Domestic demand will increase, in contrast to more advanced regions

In the coming decades, oil consumption in Latin America will continue to grow, in the face of a trend to leave that is already on the horizon in many advanced countries. Population growth and the increase in class average explain this increase in demand. This domestic demand will serve to strengthen the extractive industries of Latin American crude oil producers, but will make the refining deficit suffered by the region chronic.

article / Ignacio Urbasos

The oil industry is experiencing a change in export and consumption patterns in the Latin American region. The sector's classic orientation towards the United States has changed in a new context in which exports are much more diversified with a shift towards emerging Asian countries. Similarly, domestic demand is steadily increasing due to population and economic growth. However, refining capacity in the region will remain insufficient. This paper will offer an analysis focused on the long term to try to provide a better understanding of the region's energy future, mainly in terms of consumption, extraction and subsequent refining.

First, the demographic and economic expectations for Latin America must be taken into account: population growth will increase by 800 million people by 2050, and economic growth could be 2% per year for at least the next decade. A direct effect of this will be a 91% increase in electricity demand by 2040 and an increase in the issue of vehicles in the region from 94 million in 2016 to the 165 million expected by 2040.

As can be seen in the graph below, the greatest demand for oil in the region will be associated with transportation, which will tend towards greater efficiency in consumption, but the promised arrival of the electric car is still a long way off, with expectations of less than 4% by 2030 worldwide. Similarly, the increase in theaverage class by 126 million people by 2030 will have a direct impact on the increase in air transport, which is expected to grow by an average of 3.4% per year until 2034, agreement to the latest ICAO report , with a consequent increase in kerosene consumption.

It should be taken into account that in Latin America there are subsidies for both gasoline and diesel, which generate more affordable prices, clearly distorting demand upwards. These subsidies respond mainly to the logic that citizens should be beneficiaries of their country's possession of natural resources, and are concentrated in traditional oil-producing countries such as Ecuador, Venezuela, Mexico or Argentina. However, these countries import fuel to a large extent due to their limited refining capacity, generating a double trade and fiscal deficit, as ECLAC points out. The future of these subsidies is unknown, but any change would have a high political cost, since affecting the price of a basic good would have consequences on broad social sectors with great electoral impact.

For its part, the contribution of oil to electricity generation will remain constant at 500,000 barrels per day, its importance dropping from the current 46%, according to figures for Latin America from the International Renewable Energy Agency. The region will benefit enormously from the increased presence of renewable energies, a sector that it already leads due to its incomparable geographic conditions, highlighting the enormous importance of hydroelectric energy.

Over the coming decades, two major phenomena will occur in Latin America: universal access to energy and a new energy model with less oil and biofuel (wood and waste) in favor of gas and alternative energies. One of the great challenges facing the region is to develop a more integrated national and international electricity system that increases consumption efficiency and allows greater flexibility in production sources. However, there are already several regional projects in this direction: the Andean Electrical Interconnection System, which includes the countries of the Andean Community plus Chile, and the Electrical Interconnection System of Central American Countries (SIEPAC).

Refining deficit

This rise in consumption is not accompanied by an increase in refining capacity, which is already highly deficient, and generates a critical dependence on imports of gasoline and other derivatives from the US. A trend that is likely to be a constant in the short and medium term for the region and adds to the 14% decline in refining activity in the region since 2012 (World Oil Outlook 2017), which already adds up to a loss of one million barrels refined per day since that year. High installation and maintenance costs, at around 2% of annual installed cost, add to the region's chronic political uncertainty that is largely scaring off private investment.

An illustrative case is that of the Pacific refinery in Ecuador, which was presented as the largest refinery project in the country at the beginning of Rafael Correa's presidency in 2007. The project began with a 49% financial participation by PDVSA and 51% by Petroecuador, in addition to the award of the project to the construction company Odebrecht. Today, PDVSA has withdrawn its contribution and the Brazilian construction company is facing trials in the country for corruption, result in a lost decade and forcing Lenin Moreno to reformulate the project, including the name: now Manabí Refinery.

As we can see in the graph, Latin America's major oil producers have a deficit in refining capacity. It should be noted that in the region there is not only undercapacity, but also underactivity, which generates an even greater gap. The activity of these plants is currently around 70% of their total capacity. Those countries that do not have oil production, but do have a relevant refining industry, are Curaçao, which has one of the largest PDVSA centers, Chile and Peru.

In final, the Latin American oil sector faces the coming decades with enormous doubts about its refining capacity and far from achieving self-sufficiency. The lack of capacity to attract foreign investment from historically oil producing countries has generated a disappointing scenario that aggravates the already limited industry in the region. The social transformations inherent to a society that is growing demographically and economically require investment in infrastructure in order to meet the expectations of universal access to the electricity network and the consumption of the incipient class average.

Taiwan imports up to four times more than China from Central American countries that recognize it as a state.

Of the almost two hundred countries in the world, only 19 have diplomatic relations with Taiwan (and therefore do not have diplomatic relations with China). Of these, five are in Central America and four in the Caribbean. The recognition of Taipei has some advantages for these countries, although they have been neutralized by China's commercial weight. Panama established relations with Beijing in 2017 and the Dominican Republic has just done so now. Here we examine the interest that preference for Taiwan still holds for certain Central American countries.

article / Blanca Abadía Moreno

Taiwan's special relationship with Central America dates back to the period following Taiwan's 1971 departure from the United Nations, where Nationalist China was displaced by the People's Republic of China. Several Latin American countries had established relations with Taiwan in the 1960s, but most of them gradually came to recognize Beijing after the UN change. Taiwan retained, however, the support of the Central American nations and in the 1980s also gained the support of small Caribbean islands that then became independent.

The emergence of China as a major international trading partner has been subtracting diplomatic recognition from Taiwan. Costa Rica established full ties with China in 2007, Panama in 2017 and the Dominican Republic last May 1. Even so, of the 19 countries that continue to opt for Taipei over Beijing, five are in Central America: Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua (this country with a five-year hiatus, from 1985-1990). Four others are in the Caribbean: Haiti and three tiny nations in the Lesser Antilles. If one takes into account that the rest of the countries that recognize Taiwan are of little commercial importance, except for Paraguay (they are the Vatican, Burkina Faso, Swaziland and six Polynesian microstates), it is understandable that Central America absorbs Taiwan' s diplomatic interest.

Since the constitutive theory of statehood defines a state as a person under international law if, and only if, it is recognized as sovereign by others, Taiwan strives to ensure that those countries continue to recognize it as a subject of plenary session of the Executive Council right in the concert of nations; losing their support would directly affect the legitimacy of its claims as a sovereign state.

To this end, Taipei encourages trade relations with them, procures investments and uses what is called "checkbook diplomacy": the submission of gifts (and bribes) to maintain these relations. Central American countries receive an average of US$50 million annually in declared non-reimbursable cooperation. Taiwan directs financial aid to its Latin American partners through the International Cooperation and development Fund(ICDF), with programs ranging from infrastructure construction to coffee production. Taiwan has financed and constructed several government buildings in Nicaragua and El Salvador.

In addition, the Asian nation contributes to programs of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) and is an observer country in the Central American Parliament and other regional organizations.

This effort, however, has not prevented in recent years there have been casualties among Central American countries that saw him giving diplomatic recognition. Costa Rica's economic development led the country in 2007 to want to improve its trade figures through a rapprochement with China, which involved the opening of an embassy in Beijing and the closure of the one it had in Taipei. For the same reason, Panama also opted in 2017 to break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan, stating that China, a prominent Username of the Panamanian Canal, "has always played a relevant role in Panama's Economics " and any restrictions preventing it from remaining so had to be removed.

Business relationships

Trade relations between Taiwan and the Central American countries that recognize it as a State increased significantly thanks to the opening of the Central American Trade Office(CATO) in Taiwan in 1997, the incorporation of this country into CABEI and the entrance into force of several trade agreements. Taiwan signed free trade agreements with Guatemala (2006), with Honduras and El Salvador (2006) and with Nicaragua (2008).

