With its megacity and technology zone project , the Saudis are seeking to consolidate an economic alternative to oil.

NEOM, an acronym for New Future, is the name of the new city and economic-technological area , with an area three times the size of Cyprus, that Saudi Arabia is promoting in the northwest of the country, opposite the Sinai Peninsula. In addition to seeking alternatives to oil, with NEOM the Saudis intend to rival the urban innovations of Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha. The project also involves shifting Saudi interest from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea and closer ties with Egypt, Jordan and Israel.

Aspect of the future NEOM megacity, agreement to the vision of its promoters [NEOM Project].

article / Sebastián Bruzzone Martínez

Middle Eastern states are seeking to diversify their revenues and avoid possible collapse of their economies in order to counteract the end-of-oil crisis expected in the middle of the 21st century. The sectors favored by the Arabs are renewable energy, luxury tourism, modern infrastructure and technology. The region's governments have found ways to unify these four sectors, and Saudi Arabia, together with the United Arab Emirates, seems to want to be at the forefront of the Arab technology degree program

While the world looks to Sillicon Valley in California, Shenzhen in China or Bangalore in India, the Saudi government has begun preparations for the creation of its first independent economic and technological zone: NEOM (short for the Arabic term Neo-Mustaqbal, New Future). The project was headed until recently by Klaus Kleinfeld, former CEO of Siemens AG, who has been replaced by Nadhmi Al Nasr as CEO of NEOM, following his appointment as an advisor to the Saudi Crown.

On October 24, 2017, at the Future Investment Initiative lecture held in Riyadh, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman announced this $500 billionproject , part of the Saudi Vision 2030 political program. The territory where NEOM will be located is in the border area between Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, on the shores of the Red Sea, through which almost ten percent of world trade flows, with a temperature 10ºC lower than the average of the rest of the countries of the Gulf Cooperation committee , and located less than eight hours' flight from 70% of the world's population, so it could become a major passenger transport hub.

As announced by the Saudi government, NEOM will be a special economic city, with its own civil and tax laws and Western social customs, of 26,500 square kilometers (the size of Cyprus multiplied by three). The main objectives are to attract foreign investment from multinational companies, diversify the oil-dependent Saudi Economics , create a free market space and home to millionaires, "a land for free and stress-free people; a start-up the size of a country: a blank sheet of paper on which to write the new era of human progress," says a promotional video of the project. All this under the slogan: "The world's most ambitious project: an entire new land, purpose-built for a new way of living". According to the project's website and official accounts, the 16 sectors of energy, mobility, water, biotechnology, food, manufacturing, communication, entertainment and fashion, technology, tourism, sports, services, health and wellness, Education, and livability will generate 100 billion dollars a year.

Thanks to a report published by The Wall Street Journal and prepared by the consulting firms Oliver Wyman, Boston Consulting Group and McKinsey & Co., which, according to them, had access to more than 2,300 confidential planning documents, some of the ambitions and luxuries of the futuristic city have come to light. Among them are flying cars, holograms, a Jurassic Park-style theme park of robot dinosaurs and Genetics edition, never-before-seen technologies and infrastructure, luxury hotels, resorts and restaurants, mechanisms that create clouds to cause rainfall in arid areas, beaches with glow-in-the-dark sand, and even an artificial moon.

Another goal of the project is to make NEOM the safest city on the planet, through state-of-the-art surveillance systems that include drones, automated cameras, facial and biometric recognition machines and an AI capable of reporting crimes without the need for citizens to report them. Similarly, the leaders of the urban initiative themselves predict that the city will be an ecological center of great projection, basing its power supply system solely on solar and wind energy obtained from panels and windmills, as they have a whole desert to install them.

For the moment, NEOM is only a project that is in the initiation phase. The territory where the big city will be located is a desert terrain, mountains up to 2,500 meters high and 468 kilometers of virgin coastline of turquoise blue water, with a palace and a small airport. NEOM is being built from scratch, with an initial outlay of $9 billion from the Saudi sovereign wealth fund Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority (SAMA). Apart from foreign business investment, the Saudi government is looking for workers from all professional sectors to help in their respective fields: jurists to draw up a civil, criminal and tax code; engineers and architects to design a modern, efficient and technological infrastructure and energy plan; diplomats to collaborate in its promotion and cultural coexistence; scientists and doctors to encourage clinical and biotechnological research and welfare; academics to boost Education; economists to make income and expenditure profitable; personalities specializing in tourism, fashion and telecommunications... But, above all, people and families to inhabit and bring life to the city.

As reported by the Arab newspaper Rai Al Youm, Mohammed bin Salman has submitted C proposal drawn up by a Saudi legal committee together with the United Kingdom, which consists in providing a VIP document that will offer special visas, residency program rights to investors, senior officials and workers of the future city. Contracts have already been awarded to the US engineering business Aecom and construction contracts to the English Arup Group, the Canadian WSP and the Dutch Fugro NV.

However, not everything is as ideal and simple as it seems. Despite the great interest of 400 foreign companies in the project, according to the local government, there is uncertainty about its profitability. The problems and scandals related to the Saudi crown, such as the imprisonment of family members and dissidents, corruption, unequal rights, the military intervention in Yemen, the case of the murder of journalist Khashoggi and the possible political crisis following the future death of King Salman bin Abdulaziz, Mohammed's father, have caused investors to tread carefully. In addition, in the region where the city is to be built, there are villages of locals who would be relocated and "compensated and supported by social programs", according to the Saudi government, which will be the subject of reproach by human rights groups.

In conclusion, NEOM is a unique project on a par with the Arab sheikhs themselves, who have adopted a far-sighted economic vision. It is expected that by 2030 it will be possible to live in the city, even if construction is still underway and not completely finished. According to the markets, the project, still far from completion, seems to be on track. It already has a €20 billion structural financing commitment with BlackStone, and a €45 billion technology financing commitment with SoftBank. Since such a project has never been seen before and therefore there are no references, it is difficult to determine whether the visionary plan will be successfully consolidated or whether it will remain just smoke and mirrors and huge losses of money.

▲ View of Doha, the capital of Qatar, from its Islamic Museum [Pixabay].

essay / Sebastián Bruzzone Martínez

I. Introduction. Qatar, emirate of the Persian Gulf.

In ancient times, the territory was inhabited by the Canaanites. From the 7th century A.D., Islam settled in the Qatari peninsula. As in the United Arab Emirates, piracy and attacks on the merchant ships of powers sailing along the coasts of the Persian Gulf were frequent. Qatar was ruled by the Al Khalifa family from Kuwait until 1868, when, at the request of the Qatari sheikhs and with financial aid from the British, the Al Thani dynasty was established. In 1871, the Ottoman Empire occupied the country and the Qatari dynasty recognized Turkish authority. In 1913, Qatar achieved autonomy; three years later, Emir Abdullah bin Jassim Al Thani signed a treaty with the United Kingdom to establish a British military protectorate in the region, while maintaining the Emir's absolute monarchy.

In 1968, the United Kingdom withdrew its military force, and the Truce States (United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain) organized the Federation of Emirates of the Persian Gulf. Qatar, like Bahrain, became independent of the Federation in 1971, proclaimed a provisional constitution, signed a treaty of friendship with the United Kingdom and joined the Arab League and the UN.

The provisional Constitution was replaced by the 2003 Constitution of 150 articles, submitted to a referendum and supported by 98% of the voters. It came into force as a fundamental rule on April 9, 2004. It recognizes Islam as the official religion of the State and Sharia law as a source law (art. 1); the provision for adherence to and respect for international treaties, covenants and agreements signed by the Emirate of Qatar (art. 6); the hereditary rule of the Al Thani family (art. 8); executive institutions such as the committee of Ministers and legislative-consultative institutions such as theAl Shoura committee or Ruling Family committee . Also included are the possibility of regency through the Trustee Council (arts. 13-16), the institution of the Prime Minister appointed by the Emir (art. 72), the Emir as Head of State and representative of the State in Interior, Foreign and International Relations (arts. 64-66), a sovereign wealth fund (Qatar Investment Company; art. 17), judicial institutions such as the local courts and the Supreme Judicial committee , and its control over the unconstitutionality of laws (137-140)[1], among other aspects.

It also recognizes rights such as private property (art. 27), equality of rights and duties (art. 34), equality of persons before the law without discrimination based on sex, race, language or religion (art. 35), freedom of expression (art. 47), freedom of the press (art. 48), impartiality of justice and effective judicial protection (134-136), among others.

These rights recognized in the Qatari Constitution must be consistent with Islamic law, and their application is thus different from that observed in Europe or the United States. For example, although democracy is recognized in article 1 as the political system of the State, political parties do not exist and trade unions are prohibited, although the right of association is recognized by the Constitution. Similarly, 80% of the country's population is foreign, while these constitutional rights apply to Qatari citizens, who make up the remaining 20%.

Like the other countries in the region, oil has been a transforming factor in the Qatari Economics . Today, Qatar has a high standard of living and one of the highest GDP per capita in the world[2], and is an attractive destination for foreign investors and luxury tourism. However, in recent years Qatar has been experiencing a diplomatic crisis[3] with its neighboring Persian Gulf countries due to various factors that have condemned the Arab country to regional isolation.

II. The instability of the al thani family

The government of the Emirate of Qatar has suffered great instability due to the internal disputes of the Al Thani family. Peter Salisbury, a Middle East expert at Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, spoke of the Al Thanis in an interview for the BBC: "It's a family that initially (before oil finding ) ruled a small, insignificant piece of land that was often seen as a small province of Saudi Arabia. But it managed to carve out a position for itself in that region of giants." [4]

In 1972, by means of a coup d'état, Ahmed Al Thani was deposed by his cousin Khalifa Al Thani, with whom Qatar followed an international policy of non-intervention and search for internal peace, and maintained a good relationship with Saudi Arabia. He remained in power until 1995, when his son Hamad Al Thani dethroned him, taking advantage of his absence while he was away in Switzerland. The Saudi government saw this as a bad example for other countries in the region also ruled by family dynasties. Hamad boosted the export of liquefied natural gas and oil, and dismantled an alleged Saudi plan to reinstate his father Khalifa. Countries in the region began to see the "little brother" grow economically and internationally very fast under the new emir and his foreign minister Hamam Al Thani.

The family is structured around Hamad and his wife Mozah bint Nasser Al-Missned, who has become an icon of fashion and female prestige of the international nobility, at the level of Rania of Jordan, Kate Middleton or Queen Letizia (precisely the couple is close to the Spanish royal family).

Hamad abdicated to his son Tamim Al Thani in 2013. The latter's ascension was a short-lived breath of hope for the international Arab community. Tamim adopted a very similar international policy position to his father, strengthening rapprochement and economic cooperation with Iran, and increasing tension with Saudi Arabia, which proceeded to close Qatar's only land border. Similarly, according to a WikiLeaks leak in 2009, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan accused Tamim of belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand, the economic, political, social and even staff rivalry between Qatar's Al Thani and Saudi Arabia's Al Saud goes back decades.

From my point of view, stability and family hierarchy in nations ruled by dynasties is a crucial factor to avoid internal power struggles that consequently have great negative effects for the country's society. Each person has different political, economic and social ideas that take time to implement. Frequent changes without an objective culmination end up being a terribly destabilizing factor. In the international arena, the country's political credibility and rigidity can be undermined when the emir's son carries out a coup d'état while his father is on vacation. Qatar, aware of this, sought legislative security and rigidity in article 148 of its Constitution by prohibiting the amendment of any article within ten years of its entrance into force.

In 1976, Qatar claimed sovereignty over the Hawar Islands, controlled by the Bahraini royal family, which became a focus of conflict between the two nations. The same happened with the artificial island of Fasht Ad Dibal, which led the Qatari army to raid the island in 1986. It was abandoned by Qatar in a peace agreement with Bahrain.

