The change of government and its stricter vision have slowed down the implementation of the agreement, but it is progressing in its application.

The implementation of the peace agreement in Colombia is proceeding more slowly than anticipated by those who signed it two years ago, but there has not been the paralysis or even the crisis predicted by those who opposed the election of Iván Duque as president of the country. The latest estimate speaks of a compliance with the stipulations of the peace agreement close to 70%, although the remaining 30% is already being breached.

▲ Colombian President Iván Duque at a public event [Efraín Herrera-Presidencia].

article / María Gabriela Fajardo

Iván Duque arrived at the Casa de Nariño - the seat of the Colombian presidency - with the slogan "Peace with Legality", a degree scroll that synthesized his commitment to implement the peace agreement , signed in November 2017, but reducing the margins of impunity that in his opinion and that of his party, the Democratic Center, existed for the former combatants of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). One year after his election as president, it is worth analyzing how the peace agreement is being implemented.

About 70% of the provisions of the agreement have already been fulfilled, totally or partially, or will be fulfilled within the stipulated time, agreement to the estimate of the Kroc Institute, in charge of making the official estimate of the implementation of the peace process. According to its third report, published in April, 23% of the commitments have been completely fulfilled, 35% have reached advanced levels of implementation and 12% are expected to be completely fulfilled by the stipulated time. However, almost 31% of the content of the agreement has not yet begun to be implemented, when it should already be underway.

The United Nations, to which the agreement grants a supervisory role, has underlined the efforts made by the new government to activate the various bodies provided for in the text. In his report to the Security committee , the UN University Secretary , António Guterres, highlighted at the end of 2018 the launching of the Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final agreement (CSIVI) and the National committee for Reincorporation (CNR).

As indicated by Raúl Rosende, chief of staff of the UN Verification mission statement in Colombia, Guterres' report positively estimated that "20 collective projects and 29 individual projects of ex-combatants in the process of reincorporation, valued at 3.7 million dollars and which will benefit a total of 1,340 ex-combatants, including 366 women" had been "approved". These projects have involved the governments of Antioquia, Chocó, Cauca, goal, Santander, Sucre and Valle del Cauca, which have facilitated departmental reincorporation roundtables to coordinate local and regional efforts, thus involving Colombian civil society to a greater extent.

The UN has also expressed some concerns, shared by Colombian civil society. The main one has to do with security in some of the historical conflict zones where a high issue of social leaders have been assassinated. The murders have been concentrated in Antioquia, Cauca, Caquetá, Nariño and Norte de Santander. Thus, at least 226 social leaders and human rights defenders were assassinated in 2018, according to data from the Instituto de programs of study for development and peace(Indepaz). The Ombudsman's Office put the figure at 164.

In addition, as Rosende has recalled, many of the indigenous communities have suffered assassinations, threats and forced displacement. This has occurred in ethnic territories of the Awá, Embera Chamí and Nasa peoples in Caldas, Cauca, Chocó, Nariño and Valle del Cauca.

Along with the successes and concerns, the UN also points to a series of challenges that lie ahead in the post-conflict period. On the one hand, there is the challenge of guaranteeing former combatants the necessary legal security, generating confidence and producing real progress in terms of social and political reintegration. Another great challenge is to achieve the autonomous and effective functioning of core topic mechanisms such as the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) and the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition or Truth Commission. In addition, there is also the social challenge of attending to the communities affected by the conflict, which demand security, Education, health, land, infrastructure and viable alternatives against illegal economies.

Controversial aspects

Issues related to the SJP have been the focus of Duque's most controversial actions. In March, the president presented formal objections to the law regulating the SJP, which he wants to modify six points of its 159 articles. Two of them refer to the extradition of former combatants, something that is not now contemplated if they collaborate with the transitional justice system, especially in the case of crimes committed after the signature of the agreement. Duque also proposes a constitutional reform that excludes sexual crimes against minors from the JEP, determines the loss of all benefits if there is recidivism in a crime and transfers to the ordinary justice system the cases of illegal conducts started before the agreement and continued after. The objections were rejected in April by the House of Representatives and also by the Senate, although the validity of the result in the latter was left in question, thus prolonging the discussion.

A new controversy may arise when the Territorial Spaces for training and Reincorporation (ETCR) come to an end in August. Around 5,000 ex-combatants are still in or around them. The High Counselor for the Post-Conflict, Emilio Archila, has stated that by that time, with the financial aid of the FARC (the political party that succeeded the guerrilla) and the Government, the ex-combatants must have work, be clear about their residency program and be prepared for reincorporation into civilian life.

Within the reincorporation process, the lack of compliance by FARC leaders with their commitment, stipulated in the peace agreement , to remain until the end in the ETCRs in order to contribute with their leadership to the smooth running of the process is a cause for concern. However, in recent months, several leaders have left these territories, among them "El Paisa", who has also failed to appear before the JEP, which has demanded his capture.

Nor is former ringleader Ivan Marquez cooperating with the transitional justice system, successively delaying his appearance before the JEP citing security concerns. Márquez has cited the killing of 85 former guerrillas since the signature of the peace agreement , and has accused the government of serious failures to comply.

There is also the case of Jesús Santrich, who like Márquez had acquired a seat in congress thanks to the implementation of the peace process. Santrich has been detained since April 2018 on the basis of an Interpol red notice at the request of the United States, which accuses him of the shipment of 10 tons of cocaine made after the signature the peace agreement .

A topic that has been addressed from the time of the negotiations has to do with forced eradication and crop spraying. The illicit crop substitution program began to yield results in 2018, resulting in thousands of peasant families agreeing with the government to replace their coca crops with other licit crops. Although in some Departments such as Guaviare there was voluntary crop eradication, this was not enough to compensate for the increase in plantings in 2016 and 2017. In 2018, close to 100,000 families - responsible for just over 51,000 hectares of coca - signed substitution agreements and this issue is expected to continue to increase throughout 2019. According to the Colombian government, citing US State department figures, more than 209,000 hectares of coca leaf have been planted, far more than in the era of Pablo Escobar, according to figures presented by President Ivan Duque last month to the Constitutional Court.

The benefits of peace are indisputable and much remains to be done to consolidate it. It is a task that cannot be left in the hands of the government alone, but requires the support of former combatants, their former leaders and civil society. The great challenge is to accelerate the implementation of the agreement and reduce political polarization, all in the search for national reconciliation.

The possibility that Bolsonaro's government may seek to label the Landless Movement as terrorists for forcibly occupying farms reopens a historic controversy.

When Brazil passed its first anti-terrorism legislation around the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, the initiative was seen as an example to be followed by other Latin American countries, until then generally unfamiliar with a phenomenon that since 9/11 had become pre-eminent in many other parts of the world. However, the possibility that, with the political momentum of Jair Bolsonaro, some social movement, such as the Landless Movement, may be labeled as terrorist, revives old fears of the Brazilian left and accentuates social polarization.

Flag of the Movimento Dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST)

article / Túlio Dias de Assis

At the last Berlin Film Festival, the famous Brazilian actor and filmmaker Wagner Moura presented a somewhat controversial film, "Marighella". The film portrays the life of a character from recent Brazilian history, loved by some and hated by others: Carlos Marighella, leader of the Ação Libertadora Nacional. This organization was a revolutionary guerrilla manager of several attacks against the dictatorial military regime that ruled Brazil between 1964 and 1985. For this reason, the film provoked very different reactions: for some, it is the just exaltation of an authentic martyr of the anti-fascist struggle; for others, it is an apology for armed guerrilla terrorism. This small ideological dispute about "Marighella", although it may seem insignificant, is a reflection of an old wound in Brazilian politics that is reopened every time the country discussion the need for anti-terrorist legislation.

The concept of anti-terrorism legislation is something that has taken hold in many parts of the world, especially in the West after 9/11. However, this notion is not as common in Latin America, probably due to the infrequency of attacks of this subject suffered by the region. However, the lack of attacks does not imply that there is no presence of such movements in American countries; in fact, several of them are known to be "safe havens" for such organizations, as is the case in the Triple Frontier, the contact zone between the borders of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. What is happening in this area is largely due to the lack of direct and effective legislation against organized terrorism by national governments.

