Global interest in this fashionable grain has brought additional income to Andean communities.

The localization of quinoa production, especially in Peru and Bolivia (together they account for almost 80% of world exports), has given these nations an unexpected strategic value. The high protein component of this pseudocereal makes it attractive to countries where food security is a priority.

▲ Quinoa field in the Andes of Bolivia [Michael Hermann-CC].

article / Elisa Teomiro

Quinoa, also known as quinoa (in Latin Chenopodium quinoa), is an ancestral grain that is more than 5,000 years old and was originally cultivated by the pre-Columbian Andean cultures. After the arrival of the Spaniards in America, it was partly displaced by the cereals brought from the peninsula. It does not belong to the grass family but to the family of the chenopodiaceae (spinach, chard or beets); therefore it is more correct to consider it as a pseudocereal.

It forms the basis of the diet of the Andean population of South America, especially in the high Andean areas of Bolivia and Peru (between the two countries they account for approximately 76% of the total quinoa Issue exported in the world, 46% Bolivia and 30% Peru). Today, due to its adaptation to different climates (it survives frost, high temperatures, lack of oxygen in the air, lack of water and high salinity), its production has diversified and more countries are producing it: Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, USA and Canada, in the American continent, as well as Great Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Sweden, Holland, Spain, Australia and the USSR, outside it.

Quinoa has gone from being a perfect unknown, for the majority of the non-American population, to undergoing a spectacular rise in a very short time. One of the reasons for this was the decision made by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to declare 2013 as the International Year of Quinoa. The FAO wanted to reward the great effort being made by the Andean peoples to conserve the grain in its natural state, as food for current and future generations. The activities carried out during that year made quinoa and its nutritional properties known to the world.

Price increase

The interest awakened by this grain tripled its price between 2004 and 2013, which curiously generated a discussion about a possible negative impact on the producing populations. Thus, it was alleged that the high demand for this crop by developed countries had turned quinoa into aarticle luxuryarticle " in producing countries, where it already cost more than chicken or rice. It was considered that this status could cause malnutrition in the Andean population, as they could not supplement their scarce per diem expenses with quinoa.

A follow-up on this issue subsequently showed that the quinoa boom was actually helping communities at source. A study by the International Trade Centre, a joint agency of the World Trade Organization and the United Nations based in Geneva, conducted over the 2014-2015 period, noted that quinoa consumption by developed countries was improving the livelihoods of small-scale producers; most of them women.

agreement to this study, rising prices between 2004-2013 caused both producers and consumers in the producing regions to benefit financially from trade. Thus, there was a 46% increase in their welfare in this period, measured through the value of goods and services consumed by households. The report also highlighted how, on the contrary, the 40% drop in the price of quinoa grain, suffered towards the end of 2015, caused a decline in the welfare of rural households (food consumption fell by 10% and wages by 5%). The study reached two clear conclusions: the sustained decline in Peru in quinoa consumption since 2005 was probably due more to changing consumer preferences due to globalization and increased product supply than to changes in grain prices; global quinoa consumption in developed countries undoubtedly contributed to the development resource-poor communities in the altiplano.

Production and trade

There are several reasons why this grain has become so attractive to consumers in Europe and the U.S.A., and increasingly also in China and Japan: its protein content is very high, between 14% and 18%, and they are also proteins of high biological value that would allow it to be a substitute for animal protein (it contains the 10 essential amino acids for human per diem expenses ). This factor, together with its high iron content, makes it an ideal pseudocereal for vegetarians; it does not contain gluten, so it can also be consumed by coeliacs; it has a low glycemic content, which allows its consumption by diabetics; its fiber and unsaturated fatty acid content (mainly linoleic acid) is high, so all those concerned about their health have an option in quinoa. It is also a source of vitamin E and B2 (riboflavin) and is high in calcium, phosphorus, magnesium, potassium and iron. For all these reasons, the FAO considers that its high nutritional value financial aid eradicate hunger and malnutrition.

The ranking of quinoa producing countries is headed by Bolivia (its 118,913 hectares of cultivation accounted for 60% of the total area of quinoa sown in the world in 2016), followed by Peru (64,223 hectares, representing 30% of the world area sown) and Ecuador (2,214 hectares) [Table 1]. From 1990 to 2014, the area planted with quinoa increased from 47,585 hectares to 195,342 hectares. The global value of exports increased from US$135.5 million in 2012 to US$321.5 million in 2015.

Regarding the export Issue in tons, Bolivia was the first country during 2012 (more than 25,000 tons), which represented, together with 2013 exports, an income for the country of US$80 million. In the same year, Peruvian quinoa exports exceeded 10,000T which represented an income for the country of US$38 million. In 2014, Peru took over and dominated the market also in 2015 and 2016 [Table 2].

The USA is the main importer of quinoa in the world, with 40%; it is followed by the European Union, with more than 30% of the total (France, Holland, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Belgium mainly) and then Canada. The average price per kilo of quinoa was US$3.2 in 2012 and US$6.2 in 2014. In 2015 it dropped to 5 dollars. Per capita consumption is logically led by the two main producers: Bolivia consumes 5.2 kilos and Peru 1.8 kilos, followed at a distance by Ecuador, with 332 grams per person.

In non-producing countries, quinoa was first introduced in the organic sector, with consumers concerned about healthier diets, although today it is no longer exclusive to this market. The largest consumer of quinoa per capita worldwide is Canada, with more than 180 grams, followed closely by the Netherlands; France and Australia consume between 120 and 140 grams. In Spain, consumption is still small, at around 30 grams. Global forecasts up to 2025 are that per capita consumption will reach 200 grams (an achievement that Canada is already within reach) and that even countries that traditionally consume rice, such as Japan and South Korea, will also embrace quinoa.

Quinoa production faces future problems in terms of both environmental and market subject . Before its boom in 2013, almost 60 different varieties of the grain were grown in the Andean highlands and almost all quinoa was organic. Today, rampant trade and large-scale production on large farms has reduced biodiversity to fewer than 20 different types.

market research forecasts commissioned by the Trade for Development Center in 2016 on current and future markets for quinoa point to a very likely doubling of the global market in ten years, especially with conventional quinoa produced not only in Peru, but also in Australia, the United States and Canada. The production of organic quinoa, produced by small farmers in the highlands, will remain relatively stable. Market skill will continue to be fierce, so farmers in the altiplano will have to seek measures that will allow them to maintain a niche market with certified organic quinoa, grown using traditional and fair trade methods.

Poland-Germany struggle to gain influence in the European region between the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Black Sea

The latest summit of the Three Seas Initiative (TMI) was attended by the President of the European Commission, which sample a hitherto incomplete endorsement from Brussels. It was also attendance by German representatives, although Germany is not part of this club of twelve Central and Eastern European nations. Poland, backed by the United States, wishes to lead the effort underway to reduce the region's energy dependence on Russian gas; in reaction, Germany has announced a bid, for the moment timid, to import liquefied gas from the United States.  

article / Paula Ulibarrena

On September 17 and 18, 2018, the third summit of the Three Seas Initiative, aimed at the economic development of the European Union (EU) area between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas, was held in Bucharest. The meeting was attended by nine heads of state, two presidents of national parliaments, a prime minister and a foreign minister, along with several senior European officials, led by the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Junker, and a large German representation, as well as U.S. leaders.

The Three Seas Initiative (TMI, known in English as BABS-Initiative: Baltic, Adriatic, Black Sea) was launched in 2015 and consists of twelve countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

According to the Polish Institute of Foreign Affairs, the European Union's initial reticence about the MTI seems to have been overcome, as the summit was endorsed by the European Commission and the Commissioner for Regional Policy of the European Parliament. The role of the MTI in cohesion and in strengthening the EU is thus recognized.

The importance of energy supply

One of the main aspects that ITM deals with is energy. Its goal is to have an agile access to energy, but also to ensure the supply from different points, so as not to depend on a single provider, and also to try to play a diversification role in the supply to other European regions. At present, its efforts are mainly focused on the so-called BRUA project , which aims to open up the possibility of transporting gas from the Caspian Sea area to Romania's southern border, and from there to Romania's northwestern border with Hungary.

