After breaking off relations with Taipei, the Salvadoran government could give Beijing the management of a strategic port in the region.

Until a few years ago, China had no interest in Central America, basically because of the lack of raw materials. The diplomatic relationship that the region, almost as a bloc, maintained with Taiwan also diverted its attention. But the dynamic has changed. Encouraged by Chinese promises, El Salvador joined in August other neighboring countries that have been closing their embassies in Taipei. Why is China now interested in Central America? The Salvadoran case points to a desire to gain weight in an area of historic U.S. influence.

article / Jimena Villacorta

"After this careful analysis, advertisement that my government has made the decision to break the so-called diplomatic relations maintained until this day between the Republic of El Salvador and Taiwan and establish diplomatic relations between the Republic of El Salvador and the People's Republic of China". This is how Salvadoran President Salvador Sánchez Cerén announced the establishment of diplomatic ties with Beijing on August 20. The decision followed that adopted in May by the Dominican Republic and in 2017 by Panama, breaking the support of Central American countries to Taiwan.

Taiwan responded to this advertisement by assuring that the government of El Salvador had demanded an "astronomical sum" of money to finance the Salvadoran port of La Union and the campaign for the 2019 presidential elections of the government party, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), extremes that the Salvadoran government denied. The Taiwanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joseph Wu, presented the rupture of relations as a decision of Taipei, for the refusal to yield to those pressures, although everything indicates that the initiative was Salvadoran.

The internship of hidden payments is, of course, nothing new in the links between Taiwan and Central America, as it has been demonstrated the submission of checks to leaders of El Salvador and other countries to maintain diplomatic recognition so convenient for the Asian island. It is, in any case, a margin of corruption that, sometimes in the form of commissions, has also accompanied the landing of China in various countries.

The step taken by the Salvadoran government was criticized by the civil service examination. The mayor of San Salvador, Ernesto Muyshondt, of the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), described the decision as "terrible" and regretted that the leaders of the FMLN not only support "the repressive and murderous dictatorships of Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua", but also that "now they are breaking with a democratic country to establish relations with another dictatorship".

The civil service examination criticized that the Government is moved by partisan interests and leaves in the air the treaties and agreements signed with Taiwan, which has been a strategic partner for the country for 85 years and one of its main cooperators in areas of technology, health, agriculture and Education. Thus, there has been the loss of cooperation projects, financial resources and other aid, such as the scholarship plan for Salvadoran students in Taiwan.

U.S. Alert

The change of partner will foreseeably mean the substitution of Taiwanese programs for Chinese investment projects. In recent years, El Salvador has imported much more from China ($804 million in 2016) than from Taiwan ($135 million), but has exported similarly to both countries (about $50 million to each). It is normal that Taiwan will now stop favoring the purchase of Salvadoran products, which it used to prioritize, and that China will compensate the new relationship with investment in infrastructure.

This is where the possibility that China may take over the concession of the port of La Unión Centroamericana, in the southeastern end of El Salvador, in the Gulf of Fonseca, comes in. The Government has recognized the Chinese interest in this area, while the civil service examination criticizes the lack of information in the negotiations. The U.S. Embassy has even raised suspicions about the risk that, given the lack of transparency in the negotiations, China could use the facilities as a military base. Ambassador Jean Manes stated that "China's strategy of expansion in the region, not only economically but also militarily, is alarming". In fact, Washington has been warning for some time about China's increased presence in Central America, as in the case of the Panama Canal, in principle with civilian projects but which in certain circumstances could call into question U.S. security.

The U.S. Embassy has also indicated Chinese interest in buying Perico Island, located next to the port of La Unión. Last October, Ezequiel Milla, mayor of La Unión, stated that he had met with Bo Yang, a Chinese businessman and vice-president of the Chamber of Commerce between China and El Salvador, to discuss the sale of the island to build hotels. For his part, the businessman admitted having discussed purchase intentions with the owners of the private part of the island, where several families reside, who must be willing to vacate their homes. The island contains an important reservation of flora and fauna.

Unexploited port

The port of La Union is strategically located on the Gulf of Fonseca, where El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras converge (it is the only access of this country to the Pacific). In addition, it can connect in a matter of a few kilometers to the dry canal that Honduras is about to complete by widening the road linking its facilities in Puerto Cortés, on the Atlantic, with the Gulf of Fonseca. Honduras' coastline in the Gulf does not meet the appropriate conditions for a deep-water port, so the natural outlet for its goods to the Pacific would be La Unión.

The port construction project began in 1994, under the presidency of Armando Calderón Sol, with the goal of becoming the future "hub of the Americas", so that ships larger than the Panama Canal could dock there. Thanks to a loan from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), the project was launched. The port was built between 2005 and 2008 and inaugurated in 2010.

Under the presidency of Antonio Saca, there were two decrees for its concession. The first one, in 2008, was a master concession formula, that is, there would be only one operator managing the port for 25 years; however, an agreement could not be reached in the Legislative Assembly. In 2009, the second decree was presented, which proposed a company composed of the state-owned Autonomous Port Executive Commission (CEPA) and an international operator, with a 10% and 90% shareholding, respectively. But due to the change of government and other internal complications it was not approved either.

In June 2010, with Mauricio Funes as president, the port of La Unión was inaugurated under state administration, with the hope of being able to agree on a concession that same year. Finally, it was decided to apply the master concession. In September, the Assembly approved Decree 834, which contains the port concession law. Given the lack of approval of the bidding instructions and the contract by other institutions, the port concession was postponed for a couple of years, during which time the interested companies dropped out of the talks.

The bidding process was finally launched in 2014, but the tender was declared void in 2015 because there were no bids to operate in the infrastructure. In 2017, some laws were modified to attract investors, given the urgency of operating the port, whose maintenance has cost the country almost US$20 million in the last decade.

Special Economic Zone

If to date the facilities have attracted so little interest from investors, what benefit could China see in La Unión? ARENA congressman Mauricio Vargas does not believe that Beijing has any economic interest in the port, but rather is pursuing strategic objectives, as the Gulf of Fonseca provides access to three Central American countries and is part of the area that the United States considers important for its own security.

To make the La Unión option more attractive, in July 2018 the FMLN government presented the Special Economic Zone Law for the South Eastern Region of El Salvador, an area corresponding to La Unión and a score of neighboring municipalities. Thanks to tax advantages, China could turn that Pacific point into a distribution center for its products in the Central American Northern Triangle and Nicaragua. The connection through the Honduran dry canal would facilitate connection with the Atlantic.

The civil service examination believes that the creation of this special economic zone, which in the event of a massive influx of Chinese products could negatively affect local manufacturing, has been agreed in advance with China. The ECA president, however, denies obscurantism in the process. "We have nothing to hide. The process we are carrying out is transparent; we have entered an enquiry stage. The interest of our administration is to operate the port of La Unión and we must see it as a project for the country". He assured that there are companies interested in the concession also from Europe and America, not only from Asia.