In the case of Brazil, as in some of its neighboring countries, the lack of anti-terrorism legislation is due to the historical fear on the part of left-wing parties of its possible use against social movements of a certain aggressive nature. In Brazil, this was already reflected in the political transition of the late 1980s, when there was a clear protest by the PT(Partido dos Trabalhadores), then under the leadership of Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva, against any attempt to introduce the anti-terrorist concept into legislation. Curiously, the 1988 Federal Constitution itself mentions the word "terrorism" twice: first, as something to be rejected in Brazilian foreign policy, and second, as one of the unforgivable crimes against the Federation. In spite of this, no attempt to define this crime was successful, and although after the 9/11 attacks discussions about a possible law were resumed, the labor left - already during Lula's presidency - continued to justify its refusal by invoking the persecution carried out by the military board the dictatorship. It should be noted that former President Dilma Rousseff herself was imprisoned for being part of the VAR-Palmares(Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária Palmares), an extreme left-wing revolutionary group that was part of the civil service examination armed civil service examination the regime.

Terrorist threat at the Olympic Games

During the PT mandates (2003-2016) there was no subject of legislative initiative by the Government on the topic; moreover, any other project that came from the Legislative, whether it was the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies, was blocked by the Executive. Often the Government also justified its position by alluding to a supposed "neutrality", hiding behind the desire not to get involved in external conflicts. This attitude would lead to several fugitives accused of participating or collaborating in attacks in other countries taking refuge in Brazil. However, in mid-2015, as the start of the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro approached, the risk of a possible attack in the face of such an important event was assessed. This, together with pressure from the right wing in congress (bear in mind that Rousseff won the 2014 elections with a very narrow margin of less than 1%), led the petista government to ask parliament to draft a concise definition of terrorism and other related crimes, such as those related to financing. Finally, the first Brazilian anti-terrorism law was signed by Rousseff in March 2016. Although this is the "official" version of this process, there are many who argue that the real reason for the implementation of the law was the pressure exerted by the FATFgroup Financial Action Task Force against Money Laundering, created by the G8), since this entity had threatened to include Brazil in the list of non-cooperative countries against terrorism.

The Brazilian anti-terrorism law was effective, as it served as a legal framework for the so-called Operação Hardware. Through this operation, the Brazilian Federal Police managed to arrest several suspects of a DAESH branch operating in Brazil, who were planning to carry out an attack during the Rio Olympics. Federal judge Marcos Josegrei da Silva convicted eight suspects of membership of an Islamic terrorist group , in the first such subject in Brazilian history. The judge's decision was quite controversial at the time, largely due to Brazilian society's unfamiliarity with this subject of risk. As a result, many Brazilians, including part of the press, criticized the "disproportionality" with which the defendants were treated.

Bolsonarist Momentum

Since then, Brazil has come to be considered as a sort of example among South American countries in the fight against terrorism. However, it does not seem that the status quo maintained during the end of the Rousseff administration and the short term of Temer will remain intact for long. This is due to the fiery discussion stirred up by the Bolsonarista right wing, which advocates that the criminal activities of several far-left groups, especially the MST(Movimento Dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra), be classified as terrorism. The MST is the largest agrarian social movement, Marxist in nature, and is known nationally for its occupations of land that the group considers "useless or underutilized" in order to "put it to better use". The ineffectiveness of the State in stopping the invasions of private property carried out by the MST has been recurrently denounced in congress, especially during the PT government years, without major consequences. However, now that the right wing has greater weight, the discussion has come back to life and not a few deputies have already mentioned their intention to seek to denounce the Landless Movement as a terrorist organization. Bolsonaro himself has been a fierce advocate of outlawing the MST.

At the same time that the current Minister of Justice, Sergio Moro, announces the possibility of the creation of an anti-terrorist intelligence system, following the model of his U.S. counterpart, and the congress discussion the expansion of the current list of terrorist organizations to include groups such as Hezbollah, other Brazilian politicians have decided to initiate in the Senate a proposal for legislation to criminalize the actions of the MST. If approved, this initiative would make real the fear that the left has invoked all these years. After all, this is not the best way to fulfill the promise of "governing for all". Moreover, such a disproportionate measure for this subject of activities would only increase the already intense political polarization present today in Brazilian society: it would be tantamount to rubbing salt in an old wound, one that seemed to be about to heal.

One of the poorest countries in the Americas may become the world's largest oil producer per capita, disrupting the relationship with its neighbors.

Promising oil discoveries in Guyana's waters augur greater regional relevance for this small and poor South American country. Territorial disputes between Venezuela and its neighbor, on account of the Essequivo territory that Caracas has historically claimed (more than half of Guyana's surface area), may be exacerbated by the opening of wells in deep waters that Guyana administers but over which Venezuela seeks fair international arbitration.

Image created by ExxonMobil about its exploration in Guyana's waters.

article / Ignacio Urbasos Arbeloa

Guyana has found oil deposits 193 km off its coast by ExxonMobil that may completely change the course of its Economics and its international influence. After several decades of failed attempts in the search for hydrocarbons in its subsoil and an exhaustive search since 1999, in 2015 the Liza field responded positively to seismic analysis, subsequently showing abundant oil reserves at a depth of 1,900 meters offshore. At the moment estimates speak of 3.2 billion barrels of recoverable oil to be found in the Guiana Basin, which extends to Suriname, another country with a promising oil future. Companies such as Total, Repsol or Anadarko have already obtained exploration rights in the different blocks offered so far by the Guyanese government, however it is the Stabroek Block, exploited by Exxon (45%), Hess (30%) and the Chinese CNOOC (25%), which will be the first to start producing, in 2020.

With expectations of reaching 700,000 barrels per day by 2025, this is the largest global deepwater finding of the lustrum and one of the most valuable additions to conventional oil production. The crude is Pass for middle distillates, precisely what Gulf of Mexico refiners are looking for in a market saturated by light crude from fracking. agreement optimistic estimates, by 2025 this impoverished country of about 700,000 people would surpass OPEC member Ecuador in oil production, making it the world's largest producer of barrels per capita (ahead of the current leader, Kuwait, which has a production of 3.15 million barrels per day and 4.1 million inhabitants). Production costs per barrel are estimated at $26 considering taxes, so profits are expected to be abundant in practically any future scenario (currently the barrel of WTI is around $50), making Guyana one of the great attractions in the oil industry at the moment. Prospecting led by Exxon, a company that already dominates exploitation in the so-called deepwaters, had in 2018 hit fees close to 80%, which has generated enormous expectation in a sector accustomed to fees of 25%.

The positive impact this finding will have for Guyanese Economics is evident, although it is not without Exempt challenges, given the high levels of corruption or a bureaucracy and political class inexperienced for negotiations at this level. The IMF, which is advising Guyana, has already recommended freezing further negotiations until the tax system is reformed and the country's bureaucratic capacity is improved. The same agency has estimated a 28% GDP growth for Guyana by 2020, a historic figure for an Economics whose exports are based on rice, sugar cane and gold. The government is already designing an institutional framework to manage oil tax revenues and cushion their impact on other sectors. Among the proposals is the creation of a sovereign wealth fund similar to those of Norway, Qatar or the United Arab Emirates, which could become effective this year with the partnership of experts from the Commonwealth, to which the country belongs.

Historic dispute with Venezuela

These new discoveries, however, increase the tension with Venezuela, which maintains a territorial dispute over 70% of the Guyanese territory, the Guayana Esequiba belonging to the Captaincy General of Venezuela during the Spanish Empire. The disputed territory was later de facto colonized by the British Empire when the British took control over the Dutch territories of Guyana in 1814. In 1899 an international tribunal ruled unanimously in favor of the United Kingdom against Venezuelan claims. However, later revelations demonstrated the existence of serious elements of corruption in the judicial process, making the award "null and void" (non-existent) in 1962. In 1966 the United Kingdom, as representative of British Guyana, and Venezuela signed the Genevaagreement , which established the commitment to reach an agreement: the 1970 Port of Spain protocol , which froze negotiations for 12 years. After the end of this period, Venezuela demanded Guyana to return to direct negotiations, and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the diplomatic formula of good offices has been agreed upon and is still in force today, but no significant progress has been made. Since Guyana's independence in 1966, Venezuela promoted an indigenous separatist movement in the region, Rupununi, which was harshly repressed by Georgetown, setting a precedent of military tension on the border.

