[Juan Tovar Ruiz, La doctrina en la política exterior de Estados Unidos: De Truman a Trump ( Madrid: Catarata, 2017) 224 pages.]
review / Xabier Ramos Garzón
Every change in the White House leads to an analysis of the outgoing president's policies and to speculation about the policies of the incoming president. Given the weight of the United States in the world, the vision on international affairs of each administration is decisive for the world order. Juan Tovar Ruiz, professor of International Relations at the University of Burgos, deals in this book with the essence of the foreign policy of each president - mainly from Truman to Trump (Biden's, logically, is yet to be defined) - which in many cases follows a defined road map that has come to be called "doctrine".
Among the book's strengths are the fact that it combines several points of view: on the one hand, it covers, from the realist point of view, the structural and internal effects of each policy, and on the other, it analyzes the ideas and interactions between actors taking into account the constructivist point of view. The author explores the decision-making processes and their consequences, considers the ultimate effectiveness of American doctrines in the general context of international relations, and examines the influences, ruptures and continuities between different doctrines over time. Despite the relatively short history of the United States, the country has had an extensive and complex foreign policy which Tovar, focusing on the last eight decades, synthesizes with special merit, adopting a mainly general point of view that highlights the substantive.
The book is divided into seven chapters, organized by historical stages and, within each, by presidents. The first chapter, by way of introduction, covers the period following the independence of the United States until the end of World War II. This stage is sample as a core topic in the future American ideology, with two particularly decisive positions: the Monroe Doctrine and Wilsonian Idealism. The second chapter deals with the First Cold War, with the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson doctrines. Throughout the chapter, the different postulates are contextualized and the issues that were core topic in the creation of doctrines that only affected the foreign policy of the moment, but were imbricated in the core of American political thought are pointed out. The third chapter deals with the Distension, the period between 1969 and 1979 in which the doctrines of Nixon and Carter took place. The fourth chapter takes us to the Second Cold War and the end of the US-USSR confrontation, a time when we find the doctrines of Reagan and Bush senior. From this point, the following chapters (fifth, sixth and seventh) deal with the Post-Cold War period, with the doctrines of Clinton, Bush junior and the most recent ones - therefore still subject to study - of Obama and Trump.
In the conclusions, the author summarizes each of the chapters on the basis of academic or political characterizations and makes some qualifications, such as warning that in his opinion Obama's foreign policy is rather a "non-doctrine", since it combines elements of different ideologies and is partly contradictory. Obama dealt with various conflicts in different ways: he dealt realistically with "wars of necessity" (Afghanistan) and in agreement with the liberal internationalist approach with conflicts such as Libya. Although the flexibility pursued by Obama may be considered a weakness by some, since he did not follow a firm and marked policy, it can also be seen as the necessary adaptation to a continuously changing environment. There are many occasions when an American president, such as Bush Jr., has pursued a rigid foreign policy, ideologically speaking, that ultimately achieved little practical success written request
Another example of a variant of the conventional doctrine that the author sample is the "anti-doctrine" carried out by Trump. The man who was president until 2021 implemented a policy characterized by numerous contradictions and variations with respect to the role that the US had been playing in the world, thus casting doubts and uncertainties on the expected performance of the American superpower. This was due to Trump's political inexperience, both domestically and domestically, which caused concern not only among international actors but also in the core of Washington itself.
From the analysis of the different doctrines presented in the book, we can see how each one of them is adapted to a specific social, historical and political context, and at the same time they all respond to a shared political tradition of a country that, as a superpower, manifests certain constants when it comes to maintaining peace and guaranteeing security. But these constants should not be confused with universal aspects, since each country has its own particularities and specific interests: simply adapting U.S. positions to the foreign policy plans of other countries can lead to chaotic failures if these differences are not recognized.
For example, countries such as Spain, which depend on membership of the European Union, could not enter into random wars unilaterally as the United States has done. However, Spain could adopt some elements, such as in subject decision making, since this subject of doctrines greatly facilitates objectifying and standardizing the processes of analysis and resolutions.
