▲Transfer of immigrants arriving from North Africa to the Italian island of Lampedusa [Vito Manzani].

ANALYSIS / Valeria Nadal [English version].

In late 2017, Cable News Network (CNN) published a video recorded anonymously with a hidden camera showing the sale of four men in Libya, for $400 each. It was an example of selling slaves to Libyan nationals for work or ransom, in the case of men, or as sex slaves, in the case of women. The shocking images triggered a global response; several Hollywood celebrities joined the protests calling for an end to the slave trade in Libya. France, Germany, Chad, Nigeria and other countries have urged Libya to address this serious problem through a repatriation program for migrants and the evacuation of detention camps, where many of the slave mafias operate. Circumstances, however, do not appear to have improved since the video was released, mainly because there continues to be a lack of state coordination to address the problem, along with other factors. How is it possible that a slave trade could have occurred inside Libya?

Libya is a large country located in North Africa, with a long Mediterranean coastline. Until 2011, when the Arab Spring broke out, Libya was one of the most stable countries in the region. It had one of the highest life expectancies in all of Africa, and an educational system - from primary Education to university - better than most neighboring countries. However, this status of stability and relative prosperity came to an end in February 2011, when the uprisings that began in Tunisia, and had spread to countries such as Yemen, Jordan and Egypt, reached Libya.

Unlike other states in the region, which were able to peacefully resolve the demands of the protesters, the immediate threat of civil war in Libya forced an international intervention to resolve the conflict. The United States (US) and the European Union (EU), with the support of the United Nations (UN), acted against the dictatorial regime of Muammar Gaddafi. With the capture and killing of Qaddafi by rebel troops, the war seemed to be over. However, in the absence of a viable plan for a political transition, the status deteriorated further as various political actors attempted to fill the power vacuum left by Qaddafi's demise.

Today, Libya continues to experience severe political instability and is considered a failed state. Although there is a government promoted and recognized by the UN, the Government of National Unity (GNU), it does not control the entire country and is challenged by various power groups, many of which are armed militias. Due to this lack of governmental authority, as well as its strategic location on the Mediterranean coast, Libya has become a base of operations for mafias, which take advantage of the willingness of refugees and migrants to reach Europe via the Libyan land route. The open borders policy launched by the EU in 2015 has not helped curb their activities, as it has facilitated the establishment of human smuggling routes. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that at least 400,000 people are currently held in Libyan detention centers, where migrants are an easy goal for the slave trade. The GUN has opened a formal research and has met with European and African leaders to enable emergency repatriation of refugees and migrants. However, the effectiveness of the Libyan authorities' efforts is limited. A more important issue, however, is the role that the international community can play in alleviating the problem, of which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been core topic voices in the discussion.

Testimonials

Since 2015, Oxfam has reported extensively to the international community on the migration crisis in Libya, and has emphasized the need for European countries to seek and find a solution for the thousands of men, women and children suffering from this status. Documented cases of slave trafficking in Libya, carried out by smugglers and militias, have made the search for a solution even more urgent.

In the wake of this alarming status in Libya, on August 9, 2017, Oxfam published agraduate bulletin "You Are No Longer Human," in which it analyzed the facts of the status in Libya and blamed European countries for their "misguided policies aimed at preventing people from reaching Italy." To develop this report, Oxfam spoke "with men and women who have spent months being beaten, tied up like animals and sold as cheap labor in Libya's scandalous slave trade," and drew on the "...anguished testimonies of migrants who spent time in Libya before escaping to Italy."

The testimonies recount shocking scenes of sexual violence, torture and slave work ; they also recount cases of people who have been held captive because of the impossibility of paying the price demanded by the smugglers. The latter happened to Peter, an 18-year-old Nigerian: "Once we arrived in Sabah, in Libya, they took me to the 'Ghetto' (...) They gave us a phone to call our families and ask them for money. If you could not pay the 1,500 Libyan dinars [about 100 euros], you were held captive and beaten."

After hearing these testimonies, Oxfam has concluded that European policies must take into account the experiences of people forced to flee their homes, as the information they provide clearly sample that "Libya remains a country marked by systematic human rights abuses and (...) the EU's attempt to ensure that people cannot leave Libya only puts more men, women and children at risk of abuse and exploitation."

Some of the solutions Oxfam has proposed include promoting humanitarian search and rescue operations, increasing the issue of immigration applications that are accepted for processing, creating safe routes to Europe, and ending the policy that prevents migrants from leaving Libya.

Open, close borders

Another international agency that has actively denounced the inhumane status in Libya is Amnesty International. According to this organization's data , the world is facing one of the most serious cases of slavery in the 21st century. Refugees and migrants arriving on Libyan territory are detained and tortured in detention centers before being sold into slavery. Those who manage to escape such horrible conditions do not necessarily end up in better circumstances: at least 3,000 people have died trying to cross the Mediterranean.

As one of the most active organizations regarding the status in Libya, Amnesty International has order EU member states to stop closing their borders to refugees and migrants from Libya. It argues that this European policy only encourages and fuels violence and extortion on Libyan territory, making the EU complicit in this crisis.

Amnesty International recalls that, since the end of 2016, the closure of European borders has favored increased control by the Libyan Anti-Immigration department , which now oversees detention centers where refugees and migrants are not only arbitrarily and indefinitely detained, but also often sold as slaves. Moreover, according to the organization, the European inability or unwillingness to act, mistakenly believing that what happens outside European borders has no consequences for the EU's internal affairs, has allowed the Libyan Coast Guard to intercept people at sea. Instead of reaching the "promised land", migrants are forcibly taken back to Libya, where they are locked up and mistreated again in detention centers. All this is favored by the agreements reached by the EU and the local Libyan authorities, backed by armed groups, regarding the control of migratory flows to Europe.

International coordination

On December 7, 2017, the UN Securitycommittee held an emergency session to take action on the status of the slave trade in Libya. This status was described as an "abuse of human rights that may also constitute crimes against humanity", in which case the Libyan authorities and all member states of the organization should act in agreement with International Public Law by bringing those responsible before the International Criminal Court (ICC). In addition, the UN pointed to the Libyan authorities as one of the main actors complicit in the growing phenomenon of slave trafficking, due to their ineffectiveness in investigating it and administering justice. The organization has also placed particular emphasis on the need for the Libyan government to secure its borders and for its actions to be supported by various international instruments, so that human trafficking can be effectively countered. The UN has also encouraged cooperation with the EU and the African Union (AU) to ensure the protection of refugees and migrants, on the premise that success will only be achieved if all actors involved work together.