Although a formal agreement on the territorial dispute has never been reached, the arrival of the socialist People's Progressive Party (PPP) to power in Guyana in 1992 and the electoral victory of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1999 ideologically aligned both countries, which allowed them to reach unprecedented cooperationDegrees during the first decade of the 21st century. In the framework this golden era, Guyana participated between 2007 and 2015 in the Venezuelan Petrocaribe initiative, receiving some 25,000 barrels per day of oil and derivatives, which constituted 50% of its consumption, in exchange for rice valued on market price. On the other hand, Guyana supported Venezuela's candidacy to the United Nations Security committee in 2006 in exchange for an express promise by Caracas not to use the privileged position it temporarily acquired in the territorial dispute. An important precedent was Hugo Chávez's declaration in 2004 of not opposing Guyana "to unilaterally grant concessions and contracts to multinational companies, as long as this favors the development the region". In spite of the existence of unfriendly acts between the two States during this period, the vital importance that the Venezuelan anti-imperialist foreign policy gave to the Caribbean during Chávez's mandate, obliged him to treat the topic from the most absolute moderation to avoid a disagreement with CARICOM and to maintain Guyana's support in the OAS.

New tensions

As a result of the oil discoveries, the historic territorial dispute with Venezuela has returned to the forefront. A change of sign in the Georgetown government has also contributed to this. The 2015 elections brought to power in Guyana the A Partnership for National Unity, led by former military officer David Granger. This is a multi-ethnic coalition that could be described as center-right and with less ideological sympathies towards neighboring Venezuela than those professed by the previous president, Bharrat Jagdeo of the PPP. At the end of 2018 there was an escalation of tension, following the seizure on December 23 by the Bolivarian National Navy of two Guyanese-flagged vessels belonging to ExxonMobil that were prospecting in the area and which, agreement to the version of the Government of Nicolás Maduro, had entered Venezuelan waters. The international response was not long in coming and the United States urged Venezuela to "respect international law and the sovereignty of its neighbors". Precisely one of the most complex issues in the territorial dispute is the projection of the waters of each country. The position defended by Venezuela is to draw the maritime limits in agreement with the projection of the Orinoco River delta, as opposed to the Guyanese position which draws the line in a manner favorable to its territorial interests. Although this was a secondary element in the territorial dispute, the economic potential of these waters places them at the center of the discussion.

To all this must be added the declaration of the Lima group , of which Guyana is a member, not to recognize the May elections in Venezuela and to threaten to sanction the country economically (although, to date, it has not recognized the opposition candidate Juan Guaidó as interim president). The international ostracism of the Bolivarian Republic has allowed Guyana to obtain important diplomatic support from the aforementioned Lima group , CARICOM and the United States in relation to its international dispute and the detention of the Exxon ships.

The future of relations between Venezuela and Guyana depends to some extent on the result of the upcoming March elections in the latter country, which will pit the hitherto president, David Granger, recently ousted from power by means of a motion of no confidence, against the leader of the PPP, Bharrat Jagdeo, whose party has maintained the best relations with Chavista Venezuela. The no-confidence motion is a historic milestone for the South American country, which will have to prove its social cohesion and political stability amid geopolitical tensions and an international investment community that is watching closely the development of events.

Increased defense revenues

Georgetown, for the moment, limits itself to diplomatic action to defend its territorial sovereignty, but documents of the Guyanese Defense Forces prior to the oil discoveries already identified the need to develop military capabilities in case such resources were found in the country. agreement Exxon's estimates, Guyana would start earning US$ 16 billion annually from 2020, which would increase the military expense , currently around 1% of GDP. The Army of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana conducted in August 2018 the largest military exercises in its history, mobilizing 1,500 troops out of an Army estimated at around 7,000. available information about the material resources of navy and aviation show the need for quantitative and qualitative improvement. Overcoming the existing ethnic divisions between the population of Indian and African origin must be one of the priorities of the Armed Forces, which suffer from a clear under-representation of the original Indian community, a cause of historical mistrust by civil society.

In the final, the Caribbean region of South America will be marked in the coming years by Guyana's economic potential and its struggle for territorial survival in the face of Venezuela's legitimate demands. Achieving a real development of the oil industry will undoubtedly be the best armor for its future as a sovereign and independent country. The political uncertainty in Venezuela, immersed in an enormous crisis, generates the fear of a possible military escalation as an escape valve to the internal economic and political pressure against a rival that lacks the resources to face it. The capacity of Guyana's political class to manage the brutal increase in its economic resources after 2020 is still an unknown, but it is possible to imagine that the second poorest country in the Western Hemisphere will reach great heights of development if it is able to learn from its neighbors and manage a regional context that is favorable to its national interests.

Geopolitical misgivings about perceived foreign interests should not distract beneficiary countries from implementing sustainable use.

The Guarani Aquifer has given rise to a more political than scientific literature in South America, denouncing the alleged interest of great powers (formerly the United States, now China) to take away the water that naturally belongs to the countries of the region. These crusades often distract from a more indisputable fact: the risk comes not so much from outside as from uncontrolled practices and the lack of clear legislation in the aquifer countries themselves. This article reviews the results of some recent programs of study on the characteristics and status of the Guarani Aquifer.

▲ source: UC Irvine/NASA/JPL-Caltech

article / Albert Vidal

About one third of the large groundwater aquifers are in a critical status . Current technology does not allow us to accurately predict how much water we have left on the planet, and precisely because of this uncertainty, accelerated groundwater extraction is too great a risk not worth taking. 

The map above shows the 37 largest aquifers in the world, which have been studied by a NASA satellitemission statement known as the Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE). This mission statement has attempted to measure the water levels in the aquifers, in order to check the water stress to which they are subjected, as well as their level of renewal. Of these, there are 21 whose extraction is not sustainable, and they are losing water very rapidly. Among these, there are 13 whose status is particularly critical (darkest red), and threatens regional water security. There are 16 other aquifers that enjoy sufficient recharge to not lose water or even gain water; these are marked in blue.

This NASA research , the results of which are analyzed in a study by Water Resources Research, divides aquifer water stress into 4 different types, from highest to lowest intensity: extreme stress, variable stress, human-dominated variable stress, and no stress. Let us now look at another map, taken from this study, which sample the spatial distribution of groundwater abstraction in the world:

The color of the dots indicates the intensity of extraction, measured in millimeters per year. Thus, this statistic sample the sum of withdrawals for industrial, agricultural and domestic use. At first glance, it can be seen that the countries that suffer the most accelerated extraction are India, Pakistan, China, Egypt and the United States. In the case of the Guarani Aquifer, the extraction points are located in Paraguayan territory and near Sao Paulo, with an extraction of between 0 and 5 millimeters per year.

research has produced other maps that may be of financial aid to understand the problem in more depth. In this case, the following map sample an average annual recharge of the world's aquifers.

The yellow color represents negative recharge, i.e., systems that are losing water. The blue color, on the other hand, marks those aquifers that have a positive recharge (the more intense the blue color, the greater the recharge). The Guaraní aquifer, in particular, has a recharge of 225 millimeters per year.

Finally, we will see two maps referring to the water stress of aquifers.

The countries listed above (a) suffer from extreme water stress, i.e., natural recharge is negative, and there is also intense human use. This particularly affects the African continent, the United States, the Middle East and the heart of Asia.

Here we show (b) those aquifers with a variable stress level. This means that they have a positive natural recharge, but at the same time there is a human use that could be detrimental. The Guarani Aquifer falls into the latter group.

The Guarani Aquifer

reference letter to a famous phrase from a speech by Franklin D. Roosevelt - "with great power comes great responsibility"- we can say that the countries that enjoy access to the Guarani Aquifer System (GAS) must assume the responsibility that comes with having been endowed with this important natural resource . They know that, many times, these riches bring competition, unrest and even problems such as internal instability and tensions between some large companies and governments.

