With the agreement reached between the EU and Johnson and the polls favorable to Johnson in the December 12 elections, a possible end to Brexit is in sight.

▲ Installation against Brexit, during a protest in Manchester in 2017 [Robert Mandel, Wikimedia Commons].

COMMENT / Pablo Gurbindo

Since June 23, 2016, the date on which the referendum on the United Kingdom remaining in the European Union was held, the British exit has overshadowed any other topic, such as the momentous past European elections, and has caused the division of the British political spectrum between those who support remaining and those who support leaving.

 The "Brexit" has also taken two prime ministers by surprise: David Cameron, after the referendum, and his successor, Theresa May, who left the position after failing to get her agreement reached with the EU to be C the British Parliament. And it may be her successor, Boris Johnson, the controversial former Mayor of London who campaigned for the vote to leave the Union, who manages to lead his country out of these more than three years of uncertainty.

Johnson's arrival at 10 Downing Street caused great concern in European capitals. From the outset, he stated that he would get his country out of the European Union, agreement or no agreement, before October 31. And, in September, he did not hesitate to temporarily fail the Parliament so that the civil service examination could not veto a possible exit without agreement. This closure was declared illegal by the Supreme Court and the civil service examination succeeded in ensuring that the hypothetical exit without agreement could only be agreed by Parliament. Despite all this, negotiations in Brussels did not stop and, on October 17, it was announced that an agreement had been reached. agreement.

The agreement reached is, to a large extent, similar to the one reached with Theresa May. The main change has been the Irish "safeguard", the section most criticized at the time by the civil service examination and by the hardest wing of the "Tories". This measure implied that, if the European Union and the United Kingdom did not reach an agreement by 2020, Northern Ireland would remain in the single market and the customs union, while the rest of the United Kingdom would leave.

This system provoked a great rejection, especially in the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). May and Johnson depended on this Northern Irish Unionist party to approve the agreement in the British Parliament. This concern about the new border between the two Irelands responds to the risk it poses to the Good Friday Agreements. Thanks to these agreements, peace was restored to Northern Ireland, which was at war in the last century between Catholic groups, who advocated unification with Ireland, and Protestant unionists, who advocated maintaining ties with the United Kingdom. The breakdown of these agreements could provoke the return of violence to the island.

agreement reached

This new agreement on Northern Ireland, proposed by Johnson, is based on three main elements, according to the European Union's Brexit negotiator, the Frenchman Michel Barnier:

(1) Northern Ireland will continue to comply with certain EU customs rules, especially those related to goods and products. However, in order to avoid any border subject with Ireland, checks will only be carried out on goods arriving at Northern Irish ports. These checks will be carried out by the British in compliance with EU rules.

(2) However, it will continue to be part of the British Customs Union, so any trade agreement reached by the United Kingdom after Brexit will include Northern Ireland. The problem is that these two elements conflict: Northern Ireland would be part of both the British and EU customs unions. In order to solve the problem that this "customs bicephaly" could produce, products from third countries - which will not then move to another country in the common market - will be taxed in the United Kingdom. However, if the products are at risk of entering the common market, the UK authorities will apply the EU tariffs.

(3) Finally, the agreement with Johnson will be a permanent agreement unless the Northern Ireland Assembly decides otherwise. The agreement enables this body to vote on whether to maintain or abandon the agreed status, once four years have elapsed since the protocol came into force. In the event that they ratify the agreement , it will be extended by four or eight years, depending on whether it is a simple majority or whether it has majority support (with the support of the Protestant and Catholic communities). Otherwise, European laws will continue to apply for two more years, during which time the EU and the UK will have to reach a new agreement.

Extension and call for elections

After the advertisement the agreement reached, the most complicated part remained: ratifying it in the British Parliament, and in record time, since the deadline was October 31. Johnson was forced by Parliament to ask Brussels for an extension until January 31, 2020, contrary to his wishes to keep his promise to leave on October 31. This request was not without controversy as Johnson sent two letters: one requesting the extension, which he did not sign, and another signed in which he expressed that he would see the extension as a "mistake" and that it would be "deeply corrosive" for his country.

On October 29, the European committee accepted the extension to January 31, 2020 to allow time for the ratification of the Exit agreement . The United Kingdom could leave the Union earlier, on December 1, 2019 (a date which has already passed) or on January 1, 2020 in the event of both parties ratifying the support. This extension was unanimously approved by the 27, despite France's reluctance. France argued that this long extension should be granted only if there was certainty that there would be elections in the United Kingdom; otherwise, they advocated a shorter technical extension, so that there would be time to ratify the Exit agreement .

To carry out the Brexit, Johnson, faced with "parliamentary obstructionism", called for early elections to change the arithmetic of the Parliament and to be able to approve the agreement reached with the EU. This call was rejected twice by Jeremy Corbyn's Labour Party, the main party of the civil service examination. But after learning that the European committee accepted the extension, it supported the call.

Conclusion

With elections scheduled for next December 12, the wind seems to be blowing in Johnson's favor. The polls favor him with a percentage of 40% of the vote. Far behind, Labour, with 29%, would lose support to Jo Swinson's Liberal Democrat Party, which would rise to 15% (from 7.4% in the previous election). This rise of the "Lib Dems" would be mainly due to their strong support for remaining in the EU, unlike Corbyn, who has maintained a neutral position despite the fact that 70% of Labour voters support remaining. On the other hand, the Conservative majority would allow the "Tories" to stop depending on the DUP to achieve sufficient parliamentary majorities.

As if that were not enough, the leader of the Brexit Party, Nigel Farage, has announced that in order to facilitate a Conservative majority, his party will not stand in the constituencies where the Conservative Party won in the previous elections. In order to ensure the exit of the United Kingdom from the Union and to avoid a new referendum.

If these polls come true, Johnson would obtain his long-awaited majority to be able to approve the exit.

After more than three years, a plausible end to Brexit is in sight.

The flood of unaccompanied alien minors suffered by the Obama Administration in 2014 has been surpassed in a 2019 with a new migration peak

In the summer of 2014, the United States suffered a migration crisis due to an unexpected increase in the issue of unaccompanied foreign minors, mostly Central American, arriving at its border with Mexico. What has happened since then? Although oscillating, the Issue of this immigration subject went down, but in 2019 a new record has been registered, hand in hand with the ˝caravan crisis˝, which has led to a rise again in total apprehensions at the border.

▲ U.S. border agents search unaccompanied minors at the Texas-Mexico border in 2014 [Hector Silva, USCBP-Wikimedia Commons].

article / Marcelina Kropiwnicka [English version].

The United States hosts more immigrants than any other country in the world, with more than one million people arriving each year, either as legal permanent residents, asylum seekers and refugees, or in other immigration categories. While there is no exact figure for how many people cross the border illegally, US Customs and Border Control authorities measure changes in illegal immigration based on the number of apprehensions made at the border; these apprehensions serve as an indicator of the total issue of attempts to enter the country illegally. In terms of data, it can be concluded that there have been notable changes in the demographics of illegal migration at the border with Mexico (southwest border, in official U.S. terms) in recent years.

The peak of apprehensions at the border with Mexico was during 2000, when 1.64 million people were apprehended attempting to enter the United States illegally. The numbers have generally declined since then. In recent years there have been more apprehensions of non-Mexicans than Mexicans at the U.S.-Mexico border, reflecting a decrease in the issue of unauthorized Mexican immigrants arriving in the United States over the past decade. The increase, in fact, was largely due to those fleeing violence, gang activity and poverty in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, a region known as the Central American Northern Triangle.

The nations included in the Northern Triangle are among the poorest in Latin America - a high percentage of the population still lives on less than $2 a day (the international poverty line is $1.90) - and there has been little progress in reducing poverty in recent years. Within Latin America and the Caribbean, Honduras has the second highest percentage of population living below the poverty line (17%), after Haiti, according to the latest World Bank data .

Unaccompanied foreign minors

While fewer adults, unaccompanied by family, have attempted to cross the border without authorization in the last decade, there has instead been a surge of unaccompanied alien minors (UACM) attempting to enter the United States from Mexico. The migration of unaccompanied minors is not new; what is new now is the Issue and the need to implement policies in response to this problem. The increase in apprehensions of MENAs in FY 2014 caused alarm and prompted both intense media scrutiny and the implementation of policy responses; attention was sustained even as the phenomenon declined. Numbers dropped again to just under 40,000 apprehensions of minors the following year.

The international community defines an unaccompanied migrant minor as a person, "who is under the age of eighteen" and who is "separated from both parents and is not being cared for by an adult who by law or custom has the responsibility to do so." Many of these unaccompanied minors immediately present themselves to U.S. border security, while others enter the country unnoticed and undocumented. Not only this, but the children have no parents or legal guardians available to provide care or physical custody, which quickly overwhelms local border patrol services.

In 2014 many of the unaccompanied children claimed that they were under the false impression that the Obama Administration was granting "permits" to children who had relatives in the U.S., as long as they arrived by June at the latest. These false convincements and propagated hoaxes were even more potent this past year, especially as President Trump continues to reinforce the idea of restricting migrants' access to the US. The cartels have continued to transport an increasing issue of Central American migrants from their countries to the United States.

Critical moments in 2014 and 2019

In 2014, during Obama's second term, total apprehensions along the border with Mexico reached 569,237 (this figure includes "non-admissible" individuals), a record only surpassed now. While the increase over the previous year was 13%, the increase was much more B apprehensions of MENAs; these went from 38,759 in FY 2013 to 68,541 in FY 2014 (in the US the fiscal year runs from October of one year to September of the next), an increase of almost 80%, more than four times those recorded in FY 2011. In the case of minors from Honduras, the number rose in one year from 6,747 to 18,244; those from Guatemala rose from 8,068 to 17,057, and those from El Salvador from 5,990 to 16,404 (those from Mexico, on the other hand, fell from 17,240 to 15,634). The highest issue of apprehensions occurred in May, a month in which arrests of MENAs accounted for 17% of total apprehensions.

Since 2014, apprehensions of unaccompanied minors, although fluctuating, declined in issue. But 2019 saw a new record high, reaching 76,020, with a peak in the month of May. However, they accounted for only 9% of total apprehensions that month, as this time it was not properly a crisis of MENAs, but rather inserted into a B in total apprehensions. While overall apprehensions dropped significantly during the first six months of Trump's presidency, they then rose, reaching a 2019 total of 851,508 (with "non-admissibles" the figure reached 977,509), more than doubling from 2018. The issue of total apprehensions increased by 72% from 2014 to 2019 (in the case of MENAs the increase was 11%).

Apprehensions of unaccompanied alien minors at the US-Mexico border, between 2012 and 2019 (figure 1), and comparison of 2014 and 2019 by month (figure 2). source: US Customs and Border Patrol.

Reaction

The United States had various domestic policies aimed at addressing the massive increase in immigration. However, with the overwhelming spike in 2014, Obama requested funding for a program to "repatriate and reintegrate migrants to Central American countries and to address the root causes of migration from these countries." Although funding for the program was fairly consistent in recent years, President Trump 's proposed 2018 budget reduced financial aid to these countries by approximately 30%.

The Trump Administration has made progress in implementing its immigration diary , from beginning construction of the wall on the border with Mexico to launching new programs, but the hard line already promised by Trump in his degree program to the White House has proven ineffective in stopping thousands of Central American families from crossing the southwest border into the United States. With extreme gang violence being rampant and technicalities in the US immigration system, the motivation for migrants to leave their countries will remain.