These treaties have especially facilitated Central American exports to Taiwan. As is the case with most Latin American countries, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua have China as one of the main origins of their imports (the first is still the United States). Their political alignment with Taiwan does not prevent them from being customers of Chinese production. Thus, in 2016, China ranked between 2nd and 3rd as a source market, while Taiwan ranked far down the table (between 14th and 23rd). However, the special relationship with Taipei means that Taiwan equals or surpasses China as a destination for the exports of the four Central American countries mentioned. This is the commercial benefit they obtain from the diplomatic recognition of the Asian island.

Of this group of countries, Nicaragua exported the most to Taiwan in 2016 (US$83.7 million) compared to exports to China (US$21.5 million), a ratio of four to one. The main Nicaraguan products exported were shrimp, sugar, beef and coffee.

Honduras exported US$24.7 million to Taiwan -mainly textiles, coffee and aluminum- compared to US$18.5 million to China. El Salvador sent 53.3 million dollars worth of cargo to Taiwan -mainly sugar- and 46.5 million to China. Guatemala, whose Economics has a larger Issue , was the only country to sell more to China (75.5 million), but in figures very similar to those of Taiwan (74 million), to which it sent mainly coffee, paper and cardboard.

With these diplomatic and commercial relations Taiwan intends to show the international community that it is a capable ally and manager for international cooperation. It also wants to show the world that Taiwanese diplomacy exists despite China's attempts to isolate it. The fact that China has a special interest in markets that facilitate access to raw materials makes the Asian giant more attentive to relations with various South American countries, rich in minerals; it is there where Beijing concentrates its Latin American investments.

Central America, with less extractive activity, thus escapes China's priority (the interest in the Panama Canal is a case apart), and is left for the time being to Taiwan's action. However, the increasingly residual nature of support for the island and the very weight of relations with China suggest that the Central American countries will continue to leave this particular club, one after the other.

Nearly two-thirds of the world's identified lithium reserves are located in Bolivia, Chile and Argentina.

The explosion of electric cars through the use of lithium-ion batteries has placed the large reserves of this metal in the Bolivian Altiplano and the Atacama Desert at the center of the world's interest in this new industry. Will South America seize the opportunity to enter into technological innovation processes itself, or will it once again resign itself, as has happened with so many other minerals, to mere extraction?

▲Salar de Uyuni, in the highlands of Bolivia [Luca Galuzzi, Wikimedia Commons].

article / Milene Pardo-Figueroa

With the gradual incorporation of electric vehicles into the market, as well as increased sales of smartphones, laptops, tablets and other electronic devices - all of which are powered by lithium-ion batteries - global demand for lithium is rising. This alkaline chemical element, which in its pure form appears as a soft, especially light metal, is abundant in nature, although the largest reserves are concentrated in just a few countries. Due to the conditions of its extraction, it is particularly profitable in the dry areas of the triangle delimited by the borders of Bolivia, Chile and Argentina. If lithium is known as "white oil" or "new gasoline" because of the color of the saltpetre in the deposits where it is found and because it is the driving force behind modern automobiles, the border area of these countries is known as the "Saudi Arabia of lithium".

The "fever" for lithium has led to a current production of 40,000 tons per year, a figure that falls short of the enormous existing demand, which currently poses a need for 180,000 tons. Although this Issue may be reached in the next few years, estimates point to a demand of between 500,000 and 800,000 tons in 2025. By then, agreement to some forecasts, the global lithium battery market could be worth $46 billion. Part of the boost to the sector comes from the innovation of electric cars. The expansion of that market, however, could be slowed if lithium production does not accelerate. As visionary entrepreneur Elon Musk, promoter of the high-end electric car brand Tesla, has warned, "to create 500,000 vehicles a year, we basically have to retain all the lithium generation on the planet."

The difficulty in meeting this growing demand comes from the high costs of extraction, which vary considerably depending on the characteristics of the deposit. The most profitable deposits are found in brine concentrates in arid climates, which undergo rapid evaporation when brought to light. This is especially true in the area formed by the Atacama Desert and the Bolivian Altiplano.

World production is led by Australia, which in 2016 extracted 14,300 tons, followed by Chile, with 12,000, and Argentina, with 5,700, agreement to figures from the US Geological Survey. The Issue of identified reserves places the South American countries clearly ahead, especially Bolivia, which has the largest deposits, although for now there has been little development of mining activity of this metal. Thus, Bolivia has identified reserves of 9 million tons (22.7% of the world total), Chile 7.5 million (18.9%) and Argentina 6.5 million (16.4%), which means that the three countries account for 58% of the world's reserves. They are followed by the United States, with 5.6 million (13.9%), and China, with 5.4 million (13.6%). Other estimates give China reserves similar to those of Argentina. The sector is dominated by five large companies, which control 90% of world production: SQM (Chile), FMC and Albermarle (USA), Talison (Australia) and Tianqi Lithium (China).

The white triangle

The Salar de Uyuni in the Bolivian altiplano - a salt-covered surface generated by the evaporation of seawater that was locked up in a lake when the Andes Mountains emerged in its trainingis home to what could be the world's largest lithium deposit. Obtaining it faces the problem that here the metal is especially mixed with magnesium and the separation of both requires access to technology that Bolivia does not have at the moment on a large scale. Fearing that foreign companies will control the extraction and leave little benefit to the country, as has historically happened with mining development , the government of Evo Morales has opted for a limited exploitation for the time being. Bolivian authorities have preferred to prevent the penetration of multinationals, in order to ensure that the South American nation maintains control of the business. Morales has announced plans for the start-up, with public financing, of a lithium carbonate manufacturing facility at the Uyuni salt plant.

Lithium mining is much more advanced in Chile, which accounts for around 33% of the world's supply, thanks to the large deposits in the Atacama Desert and the development of its own industry. Sociedad Chemistry y Minera de Chile (SQM), a private Chilean company, leads the domestic sector, where concessions are closely controlled by the state. For its part, Argentina is taking steps to boost the lithium business; to this end, the government of Mauricio Macri is proceeding with the liberalization of the sector and has established contacts to attract foreign capital.

Beyond the economic benefits that these South American countries can obtain from the boom in lithium exploitation, a discussion has been generated in their societies about the ecological impact that this may cause in places as unique for their natural characteristics as Atacama or Uyuni; there are voices that warn that the Andean salt solution may be condemned to disappear to satisfy foreign interest in batteries. There are also fears of a social impact, without compensation for the human groups settled in the affected territories.

On the other hand, the negative impact that the perpetuation of an economic culture of extraction has historically had in Latin America advises Bolivia, Chile and Argentina to take the opportunity to try to develop their own transformation initiatives and new technologies in the generation of batteries, without limiting themselves, as is the case with so many other minerals, to an extractive activity.

July 1 presidential election does not open a serious discussion on the fight against drug trafficking

The 'iron fist' that Felipe Calderón (PAN) began in 2006, with the deployment of the Armed Forces in the fight against drugs, was extended in 2012 by Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI). In these twelve years the status has not improved, but rather violence has increased. In the 2018 elections, none of the main candidates presents a radical change of model; the populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador (Morena) proposes some striking measures, but continues to count on the work of the Army.

▲The Mexican president on Flag Day, February 2018 [Presidency of the Republic].

article / Valeria Nadal [English version] [English version].

Mexico faces a change of sexenio after closing 2017 as the most violent year in the country's history, with more than 25,000 homicides. How has this status been reached? Can it begin to be resolved in the coming years?

There are various theories about the beginning of drug trafficking in Mexico, but the most widely accepted argues that Mexican drug trafficking was born when Franklin Delano Roosevelt, president of the United States between 1933 and 1945, promoted the cultivation of poppy in Mexican territory with the veiled intention of promoting the production of large quantities of morphine to relieve the pain of U.S. soldiers during World War II. However, drug trafficking was not a serious national problem until the 1980s; since then, cartels have multiplied, violence has increased and crime has spread throughout Mexico.