Meanwhile, the UN is already operating in the territory through the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which has helped 13,000 people to leave detention centers in Libya, and another 8,000 from those in Niger. But IOM's efforts do not end in Libya. Once refugees and migrants are safe, the organization stores their information and testimonies and offers them the possibility of returning home, ensuring IOM's attendance in the process.

Despite attempts to unify the efforts of all organizations active on the ground, the reality is that the UN today does not have a plan of action that includes all parties to end slavery in Libya and seek a common solution. According to reports from this organization, slavery in Libya could end by 2030, after 20 years of test and error. Not surprisingly, however, most NGOs have no action plans.

NGO solutions

NGOs play an important role in helping to alleviate the humanitarian problems caused by migration; however, the solutions they suggest often do not take into account the complex political realities that make reaching those solutions, if not totally impossible, at least challenging. As a result, many of the proposals offered by human rights agencies such as Oxfam and Amnesty International are too broad to be useful internship. The migration crisis, which reached its peak in the summer of 2015 with the effective invitation by several European nations for refugees to migrate to Europe-coupled with the relaxation of Dublin regulations and the opening of borders within the EU-paradoxically helped to exacerbate the problem. These measures provided an incentive for mass migration of people who did not fall into the "refugee" category, encouraging risk-taking among migrants on the premise that borders would remain open and all would be welcome.

The result has not only been the rapid backtracking on this policy by a number of countries that initially supported it, such as Austria, but also a dramatic internal and diplomatic conflict within the EU between countries that are against mass migration to the territory of the Union. The crisis also shed light on the inability of the existing laws of both the EU and its member states to find solutions to the migration problem. Thus, the policy of open borders as a solution to the problem may be well intentioned, but ineffective in providing a balanced solution to the problem.

Similarly, ensuring safe passage for migrants back to their home country is based on the assumption that there is an actual functioning government in Libya with which such efforts can be coordinated; however, no such entity exists as yet. While the GUN has a limited amount of control over certain swaths of territory, the problem remains that in other parts of Libya this government exercises no control. While assisting (limited) migration and/or repatriation and securing land and sea borders could be a first step in stemming the flow, the fact remains that political instability in Libya - as well as in other nations - is what breeds smuggling networks, one of which is the slave trade.

Therefore, the European policy of helping more people by relaxing borders hardly solves the problem. At its height, the migration crisis saw hundreds of thousands of migrants crossing open borders in Europe, with no realistic plan to deal with the numbers. Moreover, the international press seems to be reporting less aggressively on the various difficulties migrants face within their new host states as a result of a utopian policy in which the sky is the limit for immigration. More importantly, the open-door policy for immigration - pushed by a number of humanitarian organizations - has also led to the proliferation of smuggling networks within Europe that have required the establishment of new work forces to deal with them, although the result of this measure could be worse as increased control may lead to the emergence of new routes and access points. Nearly 90% of migrants arriving in Europe are facilitated by the multinational smuggling business. The point is that illegal activities thrive as a result of failed policies and the inability to find determined political solutions to the migration crisis: a necessary ingredient for successful practical measures.

The primary role of the states

The lack of government control over territory in Libya, characteristic of a failed state, has made possible the proliferation of illegal and highly humiliating activities against human dignity, such as the slave trade. Images such as the one on CNN, which provided evidence of people being sold into slavery in detention centers, have raised international awareness of the problem. Numerous organizations, led by the UN, have intensified their work in recent months to try to put an end to such a disastrous status . These efforts have achieved some results, however, there is no meaningful method to improve them because they are not coordinated at the state level, and the large-scale cooperation required by all parties involved is unlikely to be possible.

Moreover, the effects of the migration crisis are not unique to Libya or Africa, and have manifested themselves in Europe as well. Although human trafficking, both in the slave trade and for other purposes, occurs on a much larger (and quite alarming) scale in the African theater, the phenomenon has similarly affected Europe as a result of its failed - or non-existent - plan of action to manage immigration, both internally and externally. The solution is necessarily political, and the reality is that, however well-intentioned and necessary, the independent, rights-based solutions advocated by NGOs will not be decisive in solving the problem. Only states, working together with various NGOs, can put an end to this misery through well thought out and coordinated solutions. And the sad reality is that not everyone can necessarily be saved in the process, nor will all migrants be able to obtain their "European dream".

▲Enrique Peña Nieto and Donald Trump at the July 2017 G20 summit in Hamburg [Presidency of Mexico].

ANALYSIS / Dania Del Carmen Hernández [English version].

Canada, the United States and Mexico are immersed in the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The trade agreement between these three countries has been somewhat controversial in recent years, especially in the United States, where its appropriateness has been questioned. During the presidential campaign, Donald Trump defended the cancellation of the treaty; later, once in the White House, he accepted that there should be a renegotiation. Trump argued that the pact has reduced US manufacturing jobs and generated a trade deficit of more than $60 billion with Mexico ($18 billion with Canada), so unless new conditions substantially reduced that deficit, the US would withdraw from the agreement.

Overall, Americans have positive views of the treaty, with 56% of the population saying NAFTA is beneficial to the country, and 33% saying it is detrimental, agreement to a November 2017 Pew Researchsurvey . Among those who have a negative opinion, the majority are Republicans, with 53% of them saying Mexico benefits the most, while Democrats mostly support the pact and only 16% view it negatively.

Regardless of public acceptance, opinion about the treaty has not always been so dubious. When President Bill Clinton ratified the treaty, it was considered one of the greatest achievements of his presidency. Just as globalization has liberalized trade around the world, NAFTA has also expanded trade very effectively and presented a great issue of opportunity for the United States, while strengthening the U.S. Economics .