[Jorge Orlando Melo, Historia mínima de Colombia. The high school of Mexico-Turner. Bogotá, 2018. 330 p.]

review / María Gabriela Fajardo

This history of Colombia written by Jorge Orlando Melo stands out for its evident effort of political neutrality. The processes, continuities and historical ruptures of the nation are mentioned without any partisan subject . The author tries to remain impartial in narrating the events that have brought Colombia to where it is today. This makes the work of Melo - born in Medellin in 1942, historian at the National University of Colombia and presidential advisor for human rights in 1990 - especially suitable for readers without special knowledge of Colombian history, as they can judge for themselves the evolution of the creation of a nation where the State was first. This is precisely the purpose of the collection of "minimal histories" commissioned by the Mexican high school .

A large part of the book is devoted to the colonial period, thus highlighting the importance of the historical report in the country's training process and in its current changes. It is not, therefore, the usual linear tour through political events, but rather focuses on the cultural evolution of that report , forged early and developed in successive social dynamics.

On the other hand, the role of the regions is a core topic in the training of the colonial society, whose bequest is an inefficient central power, in a country where there are laws that seem to be negotiable, the society is divided into different social strata, the land belongs to a few and there is a constant political polarization at the hands of clientelist governments.

This happens in a Colombia where the role of geography has been a determining factor in the nation's development processes. Melo speaks of isolated areas of difficult access, of very diverse subject: "islands of prosperity, security or health in the middle of an ocean of poverty, violence and disease". That ocean has diminished nowadays, but there are islands that continue to be the perfect route for drug trafficking.

The ideological struggles in Colombia have been intense: the Conservative Hegemony, of 32 years, was followed by the Liberal Hegemony, of 13; then came the era of the National Front, during which Conservatives and Liberals alternated in each period, creating an atmosphere of equilibrium and relative tranquility for a short period of time. "The struggle between liberals and conservatives was, more than a political confrontation for the electoral triumph, a holy war for different social models," writes Melo. However, this generated political exclusion and led to the training of groups outside the law, raised against the government and financed by drug trafficking. The confrontation made institutional weaknesses visible and left little room for justice. Violence then became routine and ended up being Colombia's greatest historical failure, with special responsibility of those who promoted violence as an effective tool for social change. 

For Melo, it is "human agency"-that is, the way in which people use their resources to adapt to circumstances-that defines history; it is men and women who, in their joint action, generate change and are the builders of their history. Unlike the most common position on Colombian history, Melo does not fall into determinism: he does not make reference letter to a culture of innate violence that naturally condemns Colombians to fight. On the contrary, he makes it clear that events such as April 6, Rojas Pinilla's coup d'état in 1953 or the bloody seizure of the Palace of Justice in 1985, must be seen in perspective and considered as moments of a social process. 

The Colombian state did not achieve nationhood properly until the end of the 20th century, when the "dream of the creators of the nation" that the whole territory would be covered by law, a single market and a political system was achieved. Colombia's unique history began with the Patria Boba, as the stage between the cry for independence and the Battle of Boyacá, when the Creoles effectively achieved independence, is usually called. Since then there was a great lack of unity, manifested in an endless number of revolutions, reforms and constitutions. Colombia underwent an exhausting, exhausting and at the same time violent process aimed at achieving political, legal, economic and cultural cohesion throughout this extremely diverse country, with a geography that segmented it into regions, with varied and dispersed human groups.

But this past does not prejudge the future. The reader arrives at the end of this "Minimal History of Colombia" with the awareness of an open future for the great South American country. Colombia, once one of the most violent countries, now has a Nobel Peace Prize winner, is in a post-conflict process and has begun to be taken into account to a greater extent by the international community for its great progress.

Limiting attention China and controlling the arrival of Venezuelan refugees, among the measures promoted by the winner of the first round of the presidential election

With a support of more than 46% of the voters, the right-wing Jair Bolsonaro won a wide victory in the presidential elections of October 7, which will nevertheless require a second round at the end of the month. His direct opponent, Fernando Haddad, of the Workers' Party, barely reached 29% of the votes, which complicates that in three weeks the correlation of forces could be turned around. A Bolsonaro presidency, therefore, is possible and it is advisable to examine what foreign policy the new stage will bring.

▲ Jair Bolsonaro, at an electoral campaign rally [PSL].

article / Túlio Dias de Assis

One of the most well-known sayings Brazilians have about their own country is that "O Brasil não é um país para principiantes" (Brazil is not a country for beginners ). Of course, such a saying would be very accurate in describing the country's current status . The Latin American giant is reeling from the instability caused by a truly unprecedented electoral campaign and the possibility of the victory of a divisive candidate .

The electoral campaign has been anything but "conventional", with one candidate trying to promote the vote from his cell in the federal prison of Curitiba, in Paraná, and another being stabbed at a plenary session of the Executive Council political event in the streets of Juíz de Fora, in Minas Gerais. The first, former president Luís Inácio "Lula" da Silva, had to finally cede the post to another leader of his party, Fernando Haddad, due to his criminal status ; the second, Jair Bolsonaro, was favored electorally by the stabbing and the greater dispersion of the vote due to the forced withdrawal Lula.

The elections had a motley group of candidates representing the most disparate types of ideologies. In this last Sunday's vote, as predicted by the polls, the race was reduced to two presidential candidates, located at the antipodes of the political spectrum: Bolsonaro and Haddad, candidates of the Social Liberal Party (PSL) and the Workers' Party (PT), respectively.

Thus, Bolsonaro obtained more than 46% of the votes, far exceeding the polls' forecasts, while Haddad received the support of 29% of the voters. As no candidate surpassed 50% of the votes on October 7, the two most voted presidential candidates will go to a second round, which will take place on October 28.

Jair Messias Bolsonaro, the "Brazilian Trump".

Bolsonaro is undoubtedly the biggest surprise of these elections, since his positions, very reactionary in some issues, are completely out of the mostly socialist political spectrum to which Brazil had become accustomed since the beginning of the century. He is a member of the military in the reservation who for the last decades served as federal deputy for the state of Rio de Janeiro. During his work in the Chamber of leave, many of his statements, often homophobic, racist and sexist, went viral. Much of the Brazilian press has labeled him as extreme right-wing and has carried out a harsh campaign against him, similar to what happened with Donald Trump in the USA.

The controversy has benefited Bolsonaro, expanding his electoral base. After the attack in Minas Gerais, he saw his popularity increase(rising in the polls from 22% to 32%) and somewhat mitigating the rejection he provokes among part of the population.

On domestic policy issues, the PSL candidate is characterized by controversial statements in favor of the revocation of the disarmament statute (issued during the Lula administration), a reduction of the state bureaucratic apparatus, the liberalization of Economics, the privatization of companies and public agencies, the reduction of the age of criminal majority, the establishment of higher and harsher penalties for serious crimes and the militarization of the police in their confrontations against the criminal gangs dominant in the favelas. In addition, it categorically rejects, among other issues, gender ideology, gender and racial quotas - in all subject of public bodies - and political movements of Marxist ideology.

Foreign policy. In terms of international policy, Bolsonaro has mentioned that he intends to strengthen Brazil's relations with the US -given his sympathy towards President Trump's policies-, the EU and democratic countries in Latin America; while he has radically positioned himself against rapprochement with countries with dictatorial regimes, among which he has included China, Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba. He defends Israel's policies and has promised to move the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem, as President Trump did almost a year ago. Finally, he rejects the uncontrolled flow of Venezuelan immigrants entering Brazil through the state of Roraima, and has warned that he would take drastic measures to control it, since the number of migrants from Venezuela already exceeds 50,000.

