[Parag Khanna, The Future is Asian. Simon & Schuster. New York, 2019. 433 p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

Parag Khanna's book may be greeted with suspicion at the entrance because of the apparent axiomatic nature of its degree scroll. However, the blunt assertion on the cover is softened when one begins to read the pages inside. The thesis of the work is that the world is in a process of asianizationnot of chinizationMoreover, this process is presented as another coat of paint on the planet, not as a color that will be clearly predominant or definitive.

It is possible that the discussion of whether the United States is in decline and will be replaced by China as the preeminent superpower prevents seeing other parallel developments. Those watching Beijing's rise in the world order, writes Khanna, "have often been paralyzed by two views: either China will devour the world or it is on the verge of collapse. Neither is correct." "The future is Asian, even for China," he asserts.

Khanna believes that the world is moving towards a multipolar order, something that is also true in Asia, even if China's size often dazzles.

It is possible that this judgment is influenced by the author's Indian origin and also by his time living in the United States, but he offers figures to support his words. Of the 5 billion people living in Asia, 3.5 billion are not Chinese (70%): China, therefore, has only a third of Asia's population; it also accounts for slightly less than half of its GDP. Other data: half of the investments leaving the continent are non-Chinese, and more than half of foreign investments go to Asian countries other than China. Asia, therefore, "is more than China plus".

It is not just a question of size, but of wills. "A China-led Asia is no more acceptable to most Asians than the notion of a U.S.-led West is to Europeans," says Khanna. He rejects the idea that, because of China's power, Asia is heading toward a kind of tributary system like the one ruled in other centuries from Beijing. He points out that this system did not go beyond the Far East and was based mainly on trade.

The author reassures those who fear Chinese expansionism: "China has never been an indestructible superpower presiding over all of Asia like a colossus". Thus, he warns that while Europe's geographical characteristics have historically led many countries to fear the hegemony of a single power, in the case of Asia its geography makes it "inherently multipolar", as natural barriers absorb friction. In fact, the clashes that have taken place between China and India, China and Vietnam or India and Pakistan have ended in stalemates. "Whereas in Europe wars have occurred when there is a convergence in power between rivals, in Asia wars have taken place when there is a perception of advantage over rivals. So the more powerful China's neighbors like Japan, India or Russia are, the less likelihood of conflict between them."

For Khanna, Asia will always be a region of distinct and autonomous civilizations, especially now that we are witnessing a revival of old empires. The geopolitical future of Asia will not be led by the United States or China: "Japan, South Korea, India, Russia, Indonesia, Australia, Iran and Saudi Arabia will never come together under a hegemonic umbrella or unite in a single pole of power".

There will not be, then, a chinization of the world, according to the author, and the Asianization that is taking place - a shift of the planet's specific weight towards the Indo-Pacific - should not be seen as a threat to those who live elsewhere. Just as there was a Europeanization of the world in the 19th century, and an Americanization in the 20th century, in the 21st century we are witnessing an Asianization. Khanna sees this as "the most recent sedimentation substrate in the geology of global civilization," and as a "layer" he does not assume that the world Withdrawal to what came before. "Being more Asian doesn't necessarily mean being less American or European," he says.

The book analyzes the weight and fit of different Asian countries in the continent. Of Russia, he says it is strategically closer to China today than at any time since its communist pact in the 1950s. Khanna believes that geography leads to this understanding, as it invites Canada to maintain good relations with the United States; he predicts that climate change will further open up the lands of Siberia, which will integrate them more with the rest of the Asian continent.

As for India and China's relationship, Khanna believes that both countries will have to accept each other as powers more normally. For example, despite India's reluctance towards China's Silk Road and India's own regional connectivity projects, in the end the two countries' preferred corridors "will overlap and even reinforce each other," ensuring that products from Asia's interior reach the Indian Ocean. "Geopolitical rivalries will only accelerate the Asianization of Asia," Khanna sentences.

In assessing the importance of Asia, the book includes Middle East oil. Technically, this region is part of the continent, but it is such a separate chapter with its own dynamics that it is difficult to see it as Asian territory. The same is true when Israel or Lebanon are label as such. It may give the impression that the author is lumping everything together to make the figures more impressive. He argues that the Middle East is becoming less and less dependent on Europe and the United States and is looking more to the East.