The new phase of Felipe Calderón

In the fight against drug trafficking in Mexico, the presidency of Felipe Calderon marked a new stage. candidate of the conservative National Action Party (PAN), Calderon was elected for the six-year term 2006-2012. His program included declaring war on the cartels, with a "mano dura" (iron fist) plan that translated into sending the Army into the streets of Mexico. Although Calderon's speech was forceful and had a clear goal , to exterminate insecurity and violence caused by drug trafficking, the result was the opposite because his strategy was based exclusively on the action of police and military. This militarization of the streets was carried out through joint operations combining government forces: National Defense, Public Security, the Navy and the Attorney General's Office (PGR). However, despite the large deployment and the 50% increase in security expense , the strategy did not work; homicides not only did not decrease, but increased: in 2007, Calderón's first full presidential year, 10,253 homicides were registered and in 2011, the last full year of his presidency, a record 22,409 homicides were registered.

agreement to the Institute for Legal Research (IIJ) of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), in that record year of 2011 almost a quarter of the total Mexican population over 18 years of age (24%) was assaulted in the street, suffered a robbery in public transportation or was a victim of extortion, fraud, threats or injuries. The fees of violence were so high that they surpassed those of countries at war: in Iraq between 2003 and 2011 there was an average of 12 murders per day per 100,000 inhabitants, while in Mexico that average reached 18 murders per day. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the number of complaints about this indiscriminate wave of violence was quite leave: only 12% of the victims of drug-related violence filed a complaint. This figure is probably related to the high rate of impunity (70%) that also marked Calderón's mandate.

Peña Nieto's new approach

After the failure of the PAN in the fight against drug trafficking, in 2012 Enrique Peña Nieto, candidate the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), was elected president. With this, this party, which had governed uninterruptedly for decades, returned to power after two consecutive six-year periods of absence (presidencies of Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón, both from the PAN). Peña Nieto assumed the position promising a new approach , contrary to the "open war" proposed by his predecessor. He mainly focused his security policy on the division of the national territory into five regions to increase the efficiency and coordination of operations, on the reorganization of the Federal Police and on the strengthening of the legal framework . However, the new president maintained the employment the Army in the streets.

Peña Nieto's results in his fight against drug trafficking have been worse than those of his predecessor: during his term, intentional homicides have increased by 12,476 cases compared to the same period in Calderón's administration and 2017 closed with the regrettable news of being the most violent year in Mexico to date. With just months to go before the end of his six-year term, and in a last-ditch effort to right the wrongs that have marked it, Peña Nieto brought about the approval of the Internal Security Law, which was voted by Mexico's congress and enacted in December of last year. This law does not remove the military from the streets, but rather seeks to legally guarantee the Armed Forces' capacity for policing, something that previously had only a provisional nature. According to the law, military participation in daily anti-narcotics operations is not to supplant the police, but to reinforce them in those areas where they are unable to deal with drug trafficking. The initiative was criticized by critics who, while recognizing the problem of the scarcity of police resources, warned of the risk of an unlimited military deployment over time. Thus, although Peña Nieto began his term in office trying to distance himself from Calderón's policies, he has concluded it by consolidating them.

What to expect from the 2018 candidates

Given the obvious ineffectiveness of the measures adopted by both presidents, the question in this election year is what anti-drug policy the next president will adopt, in a country where there is no re-election and therefore every six-year presidential term means a change of face. The three main candidates are, in the order of the polls: Andrés Manuel López Obrador, of the Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (Morena); Ricardo Anaya, of the PAN coalition with the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), and José Antonio Meade, of the PRI. López Obrador came close to reaching the presidency in 2006 and 2012, both times as candidate of the PRD (he had previously been leader of the PRI); then he created his own party.

Meade, who represents a certain continuity with respect to Peña Nieto, although in the electoral campaign he has adopted a more anti-corruption tone, has pronounced himself in favor of the Internal Security Law: "It is an important law, it is a law that gives us framework, that gives us certainty, it is a law that allows the participation of the Armed Forces to be well regulated and regulated". Anaya has also positioned himself in favor of this law, since he considers that a withdrawal of the Army from the streets would be "leaving the citizens to their fate". However, he is in favor of the need for the Police to recover its functions and strongly criticizes the lack of responsibility of the Government in subject of public security, alleging that Mexico has entered a "vicious circle that has become very comfortable for governors and mayors". In any case, neither Meade nor Anaya have specified what turn they could take that would be truly effective in reducing violence.

Lopez Obrador, from a left-wing populist stance, is a major change from previous policies, although it is unclear how effective his measures could be. Moreover, some of them, such as granting amnesty to the main drug cartel leaders, seem clearly counterproductive. In recent months, the Morena candidate has changed the focus of his speech, which was first centered on the eradication of corruption and then focused on security issues. Thus, he has said that if he wins the presidency he will assume full responsibility for the country's security by integrating the Army, the Navy and the Police into a single command, to which a newly created National Guard would be added. He has also announced that he would be the only one to assume the single command: "I am going to assume this responsibility directly". López Obrador pledges to end the war against drugs in the first three years of his mandate, assuring that, together with measures of force, his management will achieve economic growth that will translate into employment creation and improvement of welfare, which will reduce violence.

In conclusion, the decade against drug trafficking that began almost twelve years ago has result be a failure that can be measured in numbers: since Calderon became president of Mexico in 2006 with the slogan "Things can change for the better," 28,000 people have disappeared and more than 150,000 have died as a result of the drug war. Despite small victories for Mexican authorities, such as the arrest of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman during the Peña Nieto presidency, the reality in Mexico is one of intense criminal activity by drug cartels. From the electoral proposals of the presidential candidates, no rapid improvement can be expected in the next six years.

▲Street art in the city of Medellín

ANALYSIS / María Gabriela Fajardo

Colombia experienced on March 11 the first elections held after the signature in 2016 of the Peace agreement between the government and the guerrilla of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). These elections to the country's bicameral congress - members of the Senate and the House of Representatives were elected - were the first occasion in which the different ideological sectors could measure their forces without the distortion of an armed struggle in significant parts of the territory. Traditionally, social rejection of the guerrilla campaign has been alluded to as an explanation for why the left in Colombia has usually enjoyed little popular support. Has the arrival of peace changed the correlation of political forces and has it led to an improvement in the electoral results of the left?

To answer these questions, we will examine the results obtained by the different political options, grouped into sections of the ideological spectrum (right, center-right, center-left and left), in the congress elections held since the beginning of this century. An examination of the political composition of congress over the last decade and average will give perspective to the results of the March 11 legislative elections. These elections meant the integration of the FARC into the Colombian political party system, under a different name - Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común - but with the same acronym.

In the 2002-2018 period, in addition to the five congress elections, there were also five presidential elections. The latter are mentioned in the analysis because they help to clarify the contexts, but are not included in the comparative work , given that the presidential elections are governed by more personalistic dynamics and complex vote transfers take place due to the two-round process. The March 11 elections, however, provide considerations for the presidential elections of May 27.

Senate

The Parapolitics scandal distorted the reception of the 2002 legislative election results, after paramilitary chief Salvatore Mancuso claimed that 35% of the elected congress was a "friend" of his organization. The right wing, represented by the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, won 41.1% of the Senate seats. This figure does not include the seats won by other minor political groups, among them Colombia Siempre, whose list was headed by the current presidential candidate Germán Vargas Lleras. The left, on the other hand, was quite fractioned, in groups such as Vía Alterna and Movimiento Popular Unido, and obtained 14% of the Senate seats. The center-left won 12.9% and the center-right 7%.

In the 2002 presidential elections, held a few months after the legislative elections, Álvaro Uribe became head of state, with the vote of 53.1% of the voters. Uribe ran as an independent candidate , after splitting from the Liberal Party, and had the support of much of the right and center-right, including Cambio Radical, Somos Colombia and the Conservative Party, which then did not participate in the presidential race.

Thus, in the 2006 legislative elections, a new party, the Social Party of National Unity (better known as the U Party), created by Álvaro Uribe, played a major role. The Partido de la U won the elections, obtaining 20% of the seats: for the first time neither of the two traditional parties (Liberal and Conservative) had won. The new party was here to stay, so that the right wing was now represented by three parties (de la U, Liberal and Conservative), with 61% of the senators. The left, although it increased to 19% of the Senate seats, was split into several political parties without weight and without the possibility of proposing drastic legislative changes. The center-right, represented by Cambio Radical, was in fourth place, with 15% of seats, while the center-left obtained none.