[Richard Nephew, The Art of Sanctions. A View from the Field. Columbia University Press. Chichester. New York, 2018. 216 p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

International sanctions often arouse lively discussion between those who defend them as a legitimate instrument of state-to-state interaction and those who consider that their application has had little effect other than to increase the suffering of entire populations through no fault of their own.

When asked if these sanctions, which may be of various kinds but are mainly economic in nature, are of any use, Richard Nephew answers that it depends. And this is not an evasion, but rather a defense of his own tools by a mechanic of U.S. diplomacy (Nephew was director for Iran at the National Security committee and deputy coordinator for sanctions at the State department ): "Sanctions do not fail or succeed. Rather, sanctions help or fail to achieve the desired end result of a sanctioning state (...) Tools can only perform well when they are employed with the right strategy; you can't accuse the saw if it fails to do the work of a screwdriver".

Nephew is not a theorist of sanctions, but a "practitioner"; the content of his book comes from experience ("A view from the field" is the subtitle of the book). This experience makes him convinced of the usefulness of these measures, provided they are applied in an appropriate manner. He basically gives the example of two cases: that of Iraq, where the sanctions did not achieve the desired goal due to a bad approach to international pressure, which finally led to war in 2003, and that of Iran, where the regime of punitive measures on the Islamic Republic had its effect and in 2015 an agreement was signed to curb the Iranian nuclear program.

An active participant in the Iran sanctions architecture, Nephew expands especially on the case of negotiations with Tehran, after first touching briefly on the Iraq chapter. From all this he draws conclusions and presents his own decalogues on how sanctions should be approached if they are to be effective. In the last pages he tries to advise how to conduct a new sanctions package on Iran, to control its missile program and contain its activity abroad through proxies, but without breaking the agreement reached (JCPOA) as the Trump Administration has done; how to manage the pressure on Russia in relation to Ukraine; and how to confront the attitude of North Korea. It does not address other situations that the discussion on sanctions is well aware of, such as Trump's harshness towards Cuba, in the framework a decades-long embargo that has not produced changes on the island, or the encirclement of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela.

Rules for successful sanctioning

Nephew's main conclusion is that " knowledge of one's opponent, his tolerances and his vulnerabilities, is the most important predictor of the chances of success of a strategy that focuses on sanctions (...) In fact, for sanctions to work, one really must know the enemy better than the enemy knows himself".

That is what, in his opinion, went wrong in Iraq. The sanctions were certainly effective, in that they prevented Saddam Hussein from returning to a program of weapons of mass destruction, but they did not prevent a war. This was because they did not take into account the psychology of the leader, who was willing to endure any subject of suffering -which he passed on to the population, without fearing that they might take power away from him- rather than admit that he did not have the powerful arsenal that supposedly made him one of the regional leaders. The international community did not understand how important it was for him to maintain this simulation, in his claim to credibility and prestige, above the pressure of any sanctions package.

There were other shortcomings in the Iraqi process, according to Nephew: maximum sanctions were applied from the beginning, with no room for an incremental policy, and over time there was a shift in the goal from wanting to avoid rearmament of the regime to a change of the regime itself (even if Saddam Hussein had accepted the conditions that were set, Washington would not have accepted his continuity in power).

These mistakes led to a better understanding of the mechanisms at play, which were refined in the attention with Iran. Nephew points out that a good understanding of the country targeted by possible sanctions must take into account its political institutions, macroeconomic and financial system, trade relations, cultural values, recent history, demographics and the population's access to external sources of information. This will make it possible to identify the vulnerabilities and the threshold of pain that the government of the day is willing to absorb. Then both the sanctions and the assumptions themselves must be continually recalibrated, following a well-defined strategy. It is also important that the State targeted by the sanctions is clearly presented with the conditions necessary for the pressure to be lifted, framework of a negotiation with clear terms. Finally, there must be a willingness to help the State under pressure to get out of a labyrinth whose exit it may not perceive, or even to accept lower objectives if they are also a reasonable result .

The author states that the three most common causes of failure of a sanctions regime are: falling short, going too far, and confusing objectives. These labels can easily be applied to past processes, but it is not so easy to fix the steps of coercive diplomacy of this subject in ongoing conflicts or conflicts that may occur in the future.

Thus, Nephew himself would not have full guarantees of success with the sanctions he suggests for a new negotiation with Iran in order to limit its missile program and its actions through groups such as Hezbollah. At odds with the Trump Administration, he would have preferred to maintain the 2015 nuclear program agreement (known by its acronym JCPOA) and the consequent lifting of the previously implemented sanctions regime, in order to move on to different sanctions seeking that other goal. It remains to be seen how useful Trump's move will be, but it is difficult to believe that Tehran will give up these other actions because of pressure that would not be so international in any case (China and Russia only lent themselves to a front against Iran because Iran's becoming a nuclear power was at stake).

With its blocking of certain candidates, the European Parliament is seeking the prominence denied to it when the proclamation of the Spitzenkandidat failed.

Ursula von der Leyen, at the plenary session of the European Parliament where she defended her candidacy [European Commission].

ANALYSIS / Jokin de Carlos

In 1963 the Elysée Treaty was signed between President Charles de Gaulle and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, ending centuries of Franco-German rivalry and beginning the friendship between the two countries. During the following decades, France and Germany, as the first economies of the Union, would largely mark the political and economic diary . Even in times of crisis, the two leading countries avoided a confrontational image.

However, after the European elections last May, there was a public tussle between Berlin and Paris over who should replace Jean-Claude Juncker as head of the European Commission. On one side, led by Angela Merkel, were those leaders who defended the nomination of the Bavarian Manfred Weber, Spitzenkandidat of the European People's Party, made up of conservative-leaning formations; on the other side, led by Emmanuel Macron, were those with liberal or social democratic leanings who opposed this nomination in preference to the Dutchman Frans Timmermans or the Danish Margrathe Vestager.

After weeks of negotiation and diplomatic tension, Weber's candidacy was withdrawn, partly because of Merkel's political weakness in Germany and the momentary defenestration of Sebastian Kurz in Austria due to the Ibizagate affair. But the position did not go to Vestager or Timmermans but to Ursula von der Leyen, German Defense Minister and Merkel's Christian Democrat colleague, originally from Hanover and from an aristocratic family. 

And so ends the summer of our discontent, with this Hanoverian sunshine.

Election

One of the main problems for the new president of the Commission will be how to achieve consensus among the leaders in the committee and among the parties in the Parliament.

Von der Leyen was elected unanimously in the committee, however, her election in the European Parliament was the narrowest in history, with only nine votes above the required majority. This vote had several surprises, such as the favorable vote of the Italian 5 Star Movement or the Polish PiS and the rejection of the SPD or the entirety of the Greens.

Composition of the Commission

On September 9, Von der Leyen made public his nominees for the new Commission, composed of 28 members for the 28 member countries, although the United Kingdom Withdrawal to have a seat due to its scheduled departure from the Union on October 31.

The von der Leyen Commission has been organized in the form of pillars, each led by a vice-president and composed of one or more commissioners with specific portfolios. These pillars are five: (a) European greenagreement , which will cover issues such as energy, transport or agriculture; (b) a Europe ready for the digital age, for issues such as innovation and skill; (c) protecting our European way of life, which will cover the areas of immigration and security; (d) an Economics that works for the people, aimed at trade, work and finance; and (e) a Europe strong in the world, which will include issues such as international relations or crisis management.

For the composition of this Commission, Von der Leyen has tried to integrate two of the Spitzenkandidat who were discarded for the presidency. Socialist Frans Timmermans, former Dutch deputy prime minister, will continue as vice-president and lead the European greenagreement pillar, while liberal Margrethe Vestager, former Danish deputy prime minister, having been skill commissioner in the previous Commission, will lead the Digital-ready Europe pillar. These are two of the most popular commissioners in the Juncker Commission; in the case of Vestager for her fight against tax evasion by several large American technology companies, such as Google, Amazon or Apple.

Of the remaining vice presidents, three will head the other three pillars: the new High Representative of the Union Josep Borrell, former Spanish minister in several portfolios and former president of the European Parliament, will lead Strong Europe in the World; Latvian Christian Democrat and former premier Valdis Dombrovskis will head the economic pillar; and Greek conservative Margaritis Schinas will lead the pillar of protecting the European way of life.

Three other vice-presidencies, with smaller areas, will go to Czech Verá Jorubá (Values and Transparency), Slovak Maroš Šefčovič (Inter-Institutional Relations) and Croatian Dubravka Šuica (Democracy and Demography).

Among the nominees for commissioners are prestigious people who have achieved important positions in their respective countries, as well as in previous European commissions: Paolo Gentiloni, former Italian Prime Minister, will be Commissioner for Economics, and Didier Reynders, former Belgian Minister of Defense, Finance and Foreign Affairs, will head Justice.

Analysis

There are two characteristics that can be highlighted about this proposal Commission: (1) the first is its more political character and (2) the second is a marked Francophilia. 

(1) In the past, the commissioners tended to show a technical profile and in many cases a preference for remaining in the shadows. In a way, they could have been considered the secretariat of the European committee . However, the selection made by Von der Leyen seems to want to put an end to this tradition by opting for better known names. Thus, Gentiloni or Dombrovskis have previously governed their countries, while others such as Vestager, Timmermans or Reynders have had some previous prominence. It seems that the interest of EU politicians is no longer so much to create the European Federation as soon as possible as to bring Brussels closer to the people. Whether this strategy works or not, time will tell.

(2) The second characteristic of this new Commission is a clear pro-French direction, to the satisfaction of Emmanuel Macron. Many of the members of the Commission are political allies of the French president; the clearest is the case of Ursula von der Leyen herself, despite having been part of Merkel's cabinet and a co-religionist of hers. It should be remembered that it was Macron who proposed her for the position after the veto of Weber, who was Merkel's initial candidate . But that is not all. Both Timmermans and Vestager are political allies of Macron (Vestager had been his first choice to chair the Commission). Josep Borrell is also a well-known Francophile, and Didier Reynerds is a French-speaking Belgian whose party is an ally of Macron's, as is the case with Italian Commissioner Paolo Gentiloni. It is therefore a largely Francophile Commission, which could increase Macron's weight on the Union and advance his vision of Europe.

Outside the Commission the other positions nominated by the European committee were Christine Lagarde, former French Finance Minister, who has left to head the IMF to head the European Central Bank, and Charles Michell, French-speaking premier of Belgium and fellow liberal of Macron, new president of the European committee .

These nominations were also intended to meet a number of objectives:

i) First and foremost, the aim is to put an end to the possible alienation of the countries of Central and Southern Europe. Out of eight vice presidents, four are from Central Europe, in charge of such important areas as the economic pillar or justice issues; two others are from the South, with responsibility for immigration and foreign policy issues.

ii) There has also been an attempt to reach out to groups that may have doubts about Von der Leyen or directly voted against him in the parliamentary session. Looking at the Greens, the European greenagreement portfolio aims to reduce carbon emissions by 55% of their 1990 levels by 2030 and to make Europe the first zero-carbon continent by 2050. The pillar on immigration, called Protecting our European way of life, seems to augur a stricter policy on immigration issues with the goal of maintaining the support of Poland's PiS and Hungary's Fidesz.

iii) Briefly it should also be mentioned that the nomination of Gentiloni to the economic portfolio seems to be a way of rewarding Italy for the training of a Brussels-friendly government. While the nomination of a left-wing Italian for Economics might worry Germany or the New Hansa, it seems that the nomination of Austrian conservative Johannes Hahn for the Budget Commission has been made to balance that of Gentiloni.