Under NAFTA, trade in U.S. goods and services with Canada and Mexico grew from $337 billion in 1994, when the treaty entered into force, to $1.4 trillion in 2016. The impact has been even greater when taking into account cross-border investments between the three countries, which went from $126.8 billion in 1993 to $731.3 billion in 2016.

Washington's concern is that, despite this increase in the trade Issue , in relative terms the United States is not achieving sufficiently fruitful results compared to what its neighbors are getting from the treaty. In any case, Canada and Mexico accept that, after almost 25 years in force, the agreement must be reviewed to adapt it to new production and trade conditions, marked by technological innovations that, as in the case of Internet development , were not contemplated when the agreement was signed.

Round-by-round examination

The discussion of the three countries touches on numerous aspects, but there are three blocks, which have to do with certain red lines set by the different negotiating parties: the rules of origin; the desire of the United States to end the independent arbitration system, through which Canada and Mexico have the ability to end measures that violate the trade agreement (elimination of Chapter 19), and finally proposals, perhaps less decisive but equally important, aimed at the general update the treaty.

When negotiations began in August 2017, it was hoped that they could be concluded by January 2018, with six rounds of meetings planned. This issue is already being surpassed, with a seventh round at the end of February, possibly to be followed by others. Now that the initial deadline has been reached, however, it is time to review the status of the discussions. A good way to do this is to follow the evolution of the talks through the rounds of meetings held and thus be able to assess the results that have been recorded so far.

1st Round (Washington, August 16-20, 2017)

The first round of negotiations put on the table the priorities of each of the three countries; it served to set the diary for the main issues to be discussed in the future, without going into concrete measures.

First of all, Donald Trump already made it clear during his election campaign that he considered NAFTA to be an unfair agreement for the United States due to the trade deficit that the country has mainly with Mexico and, to a lesser extent, with Canada.

According to figures from the Office of the US Trade Representative, the US went from a surplus of $1.3 billion in 1994 to a deficit of $64 billion in 2016. Most of this deficit comes from the automotive industry. For the new U.S. Administration, this casts doubt on whether the agreement will have beneficial effects for domestic Economics . Mexico, less inclined to introduce major changes, insists that NAFTA has been good for all parties.

Another topic that was mentioned was the wage gap between Mexico and the United States and Canada. Mexico argues that, despite having one of the lowest minimum wages in Latin America, and having had a stagnant average wage for the last two decades, this should not be taken into account in the negotiations, as it believes that Mexican wages will gradually catch up with those of its trading partners. On the contrary, for the US and Canada it is a topic of concern; both countries warn that a wage increase would not harm the growth of the Mexican Economics

Rules of origin was one of the main topics of discussion. The United States is seeking to increase the percentage of content required to consider a product as originating so that it is not necessary to pay tariffs when moving it between any of the three countries. This was controversial in this first round, as it could negatively affect Mexican and Canadian companies. Specialists warn that the minimum national content requirement does not exist in any free trade agreement in the world.

Finally, the Trump administration hinted at its intentions to eliminate Chapter 19, which guarantees equality in resolving disputes between countries, so that it is not the national laws of each country that resolve the conflict. The United States sees this as a threat to its sovereignty and believes that conflicts should be resolved in such a way that its own democratic processes are not ignored. Canada has conditioned its continued membership in the treaty on the maintenance of this chapter. Mexico also defends guarantees of independence in conflict resolution, although so far in this discussion it was not categorical.

2nd Round (Mexico City, September 1-5, 2017)

Although considered successful by many analysts, the second round of renegotiation continued at a slow pace. Some of the issues that advanced were: wages, market access, investment, rules of origin, trade facilitation, environment, digital trade, SMEs, transparency, anti-corruption, agriculture and textiles.

Juan Pablo Castañón, President of Mexico's Business committee coordinator insisted that the wage issue was not subject to negotiation for the moment, and denied that any of the parties had any intention of leaving the agreement, despite threats to that effect from the Trump Administration. Castañón said he was in favor of Mexico supporting the maintenance of Chapter 19 or the establishment of a similar instrument for the settlement of trade disputes between the three countries.

Round 3 (Ottawa, September 23-27, 2017)

The delegates made significant progress on skill policies, digital commerce, state-owned enterprises and telecommunications. The main breakthrough was on some aspects related to SMEs.

Canadian Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland complained that the United States had not made any formal or written proposals in the most complex areas, which in her opinion demonstrates a passive attitude on the part of that country in the context of the negotiations.

U.S. Trade Secretary Robert Lighthizer said that his country is interested in increasing wages in Mexico, under the logic that this is an unfair skill , as Mexico has attracted factories and investments with its low wages and weak union rules. However, Mexican business and union leaders are resisting such pressures.

Canada stood firm on its position on Chapter 19, which it considers one of the great achievements of the current agreement. "Our government is absolutely committed to defending it," Freeland said. Washington raised, although without presenting a formal proposal , the modification of the rules of origin to make them stricter and prevent imports from other nations from being considered "made in North America", just because they were assembled in Mexico.

This round took place while the United States imposed a tariff of almost 220% on C Series aircraft from Canadian manufacturer Bombardier, considering that the business had used a government subsidy to sell its aircraft to the United States at artificially low prices.

Round 4 (Virginia, October 11-17, 2017)

The United States presented its formal proposal to raise the rules of origin for the automotive industry and its suggestion to introduce a sunset clause in the agreement.

The United States proposed raising from 62.5% to 85% the percentage of components of national origin from one of the three countries in order for the automotive industry to benefit from NAFTA, and that 50% be of U.S. production. The Mexican Automotive Industry association (AMIA) rejected the proposal.

Washington's interest in weakening the dispute settlement system within the treaty (Chapter 19) was also debated, without a rapprochement of positions.

Finally, there was talk of including a sunset clause, which would cause the agreement to cease to exist after five years, unless the three countries decide to renew it. This proposal was widely criticized, warning that this would go against the essence of the agreement and that every five years it would generate uncertainty in the region, as it would affect companies' investment plans.

These proposals add to the tough negotiating climate, as already in the third round the United States had begun to defend difficult proposals, on issues such as lawsuits for dumping (selling a product below its normal price) in the importation of perishable Mexican products (tomatoes and berries), government purchases and the purchase of textiles.