In 2010 the right wing reached its highest point, with 66.7% of the Senate seats, a figure that includes the three right-wing parties mentioned above and MIRA, a group with a smaller presence. These were moments of political dominance of Uribismo. In the electoral months of 2010, President Uribe was expressing his support for Juan Manuel Santos as presidential candidate . It was thought that he would continue Uribe's policies of confronting the guerrillas and organizing the security forces. However, after coming to power, Santos surprised by disassociating himself from Uribe and opening negotiations with the FARC in 2012, which led to the rupture of the relationship between the two politicians (El periodico, 2017). The strength demonstrated by the right in the 2010 legislative elections was accompanied by a great weakness of the left, which obtained only 7.7% of the Senate seats and would become the perfect ally of President Santos to carry out his diary and his journey towards the political center. The center-left had a representation of 13.3%, thanks to the push of the new Alianza Verde party, and the center-right remained at 7.9%.

The 2014 legislative elections meant the consolidation of a new right-wing party, the Democratic Center, created by Uribe after his separation from the U Party, which had been left in the hands of Santos, who that year would win reelection as Colombian president. The Democratic Center came in second place in the Senate elections, with only one senator less than the U Party (Sanchez, 2018). In 2014, the right wing came to control 48.1% of the Senate, in agreement with the ideological realignment of the party system. Thus, several experts came to classify the Partido de la U as center-right, a label that they also began to grant to the Partido Liberal, in a political space shared with Cambio Radical; these three parties formed the "Unidad Nacional" (Castillo, 2018). With this, the center-right totaled 19.6% of the seats, while the center-left obtained 9.8%, due to the votes achieved by the Green Party and the Progressives, the latter led by Gustavo Petro, current presidential candidate . The left only reached 4.9%, represented by the minorities of the Polo Democrático, the Unión Patriótica, Marcha Patriótica and the groups that came from the demobilized guerrillas.

In the legislative elections of March 11, there was a reinforcement of right-wing positions, with the return of some parties which in previous elections had slid towards the center-right by defending the negotiation with the FARC and which now wanted to counteract the fear of part of the population of a rise of the radical left, in a very polarized electoral process. Thus, the right rose to 55.2% of the senators, led by those of the Democratic Center, while the center-right fell to 15.9%. The moderate and radical left increased their presence: the center-left rose to 11.5% and the left to 9%. This last percentage does not include the five seats guaranteed to the FARC, which despite not winning any senator electorally, will have those five seats guaranteed by the Peace Accords.

House of Representatives

The results in the 2002-2018 period of the elections for the House of Representatives, held simultaneously with those for the Senate, do not differ much from what was discussed in the previous epigraph; however, they present some variations that should be considered.

The institution was quite affected by parapolitics scandals, a factor that influenced the political polarization of the country, which would be reflected in the elections throughout this period. In 2002, the right won 47% of the seats in the House, with the Liberal Party having the largest representation; the left won 27.1%. From then on, the center-right, which in 2002 obtained 4.2% of the representatives (the center-left took 1.8%) began to take on a certain configuration, as the contours of the two traditional parties -Conservative and Liberal- blurred with the division into factions, from which new parties would emerge; this ended the bipartisanship experienced in Colombia throughout the 20th century: the Conservative governed for 48 years and the Liberal for 13.

The emergence of the Partido de la U, led by Álvaro Uribe and the wide acceptance of his political figure (Uribe became president in 2002 and was reelected in 2006), led for the first time a party other than the two traditional ones to come in second place in the 2006 legislative elections, in which the Partido de la U won 16.7% of the seats in the Chamber, raising the representation of the right to 54.2%. For its part, the left dropped its representation to 16.7% and entered a period of special political weakness (these elections were not good for the center-left either, which did not obtain representation). At a time of President Uribe's successes against the guerrillas, with measures supported by a large part of the population, although not without controversy, the left-wing parties were weighed down by sharing certain ideological assumptions with the guerrillas, as political scientist Andrés Dávila of the Universidad de los Andrés Dávila of the Universidad de los Andres points out.

This dynamic led to an even greater increase of the right wing and a new decline of the left wing in the House of Representatives in 2010, in parallel with what happened in the Senate, in a year in which the candidate promoted by Uribe, Juan Manuel Santos, would also win the presidency. The Partido de la U was ahead of the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party in the House of Representatives, with these three right-wing parties accounting for 74.6% of the seats, the highest percentage of the entire period studied; the center-right party reached 9.7%. For its part, the left, whose largest party was the Polo Democrático, reached only 4%, its worst share in the period, minimally compensated by the maximum representation of the center-right, although this was a modest 8.5%.

The 2014 elections brought with them the presence of a new party headed by Uribe, the Democratic Center, which positioned itself to the right of the previous ones by positioning itself forcefully against the continuation of the peace dialogues with the FARC propitiated by President Santos (El periodico, 2017). The rupture between Santos and Uribe caused their electorate to split, so that in the elections to the House of Representatives the Liberal Party won, followed by the U Party, the Conservative Party and the Democratic Center. Taking into account the shift towards more moderate positions of some of these formations, when grouping them together we have that the right-wing advocates dropped to 46.7% of the seats in the House, while the center-right rose to 11.1%. The left, with the Polo Democrático, improved its representation somewhat to 10%, and the center-left languished at 3.3%.

Four years later, last March 11, the Liberal Party won again the elections to the House of Representatives, followed by the Democratic Center, the Radical Change, the U Party and the Conservative Party. Some of these formations returned during the electoral campaign to clear right-wing positions that they had previously moderated, so that the right wing added 61.1% of the seats (Sánchez, 2018), compared to 6% for the left. For its part, the center-right scored 9.1% and the center-left 6.1%. To these figures must be added the five seats in the House granted by the Peace agreement to the FARC, which also failed to win any by citizen vote, as in the Senate. With this enlargement, the Colombian bicameral congress goes from 268 to 280 members (the ten members of the FARC party and two that will correspond to the presidential ticket that comes second in the presidential elections).

The division of the left

The analysis carried out allows us to affirm that right-wing political approaches have remained in the majority in Colombia so far this century, as in previous decades, although no longer in the hegemonic framework of two major parties, but of a wider range of partisan options. In a period in which in many other Latin American countries there were turns to the left -notably, the Bolivarian revolutions- Colombia was a clear exception. In this time, the right in Colombia (not including the center-right) has controlled between 43.3% (2002) and 66.7% (2010) of the Senate seats and between 46.7% (2014) and 74.6% (2010) of those in the House of Representatives. In contrast, the left (not including the equally reduced center-left) has remained a minority: it has moved between 4.9% (2014) and 19% (2006) of the Senate, and between 4% (2010) and 27.1% (2002) of the House.

The 2016 Peace agreement and the integration of the FARC into political life have not so far led to a significant electoral boom for the left. In the legislative elections of March 11, 2018, the right actually recovered positions compared to 2014 in the two institutions of the Contreso, while the left, although it certainly improved its presence in the Senate, but far from the levels of 2002 and 2006, instead lost space in the Chamber.

The fear of broad sectors of the population that the political benefits granted to the FARC, such as guaranteed access to media or campaign financing, would contribute to an electoral advance of the ex-guerrillas did not materialize in these elections. The results of the October 2016 plebiscite, in which the Peace agreement was rejected (it came into force in 2017 after some changes, without a new plebiscite), were again reflected in the last legislative elections: Colombians oppose the participation of former members of the belligerent group in politics. FARC candidates obtained only 0.28% of the votes. Moreover, this party announced days before the legislative elections that it will not run in the presidential elections, for which the maximum leader of the group, Rodrigo Londoño, was running as candidate .

Is Colombia a conservative country? Why has the left in Colombia been so weak electorally? These recurring questions about Colombian politics are not easy to answer. "The left is a sector that has traditionally been very much divided among doctrinal tendencies, for strategic reasons and even by personalities", explains Yeann Basset, director of the Observatory of Electoral Processes of the Universidad del Rosario.