III. Alleged support to terrorist groups

This is the main cause why neighboring states have isolated Qatar. Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Libya and the Maldives, among others, cut diplomatic and trade relations with Qatar in June 2017 over its alleged funding and support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which it considers a terrorist organization. In 2010, WikiLeaks leaked a diplomatic grade in which the U.S. called Qatar the "worst in the region in subject of cooperation to eliminate funding for terrorist groups."

The Muslim Brotherhood, which originated in 1928 with Hassan Al Bana in Egypt, is a political activist and Islamic movement, with principles based on nationalism, social justice and anti-colonialism. However, within the movement there are several currents, some more rigorous than others. The founders of the Muslim Brotherhood see the Education of society as the most effective tool to reach state power. For this reason, the indoctrinators or evangelists of the movement are the most persecuted by the authorities of the countries which condemn membership of the group. It is endowed with a well-defined internal structure, whose head is the supreme guide Murchid, assisted by an executive body, a committee and an assembly.

From 1940, the paramilitary activity of the group began clandestinely with Nizzam Al Khas, whose initial intention was to achieve the independence of Egypt and expel the Zionists from Palestine. They carried out attacks such as the assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud An Nukrashi. The creation of this special section final sentenced the reputation and violent character of the Muslim Brotherhood, which continued its expansion around the world in the form of Tanzim Al Dawli, its international structure.[5] The Muslim Brotherhood's international structure, the Tanzim Al Dawli, was created by the Muslim Brotherhood.

Khaled Mashal,[6] former leader of the militant organization Hamas, is in exile in Qatar's capital, Doha, and the Taliban of Afghanistan has a political office. It is important to know that most Qatari citizens are followers of Wahhabism, a puritanical version of Islam that seeks the literal interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah, founded by Mohammad ibn Abd Al Wahhab.

During the political crisis following the Arab Spring in 2011, Qatar supported the Muslim Brotherhood's electoral efforts in North African countries. The Islamist movement saw the revolution as a useful means to gain access to governments, taking advantage of the power vacuum. In Egypt, Mohamed Mursi, linked to the movement, became president in 2013, although he was overthrown by the military. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain negatively rated the support and saw it as a destabilizing Islamist element. In those countries where they were unsuccessful, their members were expelled and many took refuge in Qatar. Meanwhile, in neighboring countries in the region, alarms were raised and every pro-Islamist move by the Qatari government was closely followed.

Similarly, Dutch sources and Human Rights lawyer Liesbeth Zegveld accused Qatar of financing the Al Nusra Front[7], the Syrian branch of Al Qaeda involved in the war against Al Assad, declared a terrorist organization by the United States and the UN. The Dutch lawyer claimed in 2018 to possess the necessary evidence to prove the flow of Qatari money to Al Nusra through companies based in the country and to hold Qatar judicially responsible before the court in The Hague, for the victims of the war in Syria. It is important to know that, in 2015, Doha obtained the release of 15 Lebanese soldiers, but in exchange for the release of 13 detained terrorists. Other sources claim that Qatar paid 20 million euros for the release of 45 Fijian blue helmets kidnapped by Al Nusra in the Golan Heights.

According to the BBC, in December 2015, Kataeb Hezbollah or the Islamic Resistance Movement of Iraq, recognized as a terrorist organization by the United Arab Emirates and the United States, among others, kidnapped a group of Qataris who went hunting in Iraq.[8] Among the group s hunters were two members of the Qatari royal family, the cousin and uncle of Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Qatari Foreign Minister since 2016. After 16 months of negotiations, the hijackers demanded a chilling $1 billion from the Qatari ambassador to Iraq to free the hostages. According to Qatar Airways officials, in April 2017 a Qatar Airways plane flew to Baghdad with the money to be delivered to the Iraqi government, which would act as an intermediary between Hezbollah and Qatar. However, the business has never commented on the facts. The official version of the Qatari government is that the terrorists were never paid and the release of the hostages was achieved through a joint diplomatic negotiation between Qatar and Iraq.

Qatar's financing of the armed group Hamas in the Gaza Strip is a real fact. In November 2018, according to Israeli sources, Qatar paid fifteen million dollars in cash as part of an agreement with Israel negotiated by Egypt and the UN, which would cover a total of ninety million dollars divided into several payments[9], with the intention of seeking peace and reconciliation between the political parties Fatah and Hamas, considered a terrorist group by the United States.

IV. Qatar's relationship with Iran

Qatar has good diplomatic and commercial relations with Iran, mostly Shiite, which is not to the liking of the Quartet (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain), mostly Sunni, especially Saudi Arabia, with whom it maintains an obvious confrontation - subsidiary, not direct - for the predominant political and economic influence in the Persian region. In 2017, during his last visit to Riyadh, Donald Trump asked the countries of the region to isolate Iran because of the military and nuclear tension it is experiencing with the United States. Qatar acts as an intermediary and a turning point between the US and Iran, trying to open the way for dialogue in relation to the sanctions implemented by the American president.

Doha and Tehran have a strong economic relationship around the oil and gas industry, as they share the world's largest gas field, the South Pars-North Dame, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have followed the US lead in their foreign policy agendas towards Iran. One of the conditions the Quartet demands of Qatar to lift the economic and diplomatic blockade is the cessation of bilateral relations with Iran, reinstated in 2016, and the establishment of trade conduct with Iran in compliance with U.S.-imposed sanctions.

V. Al Jazeera Television Network

Founded in 1996 by Hamad Al Thani, Al Jazeera has become the most influential digital media in the Middle East. It positioned itself as a promoter of the Arab Spring and was present in the climates of violence in the different countries. As a result, it has been criticized by Qatar's antagonists for its positions close to Islamist movements, for acting as a mouthpiece for the fundamentalist messages of the Muslim Brotherhood and for becoming a vehicle for Qatar's diplomacy. Its closure was one of the requirements requested of Qatar by the Quartet to lift the economic blockade, the transit of people and the opening of airspace.

The United States accuses the network of being the mouthpiece of extremist Islamic groups since the former head of Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, began to disseminate his communiqués through it; of being anti-Semitic in nature; and of adopting a position favorable to the armed group Hamas in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In 2003, Saudi Arabia, after several failed attempts to cause the closure of the Qatari television network, decided to create a competing television station, Al Arabiya TV, initiating a disinformation war and vying over which of the two has the most reliable information.

VI. The position of Washington and London

On the one hand, the United States seeks to have a good relationship with Qatar, since there it has the large military base of Al-Udeid, which has an excellent strategic position in the Persian Gulf and more than ten thousand troops. In April 2018, the Qatari emir visited Donald Trump at the White House, who said that the relationship between the two countries "works extremely well" and considers Tamim a "great friend" and "a great gentleman". Tamim Al Thani has stressed that Qatar will not tolerate people who finance terrorism and confirmed that Doha will cooperate with Washington to stop the financing of terrorist groups.

The contradiction is clear: Qatar confirms its commitment to the fight against the financing of terrorist groups, but its track record does not back it up. So far, it has been proven that the small country has helped these groups in one way or another, through political asylum and protection of its members, direct or indirect financing through controversial negotiation techniques, or by promoting political interests that have not been to the liking of its great geopolitical rival, Saudi Arabia.

The United States is the great mediator and impediment to direct confrontation in the tension between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Both countries are members of the United Nations and allies of the United States. Europe and American presidents have been aware that a direct confrontation between the two countries could prove fatal for the region and their commercial interests related to oil and the Strait of Hormuz.

On the other hand, the UK government has remained aloof in taking a position in the Qatar diplomatic crisis. Emir Tamim Al Thani owns 95% of The Shard building, 8% of the London Stock Exchange and Barclays bank, as well as apartments, stocks and shares in companies in the English capital. Qatari investments in the capital of the United Kingdom total around sixty billion dollars.

In 2016, former British Prime Minister David Cameron showed concern about the future when the London mayoralty was held by Sadiq Khan, a Muslim, who has appeared on more than one occasion alongside Sulaiman Gani, an imam who supports the Islamic State and the Muslim Brotherhood.[10] In 2016, former British Prime Minister David Cameron showed concern about the future when the mayoralty of London was held by Sadiq Khan, a Muslim, who has appeared on more than one occasion alongside Sulaiman Gani, an imam who supports the Islamic State and the Muslim Brotherhood.[10

VII. Civil war in Yemen

Since the start of foreign military intervention in Yemen's civil war in 2015, at the request of Yemeni President Rabbu Mansur Al Hadi, Qatar has aligned itself alongside the states of the Cooperation committee for the Arab States of the Gulf (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), backed by the United States, the United Kingdom and France, to create an international coalition to help restore Al Hadi's legitimate power, which has been under siege since the coup d'état promoted by Houthis and forces loyal to former president Ali Abdala Saleh. However, Qatar has been accused of clandestinely supporting the Houthi rebels[11], and its actions are viewed with great caution by the rest of the committee countries.

Today, the Yemeni civil war has become the largest humanitarian crisis since 1945.[12] On August 11, 2019, South Yemeni separatists, backed by the United Arab Emirates, which initially supports al-Hadi's government, seized the port city of Aden, storming the presidential palace and military instructions . The president, in exile in Riyadh, has called the attack by his allies a coup against the institutions of the legitimate state, and has received direct support from Saudi Arabia. After a few days of tension, the separatists of the Southern Movement left the city.

The Emirates and Saudi Arabia, together with other neighboring states such as Bahrain and Kuwait, of Sunni belief, seek to halt the advance of the Houthis, who dominate the capital, Sana'a, and a possible expansion of Shi'ism promoted by Iran through the conflict in Yemen. Likewise, the great geopolitical interest of the Strait of Bab el Mandeb, which connects the Red Sea with the Arabian Sea and is a great alternative to the commercial flow of the Strait of Hormuz, off the coast of Iran, has an influence. This interest is shared with France and the United States, which seeks to eliminate the presence of ISIS and Al Qaeda from the region.

The day after the capture of Aden, and in the midst of Eid Al-Adha celebrations, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed met in Mecca with Saudi King Salman bin Abdelaziz and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, in an apparent effort to downplay the significance of the event, call on the warring parties in the city to safeguard Yemen's interests, and reaffirm regional cooperation and unity of interests between the UAE and Saudi Arabia.[13] The Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi has posted on his official Twitter accounts comments and photographs of the meeting in which a positive attitude can be seen on the faces of the leaders.

A contrario sensu, if the partnership and understanding on the Yemen issue between the two countries were total, as they claimed, there would be no need to create an apparently "ideal" image through official communications from the Abu Dhabi government and the publication of images on social networks.

Although the UAE supports the separatists, the latest developments have caused a sense of mistrust, opening the possibility that the southern militias are disregarding Emirati directives and beginning to execute a diary of their own in line with their own particular interests. Likewise, foreign sources are beginning to speak of a civil war within a civil war. Meanwhile, Qatar remains close to Iran and cautious about the status the southwest of the Arabian Peninsula.

▲ Dubai Air Visa [Pixabay].

essay / Sebastián Bruzzone Martínez

I. ORIGIN AND FOUNDATION OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

In ancient times, the territory was inhabited by Arab tribes, nomadic farmers, artisans and traders, accustomed to plundering merchant ships of European powers that sailed along its coasts. Islam became established in the local culture in the 7th century AD, and Sunni Islam in the 11th century AD. From 1820, the United Kingdom signature a peace treaty with the leaders or sheikhs of the area to put an end to piracy. In 1853, both parties signed another agreement by which the United Kingdom established a military protectorate in the territory. And in 1892, due to the pretensions of Russia, France and Germany, they signed a third agreement that guaranteed the monopoly on trade and exploitation only for the British. The Emirate zone was renamed from "Pirates' Coast" to "Trucial States " (the current seven United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain).

During World War I, the airfields and ports of the Gulf played an important role in the development the conflict in favor of the United Kingdom. At the end of World War II in 1945, the League of Arab States (Arab League) was created, formed by those who enjoyed some colonial independence. The organization attracted the attention of the Truce States.

In 1960, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was created, with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Venezuela as founders and headquartered in Vienna, Austria. The seven emirates, which would later form the United Arab Emirates, joined in 1967.