Fernando Haddad, the heir to Lula's bequest

Haddad has been mayor of the city of São Paulo and minister of Education during Lula's government. He initially opted for the post of vice-president, accompanying Lula in the PT candidacy. But when Lula saw his options final closed by the Supreme Electoral Court, being imprisoned under a 12-year sentence for corruption, he designated Haddad as presidential candidate, well into the electoral campaign.

Before the annulment of his candidacy, Lula was clearly leading in the polls and could even win in the first ballot. This support was mainly among the population that benefited from his highly successful socialist policies during his two terms in office (2003-2006 and 2007-2010), including the Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) program, which aimed to end hunger in Brazil; Primeiro Emprego (First employment), a program focused on eliminating youth unemployment; and the better known Bolsa Família, a continuation of Fome Zero in the form of family benefits, which successfully lifted several million Brazilians out of poverty.

This social success, which mainly affected the North and Northeast regions of Brazil, where there is a larger population below the poverty line, gave the PT a solid electoral base, although linked to Lula's leadership. With the change of candidate, the PT's popularity declined and its voting intentions were distributed among the other presidential candidates. As a candidate, Lula surpassed 37% in the first polls; however, Haddad did not reach 30% in the first round.

Foreign policy. The PT is a left-wing party that is quite aligned with the Latin American political doctrine of the so-called Socialism of the 21st Century. Its program in international politics is to maintain good relations with the members of the BRICS -especially the cooperation with China- and MERCOSUR, and to continue to actively participate in the UN, specifically in bodies such as the Human Rights committee (HRC) or the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), today presided over by Lula's former minister manager of the Fome Zero program, José Graziano da Silva. Haddad has not taken a specific position on the Venezuelan regime, unlike Bolsonaro; however, he has mentioned the need to help in the mediation for the resolution of internal conflicts in the neighboring country, without condemning the Chavista government at any time.

Second round

The Brazilian scenario is undoubtedly very peculiar and there is an awareness that these elections could define the course of the tropical giant for some time to come. Bolsonaro starts with a decisive advantage for the second round on October 28. Haddad will probably be able to count on the support of several of the candidates who have been left behind, such as Ciro Gomes, from PDT, or Marina Silva, from REDE (both former ministers of Lula's government), due to the radical difference of Bolsonaro's policies with the "conventional" candidates.

The possibility of a final triumph of the military man in the reservation may mobilize part of the electorate, increasing the participation among those who want to prevent his entrance in Brasília. The vote of fear of Bolsonaro that the PT will promote and the "normality" with which the controversial candidate will want to accentuate his candidacy will decide this final stretch.

The Fleet was restored in 2008 due to Venezuela's geopolitical alliances.

Of the U.S. naval forces, the Sixth and Seventh Fleets - based in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, respectively - are the ones that have traditionally been most in the news. The Fourth Fleet usually goes unnoticed. In fact, it barely has any staff, and when it needs ships it must borrow them from other units. However, its restoration in 2008, after having been deactivated in 1950, indicates that Washington does not want to neglect security in the Caribbean in the face of Russia and China's moves.

▲The USS Dwight D. Eisenhower arriving in 2010 at Mayport, Florida [US Navy].

article / Dania del Carmen[English version].

The Fourth Fleet is part of the U.S. Southern Command. It is located in Mayport, Florida, and its area of operations is the waters off Central and South America. The ships based in Mayport do not strictly belong to the base and none are currently deployed in the waters of the region. The staff stationed in the fleet is approximately 160 people, including military, federal civilians and contractors. They work out of the U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (USNAVSO) headquarters. The Southern Command commander is also commander of the Fourth Fleet, currently Rear Admiral Sean S. Buck.

It was originally established in 1943, during World War II, to protect the U.S. from German naval actions, both surface attacks, blockade operations and submarine raids. After the war ended in 1945, the FOURTHFLT remained active until 1950. At that time, its area of operations was turned over to the Second Fleet, which had just been established to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[1] The FOURTHFLT's operations were then transferred to the Second Fleet.

The Fourth Fleet was reactivated in 2008, during George W. Bush's presidency, in reaction to possible threats from anti-U.S. sentiment promoted by then Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. During that time, Venezuela received loans from Russia for the purchase of arms and for Venezuelan military development . In 2008 Venezuela conducted a joint naval exercise with Russia in the Caribbean as a way of supporting Russia's intentions to increase its geopolitical presence as a counterweight to the power of the United States.

The fact that Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador had a similar ideology to Venezuela reinforced Washington's conviction to reactivate the fleet, as a reminder that the US maintained its interest in being the only military power in the western hemisphere. Although US territory could hardly be threatened, preventing any risk status in the free access to the Panama Canal has been a permanent task for the Southern Command. In recent years, Russia has sought to expand its military presence in the Americas, through particular relations with Cuba and Nicaragua, while China has increased its investments in the Panama Canal area .

Current activity

As the USNAVSO/FOURTHFLT website states in its "mission statement" section , the Fourth Fleet "employs maritime forces in cooperative maritime security operations to maintain access, enhance interoperability, and establish enduring partnerships that promote regional security in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility." As mentioned, when ships and other equipment are assigned to SOUTHCOM and the Fourth Fleet, they are provided by other U.S. Navy commands with broader geographic responsibilities based in other parts of the world[2].

FOURTHFLT has three main lines of action: maritime security operations, security cooperation activities and contingency operations.

-In terms of its maritime security operations, it currently provides maritime forces to Interagency Task Force South(JIATF South) in support of Operation HAMMER. JIATF South "conducts detection and monitoring (D&M) operations throughout its joint operational area to facilitate interdiction of illicit trafficking in support of national and partner nation security." It utilizes the resources of the Fourth Fleet or temporarily employs other assets, such as the USS George Washington Carrier Strike Group or individual ships from other fleets such as Norfolk, VA Fleet Forces Command or the Third Fleet, based in San Diego, California. Operation MARTILLO is primarily aimed at combating international drug trafficking, enhancing regional security and promote peace, stability and prosperity in Central and South America. As part of Operation MARTILLO, in a joint operation with the U.S. Coast Guard, the USS Vandegrift stopped a suspicious vessel off the coast of Central America in 2014. Security staff found nearly two thousand pounds of cocaine. More recently, in January 2015, the USS Gary and the U.S. Coast Guard seized more than 1.6 tons of cocaine from a fast vessel. However, the absence of dedicated Fourth Fleet assets demonstrates that its counternarcotics missions are a lower priority for the U.S. Navy, even though they are significantly less demanding, operationally.

-In terms of security cooperation activities, the two main events of participation with other nations are the UNITAS and PANAMAX exercises. UNITAS was conceived in 1959 and was first conducted in 1960. It is an annual exercise whose purpose is to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the region and to maintaining strong relationships with its partners. PANAMAX dates back to 2003 and has become one of the largest multinational training exercises in the world. It is primarily focused on securing the defense of the Panama Canal, one of the world's most strategic and economically important infrastructure assets.

-Finally, the Fleet is always ready to carry out contingency operations: basically humanitarian attendance and financial aid in case of disasters. The U.S. Navy hospital ship regularly travels throughout area Caribbean and Central America to provide humanitarian support. In the framework of the Continuing Promise 2015 program, the Comfort visited a total of 11 countries, from Guatemala to Dominica, performing procedures such as general surgery, ophthalmic surgery, veterinary services and public health training . The ship previously participated in the 2007, 2009 and 2011 programs.