Challenges and possible complications

The four main challenges of this new Commission appear to be ecology, Economics, immigration and the construction of a common foreign policy.

As mentioned above, the nomination of Borrell and other commissioners may lead to a foreign policy along French lines, which at certain times may entail conflicts with Poland, the Baltic States or even Germany if tensions between France and the United States lead Washington to question its commitments to NATO and Russia.

Immigration looks set to remain a major issue for the Commission, although not as much as in recent years, largely because the issue of people arriving in Europe has fallen dramatically. From over one million in 2015 to less than 150,000 in 2018. Everything seems to indicate that the line on illegal immigration is going to be tougher than in previous years, although an attempt will be made to avoid populist rhetoric. However, the very name of the portfolio, Protecting our European way of life, has already been criticized by certain political and civil society sectors in Western Europe.

Economics will be another core topic. With a Brexit that could damage European Economics or cause a slowdown.

Another major issue will be related to Timmermans and his position. As head of the European greenagreement pillar, the Dutchman will be in charge of dealing with countries to reduce their carbon emissions. Central European countries, especially Poland, are still very dependent on the coal sector, which employs a significant portion of the workforce. Timmermans showed some clumsiness in dealing with Poland and Hungary on justice issues when he was Juncker's vice-president, so it remains to be seen how he deals with the energy issue.

In relation to the nominations, there has been concern about the Parliament's blocking of the Romanian, Hungarian and French commissioners, who were rejected for different reasons. In the case of the Hungarian nominee, the veto was attributed to his relationship with a law firm, and in the case of the French nominee, to the link with an American think tank . However, the general analysis seems to indicate that these rejections, especially in the case of the French nominee, seem to be a retaliation of the Parliament for having been section in the decision on the Commission presidency - by disregarding the proclamation of the most voted Spitzenkandidat - by the European committee , especially by Emmanuel Macron. The fall of the Romanian government and the establishment of a provisional government until the 2020 legislative elections may delay the training of the Commission. According to the High Representative Josep Borrell, the training of the Von der Leyen Commission is expected to be delayed until December 1.

Conclusion

To say that the Von der Leyen Commission will be continuist, as many claim, would be partially incorrect. Although the ideology seems to be the same, the objectives set are very different and much more political. It seems that some of the mistakes made by the Juncker Commission want to be solved and an attempt is being made to respond to some of the demands made by citizens to Brussels, on issues such as environmental protection, economic improvement, the correct integration of Central Europe, border control, the development of a common international policy and the rapprochement of Brussels with Europeans.

Whether this will be a failure or a victory, on verra.

▲ View of Doha, the capital of Qatar, from its Islamic Museum [Pixabay].

essay / Sebastián Bruzzone Martínez

I. Introduction. Qatar, emirate of the Persian Gulf.

In ancient times, the territory was inhabited by the Canaanites. From the 7th century A.D., Islam settled in the Qatari peninsula. As in the United Arab Emirates, piracy and attacks on the merchant ships of powers sailing along the coasts of the Persian Gulf were frequent. Qatar was ruled by the Al Khalifa family from Kuwait until 1868, when, at the request of the Qatari sheikhs and with financial aid from the British, the Al Thani dynasty was established. In 1871, the Ottoman Empire occupied the country and the Qatari dynasty recognized Turkish authority. In 1913, Qatar achieved autonomy; three years later, Emir Abdullah bin Jassim Al Thani signed a treaty with the United Kingdom to establish a British military protectorate in the region, while maintaining the Emir's absolute monarchy.

In 1968, the United Kingdom withdrew its military force, and the Truce States (United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain) organized the Federation of Emirates of the Persian Gulf. Qatar, like Bahrain, became independent of the Federation in 1971, proclaimed a provisional constitution, signed a treaty of friendship with the United Kingdom and joined the Arab League and the UN.

The provisional Constitution was replaced by the 2003 Constitution of 150 articles, submitted to a referendum and supported by 98% of the voters. It came into force as a fundamental rule on April 9, 2004. It recognizes Islam as the official religion of the State and Sharia law as a source law (art. 1); the provision for adherence to and respect for international treaties, covenants and agreements signed by the Emirate of Qatar (art. 6); the hereditary rule of the Al Thani family (art. 8); executive institutions such as the committee of Ministers and legislative-consultative institutions such as theAl Shoura committee or Ruling Family committee . Also included are the possibility of regency through the Trustee Council (arts. 13-16), the institution of the Prime Minister appointed by the Emir (art. 72), the Emir as Head of State and representative of the State in Interior, Foreign and International Relations (arts. 64-66), a sovereign wealth fund (Qatar Investment Company; art. 17), judicial institutions such as the local courts and the Supreme Judicial committee , and its control over the unconstitutionality of laws (137-140)[1], among other aspects.

It also recognizes rights such as private property (art. 27), equality of rights and duties (art. 34), equality of persons before the law without discrimination based on sex, race, language or religion (art. 35), freedom of expression (art. 47), freedom of the press (art. 48), impartiality of justice and effective judicial protection (134-136), among others.

These rights recognized in the Qatari Constitution must be consistent with Islamic law, and their application is thus different from that observed in Europe or the United States. For example, although democracy is recognized in article 1 as the political system of the State, political parties do not exist and trade unions are prohibited, although the right of association is recognized by the Constitution. Similarly, 80% of the country's population is foreign, while these constitutional rights apply to Qatari citizens, who make up the remaining 20%.

Like the other countries in the region, oil has been a transforming factor in the Qatari Economics . Today, Qatar has a high standard of living and one of the highest GDP per capita in the world[2], and is an attractive destination for foreign investors and luxury tourism. However, in recent years Qatar has been experiencing a diplomatic crisis[3] with its neighboring Persian Gulf countries due to various factors that have condemned the Arab country to regional isolation.

II. The instability of the al thani family

The government of the Emirate of Qatar has suffered great instability due to the internal disputes of the Al Thani family. Peter Salisbury, a Middle East expert at Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, spoke of the Al Thanis in an interview for the BBC: "It's a family that initially (before oil finding ) ruled a small, insignificant piece of land that was often seen as a small province of Saudi Arabia. But it managed to carve out a position for itself in that region of giants." [4]

In 1972, by means of a coup d'état, Ahmed Al Thani was deposed by his cousin Khalifa Al Thani, with whom Qatar followed an international policy of non-intervention and search for internal peace, and maintained a good relationship with Saudi Arabia. He remained in power until 1995, when his son Hamad Al Thani dethroned him, taking advantage of his absence while he was away in Switzerland. The Saudi government saw this as a bad example for other countries in the region also ruled by family dynasties. Hamad boosted the export of liquefied natural gas and oil, and dismantled an alleged Saudi plan to reinstate his father Khalifa. Countries in the region began to see the "little brother" grow economically and internationally very fast under the new emir and his foreign minister Hamam Al Thani.

The family is structured around Hamad and his wife Mozah bint Nasser Al-Missned, who has become an icon of fashion and female prestige of the international nobility, at the level of Rania of Jordan, Kate Middleton or Queen Letizia (precisely the couple is close to the Spanish royal family).

Hamad abdicated to his son Tamim Al Thani in 2013. The latter's ascension was a short-lived breath of hope for the international Arab community. Tamim adopted a very similar international policy position to his father, strengthening rapprochement and economic cooperation with Iran, and increasing tension with Saudi Arabia, which proceeded to close Qatar's only land border. Similarly, according to a WikiLeaks leak in 2009, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan accused Tamim of belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand, the economic, political, social and even staff rivalry between Qatar's Al Thani and Saudi Arabia's Al Saud goes back decades.

From my point of view, stability and family hierarchy in nations ruled by dynasties is a crucial factor to avoid internal power struggles that consequently have great negative effects for the country's society. Each person has different political, economic and social ideas that take time to implement. Frequent changes without an objective culmination end up being a terribly destabilizing factor. In the international arena, the country's political credibility and rigidity can be undermined when the emir's son carries out a coup d'état while his father is on vacation. Qatar, aware of this, sought legislative security and rigidity in article 148 of its Constitution by prohibiting the amendment of any article within ten years of its entrance into force.

In 1976, Qatar claimed sovereignty over the Hawar Islands, controlled by the Bahraini royal family, which became a focus of conflict between the two nations. The same happened with the artificial island of Fasht Ad Dibal, which led the Qatari army to raid the island in 1986. It was abandoned by Qatar in a peace agreement with Bahrain.

III. Alleged support to terrorist groups

This is the main cause why neighboring states have isolated Qatar. Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Libya and the Maldives, among others, cut diplomatic and trade relations with Qatar in June 2017 over its alleged funding and support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which it considers a terrorist organization. In 2010, WikiLeaks leaked a diplomatic grade in which the U.S. called Qatar the "worst in the region in subject of cooperation to eliminate funding for terrorist groups."

The Muslim Brotherhood, which originated in 1928 with Hassan Al Bana in Egypt, is a political activist and Islamic movement, with principles based on nationalism, social justice and anti-colonialism. However, within the movement there are several currents, some more rigorous than others. The founders of the Muslim Brotherhood see the Education of society as the most effective tool to reach state power. For this reason, the indoctrinators or evangelists of the movement are the most persecuted by the authorities of the countries which condemn membership of the group. It is endowed with a well-defined internal structure, whose head is the supreme guide Murchid, assisted by an executive body, a committee and an assembly.

From 1940, the paramilitary activity of the group began clandestinely with Nizzam Al Khas, whose initial intention was to achieve the independence of Egypt and expel the Zionists from Palestine. They carried out attacks such as the assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud An Nukrashi. The creation of this special section final sentenced the reputation and violent character of the Muslim Brotherhood, which continued its expansion around the world in the form of Tanzim Al Dawli, its international structure.[5] The Muslim Brotherhood's international structure, the Tanzim Al Dawli, was created by the Muslim Brotherhood.

Khaled Mashal,[6] former leader of the militant organization Hamas, is in exile in Qatar's capital, Doha, and the Taliban of Afghanistan has a political office. It is important to know that most Qatari citizens are followers of Wahhabism, a puritanical version of Islam that seeks the literal interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah, founded by Mohammad ibn Abd Al Wahhab.

During the political crisis following the Arab Spring in 2011, Qatar supported the Muslim Brotherhood's electoral efforts in North African countries. The Islamist movement saw the revolution as a useful means to gain access to governments, taking advantage of the power vacuum. In Egypt, Mohamed Mursi, linked to the movement, became president in 2013, although he was overthrown by the military. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain negatively rated the support and saw it as a destabilizing Islamist element. In those countries where they were unsuccessful, their members were expelled and many took refuge in Qatar. Meanwhile, in neighboring countries in the region, alarms were raised and every pro-Islamist move by the Qatari government was closely followed.

Similarly, Dutch sources and Human Rights lawyer Liesbeth Zegveld accused Qatar of financing the Al Nusra Front[7], the Syrian branch of Al Qaeda involved in the war against Al Assad, declared a terrorist organization by the United States and the UN. The Dutch lawyer claimed in 2018 to possess the necessary evidence to prove the flow of Qatari money to Al Nusra through companies based in the country and to hold Qatar judicially responsible before the court in The Hague, for the victims of the war in Syria. It is important to know that, in 2015, Doha obtained the release of 15 Lebanese soldiers, but in exchange for the release of 13 detained terrorists. Other sources claim that Qatar paid 20 million euros for the release of 45 Fijian blue helmets kidnapped by Al Nusra in the Golan Heights.