BRUA is an acronym for Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria, and aims to diversify the natural gas supply system in the region. "We are creating a distribution network ," said Miguel Arias Cañete, European Commissioner for Energy and Climate Change; "it is not just a classic large pipeline but small reverse-flow pipelines that allow gas to be sent south, east, west, so the region will have more sources of energy and cheaper energy."

The BRUA pipeline would be, to some extent, a substitute for the failed Nabucco project . This project consisted in the development of a natural gas transport capacity between existing interconnection points with the natural gas transport networks of Bulgaria (in Giurgiu) and Hungary (Csanadpalota), through the construction of a new gas pipeline with a total length of 550 km, on the route Giurgiu-Podisor-Corbu-Hurezani-Hateg-Recas-Horia, and three compressor stations located along its route (in Corbu, Hateg and Horia). It expected to reach a gas flow of 4.4 million cubic meters per year in the direction of Hungary, and 1.5 million cubic meters to Bulgaria.

The BRUA pipeline will only account for one third of the flow that Nabucco would have provided, thus minimizing the risk of market loss for Russia. The route, which crosses Romania from east to west and from north to south, is estimated to cost a total of 560 million euros. Romania anticipates that the Black Sea exploration activities of OMV Petrom ExxonMobil could lead to the finding new natural gas fields. To this end, it is envisaged to extend the BRUA gas pipeline for another 300 kilometers, from Giurgiu to the Black Sea perimeters.

Germany sent its foreign minister to the summit as an observer. Germany's interest is to strengthen its economic presence in the eastern region of the EU, in order to prevent the growing weight of China, secure its energy supply and play an important role in the gas distribution network within Europe, in a context of conflict over the supply of Russian gas, and the dependence that this entails for European countries. The construction of the second North European pipeline, known as project NS2 (Nord Stream 2), which will carry liquefied gas from Vyborg (western Russia) to Greifswald, on the Baltic coast of Germany, is currently being finalized. This project has always had the civil service examination the United States, which views with displeasure the EU's energy dependence on Russia, which is why the US is inclined to promote the ITM as an area for the development and entrance of energy sources that are not dependent on Russia.

Poland enters the game

Poland aligns itself with the US and tries to reduce the economic and energy dependence of Eastern European countries on Russia. But it is also trying to reduce Germany's weight in the region; this is reminiscent of the Intermarium promoted by Poland in the years between the two world wars. Poland's aim is to become a new gas distribution hub for the EU, where its ports would be used for the landing of liquefied natural gas of U.S. origin. These ports would be connected to the BRUA project , replacing Ukraine as a gas entrance to the EU and in turn substituting Russian gas for American gas (9).

It is precisely this ITM project , together with pressure from the U.S. president, that has provoked a reaction from Berlin. German Chancellor Angela Merkel counterattacked in October with the advertisement that Germany is once again opening the door to US gas by deciding to co-finance the construction of a 500 million euro terminal for liquefied natural gas ships in the north of the country. Germany would thus strengthen its alliance with the United States, but could also reduce its dependence on nuclear energy and greenhouse gas emissions.

The TTI projects are financed by a financial fund provided by six of the member states (Croatia, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Latvia), but open to the participation of all the countries that make up the group. Its goal is to provide financial support for the development of trans-national infrastructures in which at least three ITM member states participate. The institutional contribution exceeds 5 billion euros, and aims to attract external investment, from private funds, to strengthen the fund itself. With a thirty-year perspective, the goal is to exceed 100 billion euros.

▲Satellite imagery of the Jordan River [NASA].

ANALYSIS / Marina Díaz Escudero

Water is an essential natural resource, not only for individual survival on Earth, but also for nation-states and their welfare; having an effect on partner development, trade, health and population productivity.

As a natural determinant of power, its accessibility must be considered by states in their policies on national security; "hydropolitics" being the branch of study for this phenomenon. Although it has been, and continues to be, a major source of inter-state conflict, it is an arena in which cooperation and diplomacy between rival countries can set the ground for further political agreements, effectively leading to more stable and peaceful relations.

On the other hand, when water is used as a natural border or must be shared between various countries, concurrent cooperation between all of them is essential to find an effective and non-violent way to approach the resource. Otherwise, an overlapping of different, and potentially contradictory, bilateral agreements may lead to frictions. If one of the concerned countries is not present in negotiations, as some historical events suggest (e.g. 1992 multilateral negotiations in Moscow, where Lebanon and Syria where not present), this will always constitute an obstacle for regional stability.

Moreover, although 71% of the Earth's surface is covered by water, factors such as economic interests, climate change, and explosive population growth are also challenging the sustainable distribution of water sources among countries. The future effects of this scarcity in the region will demand consistent political action in the long-term and current leaders should bear it in mind.

Water availability and conflict in the MENA region

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is known as an arid and semi-arid region, with only 1% of the world's renewable water resources. On average, water availability is only 1,200 cubic meters, around six times less than the worldwide average of 7,000 cubic meters.

As global temperatures rise, more frequent and severe droughts will take place in the region and this will make countries which already have partner rivalries more prone to go to war with each other. According to the World Resources Institute, thirteen of the thirty three states that will suffer from worse water scarcity in the twenty-first century will be Middle Eastern countries.

To quote the findings of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) report, Global Trends: Paradox of Progress, more than thirty countries - nearly half of them in the Middle East - will experience extremely high water stress by 2035, increasing economic, social, and political tensions.

Although claims to the land were and are the main motives for much of the current conflict, water, as part of the contested territories, has always been considered as a primary asset to be won in conflict. In fact, recognition of the importance of water lent the term, the "War over Water", to conflicts in the region, and control over the resource constitutes a significant advantage.

Despite there being several water bodies in the Middle East (Nile, Euphrates, Tigris...), the Jordan River basin is one of the most significant ones today in terms of its influence on current conflicts. The Jordan River Basin is a 223 km long river with an upper course from its sources up to the Galilee Sea, and a lower one, from the latter to the Dead Sea. Territories such as Lebanon, Israel and the West Bank are situated to its West, while Syria and Jordan border it to the East. Water scarcity in the Jordan watershed comes from many different factors, but the existence of cultural, religious and historical differences between the riparian countries (situated on the banks of the river) has led to a centuries-long mismanagement of the source.

Tensions between Zionism and the Arab world on regards to the Jordan River became noticeable in the 1950s, when most Arab countries rejected the Johnston Plan that aimed at dividing the water by constructing a number of dams and canals on the different tributaries of the river. The plan was based on an earlier one commissioned by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA) and was accepted by the water technical committees of the five riparian countries. Nevertheless, the Arab League didn't give the go-ahead and even hardened its position after the Suez Crisis.

In spite of this, Jordan and Israel decided to abide by their allocations and developed two projects, the Israeli National Water Carrier (to transport water from the north to the center and south) and Jordan's East Ghor Main Canal (King Abdullah Canal). In retaliation and with severe consequences, Arab states reunited in an Arab Summit (1964) and decided to divert Jordan's headwaters to the Yarmouk river (for the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan), depriving Israel of 35% of its Water Carrier capacity.

This provocation led to a series of military clashes and prompted Israel's attack on Arab construction projects; a move that would help precipitate the 1967 Six-Day War, according to some analysts. As a result of the war, Israel gained control of the waters of the West Bank (formely Jordan-annexed in the 1948 war and today still controlled by the Israeli Civil Administration) and the Sea of Galilee (today constituting about 60% of the country's fresh water).

Later, in 1995, by the Article 40 of the Oslo II political agreement, [...] Israel recognized Palestinian water rights in the West Bank and established the Joint Water Committee to manage and develop new supplies and to investigate illegal water withdrawals. Nevertheless, the loss of control over water in the West Bank has never been accepted by neighboring Arab countries as, despite the agreement, much of the water coming from it is still directly given to Israeli consumers (and only a smaller fraction to Palestinians living under their control).