Objectives met at reasonable cost

As an integrated part of Southern Command, the Fourth Fleet has been involved in major humanitarian operations, such as the response to the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010. The FOURTHFLT had naval command in Operation Unified Response, which was the largest contingency response in humanitarian attendance and financial aid in disasters.

The budget for those missions does not rely solely on the Navy, as a SOUTHCOM spokesperson stated, but there is also a contribution of resources from "other U.S. entities, such as the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection, which also provide platforms and forces, both maritime and air, that are core topic for the support of those missions. So, we are looking for a good expense counterbalance."

In addition to developing effective humanitarian actions, at a limited economic cost, the Fourth Fleet also serves the purpose of ensuring that the United States has a significant military presence in the Western Hemisphere in the eyes of Latin American and Caribbean states, as well as superpowers such as Russia and China.

1. The Second Fleet was deactivated in 2011 and reestablished in 2018.

REICH, Simon and DOMBROWSKI, Peter. The End of Grand Strategy. US Maritime Operations In the 21st Century. Cornell University Press. Ithaca, NY, 2017. p. 144.

After centuries of Caribbean orientation, the enclave accentuates its relationship with its neighbors on the mainland.

Two years ago, Suriname and Guyana became part of the South American soccer federation, leaving the North, Central American and Caribbean federation to which they belonged. It is a clear symbol of the change in geographical orientation that is taking place in this northeastern corner of South America, which, as in the case of soccer, sees the potential for a closer relationship with its southern neighbors.

article / Alba Redondo

As vestiges of the colonial past of the great European naval powers of the 17th century -England, Holland and France- we find in the northeast of South America the three Guianas: Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana. In addition to the natural barriers that isolate the region and hinder its connection with the rest of the South American continent - it has a closer relationship with the Caribbean, although its Atlantic coast is outside that sea - there are also social, cultural and idiomatic barriers that complicate its integration into the continent.

Located in the northeast of the South American continent, the region was called Guayana or "land of many waters" by its original inhabitants, the Arawaks. The area is bordered to the west by Venezuela and to the south by Brazil, countries that also include lands that are part of the Guiana natural region. The humid terrain and coastline, dense with mangrove swamps and marshes, combine with the tropical climate of the interior, which is characterized by virgin forests, high plateaus and large mountain ranges such as the Guiana Shield. Its population, ranging from indigenous to European descendants, is located in the coastal area and in the river valleys.

The Guianas are spoken of jointly not only because they form a common territory for the natives, but also because they were left out of the continental distribution made by the two great empires of the Iberian Peninsula. Being a territory not easily accessible from the rest of the continent, the lack of Spanish and Portuguese presence led other European powers of the time to seek to set foot there, in exploration campaigns carried out during the seventeenth century. British Guiana gained independence in 1970 and Dutch Guiana in 1975. French Guiana remains a department and an overseas region of France and, consequently, an outermost territory of the European Union in South America.

The three unknown

To the west of the region lies Guyana, officially known as the Cooperative Republic of Guyana. The country has a population of about 773,000 inhabitants, mostly located in Georgetown, its capital. Its official language is English, a bequest of its colonial past. The Guyanese political-social reality is marked by the conflictive coexistence between the two great ethnic groups: the Afro-Guyanese and the Indo-Guyanese. Its internal politics is characterized by the bipartisanship between the PNC (People's National Congress) formed by the Afro-descendants concentrated in the urban centers; and the PPP (People Progressive Party), with greater influence in the rural zone, constituted by descendants of immigrants from India arrived during the British Empire and who work in the sugar plantations.

Despite a recent increase in foreign investment, Guyana is the poorest country with the highest crime, violence and suicide rates on the continent. In addition, its international image is conditioned by its perception as a reference area for international cocaine distribution and its high rate of corruption. However, the country's future points to its entry into the world's major oil powers after finding one of the largest oil and gas fields discovered in our decade.

Like Guyana, the political life of the Republic of Suriname is subject to a great ethno-cultural mosaic. The former Dutch colony, with its capital in Paramaribo, is the smallest and least populated country in South America, with only 163,821 inhabitants. After its independence in 1975, more than one third of the population emigrated to the metropolis (the Netherlands). This produced a major structural crisis due to the lack of human capital in the country. Suriname is made up of descendants from almost all continents: Africans, Indians, Chinese and Javanese, aborigines and Europeans. Its domestic policy is marked by the influence of Desiré Bouterse and by the democratic aspirations of the society. Regarding its foreign policy, Suriname is committed to a better control of its resource exports, mainly aluminum, and to a progressive integration in the regional and international sphere, in most cases, together with its neighboring country, Guyana.

Unlike the other two Guianas, French Guiana is not an independent country, but an overseas region of France, which is located more than 7,000 km from France. The capital of this territory is Cayenne. For a long time it was used by France as a penal colony. It has the highest homicide rate in the entire French-speaking territory and is known for its high crime rate. As a Gallic department , it is part of the European Union and home to the French Guiana Space Center, housing one of Europe's main satellite launching stations in Kourou. French Guiana is facing growing unemployment, lack of resources for Education and dissatisfaction among its population which has led to numerous protests.

Change of orientation

Due to the strong historical relationship with their respective metropolises and their late independence, there has traditionally been an important barrier between the Guianas and South America. Geographically, they are cornered on the northern coast of South America, with difficulty in developing contacts to the south, due to the orography of the Guiana massif and the Amazon rainforest. But there have also been cultural and linguistic reasons that contributed to a rapprochement between this region and the western Caribbean, where England, Holland and France had -and still have in some cases- island possessions.

However, after a long period of relative isolation, with hardly any relations with their southern neighbors, the republics of Suriname and Guyana have begun to join the dynamics of economic and political integration in South America.

Traditionally, the two States have had a closer relationship with the Caribbean: both are full members of CARICOM, Georgetown being the headquarters of this community of Caribbean countries, and are part of the association of Caribbean States (ACS), with the peculiarity of the presence of French Guiana as a partner. In recent years, Suriname and Guyana have begun to look more towards the continent itself: they participated in the creation of Unasur and are observer countries of Mercosur. Symbolic of this change of orientation was the entry in 2016 of these two countries into Conmebol, the South American soccer federation, leaving the North, Central American and Caribbean federation to which they belonged.

This closer relationship with its continental neighbors and participation in the South American integration process should serve to resolve some pending border issues, such as the dispute between Venezuela and Guyana: Caracas has historically claimed the territory between its border and the Essequibo River, which flows through the middle of Guyana. However, as other Latin American territorial disputes are being resolved in international courts, the Essequibo dispute threatens to perpetuate itself for the time being.

signature of the peace agreement in Cartagena, in September 2016, before the referendum that rejected it and led to some modifications of the text [Government of Chile].

ANALYSIS / Camila Oliveros

The Peace agreement signed on November 26, 2016 between the Colombian Government and the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) is one of the most decisive issues in the elections of this June 17, in its second round, and of the next presidential term.