Khanna is in a position to reasonably defend himself against most of the objections that can be made to his text. The most controversial, however, is the justification, close to defense, that he makes of technocracy as a system of government. Beyond the descriptive attitude of a model that in some countries has been the subject of significant economic and social development , Khanna even seems to endorse its moral superiority.

[John West, Asian Century on A Knife Edge: A 360 Degree Analysis of Asia's Recent Economic Development.. Palgrave Macmillan. Singapore, 2018. 329 p.]

REVIEW / Gabriela Pajuelo

The degree scroll of this book seems to contribute to the generalized chorus that the 21st century is the century of Asia. In reality, the book's thesis is the opposite, or at least it puts that statement "on the razor's edge": Asia is a continent of great economic complexity and conflicting geopolitical interests, which poses a series of challenges whose resolution will determine the region's place in the world in the coming decades. For the time being, according to John West, a university professor in Tokyo, nothing is certain.

The book begins with a preamble on the recent history of Asia, from World War II to the present. Already at the beginning of that period, economic liberalism was established as the standard doctrine in much of the world, including most Asian countries, in a process driven by the establishment of international institutions.

China joined this system, without renouncing its internal doctrines, when it joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. Since then, there have been some shocks such as the financial crisis of 2007-2008, which severely affected the U.S. economy and had repercussions in the rest of the world, or the recent tariff tensions between Washington and Beijing, in addition to the current global crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic.

The principles of protectionism and nationalism deployed by Donald Trump and an increased U.S. resource to the hard power in the region, as well as a more assertive policy of Xi Jinping's China in its geographical environment, also resorting to positions of force, as in the South China Sea, have damaged the multilateralism that had been built up in that part of the world.

The author provides some thought-provoking ideas on the challenges that Asia will face, given that the core topic factors that favored its development have now deteriorated (mainly due to the stability provided by international economic interdependence).

West examines seven challenges. The first is to obtain a better position in global value chains, since since the 1980s the manufacture of components and the production of final products has taken place in different parts of the world. Asia is heavily involved in these supply chains, in fields such as technology and apparel production, but is subject to the business decisions of multinationals whose practices are sometimes not socially responsible and allow the abuse of labor rights, which are important for middle-class development .

The second challenge is to maximize the potential of urbanization, which has grown from 27% of the population in 1980 to 48% in 2015. The region is known for densely populated megacities. This brings with it some difficulties: the population migrating to industrial centers generally moves from leave to high-productivity jobs, and health care capacity is put to the test . But it is also an opportunity to improve environmental practices or encourage innovation through green technologies, even though much of Asia today still faces high levels of pollution.

Another challenge is to give all Asians equal opportunities in their respective societies, from LGBT people to women and indigenous communities, as well as ethnic and religious minorities. The region also faces a major demographic challenge , as many populations either age (such as China's, despite the correction of the "two-child policy") or continue to expand with presumed future supply problems (as in the case of India).

West also reference letter to the barriers to democratization that exist in the region, with China's notable immobility, and to the spread of economic crime and corruption (counterfeiting, piracy, drug trafficking, human trafficking, cybercrime and money laundering).

Finally, the author speaks of the challenge for Asian countries to live together in peace and harmony, while China consolidates its position as a regional leader: if there is a Chinese commitment to thesoft powerThrough the Belt and Road initiative, there is also a more confrontational attitude on the part of Beijing towards Taiwan, Hong Kong and the South China Sea, while players such as India, Japan and North Korea want a greater role.

Overall, the book offers a comprehensive analysis of Asia's economic and social development and the challenges ahead. In addition, the author offers some thought-provoking ideas, arguing that a so-called "Asian century" is unlikely due to the region's lagging economic development , as most countries have not caught up with their Western counterparts in terms of GDP per capita and technological sophistication. Nevertheless, it leaves the future open: if the challenges are successfully met, the time may indeed come for an Asian Century.

[Xulio Ríos. Xi Jinping's China. De la amarga decadencia a la modernización soñada. publishing house Popular. Madrid, 2018. 300 p.]

review / María Martín Andrade

Given the globally known growth of China in recent years and the uncertainty caused internationally by its giant steps in a rather short period of time, it is worth examining what underpins the Chinese modernization process in order to determine its solidity. Xulio Ríos, expert in sinology and director of the Observatory of Chinese Politics (jointly dependent on Igadi and Casa Asia), carries out this analysis in Xi Jinping's ChinaRíos' approach covers political, economic and social issues. Rios addresses China's role in globalization and how Xi Jinping's 2012 takeover of power has further accelerated the country's rapid modernization.