Role of water in Syrian-Israeli hostilities

Hostilities have been covering the diary of Syrian-Israeli relationships ever since the Armistice Agreements signed by Israel with each of the four neighboring Arab countries in 1949. This is compounded by the fact that there is seldom mutual agreement with resolutions proposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The Golan Heights, a rocky plateau in south-western Syria, was taken away by Israel in the aftermath of the Six-Day War and is still considered an Israeli-occupied territory. In 1974 the Agreement on Disengagement was signed, ending the Yom Kippur War and resulting in the formation of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), a buffer zone separating the Israeli portion of the Golan Heights and the rest of Syria. Although Israel kept most of the Golan Heights territory, in 1981 it unilaterally passed the Golan Heights Law to impose its jurisdiction and administration on the occupied territory (refusing to call it "annexation"). These laws did not receive international recognition and were declared void by the UNSC.

The fact that Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated in April 2016 in a weekly cabinet meeting that "the Golan Heights will remain forever in Israeli hands" has once again triggered the rejection of UNSC's members, who have declared that the status of the Heights "remains unchanged."

Rainwater catchment in the Golan Heights feeds into the Jordan River and nowadays provides a third of Israel's water supply. Although "Syria has built several dams in the Yarmouk river sub-basin, which is part of the Jordan River basin", the Golan Heights are likely to remain an important thorn in future Israeli-Syrian relations.

Water as a casus belli between Lebanon and Israel

In March 2002, Lebanon decided to divert part of the Hasbani (a major tributary of the Jordan upper course) to supply the Lebanese Wazzani village. Ariel Sharon, the former Prime Minister of Israel, said that the issue could easily become a "casus belli". According to Israel, Lebanon should have made consultations before pumping any water from the Springs, but both the Lebanese government and Hezbollah (a shi'a militant group) condemned the idea.

The Wazzani project, according to Lebanon, only aimed to redevelop the south by extracting a limited amount of water from the Hasbani; 300 MCM per year (they drew 7 MCM by the time). The actual conflict with Israel began when Lebanon started constructing the pumping station very close to the Israeli border.

The United States (US) decided to establish a State Department water expert in order to assess the situation "and cool tempers" but in 2006, during the Lebanon war, the pumping station and other infrastructures, such as an underground water diversion pipe which run Letani river water to many villages, were destroyed.

Although Israeli-Lebanese tensions have continued due to other issues, such as spying, natural gas control and border incidents, water source domination has been a significant contributor to conflict between the two states.

Inter-Arab conflicts on water allocation

Some inter-Arab conflicts on regards to water distribution have also taken place, but they are small-scale and low level ones. In 1987, an agreement was signed between Jordan and Syria which allowed the latter to build twenty five dams with a limited capacity in the Yarmouk River. Later on it was proved that Syria had been violating the pact by constructing more dams than permitted: in 2014 it had already constructed forty two of them. New bilateral agreements were signed in 2001, 2003 and 2004, but repeated violations of these agreements by Syria in terms of water-allocation became unsustainable for Jordan. Most recently (2012), former Jordan's water minister Hazim El Naser stressed the necessity "to end violations of the water-sharing accords."

Although these are low-level tensions, they could quickly escalate into a regional conflict between Jordan, Syria and Israel, as a decrease of water from the Yarmouk released by Syria to Jordan may prevent Jordan to comply with its commitments towards Israel.

Regional cooperation: from multilateralism to bilateralism

Since the beginning of the last century, attempts to achieve multilateral cooperation and a basin-wide agreement between the five co-riparian countries have been hindered by regional political conflict. Boundary definition, choices about decision-making arrangements, and issues of accountability, together with other political divisions, can help explain the creation of subwatershed communities of interest instead of a major watershed agreement between all neighboring countries.

The Israeli-Palestine peace process began in 1991 with the Conference in Madrid, attended by all riparians: Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria. Co-sponsored by the US and the Soviet Union as representatives of the international community, it addressed several regional issues, such as environment, arms control, economic development and, of course, water distribution (in fact, water rights became one of the trickiest areas of discussion).

In 1992, multilateral negotiations about regional cooperation continued in Moscow but this time they were only attended by Israel, the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and the international community; Syria and Lebanon were not present. "After the failed Johnston plan, external efforts to achieve a multilateral agreement through cooperation on water sources were attempted by the Centre for Environmental Studies and Resource Management (CESAR) [...] As Syria and Lebanon did not want to participate in a process involving Israel, (it) ran parallel processes for Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan on the one hand, and Syria and Lebanon on the other hand."

As a matter of fact, bilateral instruments grew in importance and two treaties, between Israel and Jordan/Palestine respectively, were signed: The Treaty of Peace between The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and The State of Israel (1994) and The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II, 1995). Discussions about water use and joint water management played an important role and were included in the annexes.

In 1996, the Trilateral Declaration on Principles for Cooperation on Water-Related Matters and New and Additional Water Resources was signed by Israel, Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and in 2003 the first two initiated a plan called Roadmap for Peace which included the revival of cooperation on regional issues like water.

Although Israel and Syria started some negotiations to solve the Golan Heights' problem in 2008, after the break out of the Syrian civil war distrust between both actors has increased, leaving the most important thorn in multilateral regional negotatiations still unsolved. Nevertheless, "a new government in Syria after the end of the war may provide new opportunities for improved bi- and ultimately multilateral cooperation," says the FAO. The previous year (2007) Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic also signed some agreements "in regard to shared water in the Yarmouk river basin."

Role of Non-Governmental Organizations

Civil society has also been an important platform for resource-management discussions between riparian countries.

Middle Eastern rhetoric, according to the BBC, "often portrays the issue of water as an existential, zero-sum conflict - casting either Israel as a malevolent sponge sucking up Arab water resources, or the implacably hostile Arabs as threatening Israel's very existence by denying life-giving water."

For this reason, in 2010, Friends of the Earth Middle East (FoEME, also called EcoPeace Middle East) stressed the importance of replacing this win-lose approach for a compromising perspective of mutual gains for all. In this way, their proposals don't "include quantitative water allocations, but the implementation of a joint institutional structure that is continuously tasked with peaceful conflict resolution over water resources; [...] defining water rights not as the access to a certain water quantity, but as a broader bundle of rights and duties to access and use the available water and to uphold quality and quantity standards."

Through "The Good Water Neighbors" project (2001), the NGO tried to raise awareness about the negative consequences of leaving this issue unmanaged and reiterated its willingness to strenghten "institutional capacities for collaboration in the region." According to the staff, Israel, Jordan and Palestine could develop a certain interdependence, focused on water (Israel to Jordan/Palestine) and solar-generated electricity (Jordan to Palestine/Israel), in order to facilitate the powering of desalination plants and produce more cleanwater for sale.

The use of this type of political support for transboundary cooperation, based on water access but focused on solving less cultural and sensitive problems (like environmental sustainability), as a means to opening up avenues for dialogue on other political issues, could be the key for a lasting peace in the region.

According to Gidon Brombert, cofounder and Israeli director of FoEME, adopting "healthy interdependencies is a powerful way to promote regional water and energy stability as a foundation for long-lasting peace between our people".

A testament to the success of these initiatives is the fact that Jordan and Israel scored 56.67 under the Water Cooperation Quotient (WCQ) 2017, which means that there is currently zero risk of a water-related war between both states (50 is the minimum score for this to apply).

Final key points and conclusions

There is no doubt that water issues have been a key discussion point between riparian countries in the Jordan River watershed since the late nineteenth century, and rightly so, as the only way to achieve a long-lasting peace in the region is to accept that water management is an integral part of political discourse and decisions. Not only because it is an essential factor in the conflicts that arise between states, but because agreements on other political matters could be furthered through the establishment of sound agreements in the hydropolitical arena.

In other words, a "baby-step" approach to politics should be applied: peaceful discussions on this and other matters leveraged to talk about other sources of conflict and utilized to improve political relations between two parties. The Korean conflict is a good example: although both Koreas are far from agreeing with regards to their political outlook, they have been able to cooperate in other fields, such as the Winter Olympic games. Communication during the games was used to subtly suggest avenues for a political reapproachment, which now seems to be progressing satisfactorily.