According to the BBC, in December 2015, Kataeb Hezbollah or the Islamic Resistance Movement of Iraq, recognized as a terrorist organization by the United Arab Emirates and the United States, among others, kidnapped a group of Qataris who went hunting in Iraq.[8] Among the group s hunters were two members of the Qatari royal family, the cousin and uncle of Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Qatari Foreign Minister since 2016. After 16 months of negotiations, the hijackers demanded a chilling $1 billion from the Qatari ambassador to Iraq to free the hostages. According to Qatar Airways officials, in April 2017 a Qatar Airways plane flew to Baghdad with the money to be delivered to the Iraqi government, which would act as an intermediary between Hezbollah and Qatar. However, the business has never commented on the facts. The official version of the Qatari government is that the terrorists were never paid and the release of the hostages was achieved through a joint diplomatic negotiation between Qatar and Iraq.

Qatar's financing of the armed group Hamas in the Gaza Strip is a real fact. In November 2018, according to Israeli sources, Qatar paid fifteen million dollars in cash as part of an agreement with Israel negotiated by Egypt and the UN, which would cover a total of ninety million dollars divided into several payments[9], with the intention of seeking peace and reconciliation between the political parties Fatah and Hamas, considered a terrorist group by the United States.

IV. Qatar's relationship with Iran

Qatar has good diplomatic and commercial relations with Iran, mostly Shiite, which is not to the liking of the Quartet (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain), mostly Sunni, especially Saudi Arabia, with whom it maintains an obvious confrontation - subsidiary, not direct - for the predominant political and economic influence in the Persian region. In 2017, during his last visit to Riyadh, Donald Trump asked the countries of the region to isolate Iran because of the military and nuclear tension it is experiencing with the United States. Qatar acts as an intermediary and a turning point between the US and Iran, trying to open the way for dialogue in relation to the sanctions implemented by the American president.

Doha and Tehran have a strong economic relationship around the oil and gas industry, as they share the world's largest gas field, the South Pars-North Dame, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have followed the US lead in their foreign policy agendas towards Iran. One of the conditions the Quartet demands of Qatar to lift the economic and diplomatic blockade is the cessation of bilateral relations with Iran, reinstated in 2016, and the establishment of trade conduct with Iran in compliance with U.S.-imposed sanctions.

V. Al Jazeera Television Network

Founded in 1996 by Hamad Al Thani, Al Jazeera has become the most influential digital media in the Middle East. It positioned itself as a promoter of the Arab Spring and was present in the climates of violence in the different countries. As a result, it has been criticized by Qatar's antagonists for its positions close to Islamist movements, for acting as a mouthpiece for the fundamentalist messages of the Muslim Brotherhood and for becoming a vehicle for Qatar's diplomacy. Its closure was one of the requirements requested of Qatar by the Quartet to lift the economic blockade, the transit of people and the opening of airspace.

The United States accuses the network of being the mouthpiece of extremist Islamic groups since the former head of Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, began to disseminate his communiqués through it; of being anti-Semitic in nature; and of adopting a position favorable to the armed group Hamas in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In 2003, Saudi Arabia, after several failed attempts to cause the closure of the Qatari television network, decided to create a competing television station, Al Arabiya TV, initiating a disinformation war and vying over which of the two has the most reliable information.

VI. The position of Washington and London

On the one hand, the United States seeks to have a good relationship with Qatar, since there it has the large military base of Al-Udeid, which has an excellent strategic position in the Persian Gulf and more than ten thousand troops. In April 2018, the Qatari emir visited Donald Trump at the White House, who said that the relationship between the two countries "works extremely well" and considers Tamim a "great friend" and "a great gentleman". Tamim Al Thani has stressed that Qatar will not tolerate people who finance terrorism and confirmed that Doha will cooperate with Washington to stop the financing of terrorist groups.

The contradiction is clear: Qatar confirms its commitment to the fight against the financing of terrorist groups, but its track record does not back it up. So far, it has been proven that the small country has helped these groups in one way or another, through political asylum and protection of its members, direct or indirect financing through controversial negotiation techniques, or by promoting political interests that have not been to the liking of its great geopolitical rival, Saudi Arabia.

The United States is the great mediator and impediment to direct confrontation in the tension between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Both countries are members of the United Nations and allies of the United States. Europe and American presidents have been aware that a direct confrontation between the two countries could prove fatal for the region and their commercial interests related to oil and the Strait of Hormuz.

On the other hand, the UK government has remained aloof in taking a position in the Qatar diplomatic crisis. Emir Tamim Al Thani owns 95% of The Shard building, 8% of the London Stock Exchange and Barclays bank, as well as apartments, stocks and shares in companies in the English capital. Qatari investments in the capital of the United Kingdom total around sixty billion dollars.

In 2016, former British Prime Minister David Cameron showed concern about the future when the London mayoralty was held by Sadiq Khan, a Muslim, who has appeared on more than one occasion alongside Sulaiman Gani, an imam who supports the Islamic State and the Muslim Brotherhood.[10] In 2016, former British Prime Minister David Cameron showed concern about the future when the mayoralty of London was held by Sadiq Khan, a Muslim, who has appeared on more than one occasion alongside Sulaiman Gani, an imam who supports the Islamic State and the Muslim Brotherhood.[10

VII. Civil war in Yemen

Since the start of foreign military intervention in Yemen's civil war in 2015, at the request of Yemeni President Rabbu Mansur Al Hadi, Qatar has aligned itself alongside the states of the Cooperation committee for the Arab States of the Gulf (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), backed by the United States, the United Kingdom and France, to create an international coalition to help restore Al Hadi's legitimate power, which has been under siege since the coup d'état promoted by Houthis and forces loyal to former president Ali Abdala Saleh. However, Qatar has been accused of clandestinely supporting the Houthi rebels[11], and its actions are viewed with great caution by the rest of the committee countries.

Today, the Yemeni civil war has become the largest humanitarian crisis since 1945.[12] On August 11, 2019, South Yemeni separatists, backed by the United Arab Emirates, which initially supports al-Hadi's government, seized the port city of Aden, storming the presidential palace and military instructions . The president, in exile in Riyadh, has called the attack by his allies a coup against the institutions of the legitimate state, and has received direct support from Saudi Arabia. After a few days of tension, the separatists of the Southern Movement left the city.

The Emirates and Saudi Arabia, together with other neighboring states such as Bahrain and Kuwait, of Sunni belief, seek to halt the advance of the Houthis, who dominate the capital, Sana'a, and a possible expansion of Shi'ism promoted by Iran through the conflict in Yemen. Likewise, the great geopolitical interest of the Strait of Bab el Mandeb, which connects the Red Sea with the Arabian Sea and is a great alternative to the commercial flow of the Strait of Hormuz, off the coast of Iran, has an influence. This interest is shared with France and the United States, which seeks to eliminate the presence of ISIS and Al Qaeda from the region.

The day after the capture of Aden, and in the midst of Eid Al-Adha celebrations, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed met in Mecca with Saudi King Salman bin Abdelaziz and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, in an apparent effort to downplay the significance of the event, call on the warring parties in the city to safeguard Yemen's interests, and reaffirm regional cooperation and unity of interests between the UAE and Saudi Arabia.[13] The Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi has posted on his official Twitter accounts comments and photographs of the meeting in which a positive attitude can be seen on the faces of the leaders.

A contrario sensu, if the partnership and understanding on the Yemen issue between the two countries were total, as they claimed, there would be no need to create an apparently "ideal" image through official communications from the Abu Dhabi government and the publication of images on social networks.

Although the UAE supports the separatists, the latest developments have caused a sense of mistrust, opening the possibility that the southern militias are disregarding Emirati directives and beginning to execute a diary of their own in line with their own particular interests. Likewise, foreign sources are beginning to speak of a civil war within a civil war. Meanwhile, Qatar remains close to Iran and cautious about the status the southwest of the Arabian Peninsula.

▲ Almagro's speech at the opening of the 49th OAS General Assembly in Medellin, Colombia in June 2019 [OAS].

COMMENTARY / Ignacio Yárnoz

At the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) held in Medellin last June, the tensions and divisions that currently exist within this international organization became evident. In the first place, these discrepancies were evident in the Venezuelan issue, an issue that took center stage at the meeting with the presentation of migration reports, criticism of the Bolivarian regime and the presence of the Venezuelan delegation representing the Guaidó government headed by Ambassador Gustavo Tarre.

These facts were met with the rejection of most of the Caribbean countries, who left the conference room at the presentation of the reports and declared their refusal to comply with any OAS resolution in which the Venezuelan delegation voted in favor. And the fact is that, in the opinion of the Caribbean countries, Venezuela formally left the organization in March and the presence of Guaidó's delegation as the legitimate representative of Venezuela contravenes international law and the principles of the OAS Charter, given that it represents a government without effective control of the territory or legal legitimacy. But the Caricom countries were not the only ones to express their protest, the delegation of Uruguay also left the conference room and that of Mexico expressed its displeasure at the presence of the Venezuelan opposition as a delegation of plenary session of the Executive Council right.

The controversy, however, not only revealed discrepancies on how to deal with the Venezuelan crisis, but also reflected another underlying reality, which is that Luis Almagro's candidacy for reelection as University Secretary of the organization hangs in the balance.

In December of last year, Uruguay's Almagro formally announced that, at the request of Colombia and the United States, he had decided to run for reelection with the assurance of having the necessary votes. Since then, however, the re-election landscape has darkened. The vote will take place in the first semester of 2020 and to get re-elected Almagro needs at least 18 votes from the 35 countries of the OAS (if we include Cuba, even if it does not actively participate).

Variables

The future of Almagro, who came to the position in May 2015, depends on several factors that will unfold this year. Mainly, the general elections in Argentina, Canada, Uruguay and Bolivia, which will be held between October and November. However, there are other variables that may also affect his reelection, such as the support he obtains from the Lima group countries or the possible division among Caricom members in this regard. Below, we will review these assumptions one by one.

In the case of the Bolivian elections, Almagro has already played his cards and has been accused of having used a double standard by harshly criticizing the Maduro regime, but then not being critical of the possibility of re-election of Evo Morales for a third time. Such re-election is supposedly not legal according to the Bolivian Constitution and was vetoed by the population in a referendum, but President Evo Morales has ignored it under the pretext that preventing him from being a candidate again is against human rights, an argument later endorsed by the Bolivian Supreme Court. The administrative office General administrative office of the OAS, despite not agreement with the "right to be reelected", did not raise any criticism or position against such election supposedly due to the possible Bolivian vote in favor of Almagro, something that could happen if Evo Morales is finally reelected but is not completely certain either. However, if not, he has already earned the animosity of civil service examination candidates such as Carlos Mesa or Óscar Ortiz and opposition leader Samuel Doria Medina who, if elected, would not vote for him.

Regarding Guatemala, the first round of the presidential elections gave the victory to Sandra Torres (22.08% of the votes) and Alejandro Giammattei (12.06% of the votes), who will face each other in the second round on Sunday, August 11. Should Torres be elected, she may align her stance with that of Mexico by adopting a less interventionist policy towards Venezuela and therefore against Almagro. In the case of the victory of Giammattei, a center-right politician, it is likely that he will align his positions with Almagro and vote in favor of him. Guatemala has always been aligned with US positions, so it is doubtful that the country would vote against a candidacy supported by Washington, although not impossible.

As for Argentina and Canada, the position will depend on whether the winning candidate in their respective elections is conservative or progressive. Even in the case of Canada, the possibility of a rejection of Almagro is open regardless of the political orientation of the new government, since while Canada has been critical of the Maduro regime, it has also criticized the internal organization of the OAS under the current University Secretary As far as Argentina is concerned, there is a clear difference between the presidential candidates: while Mauricio Macri would represent continuity in support for Almagro, the Alberto Fernández-Cristina Kirchner ticket would clearly represent a rejection.