Ríos begins by identifying the three keys to China's success in the modernization process: the employment a sound economic policy, the implementation of its own strategy and a strong identity capable of adapting the major currents of international thought to the country's specific characteristics. This adaptation has been at the heart of China's modernization process, whose challenges in the coming years are to move from an Economics of imitation to an Economics of innovation, to invest in fair policies aimed at correcting the inequalities the country faces, and to carve out a niche for itself in the international system without having to abandon its identity.

The Chinese dream is the main element that characterizes this new path that Xi Jinping intends to follow since he became University Secretary of the CCP; a dream that reference letter the illusion and aspirations of a people who have seen their path to modernization hindered. Unlike Maoism, where traditional culture was seen as an expression of the old society, Xi stresses the importance of highlighting some of the values of popular culture that can help consolidate the nation's consciousness in this century.

The author does not fail to note that the main obstacles to this rapid Chinese evolution are the high social costs of the latest transformations and the environmental bankruptcy that is causing so much serious damage. For this reason, without ever taking his eyes off the Chinese dream, the University Secretary of the CCP and President of the country assures us that he wants a beautiful, environmental, rich and powerful China, with global influence, but without ever abandoning its own profile .

As part of the party's governance reform, Xi Jinping persists, like no other previous president, in the importance of the rule of law as an expression of modernization in the form of government. In tune with this, judicial reform has become one of the main thrusts of his mandate to combat the imbalance in the administration of justice throughout the country. On the economic front, the role of private Economics in modernization is making China the world's leading Economics . The diversification of its investment in foreign reserves and developments in sectors such as automobiles are proving to be an alternative to the Western model that is aimed at taking the lead in globalization.

Thus, the four modernizations of Xi's governance focus on industry, agriculture, science and technology, and defense. These advances are intended to be complemented by a remarkable drive to strengthen multipolarity, increasing its presence in foreign markets and seeking global recognition of its update through new objectives, such as the revitalization of the Silk Roads, the creation of economic corridors or the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank.

Having broken down the different elements that make up the change in China's image, the author concludes by pointing out that, despite economic development and increased political confidence, the country can become more involved and take on more responsibility. However, due to its structural circumstances and domestic conflicts, China is not yet sufficiently prepared to replace the US or the West in global leadership. Nevertheless, there is nothing to stop Xi Jinping's distinguished move, compared to other Chinese leaders, to assert interests more conspicuously and visibly, with the Silk Road being a clear example of the ambition of the Chinese process.

[Jim Sciutto, The Shadow War: Inside Russia's and China's Secret Operations to Defeat America. Hasper-Collins. New York, 2019. 308 p.]

review / Álvaro de Lecea

With the end of the Cold War, which pitted the former Soviet Union against the victorious United States of America, the international system went from being bipolar to a hegemony led by the latter. With the United States in the lead, the West focused on the spread of democracy and commercial globalization, and if anything concentrated its geostrategic concern on the Al-Qaeda attacks on the Twin Towers on 9/11, so the focus shifted and today's Russia was put on the back burner. However, Russia continued to slowly reconstitute itself, in the shadow of its former enemy, which no longer showed much interest in it. Russia was joined by China, which began to grow by leaps and bounds. At this point, the United States began to realize that it had two great powers nipping at its heels and that it was engaged in a war it did not even know existed, the Shadow War.

This is the term used by Jim Sciutto, CNN's chief national security correspondent, to designate what he describes in detail throughout his book and which has largely come to be known as hybrid or gray zone warfare. Sciutto prefers to speak of Shadow War, which could be translated as war in the shadows, because this better denotes its character of invisibility under the radar of open or conventional warfare.

This new war was started by Russia and China, not as allies, but as powers with a common enemy: the United States. It is a subject of hybrid warfare, so it contains both military and non-military methods. On the other hand, it does not contemplate a direct military confrontation between the two blocs. In The Shadow War: Inside Russia's and China's Secret Operations to Defeat America, Sciutto explains seven situations in which one can clearly observe the strategies that China and Russia are following to defeat the United States in order to become the major world powers and to be able to impose their own international rules.