It is worth highlighting what Fabio López, author of the book "Izquierdas y cultura política", said in response to the question of whether there is a left in Colombia:

"One thing is that we come from a defeat, internationally thought, of the left, an enormous setback of the workers' movement, a discrediting of socialist ideas, and another thing is the disappearance of the causes, of the structural reasons that motivate at international and national level some leftist ideas, some roots and some justifications, to appeal to the rescue or better restructuring, a new beginning of some leftist approaches in Colombia".

One of the reasons usually given to explain the difficulty of the left in gaining greater support is the negative weight of the guerrilla subversion. In Colombia, after the constant conflicts, massacres and the pain that the armed conflict has left on Colombians, the leftist parties have not achieved the support of society as in neighboring countries since there is a direct association of the leftist party with the guerrillas and what comes with them. The arrival of political leaders such as Uribe to the presidency intensified this association and increased the taboo of supporting a leftist party that is present today in a large part of the citizens. At the same time, the left has not done much to repair this bad image; the great internal fragmentation and differences among political leaders have not helped the training a solid left with the capacity to increase its representation in congress.

Opportunity for the presidential election?

The presidential elections on May 27 are an opportunity for the left to improve its electoral results, which in any case could advance in the future to the extent that peace is consolidated and the past of violence can be forgotten.

The political polarization, which on other occasions has harmed the left, this time is assuming a certain unity of this ideological sector around the candidacy of Gustavo Petro, former mayor of Bogota. The celebration on March 11 of primaries on the right, won by the pro-Uribe Iván Duque, and on the left, won by Petro (Sánchez, 2018), have accentuated the polarization for the presidential elections, increasing citizen mobilization (in the legislative elections there were five more points of participation) and attracting media attention to both candidates. Polarization, at the same time, has reduced support to possible centrist alternatives, as divided as the left was before, so that it cannot be ruled out that Petro may go to a second round, on June 17. A victory against the odds for Petro, for which he should attract the bulk of the moderate electorate, would not mean a radical change in legislative policies, since the congress revalidated last March 11 the dominance of the right.

[Michael Reid, Forgotten Continent: A History of the New Latin America. Yale University Press, New Haven, 2017. 425 pages]

review / María F. Zambrano

Latin America's recent history is full of progress, even if at times only a few steps backward. In addition to the important changes that have taken place since the 1980s, when the region embraced democracy, began to overcome economic protectionism and tamed the problem of inflation, more recently there has been a period of economic acceleration - known as the golden decade, due to the boom in raw materials - which between 2002 and 2012 has meant a social B : 60 million people escaped poverty in those years, so that, although great inequalities continue to exist, at least theaverage class now extends to 50% of the population. This has generated better educated societies, which have recognized the primacy of law over the paternalism of the caudillo. But the large revenues that many states obtained in that golden decade also led to negative courses.

This moderate optimism about Latin America -without ignoring the difficulties, but without ignoring the progress made- is what is conveyed in the book Forgotten Continent: A History of the New Latin America, by Michael Reid, Latin America publisher of The Economist, where he writes the Bello column. A correspondent for almost 35 years in the region, where he has lived most of this time, Reid is one of the voices with the best knowledge of the multiple continental realities. The result of that staff experience is Forgotten Continent, which Reid published in 2007 (then with the subtitle "The Battle for the Soul of Latin America") and which he now offers again in a revised and updated edition, with extensive changes with respect to the first version.

What has happened in Latin America in the last ten years to make Reid see the need for a new presentation of his book? Although there are various elements, such as the end of the commodities boom, which has brought economic difficulties to some countries, and certain changes in political orientation (Kirschner for Macri, or Temer for Rousseff), perhaps the most notable thing is that, in democratic terms, Latin America today looks less hopeful than it did a decade ago. Ten years ago, the new left-wing populism might have seemed a mere parenthesis in the progressive democratic consolidation of Latin American societies; today, Bolivarianism has certainly already shown signs of failure, but it may have greater continuity than expected when inserted with the current of populism of various kinds that is emerging in many other parts of the world.

Reid notes the failed path taken by Chávez, also followed by other neighboring leaders of the same ilk: "There are lessons for the region in the catastrophic failure of Chavismo. An accident in history -the rise in oil prices from 2001 onwards- gave for a time spurious plausibility in some places to an alternative course to which Latin Americans seemed to have turned their backs not long ago. The 'Bolivarian alternative' was based on erroneous premises (...) In its enchantment with Bolivarianism and renewed regard for Cuba, much of the left forgot the enduring lessons of the end of the Cold War: that central planning had failed and that communism was tyranny, not liberation." In any case, the Bolivarian experience has shown that Latin America did not enter an era of assured democracy at the end of its military dictatorships, as we now see that neither did the rest of the world with the fall of the Berlin Wall, despite the perception at the time. The risk in the region is perhaps greater, due to the persistence of strong social differences: as Reid says, Chavismo is "another reminder that extreme inequality provides fertile ground for populism".

Challenges ahead

In a post-Chávez and post commodity price boom era, Latin America faces a series of challenges, which are certainly long-standing but in some cases more urgent. The double goal of achieving strong institutions and sustainable economic development requires solving important challenges, among which Reid highlights several.

One of them is security. Crime and violence have become an epidemic. In 2013, eight of the ten countries and 42 of the 50 most violent cities in the world, outside theaters of war, were in the region. Reid points to the need for territorial control by the armed forces, the professionalization of police forces, closer cooperation between police and judges, and clear accountability of these bodies to society.

Another challenge is the consolidation of the new class average. There has been progress in primary and secondary Education , but the preparation of both students and teachers is far below that of their peers in developed countries. In the 2015 PISA report , Latin American 15-year-old students were in the bottom third of the world ranking. If the status does not evolve favorably with an increase in the quality of public teaching , warns Reid, private entities would become the first alternative for the new social stratum, which would even be subjected to indebtedness without quality guarantees. This is a phenomenon that also occurs in health care.

In the fight against social inequality, many governments have promoted various Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) formulas, which are social attendance programs that seek to raise attitudinal standards, such as school enrollment of children, in exchange for subsidies. Some programs have been successful in contributing to social development , but in many cases they transfer resources without achieving long-term progress, and in some countries they have become a clear cultivation of a captive vote. By having two parallel social security systems, the government is taxing the formal sector while subsidizing the informal sector.

Esperanza

To overcome these challenges, Forgotten Continent proposes the need to advance regional integration, diversify the Economics and overcome political dogmatism. Thus, true regional integration would allow for skill that would stimulate economies of scale and regional supply chains. To overcome, at least in part, the natural barriers that hinder such integration, real investment in infrastructure beyond the current 3% of GDP is needed.

Raw materials will continue to be an important economic driver in the region, but they should not be the only one. Agricultural production should provide added value, derived from the application of innovative technologies, such as the advances being made in Argentina and Brazil with "no-till farming" and "precision agriculture". This requires an increase in investment in research and development, which currently accounts for only 0.5% of GDP. Latin America also has many natural resources that are conducive to the development of tourism and the expansion of manufacturing industries.

The author proposes to break with the historical discussion between unrestricted free market and protectionism, and to stop nurturing the corporatist culture of seeing power as a staff patrimony. "To get there requires a new subject of politics: instead of the polarization and confrontation offered by populists (and sometimes by their opponents), Latin America needs consensus building, where the state, the private sector and civil society work together to set medium-term goals and hold the government accountable for their fulfillment".

These propositional elements by Reid come at the end of a book that is above all a description of the soul of Latin America. It is a continent that has not been poor or dangerous enough, nor has it grown fast enough economically, to attract international attention. Hence the degree scroll of the book. It begins by outlining the structural, geographic and cultural difficulties that the region has had to face in its attempt to establish lasting democracies and overcome its imbalances. It continues with an analysis of the political and economic cycles, from independence to the latest dictatorships. And finally concludes with a diagnosis. Although the problems of Latin America were already well diagnosed in the first edition, ten years ago, it is in this final part of the book where the author has changed more pages. His conclusion does not vary much, but the tone is slightly more somber; nevertheless, Reid prefers to end the story with the same hopeful quotation of the Argentine liberal Bautista Alberdi: "Nations, like men, have no wings; they make their journeys on foot, step by step".