After lengthy negotiations between the Government and the FARC in Havana, and the introduction of modifications to the initially agreed text, following the victory of the "no" vote in the plebiscite, the peace agreement was finally signed in November 2016. The long duration of the negotiations and the result the plebiscite show that the peace agreement is particularly controversial in Colombia, where the 52-year conflict resulted in the death of 220,000 people and the forced displacement of almost 6 million, in addition to 25,000 disappeared and almost 30,000 kidnapped.

Clearly, all Colombians long for a lasting peace, but while some believe that what was drafted in Havana is the solution to achieve that peace, others believe that there are still several modifications that can be made to the text. The decision on this and on the speed of the implementation of the agreement remains in the hands of the next president.

Degree of implementation

For now, more than a year after the signature the Finalagreement for the Termination of the Conflict, it is possible to highlight both negative and positive elements in the implementation of what was agreed in Havana. According to the Observatory for Monitoring the Implementation of the Peace agreement , at the beginning of 2018, before the country entered the long electoral process in which it finds itself, only 18.3% of the agreement had been fulfilled. This is a relatively leave figure, which in part may be due to insufficient economic and human resources to implement the agreements quickly and effectively, and not so much to a lack of commitment on the part of the government.

However, in contrast to this low percentage of what has already been implemented, there are other figures that show that the agreement is having some positive results. This is the case of the decrease in the homicide rate in Colombia. It is now one of the lowest in thirty years, with 24 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. In addition, the issue of displaced persons was reduced by almost half, from 91,045 displaced persons in 2016 to 48,335 in 2017, according to the Victims Unit. The issue of displaced persons had already been decreasing significantly in previous years, even at a faster pace: in 2002 the figure had been 757,240 people; in the following 14 years there was a decrease of 47,598 people on average per year, including the 8 years of presidency of Álvaro Uribe, who has been the great opponent to the terms of the peace agreement .

The issue of landmine casualties has also decreased: from 72 in 2016 to 58 in 2017, which has helped generate a climate of greater confidence in rural communities.

It is important to highlight that in the areas that have been most affected by the armed conflict, in agreement with the peace agreement , new companies have been formed that benefit from the mechanisms foreseen for the "zones most affected by the armed conflict" or Zomac. However, these companies are facing a complicated environment, as although FARC has completed the various phases of its demobilization, such as the submission of weapons and the return of recruited minors, FARC dissidents and other drug trafficking groups continue to operate in several areas.

Although there has been some progress, the implementation of most of the agreement is still ahead. How are the two presidential candidates, Iván Duque and Gustavo Petro, dealing with it?

Duque or Petro

Iván Duque is a lawyer and politician who has been a senator of the Republic for the Democratic Center, a party headed by former president Uribe, a great opponent of the peace agreement . This has led many to think that if Duque becomes president, he will leave the Havana agreement a dead letter, without implementing it during his four years in office. His government proposal is aimed at improving Economics, reducing taxes for large companies, financing youth entrepreneurship and favoring investment. In addition, he promotes a major reform of the Colombian justice system.

Gustavo Petro is an economist and politician, but also demobilized from the M-19 guerrilla. He belongs to the center-left Progressive Movement political party. Petro proposes an economic model with socialist tones that focuses on "changing the extractivist model " and promoting agricultural policies. The central axes of his government proposal are in the public sphere, fully guaranteeing the rights to health, to "quality, pluralistic, universal and free" Education .

Colombia has never elected a leftist candidate to be president of the Republic, perhaps because the left is identified with communism and that associates it with the FARC. In any case, Petro has not been against the Havana agreements, and that makes him attractive to many Colombians who wish to preserve what was agreed in 2016, in the hope of ending the armed conflict experienced by the country.

The truth is that it is difficult to legally reverse the peace agreement , since a constitutional reform established that the next three governments are obliged to comply with the agreement. If Duque wins, the peace agreement may be subject to further changes, but in no way Duque is synonymous with war and Petro with peace. 

As Duque has expressed, making certain modifications to the agreements is not the same as ending them. The candidate of the Democratic Center maintains that the agreement must have certain adjustments that allow reaching a "credible, sustainable and based on justice" peace. agreement to his proposals, the main changes he would promote would be the following two:

Special Jurisdiction and political participation

The first has to do with the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), since Iván Duque in his government plan seeks to simplify the Colombian justice system, going from the current six courts to only one, with the purpose of achieving greater speed and efficiency in judicial processes. However, with this change power may be highly concentrated and centralized. A modification of the JEP provided for in the peace agreement may cause some uncertainty among former guerrillas, with whom some leniency had been agreed.

On the other hand, the big change Duque could make has to do with political participation. He believes that former FARC members who have been responsible for crimes against humanity cannot reach congress without having served a sentence. Duque assures that he does not seek to do away with point 2 of the peace agreement , which talks about the political participation of former guerrillas in congress. If a member of the congress is ratified for a conviction for a crime of this subject, he should leave his seat and be replaced by someone from the same group who does not have any crime against humanity.

Although in the event of winning the elections, Gustavo Petro will not propose special modifications to the agreements, whoever the next president is, he will face serious challenges in relation to the peace process.

Most important challenges in the next presidential mandate

The presence of FARC dissidents in border areas of the country is one of the challenges facing the next president; not only for security reasons, but also because of their links to drug production, which has increased by 52%. The government is aware that around 10% of the FARC's fighting force has remained in the armed struggle, which represents an Issue of at least 700 individuals, although other entities even double that figure. This dissidence operates in fifteen different groups, which have been concentrated in areas of the country such as Nariño, Norte de Santander and Cauca. In addition, another armed group, the ELN (National Liberation Army), has begun to increase its presence in certain border areas, such as Norte de Santander. This not only poses a threat to Colombian security but may also trigger a war between guerrilla and organized crime groups for control of the illegal coca production and drug trafficking business.

Faced with the continued presence of armed groups in part of the Colombian territory, both candidates defend the increase of military troops in conflict zones. However, regarding the eradication of illegal crops, Iván Duque advocates the use of glyphosate, a strong herbicide whose employment is rejected by Gustavo Petro on the grounds of its environmental effects. The use of this chemical, somewhat controversial in Colombia, could be assumed as an effective way to end illicit crops if its contamination is counteracted, for example, by planting new trees in the areas where coca production is eradicated. In any case, some environmentalists have used the negative image of glyphosate to ask for Petro's vote in the second round of elections.

Another major challenge that the next president will face is the topic the Special Jurisdiction for Peace. The JEP is a body in charge of judging the former guerrillas. It has judicial powers and "represents the backbone of the signed agreements". It is composed of five bodies, each one in charge of the fulfillment of essential parts of the agreement: "the conference room of Truth and Responsibility Acknowledgment, the conference room of Amnesty and Pardon, the conference room of Definition of Legal Situations, the Unit of research and Accusation, and the Tribunal for Peace". The JEP is a complex body on which the progress of the peace process depends. In fact, one of the reasons for the great delays in the implementation of the agreement has been the slowness in the constitution of this institution, which did not begin to function until last January. However, the obstacles suffered by the JEP have not only had to do with lack of activity, but also with issues such as the case of Jesús Santrich.