First of all, it is important to note that Russia and China, while pursuing similar strategies, are different types of adversaries: on the one hand, China is a rising power, while Russia is more of a declining power that is trying to return to what it was before. Nevertheless, both share a number of similarities. First, both seek to expand their influence in their own regions. Second, they are suffering from a crisis of legitimacy within their borders. Third, both seek to right the wrongs of history and restore what they perceive as their countries' rightful positions as world leaders. And finally, they possess great national unity, so the majority of their people would do whatever it takes for their nation.

In the shadow war, thanks to the rules established by Russia and China, any major player can win, regardless of the power it has or the influence it exerts on the other international players. Following the theories of international relations, one could consider that these rules follow a very realistic patron saint , since, in a way, anything goes to win. The power of lies and deception is the daily bread, and lines that were thought to be unthinkable are crossed. Examples of this, as the book explains and elaborates on, are the militarization of the artificial islands built by China in the South China Sea when Xi Jinping himself had promised not to do so, or the hacking of the Democratic Party's computer system in the 2016 US election campaign by Russian hackers, which could have helped Donald Trump to emerge victorious.

To all this must be added an essential part of what is happening in this context of non-traditional warfare: the particularly mistaken idea that the United States has about everything that is happening. To begin with, the first mistake made by the United States, as Sciutto explains, was to set aside Russia as a relevant focus in the international arena. It believed that, having defeated it in the Cold War, the country would no longer re-emerge as a power, and so it failed to see the clear clues that it was slowly growing, led by President Vladimir Putin. Similarly, it failed to understand the true intentions of the Chinese government in situations such as the South China Sea or the submarine degree program . All this can be summed up by the fact that the United States believed that all international actors would play by the rules established by Washington after the Cold War, without imagining that they would create a new scenario. In conclusion, the United States did not understand its opponents.

In his latest chapter, Sciutto makes it clear that the United States is currently losing the war. Its biggest mistake was not realizing the status until it was in front of it, and now it finds itself playing on a disadvantaged stage. It is true that the United States is still the world leader in many respects, but Russia and China are overtaking it in others, following the new rules they themselves have set. However, a change of attitude in U.S. policies could turn the tables completely. Thus, the author proposes a number of solutions that could help the United States get back in the lead.

The solutions he proposes focus, in the first place, on total knowledge of the enemy and his strategy. This has always been their great disadvantage and would be the first step to begin to control the status. In the same way, he recommends a greater unity within the allied block, as well as an improvement of their own defenses. He also recommends a better understanding of the new scenario in which the whole conflict is taking place, so that a series of international treaties regulating these new spaces, such as cyberspace, would be of great financial aid. Further on, he proposes setting clear limits on enemy actions, raising the costs and consequences of such actions. And finally, he encourages the United States to exercise clear leadership.

In conclusion, Sciutto's thesis is that the United States finds itself fighting a war whose existence it has just discovered. It is a subject of a war it is not accustomed to and with a set of rules that are alien to what it preaches. Although it is still the leader of the current international system, it finds itself losing the game because China and Russia have been able to discover its rival's weaknesses and use them to their advantage. The biggest mistake of the United States was to ignore all the signs of this shadow war and to do nothing about it. New scenarios have been introduced and the rules of the game have been changed, so the United States, if it wants to turn the status quo around and once again emerge as the victor, the author argues, will have to unite more than ever internally as a nation and strengthen its alliances, and know its enemies and their intentions better than ever before.

As for an evaluation of the book, it can be stated that it manages to convey in a clear and concise manner the most relevant points of this new contest. It manages to make clear the strengths and weaknesses of each actor and to make a general assessment of the current status . However, the author does not manage to be too goal in his judgments. Although he admits the failures committed by the United States, he offers a negative image of its rivals, taking for granted who are the good guys and who are the bad guys. That objectivity is lacking in some cases, since neither the good guys are always so good nor the bad guys are always so bad. That said, Sciutto does a great analysis of the current international status of the world's major powers.

[Bruno Maçães, Belt and Road. A Chinese World Order. Penguin. Gurgaon (India), 2019. 227p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

Having covered the moment of literature devoted to present the novelty of the Chinese New Silk Road project , Bruno Maçães leaves aside many of the specific concretions of the Chinese initiative to deal with its more geopolitical aspects. This is why Maçães uses the name Belt and Road throughout the book, instead of its acronyms - OBOR (One Belt, One Road) or the more recently used BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) - because he is not so much referring to the layout of the transport connections as to the new world order that Beijing wants to shape.