Round 5 (Mexico City, November 17-21, 2017)

The fifth round took place without much progress. The U.S. maintained its demands and this generated great frustration among the representatives of Mexico and Canada.

The United States received no alternatives to its proposal to increase the regional composition from 62.5% to 85%, with at least 50% being U.S.-based. On the contrary, its trading partners put on the table data showing the damage this proposal would cause to the three economies.

Faced with the U.S. desire to limit the issue of concessions that its federal government offers to Mexican and Canadian companies, Mexican negotiators responded with a proposal to limit the country's government contracts to the issue of contracts reached by Mexican companies with other governments under NAFTA. Since the issue of these contracts is quite small, U.S. companies would be restricted in their contracting.

At the end of this fifth round, the most advanced issues are the regulatory improvement of telecommunications and the chapter on sanitary and phytosanitary measures. With the latter, the Americans are seeking to establish new transparent and non-discriminatory rules that will allow each country to establish the Degree of protection it deems appropriate.

Round 6 (Montreal; January 23-29, 2018)

The sixth negotiation showed some progress. The chapter on corruption was finally Closed , and there was progress in other areas. Some of the important issues that had been left out of the previous negotiations were discussed. Progress is slow, but seems to be making headway.

Robert Lightizer rejected the compromise on rules of origin that Canada had previously proposed. The framework was based on the idea that rules of origin should be calculated to include the value of software, engineering and other high-value work, facets that today are not taken into account with a view to the regional content goal

As a form of pressure, Canada threatened to reserve the right to treat its neighboring countries worse than other countries if they enter into agreements. One of them could be China. The proposal was not considered, as the United States and Mexico found it unacceptable.

Beyond the deadline

After more than seven months of meetings, as reflected in this round-by-round review of the talks, the negotiations between the three countries have still not reached the threshold of a pre-agreement that, while awaiting the resolution of more or less important points, would confirm the shared will to continue NAFTA. The tough positions of the United States and the pressure from Canada and Mexico to save the treaty have so far resulted in a "tug of war" that has allowed some partial, but not decisive, result . Thus, it remains to be determined whether the treaty has actually reached its expiration date or whether it can be reissued. For the time being, the three countries agreement to continue working towards a renewed treaty.

From what has been seen so far in the negotiations, it is difficult to determine which country will be more willing to yield to the pressure exerted by the others. The most controversial issues have hardly been addressed until recently, so it is not possible to say what each country has achieved in this negotiating process.

The two neighbors of the United States, but especially Canada, continue to warn of the risk of Trump wanting to kill the treaty. An acceleration of the negotiations could help the positive resolution of the process, but the electoral calendar rather threatens postponements. On March 30, campaigning begins for Mexico's presidential election, which will take place on July 1. In September, the U.S. will begin to look more closely at the November congressional elections. A substantial breakthrough before the Mexican presidential elections could put the agreement back on track, even if some issues remain to be closed, but if the next meetings fail to take that big step, the three countries could start to get used to the idea of the end of NAFTA, which would weigh down the negotiations.

U.S.-China relations do not satisfy either country; they probably never will. They must try to manage them, peacefully, peacefully

meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump [White House video screebshot].

ANALYSIS / María Granados

The National Security Strategy presented in December by Donald Trump formally label China and Russia as "rivals" of the United States. It presents these two countries as actors that "challenge the power, influence and interests" of Washington and "seek to erode the security and prosperity" of Americans. Although the document also considers "rogue" states such as Iran and North Korea, and transnational organizations, both jihadist and organized crime, as threats, the arguments of the new U.S. Administration focus especially on China. The Asian nation appears as the great obstacle to the realization of the "America First" promised by Trump, because of its unfair trade and currency practices.

Thus, the first National Security Strategy document of the Trump era corroborates the speech he had maintained as a candidate. During the election campaign Trump spoke of China as a "currency manipulator" and accused it of keeping the yuan artificially low. He also threatened Beijing with starting a trade war, complaining about the economic consequences for the US of China's excessive trade surplus in bilateral relations, as well as the reduction of US manufacturing jobs. Shortly after being elected, before the inauguration of his term, Trump provoked a diplomatic friction with China by having a telephone conversation with the president of Taiwan.

However, since his arrival at the White House, Trump has taken care to iron out these differences with China. He committed to maintaining the One China Policy, retracted his criticisms, and met in Florida with President Xi Jinping, agreeing to respect each other's sphere of influence and not to intervene in the internal affairs of the other. This, together with an incipient partnership in the sanctions against North Korea, seemed to be giving birth to a rapprochement that has not materialized. In fact, the US National Security Strategy's official treatment of China as a "rival" breaks with a long period of mutual acceptance that began in the 1970s.

Nixon's opening

The United States and China had serious precedents: the Korean War (1950-1953), which pitted China and the USSR in the North against the American-supported South, of which the Vietnam War (1955-1975) was a collateral consequence; and the nuclear danger that began in 1949, the year in which the USSR carried out the first effective essay . For Washington, from an ideological and military point of view, China was an international actor that it was desirable to control. For Beijing, in alliance with the Soviet Union, it was urgent to propagate communism's speech about the "imperialist enemy", which it repeated with intensity throughout the first years of the Cold War.

In 1969, the new US president, Richard Nixon, included in his inaugural speech a reference letter against isolationism (1). From the other side of the world there were also new messages: the distancing that Mao began to establish in relation to the USSR due to their border conflicts. This disrupted the triangle of international relations existing in those years of the Cold War (China, USSR, USA), and began to create a link between Beijing and Washington.

Thus, the first signs of rapprochement began to appear. In 1971 the United States voted for Taiwan's seat on the United Nations Security committee to be taken by the People's Republic of China. In 1972, the Shanghai statement was drawn up, which established the instructions for Sino-US rapprochement and was embodied in five principles:

1. The One China Policy: establishing diplomatic relations with China meant not being able to establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and vice versa, since both claim to be the true and only China.

2. Do not support Taiwan's independence.

3. Not to support the possible invasion of Japan.

4. Peaceful resolution of the conflict with Taiwan, reducing military installations on the island.

5. The commitment to continue being peaceful allies in search of lasting cooperation.

Since the rapprochement of the 1970s, relations between the two countries have been heavily influenced by Washington and Beijing's attitude towards Taiwan and the two Koreas, in a sort of indirect Sino-American relations.