In 1968, the United Kingdom withdrew its military force from the region, and the Truce States organized the Federation of Emirates of the Persian Gulf, but it failed when Qatar and Bahrain became independent. In the following years, the exploitation of the enormous oil wells discovered years earlier began.

In 1971, six Emirates became independent from the British Empire: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Qaywayn and Fujairah, forming the federation of the United Arab Emirates, with a legal system based on the 1971 constitution. Once consolidated, they joined the Arab League on June 12. The seventh emirate, Ras Al-Khaimah, joined the following year.

After the 1973 oil crisis, the UAE began to accumulate enormous wealth, because OPEC members decided not to export any more oil to the countries that supported Israel during the Yom Kippur war. Today, 80-85% of the UAE population is immigrant. The UAE became the third largest oil producer in the Middle East, after Saudi Arabia and Libya.

II. POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEM

By the constitution of 1971, the United Arab Emirates is constituted as a federal monarchy. Each State is governed by its emirdegree scroll of the sheikhs, Sheikh). Each emirate has great political, legislative, economic and judicial autonomy, each having its own executive councils, always in correspondence with the federal government. There are no political parties. The federal authorities are composed of:

Supremecommittee of the Federation or of Emirs: it is the supreme authority of the State. It is composed of the governors of the 7 Emirates, or those who replace them in their absence. Each Emirate has one vote in the deliberations. It establishes the general policy in the matters entrusted to the Federation, and studies and establishes the objectives and interests of the Federation.

President and Vice-President of the Federation: elected by the Supreme committee from among its members. The President exercises, by virtue of the Constitution, important powers such as the presidency of the Supreme committee ; signature laws, decrees or resolutions ratified and dictated by the committee; appointment of the President of the committee of Ministers and of the Vice-President and Ministers; acceptance of their resignations or their suspension from office at the proposal of the President of the committee of Ministers. The Vice-President exercises all presidential powers in his absence.

By tradition, not recognized in the Emirati Constitution, the sheikh of Abu Dhabi is the president of the country, and the sheikh of Dubai is the vice-president and Prime Minister.

Thus, Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, has been President of the United Arab Emirates since 2004, and Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Sheikh of Dubai, has been Prime Minister and Vice President since 2006.

committee of Ministers: composed of the Chairman of the committee of Ministers, the Vice-Chairman and the Ministers. It is the executive organ of the Federation. Supervised by the President and the Supreme committee , its mission statement is to manage the domestic and foreign affairs, which are of skill of the Federation by virtue of the Constitution and federal laws. It has certain prerogatives such as monitoring the implementation of the general policy of the Federal State at home and abroad; proposing draft federal laws and submitting them to the Supreme committee of the Federation; supervising the execution of federal laws and resolutions, and the implementation of international treaties and conventions signed by the UAE.

Federal National Assembly: what would resemble a congress, but is a consultative body only. It is composed of 40 members: twenty elected by the eligible citizens, by census suffrage, of the UAE through general election, and the other half by the rulers of each Emirate. In December 2018, the president, Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, issued a decree providing for fifty percent of the Federal National Assembly (or FNC) to be filled by women, with the intention of "further empowering Emirati women and strengthening their contributions to the development of the country." It is distributed with seats: Abu Dhabi (8); Dubai (8); Sharjah (6); Ras Al Khaimah (6); Ajman (4); Umm Al Quwayn (4); and Fujairah (4). Federal and financial bills are referred to it before being submitted to the President of the Federation for submission to the Supreme committee for ratification. The Government is also responsible for notifying the Assembly of international covenants and treaties. The Assembly studies and makes recommendations on matters of a public nature.

The Federal Administration of Justice: The judicial system of the United Arab Emirates is based on Sharia or Islamic law. article 94 of the Constitution states that justice is the basis of government and reaffirms the independence of the judiciary, stipulating that there is no authority over judges except the law and their own conscience in the exercise of their duties. The federal justice system is composed of courts of first instance written request and courts of appeal (civil, criminal, commercial, contentious-administrative...).

There is also a Federal Supreme Court, consisting of a president and vocal judges, with powers such as reviewing the constitutionality of federal laws and unconstitutional acts.

In addition, the local Administration of Justice will hear all judicial cases that do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Administration. It has three levels: first written request, appeal and cassation.

The Constitution provides for the existence of an Attorney General, who presides over the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, in charge of filing position statements in crimes committed in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Criminal Code and procedure .

In order to promote understanding between federal and local administrations, a Judicial Coordination committee , chaired by the Minister of Justice and composed of presidents and directors of the State's judicial bodies, has been in place since 2007. [1]

It is important to know that the Constitution of the Federation has guarantees of reinforcement and protection of human rights in its Chapter III of freedoms, rights and public obligations, such as the principle of equality on the grounds of extraction, place of birth, religious belief or social position, although it does not mention gender, and social justice (art. 25); freedom of citizens (art. 26); freedom of opinion and guarantee of the means to express it (art. 30); freedom of movement and residency program (art. 29); religious freedom (art.32); right to privacy (arts. 31 and 36); family rights (art. 15); right to social welfare and social security (art. 16); right to Education (art. 17); right to health care (art. 19); right to work (art. 20); right to association and to form associations (art. 33); right to property (art. 21); and right to complain and right to litigate before the courts (art. 41).[2].

At first glance, it seems that these rights and guarantees contained in the 1971 Emirati Constitution are similar to those that would be found in a normal European and Western Constitution. However, they can be nuanced and are not as effective in the internship. On the one hand, because most of them include references to the specific and applicable law, saying"...within the limits set by law; in accordance with the provisions set by law; or in cases where so provided by law". In this way, the legislator will ensure that these rights are consistent and compatible with Sharia or Islamic law, or with political interests, as the case may be.

On the other hand, these rights and guarantees fully protect Emirati nationals. Considering that 80-85% of the population is foreign, 15% of the total population of the State would be protected in a fully constitutional manner. By Federal Law No. 28/2005 concerning the status of staff, the law applies to all citizens of the State of the United Arab Emirates provided that there are no special provisions for non-Muslims among them, specific to their confession or religion. Likewise, its provisions apply to non-nationals when they are not bound by the laws of their own country.

Legal safeguards include the Federal Penal Code (Act No. 3/1987); the Code of Criminal procedure (Act No. 35/1992); Federal Act on the Regulation of Prison Reform Institutions (No. 43/1992); Federal Act on the Regulation of Labor Relations (No. 8/1980); Federal Act on Combating Trafficking in Persons (No. 51/2006); Federal Act on staff Status (No. 28/2005); Federal Act on Juvenile Offenders and Homeless Persons (No. 9/1976); Federal Act on Publications and Publishing (No. 15/1980); Federal Act on the Regulation of Human Organs (No. 15/1993); Federal Act on Associations Declared to be in the Public Interest (No. 2/2008); Federal Act on Social Welfare (No. 2/2001); Federal Act on Pensions and Social Insurance (No. 7/1999); Federal Act on Environmental Protection and development (No. 24/1999); and Federal Act on the Rights of Persons with Special Needs (No. 29/2006).

Military service of 9 months is compulsory for university men between 18 and 30 years of age, and of two years for those who do not have higher programs of study . For women, it is optional and subject to the agreement of their tutor. Although the country is not a member of NATO, the Emirates has decided to join the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) coalition, and to provide arms assistance in the war against the Islamic State.

In terms of international treaty guarantees and international cooperation, the UAE has made a great effort to include in its Constitution laws and principles protected by the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, being a member of the UN and adhering to its treaties: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1974), Convention on the Rights of the Child (1997), UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2007), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (2004); UN Convention against Corruption (2006), among others.

It has also ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Arab Charter on Human Rights, and conventions on the organization of work. It is a member of WHO, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, UNICEF, WIPO, World Bank and IMF. It is also bound by cooperation agreements with more than 28 international organizations of the United Nations carrying out advisory, technical and ministerial tasks.

They are members of the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic lecture , reinforcing and promoting Arab work in their regional activities and programs.

The Emirati police maintain public order and state security. The Ministry of Interior places human rights at the forefront of its priorities, focusing on justice, equality, fairness and protection. Members of the police force must commit to 33 standards of conduct before taking up their post. The Ministry of the Interior provides administrative units for citizens to monitor police activity and take the necessary measures. However, there is a certain distrust of foreigners towards the police. Most complaints come from Emirati nationals.

The Ministry of the Interior should provide diplomatic and consular missions with lists including data on their nationals held in penitentiary institutions.

III. SOCIAL SYSTEM

The Emirati government has promoted civil societies and national institutions such as the Emirates association for Human Rights (under Federal Law No. 6/1974), the General Women's Federation, association of Jurists, association of Sociologists, association of Journalists, General Administration for the Protection of Human Rights attached to the General Headquarters of the Dubai Police, Dubai Charitable Foundation for the Care of Women and Children, National Commission to Combat Human Trafficking, Social Support Center of the General Administration of Abu Dhabi Police, Zayed Charities Institution, Emirates Red average , Family development Institution, and the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation for Charitable and Humanitarian Works, and the Marriage Fund, among many others.

It is important to note that the development of political participation is following a progressive process. To date, there is a full and general election to appoint half of the members of the Federal National Assembly, by census suffrage, for Emirati citizens and by publication of lists.

Also, the importance of women in Emirati society is growing thanks to legislative and legal measures taken by the government to empower women, through membership of the Social development committee of the Economic and Social committee , to provide opportunities for women to actively participate in sustainable development , and the integration of women in government and private-business sectors (women make up 22.5% of the Assembly, 2006; expected to be 50% as of 2019 by decree)[3], and promoting female literacy to equalize it with male literacy. However, despite being signatories to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, in the internship they suffer discrimination in marriage and divorce proceedings. Fortunately, the Emirati legislation providing for the mistreatment of women and minor children by the husband or father was abolished as long as the aggression did not exceed the limits allowed by Islamic law. Also, once married, women must obey their husbands and be authorized by them to take up employment. Likewise, cohabitation between unmarried men and women and sexual relations outside marriage are forbidden under penalty of imprisonment. Polygamy is present even in the royal family.

As in the rest of the Arab countries, homosexuality is considered a serious crime and punishable by fines, imprisonment and deportation in the case of foreigners, although enforcement is very weak.

The media play an important role in Emirati society. They are supervised by the National Media committee , which acts largely as a censor. They have reached a high technical and professional level in the journalistic sector, with more than 1,000 specialized companies in the Dubai average City. However, journalism is controlled by the Federal Law on Press and Publications of 1980, and the Charter of Honor and Morals of the Journalistic Profession, which the heads of essay have signed. For example, some news that may be unfavorable to Islam or the government would never be published in domestic newspapers, but would be published in foreign newspapers (case of Jordan's Haya). Since 2007, by a decree of the committee of Ministers, the imprisonment of journalists in case they made mistakes during the exercise of their professional duties was prohibited. However, it ceased to apply with the entrance into force of the Law against cybercrime adopted in 2012.

The government is striving to improve work conditions, as the UAE is convinced that human beings have the right to enjoy adequate living conditions (housing, working hours, means, labor courts, health insurance, protective guarantees in labor disputes at the international cooperative level...). However, the "Sponsor" or "Kafala" system , whereby an employer exercises sponsorship of its employees, is still in force . Thus, there are cases in which the sponsor retains the passports of its employees during the term of the contract, which is illegal, but has never been investigated and punished by the government (case of the Saadiyat Island construction project ), despite being a signatory to UN conventions on work .

The latest Human development report for 2018 ranks the United Arab Emirates 34th out of 189 countries. Spain is ranked 26th. The State has ensured free and quality Education up to the university stage for all Emirati citizens, and the integration of disabled people. University and higher Education centers have been positively encouraged by the government, such as the United Arab Emirates University, Zayed University, or New York University in Abu Dhabi. Healthcare has improved considerably with the construction of hospitals and clinics, lowering mortality fees and increasing life expectancy to 77.6 years (2016). The state allocates money from the public coffers to social care for the most disadvantaged sectors of the Emirati population and for the elderly, widows, orphans or the disabled. It has also ensured that citizens have decent housing through government agencies such as the Ministry of Public Works, the Zayed Housing Program that offers interest-free mortgage loans, the Abu Dhabi Mortgage loan Agency, the Mohammed bin Rashid Institution for Housing that provides loans, and the Sharjah Public Works Agency.