Santrich, one of the guerrilla leaders who was a negotiator in Havana for the FARC and received one of the posts assigned to the new congress party, was arrested in April, accused of participating in a plan to bring 10 tons of cocaine to the United States. Based on an research by the DEA, the US anti-narcotics agency, US judicial authorities requested his arrest and are now awaiting his extradition. However, taking into account that all FARC members must be tried by the JEP, and that this body does not provide for extradition, Jesús Santrich could not be handed over to the United States. In addition, there is currently no evidence as to when the alleged drug trafficking crimes were committed, so for now it has not been possible to determine whether they occurred before or after the creation of the JEP. The former guerrilla is being held in a Bogotá prison and the FARC is insisting that he be released. The next president will have to determine how to proceed with the case. This is also a sample that there are loopholes in the agreement, which generates a lot of uncertainty and leaves room for the next president to take various courses of action.

Beyond peace

On June 17, in the presidential runoff between Iván Duque and Gustavo Petro, the future of Colombia will be decided. Although many Colombians believe that it is a choice between war or peace, this is wrong. As has been discussed before, the peace agreement is very difficult to roll back legally. The substance of the agreement must be respected by the next three governments. Although it is true that with the candidate of the Democratic Center in power the agreement may suffer more modifications than those that would be applied by the candidate of the Progressive Movement, the possibility of consolidating peace remains open with either of the two. Beyond peace, the economic and social model of Colombian society is also at stake. Even if peace is one of the most important issues, the next president should not leave behind other relevant elements such as corruption, security, trade and Economics in the 2018-2022 presidential term of the Republic of Colombia. The candidates' position on these issues should also influence voters.

Trump has maintained several of the measures passed by Obama, but has conditioned their implementation

Donald Trump has not Closed the embassy opened by Barack Obama in Havana and has kept to the letter of the rules allowing only certain travel by Americans to the island. However, his imposition of not establishing commercial or financial relations with companies controlled by the Cuban military-police apparatus has affected the trade Issue . But it has been above all his anti-Castro rhetoric that has returned the relationship almost to the Cold War.

▲Barack Obama and Raúl Castro, at the baseball game they attended during the U.S. president's 2016 visit to Cuba [Pete Souza/White House].

article / Valeria Vásquez

For more than half a century, relations between the United States and Cuba were marked by political tensions. The last years of Barack Obama's presidency marked a significant change with the historic reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the approval of certain measures of U.S. openness toward Cuba. The White House then hoped that the climate of growing cooperation would boost the modest economic reforms that Havana had begun to implement earlier and that all this would eventually bring political transformations to the island.

The Cuban government's lack of concessions in subject of freedoms and human rights, however, was used by Donald Trump to reverse, upon his arrival to power, several of the measures approved by his predecessor, although it has been above all his anti-Castro rhetoric that has created a new hostile environment between Washington and Havana.

Obama era: détente  

In his second term, Barack Obama began secret negotiations with Cuba that culminated in the advertisement in December 2014 of an agreement for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The respective embassies were reopened in July 2015, thus overcoming an anomaly dating back to 1961, when the Eisenhower Administration decided to break relations with the Antillean neighbor in view of the communist orientation of the Cuban Revolution. In March 2016, Obama became the first U.S. president to visit Cuba in 88 years.

Beyond the diplomatic sphere, Obama also sought an economic opening towards the island. Since lifting the decades-old US embargo required the approval of congress, where he faced a Republican majority, Obama introduced certain liberalizing measures by means of presidential decrees. Thus, he eased travel restrictions (he hardly changed the letter of the law, but did relax his internship) and authorized raising the Issue of purchases that Americans could make in Cuba.

For Obama, the economic embargo was a failed policy, as it had not achieved its purpose of ending the Cuban dictatorship and, consequently, had prolonged it. For this reason, he was in favor of a change of strategy, in the hope that the normalization of relations - diplomatic and, progressively, economic - would help to improve Cuba's social status and contribute, in the medium or long term, to the change that the economic embargo had failed to bring about. According to Obama, the embargo had had a negative impact, as issues such as the limitation of tourism or the lack of foreign direct investment had affected the Cuban people more than the Castro nomenklatura.

A new economic relationship

Faced with the impossibility of lifting the economic embargo on Cuba, Obama opted for presidential decrees that opened up trade relations between the two countries. Several measures were aimed at facilitating better access to the Internet for Cubans, which should help to promote democratizing demands in the country. Thus, Washington authorized U.S. telecommunications companies to establish business in Cuba.

In the financial field, the United States allowed its banks to open accounts in Cuba, which facilitated transactions. In addition, Cuban citizens residing on the island could receive payments in the U.S. and send them back to their country.

Another of the measures adopted was the lifting of some of the travel restrictions. As required by U.S. legislation, Obama maintained the restriction that Americans can only travel to Cuba under various circumstances, all linked to certain missions: academic, humanitarian, religious support trips... Although purely tourist trips were still excluded, the lack of control that the U.S. authorities deliberately stopped applying meant a considerable opening of the hand.

In addition to authorizing banking transactions related to such travel, to cater to the anticipated increase in tourists it was announced that several U.S. carriers such as JetBlue and American Airlines had received approval to fly to Cuba. For the first time in 50 years, in late November 2016 a U.S. commercial aircraft landed in Havana.

The U.S. president also eliminated the expense limit for U.S. visitors in the purchase of staff products (particularly cigars and rum). He also promoted partnership in medical research and approved the importation of medicines produced in Cuba.

In addition, Obama repealed the "wet foot, dry foot" policy, whereby Cubans arriving on U.S. soil were automatically granted political asylum, while only those intercepted by Cuba at sea were returned to the island.

Trump's review

Since his election campaign, Donald Trump showed clear signals about the direction his relations with Cuba would take if he became president. Trump announced that he would reverse the opening towards Cuba carried out by Obama, and as soon as he arrived at the White House he began to strengthen Washington's anti-Castro speech . The new president said he was willing to negotiate a "better agreement" with the island, but on the condition that the Cuban government showed concrete progress towards the democratization of the country and respect for human rights. Trump raised the prospect of free elections and the release of political prisoners, knowing that the Cuban regime would not accede to these requests. In the absence of a response from Havana, Trump insisted on his previous proposals: maintenance of the embargo (which in any case the Republican majority in congress is not willing to lift) and reversal of some of Obama' s decisions.

In reality, Trump has formally maintained several of his predecessor' s measures, although the ban on doing business with companies controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), which dominate a good part of Cuban economic life, and the respect for the letter in travel restrictions have reduced the contact between the US and Cuba that had begun to occur at the end of the Obama era.

Trump has ratified the repeal of the "wet foot, dry foot" policy decided by Obama and has maintained the diplomatic relations reestablished by Obama (although he has paralyzed the appointment of an ambassador). It has also respected the timid commercial and financial opening operated by the Democratic president, but as long as the economic transactions do not take place with companies linked to the Cuban army, intelligence and security services. In this regard, on November 8, 2017, the Treasurydepartment published a list of companies in these sectors with which no U.S. contact subject is allowed.

In terms of travel, the restricted assumptions for American travel to the island are maintained, but in contrast to the blind eye adopted by the Obama Administration, the Trump Administration requires that Americans who want to go to Cuba must do so on tours conducted by American companies, accompanied by a representative of the group sponsor and with the obligation to communicate the details of their activities. Treasury rules and regulations require that stays be in private hostels (casas particulares), meals in restaurants run by individuals (paladares) and shopping in stores run by citizens (cuentapropistas), with the purpose of "channeling funds" away from the Cuban army and weakening communist policy.