Through this economic integration, according to Maçães, China could project power over two thirds of the world, including Central and Eastern Europe, in a process of geographic cohesion of Eurasia to which this Portuguese politician and researcher has already dedicated his previous work.

Compared to other essays on the New Silk Road, this one focuses a lot on India (this is the case in its general content, but also in this review we have used a special edition dedicated to that country, with a particular introduction).

Maçães grants India the role of core topic in the Eurasia integration project . If India decides not to participate at all and, instead, to go for the alternative promoted by the United States, together with Japan and Australia, then the Chinese design will not reach the dimension desired by Beijing. "If India decides that life in the Western order will be better than under alternative arrangements, the Belt and Road will have difficulty achieving its original ambition," the author says.

Maçães believes, however, that the West is not all that attractive to the subcontinent. In that Western order, India can only aspire to a secondary role, while the rise of China "offers it the exciting possibility of a genuinely multipolar, rather than merely multilateral, world in which India can legitimately hope to become an autonomous center of geopolitical power," at least on a par with a declining Russia.

Despite these apparent advantages, India will not go all the way to either side, Maçães predicts. "It will never join the Belt and Road because it could only agree to join China in a project that was new. And it will never join a US initiative to rival the Belt and Road unless the US makes it less confrontational." So, "India will keep everyone waiting, but it will never make a decision on the Belt and Road".

Without Delhi's participation, or even more, with resistance from the Indian leadership, neither the US nor China's vision can be fully realized internship, Maçães continues to argue. Without India, Washington may be able to preserve its current model of alliances in Asia, but its ability to compete on the scale that the Belt and Road does would collapse; for its part, Beijing is realizing that it alone cannot provide the financial resources needed for the ambitious project.

Maçães warns that China has "ignored and disdained" India's positions and interests, which may end up being "a major miscalculation". He believes that China's impatience to start building infrastructure, because of the need to demonstrate that its initiative is a success, "may become the worst enemy".

He ventures that the Chinese may correct the shot. "It is likely - perhaps even inevitable - that the Belt and Road will grow increasingly decentralized, less China-centric," he says, commenting that in the end such a new Chinese order would not be so different from the structure of the existing Washington-led world order, where "the US insists on being recognized as the state at the apex of the hierarchy of international power" and leaves some autonomy to each regional power.

While Maçães places India in a non-aligned status plenary session of the Executive Council, he does foresee an unequivocal partnership between India and Japan. In his view it is a "symbiotic" relationship, in which India sees Japan as its first source of technology, while Japan sees the Indian navy as "an indispensable partner in its efforts to contain Chinese expansion and safeguard freedom of navigation" in the region's seas.

As for Europe, Maçães sees it in the difficult position "of not being able to oppose an international economic integration project , while being equally incapable of joining as a mere participant" in the Chinese initiative, in addition to the germ of division that the project has already introduced into the European Union.

From Bangladesh to Pakistan and Djibouti

Despite the differences indicated above, Maçães believes that the relationship between China and India can develop positively, even if there is some element of latent conflict, encouraged by a certain mutual distrust. The commercial linkage of two such immense markets and production centers will generate economic ties "called to dominate" world Economics by the middle of this century.

This movement of goods between the two countries will make Bangladesh and Myanmar the center of a major trade corridor.

For its part, Pakistan, in addition to being a corridor for the exit to the Indian Ocean from western China, will be increasingly integrated into the Chinese production chain. In particular, it can supply raw materials and basic manufactures to the textile industry that China is developing in Xinjiang, its export gateway to Europe for goods that can optimize rail transport. The capital of that province, Urumqi, will become the fashion capital of Central Asia in the next decade, agreement to Maçães' forecast.

Another interesting observation is that the shrinking of Eurasia and the development of internal transport routes between the two extremes of the supercontinent may lead to the North Sea container ports (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hamburg) losing weight in the trade between Europe and China at the expense of a greater transit of those in the Mediterranean (Piraeus, in particular).

The author also ventures that Chinese infrastructure works in Cameroon and Nigeria can help facilitate connections between these countries and Doralé, the port that China manages in Djibouti, which, through these trans-African routes, could become "a serious rival" to the Suez Canal.