In terms of religion, approximately 75% of the population is Muslim. Islam is the official religion of the United Arab Emirates. The government follows a tolerant policy towards other religions, and prohibits non-Muslims from interfering in Islamic Education . The evangelization of other religions is prohibited, and the internship of these religions must be carried out in authorized places.

On February 3, 2019, at the beginning of the Year of Tolerance, Pope Francis was received with the highest honors in Abu Dhabi by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Vice President and Emir of Dubai Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum, and Ahmed al Tayyeb, Grand Imam of Al-Azhar University and main Islamic theological reference, being the first time that the head of the Catholic Church set foot on the Arabian Peninsula. Likewise, the Pope officiated a mass in Zayed Sport City in front of 150,000 people, saying in his homily: "let us be an oasis of peace". The event was described by Mike Pompeo, US Secretary of State, as "a historic moment for religious freedom".

There are projects for the development of remote regions, which seek to modernize the infrastructure and services in those areas of the State that are farther away from population centers. Also, by virtue of Federal Law No. 47/1992, the Marriage Fund was created, whose goal is to encourage marriage between citizens and promote the family, which according to the government is the basic unit and fundamental pillar of society, offering financial subsidies to those citizens with limited resources in order to help them meet wedding expenses and contribute to achieving family stability in society.

IV. ECONOMICS

Since 1973, the UAE has undergone a huge transformation and modernization thanks to oil exploitation, which accounted for 80% of GDP at the time. In recent years, with the knowledge that oil will run out in less than 40 years, the government has diversified its Economics into financial services, tourism, trade, transport and infrastructure, with oil and gas making up only 20% of national GDP.

Abu Dhabi has 90% of the oil and gas reserves, followed by Dubai, and in small quantities in Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah. The country's oil policy is carried out through the Supreme Petroleum committee and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). The main foreign oil companies operating in the country are BP, Shell, ExxonMobil, Total, Petrofac or Partex, and the Spanish company CEPSA, of which the Emirati sovereign wealth fund Mubadala owns 80% of the business.

The borrowing capacity of financial companies was strongly negatively affected during the economic crisis of 2008. The entrance of large foreign private capital came to a standstill, as did investment in the property and construction sectors. The fall in property values forced liquidity to be restricted. In 2009, local companies were seeking moratorium agreements with their creditors on $26 billion in debt. The Abu Dhabi government provided a $5 billion bailout to reassure international investors.

Tourism and infrastructure is a success story for the country, especially in Dubai. 4] The construction of luxury tourist attractions such as the Palm Islands and the Burj al-Arab, and the good weather most of the year, has attracted Westerners and people from all over the world. According to the Emirati government, the tourism industry generates more money than oil does today. Major investments are being made in renewable energy, notably through Masdar, the government business , which has initiated theMasdar City project , the creation of a city powered solely by renewable energy.

V. DYNASTIES AND ROYAL FAMILIES. THE AL NAHYAN DYNASTY

The United Arab Emirates consists of seven Emirates and is ruled by six families:

Abu Dhabi: by the Al Nahyan family (Al Falahi House)

Dubai: by the Al Maktum family (Al Falasi House)

Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah: by the Al Qassimi Family

Ajman: by the Al Nuaimi family

Umm Al Quwain: by the Al Mualla family

Fujairah: by the Al Sharqi family

It is important to know the terminology used in the family tree of the Emirati royal families: "Sheikh" means sheikh, and an emir is a nobiliary degree scroll attributed to sheikhs. In the composition of the names, the proper name of the descendant is placed first, followed by the infix "bin" meaning "of", plus the proper name of his father, and the surname of the family. The infix is "bint" for females.

For example: Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan is the father of Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan.

It is frequent that marriages are celebrated between the ruling families of the different Emirates, intertwining dynasties, but the husband's surname will always prevail over the wife's in the name of the children. Contrary to the great European monarchies in which the reign is transmitted from father to son, in the Emirate families the power is transmitted first between brothers, by appointment, and as a second resource, to the sons. These positions of power must be ratified by the Supreme committee .

The Al Nahyan family of Abu Dhabi is a branch of the Al Falahi House. This is a royal house belonging to Bani Yas and is related to the Al Falasi House to which the Al Maktoum family of Dubai belongs. Bani Yas is known to be a very old tribal confederation of the Liwa Oasis region. There is little historical data on its exact origin. The Al Nahyan royal family is incredibly large, as each of the brothers has had several children and with different wives. The most important and recent governors of Abu Dhabi would be those who have been in power since 1971, when the United Arab Emirates consolidated as a country, ceasing to be a Truce State and British protectorate. They are:

Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan (1918-2004): was governor of Abu Dhabi from 1966 until his death. He collaborated closely with the British Empire to maintain the integrity of the territory in the face of Saudi Arabia's expansionist pretensions. He is considered the Father of the Nation and founder of the United Arab Emirates, along with his counterpart Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum of Dubai. Both pledged to form a Federation together with other rulers after the British military withdrawal. He was the first president of the United Arab Emirates, and was re-elected four times: 1976, 1981, 1986 and 1991. Zayed was characterized as sympathetic, peaceful and united with neighboring emirates, charitable in terms of donations, relatively liberal and permissive of private means. He was considered one of the richest men in the world by Forbes magazine, with a net worth of twenty billion dollars.

He died at the age of 86 and was buried at the Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque in Abu Dhabi. He was succeeded in the position by his first-born son Khalifa as governor and ratified president of the UAE by the Supreme committee .

He had six wives: Hassa bint Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, Sheikha bint Madhad Al Mashghouni, Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi, Mouza bint Suhail bin Awaidah Al Khaili, Ayesha bint Ali Al Darmaki, Amna bint Salah bin Buduwa Al Darmaki, and Shamsa bint Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Nahyan; and thirty children, of whom some are as follows:

Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1948-present): eldest son of the above, whose mother is Hassa bint Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, is the current governor of Abu Dhabi and president of the United Arab Emirates. His wife is Shamsa bint Suhail Al Mazrouei, with whom he has eight children. He also holds other positions: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, chairman of the Supreme Petroleum committee , and chairman of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority. He was educated at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in the UK. Previously, he was appointed Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi; Head of the Abu Dhabi Defense department , which would become the Emirates Armed Forces; Prime Minister, Abu Dhabi Chief of Staff, Minister of Defense and Finance; Second Deputy Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates and Chairman of the Abu Dhabi Executive committee . Dubai's Burj Khalifa is named after him, as he paid the money needed to complete its construction. He intervened militarily in Libya by sending the Air Force along with NATO, and pledged support for the democratic uprising in Bahrain in 2011.

According to a WikiLeaks leak, the U.S. ambassador describes him as "distant and uncharismatic character". He has been criticized for his spendthrift character (purchase of the Azzam yacht, scandal of the construction of the palace and purchase of territories in the Seychelles, the Panama Papers and the revelation of properties in London and front companies...).

In 2014, according to the official version, Khalifa suffered a stroke and underwent surgery. According to the government, he is stable, but has virtually disappeared from the public eye.

Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1961-present): brother of Khalifa, but whose mother is Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi. He is the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, deputy supreme commander of the Armed Forces, and entrusted with the execution of presidential affairs, receptions of foreign dignitaries and political decisions due to the President's poor health. Also, like Khalifa, he was educated at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. He has been an Officer in the Presidential Guard and a pilot in the Air Force. He is married to Salama bint Hamdan Al Nahyan, and has nine children.

He has been characterized by his activist foreign policy against Islamist extremism, and charitable characterpartnership with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation for vaccines in Afghanistan and Pakistan). International governments such as France, Singapore and the United States have invited Mohammed to various events and bilateral dialogues. He has even met Pope Francis twice (Rome, 2016; Abu Dhabi, 2019), promoting the Year of Tolerance.

In economic subject , he is the chairman of the sovereign wealth fund Mubadala and head of the Abu Dhabi committee for Economic development . He has been involved in billion-dollar economic stimulus C for the modernization of the country in the energy and infrastructure sectors.

She has also promoted women's empowerment by welcoming a delegation of women officers from the Arab Women's Military and Peacekeeping Program, who are preparing for United Nations peace operations. She has encouraged the presence of women in public services, and has pledged to meet regularly with female representatives of the country's institutions.

Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1955-present): Zayed's second son. He has six children. He is the son of Shamsa bint Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Nahyan. He was educated at Millfield School and Sandhurst Military Academy like his two previous brothers. He is the third deputy prime minister of the United Arab Emirates, a member of the Supreme Petroleum committee and a member of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority.

Hamdan bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1963-present): fifth son of Zayed, whose mother is Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi. He is married to Shamsa bint Hamdan bin Mohammed Al Nahyan. He was educated at the Sandhurst Military Academy. He held the position of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs until 2009. He is currently the emir's representative in the western region of Abu Dhabi. He holds a graduate in Political Science and Business Administration from the United Arab Emirates University.

Nahyan bin Mubarak al Nahyan (1951-present): son of Mubarak bin Mohammed Al Nahyan. He is the current head of the UAE Ministry of Tolerance since 2017. From 2016 to 2017, he was minister of culture and development of knowledge. He also dedicated years of his life to the establishment of higher Education centers such as the United Arab Emirates University (1983-2013), technical school of Technology (1988-2013), and Zayed University (1998-2013). He is also the chairman of Warid Telecom International, a telecommunications business , and the chairman of Abu Dhabi banking group , Union National Bank and United Bank Limited, among other companies.

Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1972-present): Ninth son of Zayed, whose mother is Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi. He is married to Al Jazia bint Saif bin Mohammed Al Nahyan, with whom he has five children. He has held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the United Arab Emirates since 2006. He holds a graduate in Political Science from the United Arab Emirates University. During his tenure, the UAE has experienced a great expansion in its diplomatic relations with countries in South America, South Pacific, Africa and Asia, and a consolidation with Western countries. He is a member of the country's National Security committee , Vice Chairman of the Permanent Border committee , Chairman of the National Media committee , Chairman of the board of Directors of the Emirates Youth development Foundation, Vice Chairman of the board of Directors of the Abu Dhabi Fund for development and Member of the board the National Defense high school He was Minister of Information and Culture from 1997 to 2006, and Chairman of Emirates average Incorporated.

Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1970-present): eighth son of Zayed, whose mother is Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi. He is married to two wives, Alia bint Mohammed bin Butti Al Hamed, and Manal bint Mohammed Al Maktoum, with whom he has six children in total. He has held the positions of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Presidential Affairs of the UAE since 2009. He is chairman of the Ministerial committee for Services, the Emirates Investment Authority and the Emirates Racing Authority. He is a member of the Supreme Petroleum committee and the Abu Dhabi Investment committee . He was educated at Santa Barbara Community College in the United States, and holds a B.A. in International Affairs from the United Arab Emirates University. He chairs the National Documentation and research Center and the Abu Dhabi Fund for development. He was chairman of First Gulf Bank until 2006.

He has a developed business vision. He is the owner of the English soccer team Manchester City, and co-owner of New York City of the MLS, an American professional soccer league. He is a member of the board of directors of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, has a 32% stake in Virgin Galactic, a 9.1% stake in Daimler, and owns the Abu Dhabi average Investment Corporation, through which he owns the English newspaper The National.

Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan(1968-present): twelfth son of Zayed, whose mother is Mouza bint Suhail Al Khaili. He has been Deputy Prime Minister since 2009 and Minister of Interior since 2004. His role is to ensure the internal protection and national security of the United Arab Emirates. He holds a graduate in Political Science from the United Arab Emirates University. He was Director General of the Abu Dhabi Police in 1995, and Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior in 1997, until his appointment as Minister.