ESSAY / Martín Villegas Jordán

The concept of humanity is a contemporary idea that took shape just recently. Many say that it took place after the conference of Yalta in 1945[1]. In other words, this concept was beginning to be conceived by one of the three leaders that shaped today's world, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt. During the conference, the three big leaders of the world, who at the time were British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, and U.S. President Roosevelt[2], came to an agreement (mostly encouraged by Roosevelt) that would eventually give birth to the United Nations. Now it's vital to know that this intergovernmental organization is intricately composed of the idea of a global union.

Moreover, the concept of a global union, of the United Nations, embodies the idea of humanity as universal. It encompasses the idea of humanity as a composition of every existing nation. In short, humanity eventually becomes the nation for all human beings, a nation of nations. And this is where Mr. Roosevelt plays a relevant role when he said: "A nation that destroys its soils destroys itself. Forests are the lungs of our land, purifying the air and giving fresh strength to our people"[3].

It's possible, then to say that the previous century was the time when global issues were given the attention that they deserved. For instance, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) marks 407.62 parts per million of carbon dioxide of earth and 0.99 degrees Celsius for the temperature anomaly of 2016 (denoting that year as one of the sixteen warmest years since 2001)[4].

Besides, humanity faces dramatic gaps in temperature. Take a look, for instance, at Oymyakon, Russia, where the temperature is normally around negative fifty-four degrees Celsius[5]. Now, looking at the Sahara desert, it's inhabitants face temperatures of fifty-nine degrees Celsius or more.

Moreover, climate change becomes a more pressing matter when looking at two reports of the NASA. On the first hand, the one titled "November of 2017 was the third warmest November on record" states: "The last three Novembers - 2015, 2016, and 2017 - are the three warmest in the entire modern record."[6]. On the other hand, the one titled "Greenland melt speeds East Coast sea level rise" states the following: "the Greenland and Antarctic influence alone would account for an increase in the rate of sea level rise on the East Coast of 0.0016 to 0.0059 inches (0.04 to 0.15 millimeters) each year, varying by location. That's equivalent to 7.8 inches (0.2 meters) of sea-level rise on the northern East Coast over the next century, and 2.5 feet (0.75 meters) in the south, though the estimates are quantitative and not an attempt at an actual projection"[7].

Still, having such a clear evidence of climate change, it is true that legislators choose to deny this, which actually ends up convincing people. This is evident, for example, when analyzing the politics of the current President of the U.S., Donald Trump. For instance, during his campaign (when addressing the mining community) he said: "If I take hairspray, and I spread it in my apartment, which is all sealed, you are telling me that affects the ozone layer. I say "no way folks" (...) that is like all of the rules and regulations you people have in mines"[8].

What is also true about this blind humanity is that the many pronunciations of the United States' president have a strong pull towards decisions that countries in Mesoamerica and South America take. Take Colombia, for instance. Now, this country had banned the eradication of illicit cultivations of drugs by aspartame but president Trump has been insisting and pushing for this harmful way for the environment and for humans that can possibly live by the crops[9]. Furthermore, it can be said that pressure from the North American country has not been light in the rest of Latin America.

Summing up, it is clear that America is clearly in need of renewable energy sources no matter what the political discourse states. Specifically, America is in need of "those sources of energy obtained from natural means that are renewable and susceptible to indefinite use"[10]. Take, for instance, countries like Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, which are called to be the future in the study of sustainability due to their "geographical and climatological conditions, which make Latin America one of the regions that pose high potential from renewable energy sources"[11]. Furthermore, these countries are pioneer in the ambits of wind, hydropower, and large-scale soy growing, which makes them subject to the advantages that the implementation of renewable energy poses. In fact, experts Emma Mendoza and Vadim Pérez at the University of Chile insist on these advantages being: (1) the potential for creating almost six times of what global consumption is today (2) the production being national (3) the de-centralized consumption, meaning that energy is consumed in the place where it is produced and there is no necessity to export (4) the hygiene of the obtained energy, meaning that there are no significantly harmful remnants (5) and the investment in high tech industry[12].

In fact, in America there has been an exponential growth in the implementation of renewable energy projects since the implementation of the Paris 2015 accords on Climate Change. Such growth though, is directly proportional with the increments in federal or particular centralized companies with strong governmental support [13].

In Latin America the three pillars in the ambit of sustainability are the eolian industry, the hydroelectric industry, and the industry of the monocultures[14]. Of the countries previously mentioned, for example, Brazil and Mexico specialize in the eolian industry, Brazil also plays an important role in hydropower development, and Argentina leads the large scale soy growing. It is of vast importance though, to previously mention the fact that the development of renewable energies is not the only factor that is taken into account when analyzing the partner field of sustainable energies. Then, in addition to the plain development of these energies, the social movements that emerge in response to the expansion of these industries play a key role for the future of sustainable energies in the world.

It is interesting to look at each of the fields with important developments in America. Firstly, taking a close look at how the wind power is transformed into renewable energy and the toll that it has within a partner sphere. Now, this type of energy is the least efficient among the three types analyzed in this paper because it has the least impact on the environment and on society. However, the two countries that contribute primarily are Brazil and Mexico, respectively, with a generation of 256 MW and 88 MW[15]. Mainly, the power generated in each country is based upon eolian parks built on the appropriate territories. For example, Brazil's main park is found in the municipality of Osório and it includes three projects that sum a generation potential of 150 MW. Unfortunately, the social outcome of eolian implementation has been negative. Experts Mendoza and Pérez state that the probable origin for the social unrest is the government for ignoring the process of negotiation between enterprises and local habitants. Also, the clean energy enterprises are paying only 1.5% of the incomes to the landowners that put their terrains for the disposition of these enterprises. Besides, another social unrest is the co-ownership of most of the terrains, presenting more negotiation difficulties between enterprises and landowners. In short, the main opponents (via judicial demands) in Mexico are: "la Union de Comunidades Indígenas de la Zona Norte del Itsmo" and "los centros de Derechos Humanos Topeyec y Gubiña"[16]. As if there was not enough opposition already, these denouncers even claim that some of the acts committed by the enterprises are unconstitutional. 

Secondly, it is important to look at hydroelectric power principally developed in Brazil because hydroelectricity is the principal source of electricity generation in Latin America. For example, Brazil's hydroelectric power in 2006 accounted for 60% of the total of electricity generated. Furthermore, hydroelectricity can be developed under low costs of operation and high efficacy. It is also important to look at hydroelectric power in Brazil as a pioneer due to the first efforts of implementation that have been present in the country since 1970.

Thirdly, the large-scale soy production can also be considered as a renewable energy source.

Examination of the reformulation of Castro's economic model attempted by Fidel's successor

Next April, a year and a half after Fidel Castro's death, his brother Raul plans to leave the presidency of Cuba, where he has been for a decade. His bequest is the attempt to extend the Castro regime in time by means of the forced economic reorganization of the island. But the restrictions of the reforms themselves, the slowness of their implementation and the fact that they are not accompanied by greater political freedom, have limited the effect of the changes. In any case, they may be a good starting point for the next president, if he really wants to move towards a full opening.

article / Valeria Vásquez

Raúl Castro replaced his brother Fidel as president of Cuba's State committee in 2008. Since then, the island has undergone changes in its organization, although without abandoning its communist structure or the revolutionary principles set in motion in 1959. Upon his arrival to power, Castro made the decision to embark on a path of structural reforms to "update" the Cuban economic-social model and overcome the serious economic crisis.

As part of this program, Raúl Castro approved a series of social and economic reforms of a "transformative" nature, which tended to introduce market mechanisms, while maintaining adherence to socialist principles based on centralized planning (and without accompanying these changes with political liberalization). Revitalization was the main goal of the reforms in the economic sphere, turning around what had been a policy with a totally socialist approach and rejection of free market reforms.