As for multilateral-bilateral conditions of negotiations, it is important to take into account the fact that the Jordan River basin, mainly due to its geological condition as a watershed, has to be shared by several different countries, five to be exact. This may seem obvious but clearly many actors don't see its implications.

Understandably, it is very difficult for a state to manage various bilateral agreements concerning the same asset with countries that are mutually at odds with one another. Their contents can overlap, creating contradictions and making the achievement of a general arrangement not only disorganized, but also challenging. Notwithstanding, a multilaterally agreed distribution of the basin's water - taking into account the necessities of all riparians simultaneously, could more easily pave the way for further cooperation on other, pressing, political issues.

Last but not least, it is important not to forget about policies related to other regional affairs, and their potential effect on water management. Climate change, for instance, will certainly affect water availability in the MENA region and the Jordan River basin, easily disrupting and modifying past and future agreements on the resource's allocation and distribution. Attention should also be paid to interest groups and to the economic situation of the countries involved in the negotiations, as these will be determinant in states' decisions about the implementation of certain future projects.

Central Asian republics dispute scarce water resources in the Aral Sea Basin

The lack of effective cooperation between the republics through which the two main rivers of Central Asia, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, which have historically fed the Aral Sea, flow, is preventing the region's water problems from being solved. Short-term objectives, such as hydroelectric exploitation or oil exploration, hinder understanding, although recent initiatives point in the right direction.

▲Satellite image of the Aral Sea, with north below [NASA].

article / Roberto Ramírez Millán

source of life, food for crops, means of navigation... There are many functions that water fulfills as a human resource . It is indispensable and necessary for the maintenance and development of any nation. Today this resource is being depleted due to the great industrial expansion of the last centuries, mass population growth and climate change. The dispute over fresh water, given its economic, geopolitical and geostrategic importance, is triggering conflicts between different countries, known as "water wars". This is happening in the Asia-Pacificarea and particularly in the case of the Central Asian region, in the Aral Sea Basin.

Due to the drought that characterizes this area, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers are under particular stress as the main suppliers of fresh water to the countries of Central Asia. Since the collapse of the USSR, together with its organizations for the negotiation of the waters of this basin, and the independence of the countries located in this region, the lack of an effective international organization to regulate the use of this resource among the States has led to a series of international conflicts due to inequalities of access to water.

In 1993 the Kyrgyz Republic began using the Naryn waterfall as a source of hydroelectric power, with the intention of making up for the lack of organic fuel. With this new use of infrastructure, which entailed high water retention during the summer, the Kyrgyz Republic took the opportunity to sell electricity at exorbitant prices in exchange for gas and coal, which it lacks, to countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The states' pursuit of their own profit and the lack of cooperation between them made it impossible to reach any agreement. 

Furthermore, in 1997, Kyrgyzstan declared that the Syr Darya River would no longer be a common good for legal purposes. To this end, it remodeled and restricted the right to its use and demanded financial aid from the States benefiting from this basin to maintain the freshwater reserves available on their territory. Not content with this, it remarked that, if Uzbekistan did not pay, it would sell a large part of this water to China, thus damaging attempts to reach an agreement between the two.

These events have not been the only ones that have hindered cooperation between these countries, but also the sharp global drop in prices for irrigated agriculture, Uzbek cotton crops that require large amounts of water, and the problems resulting from climate change, among others.

Aral Sea

In addition, the current status of the Aral Sea must also be taken into account. Once one of the four largest lakes in the world and providing economic sustainability to the region, the Aral Sea has been in a state of continuous drought since 1960. Due to the aforementioned operations on the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers, the Aral Sea was divided into two parts, the northern and southern lakes, with the eastern part of the southern lake completely evaporating. In the past, the Aral Sea provided between 20,000 and 40,000 tons of fish per year; however, it can now supply only about 1,000 tons.

To deal with drought problems Kazakhstan developed the project "Regulation of the Darya river bed and preservation of the northern part of the Aral Sea". This included the construction of the Kokaral dam on the southern shore of the northern lake, thanks to the support of the World Bank. The dam ensured the growth of the lake by 20%. The project also provided for the Building of a fish hatchery, which promoted the production of 10,000 to 12,000 tons of fish per year.

However, these measures in favor of Aral Sea development are at the same time being counteracted by Uzbekistan's actions. If previously the Uzbek part of the Aral Sea was damaged by high irrigation of cotton crops, it is now oil extraction that is damaging the southern lake. Soil drilling in the Amu Darya River delta and at the bottom of the Aral Sea plays a negative role. In the dilemma between the development of the oil and gas industry and saving its part of the Aral, Uzbekistan is showing which is its priority, given the benefits of hydrocarbon development .

Effective cooperation

Researchers and experts in the region are aware that cooperation among the six countries is indispensable for their development, which is why the Regional Environmental Center for Central Asia (CAREC), a non-governmental organization charged with addressing environmental and sustainability challenges in Central Asia and Afghanistan, was created in 2001. This organization has denounced that the region is losing $4.5 billion annually due to "the lack of effective mutual cooperation between the countries", as indicated by its executive director , Iskandar Abdullayev.

For this reason, on June 8, CAREC hosted the launching ceremony of the Innovation and Scientific research Cluster in the field of water management , the first in Central Asia, whose goal is to "ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of developmentprojects". These and similar initiatives are the first steps towards creating a prosperous and sustainable future, avoiding retaliation and preventing possible "water wars".

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Bernauer, T., & Siegfried, T. (2012). Climate change and international water conflict in Central Asia. Journal of Peace Research, 49(1), 227-239.

Dukhovny, V. A., & Sokolov, V. (2003). Lessons on cooperation building to manage water conflicts in the Aral Sea Basin. Paris: Unesco, 7-16

Karaev, Z. (2005). Water Diplomacy in Central Asia. Middle East Review of International Affairs, 9(1), 63-69.

Sievers, E. W. (2001). Water, conflict, and regional security in Central Asia. NYU Envtl. LJ, 10, 356.

Swain, A. (2004). Managing water conflict: Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Routledge.

Tishkov, V. (1997). Ethnicity, nationalism and conflict in and after the Soviet Union: the mind aflame (Vol. 15). Sage.

The EU has backed down on the project, but Germany still gives support to the Russian initiative

The project of a second set of gas pipelines through the Baltic Sea, in order to transport Russian gas to the European Union without crossing Ukraine, has divided the EU governments. Some Eastern and Central European countries, backed by the United States, argue against any dependency on Russian gas supplies, but Germany keeps its support to the Russian plans.

▲The routes of the Nord Stream and the planned Nord Stream 2 pipelines from Russia to Germany [Gazprom].

ARTICLE / Ane Gil Elorri

The natural gas consumption for nowadays is essential to have basic necessities covered. Therefore, it's imperative for everyday life. Nevertheless, it goes through a laborious process before it reaches the consumers. The gas needs to be extracted from the land or sea subsurface, and transported, before it reaches its destination, being pipelines the most common via of transportation.

The EU's domestic gas production has been declining and the reserves in the North Sea depleted. Therefore, in order to meet demands, the EU has turned to other suppliers; being the most important Russia, Saudi Arabia and Norway. In fact, a lot of countries in the European Union are heavily dependent on Russian imports, especially of natural gas, which often go through transit countries such as Ukraine and Belarus. The decisions are all make through the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue. Russia has the largest gas reserves in the world. With 44,600 billion cubic meters, Russia has 23.9 percent of the world's currently known gas reserves, followed by Iran (15.8 percent), Qatar (13.5 percent), the United States, and Turkmenistan (4.3 percent each).

The most prominent European energy supply is the Nord Stream Pipelines. Nord Stream are a twin set of pipelines that provide gas transportation capacity for the natural gas, which comes from the Western Russia (Vyborg) into Lubmin, Germany, for the distribution into the European gas grid. This system is composed by a set of 1,224-kilometer pipelines through the Baltic Sea, and each hold the capacity to transport 27.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas a year. Line 1 became operational in November 2011 and by October 8, 2012 the system was fully operational, having taken the construction of these pipelines 30 months.