Hazza bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1965-present): fifth son of Zayed, whose mother is Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi. He is married to Mozah bint Mohammed bin Butti Al Hamed, with whom he has five children. He is the Minister of National Security of the United Arab Emirates, Vice Chairman of the Executive committee of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and Chairman of the Emirates Identity Authority.

Nasser bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1967-2008): son of Zayed, whose mother is Amna bint Salah Al Badi. He was chairman of the department Planning and Economics of Abu Dhabi, and was an officer of the royal security. According to the official version, he died at the age of 41 when the helicopter in which he was traveling with his friends crashed off the coast of Abu Dhabi. He was buried at the Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed Mosque, and three days of mourning were declared throughout the UAE.

Issa bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1970-present): son of Zayed, whose mother is Amna bint Salah Al Badi. He is a prestigious real estate developer in the city of Dubai, but does not hold any political position in the government of the Emirates. He starred in a case in which, allegedly, in a leaked video, he himself tortured two Palestinians who were his business partners. The Emirati court declared in a final judgment that Issa was innocent because he was the victim of a conspiracy and sentenced the Palestinians to five years' imprisonment for drug use, recording, publication and blackmail. International observers sharply criticized the Emirati judicial system and called for an overhaul of the country's penal code.

From my point of view, and with the experience of having lived in the country, the United Arab Emirates is a very unknown country for the Spanish youth and has incredible professional opportunities due to the demand for foreign work , a very high quality of life at an affordable price, as salaries are quite high, and a strong and modernized administration and institutions. The culture shock is not very big, as the State makes sure to avoid discriminatory situations, unlike other Arab countries. I can say with full conviction that cultural tolerance is real. However, foreigners should keep in mind that it is not a western country, and it is recommended to respect the customs of the nation regarding dress, sacred places and public performances, and to know the basic Emirati law.

▲ Protest in London in October 2018 after the disappearance of Jamal Khashoggi [John Lubbock, Wikimedia Commons].

ANALYSIS / Naomi Moreno Cosgrove

October 2nd last year was the last time Jamal Khashoggi-a well-known journalist and critic of the Saudi government-was seen alive. The Saudi writer, United States resident and Washington Post columnist, had entered the Saudi consulate in the Turkish city of Istanbul with the aim of obtaining documentation that would certify he had divorced his previous wife, so he could remarry; but never left.

After weeks of divulging bits of information, the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, laid out his first detailed account of the killing of the dissident journalist inside the Saudi Consulate. Eighteen days after Khashoggi disappeared, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) acknowledged that the 59-year-old writer had died after his disappearance, revealing in their investigation findings that Jamal Khashoggi died after an apparent "fist-fight" inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul; but findings were not reliable. Resultantly, the acknowledgement by the KSA of the killing in its own consulate seemed to pose more questions than answers.

Eventually, after weeks of repeated denials that it had anything to do with his disappearance, the contradictory scenes, which were the latest twists in the "fast-moving saga", forced the kingdom to eventually acknowledge that indeed it was Saudi officials who were behind the gruesome murder thus damaging the image of the kingdom and its 33-year-old crown prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). What had happened was that the culmination of these events, including more than a dozen Saudi officials who reportedly flew into Istanbul and entered the consulate just before Khashoggi was there, left many skeptics wondering how it was possible for MBS to not know. Hence, the world now casts doubt on the KSA's explanation over Khashoggi's death, especially when it comes to the shifting explanations and MBS' role in the conspiracy.

As follows, the aim of this study is to examine the backlash Saudi Arabia's alleged guilt has caused, in particular, regarding European state-of-affairs towards the Middle East country. To that end, I will analyze various actions taken by European countries which have engaged in the matter and the different modus operandi these have carried out in order to reject a bloodshed in which arms selling to the kingdom has become the key issue.

Since Khashoggi went missing and while Turkey promised it would expose the "naked truth" about what happened in the Saudi consulate, Western countries had been putting pressure on the KSA for it to provide facts about its ambiguous account on the journalist's death. In a joint statement released on Sunday 21st October 2018, the United Kingdom, France and Germany said, "There remains an urgent need for clarification of exactly what happened on 2nd October - beyond the hypotheses that have been raised so far in the Saudi investigation, which need to be backed by facts to be considered credible." What happened after the kingdom eventually revealed the truth behind the murder, was a rather different backlash. In fact, regarding post-truth reactions amongst European countries, rather divergent responses have occurred.

Terminating arms selling exports to the KSA had already been carried out by a number of countries since the kingdom launched airstrikes on Yemen in 2015; a conflict that has driven much of Yemen's population to be victims of an atrocious famine. The truth is that arms acquisition is crucial for the KSA, one of the world's biggest weapons importers which is heading a military coalition in order to fight a proxy war in which tens of thousands of people have died, causing a major humanitarian catastrophe. In this context, calls for more constraints have been growing particularly in Europe since the killing of the dissident journalist. These countries, which now demand transparent clarifications in contrast to the opacity in the kingdom's already-given explanations, are threatening the KSA with suspending military supply to the kingdom.

COUNTRIES THAT HAVE CEASED ARMS SELLING

Germany

Probably one of the best examples with regards to the ceasing of arms selling-after not being pleased with Saudi state of affairs-is Germany. Following the acknowledgement of what happened to Khashoggi, German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared in a statement that she condemned his death with total sharpness, thus calling for transparency in the context of the situation, and stating that her government halted previously approved arms exports thus leaving open what would happen with those already authorized contracts, and that it wouldn't approve any new weapons exports to the KSA: "I agree with all those who say that the, albeit already limited, arms export can't take place in the current circumstances," she said at a news conference.

So far this year, the KSA was the second largest customer in the German defense industry just after Algeria, as until September last year, the German federal government allocated export licenses of arms exports to the kingdom worth 416.4 million euros. Respectively, according to German Foreign Affair Minister, Heiko Maas, Germany was the fourth largest exporter of weapons to the KSA.

This is not the first time the German government has made such a vow. A clause exists in the coalition agreement signed by Germany's governing parties earlier in 2018 which stated that no weapons exports may be approved to any country "directly" involved in the Yemeni conflict in response to the kingdom's countless airstrikes carried out against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in the area for several years. Yet, what is clear is that after Khashoggi's murder, the coalition's agreement has been exacerbated. Adding to this military sanction Germany went even further and proposed explicit sanctions to the Saudi authorities who were directly linked to the killing. As follows, by stating that "there are more questions unanswered than answered," Maas declared that Germany has issued the ban for entering Europe's border-free Schengen zone-in close coordination with France and Britain-against the 18 Saudi nationals who are "allegedly connected to this crime."

Following the decision, Germany has thus become the first major US ally to challenge future arms sales in the light of Khashoggi's case and there is thus a high likelihood that this deal suspension puts pressure on other exporters to carry out the same approach in the light of Germany's Economy Minister, Peter Altmaier's, call on other European Union members to take similar action, arguing that "Germany acting alone would limit the message to Riyadh."

Norway

Following the line of the latter claim, on November 9th last year, Norway became the first country to back Germany's decision when it announced it would freeze new licenses for arms exports to the KSA. Resultantly, in her statement, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ine Eriksen Søreide, declared that the government had decided that in the present situation they will not give new licenses for the export of defence material or multipurpose good for military use to Saudi Arabia. According to the Søreide, this decision was taken after "a broad assessment of recent developments in Saudi Arabia and the unclear situation in Yemen." Although Norwegian ministry spokesman declined to say whether the decision was partly motivated by the murder of the Saudi journalist, not surprisingly, Norway's announcement came a week after its foreign minister called the Saudi ambassador to Oslo with the aim of condemning Khashoggi's assassination. As a result, the latter seems to imply Norway's motivations were a mix of both; the Yemeni conflict and Khashoggi's death.

Denmark and Finland

By following a similar decision made by neighboring Germany and Norway-despite the fact that US President Trump backed MBS, although the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had assessed that the crown prince was responsible for the order of the killing-Denmarkand Finland both announced that they would also stop exporting arms to the KSA.

Emphasising on the fact that they were "now in a new situation"-after the continued deterioration of the already terrible situation in Yemen and the killing of the Saudi journalist-Danish Foreign Minister, Anders Samuelsen, stated that Denmark would proceed to cease military exports to the KSA remarking that Denmark already had very restrictive practices in this area and hoped that this decision would be able to create a "further momentum and get more European Union (EU) countries involved in the conquest to support tight implementation of the Union's regulatory framework in this area."

Although this ban is still less expansive compared to German measures-which include the cancellation of deals that had already been approved-Denmark's cease of goods' exports will likely crumble the kingdom's strategy, especially when it comes to technology. Danish exports to the KSA, which were mainly used for both military and civilian purposes, are chiefly from BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, a subsidiary of the United Kingdom's BAE Systems, which sold technology that allowed Intellectual Property surveillance and data analysis for use in national security and investigation of serious crimes. The suspension thus includes some dual-use technologies, a reference to materials that were purposely thought to have military applications in favor of the KSA.

On the same day Denmark carried out its decision, Finland announced they were also determined to halt arms export to Saudi Arabia. Yet, in contrast to Norway's approach, Finnish Prime Minister, Juha Sipilä, held that, of course, the situation in Yemen lead to the decision, but that Khashoggi's killing was "entirely behind the overall rationale".

Finnish arms exports to the KSA accounted for 5.3 million euros in 2017. Nevertheless, by describing the situation in Yemen as "catastrophic", Sipilä declared that any existing licenses (in the region) are old, and in these circumstances, Finland would refuse to be able to grant updated ones. Although, unlike Germany, Helsinki's decision does not revoke existing arms licenses to the kingdom, the Nordic country has emphasized the fact that it aims to comply with the EU's arms export criteria, which takes particular account of human rights and the protection of regional peace, security and stability, thus casting doubt on the other European neighbours which, through a sense of incoherence, have not attained to these values.

European Parliament

Speaking in supranational terms, the European Parliament agreed with the latter countries and summoned EU members to freeze arms sales to the kingdom in the conquest of putting pressure on member states to emulate Germany's decision.      

By claiming that arms exports to Saudi Arabia were breaching international humanitarian law in Yemen, the European Parliament called for sanctions on those countries that refuse to respect EU rules on weapons sales. In fact, the latest attempt in a string of actions compelling EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini to dictate an embargo against the KSA, including a letter signed by MEPs from several parties.

Rapporteur for a European Parliament report on EU arms exports, Bodil Valero said: "European weapons are contributing to human rights abuses and forced migration, which are completely at odds with the EU's common values". As a matter of fact, two successful European Parliament resolutions have hitherto been admitted, but its advocates predicted that some member states especially those who share close trading ties with the kingdom are deep-seated, may be less likely to cooperate. Fact that has eventually occurred.

COUNTRIES THAT HAVE NOT CEASED ARMS SELLING

France

In contrast to the previously mentioned countries, other European states such as France, UK and Spain, have approached the issue differently and have signalled that they will continue "business as usual".

Both France and the KSA have been sharing close diplomatic and commercial relations ranging from finance to weapons. Up to now, France relished the KSA, which is a bastion against Iranian significance in the Middle East region. Nevertheless, regarding the recent circumstances, Paris now faces a daunting challenge.

Just like other countries, France Foreign Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, announced France condemned the killing "in the strongest terms" and demanded an exhaustive investigation. "The confirmation of Mr. Jamal Khashoggi's death is a first step toward the establishment of the truth. However, many questions remain unanswered," he added. Following this line, France backed Germany when sanctioning the 18 Saudi citizens thus mulling a joint ban from the wider visa-free Schengen zone. Nevertheless, while German minister Altmeier summoned other European countries to stop selling arms to Riyadh-until the Saudi authorities gave the true explanation on Khashoggi's death-, France refused to report whether it would suspend arms exports to the KSA. "We want Saudi Arabia to reveal all the truth with full clarity and then we will see what we can do," he told in a news conference.           