Reduced tourist expectations led already at the end of 2017 to several US airlines having cancelled all their flights to the Caribbean island. Cuban Economics had counted on a large increase in U.S. tourists and yet now had to face, without higher revenues, the serious problem of falling shipments of cheap oil from Venezuela.

Future of diplomatic relations

The greatest tension between Washington and Havana, however, has not been in the commercial or economic sphere, but in the diplomatic sphere. Following a series of apparent "sonic attacks" on U.S. diplomats in Cuba, the United States withdrew a large part of its staff in Cuba and expelled 15 diplomats from the Cuban embassy in Washington. In addition, the State department issued a travel advisory against travel to the island. Although the origin of these alleged attacks, which the Cuban authorities deny having carried out, has not been clarified, it could be the accidental side effect of an espionage attempt, which would have eventually caused brain damage to the persons being monitored.

The future of relations between the two countries will depend on the direction taken by Trump's policies and the pace of reforms that the new Cuban president may establish. Given that not many changes are foreseen in Miguel Díaz-Canel's management , at least as long as Raúl Castro lives, Havana's immobility in the political and economic fields will probably continue to run up against Trump's anti-revolutionary rhetoric.

Opportunities and challenges in Sino-Panamanian relations, one year after the establishment of diplomatic relations

In June 2016, Panama inaugurated the expansion of its Canal. In June 2017, the Panamanian government decided to establish diplomatic relations with China (Central America has been a traditional ally of Taiwan), thus giving rise to the flow of new Chinese investments in a Canal revitalized with the expansion. On the one-year anniversary of the establishment of relations, here is a review of the opportunities and challenges posed by the increased Chinese presence in the isthmus.

▲Container ship of Chinese shipping line COSCO, making transit issue 2,000 in the expanded Canal, in September 2017 [Panama Canal].

article / Ximena Barria

In the last decade, the People's Republic of China has made efforts to increase its presence in different regions of the world. China's projection as a global power has meant that no region is alien to it and there are hardly any countries that do not actively seek commercial exchange with the Asian giant. Therefore, it is not surprising that China has wanted to increase its activity around the Panama Canal, and that this Central American country has established diplomatic relations with Beijing, breaking the traditional relationship with Taiwan.

Panama's privileged geography and its rapid economic growth in the region are two important aspects taken into account by China. The Panama Canal offers advantageous access to the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and about 6% of global maritime trade passes through it. At times there has been talk of Chinese interest in building a canal in Nicaragua, something that was never really on Beijing's diary . China sees Panama as an important geostrategic point from which to project its foreign policy in Latin America, which undoubtedly unsettles Washington.

On June 13, 2017, the Republic of Panama and the People's Republic of China announced the establishment of diplomatic relations. With this, Panama recognized the government of Beijing as the legitimate Chinese government and broke the previous diplomatic relations established with Taipei. The new Sino-Panamanian relations gave way to 19 agreements in various areas.

Chinese projects in the isthmus

In a country as open to trade and transactions of all subject as Panama is, the Chinese population has always had a relative presence. The Chinese community in Panama is made up of some 135,000 people, which represents 4% of its 4 million inhabitants.

Since 1911, Panama had maintained diplomatic relations with China. However, after the defeat of the Chinese Nationalist Party and the victory of Mao Zedong's communism, the Panamanian State decided to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, due to its capitalist stance, during the Cold War. Since 1949, Panama remained one of Taiwan's major allies until its rupture in 2017.  

Despite the recognition of Taipei, trade relations between Panama and the People's Republic of China have been increasing in recent years, generating an exchange Issue greater than that recorded between the Central American country and Taiwan.

Panama's most important economic engine is the Canal, which links the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and constitutes one of the most important routes for world trade. Canal revenues generate one third of Panama's Gross Domestic Product. Over the years, China has become an important customer of the Canal, becoming its second largest Username after the United States. The first ship to cross the expanded Canal, at the inauguration held in June 2016, was a vessel of the Chinese shipping company COSCO, which was awarded the honor by lottery.

China is the largest provider the Colon Free Zone (CFZ), located on the Caribbean coast of Panama, next to the northern mouth of the Canal. It is the most important free zone in the Americas and the second largest in the world, with an annual import and re-export Issue of $16.16 billion. In the first semester of 2017, the FTZ imported $1.344 billion worth of goods from China. Likewise, important Chinese companies have sought to establish themselves in the FTZ, taking advantage of the strategic advantages it offers.

China has also announced the construction of a container port in the Colon area , which will have facilities for receiving liquefied natural gas. The planned construction is estimated to cost $900 million. The construction will result in the first container terminal designed to handle Neopanamax ships, which have the maximum dimensions to transit the canal.

In the area of communications, the People's Republic of China expressed its interest in building a railway infrastructure connecting the capital of Panama and the province of Chiriqui, covering a distance of 400 kilometers. As for air transportation, the Air China airline committed to operate the Panama City-Beijing route twice a week. Panama has the most important air hub in Latin America and having a direct flight to Beijing represents an important opportunity to bring Asian markets closer to Latin America.

In addition, Panama has an important and diversified financial center that is attractive to Chinese banks as a strategic gateway to establish themselves in the region. The presence of Bank of China, with more than 30 years in the country, and future establishments of other entities such as Banco Industrial y Comercial, Exim Bank and China Development Bank will contribute to increase the flow of Chinese capital to Panama. This, in turn, will diversify and make Panama's banking sector increasingly dynamic.

The Panamanian challenge to seize the opportunity

Ensuring that this increased relationship with China and the Asian market structurally benefits Panama and does not degenerate into a future dependency status presents important challenges for a country that is in the process of development. Panama must increase productivity in sectors such as agriculture and industry, train more staff and create a transparent framework of financial institutions.

The agricultural sector presents marketing difficulties and a lack of agricultural policies to produce and sell crops at fair prices. In recent years, there has been a shortage of land for crop marketing purposes as a result of droughts and floods. Another challenge is food imports, since many imported foreign products are cheaper and this causes a drop in the prices of domestic products, which makes their production unprofitable for the farmer.

The increase in industrial productivity goes hand in hand with the effort to training better human capital. Currently, in the Panamanian Republic there is a lack of preparation of people who can manage important companies. In 2015, the issue of people enrolled in universities reached only a meager 160,000 students. The Panamanian government should promote technical training projects and scholarships to increase this issue so that in the long term there will be more qualified staff for the new companies that will arrive.  

The Panamanian financial structure should also be prepared to create new legislation that will contribute to legal certainty. In order to harmonize the financial sector with international anti-money laundering conventions, the Panamanian government should establish tax reforms that promote fiscal transparency. The entry of foreign banks should be regulated more effectively. The discussion of considering tax evasion as a tax crime will present an important challenge for the country to consider.

Central America's Northern Triangle migrants look to the U.S., Nicaragua's to Costa Rica

While migrants from Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras continue to try to reach the United States, those from Nicaragua have preferred to travel to Costa Rica in recent years. The restrictions put in place by the Trump Administration and the deterioration of the Costa Rican economic boom are reducing the flows, but this migratory divide in Central America remains for the time being.