The desire of a grand-scale gas transport between Russia and the western Europe goes back to the 1970's, to the contract between a German company (Ruhrgas AG) and Gazprom (national Russian gas company) to supply natural gas. In 2000 the European Commission recognized the need for a pipeline in the Baltic Sea. In December 2005, the North European Gas Pipeline Company was established and by October 4, 2006, the North European Gas Pipeline was officially renamed Nord Stream. It was finally completed and functional in October 2012.

The Nord Stream project was very ambitious. Nevertheless, it was completed on time, on budget, and without permanently impacting the environment. The Nord Stream Pipeline system is fully operational and capable of transporting up to 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas every year to Europe.

Now, a new project is developing based on the success of the Nord Stream Pipelines: Nord Stream 2. This project will benefit from the experience of the previous pipeline, which has set a new high for the environmental, technical and safety standards throughout its planning, construction and operation. The idea is to add a new set of twin pipelines along the Baltic Sea route to increase the capacity of gas transportation in order to meet the demands of Europe. In fact, this new pipeline will create a direct link between Gazprom and the European consumers.

The Nord Stream 2 project is implemented by the Nord Stream 2 AG project company, where Gazprom is the sole shareholder. In October 2012, the shareholders of the Nord stream project examined the possibility of constructing a third and fourth pipeline and came to the conclusion that it was economically and technically attainable. In April 2017, Nord Stream 2 AG signed the financing agreements for the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project with ENGIE, OMV, Royal Dutch Shell, Uniper, and Wintershall. These five European energy companies will provide long-term financing for 50 per cent of the total cost of the project.

The entry point into the Baltic Sea of the twin pipeline will be the Ust-Luga area of the Leningrad Region. Then the pipeline will stretch across the Baltic Sea. Its exit point in Germany will be in the Greifswald area close to the exit point of the original Nord Stream. The route covers over 1,200 kilometers.

The total capacity of the second twin set of pipelines is 55 billion cubic meters of gas per year. Therefore, the sum with the prior pipelines would give an outstanding number of 110 billion cubic meters of gas per year. Nord Stream 2 will be operational before late 2019.

This project is defended with the argument that it supposed a diversification of the routs transporting natural gas to Europe and to elevate the energetic security due to the instability of the transit of gas through Ukraine. For now, a lot of the natural gas consumed by Europe comes from Russia through Ukraine. Nevertheless, if this project goes through, Ukraine will lose 2,000 million dollars for the transit of natural gas, and even the proportion of gas will decrease (which is also for staff use) leading to the collapse and finalization of the transit of natural gas through Ukraine. Furthermore, if Hungary, Slovakia and Poland receive natural gas through the Nord Stream 2 pipelines instead of through Ukraine, it will be very difficult that Ukraine receives gas from the west, seeing as Gazprom along with others controls EUGAL (European Gas Pipeline Link) can reduce the supply of gas to those companies that provide gas to Ukraine.

The cost of 1,000 cubic meters in 100 kilometers through Nord Stream 2 would cost 2.1 million dollars while through Ukraine it costs 2.5 million dollars. The tariff of transportation of natural gas through Nord Stream is 20% lower than through Ukraine.

Only half of the European Union members approve the negotiations between the EU and Russia over the Nord Stream 2 Project. It is true that the natural gas demand of Europe is growing each year but some countries such as the Baltics are against anything that has to do with Russia. Besides the US, thanks to fracking, has become the biggest producer of gas, and is now looking to substitute Russia as the main gas supplier of the EU.

But other countries are in favor of this project. In January 31 this year, Germany gave its permission to begin the construction of the pipelines of Nord Stream 2 in their territorial waters. Berlin also authorized the construction of the section of 55 kilometers that will go through the terrestrial part situated in Lubmin. In April this year, Finland has also given the two permissions needed to begin the construction.

Nevertheless, Gazprom will be facing a few difficulties in order to pull through with this project. The company still needs that other countries, such as Norway, Denmark and Russia, give authorizations and permissions to construct the pipelines in their exclusive economic zone. There is a risk that Denmark doesn't authorize these new pipelines. The Danish Agency of Energy and the Foreign Office both have to give their approval but can deny the permit if Nord Stream 2 represents a danger for the environment. Another problem is purely political: the European Commission is trying to make the implementation of the project fit with the EU legislation. In November 2017, the European Commission prepared a list of amendments to its energy legislation, known as the Third Energy Package, which will pursue gas pipelines that come from the markets of countries that have the Brussels standards. Because of this, Gazprom won't be able to be the only shareholder of the Nord Stream 2 project and the pipelines will have to carry gas from other companies that have nothing to do with Gazprom.

Although, as previously mentioned, Nord Stream 2 has already received the two permits necessary in Germany and Finland in order to begin the construction, it seems that not many European countries are in favor of this project. In fact, since this April, the EU and the European Commission have withdrawn their support claiming that Nord Stream 2 does not encourage the diversification of gas supply, and they give more significance to the gas pipelines going through the Ukrainian territory in context of diversification of supply routes.
Other EU countries and of the region, such as Ukraine, Denmark, the Baltic States and Poland, have continuously spoken against Nord Stream 2, claiming that the project will increase Europe's dependence on imported Russian gas. Nevertheless, German Chancellor Angela Merkel supports this project, considering it to be an economic project which does not pose a threat to EU energy security, has is expected, seeing as the Nord Stream 2 is a joint venture between Russia's Gazprom, France's Engie, Austria's OMV AG, the Anglo-Dutch company Royal Dutch Shell, and Uniper and Wintershall, both German.

Nevertheless, the most vocally active countries against this project are the US and Ukraine. On one side, the United States believes that this project would undermine Europe's overall energy security and stability. It would also provide Russia other ways to pressure European countries, especially Ukraine. The US even threatened the EU firms to be subjected to Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). On the other side, Ukraine's efforts to prevent the implementation of Nord Stream appears to be futile. They openly stated that this would conclude on the Russian monopoly on the world gas market, which would lead in Europe to an energy crisis and to an economic and political destabilization, and called for the international community to step in. Unfortunately, Germany is as headstrong as ever, stating that underwater pipeline to bring gas from Russia could not go forward without Ukrainian involvement in overland transit.

As the recent expulsion of European diplomats in Moscow shows, the global political relations have worsened considerably in the last few years. In fact, some would say that it the worst condition since the Cold War. This new political situation has had consequences on the Nord Stream 2, causing European countries to oppose to this project. The ultimate defender left standing of the programme is Germany, even the EU has backed down after Ukraine's protest. Ukraine has every right to oppose to this project, seeing as Russia has had nothing more but cold moves towards this country(cut off gas supplies in the middle of winter, Crimea), and is not outrageous to think that this project would ultimately affect the country, especially economically. Therefore, this project does not diversify the sources of natural gas, the first Nord Stream already reached this objective. The second Nord Stream, however, would grant Russia a monopoly of natural gas, which is not recommendable seeing as it would create Europe's dependence on Russia, and Russia could take advantage of it. Unfortunately, Russia will not give up this project, even with mostly everybody turns against it.

Domestic demand will increase, in contrast to more advanced regions

In the coming decades, oil consumption in Latin America will continue to grow, in the face of a trend to leave that is already on the horizon in many advanced countries. Population growth and the increase in class average explain this increase in demand. This domestic demand will serve to strengthen the extractive industries of Latin American crude oil producers, but will make the refining deficit suffered by the region chronic.

article / Ignacio Urbasos

The oil industry is experiencing a change in export and consumption patterns in the Latin American region. The sector's classic orientation towards the United States has changed in a new context in which exports are much more diversified with a shift towards emerging Asian countries. Similarly, domestic demand is steadily increasing due to population and economic growth. However, refining capacity in the region will remain insufficient. This paper will offer an analysis focused on the long term to try to provide a better understanding of the region's energy future, mainly in terms of consumption, extraction and subsequent refining.