In this context, Amnesty International France has become one of Paris' biggest burdens. The organization has been putting pressure on the French government for it to freeze arms sales to the realm. Hence, by acknowledging France is one of the five biggest arms exporters to Riyadh-similar to the Unites States and Britain-Amnesty International France is becoming aware France's withdrawal from the arms sales deals is crucial in order to look at the Yemeni conflict in the lens of human rights rather than from a non-humanitarian-geopolitical perspective. Meanwhile, France tries to justify its inaction. When ministry deputy spokesman Oliver Gauvin was asked whether Paris would mirror Berlin's actions, he emphasized the fact that France's arms sales control policy was meticulous and based on case-by-case analysis by an inter-ministerial committee. According to French Defence Minister Florence Parly, France exported 11 billion euros worth of arms to the kingdom from 2008 to 2017, fact that boosted French jobs. In 2017 alone, licenses conceivably worth 14.7 billion euros were authorized. Moreover, she went on stating that those arms exports take into consideration numerous criteria among which is the nature of exported materials, the respect of human rights, and the preservation of peace and regional security. "More and more, our industrial and defence sectors need these arms exports. And so, we cannot ignore the impact that all of this has on our defence industry and our jobs," she added. As a result, despite President Emmanuel Macron has publicly sought to devalue the significance relations with the KSA have, minister Parly, seemed to suggest the complete opposite.

Anonymously, a government minister held it was central that MBS retained his position. "The challenge is not to lose MBS, even if he is not a choir boy. A loss of influence in the region would cost us much more than the lack of arms sales". Notwithstanding France's ambiguity, Paris' inconclusive attitude is indicating France's clout in the region is facing a vulnerable phase. As president Macron told MBS at a side-line G20 summit conversation in December last year, he is worried. Although the context of this chat remains unclear, many believe Macron's intentions were to persuade MBS to be more transparent as a means to not worsen the kingdom's reputation and thus to, potentially, dismantle France's bad image.

United Kingdom

As it was previously mentioned, the United Kingdom took part in the joint statement carried out also by France and Germany through its foreign ministers which claimed there was a need for further explanations regarding Khashoggi's killing. Yet, although Britain's Foreign Office said it was considering its "next steps" following the KSA's admission over Khashoggi's killing, UK seems to be taking a rather similar approach to France-but not Germany-regarding the situation.

In 2017, the UK was the sixth-biggest arms dealer in the world, and the second-largest exporter of arms to the KSA, behind the US. This is held to be a reflection of a large spear in sales last year. After the KSA intervened in the civil war in Yemen in early 2015, the UK approved more than 3.5billion euros in military sales to the kingdom between April 2015 and September 2016.

As a result, Theresa May has been under pressure for years to interrupt arms sales to the KSA especially after human rights advocates claimed the UK was contributing to alleged violations of international humanitarian law by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Adding to this, in 2016, a leaked parliamentary committee report suggested that it was likely that British weapons had been used by the Saudi-led coalition to violate international law, and that manufactured aircraft by BAE Systems, have been used in combat missions in Yemen.

Lately, in the context of Khashoggi's death things have aggravated and the UK is now facing a great amount of pressure, mainly embodied by UK's main opposition Labour party which calls for a complete cease in its arms exports to the KSA. In addition, in terms of a more international strain, the European Union has also got to have a say in the matter. Philippe Lamberts, the Belgian leader of the Green grouping of parties, said that Brexit should not be an excuse for the UK to abdicate on its moral responsibilities and that Theresa May had to prove that she was keen on standing up to the kind of atrocious behaviour shown by the killing of Khashoggi and hence freeze arms sales to Saudi Arabia immediately.

Nonetheless, in response and laying emphasis on the importance the upholding relationship with UK's key ally in the Middle East has, London has often been declining calls to end arms exports to the KSA. Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt defended there will be "consequences to the relationship with Saudi Arabia" after the killing of Khashoggi, but he has also pointed out that the UK has an important strategic relationship with Riyadh which needs to be preserved. As a matter of fact, according to some experts, UK's impending exit from the EU has played a key role. The Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) claims Theresa May's pursuit for post-Brexit trade deals has seen an unwelcome focus on selling arms to some of the world's most repressive regimes. Nevertheless, by thus tackling the situation in a similar way to France, the UK justifies its actions by saying that it has one of the most meticulous permitting procedures in the world by remarking that its deals comprehend safeguards that counter improper uses.

Spain

After Saudi Arabia's gave its version for Khashoggi's killing, the Spanish government said it was "dismayed" and echoed Antonio Guterres' call for a thorough and transparent investigation to bring justice to all of those responsible for the killing. Yet, despite the clamor that arose after the murder of the columnist, just like France and the UK, Spain's Prime Minister, Pedro Sanchez, defended arms exporting to the KSA by claiming it was in Spain's interest to keep selling military tools to Riyadh. Sanchez held he stood in favor of Spain's interests, namely jobs in strategic sectors that have been badly affected by "the drama that is unemployment". Thusly, proclaiming Spain's unwillingness to freeze arms exports to the kingdom. In addition, even before Khashoggi's killing, Sanchez's government was subject to many critics after having decided to proceed with the exporting of 400 laser-guided bombs to Saudi Arabia, despite worries that they could harm civilians in Yemen. Notwithstanding this, Sanchez justified Spain's decision in that good ties with the Gulf state, a key commercial partner for Spain, needed to be kept.

As a matter of fact, Spain's state-owned shipbuilder Navantia, in which 5,500 employees work, signed a deal in July last year which accounted for 1.8 billion euros that supplied the Gulf country with five navy ships. This shipbuilder is situated in the southern region of Andalusia, a socialist bulwark which accounts for Spain's highest unemployment estimates and which has recently held regional elections. Hence, it was of the socialist president's interest to keep these constituencies pleased and the means to this was, of course, not interrupting arms deals with the KSA.

As a consequence, Spain has recently been ignoring the pressures that have arose from MEP's and from Sanchez's minorities in government-Catalan separatist parties and far-left party Podemos- which demand a cease in arms exporting. For the time being, Spain will continue business with the KSA as usual.

CONCLUSION

All things considered, while Saudi Arabia insists that MBS was not aware of the gruesome murder and is distracting the international attention towards more positive headlines-suchas the appointment of the first female ambassador to the US-inorder to clear the KSA's image in the context of Khashoggi's murder, several European countries have taken actions against the kingdom's interests. Yet, the way each country has approached the matter has led to the rise of two separate blocks which are at discordance within Europe itself. Whereas some European leaders have shown a united front in casting blame on the Saudi government, others seem to express geopolitical interests are more important.

During the time Germany, Norway, Denmark and Finland are being celebrated by human rights advocates for following through on their threat to halt sales to the kingdom, bigger arms exporters-like those that have been analyzed-have pointed out that the latter nations have far less to lose than they do. Nonetheless, inevitably, the ceasing carried out by the northern European countries which are rather small arms exporters in comparison to bigger players such as the UK and France, is likely to have exacerbated concerns within the European arms industry of a growing anti-Saudi consensus in the European Union or even beyond.

What is clear is that due to the impact Saudi Arabia's state of affairs have caused, governments and even companies worldwide are coming under pressure to abandon their ties to the oil-rich, but at the same time, human-rights-violating Saudi Arabian leadership. Resultantly, in Europe, countries are taking part in two divergent blocks that are namely led by two of the EU's most compelling members: France and Germany. These two sides are of rather distant opinions regarding the matter, fact that does not seem to be contributing in terms of the so-much-needed European Union integration.

[Bruce Riedel, Kings and Presidents. Saudi Arabia and the United States since FDR. Brookings Institution Press. Washington, 2018. 251 p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

Oil in exchange for protection is the pact that Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz bin Saud sealed on board the USS Quincy in early 1945, in the waters off Cairo, when the American president was returning from the Yalta lecture . Since then, the special relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia has been one of the key elements of international politics. Today, fracking makes Arabian oil less necessary for Washington, but cultivating Saudi friendship continues to be of interest to the White House, even in an unorthodox presidency in diplomatic matters: the first country that Donald Trump visited as president was Saudi Arabia.

The ups and downs in this relationship, due to the vicissitudes of the world, especially in the Middle East, have marked the tenor of the contacts between the various presidents of the United States and the corresponding monarchs of the House of Saud. This book by Bruce Riedel, a former CIA analyst and member of the US National Security committee as a specialist on the region, who now directs the Intelligence project of the Brookings Institution think tank, is devoted to analyzing the content of these relations, following the successive pairs of interlocutors between Washington and Riyadh.

In this relationship, the central position occupied by the Palestinian question is surprising. One might sometimes think that many Arab countries' invocation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is rhetorical, but Riedel notes that in the case of Saudi Arabia the issue is fundamental. It was part of the initial pact between Roosevelt and Abdulaziz bin Saud (the U.S. president pledged not to support the partition of Palestine to create the State of Israel without Arab consent, something that Truman did not respect, aware that Riyadh could not break with Washington because it needed U.S. oil companies) and since then it has appeared on every occasion.

Progress or stalemates in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and the differing passion of Saudi kings on this issue, have directly shaped the relationship between U.S. administrations and the Saudi Monarchy. For example, Washington's support for Israel in the 1967 war led to the 1973 oil embargo; George Bush senior and Bill Clinton's efforts for a peace agreement helped a close relationship with King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah; the latter, on the other hand, led to a cooling off in the face of the disinterest shown by George Bush junior. "A vibrant and effective peace process will help cement a strong relationship between king and president; a stalled and exhausted process will damage their connection."

Will this issue remain a defining one for the new generations of Saudi princes? "The Palestinian cause is deeply popular in Saudi society, especially in the clerical establishment. The House of Saud has made the creation of a Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital, emblematic of its policy since the 1960s. A generational change is unlikely to alter that fundamental stance."

In addition to this, there are two other aspects that have proven to be disruptive in the Washington-Riyadh entente: Wahhabism promoted by Saudi Arabia and the US demand for political reforms in the Arab world. Riedel asserts that, given the foundational alliance between the House of Saud and this strict Sunni variant of Islam, which Riyadh has promoted in the world to ingratiate itself with its clerics, as compensation each time it has had to bow to the demands of the impious United States, there is no room for a rupture between the two bodies. "Saudi Arabia cannot abandon Wahhabism and survive in its present form," he warns.

Thus, the book ends with a rather pessimistic outlook on the change -democratization, respect for human rights- that Saudi Arabia is facing from the international community (certainly without much insistence, in the case of the United States). Not only was Riyadh the "major player" in the counter-revolution at the time of the Arab Spring, but it may be a factor going against a positive evolution of the Middle East. "Superficially it looks like Saudi Arabia is a force for order in the region, someone who is trying to prevent chaos and disorder. But in the long term, by trying to maintain an unsustainable order, forcibly enforced by a police state, the kingdom could, in fact, be a force for chaos."

Riedel has personally dealt with prominent members of the Saudi royal family. Despite a close relationship with some of them, especially Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who was ambassador to the United States for more than twenty years, the book does not patronize Saudi Arabia in the disputes between Washington and Riyadh. More critical of George W. Bush than of Barack Obama, Riedel also points out the latter's inconsistencies in his Middle East policies.

▲Satellite imagery of the Jordan River [NASA].

ANALYSIS / Marina Díaz Escudero

Water is an essential natural resource, not only for individual survival on Earth, but also for nation-states and their welfare; having an effect on partner development, trade, health and population productivity.

As a natural determinant of power, its accessibility must be considered by states in their policies on national security; "hydropolitics" being the branch of study for this phenomenon. Although it has been, and continues to be, a major source of inter-state conflict, it is an arena in which cooperation and diplomacy between rival countries can set the ground for further political agreements, effectively leading to more stable and peaceful relations.

On the other hand, when water is used as a natural border or must be shared between various countries, concurrent cooperation between all of them is essential to find an effective and non-violent way to approach the resource. Otherwise, an overlapping of different, and potentially contradictory, bilateral agreements may lead to frictions. If one of the concerned countries is not present in negotiations, as some historical events suggest (e.g. 1992 multilateral negotiations in Moscow, where Lebanon and Syria where not present), this will always constitute an obstacle for regional stability.