Uruguay represents a curious case of how internal politics and political games affect even members of the same party. We must not forget that Luis Almagro was a minister in the government of Pepe Mujica and that his first candidacy for University Secretary was presented by Uruguay. However, given the division in the political training to which he belonged, Frente Amplio, he earned some enemies such as those of the current government of Tabaré Vázquez. That is why Uruguay has been so critical of Luis Almagro despite being a compatriot and fellow party member. However, we should not doubt that he will also have his friends in the party that will change Uruguay's position. If so, no matter which candidate is elected (Luis Lacalle Pou for the National Party or Daniel Martinez for the Frente Amplio), Almagro would have a guaranteed vote: that of the right wing of the National Party by having a more critical thesis with Maduro (in fact, they recognized the Guaidó government as a party and criticized Uruguay's neutrality), or that of the left wing of the Frente Amplio by the contacts Almagro may have, although the latter is still a hypothesis given that the most extreme wing of the party is the one that still has the majority of votes within the Frente Amplio.

Another applicant

However, Almagro's chances for reelection could be frustrated if another aspirant presents his candidacy who could win the sympathy of the Lima group , created in August 2017 and integrated by a dozen countries of the Americas to coordinate their strategy in relation to Venezuela. Peru sounds like the one that could possibly present a candidate: Hugo de Zela, a Peruvian diplomat with 42 years of degree program who in April was appointed Peru's ambassador in Washington and who has played a very relevant role within the Lima group as coordinator. In addition, De Zela knows the structure of the OAS since he has served as chief of staff of the administrative office General on two occasions: first, between 1989 and 1994, when the head of the organization was the Brazilian Joao Clemente Baena Soares; and then between 2011 and 2015, with the Chilean José Miguel Insulza. This candidate, apart from his wide political experience, has the advantage of having been coordinator of the Lima group , which could give guarantees about the partnership between this group and the OAS on the Venezuelan issue.

If De Zela decides to run, the Lima group could break up and split its votes, which could favor the interests of the 14 countries of the Caribbean Community (Caricom), which usually vote as a bloc and have been dissatisfied with Almagro's management of the Venezuelan crisis. In fact, Caricom is already thinking of presenting a candidate that takes into account the interests of these countries, mainly climate change. The names that sound among Caricom members are the ambassador to the OAS of Antigua and Barbuda, Ronald Sanders, or the representative of Barbados to the UN, Liz Thompson.

However, there remains one hope in the Caricom community for Almagro. Saint Lucia, Haiti, Jamaica and the Bahamas broke ranks at the time of voting for the admission of Ambassador Gustavo Tarre appointed by the Guaidó government to represent Venezuela before the OAS (although technically what they supported is that he be appointed as "permanent representative appointed by the National Assembly, pending new elections and the appointment of a democratically elected government"). These four countries, although with a more moderate position than that of the Lima group , joined their position by accepting the designation of said representative with the aforementioned nuance. This is the third occasion so far this year that Caricom has broken ranks on the Venezuelan topic . This could give the University Secretary a trump card with which to play in order to obtain the support of some of these four countries, although he will need skillful negotiation techniques and give something in exchange to these countries, whether it be positions in the general administrative office or benefits in new programs and scholarships for integral development or climate change, for example.  

In conclusion, in the best possible scenario for Almagro and assuming that no country of the Lima group presents an alternative candidate , the candidacy for reelection of the current University Secretary would have 12 assured votes, 4 negotiable votes from St. Lucia, Jamaica, Haiti and Bahamas and 5 pending elections (Guatemala, Canada, Uruguay, Argentina and Bolivia). It is clear that Mexico, a large part of Caricom (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago) and Nicaragua will vote against. In addition, we must add the fact that any candidacy can be presented up to 10 minutes before the extraordinary General Assembly, which gives even more room for political games in the shadows and last-minute surprises. As we can see, it is a very difficult status for the University Secretary and it will surely mean more than one headache in this arithmetic of votes to get the position. Undoubtedly a fight for the position that will give much to talk about between now and February 2020.

[I. H. Daalder & James M. Lindsay, The Empty Throne. America's Abdication of Global Leadership. Public Affairs. New York, 2018. 256 p.]

review / Salvador Sánchez Tapia

The arrival of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States in January 2017 has unleashed a significant flow of publishing house that continues to this day, and in which numerous pens question, in substance and form, the new tenant of the White House from different angles.

In this case, two authors from the field of American think tanks , close to Barack Obama - one of them served during his presidency as US ambassador to NATO - offer us a very critical view of President Trump and his management at the head of the US executive branch. With the solid support of numerous quotes, statements and testimonies collected from the media, and in an agile and attractive language, they compose the portrait of an erratic, ignorant - in one passage they highlight without palliation his "ignorance on many issues, his unwillingness to accept advice from others, his impulsiveness, and his lack of critical thinking skills" -, arrogant and irresponsible president.

The authors of The Empty Throne argue that President Trump's deeds and words show how he has broken with the traditional line of U.S. foreign policy since Franklin Delano Roosevelt, based on the exercise of leadership oriented toward collective security, the opening of global markets and the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and which has result highly beneficial to the United States. Trump, they argue, would have abdicated that leadership, embracing instead another purely transactional policy, made by a simple calculation of interest.

This new way of conceiving international politics, based on the logic of competition and domination, would be justified by the Trump administration with the argument that the old one has been highly pernicious for the United States, since it has allowed friends and allies to obtain important profits at the expense of American prosperity.

Paraphrasing Trump's America First campaign slogan, the authors argue that this new policy will result, rather, in an America Alone, and will instead benefit China, assuming that it will be to China that nations will look for a new leader.

To support their thesis , the authors review the management of Donald Trump in the year and a half between his inauguration in early 2017 and the book's publication date in 2018. In their argument they review the management of the presidents the nation has had since the end of World War II, and compare it to that put in internship by the Trump administration.

An important part of the criticism is directed at the controversial presidential style displayed by Donald Trump, which has been evident even before the elections, and which is evident in facts such as the withdrawal of the usual label in the world of international relations, especially hurtful in his relations with friends and allies; the lack of interest shown in coordinating an orderly transition with the Obama administration, or the making of certain decisions against his national security team or even without consulting its members.

Not to acknowledge these facts would be to deny the evidence and question the inescapable reality of the unease that this new way of dealing with nations with which America shares so many interests and values, such as those of the European Union, or others such as Japan, Canada or Australia, firm allies of the United States for decades, produces in many people. However, there is room for some criticism of the arguments.

First of all, and leaving aside the lack of time perspective to make afinal evaluation of Trump's presidency, the authors make a comparison between the first year and a half of the current president's term and those of all his predecessors since the end of World War II to demonstrate Trump's return to the America First policy prevailing until Roosevelt. This contrast requires certain nuances because, based on the common denominator of the international leadership strategy that all of Trump's predecessors practiced, the country experienced in this time moments of greater unilateralism such as that of George W. Bush's first term, along with others of lesser global presence of the country such as, perhaps, those of the presidencies of Eisenhower, Ford, Carter and, even, Obama.

In Obama's case, moreover, the fundamental differences with Trump are not as great as they seem. Both presidents are trying to manage, in order to mitigate, the loss of relative American power caused by the long years of military presence in the Middle East and the rise of China. It is not that Trump believes that the United States should abandon the ideas of global leadership and multinational interaction; in fact, while he is accused of leaving traditional allies to their fate, he is reproached for his rapprochement, almost complicity, with others such as Saudi Arabia and Israel. Rather, what he intends is to exercise leadership, but, of course, dictating his conditions so that they are favorable to the United States. From inspirational leadership to leadership by imposition.

The question is, is it possible to maintain leadership under these conditions? According to the authors, no. In fact, as a consequence of this "abdication of American leadership", they offer two scenarios: the return to a world in which no nation leads, or the emergence of another nation - China, obviously - that will fill the vacuum created by this abdication.

The authors do not consider a third option: that of traditional allies adapting to the new style of leadership, albeit reluctantly, out of necessity, and in the confidence that one day, the Trump presidency will be history. This idea would be consistent with the premise set out in the book, and with which we concur, that American leadership remains indispensable, and with the very recognition at the end of the book that there is some substance to the grievances that Trump presents and that the president's attitude is leading many of America's friends and allies to reconsider their defense spending, to rethink the rules of international trade to make them more palatable to America, and to take a more active role in resolving major global challenges.

Time will tell which of the three options will prevail. Even considering the challenges of attention with the current White House incumbent, the United States remains bound to its traditional partners and allies by a dense network of common interests and, above all, shared values that transcend individuals and will outlast them.

[Amil Saikal, Iran Rising: The survival and Future of the Islamic Republic. Princeton University Press. Princeton, 2019. 344 p.]

review / Ignacio Urbasos Arbeloa

Since its constitution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been a conflictive actor, isolated and misunderstood by the international community and, to a greater extent, by its regional neighbors. Its origin, revolutionary in character and antagonistic to the Shah's pro-Western model , completely changed the geopolitics of the Middle East and the role of the US in the region. Both the Hostage Crisis and the bloody war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq left deep wounds in Iran's foreign relations. More than 40 years after the Revolution, the country remains in a dynamic that makes the normalization of its international relations impossible, always under the threat of armed conflict or economic sanctions. In this book, Amin Saikal describes in depth the ideological and political nature of the Ayatollahs' regime with the intention of generating a better understanding of the motivations and factors that explain their behavior.

The first chapters develop the concept of governance devised by Ayatollah Imam Khomeini, known as Velayat-E Faqih or Governance of the Guardian of Islam. A model defended by a non-majority faction of the revolution that managed to impose itself by the charisma of its leader and the enormous repression on the rest of the political groups. The political system resulting from the 1978 Revolution tries to confluence the Shiite teachings of Islam and a representative model with institutions such as the Majlis (parliament) or the President that to some extent simulates Western liberal democracy. This model is unique and has never been imitated despite the efforts of the Islamic Republic to export it to the rest of the Muslim world.

In the internship, the system has proven to subject Iranian politics to schizophrenia, with a constant struggle between the power of the clerics -Supreme Leader and committee of Guardians- versus the executive and legislative power elected through elections. This tension, dubbed as Jihadi-Itjihadi (conservatism-flexibility) by Khomeini himself, has result be a resounding failure. The lack of clarity in the roles that religious groups play in the system results in unlimited power to repress and eliminate political opponents, as the house arrest of Khatami or Moussaoui demonstrates. This struggle generates duplicities at all levels with the omnipresence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) in the armed forces, intelligence, social services and public enterprises. The lack of political transparency generates corruption and inefficiencies that hinder the development of an Economics that does not lack the human capital and natural resources to prosper.

Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the evolution of the system after the death of leader Khomeini in 1988 and the end of the war against Iraq. This new context allowed new ideas to entrance the Iranian political discussion . The controversial appointment of the ultraconservative Ali Khamenei in 1989 as the new Supreme Leader meant reinforcing authoritarianism and the rigidity of religious power, but now without the undisputed leadership exercised by Khomeini. The presidency of Rafsanjani, a pragmatic conservative, marked the beginning of a trend within Iran that advocated normalizing the country's international relations.

