: "in 2017, a total of 775,000 recipients received 6,678 million euros through this channel. In the period 2021-2027 we are playing more than 44,000 million euros."

These CAP subsidies are of two different types:

• Direct subsidies: some are granted per production Issue , per crop (called "coupled"), and the others, the "decoupled" ones, are granted per hectare, not per production or yield, and have been criticized by some sectors.

• Indirect subsidies: these are not intended directly for the farmer, but are used for the development of rural areas.

The Issue of aid received varies depending on the sector, but can represent up to 30% of a farmer's income. Without this aid, a large part of the Spanish countryside and that of other European countries cannot compete with products coming from outside the Union.

Failure of the first budget summit

On February 20 and 21, an extraordinary summit of the European committee was held to reach an agreement. It did not start well with the proposal of the committee chairman, Charles Michel, for a budget based on 1.074% of GNI. This proposal did not convince anyone, neither the frugal for being excessive, nor the friends of cohesion for being insufficient.

Michel's proposal included the added complication of linking the submission aid to compliance with the rule of law. This measure put the so-called Visegrad group (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia) on their guard, since from the west of the Union they question the rule of law in some of these countries. So another group is taking the lead.

The Commission's technical services made several proposals to try to please everyone. The final one was 1.069 % of GNI. Closer to 1%, and including an increase in the "rebates" for Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria and Denmark, to please the frugal and attract the Germans. But also an increase in the CAP to please the friends of cohesion and France, at the cost of reducing other budget items such as research, defense and foreign funds.

But the blocs did not budge. The frugal remain entrenched at 1%, and the friends of cohesion in response have decided to do the same, but at the 1.3% proposed by the European Parliament (even if they know it is unrealistic).

In the absence of agreement Michel dissolved the meeting; it is expected that in the coming weeks there will be talks and another summit will be convened.

Conclusion

The EU has a problem: its ambition is not matched by the commitment of its Member States. The Union needs to reinvent itself and be more ambitious, say its members, but when it comes down to it, few are truly willing to contribute and deliver what is needed.

The Von der Leyen Commission arrived with three star plans: the European Green Pact to make Europe the first carbon neutral continent; digitalization; and, under Josep Borrell, greater international involvement on the part of the Union. However, as soon as the budget negotiations began and it became clear that this would lead to an increase in expense, each country pulled in its own direction and these proposals were the first to fall victim to cuts due subject the impossibility of reaching an understanding.

An agreement must be reached before December 31, 2020, if we do not want to have no money for anything: neither for PAC, nor for "rebates" nor even for Erasmus.

Member States must understand that for the EU to be more ambitious they themselves have to be more ambitious and willing to be more involved, with the increased budget that this entails.

[Angela Stent, Putin's World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest. Twelve. New York, 2019. 433 p.]

review / Ángel Martos

Angela Stent, director of Georgetown University's Center for Eurasia, Russia and Eastern Europe programs of study , presents in this book a profound analysis of the nature of Russia at the beginning of the 21st century. In order to understand what is happening today, she first sample us the historical outlines that shaped the massive heartland that Russian statesmen have consolidated over time.

Russia took advantage of the global showcase provided by the organization of the 2018 World Cup to present a renewed image. The operation to sell Russia's national brand had some success, as reflected in surveys: many foreign viewers (especially Americans) who visited the country for the soccer tournament came away with an improved image of the Russian people, and vice versa. However, what was presented as an opening to the world has not manifested itself in the Kremlin's domestic or international policy: Putin's control over the hybrid regime that has ruled Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union has not been loosened in the slightest.

Many experts could not predict the fate of this nation in the 1990s. After the collapse of the communist regime, many thought that Russia would begin a long and painful road to democracy. The United States would maintain its status as the sole superpower and shape a New World Order that would embrace Russia as a minor power, equal to other European states. But these considerations did not take into account the will of the Russian people, who understood Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's management as "historical mistakes" that had to be corrected. And this perspective can be seen in Vladimir Putin's main speeches: a nostalgic feeling for Russia's imperial past, the refusal to be part of a world ruled by the United States and the need to bend the sovereignty of the once Soviet republics. The latter is a crucial aspect of Russia's foreign policy that, to varying degrees, it has already applied to Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and others.