First, the demographic and economic expectations for Latin America must be taken into account: population growth will increase by 800 million people by 2050, and economic growth could be 2% per year for at least the next decade. A direct effect of this will be a 91% increase in electricity demand by 2040 and an increase in the issue of vehicles in the region from 94 million in 2016 to the 165 million expected by 2040.

As can be seen in the graph below, the greatest demand for oil in the region will be associated with transportation, which will tend towards greater efficiency in consumption, but the promised arrival of the electric car is still a long way off, with expectations of less than 4% by 2030 worldwide. Similarly, the increase in theaverage class by 126 million people by 2030 will have a direct impact on the increase in air transport, which is expected to grow by an average of 3.4% per year until 2034, agreement to the latest ICAO report , with a consequent increase in kerosene consumption.

It should be taken into account that in Latin America there are subsidies for both gasoline and diesel, which generate more affordable prices, clearly distorting demand upwards. These subsidies respond mainly to the logic that citizens should be beneficiaries of their country's possession of natural resources, and are concentrated in traditional oil-producing countries such as Ecuador, Venezuela, Mexico or Argentina. However, these countries import fuel to a large extent due to their limited refining capacity, generating a double trade and fiscal deficit, as ECLAC points out. The future of these subsidies is unknown, but any change would have a high political cost, since affecting the price of a basic good would have consequences on broad social sectors with great electoral impact.

For its part, the contribution of oil to electricity generation will remain constant at 500,000 barrels per day, its importance dropping from the current 46%, according to figures for Latin America from the International Renewable Energy Agency. The region will benefit enormously from the increased presence of renewable energies, a sector that it already leads due to its incomparable geographic conditions, highlighting the enormous importance of hydroelectric energy.

Over the coming decades, two major phenomena will occur in Latin America: universal access to energy and a new energy model with less oil and biofuel (wood and waste) in favor of gas and alternative energies. One of the great challenges facing the region is to develop a more integrated national and international electricity system that increases consumption efficiency and allows greater flexibility in production sources. However, there are already several regional projects in this direction: the Andean Electrical Interconnection System, which includes the countries of the Andean Community plus Chile, and the Electrical Interconnection System of Central American Countries (SIEPAC).

Refining deficit

This rise in consumption is not accompanied by an increase in refining capacity, which is already highly deficient, and generates a critical dependence on imports of gasoline and other derivatives from the US. A trend that is likely to be a constant in the short and medium term for the region and adds to the 14% decline in refining activity in the region since 2012 (World Oil Outlook 2017), which already adds up to a loss of one million barrels refined per day since that year. High installation and maintenance costs, at around 2% of annual installed cost, add to the region's chronic political uncertainty that is largely scaring off private investment.

An illustrative case is that of the Pacific refinery in Ecuador, which was presented as the largest refinery project in the country at the beginning of Rafael Correa's presidency in 2007. The project began with a 49% financial participation by PDVSA and 51% by Petroecuador, in addition to the award of the project to the construction company Odebrecht. Today, PDVSA has withdrawn its contribution and the Brazilian construction company is facing trials in the country for corruption, result in a lost decade and forcing Lenin Moreno to reformulate the project, including the name: now Manabí Refinery.

As we can see in the graph, Latin America's major oil producers have a deficit in refining capacity. It should be noted that in the region there is not only undercapacity, but also underactivity, which generates an even greater gap. The activity of these plants is currently around 70% of their total capacity. Those countries that do not have oil production, but do have a relevant refining industry, are Curaçao, which has one of the largest PDVSA centers, Chile and Peru.

In final, the Latin American oil sector faces the coming decades with enormous doubts about its refining capacity and far from achieving self-sufficiency. The lack of capacity to attract foreign investment from historically oil producing countries has generated a disappointing scenario that aggravates the already limited industry in the region. The social transformations inherent to a society that is growing demographically and economically require investment in infrastructure in order to meet the expectations of universal access to the electricity network and the consumption of the incipient class average.

Nearly two-thirds of the world's identified lithium reserves are located in Bolivia, Chile and Argentina.

The explosion of electric cars through the use of lithium-ion batteries has placed the large reserves of this metal in the Bolivian Altiplano and the Atacama Desert at the center of the world's interest in this new industry. Will South America seize the opportunity to enter into technological innovation processes itself, or will it once again resign itself, as has happened with so many other minerals, to mere extraction?

▲Salar de Uyuni, in the highlands of Bolivia [Luca Galuzzi, Wikimedia Commons].

article / Milene Pardo-Figueroa

With the gradual incorporation of electric vehicles into the market, as well as increased sales of smartphones, laptops, tablets and other electronic devices - all of which are powered by lithium-ion batteries - global demand for lithium is rising. This alkaline chemical element, which in its pure form appears as a soft, especially light metal, is abundant in nature, although the largest reserves are concentrated in just a few countries. Due to the conditions of its extraction, it is particularly profitable in the dry areas of the triangle delimited by the borders of Bolivia, Chile and Argentina. If lithium is known as "white oil" or "new gasoline" because of the color of the saltpetre in the deposits where it is found and because it is the driving force behind modern automobiles, the border area of these countries is known as the "Saudi Arabia of lithium".

The "fever" for lithium has led to a current production of 40,000 tons per year, a figure that falls short of the enormous existing demand, which currently poses a need for 180,000 tons. Although this Issue may be reached in the next few years, estimates point to a demand of between 500,000 and 800,000 tons in 2025. By then, agreement to some forecasts, the global lithium battery market could be worth $46 billion. Part of the boost to the sector comes from the innovation of electric cars. The expansion of that market, however, could be slowed if lithium production does not accelerate. As visionary entrepreneur Elon Musk, promoter of the high-end electric car brand Tesla, has warned, "to create 500,000 vehicles a year, we basically have to retain all the lithium generation on the planet."

The difficulty in meeting this growing demand comes from the high costs of extraction, which vary considerably depending on the characteristics of the deposit. The most profitable deposits are found in brine concentrates in arid climates, which undergo rapid evaporation when brought to light. This is especially true in the area formed by the Atacama Desert and the Bolivian Altiplano.

World production is led by Australia, which in 2016 extracted 14,300 tons, followed by Chile, with 12,000, and Argentina, with 5,700, agreement to figures from the US Geological Survey. The Issue of identified reserves places the South American countries clearly ahead, especially Bolivia, which has the largest deposits, although for now there has been little development of mining activity of this metal. Thus, Bolivia has identified reserves of 9 million tons (22.7% of the world total), Chile 7.5 million (18.9%) and Argentina 6.5 million (16.4%), which means that the three countries account for 58% of the world's reserves. They are followed by the United States, with 5.6 million (13.9%), and China, with 5.4 million (13.6%). Other estimates give China reserves similar to those of Argentina. The sector is dominated by five large companies, which control 90% of world production: SQM (Chile), FMC and Albermarle (USA), Talison (Australia) and Tianqi Lithium (China).

The white triangle

The Salar de Uyuni in the Bolivian altiplano - a salt-covered surface generated by the evaporation of seawater that was locked up in a lake when the Andes Mountains emerged in its trainingis home to what could be the world's largest lithium deposit. Obtaining it faces the problem that here the metal is especially mixed with magnesium and the separation of both requires access to technology that Bolivia does not have at the moment on a large scale. Fearing that foreign companies will control the extraction and leave little benefit to the country, as has historically happened with mining development , the government of Evo Morales has opted for a limited exploitation for the time being. Bolivian authorities have preferred to prevent the penetration of multinationals, in order to ensure that the South American nation maintains control of the business. Morales has announced plans for the start-up, with public financing, of a lithium carbonate manufacturing facility at the Uyuni salt plant.

Lithium mining is much more advanced in Chile, which accounts for around 33% of the world's supply, thanks to the large deposits in the Atacama Desert and the development of its own industry. Sociedad Chemistry y Minera de Chile (SQM), a private Chilean company, leads the domestic sector, where concessions are closely controlled by the state. For its part, Argentina is taking steps to boost the lithium business; to this end, the government of Mauricio Macri is proceeding with the liberalization of the sector and has established contacts to attract foreign capital.