The SAG is a transboundary aquifer that extends below the surface across 1.2 million km2 between Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina. According to the most recent research, this is the third largest groundwater reservation in the world in terms of surface area, and contains about 45,000 km3. The low recharge capacity is the most common problem in the aquifers of our planet, since it is usually not enough to cover the amount extracted, thus jeopardizing their sustainable use. This system is particularly important because of its very high renewal capacity (between 160 and 250 km3 per year), which takes place thanks to the abundant rainfall that feeds it.

Challenges posed by

Let us begin, then, with a brief historical contextualization. There have been several moments that will help us understand the current state of interest and challenges surrounding the SAG. In 1969, the La Plata Basin Treaty was signed to carry out a series of programs of study on the hydrological basin of La Plata (which includes the Guarani Aquifer). Three decades later, in 2001, the agreement framework on the Mercosur Environment was ratified, in which the importance of the environment was highlighted and the creation of a legal framework to preserve it was proposed. Between 2003 and 2009, the project for the Environmental Protection and Sustainable development of the Guarani Aquifer System(PSAG) was developed thanks to the impulse of the four countries of the Rio de la Plata basin, to prepare a management framework for the SAG with environmental sustainability criteria (and to anticipate future problems). Finally, in 2010, the Treaty of San Juan was signed; a much broader cooperation treaty, but which was not ratified by all states parties. Also known as the Guarani Aquifer agreement , it was influenced by many supranational bodies and transnational companies. So, the question arises, where are the problems?

Well, first of all, Argentina and Uruguay ratified the Guarani Aquifer agreement in 2012, which provided for a series of restrictions on water extraction, in order to manage the aquifer's resources in a more sustainable way. What happened is that neither Brazil nor Paraguay ratified it at that time and their signatures are necessary for the agreement to enter into force. Surprisingly, Paraguay stepped forward in 2018 and ratified the agreement, showing signs of wanting greater cooperation. Brazil depends heavily on the water extracted from the SAG (especially its southern provinces), so it wants to renegotiate the Guarani Aquifer agreement to obtain more favorable conditions.

Of course, Brazil is not the only one that has problems with the current status . Paraguay, for example, did not ratify the agreement until 2018, alleging a violation of national sovereignty (something totally understandable, if we take into account that Paraguay has the largest aquifer recharge area ). As an example of all this, Miguel Giraut, from Argentina's Ministry of Mines and Energy, commented in 2016 that coordination was non-existent.

In addition to these regional tensions, there are other subject of problems related to interference from outside powers, international organizations and transnational corporations. Again, a reservation such as the SAG is especially attractive to companies and some countries that need to secure their supply of water resources. However, these dangers are relatively innocuous compared to others that could lead to aquifer contamination or irreversible change in the ecosystem.

If we face this question with some realism, it is unlikely that there will be intentional contamination of the aquifer (by chemical attack, for example), as this would benefit no one. Certainly, there is the danger of accidental contamination by the discharge of toxic substances from agriculture. In Brazil, specifically, there is a lot of agribusiness being developed over the aquifer (especially for soybean cultivation). It happens that, through the same cracks through which the water that recharges the aquifer passes, pesticides, residues and agrotoxins can also enter. In addition, the recent introduction of hydraulic fracturing techniques (known as fracking) is another potential source of contamination.

Another possible risk comes from an accelerated extraction by transnational companies or governments themselves, which would exceed the level of recharge and produce irreversible changes in the ecosystem. Deforestation brings another risk factor: water infiltration capacity is lower when trees are cut down, and the soil is exposed to erosion and pollutants as it loses nutrients (especially in recharge areas). In addition, population pressure and economic growth add even more variables to the uncertain future.

Uncertain but hopeful future

In summary, although these challenges may evolve negatively, there are many reasons that give us hope. After all, aquifer water is highly valued for its medicinal purposes, its usefulness for the coffee industry and its use in the production of geothermal energy. That is why the owners of this precious resource are the first to be interested in conserving and managing it in a sustainable manner, and they are fully aware that cooperation is crucial to this end.

Moreover, the SAG could increase the geopolitical and geoeconomic importance of the region, which until now has been considered a peripheral region on the international scene. It is obvious that water is gaining importance as a natural resource , given its scarcity and growing demand. Although it is unlikely that the region will become a major player, due to its geographical location and integration difficulties, it could give rise to the four Southern Cone countries taking leadership positions in areas related to sustainable extraction and fair distribution of water in the future. To seize this opportunity, it is necessary to adopt exemplary attitudes right now. If this happens, not only will they be considered exemplary countries, but they will surely attract investment in new and more efficient extraction methods. All this will also enhance the socioeconomic development of the population living above the aquifer, which, if it can be maintained, will mark the future of South America.

The risk of military use of the facility, fueled by confidentiality clauses, fuels discussion in Argentina and suspicions in Washington.

China's arrival on the far side of the Moon has highlighted Chinese space advances. For this new degree program, Beijing has a tracking and observation station in Patagonia, the first of its own territory. In Argentina there has been extensive discussion about possible unacknowledged purposes of these facilities and alleged secret clauses negotiated at the time by the Kirchner Administration. The government of Mauricio Macri guarantees the peaceful uses of the station, but the controversy has not ceased.

▲ Chinese space station in the Argentine province of Neuquén [Casa Rosada].

article / Naomi Moreno Cosgrove

After years of gradual economic penetration, which has led it to become the leading trading partner of several South American countries and a major lender and investor throughout the region, China's incursion into Latin America is no longer silent. The influence achieved in several nations - for example, it acquires almost 90% of the oil exported by Ecuador and its credits have been essential for the subsistence of Venezuela or certain Brazilian public companies - means that China's activities are attracting special attention and its expansion is becoming increasingly clear.

China's growing power in Latin America is especially observed by the United States, although its own neglect of the region, sometimes presented as a consequence of its shift towards Asia, has contributed to national governments seeking other reference letter partners to meet its needs reference letter

Already suspicious of this growing Chinese presence in the American continent, any activity in strategic fields, such as security, arouses particular suspicion in Washington. This has also been the case with moves made by Moscow, such as the siting of a station for the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema or GLONASS) in Managua (Nicaragua). The secrecy surrounding the operation of the facilities has caused mistrust among the population itself, raising suspicions as to whether their use is really intended only to provide a higher quality of the Russian navigation system or whether there is the possibility of strategic exploitation by the Russian aerospace defense forces.

Negotiation

Suspicions about the so-called Far Space Station, the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA) station in Patagonia, in the province of Neuquén, stem from entrance fact that it was negotiated at a time of particular disadvantage for Argentina, due to the financial weakness of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's government and its need for urgent credits. When Argentina was out of the international credit markets for having defaulted on the payment of close to 100 billion dollars in bonds, the Asian country was a blessing for the then president.

In 2009, in the midst of the financial crisis, China sent representatives to the Latin American country to discuss an issue that had little to do with currency fluctuations: Beijing's space interests. This was due to China's desire to have a center in the other hemisphere of the globe that could support its space activity, such as the expedition to the far side of the Moon.

After months of negotiation under great discretion, the Chinese government and the government of the province of Neuquén signed an agreement in November 2012, whereby China obtained the right to use the land - rent-free - for fifty years. The technical agreement was signed by China's state-owned satellite safety and control business (CLTC) and Argentina's National Commission for Space Activities (CONAE).

Enormous in size, the larger of the two circular antennas - it is twelve stories high, weighs 450 tons and has a large diameter - and visible from a great distance due to its location in the middle of a desert plain, the station soon became an ideal target for controversy and suspicion. The fear that, in addition to the declared civilian use, it might also have a military use and be used to gather information by intercepting communications in that part of South America, fueled the controversy.

After becoming Argentine president in 2015, Mauricio Macri entrusted then Foreign Minister Susana Malcorra and the Argentine ambassador in Beijing, Diego Guelar, with the task of negotiating that the agreement should include the specification that the station would only be used for peaceful purposes, something the Chinese accepted.

In spite of everything, the discussion about the risks and benefits of the Chinese base is still alive in the Argentine public opinion. Politicians of the civil service examination in Neuquén consider that "it is shameful to renounce sovereignty in your own country", as Congresswoman Betty Kreitman said when provincial legislators learned about the project.