The Taiwan issue

The self-styled Republic of China had been the main obstacle to the complete normalization of relations, as seen with the Shanghai statement . Actual reunification by (mainland) China was prevented by U.S. troops.

After 1973 there were two important documents: the so-called Taiwan Relations Act, by which the US recognized the island as having the same privileges as before, but not as a sovereign nation, and the Joint statement (sometimes known as the "Second Shanghai statement "), which drastically cut arms sales to Taiwan. In 1979, Washington and Beijing exchanged ambassadors and the Americans ceased formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Around 1980, the policy advocated by the mainland Chinese government was "one country, two systems", offering Formosa the exceptionality of a different and economically independent political system, but being part of the one China. However, this formula did not meet the 23rd province's desire for independence. By 1985, the island's government was moving steadily towards democracy (2).

In the late 1990s, Beijing threatened Taiwan with military exercises in the surrounding waters, in which missiles were deployed, prompting a forceful response from the United States: the dispatch of two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region; with this Washington showed a clear decision to protect the former ally because of its strategic importance.

The current status remains complex. No direct courier or telecommunications links have been established between China and its rebel province; no postal or parcel shipments are sent, and there is no direct flight connection. Face-to-face meetings between delegates have been infrequent and not very productive.

The North Korea problem

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for its part, constitutes a particularly critical point in Sino-American relations, which also affects South Korea and Japan, both US allies Pyongyang has already conducted six subway nuclear tests and continues with its missile launches over the Sea of Japan.

China is North Korea's only ally: it is its largest trading partner and its main source of food and energy. Beijing has historically opposed tough international sanctions against its neighbor. The desire for the survival of communism is essential to understand the close relationship between the sui generis Korean dictatorship and China. It is easy to guess why: if Kim Jong-Un's regime falls, Xi Jinping's regime could be destabilized. A refugee crisis, with thousands of North Koreans crossing the 1,400-kilometer border between the two countries, would have serious effects on the Asian giant. Although they continue to be strongly linked to Pyongyang, the Chinese have pushed for the resumption of the Six-Party Dialogue and have accepted the application of certain international sanctions.

Trump's blunt assertion that "if China won't solve the North Korean problem, we will" does not really dispel doubts about what might happen if Pyongyang crosses the threshold of nuclear capability. Certainly as the Kim Jong-Un regime has moved closer to that threshold, Beijing has increased its diplomatic, financial and trade pressures on its neighbor (3). But the possibility that North Korea is already on the verge of reaching its strategic goal leaves the United States with the choice of military action, which can hardly be both effective and limited, or having to settle for a policy of containment.

Over the years, Washington has tried to encourage North Korea to irreversibly abandon its nuclear program, offering in return a reward in the form of financial aid, diplomatic advantages and normalization of relations. At the same time, South Korea hosts 29,000 U.S. military personnel. In March 2017, executive orders from the US President and congress went beyond sanctions: a defense system known as THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) (4) was programmed as a preventive measure against a possible attack from the North and with the goal of ensuring the stability of the region.

The THAAD battery is particularly interesting to analyze because of the dual perspective it presents. Because of its limited range and capability, it should not be of concern to China, as the interceptors would not be able to reach Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles at any point along the trajectory from almost any of the possible launch locations. Thus, neither Washington nor Seoul should portray the system as a form of retaliation against Beijing for its failed sanctions on North Korea. Unfortunately, U.S. and South Korean officials suggest that the purpose of installing the THADD system is to send a warning message to China. This is counterproductive, as it only offers reasons to justify the nuclearization of the Asian hegemon in the face of the apparent degradation of its medium-range,second-strike capability Degree

Mutual dissatisfactions

If issues relating to Taiwan and North Korea have occupied much of the bilateral diary , the question of China's economic transformation, since its impetus by Deng Xiaoping, has been central to the direct relationship between China and the United States.

The Gǎigé kāifàng (reform and opening up) emphasized modernization and economic and political reform. This led to normalized diplomatic relations and the development bilateral trade and investment. Political, economic and security cooperation with the former "American imperialists" was based on subject prevention of terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation, and the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula.

However, there are still unresolved issues. U.S. dissatisfaction is due to China's human rights policy and its financial moves to devalue its currency as a means of controlling inflation. These currency movements call into question the control of the market by the American hegemon, which currently has greater weight and primacy, among other things, because the dollar is the international currency of exchange (it could thus "export its inflation" to Beijing). Also of concern in Washington is the dependence of the United States on imports from China, which generates a large bilateral trade deficit for the Americans. Another potential problem is the sale of missiles and nuclear technology to third states in the Middle East and Asia.

From the Chinese perspective, their dissatisfaction is due to US arms sales to the rogue province (Taiwan), the defense system established in South Korea (both the THAAD system and the military financial aid ), and a US international policy that Beijing describes as threatening, imperialist and domineering.

Cooperation channels

The U.S. view of China as a "rival," as reflected in the Trump Administration's first National Defense Strategy document, stems from the realization that the Chinese regime is not moving toward democracy as many in the rest of the world had hoped. "For decades, US policy was based on the belief that supporting China's rise and integration into the post-war international order would liberalize that country," the document says, noting that Beijing is not sliding towards a regime of political freedoms and respect for human rights, so Washington can no longer be as condescending to Beijing as it used to be.

Probably, without China's assumption of the values and principles that give meaning to the United States, a real and confident rapprochement between the two superpowers is impossible. Still, for the survival of both, extensive cooperation between them is necessary.

Although a war between the United States and China is not impossible, it is unlikely for a number of reasons, as Steinberg and O'Hanlon argue in Strategic Reassurance and Resolve (2015):

-The common goals of economic prosperity, trade exchange and interdependence at the stock market, financial and business levels make a warlike confrontation very damaging for both countries. In addition, China has progressively adopted measures against fraud and destabilization by computer manipulation, at the request of the United States; the issue of cyber espionage, although it continues to provoke mutual disagreements, is regularly addressed by both countries in their bilateral meetings, aware that it is likely to become more important over the years.