Beyond the economic benefits that these South American countries can obtain from the boom in lithium exploitation, a discussion has been generated in their societies about the ecological impact that this may cause in places as unique for their natural characteristics as Atacama or Uyuni; there are voices that warn that the Andean salt solution may be condemned to disappear to satisfy foreign interest in batteries. There are also fears of a social impact, without compensation for the human groups settled in the affected territories.

On the other hand, the negative impact that the perpetuation of an economic culture of extraction has historically had in Latin America advises Bolivia, Chile and Argentina to take the opportunity to try to develop their own transformation initiatives and new technologies in the generation of batteries, without limiting themselves, as is the case with so many other minerals, to an extractive activity.

It generates many of the raw materials needed for global technology production.

China not only has significant reserves of mineral resources, but also leads the world in the production of many of them. This gives it a geopolitical B as a source of essential resources for global technological production.

▲Satellite image [NASA].

article / Gabriel Ros Casis [English version] [English version].

With a vast territory like China's, it is obvious that it possesses a wealth of raw materials and natural resources. Throughout China's history, this has become a strong geopolitical asset, not only for the country's own development , but also for its trading partners through exports. Today, when we talk about these raw materials, China stands out in two main groups: base metals and technological elements.

The base metals group essentially comprises five metals from the periodic table, namely iron, copper, aluminum, magnesium and zinc (sometimes lead and tin are also included). There is no need to recall that we can find all these metals in everyday objects, and that they have been the backbone of industry for a long time. Therefore, every country needs them, placing those with the largest deposits of these metals at a strategic advantage. But a country's mineral wealth is not always given by this condition, as it can also be measured by the ease and feasibility of extracting the product. In the case of China, both arguments would be valid, since the country has the largest deposits of many of these minerals, with magnesium leading the way (79% of global extractions) followed by tin (43%) and zinc (31%).

As far as technological metals are concerned, it is important to note that they include various minerals, such as rare earths, precious metals, as well as semiconductors. From a quantitative approach , the required amount of these metals is minimal, even though their availability is crucial for the production of today's technology. For example, some of the most common technological metals include lithium, yttrium, palladium, cerium and neodymium, which can easily be found in cell phone batteries, medicines, magnets or catalysts. Once again, China leads the way with the largest deposits of several of these elements, especially tungsten (83%), followed by rare earths (78%) and molybdenum (38%).

From this we can conclude that China not only has the largest deposits, but is also the world's largest exporter. In addition to extraction, this country also refines and manufactures components with minerals such as aluminum, copper and certain rare earths, and in some cases even manufactures the final product.

Therefore, it must be taken into account that extraction brings with it certain consequences. Environmentally, extraction always has an impact on the land, perhaps less in China compared to other countries (due to the size of its territory), but equally significant. From an economic approach , these extractions entail a great cost, but which, properly managed, can generate an immense benefit. In the political scenario, they are seen as an important geopolitical advantage, creating dependence on the demand of other countries.

As a conclusion, it can be drawn from this that China has great power in terms of raw material resources, but this carries with it a great responsibility, since a substantial part of the raw materials used for almost all the world's technology production depends on this country, which provides the resources, but also manufactures them.

ESSAY / Martín Villegas Jordán

The concept of humanity is a contemporary idea that took shape just recently. Many say that it took place after the conference of Yalta in 1945[1]. In other words, this concept was beginning to be conceived by one of the three leaders that shaped today's world, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt. During the conference, the three big leaders of the world, who at the time were British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, and U.S. President Roosevelt[2], came to an agreement (mostly encouraged by Roosevelt) that would eventually give birth to the United Nations. Now it's vital to know that this intergovernmental organization is intricately composed of the idea of a global union.

Moreover, the concept of a global union, of the United Nations, embodies the idea of humanity as universal. It encompasses the idea of humanity as a composition of every existing nation. In short, humanity eventually becomes the nation for all human beings, a nation of nations. And this is where Mr. Roosevelt plays a relevant role when he said: "A nation that destroys its soils destroys itself. Forests are the lungs of our land, purifying the air and giving fresh strength to our people"[3].

It's possible, then to say that the previous century was the time when global issues were given the attention that they deserved. For instance, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) marks 407.62 parts per million of carbon dioxide of earth and 0.99 degrees Celsius for the temperature anomaly of 2016 (denoting that year as one of the sixteen warmest years since 2001)[4].

Besides, humanity faces dramatic gaps in temperature. Take a look, for instance, at Oymyakon, Russia, where the temperature is normally around negative fifty-four degrees Celsius[5]. Now, looking at the Sahara desert, it's inhabitants face temperatures of fifty-nine degrees Celsius or more.

Moreover, climate change becomes a more pressing matter when looking at two reports of the NASA. On the first hand, the one titled "November of 2017 was the third warmest November on record" states: "The last three Novembers - 2015, 2016, and 2017 - are the three warmest in the entire modern record."[6]. On the other hand, the one titled "Greenland melt speeds East Coast sea level rise" states the following: "the Greenland and Antarctic influence alone would account for an increase in the rate of sea level rise on the East Coast of 0.0016 to 0.0059 inches (0.04 to 0.15 millimeters) each year, varying by location. That's equivalent to 7.8 inches (0.2 meters) of sea-level rise on the northern East Coast over the next century, and 2.5 feet (0.75 meters) in the south, though the estimates are quantitative and not an attempt at an actual projection"[7].

Still, having such a clear evidence of climate change, it is true that legislators choose to deny this, which actually ends up convincing people. This is evident, for example, when analyzing the politics of the current President of the U.S., Donald Trump. For instance, during his campaign (when addressing the mining community) he said: "If I take hairspray, and I spread it in my apartment, which is all sealed, you are telling me that affects the ozone layer. I say "no way folks" (...) that is like all of the rules and regulations you people have in mines"[8].

What is also true about this blind humanity is that the many pronunciations of the United States' president have a strong pull towards decisions that countries in Mesoamerica and South America take. Take Colombia, for instance. Now, this country had banned the eradication of illicit cultivations of drugs by aspartame but president Trump has been insisting and pushing for this harmful way for the environment and for humans that can possibly live by the crops[9]. Furthermore, it can be said that pressure from the North American country has not been light in the rest of Latin America.

Summing up, it is clear that America is clearly in need of renewable energy sources no matter what the political discourse states. Specifically, America is in need of "those sources of energy obtained from natural means that are renewable and susceptible to indefinite use"[10]. Take, for instance, countries like Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, which are called to be the future in the study of sustainability due to their "geographical and climatological conditions, which make Latin America one of the regions that pose high potential from renewable energy sources"[11]. Furthermore, these countries are pioneer in the ambits of wind, hydropower, and large-scale soy growing, which makes them subject to the advantages that the implementation of renewable energy poses. In fact, experts Emma Mendoza and Vadim Pérez at the University of Chile insist on these advantages being: (1) the potential for creating almost six times of what global consumption is today (2) the production being national (3) the de-centralized consumption, meaning that energy is consumed in the place where it is produced and there is no necessity to export (4) the hygiene of the obtained energy, meaning that there are no significantly harmful remnants (5) and the investment in high tech industry[12].

In fact, in America there has been an exponential growth in the implementation of renewable energy projects since the implementation of the Paris 2015 accords on Climate Change. Such growth though, is directly proportional with the increments in federal or particular centralized companies with strong governmental support [13].

In Latin America the three pillars in the ambit of sustainability are the eolian industry, the hydroelectric industry, and the industry of the monocultures[14]. Of the countries previously mentioned, for example, Brazil and Mexico specialize in the eolian industry, Brazil also plays an important role in hydropower development, and Argentina leads the large scale soy growing. It is of vast importance though, to previously mention the fact that the development of renewable energies is not the only factor that is taken into account when analyzing the partner field of sustainable energies. Then, in addition to the plain development of these energies, the social movements that emerge in response to the expansion of these industries play a key role for the future of sustainable energies in the world.