Beyond Argentina's borders, White House officials have called the project a "Trojan Horse," reflecting U.S. concern about the initiative, according to sources quoted by The New York Times. Even apart from any strategic dispute with the United States, some Latin American leaders have doubts and regrets about the ties established with China, as they are concerned that previous governments have subjected their countries to excessive dependence on the Asian power.

Confidentiality

The main questioning of the Chinese base, then, has to do with its eventual military use and with the possible existence of secret clauses. The latter have been the main cause of international suspicion, since Macri himself came to validate the existence of these clauses, when they became a weapon against the Kirchner government, and promised to reveal them when he became president, something he has not done. However, the Argentine space authorities themselves deny any secret section .

Perhaps the misunderstanding can be found in the fact that the contract signed between the Chinese CLTC and the Argentine CONAE states that "both parties will maintain confidentiality regarding technology, activities and monitoring programs, control and dataacquisition". Although confidentiality with respect to third parties in relation to technology is a common internship , in this case it contributes to public distrust.

Given that the CLTC depends on the Chinese People's Army, it is difficult to deny that the data it obtains will pass into the domain of the Defense hierarchy and end up having a military use, although not necessarily ordered to a warlike action. Experts also say that antennas and other equipment used in support of space missions, similar to those the Chinese have in Patagonia, are likely to increase China's information-gathering capabilities. "A giant antenna is like a huge vacuum cleaner. It sucks up signals, information, all subject of things," Dean Cheng, an expert on China's national security policy, was quoted as saying in the NYT.

[Roberto Valencia, Letter from Zacatraz. Libros del K.O. Madrid, 2018. 384 pp]

review / Jimena Villacorta

The story of El Directo - a young Salvadoran who at the age of 17 was attributed with 17 murders, was in and out of jail and was finally sentenced by his fellow gang members - serves as a canvas for an even bigger picture: the serious social problem posed by violent gangs in Central America, particularly in El Salvador.

Roberto Valencia, a Spanish journalist who has lived in the Central American country for nearly 20 years, has dedicated time and effort to tackling this problem in depth as a reporter for "El Faro," an award-winning Salvadoran news portal . Letter from Zacatraz (as the local media call the maximum security prison of Zacateoluca) is a journalistic account that, through a concrete story, exposes the broader picture of a truly complex reality.

On September 11, 2012 was the first time Valencia sat down to talk with Gustavo Adolfo Parada Morales, alias El Directo, someone who for years had captured the attention of the media, despite the existence of thousands of other young people involved in gangs. That contact staff encouraged the journalist to look for other testimonies, until fill in a book that gathers the direct voice of Parada and that of people who knew him, based on interviews with those who loved him, like his mother or his wife, and with those who confronted him, like some judges.

The result of an unwanted pregnancy, El Directo was born on January 25, 1982 in the city of San Miguel. Barely two decades later, he was already the most dangerous and feared man in El Salvador, or at least that is how the media portrayed him. A member of the Pana di Locos, a clique of the Mara Salvatrucha, he became the main public enemy. From the age of 17, accused of as many murders (of which he only admitted to six) and various other crimes, El Directo was in three juvenile detention centers and nine prisons. He had the opportunity to start a new life in Costa Rica, but he blew it. He did not make it to the United States. He was free for several months, but it wasn't long before the police recaptured him.

Through Parada's life, the author projects the phenomenon of gangs in El Salvador. He emphasizes how this phenomenon affects mainly the lower classes, while the rest of society does not realize the full magnitude of the problem and, therefore, is not interested in seeking a solution. How is it possible, Valencia asks, that a society like the Salvadoran one, with 6.5 million inhabitants, tolerates an average of 10 homicides per day, not to mention numerous other crimes, in a country where 1% of the population are gang members.

The repressive measures applied by the right-wing (ARENA) and left-wing (FMLN) governments have not improved the gang problem. Gangs have been growing, both outside and inside detention centers, many of which are in a deplorable state. Precisely the condition of the prisons aggravates the status: the infrastructure is damaged, there is great insalubrity and overcrowding is extreme. In most of the prisons, gang leaders have a large part of the control and from there they dominate their respective organizations. "El Salvador's prison system is the most overcrowded in the hemisphere, a statement certified by the Organization of American States," says Valencia.

El Directo was imprisoned several times, where he was seriously wounded on multiple occasions, sometimes by the Mara Salvatrucha, who declared him a traitor and threatened to kill him, and other times by police and prison employees. After a few months in jail, he decided to reform and renounce his activity in the MS. This brought him various opportunities, but he returned to prison. He was finally killed in 2013, at the age of 31, by members of his new gang, La Mirada Locos, because he had been accused of ordering the murder of someone in the organization whose wife he had been having an affair with.

It is interesting to note how in a country where a large number of crimes are registered, for at least ten years the case of El Directo had absolute priority in the media, which often exaggerated Parada's criminal record. "We live in a country where big murderers have been granted amnesty. Drugs circulate with relative freedom and, despite the fact that police officials have said that there are important names in business, the state apparatus and the army involved in drug trafficking, we have not seen any arrest at that level", says to Valencia the President of the Central American University, José María Tojeira. And he adds: "Income tax evasion is a widespread vice among the wealthiest sectors. The police is still managed with a significant Degree of corruption. Deputies are pardoned or investigated for acts in which the life or honor of other citizens have been severely threatened". For his part, Fernando Saenz Lacalle, Archbishop Emeritus of San Salvador, regrets that journalists, commentators, analysts and politicians repeat over and over again, "like a church choir, the false refrain of 17 years, 17 murders". In his opinion, "perhaps they went too far in exhibition and arrogance", according to Valencia.

Roberto Valencia concludes that the problem with the media is that at first they were benevolent towards the gangs, and then they magnified the phenomenon, without talking about the repressive measures and policies used to combat them.

Carta desde Zacatraz is not a condescending book, but the criticism does not stifle all hope. It warns that Salvadorans have become accustomed to living with this problem. Today it is more common to avoid certain places that are known to be dangerous than to try to fight for the betterment of the country. But he encourages confidence that shattered lives like El Directo's will serve to make new generations want something better for themselves.

Washington warns of increase in transnational violent gangs and estimates MS-13 membership at 10,000 members

The Trump Administration has called attention to an increase in violent transnational gangs in the United States, particularly Mara Salvatrucha or MS-13, which is related to gang members from the Central American Northern Triangle. Although Trump has invoked this issue in a demagogic manner, criminalizing immigration and forgetting that the Central American maras were born in Los Angeles, the FBI finds that these organizations are recruiting more youth than ever before and demanding greater violence from their members. U.S. authorities estimate that these gangs are governed to some extent from El Salvador, but that hierarchy is not so clear.

▲ Mara Salvatrucha graffiti [Wikimedia Commons].

article / Lisa Cubías[English version] [English version].

Never before has the word "animal" probably caused so much controversy in the United States as when President Donald Trump used it to refer to members of the Marasalvatrucha, or MS 13, on May 16. Initially it seemed that he was referring to all undocumented immigrants, which provoked widespread rejection; he later specified that the label was intended to be applied to gang members who come to the United States illegally to commit acts of violence. Trump placed his war on gangs in the framework his zero-tolerance immigration policy and the strengthening of national agencies such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement in order to reduce migration flows from Latin America to the United States.

The description of the Latino youth gang phenomenon as an immigration problem had already come up in Trump's State of the Union speech on January 28. Before the US congress , Trump told the story of two teenagers, Kayla Cuevas and Nisa Mickens, who had been brutally murdered by six MS-13 members as they were returning home. He asserted that criminals had taken advantage of loopholes in immigration law to live in the United States and reiterated that congress must act to close them and prevent gang members from using them to enter the country.

Despite Trump's demagogic oversimplification, the truth is that Latino gangs are a product of the United States. They are, as The Washington Post has put it, "as American-made as Google." They were born in Los Angeles, first from children of Mexican immigration and then fueled by the arrival of migrants and refugees fleeing armed conflicts in Central America. Thus, El Salvador saw the emergence of a twelve-year civil war between the government and leftist guerrillas during the 1980s. The length and brutality of the conflict, coupled with the political and economic instability the country was experiencing, fueled the exodus of Salvadorans to the United States. The influx of young people from El Salvador, and also from Honduras and Guatemala, led to the emergence of the Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 maras, both related to the pre-existing Mexican Mafia (La M).