What has changed in the Russian soul since the collapse of the Soviet Union? Have relations with Europe gone through ups and downs throughout the history of the Russian Empire? What are those relations like now that Russia is no longer an empire, having lost almost all of its power in a matter of years? The author takes us by the hand through these questions. The Russian Federation, as we know it now, has only been ruled by three autocrats: Boris Yeltsin, Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, although we could argue that Medvedev does not even properly count as president, since during his tenure Putin was the intellectual leader behind every step taken in the international arena.

Russia's complicated relations with European countries have a notorious example in the case of Germany, which the book compares to a roller coaster (an expression that in Spanish is especially eloquent). Germany is the door of the Federation to Europe, a metaphorical door that, throughout contemporary history, has been ajar, wide open or closed, as at this moment. After the seizure of Crimea, Merkel's Germany's relations with Moscow have been strictly limited to trade issues. It is worth highlighting the huge differences we can find between Willy Brandty's Ostpolitik and Angela Merkel's current Frostpolitik. Although Merkel grew up in East Germany, where Putin worked as a KGB agent for five years, and the two can understand each other in both Russian and German, this biographical link between them has not been reflected in their political relationship.

Germany went from being Russia's biggest European ally (to the point that Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, after leaving the position, was appointed after leaving the position of chairman of Rosneft's management committee ), to being a threat to Russian interests. After sanctions were imposed on Russia in 2014 with the support of the German government, relations between Putin and Merkel are at their worst. However, some might argue that Germany is acting hypocritically given that it has accepted and financed the Nordstream pipeline, which heavily damages Ukraine's Economics .

Besides the EU, the other main opponent for Russian interests is NATO. At every point on the map where the Kremlin wishes to put pressure NATO has strengthened its presence. Under U.S. command, the organization follows the U.S. strategy of trying to keep Russia at bay. And Moscow perceives NATO and the US as the ultimate obstacle to regaining its sphere of influence in "near abroad" (Eastern Europe, Central Asia) and in the Middle East.

Putin's fixation with the former Soviet republics has by no means faded over time. If anything, it has increased after the successful annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the civil war that flared up in the Donbass. Russia's nostalgia for what was once part of its territory is nothing more than a pretext to try to neutralize any dissident government in the region and subjugate as much as possible the countries that make up its buffer zone, for security and financial reasons.

The Middle East also plays an important role in Russia's international affairs diary . Russia's main goal is to foster stability and combat terrorist threats that may arise in places that are poorly controlled by the region's governments. Putin has been fighting Islamic terrorism since the separatist threat in Chechnya. However, his possible good intentions in the area are often misinterpreted due to his support in every possible way (including aerial bombardments) to some authoritarian regimes, such as Assad's in Syria. In this particular civil war, Russia is repeating the Cold War proxy war game against the US, which for its part has been supporting the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurds. Putin's interest is to keep his ally Assad in power, along with the financial aid of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Angela Stent draws an accurate picture of Russia's recent past and its relationship with the outside world. Without being biased, she succeeds in critically summarizing what anyone interested in security should keep in mind when approaching the topic of Russia's threats and opportunities. For, as Vladimir Putin himself declared in 2018, "no one has succeeded in stopping Russia." Not yet.

Criticism of Maduro, the redimensioning of the Chinese embrace and greater immigration control mark the harmony with Washington after ten years of the FMLN

The surprising use of the army to pressure the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly in early February to approve a security appropriation has raised international alarm about what the presidency of Nayib Bukele, who came to power in June 2019, may hold. Having tightened relations with the United States in his first half year, after two decades of government by the former FMLN guerrillas, Bukele may have thought that his authoritarian gesture would be excused by Washington. The unanimous reaction in the region made him correct the shot, at least for the time being.