Moreover, although 71% of the Earth's surface is covered by water, factors such as economic interests, climate change, and explosive population growth are also challenging the sustainable distribution of water sources among countries. The future effects of this scarcity in the region will demand consistent political action in the long-term and current leaders should bear it in mind.

Water availability and conflict in the MENA region

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is known as an arid and semi-arid region, with only 1% of the world's renewable water resources. On average, water availability is only 1,200 cubic meters, around six times less than the worldwide average of 7,000 cubic meters.

As global temperatures rise, more frequent and severe droughts will take place in the region and this will make countries which already have partner rivalries more prone to go to war with each other. According to the World Resources Institute, thirteen of the thirty three states that will suffer from worse water scarcity in the twenty-first century will be Middle Eastern countries.

To quote the findings of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) report, Global Trends: Paradox of Progress, more than thirty countries - nearly half of them in the Middle East - will experience extremely high water stress by 2035, increasing economic, social, and political tensions.

Although claims to the land were and are the main motives for much of the current conflict, water, as part of the contested territories, has always been considered as a primary asset to be won in conflict. In fact, recognition of the importance of water lent the term, the "War over Water", to conflicts in the region, and control over the resource constitutes a significant advantage.

Despite there being several water bodies in the Middle East (Nile, Euphrates, Tigris...), the Jordan River basin is one of the most significant ones today in terms of its influence on current conflicts. The Jordan River Basin is a 223 km long river with an upper course from its sources up to the Galilee Sea, and a lower one, from the latter to the Dead Sea. Territories such as Lebanon, Israel and the West Bank are situated to its West, while Syria and Jordan border it to the East. Water scarcity in the Jordan watershed comes from many different factors, but the existence of cultural, religious and historical differences between the riparian countries (situated on the banks of the river) has led to a centuries-long mismanagement of the source.

Tensions between Zionism and the Arab world on regards to the Jordan River became noticeable in the 1950s, when most Arab countries rejected the Johnston Plan that aimed at dividing the water by constructing a number of dams and canals on the different tributaries of the river. The plan was based on an earlier one commissioned by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA) and was accepted by the water technical committees of the five riparian countries. Nevertheless, the Arab League didn't give the go-ahead and even hardened its position after the Suez Crisis.

In spite of this, Jordan and Israel decided to abide by their allocations and developed two projects, the Israeli National Water Carrier (to transport water from the north to the center and south) and Jordan's East Ghor Main Canal (King Abdullah Canal). In retaliation and with severe consequences, Arab states reunited in an Arab Summit (1964) and decided to divert Jordan's headwaters to the Yarmouk river (for the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan), depriving Israel of 35% of its Water Carrier capacity.

This provocation led to a series of military clashes and prompted Israel's attack on Arab construction projects; a move that would help precipitate the 1967 Six-Day War, according to some analysts. As a result of the war, Israel gained control of the waters of the West Bank (formely Jordan-annexed in the 1948 war and today still controlled by the Israeli Civil Administration) and the Sea of Galilee (today constituting about 60% of the country's fresh water).

Later, in 1995, by the Article 40 of the Oslo II political agreement, [...] Israel recognized Palestinian water rights in the West Bank and established the Joint Water Committee to manage and develop new supplies and to investigate illegal water withdrawals. Nevertheless, the loss of control over water in the West Bank has never been accepted by neighboring Arab countries as, despite the agreement, much of the water coming from it is still directly given to Israeli consumers (and only a smaller fraction to Palestinians living under their control).

Role of water in Syrian-Israeli hostilities

Hostilities have been covering the diary of Syrian-Israeli relationships ever since the Armistice Agreements signed by Israel with each of the four neighboring Arab countries in 1949. This is compounded by the fact that there is seldom mutual agreement with resolutions proposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The Golan Heights, a rocky plateau in south-western Syria, was taken away by Israel in the aftermath of the Six-Day War and is still considered an Israeli-occupied territory. In 1974 the Agreement on Disengagement was signed, ending the Yom Kippur War and resulting in the formation of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), a buffer zone separating the Israeli portion of the Golan Heights and the rest of Syria. Although Israel kept most of the Golan Heights territory, in 1981 it unilaterally passed the Golan Heights Law to impose its jurisdiction and administration on the occupied territory (refusing to call it "annexation"). These laws did not receive international recognition and were declared void by the UNSC.

The fact that Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated in April 2016 in a weekly cabinet meeting that "the Golan Heights will remain forever in Israeli hands" has once again triggered the rejection of UNSC's members, who have declared that the status of the Heights "remains unchanged."

Rainwater catchment in the Golan Heights feeds into the Jordan River and nowadays provides a third of Israel's water supply. Although "Syria has built several dams in the Yarmouk river sub-basin, which is part of the Jordan River basin", the Golan Heights are likely to remain an important thorn in future Israeli-Syrian relations.

Water as a casus belli between Lebanon and Israel

In March 2002, Lebanon decided to divert part of the Hasbani (a major tributary of the Jordan upper course) to supply the Lebanese Wazzani village. Ariel Sharon, the former Prime Minister of Israel, said that the issue could easily become a "casus belli". According to Israel, Lebanon should have made consultations before pumping any water from the Springs, but both the Lebanese government and Hezbollah (a shi'a militant group) condemned the idea.

The Wazzani project, according to Lebanon, only aimed to redevelop the south by extracting a limited amount of water from the Hasbani; 300 MCM per year (they drew 7 MCM by the time). The actual conflict with Israel began when Lebanon started constructing the pumping station very close to the Israeli border.

The United States (US) decided to establish a State Department water expert in order to assess the situation "and cool tempers" but in 2006, during the Lebanon war, the pumping station and other infrastructures, such as an underground water diversion pipe which run Letani river water to many villages, were destroyed.

Although Israeli-Lebanese tensions have continued due to other issues, such as spying, natural gas control and border incidents, water source domination has been a significant contributor to conflict between the two states.

Inter-Arab conflicts on water allocation

Some inter-Arab conflicts on regards to water distribution have also taken place, but they are small-scale and low level ones. In 1987, an agreement was signed between Jordan and Syria which allowed the latter to build twenty five dams with a limited capacity in the Yarmouk River. Later on it was proved that Syria had been violating the pact by constructing more dams than permitted: in 2014 it had already constructed forty two of them. New bilateral agreements were signed in 2001, 2003 and 2004, but repeated violations of these agreements by Syria in terms of water-allocation became unsustainable for Jordan. Most recently (2012), former Jordan's water minister Hazim El Naser stressed the necessity "to end violations of the water-sharing accords."

Although these are low-level tensions, they could quickly escalate into a regional conflict between Jordan, Syria and Israel, as a decrease of water from the Yarmouk released by Syria to Jordan may prevent Jordan to comply with its commitments towards Israel.

Regional cooperation: from multilateralism to bilateralism

Since the beginning of the last century, attempts to achieve multilateral cooperation and a basin-wide agreement between the five co-riparian countries have been hindered by regional political conflict. Boundary definition, choices about decision-making arrangements, and issues of accountability, together with other political divisions, can help explain the creation of subwatershed communities of interest instead of a major watershed agreement between all neighboring countries.

The Israeli-Palestine peace process began in 1991 with the Conference in Madrid, attended by all riparians: Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria. Co-sponsored by the US and the Soviet Union as representatives of the international community, it addressed several regional issues, such as environment, arms control, economic development and, of course, water distribution (in fact, water rights became one of the trickiest areas of discussion).

In 1992, multilateral negotiations about regional cooperation continued in Moscow but this time they were only attended by Israel, the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and the international community; Syria and Lebanon were not present. "After the failed Johnston plan, external efforts to achieve a multilateral agreement through cooperation on water sources were attempted by the Centre for Environmental Studies and Resource Management (CESAR) [...] As Syria and Lebanon did not want to participate in a process involving Israel, (it) ran parallel processes for Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan on the one hand, and Syria and Lebanon on the other hand."

As a matter of fact, bilateral instruments grew in importance and two treaties, between Israel and Jordan/Palestine respectively, were signed: The Treaty of Peace between The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and The State of Israel (1994) and The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II, 1995). Discussions about water use and joint water management played an important role and were included in the annexes.

In 1996, the Trilateral Declaration on Principles for Cooperation on Water-Related Matters and New and Additional Water Resources was signed by Israel, Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and in 2003 the first two initiated a plan called Roadmap for Peace which included the revival of cooperation on regional issues like water.

Although Israel and Syria started some negotiations to solve the Golan Heights' problem in 2008, after the break out of the Syrian civil war distrust between both actors has increased, leaving the most important thorn in multilateral regional negotatiations still unsolved. Nevertheless, "a new government in Syria after the end of the war may provide new opportunities for improved bi- and ultimately multilateral cooperation," says the FAO. The previous year (2007) Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic also signed some agreements "in regard to shared water in the Yarmouk river basin."

Role of Non-Governmental Organizations

Civil society has also been an important platform for resource-management discussions between riparian countries.

Middle Eastern rhetoric, according to the BBC, "often portrays the issue of water as an existential, zero-sum conflict - casting either Israel as a malevolent sponge sucking up Arab water resources, or the implacably hostile Arabs as threatening Israel's very existence by denying life-giving water."

For this reason, in 2010, Friends of the Earth Middle East (FoEME, also called EcoPeace Middle East) stressed the importance of replacing this win-lose approach for a compromising perspective of mutual gains for all. In this way, their proposals don't "include quantitative water allocations, but the implementation of a joint institutional structure that is continuously tasked with peaceful conflict resolution over water resources; [...] defining water rights not as the access to a certain water quantity, but as a broader bundle of rights and duties to access and use the available water and to uphold quality and quantity standards."

Through "The Good Water Neighbors" project (2001), the NGO tried to raise awareness about the negative consequences of leaving this issue unmanaged and reiterated its willingness to strenghten "institutional capacities for collaboration in the region." According to the staff, Israel, Jordan and Palestine could develop a certain interdependence, focused on water (Israel to Jordan/Palestine) and solar-generated electricity (Jordan to Palestine/Israel), in order to facilitate the powering of desalination plants and produce more cleanwater for sale.

The use of this type of political support for transboundary cooperation, based on water access but focused on solving less cultural and sensitive problems (like environmental sustainability), as a means to opening up avenues for dialogue on other political issues, could be the key for a lasting peace in the region.

According to Gidon Brombert, cofounder and Israeli director of FoEME, adopting "healthy interdependencies is a powerful way to promote regional water and energy stability as a foundation for long-lasting peace between our people".

A testament to the success of these initiatives is the fact that Jordan and Israel scored 56.67 under the Water Cooperation Quotient (WCQ) 2017, which means that there is currently zero risk of a water-related war between both states (50 is the minimum score for this to apply).

Final key points and conclusions

There is no doubt that water issues have been a key discussion point between riparian countries in the Jordan River watershed since the late nineteenth century, and rightly so, as the only way to achieve a long-lasting peace in the region is to accept that water management is an integral part of political discourse and decisions. Not only because it is an essential factor in the conflicts that arise between states, but because agreements on other political matters could be furthered through the establishment of sound agreements in the hydropolitical arena.

In other words, a "baby-step" approach to politics should be applied: peaceful discussions on this and other matters leveraged to talk about other sources of conflict and utilized to improve political relations between two parties. The Korean conflict is a good example: although both Koreas are far from agreeing with regards to their political outlook, they have been able to cooperate in other fields, such as the Winter Olympic games. Communication during the games was used to subtly suggest avenues for a political reapproachment, which now seems to be progressing satisfactorily.

As for multilateral-bilateral conditions of negotiations, it is important to take into account the fact that the Jordan River basin, mainly due to its geological condition as a watershed, has to be shared by several different countries, five to be exact. This may seem obvious but clearly many actors don't see its implications.

Understandably, it is very difficult for a state to manage various bilateral agreements concerning the same asset with countries that are mutually at odds with one another. Their contents can overlap, creating contradictions and making the achievement of a general arrangement not only disorganized, but also challenging. Notwithstanding, a multilaterally agreed distribution of the basin's water - taking into account the necessities of all riparians simultaneously, could more easily pave the way for further cooperation on other, pressing, political issues.