When peace came to Central America in the 1990s, many of these young people returned to their countries, following their families or expelled by U.S. authorities because of their criminal activities. Thus, the maras began to operate in the Northern Triangle, where they constitute a serious social problem.

Transnationality

According to the Justice department , there are some 33,000 violent street gangs in the United States, with a total of 1.4 million members. MS-13, with around 10,000 enlisted youths, accounts for only 1% of that total and in 2017 only 17 of its members were prosecuted, yet it deserves the full attention of the White House. Regardless of possible political interests of the Trump Administration, the truth is that US authorities have been highlighting its increase and its dangerousness, in addition to warning that certain orders are issued from El Salvador. This transnationality is viewed with concern.

The United States does not recognize MS-13 as a terrorist organization, and therefore has not included it in its National Counterterrorism Strategy released in October 2018. Instead, it is classified as a transnational criminal organization, as described in an April 2017 Justice department document. According to the document, several of the gang leaders are imprisoned in El Salvador and are sending representatives to cross illegally into the United States in order to unify the gangs operating in US territory, while forcing the MS-13 organization in the United States to send their illegal earnings to the group 's leaders in El Salvador and to exert more control and violence over their territories.

The FBI claims that MS-13 and Barrio 18 "continue to expand their influence in the United States. These transnational gangs "are present in nearly every state and continue to grow in membership issue , targeting younger recruits than ever before. As indicated in the aforementioned Justice department grade , the Attorney General warned that "in the last five years alone" the issue of gang members "has risen significantly". "Transnational criminal organizations like MS-13 present one of the most serious threats to the security of the United States," he said.

Stephen Richardson,attachment director of the FBI's criminal research division, told congress in January 2018 that the mass arrests and incarceration of MS-13 members and mid-level leaders over the past year in the United States have caused frustration for MS-13 leaders in El Salvador. "They are very interested in sending younger, more violent criminals through their channels into this country to be gang thugs," he told the House Homeland Security committee .

The transnational character of the MS-13 is questioned by expert Roberto Valencia, author of articles and books on the maras. He works as a journalist for El Faro, one of El Salvador's leading digital media outlets; his latest book, graduate Carta desde Zacatraz, was published a few months ago.

"Initially, the Los Angeles gangs served as moral guides for those who migrated to El Salvador during the 1990s. Some of the veteran leaders now living in El Salvador grew up in Los Angeles and have maintained personal and emotional ties to the gang Structures to which they belonged," Valencia tells Global Affairs. "However," he adds, "that does not imply an international connection: everyone, no matter where they live, believes they are the essence of the gang and are not subordinate to the organization in another country." "Some leaders in El Salvador share a very staff relationship with the organization they started in the United States, and that is not so easily dissolved, but the link as a single organization was broken a long time ago," he says.

Valencia firmly rejects any interference by the US MS-13 in El Salvador's MS-13. He admits, on the other hand, that there may be some subject of influence the other way around, as Salvadoran gang members in the United States "can be deported to El Salvador and end up in Salvadoran jails, where they can be punished by the prison mafia.

Migrants: cause or consequence?

Roberto Valencia also speaks out about Donald Trump's references to gangs: "Trump talks about MS-13 to win votes under the premise of an immigration policy that ends up criminalizing all immigrants. It is outrageous that Trump presents them as the cause, when gangs started in the United States. In fact, the vast majority of migrants from the Northern Triangle come to the United States escaping gangs."

In Central America, the control that gangs exert over a society that is poor ranges from demanding "rent" (extortion) from companies and people who own small businesses to forcing older women to take care of babies that gang members have had, and "asking" young girls to become girlfriends of the gang's main leader if they do not want to be killed themselves and their families. The application young girls is an extremely common cause of migration, which is also indicative of the misogynistic culture in rural areas of Latin American countries.

In most of his comments, Trump has described MS-13 as a threat to public safety and the stability of American communities. However, the Center for Immigration programs of study , a leading independent, non-profit research organization, conducted research on the impact of MS-13 in the United States and addressed immigration measures the Administration should take to control its presence. It found that MS-13 and other gangs are indeed a threat to public safety, thus sharing Trump's view, but disagreed with Trump by not linking immigration to the impact of gangs.

U.S. attorney Greg Hunter, who has been a member of the Criminal Justice Act panel in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia since 2001 and has worked on gang-related matters, says that shoplifting and illegal immigration cases are far more frequent than those that can be categorized as threats to public safety or the "American community," such as drug trafficking and murders. He also alludes to the fact that these organizations are not centralized and, although they operate under the same identity, they do not follow the same orders. He asserts that the gangs have made efforts to centralize operations, but have result ineffective.

It is crucial to take into account the statistics on the influx of migrants when assessing the recent migrant caravans from the Northern Triangle that Trump has sought to link to gangs. The US president said these migrants were "stone-cold criminals."

However, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection record does not suggest this. In its 2017 Securityreport it counts a total of 526,901 illegal immigrants who were denied entrance, of which 310,531 were detained and 31,039 arrested; of the latter only 228 belonged to MS-13 and as many were members of other maras (61 of them from Barrio-18).

The text attempts to avoid stagnation, but does not open the door to decisive transformation

Cubans will vote in referendum next February 24 on the project of the new Constitution C the National Assembly in December after a period of popular enquiry . In the preamble of the project , the reference letter to the communist goal , which already existed in the 1976 Constitution, but which had not been initially incorporated in the draft, was introduced at the last minute, so that the final text is even less novel.

▲ Building of the Central committee of the Communist Party of Cubaframework Zanferrari].

article / Alex Puigrefagut

Six decades after the Revolution, Cuba leaves behind the Castro surname , with the arrival in April 2018 of Miguel Díaz-Canel as head of state, and is preparing to approve a new Constitution, which will replace the one promulgated in 1976, to symbolize this new time. This new Magna Carta, whose initial text was C the National Assembly in July 2018, then submitted to three months of popular enquiry for the presentation of amendments and finally C by the deputies on December 22, has as its main goal to seek the modernization of the Cuban State and the sustainable development of the same, without losing the essence and the main ideals of the socialist ideology of the State.

At the end of the Castro era at the helm of Cuba, the State has found it necessary to reflect in the new essay the socioeconomic transformations carried out in the country since the entrance into force of the previous Constitution, as well as to partially modify the State structure to make it more functional. It is also worth mentioning the willingness to recognize more rights for citizens, although with limitations.

When examining the constitutional project , four aspects are particularly noteworthy: the specification of the ideology of the State, the figures and Structures of the State and the government, the question of private property and finally the redefinition of citizens' rights.

Maintenance of socialism

The text C adopted by the National Assembly did not include the reference letter to the goal of achieving a communist society, a fundamental point that was present in the previous Constitution. article 5 of the 1976 Magna Carta established that society "organizes and directs common efforts towards the high goals of the construction of socialism and the advance towards a communist society".

The omission of this point was really only a change of language, since at no time was the idea of socialism abandoned, in fact, the socialist character of the Cuban State was ratified. In the words of Esteban Lazo, president of the National Assembly, this new Constitution "does not mean that we are renouncing our ideas, but rather that in our vision we are thinking of a socialist, sovereign, independent, prosperous and sustainable country". However, in case there were any doubts, after the period of popular deliberation, the Assembly introduced as an amendment the express accredited specialization to communism in the preamble of the final text, given the alleged pressure from the most immobilist sectors.

The new Constitution reaffirms the socialist character of the Cuban regime, both in the economic and social spheres, giving a leading role to the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) as the highest power in society. The socialist nature of the Cuban State is underscored by the maintenance of the single-party system.

Presidential limits

The new Constitution includes some changes in the state structure. The most outstanding feature is that the Antillean country will have a president of the republic as head of state and a prime minister as head of government, in contrast to the current status of the same position for both functions: president of the committee state and of ministers. Everything indicates that this distinction will result more in a distribution of work than in a division of powers between the two positions, so this change will not be transcendent, given the control that will continue to be exercised from the PCC.