▲ Swearing in of Nayib Bukele as president, in June 2019, together with his wife, Gabriela Rodríguez [Presidency of El Salvador].

article / Jimena Villacorta

El Salvador and the United States had a close relationship during the long political dominance of the right-wing ARENA party, but the coming to power in 2009 of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) meant an alignment of El Salvador with the ALBA countries (Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba, fundamentally), which led to occasional tension with Washington. In addition, in 2018, in the final stretch of the presidency of Salvador Sánchez Cerén, diplomatic relations with Taiwan were severed and the possibility of strategic investments by China was opened, which were viewed with suspicion by the United States (especially the option of controlling the Pacific port of La Unión, due to the risk of its military use in a crisis status ).

Nayib Bukele won the early 2019 elections presenting himself as an alternative to the traditional parties, despite the fact that he was mayor of San Salvador (2015-2018) leading a coalition with the FMLN and that for the presidential elections he stayed with the GANA acronym, created a few years earlier as a split from ARENA. His denunciation of the corruption of the political system, in any case, was credible for the majority of an electorate certainly tired of the Bolivarian tone of recent governments.

During his electoral campaign Bukele already advocated for improving relations with the United States, as it is a more economically interesting partner for El Salvador than the ALBA nations. "All financial aid that comes is welcome and better if it is from the United States", said one of his advisors. These messages were immediately received in Washington, and in July the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, visited El Salvador: it was the first time in ten years, precisely the time of the two consecutive presidencies of the FMLN, that the head of US diplomacy visited the Central American country. This trip served to accentuate the partnership in subject fight against drug trafficking and the gang problem, two shared problems. "We have to fight against the MS-13 gang, which has sown destruction in El Salvador and also in the United States, because we have its presence in almost forty of the fifty states of our country," said Pompeo.

In line with the change of orientation that was taking place, El Salvador began to align itself in regional forums against the regime of Nicolás Maduro. Thus, on September 12, the Salvadoran representation in the Organization of American States (OAS) supported the activation of the Inter-American Reciprocal attendance Treaty (TIAR), after years of abstaining or voting in favor of resolutions supporting Chavez's Venezuela. On December 3, Bukele announced the expulsion from El Salvador of Maduro's government diplomats, an action immediately replicated by Caracas.

In those same months El Salvador accepted the terms of the new immigration approach that the Trump Administration was outlining. During the summer, the White House negotiated with the countries of the Central American Northern Triangle agreements similar to the safe third country mechanism, whereby Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador agreed to process as asylum seekers those who had passed through their territory and ended up in the US by formalizing that application. Bukele met with Trump in September in the framework the United Nations General Assembly and signed the agreement, which was presented as an instrument to combat organized crime, strengthen border security, reduce illegal trafficking and human trafficking. 

The signature the agreement was controversial, as many authorities questioned the guarantees of security and protection of rights that El Salvador can offer, when it is the lack of such guarantees that is driving the emigration of Salvadorans. Rubén Zamora, former ambassador of El Salvador to the UN, criticized that Bukele was conceding a lot to the United States, with hardly anything in return.

Bukele, however, was able to exhibit in October a US counterpart: the extension for one year, until January 2021, of the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) that gives legal coverage to the presence of 250,000 Salvadorans and their families in the US. The total number of Salvadorans residing in that country amounts to at least 1.4 million, the largest number of Latin American migrants after Mexicans. This sample the great link of the Central American nation, where 6.5 million people live, with the great power of the North, which is also the destination of 80% of its exports and whose dollar is the currency of use in El Salvador.

The new Salvadoran president seemed to truncate this harmony with Washington in December, when he made an official trip to Beijing and met with the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping. The US had warned of the risk of China taking strategic advantage of the door that was opening in Central America with the subsequent establishment of diplomatic relations with the countries of the American isthmus, which until a few years ago were a stronghold of support for Taiwan. Specifically, the US embassy in El Salvador had been particularly active in denouncing the alleged efforts of the Sanchez Ceren government to grant China the management of the Port of La Union, in the Gulf of Fonseca, which could be joined by a special economic zone.

However, what Bukele did on that trip was to resize, at least for the time being, that relationship with China, limiting expectations and calming U.S. suspicions. Not only does the question of the port of La Unión seem to have been shelved, but the Salvadoran president also confined Chinese attendance to the field of non-repayable financial aid to development and not to the granting of credits which, in the event of non-payment, condition national sovereignty. Bukele pointed out that the "gigantic cooperation" promised by China was "non-refundable" and referred to typical international cooperation projects, such as the construction of a library, a sports stadium and a sewage treatment plant to clean the sewage discharged into Lake Ilopango, near the capital.