-The South China Sea is a trade route that has never been closed, although it is a source of disputes to be taken into account, as they remain unresolved even though they have been brought before the Court dealing with the Law of the Sea (following the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). The United States has strategic and commercial interests in the region that link it to its allies (Japan and South Korea), so this could be a source of tension. In any case, at present it does not seem that China wishes to provoke a military escalation in the area, even though it has established instructions on artificial islands and moved troops.

-ASEAN's code of conduct for the South China Sea, which precludes the use of force, may cause Beijing to rethink increasing its aggressiveness in the region. That ASEAN's push for China to stop claiming maritime sovereignty that has been rejected by the international community are points against war.

-There are several joint operations in the fight against terrorism (ISIS) and in the prevention of piracy, in which the two superpowers are involved.

-China has increased its humanitarian financial aid and its support to UN peacekeeping missions.

In a scenario of non-understanding between Beijing and Washington, but at the same time of non-armed confrontation, the following actions may be suggested:

-A negotiation that would include reduced U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in exchange for increased coastal security, and a commensurate reduction by China of threats to the island.

-Greater cooperation and transparency in arms and troop movements, militarization, restructuring of the armed forces and military exercises in the Pacific.

-Creation of joint organizations to fight organized crime and cyber-attacks, especially against threats to civilian infrastructure.

-Support and consistency in preventing nuclear escalation. Negotiation in reaching a firm conclusion on how to weaken the Pyongyang regime. Serious and consistent criticism, knowing the impossibility (as well as harm) of its direct overthrow.

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(1) "We seek an open world--open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people--a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation.
We cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy". Inaugural Address (January 20, 1969)

(2) It was the first time that the Democratic Progressive Party succeeded in pushing through the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan elections and forming a unified coalition against the Kuomintang. In 1992 the first free legislative elections took place in Taiwan.

(3) "China will be most likely to put diplomatic and financial pressure on North Korea if it believes that failing to do so will lead the United States to destabilize the regime," write Joshua Stanton, Sung- Yoon Lee, and Bruce Klingner in Foreign Affairs.

(4) The system typically has between 48 and 62 interceptor missiles with ranges of up to 200 kilometers, supported by radar with a range of up to about 1,000 kilometers.

▲Trilateral summit of Russia, Turkey and Iran in Sochi in November 2017 [Turkish Presidency].

ANALYSIS / Albert Vidal and Alba Redondo [English version].

Turkey's response to the Syrian Civil War (SCW) has gone through several phases, conditioned by the changing circumstances of the conflict, both domestically and internationally: from giving support to Sunni rebels with questionable affiliations, to being one of the targets of the Islamic State (ISIS), to a failed coup attempt in 2016, and always conditioning its foreign policy decisions on the Kurdish issue. Despite an initially aggressive stance against Assad at the beginning of the Syrian war, the success and growing strength of the Kurdish civil service examination , as a result of its role in the anti-ISIS coalition, has significantly influenced Turkey's foreign policy.

Relations between Turkey and Syria have been fraught with difficulties for the past century. The Euphrates River, which originates in Turkey, has been one of the main causes of confrontation between the two countries. Turkey's construction of dams limits the flow of water to Syria, causing losses in its agriculture and generating a negative impact on Syrian Economics . This problem is not limited to the past, as currently theGAP project (Southeastern Anatoliaproject ) threatens to further compromise the water supply of Iraq and Syria through the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric dams in southern Turkey.

In addition to disputes over natural resources, Hafez al-Assad's support for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in the 1980s and 1990s greatly hindered relations between the two countries. However, conflict was completely avoided with the signature of the Adanaprotocol in 1998. Another source of discord between Syria and Turkey has been the territorial claims made by both nations over the province of Hatay, still claimed by Syria but administered by Turkey, which incorporated it into its territory in 1939.

Despite the above issues, Syria and Turkey enjoyed a good relationship during the decade leading up to the Arab Spring and the revolutions of the summer of 2011. The international response to the Syrian regime's reaction to the uprisings was mixed, and Turkey was unsure of what position to take until, finally, it chose to support the rebel civil service examination . Thus, Turkey offered protection on its territory to the rebels and opened its borders to Syrian refugees. This decision signaled the initial stage of the decline in Syrian-Turkish relations, but the status worsened significantly after the downing of a Turkish plane on June 22, 2012 by Syrian forces. This resulted in border clashes, but without the direct intervention of the Turkish Armed Forces.

From a foreign policy perspective, there were two main reasons for reversing Turkey's non-intervention policy. The first reason was a growing series of Islamic State (ISIS) attacks in July 2015 in Suruc, Central Station in Ankara and Atatürk Airport in Istanbul. The second, and arguably the most important reason, was Turkey's fear of the creation of a Kurdish proto-state in its neighboring countries: Syria and Iraq. This led to the launch of Operation Euphrates Shield (also known as the Jarablus Offensive), considered one of Turkey's first direct military actions in Syria since the SCW began. The main goal was to secure an area in northern Syria free of ISIS and Democratic Union Party (PYD) faction control. The Jarablus Offensive was supported by article 51 of the UN Charter (the right of nations to self-defense), as well as several UN Security committee resolutions (Nos. 1373, 2170, 2178) pertaining to the global responsibility of countries to fight terrorism. Despite being successful in achieving its objectives, the Jarablus offensive ended prematurely in March 2017, without Turkey ruling out the possibility of similar future interventions.

Internally, Erdogan's military intervention and assertive posturing aimed to gain public support from Turkish nationalist parties, especially the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Grand Unity Party (BBP), as well as general public backing for the constitutional changes then being proposed. That would give Erdogan greater executive powers as president. Consequently, a foreign distraction campaign was more than welcome, given the growing domestic unrest and general discontent, following the coup attempt in July 2016.