However, it was Khatami who, since 1997, bet on a reconversion of the system towards a real democracy respecting Human Rights. His staff bid to improve relations with the US failed when it was met with excessive distrust on the part of the Bush Administration. Not even Iran's exemplary response to the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York with an official condemnation of the attack and even a minute's silence observed by 60,000 people in Tehran on September 13, 2001 was enough for G.W. Bush to reconsider Iran as a part of the United States. Bush to reconsider Iran as part of the famous Axis of Evil that it constituted along with Syria, North Korea and Sudan. Despite achieving an average economic growth of 5% of GDP under his presidency, the lack of reciprocity from the international community created a complete rift between the reformist president and the conservative faction led by the Supreme Leader.

The period from 2005 to 2013 was marked by the presidency of the ultra-conservative Ahmadinejad, who ended without Khamenei's confidence after failing in economic subject and bringing Iran to the brink of armed conflict. During this period the IRGC grew to dominate a large part of the ministries and 70% of Iran's GDP. His controversial reelection in 2009 with accusations of fraud by the civil service examination generated the green movement, the largest protests since 1979, which were harshly repressed.

Rouhani's arrival in 2013 could have been a historic occasion by aligning for the first time since 1988 the vision of a moderate president with that of the Supreme Leader. Rouhani, a pragmatic moderate, assumed the position with the goals of improving the living conditions of Iranians, reconciling relations with the West, increasing minority rights and relaxing control over society. In foreign policy subject , the Supreme Leader assumed the need to reach an agreement on the nuclear program knowing that, in its absence, an economic improvement in Iran would be very difficult. The JCPOA, although imperfect, allowed for a rapprochement between the West and Iran. The arrival of Donald Trump blew up the agreement and with it the harmony between Supreme Leader Khamenei and Rouhani, who now faces a growing conservative civil service examination as he considers his foreign policy a failure.

For the author, it is essential to understand the battle between elected institutions and religious institutions. Iranian politics works like a pendulum between the dominance of conservative factions protected by the religious and reformist factions boosted by elections. If benefits are offered to reformist moderates when they are in power, the chances of bringing about political change in Iran are greater than if conservatives are treated as harshly, argues Amin Saikal in the fourth and fifth chapters. Moreover, there is a correlation between those who know the West and those who do not. Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, the main representatives of the hardliners, have never visited Europe or the USA, while Rouhani, Khatami or Sharif are fluent in English and Western culture.

With a population under 30 years of age accounting for 50% of the total and a growing modernization of society in Tehran, the demands for reforms seem unstoppable. According to Amin Saikal, an intransigent policy with Iran when there is a willingness to open up only generates mistrust and reinforces the most conservative positions. Trump's policy with Iran, he concludes, demonstrates a lack of knowledge and understanding of its society and political system.

▲ Dubai Air Visa [Pixabay].

essay / Sebastián Bruzzone Martínez

I. ORIGIN AND FOUNDATION OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

In ancient times, the territory was inhabited by Arab tribes, nomadic farmers, artisans and traders, accustomed to plundering merchant ships of European powers that sailed along its coasts. Islam became established in the local culture in the 7th century AD, and Sunni Islam in the 11th century AD. From 1820, the United Kingdom signature a peace treaty with the leaders or sheikhs of the area to put an end to piracy. In 1853, both parties signed another agreement by which the United Kingdom established a military protectorate in the territory. And in 1892, due to the pretensions of Russia, France and Germany, they signed a third agreement that guaranteed the monopoly on trade and exploitation only for the British. The Emirate zone was renamed from "Pirates' Coast" to "Trucial States " (the current seven United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain).

During World War I, the airfields and ports of the Gulf played an important role in the development the conflict in favor of the United Kingdom. At the end of World War II in 1945, the League of Arab States (Arab League) was created, formed by those who enjoyed some colonial independence. The organization attracted the attention of the Truce States.

In 1960, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was created, with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Venezuela as founders and headquartered in Vienna, Austria. The seven emirates, which would later form the United Arab Emirates, joined in 1967.

In 1968, the United Kingdom withdrew its military force from the region, and the Truce States organized the Federation of Emirates of the Persian Gulf, but it failed when Qatar and Bahrain became independent. In the following years, the exploitation of the enormous oil wells discovered years earlier began.

In 1971, six Emirates became independent from the British Empire: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Qaywayn and Fujairah, forming the federation of the United Arab Emirates, with a legal system based on the 1971 constitution. Once consolidated, they joined the Arab League on June 12. The seventh emirate, Ras Al-Khaimah, joined the following year.

After the 1973 oil crisis, the UAE began to accumulate enormous wealth, because OPEC members decided not to export any more oil to the countries that supported Israel during the Yom Kippur war. Today, 80-85% of the UAE population is immigrant. The UAE became the third largest oil producer in the Middle East, after Saudi Arabia and Libya.

II. POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEM

By the constitution of 1971, the United Arab Emirates is constituted as a federal monarchy. Each State is governed by its emirdegree scroll of the sheikhs, Sheikh). Each emirate has great political, legislative, economic and judicial autonomy, each having its own executive councils, always in correspondence with the federal government. There are no political parties. The federal authorities are composed of:

Supremecommittee of the Federation or of Emirs: it is the supreme authority of the State. It is composed of the governors of the 7 Emirates, or those who replace them in their absence. Each Emirate has one vote in the deliberations. It establishes the general policy in the matters entrusted to the Federation, and studies and establishes the objectives and interests of the Federation.

President and Vice-President of the Federation: elected by the Supreme committee from among its members. The President exercises, by virtue of the Constitution, important powers such as the presidency of the Supreme committee ; signature laws, decrees or resolutions ratified and dictated by the committee; appointment of the President of the committee of Ministers and of the Vice-President and Ministers; acceptance of their resignations or their suspension from office at the proposal of the President of the committee of Ministers. The Vice-President exercises all presidential powers in his absence.

By tradition, not recognized in the Emirati Constitution, the sheikh of Abu Dhabi is the president of the country, and the sheikh of Dubai is the vice-president and Prime Minister.

Thus, Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, has been President of the United Arab Emirates since 2004, and Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Sheikh of Dubai, has been Prime Minister and Vice President since 2006.

committee of Ministers: composed of the Chairman of the committee of Ministers, the Vice-Chairman and the Ministers. It is the executive organ of the Federation. Supervised by the President and the Supreme committee , its mission statement is to manage the domestic and foreign affairs, which are of skill of the Federation by virtue of the Constitution and federal laws. It has certain prerogatives such as monitoring the implementation of the general policy of the Federal State at home and abroad; proposing draft federal laws and submitting them to the Supreme committee of the Federation; supervising the execution of federal laws and resolutions, and the implementation of international treaties and conventions signed by the UAE.

Federal National Assembly: what would resemble a congress, but is a consultative body only. It is composed of 40 members: twenty elected by the eligible citizens, by census suffrage, of the UAE through general election, and the other half by the rulers of each Emirate. In December 2018, the president, Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, issued a decree providing for fifty percent of the Federal National Assembly (or FNC) to be filled by women, with the intention of "further empowering Emirati women and strengthening their contributions to the development of the country." It is distributed with seats: Abu Dhabi (8); Dubai (8); Sharjah (6); Ras Al Khaimah (6); Ajman (4); Umm Al Quwayn (4); and Fujairah (4). Federal and financial bills are referred to it before being submitted to the President of the Federation for submission to the Supreme committee for ratification. The Government is also responsible for notifying the Assembly of international covenants and treaties. The Assembly studies and makes recommendations on matters of a public nature.

The Federal Administration of Justice: The judicial system of the United Arab Emirates is based on Sharia or Islamic law. article 94 of the Constitution states that justice is the basis of government and reaffirms the independence of the judiciary, stipulating that there is no authority over judges except the law and their own conscience in the exercise of their duties. The federal justice system is composed of courts of first instance written request and courts of appeal (civil, criminal, commercial, contentious-administrative...).

There is also a Federal Supreme Court, consisting of a president and vocal judges, with powers such as reviewing the constitutionality of federal laws and unconstitutional acts.

In addition, the local Administration of Justice will hear all judicial cases that do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Administration. It has three levels: first written request, appeal and cassation.

The Constitution provides for the existence of an Attorney General, who presides over the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, in charge of filing position statements in crimes committed in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Criminal Code and procedure .

In order to promote understanding between federal and local administrations, a Judicial Coordination committee , chaired by the Minister of Justice and composed of presidents and directors of the State's judicial bodies, has been in place since 2007. [1]

It is important to know that the Constitution of the Federation has guarantees of reinforcement and protection of human rights in its Chapter III of freedoms, rights and public obligations, such as the principle of equality on the grounds of extraction, place of birth, religious belief or social position, although it does not mention gender, and social justice (art. 25); freedom of citizens (art. 26); freedom of opinion and guarantee of the means to express it (art. 30); freedom of movement and residency program (art. 29); religious freedom (art.32); right to privacy (arts. 31 and 36); family rights (art. 15); right to social welfare and social security (art. 16); right to Education (art. 17); right to health care (art. 19); right to work (art. 20); right to association and to form associations (art. 33); right to property (art. 21); and right to complain and right to litigate before the courts (art. 41).[2].

At first glance, it seems that these rights and guarantees contained in the 1971 Emirati Constitution are similar to those that would be found in a normal European and Western Constitution. However, they can be nuanced and are not as effective in the internship. On the one hand, because most of them include references to the specific and applicable law, saying"...within the limits set by law; in accordance with the provisions set by law; or in cases where so provided by law". In this way, the legislator will ensure that these rights are consistent and compatible with Sharia or Islamic law, or with political interests, as the case may be.

On the other hand, these rights and guarantees fully protect Emirati nationals. Considering that 80-85% of the population is foreign, 15% of the total population of the State would be protected in a fully constitutional manner. By Federal Law No. 28/2005 concerning the status of staff, the law applies to all citizens of the State of the United Arab Emirates provided that there are no special provisions for non-Muslims among them, specific to their confession or religion. Likewise, its provisions apply to non-nationals when they are not bound by the laws of their own country.

Legal safeguards include the Federal Penal Code (Act No. 3/1987); the Code of Criminal procedure (Act No. 35/1992); Federal Act on the Regulation of Prison Reform Institutions (No. 43/1992); Federal Act on the Regulation of Labor Relations (No. 8/1980); Federal Act on Combating Trafficking in Persons (No. 51/2006); Federal Act on staff Status (No. 28/2005); Federal Act on Juvenile Offenders and Homeless Persons (No. 9/1976); Federal Act on Publications and Publishing (No. 15/1980); Federal Act on the Regulation of Human Organs (No. 15/1993); Federal Act on Associations Declared to be in the Public Interest (No. 2/2008); Federal Act on Social Welfare (No. 2/2001); Federal Act on Pensions and Social Insurance (No. 7/1999); Federal Act on Environmental Protection and development (No. 24/1999); and Federal Act on the Rights of Persons with Special Needs (No. 29/2006).

Military service of 9 months is compulsory for university men between 18 and 30 years of age, and of two years for those who do not have higher programs of study . For women, it is optional and subject to the agreement of their tutor. Although the country is not a member of NATO, the Emirates has decided to join the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) coalition, and to provide arms assistance in the war against the Islamic State.

In terms of international treaty guarantees and international cooperation, the UAE has made a great effort to include in its Constitution laws and principles protected by the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, being a member of the UN and adhering to its treaties: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1974), Convention on the Rights of the Child (1997), UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2007), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (2004); UN Convention against Corruption (2006), among others.

It has also ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Arab Charter on Human Rights, and conventions on the organization of work. It is a member of WHO, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, UNICEF, WIPO, World Bank and IMF. It is also bound by cooperation agreements with more than 28 international organizations of the United Nations carrying out advisory, technical and ministerial tasks.