Georgian aspirations for European Union and NATO integration meet Western fears of Russian overreaction

▲ View of Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, with the presidential palace in the background [Pixabay].

ANALYSIS / Irene Apesteguía

In Greek times, Jason and the Argonauts set out on a journey in search of the Golden Fleece, with a clear direction: the current lands of Georgia. Later, in Roman times, these lands were divided into two kingdoms: Colchis and Iberia. From being a Christian territory, Georgia was conquered by the Muslims and later subjected to the Mongols. At this time, in the 16th century, the population was reduced due to the continuous Persian and Ottoman invasions.

In 1783, the Georgian kingdom and the Russian empire agreed to the Treaty of Georgiyevsk, by which both territories pledged mutual military support. This agreement failed to prevent the Georgian capital from being sacked by the Persians, which was allowed by the Russian tsar. And it was the Russian tsar, Tsar Paul I of Russia, who in 1800 signed the corresponding incorporation of Georgia into the Russian empire, taking advantage of the moment of Georgian weakness.

After the disappearance of the Federal Democratic Republic of Transcaucasia and thanks to the Russian collapse that began in 1917, the first modern state of Georgia was created: the Democratic Republic of Georgia, which between 1918 and 1921 fought with the support of Germany and the British forces against the Russian empire. The resistance did not last and the occupation of the Russian Red Army led in 1921 to the incorporation of Georgian territory into the Union of Soviet Republics. In World War II, seven hundred thousand Georgian soldiers had to fight against their former German allies.

In those Stalinist times, Ossetia was divided in two, constituting the southern part as an autonomous region belonging to Georgia. Later, the process was repeated with Abkhazia, thus forming today's Georgia. Seventy years later, on April 9, 1991, the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic declared its independence under the name of Georgia.

Every time has its "fall of the Berlin Wall", and this one is characterized by the disintegration of the former Russia. The major armed conflict that would unfold in 2008 as a result of the frozen conflicts between Georgia and South Ossetia and Abkhazia since the beginning of the last century came as no surprise.

Since the disintegration of the USSR

After the disintegration of the USSR, the territorial configuration of the country led to tension with Russia. With independence there was civil unrest and a major political crisis, as the views of the population of the autonomous territories were not taken into account and the laws of the USSR were violated in this regard. As twin sisters, South Ossetia wished to join North Ossetia, i.e. a Russian part, with Abkhazia again following in their footsteps. Moscow recognized Georgia without modification of borders, perhaps for fear of a similar action to the Chechen case, but for two long decades it acted as the protective parent of the two autonomous regions.

With independence, Zviad Gamsakhurdia became the first president. After a coup d'état and a brief civil war, Eduard Shevardnadze, a Georgian politician who in Moscow had worked closely with Gorbachev in the articulation of perestroika, came to power. Under Shevardnadze's presidency, between 1995 and 2003, ethnic wars broke out in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Around ten thousand people lost their lives and thousands of families fled their homes.

In 2003, the Rose Revolution against misgovernment, poverty, corruption and electoral fraud facilitated the restoration of territorial integrity, the return of refugees and the acceptance of different ethnic groups. However, the democratic and economic reforms that were proposed remained a longed-for dream.

One of the leaders of the Rose Revolution, lawyer Mikhail Saakashvili, became president a year later, declaring Georgian territorial integrity and initiating a new policy: friendship with NATO and the European Union. This rapprochement with the West, and especially with the United States, put Moscow on notice .

Georgia's strategic importance is due to its geographical centrality in the Caucasus, as it is in the middle of the route of new oil and gas pipelines. European energy security underpinned the EU's interest in a Georgia that was not subservient to the Kremlin. Saakashvili made nods to the EU and also to NATO, increasing the issue of military personnel and the expense on armaments, something which in 2008 did him no harm at all.

Saakashvili was successful with his policies in Ayaria, but not in South Ossetia. The maintenance of tension in that area and various internal disputes generated great political instability that led to the Withdrawal the president.