WORKING PAPER / Jokin de Carlos Sola
ABSTRACT
During and after the fall of the Soviet Block the three countries of Germany, Denmark and Sweden saw an opportunity to increase their influence on the region that centuries before they had possessed. They did this through diplomatic support of the opposition and communication strategies and once the new countries were either independent or liberal democracies, they used their economic and political power to attract them. This was done by buying and investing in the new privatized assets of these countries, soft power and in some cases diplomatic pressure. By this way Germany, Sweden and Denmark did not only got new investment hubs and markets for their products but also support in the Governance of the European Union.
China, Russia and Iran have increased their relationship with needier Latin America due to Covid, which has also provided an opportunity for organized crime.
► Nicolás Maduro Guerra, after getting the Sputnik V vaccine, with the Russian ambassador in Caracas, in December 2020 [Russian Embassy].
report SRA 2021 / executive summary [PDF version]
MAY 2021-The serious health and economic crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic has accentuated Latin America's vulnerabilities, also in terms of regional security. On the one hand, it has increased dependence on external powers, whose influence has grown through the shipment of vaccines (China and Russia) or gasoline and food (Iran). On the other hand, it has reduced the means for states to combat organized crime, which has made some strategic moves, such as the consolidation of Paraguay as an important focus of drug trafficking. Although the status prolonged confinement has made it possible to reduce the homicide issue in some places, as in the case of Colombia, the deterioration of regional stability has led the United States to pay greater attention to the rest of the Western Hemisphere, with a clear warning given by the U.S. Southern Command.
The needs imposed by Covid-19 around the globe have made some safety requirements more pressing in certain countries. With international trade disrupted by movement limitations, China's food security has pushed its long-distance fishing fleets to adopt more aggressive behavior. Although a growing influx of Chinese fishermen has been detected in the waters off South America for some years now, in 2020 the status took a qualitative leap. The presence of more than 500 vessels raised concerns about the continuous evasion of radars, the use of non-permitted extraction systems and the disobedience of coastguards. The governments of Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru issued a joint statement calling for the supervision of an activity that Beijing refuses to submit to international inspection. The intimidation is reminiscent of the use of Chinese fishermen as a "shock force" in the South China Sea, although here the goal is not to gain sovereignty, but to gain fishing space. Washington has expressed concern about China's activity both around the Galapagos and in the South Atlantic.
The pandemic has been a propitious occasion for the consolidation of penetration in Latin America by China and, to a lesser extent, Russia. Thanks to "vaccine diplomacy", Beijing is now a fully global partner : not only in terms of trade and loans for infrastructure, but also on a par with the United States and Europe in terms of pharmaceutical excellence and health care provider . While it is true that Latin America is getting more "Western" vaccines - only Peru, Chile and Argentina have contracted more Chinese and Russian doses - the export of injectables from China and Russia has increased its influence in the region. Huawei has managed to enter the 5G tender in Brazil in exchange for vaccines, and Beijing has offered them to Paraguay if it abandons its recognition of Taiwan. In addition to clinical trials in several Latin American nations in the second half of 2020, Argentina and Mexico will produce or package Sputnik V starting in June.
The worsening of the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela throughout 2020, on the other hand, made it easier for Iran to strengthen its ties with the regime of Nicolás Maduro, resuming a special relationship already in place during the presidencies of Chávez and Ahmadinejad. With no more credits from China or Russia, Venezuela looked to the Iranians to try to reactivate the country's paralyzed refineries. With no particular success in that endeavor, Iran ended up becoming a supplier of more than 5 million barrels of gasoline through cargo ships; it also delivered food to supply a supermarket opened by the Iranians in Caracas. With oil production at a minimum, Maduro paid for Tehran's services with shipments of gold, worth at least 500 million dollars.