Ten years after the changeover between the Castros brothers, the Cuban regime is preparing for the arrival in April of the first president from outside the family. Although it has not yet been confirmed who the new president will be, it is expected that the current vice-president, Miguel Díaz-Canel, will be the one appointed as part of a continuity.

The country is currently at a disadvantage, with the political uncertainty about the new stage that is opening, the serious economic difficulties that Venezuela (the main benefactor country of the island for more than a decade) is going through, and the truncated foreign expectations that the arrival of Donald Trump to the White House meant a year ago.

update of the economic model

Since 1959, the Cuban economic model has been based on revolutionary socialist principles. Since Raúl Castro came to power, however, a transformation process was undertaken, considered necessary to move forward an Economics that was stagnant and immersed in a serious crisis.

In reality, there was no substantial modification of the economic model , but rather an update it, maintaining the predominance of central state planning and state ownership over the laws of the free market. The goal of this process has been to guarantee the continuity and irreversibility of socialism, as stated by the Cuban authorities, as well as to promote the economic development of the country and improve the standard of living of the population.

The reform framework was approved at the VI congress of the Cuban Communist Party, held in 2011. Among other points, the approved agreements established the submission of a usufruct to peasants and cooperatives, and opened the door to the massive dismissal of hundreds of state employees. The reform guidelines, however, did not establish the specific role that the state and state-owned sector should play in the Economics.

The so-called update of the Cuban model has achieved the expansion of the market and of non-state properties, but in an Economics that continues to be conditioned by state planning, this measure continues to be inefficient, as it happened in China or Vietnam. Although state business continues to prevail (in a more decentralized form, through self-financing and without fiscal subsidies), the private sector has become more flexible, but the heavy taxes on this sector continue to hinder its development.

Land in usufruct

One of the main pillars of the Castro government's reforms was the submission in usufruct of idle state lands to peasants and cooperatives, with the purpose of reducing imports and increasing production. The usufructuaries have obtained the right to cultivate these lands and to keep what they harvest, but the State continues to maintain ownership and may terminate the contract for reasons of public interest.

The regulation was carried out through two laws: a first one, in 2008, subject to many restrictions and actually disadvantageous for farmers; and a second one, in 2012, more flexible, through which the government expanded the size of the plot (from 13 to 67 hectares), approved the planting of orchards and forests, and also allowed the construction of houses next to the land (previously prohibited).

In March 2011, the government reported that 128,000 usufructs, totaling 1.2 million hectares, had already been handed over. In any case, although the 2012 law was less restrictive than the previous one, as mentioned above, it still included certain obstacles that discouraged farmers' involvement: they recorded gains, but only after overcoming various obstacles.

Mass dismissal of civil servants and self-employment

At the beginning of 2011, the state payroll presented an "inflated" rate, with millions of state employees in precarious jobs and work conditions. For this reason, Raúl Castro promoted the dismissal of 500,000 surplus state workers between October 2010 and March 2011, which raised the unemployment rate to 12%. To counteract this measure, 250,000 self-employed jobs were created in a first stage and other private activities were also promoted.

This measure was necessary to raise labor productivity, reduce expenses and increase wages. The agreements of the 6th CCP congress allowed the approval of 178 self-employed activities: many of them were very specific and unskilled (such as forklift drivers or bath attendants), and a few were skilled (such as translators or insurance agents). This made private work more flexible.

Thus, in a country with a labor force of 5 million people, of the total of 11.2 million who reside on the island, a total of 4.2 million of those who work are state employees and the rest are located in the non-state sector, made up of agricultural cooperatives, private farmers and self-employed [1]. The latter now number 500,000 people. Despite this development of what is known in Cuba as "cuestapropismo", there are restrictions that prevent most professionals from working on their own in their profession, and this reduces the human capital available to boost the country's Economics .

Openness to foreign investment

The flow of investments from abroad has not accompanied the reforms promoted by Raúl Castro, which has been one of the major obstacles to the desired success. To attract these foreign investments, the Special development Zone Mariel (ZEDM) was inaugurated in 2013. The port of Mariel, located 45 kilometers west of Havana, was allocated a 465.4 square kilometer industrial zone and an advanced ship terminal. The purpose was to convert the ZEDM, through the existence of incentives to attract investment, into the main entrance for foreign trade and the largest industrial structure in Cuba [2]. However, four years after its inauguration, the results have not been as expected. In an administrative process that has followed an extraordinarily slow pace, today only 33 companies have C installed, which is far from the 2.5 billion dollars that the ZEDM planned to attract annually.

The restoration of diplomatic relations with Washington carried out at the end of the Obama Administration has not accelerated investments from the United States or other Western countries. In addition to the U.S. embargo remaining in place, the Trump Administration has reversed provisions passed by his predecessor that opened a timid door to greater economic engagement.

economic status

Raul Castro's reform plan has not been as successful as expected, mainly due to the Degree restriction that regulates them. The lack of the intended economic revitalization has manifested itself in the poor performance of Cuban Economics in recent years. In 2016, Cuba fell into recession, with an economic decrease of 0.9%. In 2017, it was able to recover slightly (figures not yet closed speak of a 1.6% increase in GDP) thanks to a boom in tourism and better agricultural results.

In the last decade, tourism has been precisely one of the assets of the Cuban Economics . agreement to an ECLACreport , tourism to the island grew by 11.9% in 2017, with 4.7 million visitors. This increase includes the largest issue of visits from the United States, made possible by the elimination of restrictions approved by Obama, but that Trump has reimposed.

On the other hand, Cuba maintains its chronic trade deficit. Although in 2016 it managed to reduce it to 9.6% of GDP, prospects are not good, given Venezuela's difficulties to continue supplying oil, practically on a sunk cost basis. In 2015, Venezuela was Cuba's main trading partner , with which it maintains 36% of its foreign trade, in an exchange valued at 4 billion dollars. It is followed by China, with 28%, a country that sells under soft credit conditions to the island.

bequest and new challenges

As Raúl Castro's presidency draws to a close, Cuba finds itself in an unfavorable status , with an Economics that is struggling to emerge from stagnation and a program of structural reforms that have been insufficient to solve the partner problems accumulated during more than 60 years of centralized state socialism. The timid nature and slow pace of economic reforms have not helped to revive Economics.

However, during his decade in power, Castro has led changes in the management of the model, something that should be taken into account even though in the political sphere he has perpetuated the lack of freedom and the persecution of opposition activity, without underestimating the moral guilt of the dictatorship. Among the changes that have taken place are the opening to foreign investment, new diplomatic relations, participation in Latin American forums and the immersion of Cubans in work .

Probably forced by circumstances, Raúl Castro was able to break some of the obstacles and ideological barriers that his brother Fidel had implemented on the island for more than 40 years in power. The bequest of the outgoing president marks a certain progress, but it will be the actions of the incoming president that will indicate whether Cuba is truly moving towards the economic -and political- opening longed for by Cubans.

[1] VIDAL, P. and PÉREZ Villanueva, Omar E. "Se extiende el cuentrapropismo en Cuba". Espacio Laical, vol. 6, n. 3 (2010), p. 53-58.

[2] HERSHBERG, E., & LEOGRANDE, W. M. (2016). A new chapter in US-Cuba relations: social, political, and economic implications. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

[Riordan Roett, Guadalupe Paz (Eds.). Latin America and the Asian Giants: Evolving Ties with China and India. Brookings Institution Press, 2016, 336 pages]

review / Ignacio Urbasos Arbeloa

Trade between Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region has grown during the last decade at a dizzying rate of 21% per year[1]. However, China's prominence has overshadowed and concentrated the vast majority of academic analysis, leaving other relevant actors such as India in the background. This book by Riordan Roett, Guadalupe Paz and other contributors from different parts of the world offers an interesting comparison between the two "Asian giants" in their relations with Latin American countries in a new global context. This review will focus on the rise of India in the region, although references to China are unavoidable.