When Saakashvili's term ended in 2013, he was succeeded as president by the commentator and politician Giorgi Margvelashvili, as head of the Georgian Dream list. Margvelashvili maintained the line of rapprochement with the West, as has been done since 2018 by the current president, Salome Zurabishvili, a French-born politician, also from Georgian Dream.

Fight for South Ossetia

The 2008 war was initiated by Georgia. Russia also contributed to the previous bad relations, embargoing imports of Georgian wine, repatriating undocumented Georgian immigrants and even banning flights between the two countries. In the conflict, which affected South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Saakashvili had a modernized and prepared army, and also the full support of Washington.

The battles began in the main city of South Ossetia, Tskhinval, the majority of whose population is ethnic Russian. Air and ground bombardments by the Georgian Army were followed by Russian tanks entrance the territory. Moscow gained control of the province and expelled the Georgian forces. After five days, the war ended with a death toll of between eight hundred and two thousand, depending on the different estimates of each side, and multiple violations of the laws of war. In addition, numerous reports commissioned by the European Union showed that South Ossetian forces "deliberately and systematically destroyed ethnic Georgian villages". These reports also stated that it was Georgia that initiated the conflict, although the Russian side had engaged in multiple provocations and also overreacted.

After the cease-fire of August 12, diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia were suspended. Moscow withdrew its troops from part of the Georgian territory it had occupied, but remained in the separatist regions. Since then, Russia has recognized South Ossetia as an independent territory, as do some Russian allies such as Venezuela and Nicaragua. The Ossetians themselves do not acknowledge having cultural and historical ties with Georgia, but with North Ossetia, i.e. with Russia. For its part, Georgia insists that South Ossetia is within its borders, and the same government will take care of it as a matter of public order, thus solving a problem described as constitutional.

Given Georgia's rapprochement with the EU, the war conflict prompted European diplomacy to play an active role in the search for peace, with the deployment of two hundred observers on the border between South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia, replacing Russian peacekeepers. In reality, the EU could have tried earlier to react more forcefully to Russia's actions in South Ossetia, which some observers believe would have prevented what later happened in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. In any case, despite having initiated the conflict, this did not affect Tbilisi's relationship with Brussels, and in 2014 Georgia and the EU signed an association agreement . Today we can be sure that the West has forgiven Russia for its behavior in Georgia.

The war, although short, had a clear negative impact on the Economics of the Ossetian region, which in the midst of difficulties became dependent on Moscow. However, Russian financial aid does not reach the population due to the high level of corruption.

The war is over, but not the friction. In addition to a refugee problem, there is also a security problem, with murders of Georgians on the borders with South Ossetia. The issue is not closed, but although the risk is slight, everything remains in the hands of Russia, which in addition to controlling and influencing politics, directs tourism in the area.

This non-resolution of the conflict hinders the stabilization of democracy in Georgia and with it the possible entrance into the European institution, as ethnic minorities claim lack of respect and protection of their rights. Although governance mechanisms remain weak in these conflicts, it is clear that the reforms recently acquired in the South Caucasus have led to the promote inclusive dialogue with minorities and greater state responsibility for the issue. 

Last elections

November 2018 saw the last direct suffrage presidential elections in the country, as from 2024 it will no longer be citizens who vote for their president, but legislators and certain compromisers, due to a constitutional reform transforming the country into a parliamentary republic.

In 2018, the United National Movement candidate Grigol Vashdze and Georgian Dream candidate Salome Zurabishvili faced each other in the second round. With 60% of the vote, the center-left candidate became the first woman to hold the Georgian presidency. She won with a European bet: "more Europe in Georgia and Georgia in the European Union". Her inauguration was greeted with protesters alleging election irregularities. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) endorsed the electoral process, although it pointed out the lack of objectivity of the public media during the campaign.

Some Georgian media consider that Georgian Dream enjoyed an "undue advantage" because of the intervention in the campaign of former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, today a wealthy financier, who publicly announced a financial aid program for 600,000 Georgians. It became clear that Ivanishvili pulls the strings and levers of power in the country. This questioning of the cleanliness of the campaign led Georgia to drop in democratic quality in the 2018 indexes.