Another transformation in the political system is the elimination of the provincial assemblies for the creation of provincial governorships, with the goal of giving greater decentralization to administrative power and greater dependence of the legislative command on the executive.

As for the presidential term, the new Constitution limits it to five years, with the option of a single reelection for the same period. This change is important since it should lead to a rotation of members, and it is assumed that with it there would also be a renewal of ideas both within the Party and the Executive. The purpose is to avoid the stagnation of a historical generation without new ideas.

Finally, the president will be elected directly by the deputies of the National Assembly; that is to say, Cuba does not give entrance to the direct election of its leaders, but maintains the indirect election system.

Private property

The document includes several forms of ownership, including socialist ownership, mixed ownership and private ownership. The accredited specialization to the latter does not imply its formal recognition, but the confirmation of an internship whose extension the new Constitution endorses. This implies, therefore, the recognition of the market, a deeper participation of private property and the welcoming of more foreign investment to revive the country's Economics .

This need to include in the Constitution the greater participation of private property has arisen because, in many cases, the contribution of property and foreign investment has exceeded in the internship what was established in the previous constitutional framework . But this step will also lead to greater control in this area.

These changes in the economic sphere are goal at supporting the adjustments initiated by Raúl Castro a decade ago to boost economic growth and counteract the embargo established by the United States more than fifty years ago; in addition to fixing some of the country's labor force in the private sector as self-employed workers, especially in micro and small enterprises.

Citizen's rights

Finally, as regards the redefinition of citizens' rights, the constitutional project establishes a new functioning in the interaction of the State with the population through the flexibilization of economic, legal and civil rights. From the approval of the new text, the Cuban State must guarantee citizens the extension of Human Rights, although only in accordance with the international treaties ratified by the Caribbean country.

This, which despite this limitation could be seen as an opportunity for citizens, in reality has little of an opening, because although Cuba has signed United Nations agreements on political, cultural, civil and economic rights, it has not actually ratified them. Thus, in principle, Cuba should not be obliged to recognize these rights.

Another highlight of the introduced relaxation is article 40, which penalizes discrimination "on grounds of sex, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, ethnic origin, skin color, religious belief, disability, national origin or any other distinction detrimental to human dignity". In the initial text that passed for deliberation by the instructions , the recognition of marriage between persons of the same sex was introduced, but citizen rejection led to an amendment that finally withdrew the express protection of same-sex marriage.

After analyzing the main novelties of the constitutional project , it can be determined that the Cuban regime perceives a certain need for change and renovation. The new Constitution goes somewhat in that direction, but although it tries to avoid stagnation, it does not open the door to a decisive transformation either: neither complete continuity -although there is more of this- nor revolution within the system. It is clear that the new generation of leaders, with Miguel Díaz-Canel at the helm, can be seen as a continuity of the Castro regime, for the simple fact that the Castros directly determined the successor, in addition to the fact that many of their ideals are the same as those of the generation that made the revolution. But on the other hand, Cuba is certainly forced to slightly modify its course in order to be more present in the international system and to seek a more functional state and government.

(Updated January 3, 2019)

Global interest in this fashionable grain has brought additional income to Andean communities.

The localization of quinoa production, especially in Peru and Bolivia (together they account for almost 80% of world exports), has given these nations an unexpected strategic value. The high protein component of this pseudocereal makes it attractive to countries where food security is a priority.

▲ Quinoa field in the Andes of Bolivia [Michael Hermann-CC].

article / Elisa Teomiro

Quinoa, also known as quinoa (in Latin Chenopodium quinoa), is an ancestral grain that is more than 5,000 years old and was originally cultivated by the pre-Columbian Andean cultures. After the arrival of the Spaniards in America, it was partly displaced by the cereals brought from the peninsula. It does not belong to the grass family but to the family of the chenopodiaceae (spinach, chard or beets); therefore it is more correct to consider it as a pseudocereal.

It forms the basis of the diet of the Andean population of South America, especially in the high Andean areas of Bolivia and Peru (between the two countries they account for approximately 76% of the total quinoa Issue exported in the world, 46% Bolivia and 30% Peru). Today, due to its adaptation to different climates (it survives frost, high temperatures, lack of oxygen in the air, lack of water and high salinity), its production has diversified and more countries are producing it: Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, USA and Canada, in the American continent, as well as Great Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Sweden, Holland, Spain, Australia and the USSR, outside it.

Quinoa has gone from being a perfect unknown, for the majority of the non-American population, to undergoing a spectacular rise in a very short time. One of the reasons for this was the decision made by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to declare 2013 as the International Year of Quinoa. The FAO wanted to reward the great effort being made by the Andean peoples to conserve the grain in its natural state, as food for current and future generations. The activities carried out during that year made quinoa and its nutritional properties known to the world.

Price increase

The interest awakened by this grain tripled its price between 2004 and 2013, which curiously generated a discussion about a possible negative impact on the producing populations. Thus, it was alleged that the high demand for this crop by developed countries had turned quinoa into aarticle luxuryarticle " in producing countries, where it already cost more than chicken or rice. It was considered that this status could cause malnutrition in the Andean population, as they could not supplement their scarce per diem expenses with quinoa.

A follow-up on this issue subsequently showed that the quinoa boom was actually helping communities at source. A study by the International Trade Centre, a joint agency of the World Trade Organization and the United Nations based in Geneva, conducted over the 2014-2015 period, noted that quinoa consumption by developed countries was improving the livelihoods of small-scale producers; most of them women.

agreement to this study, rising prices between 2004-2013 caused both producers and consumers in the producing regions to benefit financially from trade. Thus, there was a 46% increase in their welfare in this period, measured through the value of goods and services consumed by households. The report also highlighted how, on the contrary, the 40% drop in the price of quinoa grain, suffered towards the end of 2015, caused a decline in the welfare of rural households (food consumption fell by 10% and wages by 5%). The study reached two clear conclusions: the sustained decline in Peru in quinoa consumption since 2005 was probably due more to changing consumer preferences due to globalization and increased product supply than to changes in grain prices; global quinoa consumption in developed countries undoubtedly contributed to the development resource-poor communities in the altiplano.

Production and trade

There are several reasons why this grain has become so attractive to consumers in Europe and the U.S.A., and increasingly also in China and Japan: its protein content is very high, between 14% and 18%, and they are also proteins of high biological value that would allow it to be a substitute for animal protein (it contains the 10 essential amino acids for human per diem expenses ). This factor, together with its high iron content, makes it an ideal pseudocereal for vegetarians; it does not contain gluten, so it can also be consumed by coeliacs; it has a low glycemic content, which allows its consumption by diabetics; its fiber and unsaturated fatty acid content (mainly linoleic acid) is high, so all those concerned about their health have an option in quinoa. It is also a source of vitamin E and B2 (riboflavin) and is high in calcium, phosphorus, magnesium, potassium and iron. For all these reasons, the FAO considers that its high nutritional value financial aid eradicate hunger and malnutrition.

The ranking of quinoa producing countries is headed by Bolivia (its 118,913 hectares of cultivation accounted for 60% of the total area of quinoa sown in the world in 2016), followed by Peru (64,223 hectares, representing 30% of the world area sown) and Ecuador (2,214 hectares) [Table 1]. From 1990 to 2014, the area planted with quinoa increased from 47,585 hectares to 195,342 hectares. The global value of exports increased from US$135.5 million in 2012 to US$321.5 million in 2015.

Regarding the export Issue in tons, Bolivia was the first country during 2012 (more than 25,000 tons), which represented, together with 2013 exports, an income for the country of US$80 million. In the same year, Peruvian quinoa exports exceeded 10,000T which represented an income for the country of US$38 million. In 2014, Peru took over and dominated the market also in 2015 and 2016 [Table 2].

The USA is the main importer of quinoa in the world, with 40%; it is followed by the European Union, with more than 30% of the total (France, Holland, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Belgium mainly) and then Canada. The average price per kilo of quinoa was US$3.2 in 2012 and US$6.2 in 2014. In 2015 it dropped to 5 dollars. Per capita consumption is logically led by the two main producers: Bolivia consumes 5.2 kilos and Peru 1.8 kilos, followed at a distance by Ecuador, with 332 grams per person.