It is interesting to look at each of the fields with important developments in America. Firstly, taking a close look at how the wind power is transformed into renewable energy and the toll that it has within a partner sphere. Now, this type of energy is the least efficient among the three types analyzed in this paper because it has the least impact on the environment and on society. However, the two countries that contribute primarily are Brazil and Mexico, respectively, with a generation of 256 MW and 88 MW[15]. Mainly, the power generated in each country is based upon eolian parks built on the appropriate territories. For example, Brazil's main park is found in the municipality of Osório and it includes three projects that sum a generation potential of 150 MW. Unfortunately, the social outcome of eolian implementation has been negative. Experts Mendoza and Pérez state that the probable origin for the social unrest is the government for ignoring the process of negotiation between enterprises and local habitants. Also, the clean energy enterprises are paying only 1.5% of the incomes to the landowners that put their terrains for the disposition of these enterprises. Besides, another social unrest is the co-ownership of most of the terrains, presenting more negotiation difficulties between enterprises and landowners. In short, the main opponents (via judicial demands) in Mexico are: "la Union de Comunidades Indígenas de la Zona Norte del Itsmo" and "los centros de Derechos Humanos Topeyec y Gubiña"[16]. As if there was not enough opposition already, these denouncers even claim that some of the acts committed by the enterprises are unconstitutional. 

Secondly, it is important to look at hydroelectric power principally developed in Brazil because hydroelectricity is the principal source of electricity generation in Latin America. For example, Brazil's hydroelectric power in 2006 accounted for 60% of the total of electricity generated. Furthermore, hydroelectricity can be developed under low costs of operation and high efficacy. It is also important to look at hydroelectric power in Brazil as a pioneer due to the first efforts of implementation that have been present in the country since 1970.

Thirdly, the large-scale soy production can also be considered as a renewable energy source.

Washington's Antilles energy diversification initiative moves forward

Given the success of Venezuela's oil diplomacy in the Caribbean countries (the islands account for 13 of the 35 votes in the OAS), the United States launched its own initiative in 2014 so that these small states have greater energy diversity and do not depend on Venezuelan crude. The Maduro regime's financial difficulties have reduced Chavista influence in the Caribbean, but Trump is also cutting back on U.S. aid. Diversification of energy sources, however, is moving forward because it is a real need for the islands.

▲ The tourism boom increases electricity consumption in the Caribbean islands, where there are hardly any energy sources of their own.

article / María F. Zambrano

In the Caribbean islands, energy security is at the center of national strategic concern, due to their high dependence on fossil fuels, mostly imported. Energy security is the focus where the geopolitical, diplomatic and economic interests of these small states converge, and not only of them: the great vulnerability due to the lack of their own energy sources was taken into account by Venezuela to promote the Petrocaribe cooperation agreement in 2005, which gave it great influence in the Antilles; since 2014, the United States has been trying to counteract that program with the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative (CESI), launched by the Obama Administration.

The rivalry between the two energy diplomacy initiatives will not really be settled by a political pulse between Caracas and Washington, but by the real need of the Caribbean islands to diversify their energy sources. This will reduce Venezuela's influence in the region and open the way for the U.S. offer, focused precisely on promoting alternative sources.

The main risk to national security in the Antilles lies in the high costs of Caribbean electricity. On the one hand, the islands have replaced historically agricultural economies with others driven by tourism, which forces them not only to meet the needs of their citizens but also to rely on the fixed cost of an industry with high levels of electricity consumption. On the other hand, production does not have diversified generation Structures . With the exception of Trinidad and Tobago, Suriname and Belize, the islands are supplied by oil as the only installed production capacity; in addition, 87% of primary energies (basically crude oil) are imported. We are facing a problem of high consumption and another of oil dependence.

In view of this status, and given the demands posed by energy security, understood as the physical protection of infrastructure and also the effort to guarantee the continuity of supply, Petrocaribe became a clear option for Antillean interests. Generous financing credits -from 5% to 70% for a 25-year period- contributed to the extension of the program. During the first 10 years of Petrocaribe's existence, agreement to data from the Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA), Venezuela covered on average 32% of the energy demand of the participating States; the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Haiti received 87% of the supplies. The agreement also involved investments in the islands' refineries, which increased their processing capacity: up to 135,000 barrels of crude oil per day between the Cuban Camilo Cienfuegos refinery (65,000), the refinery near Jamaica's capital (36,000) and the Dominican Petroleum refinery (34,000).

The alliance alleviated the rise in crude oil prices for these countries, but the region was left in the hands of the volatility of market prices and those of the main supplier. A November 2017 IMFreport estimates that real crude oil price movements affect GDP growth in the Caribbean by 7%, with wide variations by country: 15% in Dominica, 9% in Jamaica and less than 1% in Guyana. At the same time, the continued drop in Venezuela's production, which began to allocate fewer barrels to Petrocaribe, left the area predisposed to new approaches to reduce its exhibition to market shocks.

Caribbean Energy Security Initiative

This expectation was addressed in a new energy security framework that sought to increase independence and reduce vulnerability through diversification. Taking advantage of the steep drop in crude oil prices in 2014, which relaxed energy costs for the islands and gave them more room to maneuver, Washington launched the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative (CESI). The program has focused on supporting countries in diversifying electricity generation, addressing their significant renewable energy potential. Thus, through CESI, US$2 million in technical support has been allocated to C-SERMS (Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strategy), a roadmap developed by CARICOM's energy policy division. This roadmap had already harmonized the goals of the 15 member states with subject to energy efficiency and the implementation of renewable energies: two strategies that sought to solve the problems previously mentioned.

The Inter-American development Bank (IDB) estimated that for the implementation of the C-SERMS roadmap, the Caribbean energy sector would require an investment of 7% of the regional GDP between 2018 and 2023. Countries with stronger financial sectors would have the capacity to finance the projects without altering debt sustainability, with these projects being self-financed over a 20-year period.

In the framework of the U.S. initiative, energy efficiency was materialized in the CHEER program (Caribbean Hotel Energy Efficiency and Renewables program), which has provided technical attendance to the hotel industry, the main source consumption. However, in this field, the IMF urges the implementation of broader public policies to further reduce oil imports and increase GDP in the long term.

In the implementation of renewable energy, the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has promoted infrastructure with public-private financing. Among other projects, it financed the construction of a 36 MW wind power plant and a 20 MW solar power plant, both inaugurated in 2016 in Jamaica. These projects also have macroeconomic influences on reducing dependence on crude oil; in the case of Jamaica, however, dependence has been decreased mainly by the expansion of natural gas receiving capacity, which has allowed that country a reduction from 97% to 80% dependence on imported oil (in fact, it no longer imports Venezuelan crude oil). Since 2016, the business New Fortress Energy has been working on the submission of liquefied natural gas to the Bogue plant in Jamaica.

Since its launch, OPIC has financed up to $120 million in energy agreements. To this must be added those promoted by the CEFF-CCA fund, also from the U.S. Government, which provided $20 million non-refundable for projects in initial phases; in 2015 the "Clean Energy in the Caribbean" project began, with a duration of five years and with special incidence in Jamaica.

Venezuela... and Trump's clippings

The U.S. initiative for energy diversification in the Caribbean had its response from Venezuela. In 2015, Petrocaribe held a special summit where it quadrupled the ALBA Caribe fund, raising it from $50 million to $200 million, destined to finance mainly social projects, along the lines of what Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold have called "social power diplomacy". However, Venezuela's severe economic crisis and the reduced finances of its national oil company, PDVSA, have forced the government of Nicolás Maduro to cut back on Venezuelan oil diplomacy.

For its part, the arrival of the Trump Administration has led to a significant decrease in the investment earmarked for CESI. In the framework of a generalized cutback in financial aid programs abroad, Washington reduced to $4.3 million the amount earmarked to promote new sources of energy in the Caribbean.

The United States, in any case, is not the only one trying to occupy the energy space previously filled by Venezuela. In 2015, the Renewable Energy and Efficient Energy Center was inaugurated in Barbados, promoted by UNID (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) with the support of Austrian and German funds. In addition, last year Russia made fuel shipments to Cuba, replacing supplies that Venezuela had not been able to cover.