Public event presided over in January by Salome Zurabishvili at the Georgian presidential palace [Presidency of Georgia].

THE APPROACH TO THE WEST

Since the policies pursued by the Georgian presidency since Saakashvili came to power, Georgia has made a decisive entry into the Western world. Thanks to all the new measures that Tbilisi is implementing to conform to Western requirements and requests, Georgia has managed to profile itself as the ideal candidate for entrance the European Union. However, despite the pro-European and Atlanticist yearnings of the ruling Georgian Dream party and a large part of Georgian society, the country could end up surrendering to Russian pressure, as has happened with several former Soviet territories that had previously attempted a Western rapprochement, such as Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan.

Compliance with the European Union

Becoming the most favored country in the Caucasus to enter the European Union, with which it has a close and positive relationship, Georgia has signed several binding treaties with Brussels, following the aspiration of Georgian citizens for more democracy and human rights. In 2016, the EU-Georgia associationagreement came into force, something that allows for serious steps in political and economic integration, such as the creation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). This preferential trade regime makes the EU the country's main trading partner . The DCFTA financial aid Georgia to reform its trade framework , following the principles of the World Trade Organization, while eliminating tariffs and facilitating broad mutual access. This alignment with the EU legal framework prepares the country for eventual accession.

As for the association agreement , it should be mentioned that Georgia is a member country of the Eastern association within the European Neighborhood Policy. Through this association, Brussels issues annual reports on the steps taken by a given state to achieve greater alignment with the EU. The association committee is the formal institution dedicated to overseeing these partnership relations; its meetings have highlighted the progress made and the growing closeness between Georgia and the EU.

In 2016 the EU Permanent Representatives committee confirmed the European Parliament's agreement on visa-free travel with Georgia. This agreement was based on visa-free travel for EU citizens crossing the country's borders, and for Georgian citizens traveling to the EU for stays of up to 90 days.

Georgia, however, has been disappointed in its expectations when the EU has expressed doubts about the advisability of its membership. Some member countries claimed the danger that Georgian criminal groups could pose, something that several pro-Russian parties in the country took advantage of to wage an energetic campaign against the EU and NATO. The campaign had its results and anti-Russian opinion declined, leading Moscow to further assertion with military maneuvers, although in the 2016 elections citizen support for Georgian Dream continued.

Although there is no prospect of forthcoming accession, the EU continues to offer hope, as in German Chancellor Angela Merkel's tour of the Caucasus last summer. On her visit to Georgia, Merkel compared the Georgian conflict to the Ukrainian conflict due to the presence of Russian troops in the country's separatist regions. She visited the town of Odzisi, located on the border with South Ossetia, and in a speech at the University of Tbilisi said that both that territory and Abkhazia are "occupied territories", which was not well received by Moscow. Merkel pledged to do her utmost to keep this "injustice" in the international diary .

Georgian President Salome Zourachvili also believes that the UK 's exit from the European Union can be a great opportunity for Georgia. "It will force Europe to reform itself. And as I am an optimist I am sure it will open new doors for us," she has said.

Hope in the Atlantic Alliance

Russia's behavior in recent years, in addition to encouraging Georgia's rapprochement with the EU, has given a sense of urgency to its desire to join the Atlantic Alliance.

In 2016 there were several joint NATO-Georgia maneuvers in the Black Sea, where a coalition fleet made landfall. It was evidence of a growing mutual rapprochement that Georgia hoped would lead to its accession to the organization at the NATO summit in Warsaw later that year. But despite the great preparation the country received in terms of defense, security and intelligence, it was not invited to join the club: Russia was not to be inconvenienced.

NATO assured, however, that it would maintain its open-door policy towards the countries of the East and considered that Georgia remained an exemplary candidate . Pending future decisions, Tbilisi was left with strengthening military cooperation, offering as an incentive the "Black Sea format", a compromise solution involving NATO, Georgia and Ukraine and increasing the Alliance's influence in the Black Sea region.

Georgia, being the capital ally of NATO and the European Union in the Caucasus region, aspires to greater protection from Russia by the Atlantic Alliance. The European political center observes the efforts of the Georgian population to join the international organization and opts for a strategy of patience for the Caucasian zone, as in the years of the Cold War.