In non-producing countries, quinoa was first introduced in the organic sector, with consumers concerned about healthier diets, although today it is no longer exclusive to this market. The largest consumer of quinoa per capita worldwide is Canada, with more than 180 grams, followed closely by the Netherlands; France and Australia consume between 120 and 140 grams. In Spain, consumption is still small, at around 30 grams. Global forecasts up to 2025 are that per capita consumption will reach 200 grams (an achievement that Canada is already within reach) and that even countries that traditionally consume rice, such as Japan and South Korea, will also embrace quinoa.

Quinoa production faces future problems in terms of both environmental and market subject . Before its boom in 2013, almost 60 different varieties of the grain were grown in the Andean highlands and almost all quinoa was organic. Today, rampant trade and large-scale production on large farms has reduced biodiversity to fewer than 20 different types.

market research forecasts commissioned by the Trade for Development Center in 2016 on current and future markets for quinoa point to a very likely doubling of the global market in ten years, especially with conventional quinoa produced not only in Peru, but also in Australia, the United States and Canada. The production of organic quinoa, produced by small farmers in the highlands, will remain relatively stable. Market skill will continue to be fierce, so farmers in the altiplano will have to seek measures that will allow them to maintain a niche market with certified organic quinoa, grown using traditional and fair trade methods.

The cancellation of the new CDMX airport, already more than 31% built, sows doubts about the economic success of the new administration.

Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador arrives to the presidency of Mexico facing the economic world, to which he has put up a fight with his advertisement to paralyze the works of the new airport of the capital, despite the fact that a third of the works have already been carried out. The desire to make clear to the economic power who rules the country and to bury what was to be an emblematic bequest of the PRI -whose historical hegemony he hopes to replace with his own party, Morena- may be behind the controversial decision.

▲ Image of the projected NAICM created by Fernando Romero Enterprise, Foster and Partners.

article / Antonio Navalón

The Mexican PRI returned to the presidency of the country in 2012, led by Enrique Peña Nieto, with the promise of making a major investment in public infrastructure that would put Mexico in the world's showcase. The stellar work chosen was the construction of a new airport, whose project was commissioned to architect Norman Foster and which the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) saw as the inheritance that would always be attributed to it.

This major project was to overshadow any negative bequest of Peña Nieto's term in office, which has been particularly marked by corruption cases and historic record violence figures. Although useful for political marketing, increasing the air traffic capacity of Mexico City (CDMX), whose metropolitan area has 23 million inhabitants, is a necessity for boosting national Economics .

The $13.3 billion project was one of the largest investments in the country's history. Named Nuevo Aeropuerto Internacional de Ciudad de México (NAICM, later simplified as NAIM) and located in the Texcoco area , a little further away than the current facilities in use, the new infrastructure was to be developed in two phases. The first phase consisted of the construction of a large terminal and three runways, which were initially planned to be ready by 2020, but whose entrance into service had been postponed to 2022 due to construction delays. The second phase would see the construction of three additional runways, plus a second terminal, which would be ready for operation from 2035.

Plans called for NAICM to have the capacity to transport between 70 and 135 million passengers annually, thanks to an operating Issue of between 115 and 135 slots per hour. These figures gave a potential long-term benefit of more than US$32 billion, according to government estimates.

The project sought first and foremost to solve the serious air saturation problem suffered by Mexico City's current Benito Juarez International Airport, caused by the low performance capacity of the two runways that operate simultaneously. In addition, the construction of NAICM was based on the hope of turning CDMX into a world logistics hub, with the potential to increase the current airport's cargo transport capacity by a factor of four.

The level of freight transport in this macro project would be able to reach 2 million tons per year, thus becoming, as its promoters assured, the main distribution center in Latin America. NAICM's ambition, therefore, was to become a reference not only in the American continent but also worldwide, both in the transfer of tourists and in the transport of goods.

Construction of NAICM began in 2015 and to date 31% of the work has been completed. Although this Degree of completion represents a slight delay with respect to the original schedule, the foundation and channeling works are already finished and high Structures intended to hold the wide roof can be seen on the surface. However, despite this progress and the investment already made, the country's new president has announced that he is completely burying the project.

Elections and enquiry

The presidential elections of July 1st were won by the leftist Andrés Manuel López Obrador (inaugurated on December 1st). Former leader of the PRI, thanks to which he served as mayor of the capital, over time he drifted to the left: he first joined the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and, after losing two elections for the presidency of the country, he created the National Regeneration Movement (Morena). In July, Morena won a majority in both houses of congress and also conquered the CDMX government, giving AMLO, as the new president is commonly known, broad powers to carry out his policies. While he fell 17 votes short of a qualified majority in the Senate that could change the Constitution, he could gain allies for that purpose.

During the election campaign, Lopez Obrador defended the cancellation of the new airport project on the grounds of its high cost, and raised the possibility that, as an alternative, some improvements could be made to the current airport and that the Santa Lucia airport, a military base in the area of the Mexican capital that could be used for international flights, could also be upgraded. However, the Morena candidate assured that he would make an enquiry to know the opinion of the Mexican people and that he would abide by the results.

Without waiting to take office as President, López Obrador had Morena carry out this enquiry, which was not organized by the Government but by a political party, and furthermore did not take place in the whole country but in 538 municipalities out of the 2,463 that exist in Mexico. The ballot boxes, set up between October 25 and 28, voted "no" to NAICM: with a participation of only 1% of the national electoral body, 69% voted for the Santa Lucia alternative and 29% voted to continue the works in Texcoco. López Obrador announced that, in application of the result, he will stop work on the new airport, despite the investment already made.

Some popular movements and also naturalists calling for the preservation of the natural environment applauded the advertisement, but there were also protest marches against the decision in the streets of downtown CDMX. The private sector has greatly regretted the purpose to cancel the NAICM project . Leading Mexican businessmen and organizations such as the Confederation of Mexican Industrial Chambers (CONCAMIN), which represents 35% of Mexico's GDP and 40% of employment in the country, came out in defense of the original project and asked López Obrador to reconsider his decision. Their argument is that any alternative will fall short of the demands of the growing air traffic, thus hindering the country's development . They also argue that any decision other than continuing with the construction of the NAICM will be more expensive than completing the planned airport [1].

Economic impact

For CONCAMIN, "the current airport lacks the infrastructure and any improvement would not fix the fundamental problems it has", and a bet on the Santa Lucia base "would be a waste of time and money, which will create problems rather than solve them", according to the president of this business association , Francisco Cervantes.

José Navalón, of CONCAMIN's Foreign Trade and International Affairs Commission, of which he is a member, warns that López Obrador's decision will be a major blow to Mexico's macroeconomic and financial system. In his words, "it is still too early to assess possible consequences, but we will have to see if Mexico has the appropriate airport infrastructure, in terms of competitiveness and connectivity, for what is the second largest Economics in Latin America". In any case, for the moment "there has been a problem of lack of confidence in the markets, which has been immediately reflected in the fall of the peso and the markets" [2].

Indeed, while López Obrador was greeted in July with a rise in the markets, because his resounding victory seemed to augur stability for Mexico, his inauguration in December is being accompanied by an "exodus" of investors. The peso has fallen nearly 10% against the dollar in August, the stock market is down 7.6% and in October alone investors sold 2.4 billion dollars in Mexican bonds.

"The main questions that investors are asking nowadays", Navalón continues, "is whether it is safe to invest in Mexico and how often this subject of decisions that do not follow any subject of legality are going to be taken", since important companies will be affected by the cancellation of a project in progress. He also warns that "the election of Bolsonaro in Brazil, whose profile is a magnet for foreign investment, may directly affect investment in Mexico".

The big question is why López Obrador maintains his decision against the new airport, in spite of the economic penalty it will mean for the Government and the risk of investor flight. We must understand that Mexico has always been a country that has been led by economic power. With its attitude towards NAICM, it aims to clearly mark the line of separation between political and economic power, making it clear that the era of economic power is over. A second reason is that NAICM was going to be the PRI's inheritance and López Obrador probably seeks to destroy any subject of association of this macro project with the party he intends to bury.

REFERENCES

[1] CONCAMIN Document "Airport Proposals" 2018.

[2] Personal interviews with Francisco Cervantes and José Navalón.