If in Djibouti China has its first, and for the moment only, military base outside its territory, it should be kept in mind that Beijing can give a possible military use to other ports whose management it has assumed. As Maçães reminds, China approved in 2016 a legal framework that obliges civilian companies to support military logistics operations requested by the Chinese Navy.

All these are aspects of a suggestive book that does not allow itself to be carried away by the determinism of China's rise, nor by an antagonistic vision that denies the possibility of a new world order. The work of a European who, although he served in the Portuguese Foreign Ministry as director General for Europe, is realistic about the weight of the EU in the design the world.

[Graham Allison, Destined for War. Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Boston, 2017. 364 pages]

review / Emili J. Blasco [English version].

It is what has been called the Thucydides trap: the dilemma faced by a hegemonic power and a rising power that threatens that hegemony. Is war inevitable? When Thucydides narrated the Peloponnesian War, he wrote of the inevitability for dominant Sparta and rising Athens to think of armed confrontation as a means of settling the conflict.

That these two Greek polis necessarily thought of war, and eventually came to it, does not mean that they had no other options. History has shown that there are: when Wilhelmine Germany threatened to overtake Britain's naval strength, the attempted sorpasso (accompanied by various circumstances) led to World War I, but when Portugal was overtaken by Spain in overseas possessions in the 16th century, or when the United States replaced Britain as the world's leading power in the late 19th century, the handover was peaceful.

The call for Washington and Beijing to do all they can to avoid falling into the trap described by the Greek historian is made by Graham Allison in Destined for War. Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? The founding Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government reviews in his book several historical precedents. The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs of the same University, of which Allison is director, has researched these precedents in a program called Thucydides's Trap.

This concept is defined by Allison as "the strong structural stress caused when an emerging power threatens to unseat a reigning power. In such a status, not only extraordinary or unexpected events, but even ordinary hotspots of tension in international affairs can trigger large-scale conflicts".

This structural stress is produced by the clash of two profound sensitivities: the emerging power syndrome ("the reinforced sense that an emerging state has of itself, its interests and its right to recognition and respect"), and its inverse image, the reigning power syndrome ("the established power exhibits a heightened sense of fear and insecurity as it faces signs of decline").

Alongside the syndromes both rival powers also experience a security dilemma: "a rising power may disregard the fear and insecurity of a leading state because it knows that it itself is well-intentioned. Meanwhile, its opponent misinterprets even positive initiatives, taking them as excessively demanding or even threatening".

The use of military force

Allison starts from the fact that China is already catching up with the US as a power. It has done so in terms of its Economics Issue (China has already surpassed the U.S. in Purchasing Power Parity) and in relation to some aspects of military strength (a Rand Corporation report predicted that in 2017 China would have "advantage" or "rough parity" in 6 of 9 areas of conventional capability. The author's assumption is that China will soon be in a position to wrest the scepter of major superpower from the United States. Faced with this status, how will both countries react?

In the case of China, its millennial perspective will probably lead it to an attitude of patience, provided that there is some small progress in its purpose to increase its specific world weight. Since 1949, China has resorted to force in only three out of 33 territorial disputes. In those cases, China's leaders waged war - limited wars, conceived as notice to their opponents - despite the fact that the enemy was equal or greater, urged on by a domestic unrest status .

For Allison, "as long as events in the South China Sea generally move in China's favor, it seems unlikely that China will use military force. But if trends in the correlation of power were to turn against it, particularly at a time of domestic political instability, China would initiate a limited military conflict against an even larger and more powerful state such as the United States.

For its part, the United States can opt for several strategies, according to Allison: adapt to the new reality, undermine Chinese power (trade war, encourage provincial separatism), negotiate a lasting peace and redefine the relationship. The author does not give a firm committee , but seems to suggest that Washington should move between the last two options.

He recalls how Great Britain realized that it could not compete with the United States in the Western Hemisphere, and how this led to a partnership between the two countries, which became evident in the First and Second World Wars. This would have to involve accepting that the South China Sea is an area of Chinese influence. And this is not out of mere condescension, but because the United States is proceeding with a real clarification of its vital interests.

Despite its positive tone, Destined for War is one of the essays of the American establishment that most openly announces the end of the American era and the passing of the baton to China (it does not seem to envision a multipolar or bipolar world, but rather the primacy of the Asian power). It is also one of those that places less emphasis - certainly less than it should - on the strengths of the United States and the problems that could undermine China's coronation.