Approaching Russia's borders is problematic, and multiple criticisms have arisen towards NATO about the easy Georgian incorporation due to its geostrategic status . Russia has repeatedly expressed concern about such joint cooperation between the United States, NATO and neighboring Georgia.

President Zurabishvili's speech at the Holocaust remembrance events in Jerusalem in January [Presidency of Georgia].

A VIGILANT RUSSIA

The wounds of the 2008 South Ossetia war have not yet healed in Georgian society. Despite Georgia's political attempts at rapprochement with Western institutions, Russia remains suspiciously on guard, so that relations between the two countries continue to be conflictive. Thus, last summer saw the latest episode of tension, which led the Georgian president to describe Russia as an "enemy and occupier".

After some rapprochement in 2013 that saw an increase in food trade and Russian tourism coming to the country, Moscow has shifted to a strategy of attempting rapprochement at the religious and political level. With that intention, a small group of Russian lawmakers traveled to the Georgian capital for the Orthodox Interparliamentary Assembly. This international organization, led by Greece and Russia, is the only one that brings together the legislative bodies of Orthodox countries. The meeting took place in the plenary hall of the Georgian Parliament, where the Russian deputy Sergei Gabrilov took the seat of the Speaker of the House. Several politicians of the civil service examination did not take kindly to this and mobilized thousands of citizens, who staged serious public disorder in an attempted storming of the Parliament. The Russian delegation was forced to leave the country, but the attempt of Russian influence through religion was clear, when until then the Church had kept out of all political controversies.

The riots, in which numerous people were injured, caused the members of the government to cancel all their trips abroad and the president to interrupt her trip to Belarus, where she was to attend the opening of the European Games, a presence considered important in Western eyes. Demonstrators protested against the Georgian Dream headquarters, where they burned and stormed outbuildings. The ten days of riots were not only justified by the incident at the Assembly, but also as a reaction to the Russian occupation. In addition, the conflict between Georgian Dream and the opposing parties led by Saakashvili, currently in exile in Ukraine, may also have contributed.

The crisis ended with the departure of Prime Minister Mamuka and the appointment of Georgi Gaharia as his successor, despite the criticism he had received for his management of the unrest as Minister of the Interior.

The riots, although they may be well-intentioned, are against Georgia's interests, according to the country's president, because what the country needs is "tranquility and internal stability", both to progress internally and to gain sympathy among EU members, who do not want more tension in the region. Salome Zurabishvili warned of the risks of any internal destabilization that Russia could provoke.

On the occasion of the June protests, the Kremlin issued a decree banning the transport of nationals to Georgia by Russian airlines. It claimed to want to ensure "national security and protection of citizens", but it was clear that Moscow was reacting to an anti-Russian tinged revolt. The decision reduced the arrival of visitors from Russia, who had been accounting for one out of every four tourists, which according to the government could mean a loss of one billion dollars and a 1% reduction in GDP.

The tension reached the television media in the Georgian capital. Days after the riots, the host of the "Post Scriptum" program on Rustavi 2 channel intervened in the broadcast speaking Russian and made several insults against President Vladimir Putin, which Russia called unacceptable and "Russophobic". The channel apologized, admitting that its ethical and editorial standards had been violated, while several Georgian politicians, including the president, condemned the episode and regretted that such events only increase tensions between the two nations.

The events of last summer show the Georgians' rejection of an enmity with Russia which, in addition to accentuating the tension with the great neighbor to the north, may affect Georgia's relationship with the EU and other Western international organizations, since they are not going to tread on quicksand, and even less so with the great Russia in front of them.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Asmus, Ronald D. A Little War That Shook the World. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010.

Cornell S. E. & Starr, F. The Guns of August 2008. Russia's War in Georgia. London: M.E. Sharpe, 2009.

De la Parte, Francisco P. The returning empire. The Ukrainian War 2014-2017: Origin, development, international environment and consequences. Oviedo: Ediciones de la Universidad de Oviedo, 2017.

Golz, Thomas. Georgia Diary: A Chronicle of War and Political Chaos in The Post-Soviet Caucasus.New York: Taylor and Francis, 2006.