Last but not least, it is important not to forget about policies related to other regional affairs, and their potential effect on water management. Climate change, for instance, will certainly affect water availability in the MENA region and the Jordan River basin, easily disrupting and modifying past and future agreements on the resource's allocation and distribution. Attention should also be paid to interest groups and to the economic situation of the countries involved in the negotiations, as these will be determinant in states' decisions about the implementation of certain future projects.

▲Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and President Donald Trump during a meeting in Washington in 2017 [White House].

ANALYSIS / Naomi Moreno

Saudi Arabia used to be the only country in the world that banned women from driving. This ban was one of the things that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) was best known for to outsiders not otherwise familiar with the country's domestic politics, and has thus been a casus belli for activists demanding reforms in the kingdom. Last month, Saudi Arabia started issuing the first driver's licenses to women, putting into effect some of the changes promised by the infamous Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) in his bid to modernize Saudi Arabian politics. The end of the ban further signals the beginning of a move to expand the rights of women in KSA, and builds on piecemeal developments that took place in the realm of women's rights in the kingdom prior to MBS' entrance to the political scene.

Thus, since 2012, Saudi Arabian women have been able to do sports as well as participate in the Olympic Games; in the 2016 Olympics, four Saudi women were allowed to travel to Rio de Janeiro to compete. Moreover, within the political realm, King Abdullah swore in the first 30 women to the shura council - Saudi Arabia's consultative council - in February 2013, and in the kingdom's 2015 municipal elections, women were able to vote and run for office for the first time. Finally, and highlighting the fact that economic dynamics have similarly played a role in driving progression in the kingdom, the Saudi stock exchange named the first female chairperson in its history - a 39-year-old Saudi woman named Sarah Al Suhaimi - last February.

Further, although KSA may be known to be one of the "worst countries to be a woman", the country has experienced a B in the last 5 years and the abovementioned advances in women's rights, to name some, constitute a positive development. However, the most visible reforms have arguably been the work of MBS. The somewhat rash and unprecedented decision to end the ban on driving coincided with MBS' crackdown on ultra-conservative, Wahhabi clerics and the placing of several of the kingdom's richest and most influential men under house arrest, under the pretext of challenging corruption. In addition, under his leadership, the oil-rich kingdom is undergoing economic reforms to reduce the country's dependency on oil, in a bid to modernize the country's economy. 

Nonetheless, despite the above mentioned reforms being classified by some as unprecedented, progressive leaps that are putting an end to oppression through challenging underlying ultra-conservatism traditions (as well as those that espouse them), a measure of distrust has arisen among Saudis and outsiders with regards the motivations underlying the as-of-yet seemingly limited reforms that have been introduced. While some perceive the crown prince's actions to be a genuine move towards reforming Saudi society, several indicators point to the possibility that MBS might have more practical reasons that are only tangentially related to progression for progression's sake. As the thinking goes, such decrees may have less to do with genuine reform, and more to do with improving an international image to deflect from some of the kingdom's more controversial practices, both at home and abroad. A number of factors drive this public skepticism.

Reasons for scepticism

The first relates to the fact that KSA is a country where an ultraconservative form of shari'a or Islamic law continues to constitute the primary legal framework. This legal framework is based on the Qur'an and Hadith, within which the public and many private aspects of everyday life are regulated. Unlike in other Muslim majority countries, where only selective elements of the shari'a are adopted, Wahhabism - which is identified by the Court of Strasbourg as a main source of terrorism - has necessitated the strict adherence to a fundamentalist interpretation of shari'a, one that draws from the stricter and more literal Hanbali school of jurisprudence. As such, music and the arts have been strictly controlled and censored. In addition, although the religious police (more commonly known as the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice) have had their authority curbed to a certain degree, they are still given the authority to enforce Islamic norms of conduct in public by observing suspects and forwarding their findings to the police.

In the past few years, the KSA has been pushing for a more national Wahhabism, one that is more modern in its outlook and suitable for the kingdom's image. Nevertheless, the Wahhabi clergy has been close to the Al Saud dynasty since the mid-18th century, offering it Islamic legitimacy in return for control over parts of the state, and a lavish religious infrastructure of mosques and universities. Therefore, Saudi clerics are pushing back significantly against democratization efforts. As a result, the continuing prevalence of a shari'a system of law raises questions about the ability of the kingdom to seriously democratize and reform to become moderate.

Secondly, and from a domestic point of view, Saudi Arabia is experiencing disharmony. Saudi citizens are not willing to live in a country where any political opposition is quelled by force, and punishments for crimes such as blasphemy, sorcery, and apostasy are gruesome and carried out publicly. This internal issue has thus embodied an identity crisis provoked mainly by the 2003 Iraq war, and reinforced by the events of the Arab Spring. Disillusionment, unemployment, religious and tribal splits, as well as human rights abuses and corruption among an ageing leadership have been among the main grievances of the Saudi people who are no longer as tolerant of oppression.

In an attempt to prevent the spill over of the Arab Spring fervor into the Kingdom, the government spent $130 billion in an attempt to offset domestic unrest. Nonetheless, these grants failed to satisfy the nearly 60 percent of the population under the age of twenty-one, which refused to settle. In fact, in 2016 protests broke out in Qatif, a city in Saudi Arabia's oil-rich, eastern provinces, which prompted Saudis to deploy additional security units to the region. In addition, in September of last year, Saudi authorities, arguing a battle against corruption and a crack down on extremism, arrested dozens of people, including prominent clerics. According to a veteran Saudi journalist, this was an absurd action as "there was nothing that called for such arrests". He argued that several among those arrested were not members of any political organization, but rather individuals with dissenting viewpoints to those held by the ruling family.

Among those arrested was Sheikh Salman al-Awdah, an influential cleric known for agitating for political change and for being a pro-Shari'a activist. Awdah's arrest, while potentially disguised as part of the kingdom's attempts to curb the influence of religious hardliners, is perhaps better understood in the context of the Qatar crisis. Thus, when KSA, with the support of a handful of other countries in the region, initiated a blockade of the small Gulf peninsula in June of last year, Awdah welcomed a report on his Twitter account suggesting that the then three-month-old row between Qatar and four Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia may be resolved. The ensuing arrest of the Sheikh seems to confirm a suspicion that it was potentially related to his favoring the renormalization of relations with Qatar, as opposed to it being related to MBS' campaign to moderate Islam in the kingdom.

A third factor that calls into question the sincerity of the modernization campaign is economic. Although Saudi Arabia became a very wealthy country following the discovery of oil in the region, massive inequality between the various classes has grown since, as these resources remain to be controlled by a select few. As a result, nearly one fifth of the population continues to live in poverty, especially in the predominantly Shi'a South where, ironically, much of the oil reservoirs are located. In these areas, sewage runs in the streets, and only crumbs are spent to alleviate the plight of the poor. Further, youth opportunities in Saudi Arabia are few, which leaves much to be desire, and translates into occasional unrest. Thus, the lack of possibilities has led many young men to join various terrorist organizations in search of a new life.

Vision 2030 and international image

In the context of the Saudi Vision 2030, the oil rich country is aiming to wean itself of its dependence on the natural resource which, despite its wealth generation capacity, has also been one of the main causes of the country's economic problems. KSA is facing an existential crisis that has led to a re-think of its long-standing practice of selling oil via fixed contracts. This is why Vision 2030 is so important. Seeking to regain better control over its economic and financial destiny, the kingdom has designed an ambitious economic restructuring plan, spearheaded by MBS. Vision 2030 constitutes a reform program that aims to upgrade the country's financial status by diversifying its economy in a world of low oil prices. Saudi Arabia thus needs overseas firms' investments, most notably in non-oil sectors, in order to develop this state-of-the-art approach. This being said, Vision 2030 inevitably implies reforms on simultaneous fronts that go beyond economic affairs. The action plan has come in at a time when the kingdom is not only dealing with oil earnings and lowering its reserves, but also expanding its regional role. As a result, becoming a more democratic country could attract foreign wealth to a country that has traditionally been viewed in a negative light due to its repressive human rights record.  

This being said, Saudi Arabia also has a lot to do regarding its foreign policy in order to improve its international image. Despite this, the Saudi petition to push the US into a war with Iran has not ceased during recent years. Religious confrontation between the Sunni Saudi autocracy and Iran's Shi'a theocracy has characterized the geopolitical tensions that have existed in the region for decades. Riyadh has tried to circumvent criticism of its military intervention in the Yemen through capitalizing on the Trump administration's hostility towards Iran, and involving the US in its campaign; thus granting it a degree of legitimacy as an international alliance against the Houthis. Recently, MBS stated that Trump was the "best person at the right time" to confront Iran. Conveniently enough, Trump and the Republicans are now in charge of US' foreign affairs. Whereas the Obama administration, in its final months, suspended the sale of precision-guided missiles to Saudi Arabia, the Trump administration has moved to reverse this in the context of the Yemeni conflict. In addition, in May of this year, just a month after MBS visited Washington in a meeting which included discussions regarding the Iran accords, the kingdom has heaped praise on president Trump following his decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal.

All things considered, 2018 may go down in history as the irreversible end of the absolute archaic Saudi monarchy. This implosion was necessitated by events, such as those previously mentioned, that Saudi rulers could no longer control or avoid. Hitherto, MBS seems to be fulfilling his father's wishes. He has hand-picked dutiful and like-minded princes and appointed them to powerful positions. As a result, MBS' actions suggest that the kingdom is turning over a new page in which a new generation of princes and technocrats will lead the breakthrough to a more moderate and democratic Saudi Arabia.

New awareness

However, although MBS has declared that the KSA is moving towards changing existing guardianship laws, due to cultural differences among Saudi families, to date, women still need power of attorney from a male relative to acquire a car, and risk imprisonment should they disobey male guardians. In addition, this past month, at least 12 prominent women's rights activists who campaigned for women's driving rights just before the country lifted the ban were arrested. Although the lifting of the ban is now effective, 9 of these activists remain behind bars and are facing serious charges and long jail sentences. As such, women continue to face significant challenges in realizing basic rights, despite the positive average endorsement that MBS' lifting of the driving ban has received.

Although Saudi Arabia is making an effort in order to satisfy the public eye, it is with some degree of scepticism that one should approach the country's motivations. Taking into account Saudi Arabia's current state of affairs, these events suggest that the women's driving decree was an effort in order to improve the country's external image as well as an effort to deflect attention from a host of problematic internal and external affairs, such as the proxy warfare in the region, the arrest of dissidents and clerics this past September, and the Qatari diplomatic crisis, which recently "celebrated" its first anniversary. Allowing women to drive is a relatively trivial sacrifice for the kingdom to make and has triggered sufficient positive reverberations globally. Such baby steps are positive, and should be encouraged, yet overlook the fact that they only represent the tip of the iceberg.

As it stands, the lifting of the driving ban does not translate into a concrete shift in the prevailing legal and cultural mindsets that initially opposed it. Rather, it is an indirect approach to strengthen Saudi's power in economic and political terms. Yet, although women in Saudi Arabia may feel doubtful about the government's intentions, time remains to be their best ally. After decades of an ultraconservative approach to handling their rights, the country has reached awareness that it can no longer sustain its continued oppression of women; and this for economic reasons, but also as a result of global pressures that affect the success of the country's foreign policies which, by extension, also negatively impact on its interests.

The silver lining for Saudi woman is that, even if the issue of women's rights is being leveraged to secure the larger interests of the kingdom, it continues to represent a slow and steady progression to a future in which women may be granted more freedoms. The downside is that, so long as these rights are not grafted into a broader legal framework that secures them beyond the rule of a single individual - like MBS - women's rights (and human rights in general) will continue to be the temporary product of individual whim. Without an overhaul of the shari'a system that perpetuates regressive attitudes towards women, the best that can be hoped for is the continuation of internal and external pressures that coerce the Saudi leadership into exacting further reforms in the meantime. As with all things, time will tell.