Despite Turkey' sample assertiveness toward Syria, Turkish military intervention does not indicate strength. On the contrary, Erdogan's effective invasion of northern Syria occurred in the wake of disputes (between Syria and Iraq) that threatened to undermine Turkish objectives, both at home and abroad. Thus, limited United States (US) interference and the failure of rebel forces to topple the Assad regime meant the perpetuation of the terrorist threat; and, more importantly, the continued strengthening of Kurdish factions, which posed the most effective force against ISIS. Indeed, the Kurds' success in the anti-ISIS coalition had helped them gain worldwide recognition similar to that of most nation-states; recognition that meant increased financial support and increased provision of arms. A Kurdish region, armed and gaining legitimacy for its efforts in the fight against ISIS, is undoubtedly the main reason for Turkish military intervention. In any case, the growing Kurdish influence has resulted in Turkey's shifting and ambiguous attitude towards Assad throughout the SCW.

Turkey's changing stance on Assad

While Turkey aggressively supported Assad's ouster at the beginning of the SCW, this stance has increasingly taken a back seat to other more important issues of Turkey's foreign policy with its neighboring states, Syria and Iraq. Indeed, recent statements by Turkish officials openly acknowledge the resilience of the Assad government, a fact that opens the door to future reconciliation between the two sides. These statements also reinforce a widely held view that Assad will be a core topic in any future agreement on Syria. Thus, on January 20, 2017, Turkey's deputy prime minister, Mehmet Şimşek, said,"We cannot keep saying that Assad should leave. An agreement without Assad is not realistic."

This easing of rhetoric towards Assad coincides with a positive shift in Turkey's relations with the Syrian regime's allies in the conflict (Iran and Russia), in its attempts to bring about a resolution of the conflict. However, the official Turkish position towards Assad lacks consistency, and appears to be highly dependent on circumstances.

Recently, there was a war of words initiated by Erdogan with the Syrian president, in which the Turkish president accused Assad of being a terrorist. Moreover, Erdogan rejected any subject negotiation with Assad on the future of Syria. For his part, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem responded by accusing Erdogan of being manager of the bloodshed of the Syrian people. On January 2, 2018, forces loyal to Assad fired shells into Turkish territory. Such a launch prompted an immediate response from Turkey. On January 18, Mevlüt Çavusoglu (Turkish Foreign Minister) announced that his country intended to carry out an air intervention in the Syrian regions of Afrin and Manbij.

A few days later, Operation Olive Branch was launched, under the pretext of creating a "security zone" in Afrin (in Syria's Aleppo province); although it has focused almost entirely on expelling what Erdogan calls Kurdish "terrorists," which are actually composed of Kurdish factions backed by the U.S. These Kurdish groups have played a crucial role in the anti-ISIS coalition. The operation was reportedly launched in response to U.S. plans to create a border force of 30,000 Syrian Kurds. Erdogan stated in a recent speech :"A country we call an ally insists on forming a terror army on our borders. Who can that terrorist army attack but Turkey? Our mission statement is to strangle it before it is born." This has significantly worsened relations between the two countries, and triggered an official NATO response, in an attempt to avoid confrontation between NATO allies in Manbij.

The US is seeking a balance between the Kurds and Turkey in the region, but has maintained its formal support for the SDF. However, according to analyst Nicholas Heras, the US will not help the Kurds in Afrin, as it will only intervene in the mission statement areas against ISIS; starting from Manbij and towards the East (thus Afrin is not under US military protection).

Impact of the Syrian conflict on Turkey's international relations.

The Syrian conflict has had a strong impact on Turkish relations with a wide range of international actors; of which the most important for both Turkey and the conflict are Russia, the United States, the European Union and Iran.

The downing of a Russian SU-24 aircraft in 2015 led to a deterioration of relations between Russia and Turkey. However, thanks to the Turkish president's apology to Putin in June 2016, relations normalized, ushering in a new era of cooperation between the two countries. This cooperation reached its pinnacle in September of the same year when Turkey purchased an S-400 defense missile system from Russia, despite warnings from its NATO allies. In addition, the Russian business ROSATOM has planned the construction of a nuclear power plant in Turkey worth $20 billion. Thus, the partnership between the two nations has been strengthened in the military and economic spheres.

However, despite the rapprochement, there are still significant differences between the two countries, particularly with regard to foreign policy perspectives. On the one hand, Russia sees the Kurds as important allies in the fight against ISIS; and considers them essential members in the post-conflict peaceful resolution (PCR) meetings. On the other hand, Turkey's priority is to bring democracy to Syria and prevent Kurdish federalism, which translates into its refusal to include the Kurds in PCR talks. Nevertheless, the ties between Turkey and Russia seem to be quite strong at the moment. This may be due to the fact that the (in Turkey's case, increasing) hostility of both countries towards their Western counterparts outweighs their differences regarding the Syrian conflict.

The relationship between Turkey and the United States is more ambiguous. As important members of NATO, both countries share important work ties. However, looking at recent developments, one can see how these relations have been deteriorating. The main problem between Washington and Ankara has been the Kurdish issue. The US supports the People's Protection Units (YPG) militias in the SCW, however, the YPG is considered a terrorist group by Turkey. It is not yet known how their relationship will evolve, but possibly both sides will come to an agreement regarding the Kurdish issue. As of today (January 2018), the confrontation in northern Syria is at a stalemate. On the one hand, Turkey does not intend to give in on the Kurdish issue, and on the other hand, the US would lose its prestige as a superpower if it decided to succumb to Turkish demands. Support for the Kurds has traditionally been based on their role in the anti-ISIS campaign. However, as the campaign winds down, the US is finding itself in a bind trying to justify its presence in Syria in any way it can. Its presence is crucial to maintain its influence in the region and, more importantly, to prevent Russian and Iranian domination of the contested theater.

The US refusal to extradite Fethullah Gülen, a bitter enemy who, according to Ankara, was one of the instigators of the failed 2016 coup, has further strained their relations. According to a Pew Research Centersurvey , only 10% of Turks trust President Donald Trump. In turn, Turkey recently declared that its agreements with the U.S. are losing validity. Erdogan subryaed that the dissolution of ties between the two countries would seriously affect the legal and economic sphere. In addition, Turkey's Zarrab was convicted in a trial in New York, for helping Iran evade sanctions by enabling a money laundering scheme, which was filtered through US banks. This has been a big problem for Turkey, as one of the defendants had ties to Erdogan's AKP party. However, Erdogan has called the trial a continuation of the coup attempt, and has dealt with potential criticism by organizing a media campaign to spread the idea that Zarrab was one of the perpetrators of the conspiracy against Turkey in 2016.