Historical ties between Latin America and India, though weak, have existed since the colonial period. Today one million people[2] descendants of Indian migrants live in the Caribbean, a fact that can be considered an opportunity to generate channels of dialogue, however the magnitude of the Indian diaspora eliminates any trait of exceptionality. Another interesting element directly relates India and Brazil, two countries that share to some extent the Portuguese bequest and have been standard bearers of South-South cooperation to this day, an approach shared by Lula and Dilma as well as Modi. In the historical section , India's relevance is much greater than that of China, which lacks relevant partner references in the region.

The growing economic presence of the two Asian giants in Latin America has not gone unnoticed in the political discussion . Historically, leftist sectors have been more supportive of increased trade relations with China as a way to achieve the emancipation and independence of the continent from the United States. The right, on the contrary, has been reluctant to a greater presence of China, aligning itself in the case of the countries of the Pacific Alliance with the TPP, which until the arrival of Trump was intended to be a free trade agreement aimed at increasing the presence of the American continent in Asia-Pacific apart from China[3]. In the authors' opinion, Latin America lacks a cohesive narrative and strategy on China, thus drastically reducing its negotiating capacity and influence on the Asian country. The case of India is different, as the trade Issue is still one tenth of China's, it is a democratic country, a US ally and has a better image in the continent.

Despite the fact that the vast majority of Latin American exports to Asia are made up of commodities and imports of manufactured products, there are subtle differences that explain India's better image in the region. First, Chinese imports are much more diversified than Indian imports, generating a general perception of destruction of the industrial fabric and local jobs due to greater competitiveness due to economies of scale and the distortion of the yuan. Likewise, what India exports to Latin America are socially valued products (as in the case of generic drugs, which have reduced the price of medicines) and cheap vehicles, while Indian entrepreneurs set up information companies, which have generated 20,000 jobs in the region.

In terms of imports, both India and China concentrate their purchases on natural products, with India's profile being more energy-intensive and China's more mining-based. Both countries have a huge demand for soybeans, a product that, agreement to Riordan Roett, will gradually become increasingly important due to its versatility as food, feed and source of biofuels. It is important to note that Latin America is one of the keys to energy and food security in these countries, which face this enormous challenge due to their population size in different ways: India is betting on private investment and China on long-term purchase agreements with its public companies. A possible collision between the two Asian giants for access to these markets cannot be ruled out, with the geopolitical implications that this entails.

As for India's financial positioning in Latin America, the reality sample an almost testimonial presence compared to that of China. However, it is worth noting that Indian investment and loans are seen in a much better light than Chinese ones. In general, India acts as a transparent partner accustomed to Latin American practices, which is not the case with China, whose actors are more accustomed to dealing with a complex bureaucracy rather than a democratic system. Likewise, Chinese loans, which are increasingly present in certain economies such as Venezuela or Ecuador, have proven to be less advantageous than those of international organizations such as the IMF or IDB, as they have higher interest rates and are tied to strict conditions for the purchase of goods. All this makes India a friendlier partner for public opinion: a challenge that it will have to face as it increases its presence in the region and thus its true way of acting abroad, still an unknown quantity, can be appreciated.

final, India's role in the region is promising, although still limited in scope. The annual growth of trade between that country and Latin America was 140% between 2009-2014[4] and India has already signed the first free trade agreements (with MERCOSUR and Chile), albeit on a small scale. It should be noted that this trade is mainly of an inter-industrial nature, in which Latin American countries export primary products and natural resource-based manufactures and import manufactures of different technological intensities, which limits the potential for establishing deeper economic relations between the two regions[5] and condemns them to commodity price fluctuations. The fact that it takes 45 to 60 days for a cargo ship to reach Indian ports from the Chilean coast is a real barrier to trade, but there are many reasons to expect a greater regional presence from India, such as its excellent relations with Brazil, expectations of annual growth of over 7% of its GDP and the inescapable importance of Latin America in guaranteeing energy and food security for the growing population of the Asian country.

[Enrique Serrano, ¿Por qué fracasa Colombia? Delirios de una nación que se desconoce a sí misma, Planeta, Bogotá 2016, 273 pages].

review / María Oliveros [English version] [English version].

Colombia's history has often been classified as one of the most violent. The long chapter of FARC terrorism or the confrontation of drug cartels are well present, but before that there were violent events in Colombia such as the Revolt of the Comuneros, the Thousand Days War or the Banana Plantation Massacre. A succession of events that has led most Colombians to believe that violence has characterized the country's history and that perhaps they can do little to avoid it.

That belief is challenged by Colombian communicator, philosopher and writer Enrique Serrano in ¿Por qué fracasa Colombia? Delusions of a nation that does not know itself. The purpose of the book is to analyze why Colombia has not prospered more as a country. To answer that question, Serrano reviews in short chapters the Colombian mentality since the beginnings of the nation; there he finds reasons why Colombia is a country that has had a hard time getting ahead, growing in progress and being able to develop to the maximum.

¿Por qué fracasa Colombia? is a risky book, which combats thoughts that have long remained in the minds of Colombians. Against that central belief that violence has characterized the country's history, Serrano warns from the very first pages: "It is also presumed that this is a nation plagued by the most vicious violence, from its beginnings to the present day. However, it has been more peaceful than violent, at least during most of its slow training , and although the importance of violence cannot be denied, it is episodic, recent, similar to that of other peoples in transition".

Serrano tries to expose the history of a country that does not begin in 1810 with the independence, but its origins go much further back, to the moment when the Spaniards arrived in America and settled in Colombia. All this in order to show the reader that during the three hundred years that followed the arrival of the first conquistadors, Colombia was a peaceful and measured nation.

Serrano's main premise is that those who arrived in Colombia were mostly new Christians, descendants of Arabs and Jews from southern Spain, who were looking for a provisional place to settle and avoid the religious conflicts that were occurring in Spain at the time. The newcomers settled in small urbanizations, some far from others, not only because that was what the country's geography allowed, but also because the last thing they wanted was to come into conflict with other settlers, both European and indigenous, according to Serrano.

In fact, it is questionable whether the new settlers were dominated by a refractory private religious approach or whether the search for refuge for their consciences motivated, in most cases, their departure to America. It seems that the author adjusts the starting point thinking of those later aspects that he wants to explain.

The author also defends the thesis that in Colombia there was a racial miscegenation, but not a cultural miscegenation, because the indigenous culture was very weak, which contributed to the assumption of the religion brought by the Spaniards. In the culture that the Spaniards transmitted to the new generations were ideas such as provisionality or even getting used to failure: "They also had to react in a peaceful, non-violent way when events were unfavorable and they could not fulfill their desires. Therefore, a relative tolerance and awareness that the frustration of the achievement of desires is something probable, is in the old patterns of upbringing of the Colombian nation".

Serrano suggests that this mentality, which originated centuries ago, is still present in Colombia: the idea of not making the maximum effort, of not taking too many risks for fear of failure, of doing things half-heartedly so as not to lose too much in case they go wrong. This mentality that was created over the years probably explains why urbanization projects in the country do not progress properly, why the subway project in the Colombian capital has not been able to materialize, or why it has cost the country so much to exploit its resources to the maximum.

Although the book touches on other aspects such as language, body hygiene and social classes, history is undoubtedly the fundamental component. Referring to historical events of the Colombian past, Serrano proposes a vision of national history far from the usual one. Thus, as has been said, his story does not begin with the cry for independence of 1810, but explains the Spanish society of the 15th and 16th centuries, in order to understand the mentality of the first men, women and families who arrived in America. It is an optimistic vision that seeks to share the idea that not everything has been suffering in Colombian history. 

It is a fact that the country's history is not lived or remembered with much enthusiasm by Colombians. Remembering the past is for many a way of recalling the violence, wars and national polarization that began with the training of the two major parties, Liberals and Conservatives, in the mid-nineteenth century. Knowing the past well, in any case, is paramount for progress; that is what the new law enacted on January 1, 2018, which requires all schools in the country to teach Colombian history class , seeks to do. 

The book concludes with a series of suggestions about the present and the future. The last chapter, graduate Where can such a nation go, tries to transmit a feeling of hope, while at the same time it is a call to high responsibility. According to the author, knowing the past and not running away from it, but accepting it in order to improve mentalities and habits, is what will give the country the basis for not failing.