▲Belize-Mexico border crossing [Marrovi/CC].

article / Celia Olivar Gil

When comparing the Degree of development of Central American countries, the different human flows operating in the region are well understood. The United States is the great migratory magnet, but Costa Rica is also to some extent a pole of attraction, obviously to a lesser Degree Thus, the five Central American countries with the highest poverty rates -Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Belize- share their migratory orientation: the first four maintain important flows to the United States, while in recent years Nicaragua has opted more for Costa Rica, given its proximity.

Migration from the Northern Triangle to the U.S.

Nearly 500,000 people try every year to cross Mexico's southern border with the goal of reaching the United States. Most of them come from Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, the Central American region known as the Northern Triangle, which is currently one of the most violent in the world. The reasons that lead this large issue of citizens from the Northern Triangle to migrate, many illegally, are varied:

On the one hand, there are reasons that could be described as structural: the porousness of the border, the complexity and high costs of regularization processes for migration, the lack of commitment by employers to regularize migrant workers, and the insufficient capacity of governments to establish migration laws.

There are also clear economic reasons: Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador have a high poverty rate, at 67.7%, 74.3% and 41.6%, respectively, of their inhabitants. Difficulties in budgetary income and pronounced social inequality mean that public services, such as Education and healthcare, are poorly presentation to a large part of the population.

Perhaps the most compelling reason is the lack of security. Many of those leaving these three countries cite insecurity and violence as the main reason for their departure. The level of criminal violence in the Northern Triangle reaches levels similar to those of an armed conflict. In El Salvador, a total of 6,650 intentional homicides were registered in 2015; in Honduras, 8,035, and in Guatemala, 4,778.

All these reasons push Guatemalans, Salvadorans and Hondurans to migrate to the United States, who use three main routes to cross Mexico on their journey north: the one that crosses the country diagonally until reaching the Tijuana area , the one that goes through central Mexico to Ciudad Juarez and the one that seeks to enter the US through the Rio Bravo valley. Along these routes, migrants face many risks, such as falling victim to criminal organizations and suffering all subject of abuses (kidnapping, torture, rape, robbery, extortion...), which can not only cause immediate physical injuries and trauma, but can also leave serious long-term consequences.

Despite all these difficulties, citizens of the Northern Triangle continue to choose the United States as their migration destination. This is mainly due to the attraction of the economic potential of a country like the USA, in plenary session of the Executive Council employment status ; to its relative geographic proximity (it is possible to arrive by land crossing only one or two countries), and to the human relations created since the 1980s, when the USA began to be a goal for those fleeing the civil wars of a politically unstable Central America with economic difficulties, which created a migratory tradition, consolidated by family connections and the protection offered to the newcomers by the already established nationals. During this period, the Central American population in the U.S. tripled. Today, 82.9% of Central American immigrants in the U.S. live in the United States.

Migration from Nicaragua to Costa Rica

If emigration from northern Central America has been directed towards the United States, emigration from southern Central America has had more destinations. If Hondurans have looked north, in recent years their Nicaraguan neighbors have looked a little more to the south. The Coco River, which divides Honduras and Nicaragua, has become a sort of migratory'watershed'.

There are certainly more Nicaraguans officially residing in the U.S. (over 400,000) than in Costa Rica (close to 300,000), but in recent years the issue new residents has increased more in Costa Rican territory. In the last decade, agreement to an OAS report (pages 159 and 188), the U.S. has granted permanent residency program to average of 3,500 Nicaraguans each year, while Costa Rica has granted an average of 5,000, reaching a record 14,779 in 2013. Moreover, the proportional weight of Nicaraguan migration in Costa Rica, a country of 4.9 million people, is large: in 2016, some 440,000 Nicaraguans entered the neighboring country, and as many exits were recorded, indicating significant cross-border mobility and suggesting that many workers return temporarily to Nicaragua to circumvent immigration requirements .

Costa Rica is seen in certain aspects in Latin America as Switzerland in Europe, that is, as an institutionally solid, politically stable and economically favorable country. This means that the emigration of Costa Ricans is not extreme and that people come from other places, so that Costa Rica is the country with the highest net migration in Latin America, with 9% of the Costa Rican population of foreign origin.

Since its independence in the 1820s, Costa Rica has remained one of the Central American countries with the least amount of serious conflicts. For this reason, during the 1970s and 1980s it was a refuge for many Nicaraguans fleeing the Somoza dictatorship and the Sandinista revolution. Now, however, they do not emigrate for security reasons, since Nicaragua is one of the least violent countries in Latin America, even below Costa Rica's figures. This migratory flow is due to economic reasons: Costa Rica's greater development is reflected in the poverty rate, which is 18.6%, compared to Nicaragua's 58.3%; in fact, Nicaragua is the poorest country in the Americas after Haiti.

Likewise, Nicaraguans have a special preference for choosing Costa Rica as a destination because of its geographic proximity, which allows them to move frequently between the two countries and to maintain a certain degree of family coexistence; the use of the same language, and other cultural similarities.

[Omar Jaén Suárez, 500 años de la cuenca del Pacífico. Towards a global history. Ediciones Doce Calles, Aranjuez 2016, 637 pages]

review / Emili J. Blasco

In just thirty years, between Columbus' arrival in America in 1492 and Elcano's return to Cadiz after his round-the-world voyage in 1522, Spain added to its domain not only a new continent, but also a new ocean. We all know about Spain's Atlantic dimension, but we often disregard its peaceful dimension. During the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the Pacific Ocean was primarily under Spanish dominion. Spain was the European power present for the longest time and with the greatest weight in the entire basin of what began to be called the South Sea. Spain was the first navy that regularly patrolled its waters - the Armada del Sur, based in El Callao, Peru - and Spain was the first trade route that periodically crossed it from side to side - the Manila galleon, between the Philippines and Mexico.

In "500 years of the Pacific Basin. Toward a global history", Panamanian diplomat and historian Omar Jaén Suárez does not limit himself to documenting that Spanish and then Hispanic presence in a vast space -one third of the Earth's sphere and half of its waters- whose eastern margin is the coast of Spanish America. As the degree scroll indicates, his is a global history. But approaching the last half millennium means starting from the fact of the finding of the Pacific by the Spaniards and that determines the approach of the narration.

If Anglo-Saxon historiography would have perhaps used another prism, this book emphasizes the development of the entire Pacific account from the arrival of the first Europeans, with Nuñez de Balboa at the head. Without forgetting the colonizing actions of other powers, the author details aspects that we Spaniards do forget, such as the permanent base that Spain had in Formosa (today Taiwan), the Crown's attempts to keep Tahiti or the voyages through Alaska in search of a sea passage to the north of America, which had as a logistic point the island of Quadra and Vancouver, the great Canadian city today known only by the second part of that name (in fact, Spain neglected to populate Oregon, more interested in the Philippines and trade with the Moluccas): quite a pioneering "turn to Asia").

Being from Panama gives Omar Jaén, who has also lived in Spain, a special sensitivity for his subject of study. The Panamanian isthmus has always been the key to the South Sea for the Old World; with the construction of the canal, Panama is also a transit point between East and West.

The careful edition of this work adds an indisputable value. Almost eight hundred maps, graphs, engravings and photographs make it especially visual. The quantity of illustrations, many in full color, and the good weight of the paper make the volume a luxury for anyone interested in the Pacific. Ediciones Doce Calles has taken great care with this first degree scroll of a new collection, Pictura Mundi, dedicated to celebrating travels, explorations and geographical discoveries.