With respect to the European Union, relations have also deteriorated, despite the fact that Turkey and the EU have strong economic ties. As a result of Erdogan's "purge" after the failed coup, the continued deterioration of freedoms in Turkey has strained relations with Europe. In November 2016, the European Parliament voted to fail EU accession negotiations with Turkey, justifying its decision on the abuse of human rights and the decline of the rule of law in Turkey. By increasingly adopting the practices of an autocratic regime, Turkey's accession to the EU is becoming impossible. At a recent meeting between the Turkish and French presidents, French President Emmanuel Macron emphasized the ties between the EU and Turkey, but suggested that there was no realistic chance of Turkey joining the EU in the near future.

Since 2017, after Erdogan's victory in the constitutional referendum in favor of the change of system (from a parliamentary to a presidential system), EU accession negotiations have ceased. In addition, several European bodies, which deal with human rights issues, have placed Turkey on a "black" list, based on an assessment, according to which the state of democracy in Turkey is in serious danger due to the AKP.

Another topic related to the Syrian conflict between the EU and Turkey is refugees. In 2016, the EU and Turkey agreed to transfer 6 billion euros to support Turkey's reception of hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees. While this appeared to be the beginning of a fruitful cooperation, tensions have continued to rise due to Turkey's limited capacity to take in such an issue of refugees. The humanitarian crisis in Syria is unsustainable: more than 5 million refugees have fled the country and only a small issue of them have received sufficient resources to restart their lives. This problem continues to grow day by day, and more than 6 million Syrians have been displaced within its borders. Turkey is currently hosting more than 3 million Syrian refugees and, as a result, Ankara's policies have result greatly influenced by this crisis. On January 23, President Erdogan stated that Turkey' s military operations in Syria would end when all Syrian refugees in Turkey could return safely to their country. Humanitarian financial aid is being sent to civilians in Afrin, where Turkey launched the latest offensive against Kurdish YPG militiamen.

Regarding the relationship between Iraq and Turkey, in November 2016, when Iraqi forces arrived in Mosul to fight against the Islamic State, Ankara announced that it would send the army to the Iraqi border, to prepare for possible developments in the region. The Turkish Defense Minister added that he would not hesitate to act if Turkey's red line was crossed. This received an immediate response from Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar Al-Abadi, who warned Turkey not to invade Iraq. Despite this, in April 2017, Erdogan suggested that in future stages, Operation Euphrates Shield would be extended to Iraqi territory: "a future operation will not only have a Syrian dimension, but also an Iraqi dimension. Al Afar, Mosul and Sinjar are in Iraq."

Finally, Russia, Turkey and Iran have cooperated in the framework of the Astana negotiations for peace in Syria, despite having somewhat divergent interests. In a recent call between Iranian President Rouhani and Erdogan, the Turkish president expressed his hope that the protests in Iran, which occurred in late 2017, will end. The relations between the two countries are strange: in the SCW, Iran supports the Syrian (Shiite) government, while Turkey supports the Syrian (Sunni) civil service examination . Something similar happened in the 2015 intervention in Yemen, where Turkey and Iran supported the opposing factions. This has led to disputes between the leaders of the two countries, however, such tensions have eased since Erdogan paid a visit to Iran to improve their relationship. The Qatar diplomatic crisis has also contributed to this dynamic, as it positioned Iran and Turkey against Saudi Arabia and in favor of Qatar. Although there is an enduring element of instability in relations between the two countries, their relationship has been improving in recent months as Ankara, Moscow and Tehran have managed to cooperate in an attempt to overcome their differences to find a solution to the Syrian conflict.

What lies ahead for Turkey in Syria?

Thanks to the negotiations in Astana, a future peace agreement in the region seems possible. The "cessation of hostilities" zones are a necessary first step, to preserve some areas from the violence of war, as the Turkish strategic plan indicated from the beginning. That said, the result is complicated by a number of factors: the strength of the Kurdish factions is a major element of discord, as well as a source of conflict for the powerful who will manage the post-conflict transition.

There are two main factors that have clearly impacted Turkey's foreign policy decisions regarding the Syrian conflict. The first has to do with the long and complex history of Turkey and its Kurdish minorities, as well as its obsession with preventing the Kurds from achieving a Degree territorial autonomy. If achieved, this would embolden the Turkish Kurds and threaten Turkey's territorial integrity. Turkey unilaterally attacked Kurdish civil service examination positions, including some backed by a NATO ally (the US), thus demonstrating the lengths to which it will go to ensure that the Kurds are not part of the solution at the end of the civil war. All this produces uncertainty and increases the chances of new conflicts in Syria.

The second factor is related to the changing nature of the government in Turkey, with a move away from the Western-democratic model towards a more authoritarian and quasi-theocratic model , taking Russia and Iran as political allies. In its pivot to the east, Turkey maintains a fragile balance, considering that its objectives differ from those of its new friends (Russia and Iran), with respect to the political result in Syria. Recent developments indicate, however, that Turkey seems to be reaching an agreement on the Assad issue, in exchange for more flexibility in dealing with the Kurdish issue (part of the anti-ISIS coalition), which it considers a threat to its national security.

Currently, in January 2018, the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. appears to be at an impasse, especially in relation to the U.S.-backed SDF group . Erdogan has stated that, after his operation in Afrin, he will continue with a move towards Manbij. Therefore, under NATO auspices, an agreement is being negotiated to clearly delineate the areas in which both countries are militarily active. There is great uncertainty as to how long such partition agreements (under the guise of an anti-ISIS coalition) can last before a new conflict breaks out. However, it seems likely that one of the two possible scenarios will occur to avoid the possible outbreak of war between the great powers in the Middle East.

There are two options. Either an agreement is reached regarding the future role of the SDF and other Kurdish factions, with Turkey's consent, or else the US will withdraw its support for the Kurds, based on the mandate that their alliance was limited to joint fighting in the anti-ISIS coalition. In the latter case, the US risks losing the political and military advantage that the Kurds give it in the region. It also risks losing the confidence of its Kurdish allies, a fact that could have serious strategic repercussions for US involvement in this region.