They are members of the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic lecture , reinforcing and promoting Arab work in their regional activities and programs.

The Emirati police maintain public order and state security. The Ministry of Interior places human rights at the forefront of its priorities, focusing on justice, equality, fairness and protection. Members of the police force must commit to 33 standards of conduct before taking up their post. The Ministry of the Interior provides administrative units for citizens to monitor police activity and take the necessary measures. However, there is a certain distrust of foreigners towards the police. Most complaints come from Emirati nationals.

The Ministry of the Interior should provide diplomatic and consular missions with lists including data on their nationals held in penitentiary institutions.

III. SOCIAL SYSTEM

The Emirati government has promoted civil societies and national institutions such as the Emirates association for Human Rights (under Federal Law No. 6/1974), the General Women's Federation, association of Jurists, association of Sociologists, association of Journalists, General Administration for the Protection of Human Rights attached to the General Headquarters of the Dubai Police, Dubai Charitable Foundation for the Care of Women and Children, National Commission to Combat Human Trafficking, Social Support Center of the General Administration of Abu Dhabi Police, Zayed Charities Institution, Emirates Red average , Family development Institution, and the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation for Charitable and Humanitarian Works, and the Marriage Fund, among many others.

It is important to note that the development of political participation is following a progressive process. To date, there is a full and general election to appoint half of the members of the Federal National Assembly, by census suffrage, for Emirati citizens and by publication of lists.

Also, the importance of women in Emirati society is growing thanks to legislative and legal measures taken by the government to empower women, through membership of the Social development committee of the Economic and Social committee , to provide opportunities for women to actively participate in sustainable development , and the integration of women in government and private-business sectors (women make up 22.5% of the Assembly, 2006; expected to be 50% as of 2019 by decree)[3], and promoting female literacy to equalize it with male literacy. However, despite being signatories to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, in the internship they suffer discrimination in marriage and divorce proceedings. Fortunately, the Emirati legislation providing for the mistreatment of women and minor children by the husband or father was abolished as long as the aggression did not exceed the limits allowed by Islamic law. Also, once married, women must obey their husbands and be authorized by them to take up employment. Likewise, cohabitation between unmarried men and women and sexual relations outside marriage are forbidden under penalty of imprisonment. Polygamy is present even in the royal family.

As in the rest of the Arab countries, homosexuality is considered a serious crime and punishable by fines, imprisonment and deportation in the case of foreigners, although enforcement is very weak.

The media play an important role in Emirati society. They are supervised by the National Media committee , which acts largely as a censor. They have reached a high technical and professional level in the journalistic sector, with more than 1,000 specialized companies in the Dubai average City. However, journalism is controlled by the Federal Law on Press and Publications of 1980, and the Charter of Honor and Morals of the Journalistic Profession, which the heads of essay have signed. For example, some news that may be unfavorable to Islam or the government would never be published in domestic newspapers, but would be published in foreign newspapers (case of Jordan's Haya). Since 2007, by a decree of the committee of Ministers, the imprisonment of journalists in case they made mistakes during the exercise of their professional duties was prohibited. However, it ceased to apply with the entrance into force of the Law against cybercrime adopted in 2012.

The government is striving to improve work conditions, as the UAE is convinced that human beings have the right to enjoy adequate living conditions (housing, working hours, means, labor courts, health insurance, protective guarantees in labor disputes at the international cooperative level...). However, the "Sponsor" or "Kafala" system , whereby an employer exercises sponsorship of its employees, is still in force . Thus, there are cases in which the sponsor retains the passports of its employees during the term of the contract, which is illegal, but has never been investigated and punished by the government (case of the Saadiyat Island construction project ), despite being a signatory to UN conventions on work .

The latest Human development report for 2018 ranks the United Arab Emirates 34th out of 189 countries. Spain is ranked 26th. The State has ensured free and quality Education up to the university stage for all Emirati citizens, and the integration of disabled people. University and higher Education centers have been positively encouraged by the government, such as the United Arab Emirates University, Zayed University, or New York University in Abu Dhabi. Healthcare has improved considerably with the construction of hospitals and clinics, lowering mortality fees and increasing life expectancy to 77.6 years (2016). The state allocates money from the public coffers to social care for the most disadvantaged sectors of the Emirati population and for the elderly, widows, orphans or the disabled. It has also ensured that citizens have decent housing through government agencies such as the Ministry of Public Works, the Zayed Housing Program that offers interest-free mortgage loans, the Abu Dhabi Mortgage loan Agency, the Mohammed bin Rashid Institution for Housing that provides loans, and the Sharjah Public Works Agency.

In terms of religion, approximately 75% of the population is Muslim. Islam is the official religion of the United Arab Emirates. The government follows a tolerant policy towards other religions, and prohibits non-Muslims from interfering in Islamic Education . The evangelization of other religions is prohibited, and the internship of these religions must be carried out in authorized places.

On February 3, 2019, at the beginning of the Year of Tolerance, Pope Francis was received with the highest honors in Abu Dhabi by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Vice President and Emir of Dubai Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum, and Ahmed al Tayyeb, Grand Imam of Al-Azhar University and main Islamic theological reference, being the first time that the head of the Catholic Church set foot on the Arabian Peninsula. Likewise, the Pope officiated a mass in Zayed Sport City in front of 150,000 people, saying in his homily: "let us be an oasis of peace". The event was described by Mike Pompeo, US Secretary of State, as "a historic moment for religious freedom".

There are projects for the development of remote regions, which seek to modernize the infrastructure and services in those areas of the State that are farther away from population centers. Also, by virtue of Federal Law No. 47/1992, the Marriage Fund was created, whose goal is to encourage marriage between citizens and promote the family, which according to the government is the basic unit and fundamental pillar of society, offering financial subsidies to those citizens with limited resources in order to help them meet wedding expenses and contribute to achieving family stability in society.

IV. ECONOMICS

Since 1973, the UAE has undergone a huge transformation and modernization thanks to oil exploitation, which accounted for 80% of GDP at the time. In recent years, with the knowledge that oil will run out in less than 40 years, the government has diversified its Economics into financial services, tourism, trade, transport and infrastructure, with oil and gas making up only 20% of national GDP.

Abu Dhabi has 90% of the oil and gas reserves, followed by Dubai, and in small quantities in Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah. The country's oil policy is carried out through the Supreme Petroleum committee and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). The main foreign oil companies operating in the country are BP, Shell, ExxonMobil, Total, Petrofac or Partex, and the Spanish company CEPSA, of which the Emirati sovereign wealth fund Mubadala owns 80% of the business.

The borrowing capacity of financial companies was strongly negatively affected during the economic crisis of 2008. The entrance of large foreign private capital came to a standstill, as did investment in the property and construction sectors. The fall in property values forced liquidity to be restricted. In 2009, local companies were seeking moratorium agreements with their creditors on $26 billion in debt. The Abu Dhabi government provided a $5 billion bailout to reassure international investors.

Tourism and infrastructure is a success story for the country, especially in Dubai. 4] The construction of luxury tourist attractions such as the Palm Islands and the Burj al-Arab, and the good weather most of the year, has attracted Westerners and people from all over the world. According to the Emirati government, the tourism industry generates more money than oil does today. Major investments are being made in renewable energy, notably through Masdar, the government business , which has initiated theMasdar City project , the creation of a city powered solely by renewable energy.

V. DYNASTIES AND ROYAL FAMILIES. THE AL NAHYAN DYNASTY

The United Arab Emirates consists of seven Emirates and is ruled by six families:

Abu Dhabi: by the Al Nahyan family (Al Falahi House)

Dubai: by the Al Maktum family (Al Falasi House)

Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah: by the Al Qassimi Family

Ajman: by the Al Nuaimi family

Umm Al Quwain: by the Al Mualla family

Fujairah: by the Al Sharqi family

It is important to know the terminology used in the family tree of the Emirati royal families: "Sheikh" means sheikh, and an emir is a nobiliary degree scroll attributed to sheikhs. In the composition of the names, the proper name of the descendant is placed first, followed by the infix "bin" meaning "of", plus the proper name of his father, and the surname of the family. The infix is "bint" for females.

For example: Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan is the father of Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan.

It is frequent that marriages are celebrated between the ruling families of the different Emirates, intertwining dynasties, but the husband's surname will always prevail over the wife's in the name of the children. Contrary to the great European monarchies in which the reign is transmitted from father to son, in the Emirate families the power is transmitted first between brothers, by appointment, and as a second resource, to the sons. These positions of power must be ratified by the Supreme committee .

The Al Nahyan family of Abu Dhabi is a branch of the Al Falahi House. This is a royal house belonging to Bani Yas and is related to the Al Falasi House to which the Al Maktoum family of Dubai belongs. Bani Yas is known to be a very old tribal confederation of the Liwa Oasis region. There is little historical data on its exact origin. The Al Nahyan royal family is incredibly large, as each of the brothers has had several children and with different wives. The most important and recent governors of Abu Dhabi would be those who have been in power since 1971, when the United Arab Emirates consolidated as a country, ceasing to be a Truce State and British protectorate. They are:

Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan (1918-2004): was governor of Abu Dhabi from 1966 until his death. He collaborated closely with the British Empire to maintain the integrity of the territory in the face of Saudi Arabia's expansionist pretensions. He is considered the Father of the Nation and founder of the United Arab Emirates, along with his counterpart Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum of Dubai. Both pledged to form a Federation together with other rulers after the British military withdrawal. He was the first president of the United Arab Emirates, and was re-elected four times: 1976, 1981, 1986 and 1991. Zayed was characterized as sympathetic, peaceful and united with neighboring emirates, charitable in terms of donations, relatively liberal and permissive of private means. He was considered one of the richest men in the world by Forbes magazine, with a net worth of twenty billion dollars.

He died at the age of 86 and was buried at the Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque in Abu Dhabi. He was succeeded in the position by his first-born son Khalifa as governor and ratified president of the UAE by the Supreme committee .

He had six wives: Hassa bint Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, Sheikha bint Madhad Al Mashghouni, Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi, Mouza bint Suhail bin Awaidah Al Khaili, Ayesha bint Ali Al Darmaki, Amna bint Salah bin Buduwa Al Darmaki, and Shamsa bint Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Nahyan; and thirty children, of whom some are as follows:

Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1948-present): eldest son of the above, whose mother is Hassa bint Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, is the current governor of Abu Dhabi and president of the United Arab Emirates. His wife is Shamsa bint Suhail Al Mazrouei, with whom he has eight children. He also holds other positions: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, chairman of the Supreme Petroleum committee , and chairman of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority. He was educated at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in the UK. Previously, he was appointed Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi; Head of the Abu Dhabi Defense department , which would become the Emirates Armed Forces; Prime Minister, Abu Dhabi Chief of Staff, Minister of Defense and Finance; Second Deputy Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates and Chairman of the Abu Dhabi Executive committee . Dubai's Burj Khalifa is named after him, as he paid the money needed to complete its construction. He intervened militarily in Libya by sending the Air Force along with NATO, and pledged support for the democratic uprising in Bahrain in 2011.

According to a WikiLeaks leak, the U.S. ambassador describes him as "distant and uncharismatic character". He has been criticized for his spendthrift character (purchase of the Azzam yacht, scandal of the construction of the palace and purchase of territories in the Seychelles, the Panama Papers and the revelation of properties in London and front companies...).

In 2014, according to the official version, Khalifa suffered a stroke and underwent surgery. According to the government, he is stable, but has virtually disappeared from the public eye.

Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1961-present): brother of Khalifa, but whose mother is Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi. He is the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, deputy supreme commander of the Armed Forces, and entrusted with the execution of presidential affairs, receptions of foreign dignitaries and political decisions due to the President's poor health. Also, like Khalifa, he was educated at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. He has been an Officer in the Presidential Guard and a pilot in the Air Force. He is married to Salama bint Hamdan Al Nahyan, and has nine children.

He has been characterized by his activist foreign policy against Islamist extremism, and charitable characterpartnership with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation for vaccines in Afghanistan and Pakistan). International governments such as France, Singapore and the United States have invited Mohammed to various events and bilateral dialogues. He has even met Pope Francis twice (Rome, 2016; Abu Dhabi, 2019), promoting the Year of Tolerance.

In economic subject , he is the chairman of the sovereign wealth fund Mubadala and head of the Abu Dhabi committee for Economic development . He has been involved in billion-dollar economic stimulus C for the modernization of the country in the energy and infrastructure sectors.

She has also promoted women's empowerment by welcoming a delegation of women officers from the Arab Women's Military and Peacekeeping Program, who are preparing for United Nations peace operations. She has encouraged the presence of women in public services, and has pledged to meet regularly with female representatives of the country's institutions.

Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1955-present): Zayed's second son. He has six children. He is the son of Shamsa bint Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Nahyan. He was educated at Millfield School and Sandhurst Military Academy like his two previous brothers. He is the third deputy prime minister of the United Arab Emirates, a member of the Supreme Petroleum committee and a member of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority.

Hamdan bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1963-present): fifth son of Zayed, whose mother is Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi. He is married to Shamsa bint Hamdan bin Mohammed Al Nahyan. He was educated at the Sandhurst Military Academy. He held the position of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs until 2009. He is currently the emir's representative in the western region of Abu Dhabi. He holds a graduate in Political Science and Business Administration from the United Arab Emirates University.

Nahyan bin Mubarak al Nahyan (1951-present): son of Mubarak bin Mohammed Al Nahyan. He is the current head of the UAE Ministry of Tolerance since 2017. From 2016 to 2017, he was minister of culture and development of knowledge. He also dedicated years of his life to the establishment of higher Education centers such as the United Arab Emirates University (1983-2013), technical school of Technology (1988-2013), and Zayed University (1998-2013). He is also the chairman of Warid Telecom International, a telecommunications business , and the chairman of Abu Dhabi banking group , Union National Bank and United Bank Limited, among other companies.

Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1972-present): Ninth son of Zayed, whose mother is Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi. He is married to Al Jazia bint Saif bin Mohammed Al Nahyan, with whom he has five children. He has held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the United Arab Emirates since 2006. He holds a graduate in Political Science from the United Arab Emirates University. During his tenure, the UAE has experienced a great expansion in its diplomatic relations with countries in South America, South Pacific, Africa and Asia, and a consolidation with Western countries. He is a member of the country's National Security committee , Vice Chairman of the Permanent Border committee , Chairman of the National Media committee , Chairman of the board of Directors of the Emirates Youth development Foundation, Vice Chairman of the board of Directors of the Abu Dhabi Fund for development and Member of the board the National Defense high school He was Minister of Information and Culture from 1997 to 2006, and Chairman of Emirates average Incorporated.

Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1970-present): eighth son of Zayed, whose mother is Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi. He is married to two wives, Alia bint Mohammed bin Butti Al Hamed, and Manal bint Mohammed Al Maktoum, with whom he has six children in total. He has held the positions of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Presidential Affairs of the UAE since 2009. He is chairman of the Ministerial committee for Services, the Emirates Investment Authority and the Emirates Racing Authority. He is a member of the Supreme Petroleum committee and the Abu Dhabi Investment committee . He was educated at Santa Barbara Community College in the United States, and holds a B.A. in International Affairs from the United Arab Emirates University. He chairs the National Documentation and research Center and the Abu Dhabi Fund for development. He was chairman of First Gulf Bank until 2006.

He has a developed business vision. He is the owner of the English soccer team Manchester City, and co-owner of New York City of the MLS, an American professional soccer league. He is a member of the board of directors of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, has a 32% stake in Virgin Galactic, a 9.1% stake in Daimler, and owns the Abu Dhabi average Investment Corporation, through which he owns the English newspaper The National.

Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan(1968-present): twelfth son of Zayed, whose mother is Mouza bint Suhail Al Khaili. He has been Deputy Prime Minister since 2009 and Minister of Interior since 2004. His role is to ensure the internal protection and national security of the United Arab Emirates. He holds a graduate in Political Science from the United Arab Emirates University. He was Director General of the Abu Dhabi Police in 1995, and Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior in 1997, until his appointment as Minister.

Hazza bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1965-present): fifth son of Zayed, whose mother is Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi. He is married to Mozah bint Mohammed bin Butti Al Hamed, with whom he has five children. He is the Minister of National Security of the United Arab Emirates, Vice Chairman of the Executive committee of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and Chairman of the Emirates Identity Authority.

Nasser bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1967-2008): son of Zayed, whose mother is Amna bint Salah Al Badi. He was chairman of the department Planning and Economics of Abu Dhabi, and was an officer of the royal security. According to the official version, he died at the age of 41 when the helicopter in which he was traveling with his friends crashed off the coast of Abu Dhabi. He was buried at the Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed Mosque, and three days of mourning were declared throughout the UAE.

Issa bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1970-present): son of Zayed, whose mother is Amna bint Salah Al Badi. He is a prestigious real estate developer in the city of Dubai, but does not hold any political position in the government of the Emirates. He starred in a case in which, allegedly, in a leaked video, he himself tortured two Palestinians who were his business partners. The Emirati court declared in a final judgment that Issa was innocent because he was the victim of a conspiracy and sentenced the Palestinians to five years' imprisonment for drug use, recording, publication and blackmail. International observers sharply criticized the Emirati judicial system and called for an overhaul of the country's penal code.

From my point of view, and with the experience of having lived in the country, the United Arab Emirates is a very unknown country for the Spanish youth and has incredible professional opportunities due to the demand for foreign work , a very high quality of life at an affordable price, as salaries are quite high, and a strong and modernized administration and institutions. The culture shock is not very big, as the State makes sure to avoid discriminatory situations, unlike other Arab countries. I can say with full conviction that cultural tolerance is real. However, foreigners should keep in mind that it is not a western country, and it is recommended to respect the customs of the nation regarding dress, sacred places and public performances, and to know the basic Emirati law.

[Bruno Maçães, Belt and Road. A Chinese World Order. Penguin. Gurgaon (India), 2019. 227p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

Having covered the moment of literature devoted to present the novelty of the Chinese New Silk Road project , Bruno Maçães leaves aside many of the specific concretions of the Chinese initiative to deal with its more geopolitical aspects. This is why Maçães uses the name Belt and Road throughout the book, instead of its acronyms - OBOR (One Belt, One Road) or the more recently used BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) - because he is not so much referring to the layout of the transport connections as to the new world order that Beijing wants to shape.

Through this economic integration, according to Maçães, China could project power over two thirds of the world, including Central and Eastern Europe, in a process of geographic cohesion of Eurasia to which this Portuguese politician and researcher has already dedicated his previous work.

Compared to other essays on the New Silk Road, this one focuses a lot on India (this is the case in its general content, but also in this review we have used a special edition dedicated to that country, with a particular introduction).

Maçães grants India the role of core topic in the Eurasia integration project . If India decides not to participate at all and, instead, to go for the alternative promoted by the United States, together with Japan and Australia, then the Chinese design will not reach the dimension desired by Beijing. "If India decides that life in the Western order will be better than under alternative arrangements, the Belt and Road will have difficulty achieving its original ambition," the author says.

Maçães believes, however, that the West is not all that attractive to the subcontinent. In that Western order, India can only aspire to a secondary role, while the rise of China "offers it the exciting possibility of a genuinely multipolar, rather than merely multilateral, world in which India can legitimately hope to become an autonomous center of geopolitical power," at least on a par with a declining Russia.

Despite these apparent advantages, India will not go all the way to either side, Maçães predicts. "It will never join the Belt and Road because it could only agree to join China in a project that was new. And it will never join a US initiative to rival the Belt and Road unless the US makes it less confrontational." So, "India will keep everyone waiting, but it will never make a decision on the Belt and Road".

Without Delhi's participation, or even more, with resistance from the Indian leadership, neither the US nor China's vision can be fully realized internship, Maçães continues to argue. Without India, Washington may be able to preserve its current model of alliances in Asia, but its ability to compete on the scale that the Belt and Road does would collapse; for its part, Beijing is realizing that it alone cannot provide the financial resources needed for the ambitious project.

Maçães warns that China has "ignored and disdained" India's positions and interests, which may end up being "a major miscalculation". He believes that China's impatience to start building infrastructure, because of the need to demonstrate that its initiative is a success, "may become the worst enemy".

He ventures that the Chinese may correct the shot. "It is likely - perhaps even inevitable - that the Belt and Road will grow increasingly decentralized, less China-centric," he says, commenting that in the end such a new Chinese order would not be so different from the structure of the existing Washington-led world order, where "the US insists on being recognized as the state at the apex of the hierarchy of international power" and leaves some autonomy to each regional power.

While Maçães places India in a non-aligned status plenary session of the Executive Council, he does foresee an unequivocal partnership between India and Japan. In his view it is a "symbiotic" relationship, in which India sees Japan as its first source of technology, while Japan sees the Indian navy as "an indispensable partner in its efforts to contain Chinese expansion and safeguard freedom of navigation" in the region's seas.

As for Europe, Maçães sees it in the difficult position "of not being able to oppose an international economic integration project , while being equally incapable of joining as a mere participant" in the Chinese initiative, in addition to the germ of division that the project has already introduced into the European Union.

From Bangladesh to Pakistan and Djibouti

Despite the differences indicated above, Maçães believes that the relationship between China and India can develop positively, even if there is some element of latent conflict, encouraged by a certain mutual distrust. The commercial linkage of two such immense markets and production centers will generate economic ties "called to dominate" world Economics by the middle of this century.

This movement of goods between the two countries will make Bangladesh and Myanmar the center of a major trade corridor.

For its part, Pakistan, in addition to being a corridor for the exit to the Indian Ocean from western China, will be increasingly integrated into the Chinese production chain. In particular, it can supply raw materials and basic manufactures to the textile industry that China is developing in Xinjiang, its export gateway to Europe for goods that can optimize rail transport. The capital of that province, Urumqi, will become the fashion capital of Central Asia in the next decade, agreement to Maçães' forecast.

Another interesting observation is that the shrinking of Eurasia and the development of internal transport routes between the two extremes of the supercontinent may lead to the North Sea container ports (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hamburg) losing weight in the trade between Europe and China at the expense of a greater transit of those in the Mediterranean (Piraeus, in particular).

The author also ventures that Chinese infrastructure works in Cameroon and Nigeria can help facilitate connections between these countries and Doralé, the port that China manages in Djibouti, which, through these trans-African routes, could become "a serious rival" to the Suez Canal.

If in Djibouti China has its first, and for the moment only, military base outside its territory, it should be kept in mind that Beijing can give a possible military use to other ports whose management it has assumed. As Maçães reminds, China approved in 2016 a legal framework that obliges civilian companies to support military logistics operations requested by the Chinese Navy.

All these are aspects of a suggestive book that does not allow itself to be carried away by the determinism of China's rise, nor by an antagonistic vision that denies the possibility of a new world order. The work of a European who, although he served in the Portuguese Foreign Ministry as director General for Europe, is realistic about the weight of the EU in the design the world.