All this activity of extra-hemispheric powers in the region is pointed out by the US Southern Command, the US military structure in charge of Latin America and the Caribbean, as a cause of serious concern for Washington. In his annual appearances before congress, the head of SouthCom has progressively raised the Degree Threat. In his last appearance, at the beginning of 2021, Admiral Craig Faller was particularly alarming about China's advance in the region: he referred to the controversy over Chinese fishermen - their alleged invasion of exclusive economic zones and illegal activity - and to the $1 billion credit announced by Beijing for financial aid in sanitary material against Covid-19. Faller said that the US "is losing its positional advantage" and called for "immediate action to reverse this trend".
Another of Washington's concerns relates to transnational crime, specifically that perpetrated by Latino gangs in the United States. In the last year, US federal prosecutors have for the first time brought charges against members of the Mara Salvatrucha for crimes against national security. The US continues to classify the gangs as a criminal organization, not a terrorist group , but in charges filed in July 2020 and January 2021 against the MS-13 leadership imprisoned in El Salvador, it has moved to consider some of its leaders as terrorists. The department Justice considers the connection between the decisions taken in Salvadoran prisons and crimes committed in the United States to be proven. In the last five years, US courts have convicted 504 gang members, 73 of whom received life sentences.
In terms of citizen security, the prolonged confinements for Covid-19 have allowed for a slight reduction in violence figures in some countries, especially in the first half of 2020. In the case of Colombia, this temporary effect was combined with the trend to leave the homicide issue that has been observed in the country since the beginning of the negotiations for the peace process in 2012, so that the 2020 figures represented a historic low, with a rate of 24.3 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, the leave since 1975. Several programs of study consider that there is a link between the demobilization of the FARC and the consistent drop in the level of violence that the country is experiencing. This is a positive development that is overshadowed by the murder of social leaders and former guerrillas, which at the beginning of 2021 had already reached more than 1,000 since the signature of the peace agreement in 2016.
The drug trafficking chapter has seen two notable developments in the last year. One is the increase in "trials" of coca cultivation in Honduras and Guatemala, which were previously only transit countries for cocaine. Both are consolidating their beginnings as producer countries, which is an important qualitative leap despite the fact that production is still very limited. After cocaine processing laboratories were located in both countries, the first plantations were discovered in 2017 in Honduras and in 2018 in Guatemala; since then, more than 100 hectares of coca bush have been detected, a very small number for the time being. Throughout 2020, Honduras eradicated 40 hectares of cultivation and Guatemala 19. Part of this own production infrastructure came to light in the trial held in the US against Tony Hernandez, brother of the president of Honduras, who in March 2021 was sentenced to life imprisonment.
For its part, Paraguay is on the rise on the drug trafficking map, as South America's biggest marijuana producer and a distributor of cocaine from Peru and Bolivia. Most of the marijuana cultivation takes place around Pedro Juan Caballero, near the border with Brazil, which is the country's criminal center. The plantations reach some 8,000 hectares, with production reaching 30,000 tons, of which 77% goes to Brazil and 20% to Argentina. At the beginning of 2021, more than 30 tons of cocaine shipped from Paraguay were located in northern European ports, making it a decisive "hub" for the distribution of this drug.
Most of the cultivation takes place in the area around Pedro Juan Caballero, near the Brazilian border, which is the country's criminal center.
° Marijuana plantations cover some 8,000 hectares, with a production of 30,000 tons, 77% of which goes to Brazil and 20% to Argentina.
As a transit point for cocaine from Peru and Bolivia, Paraguay has made a leap in the Issue of shipments to Europe: at the beginning of 2021, there was a record shipment of 23 tons.
° The Paraguayan congress has C medical use of marijuana; for the moment it is not following in the footsteps of Mexico, the leading producer in the Americas, which is discussion its full legalization.
► Paraguayan President Mario Abdo Benítez and the then Argentine Minister of Security, eradicating marijuana plants in PJC [Gov. of Paraguay].
report SRA 2021 / Eduardo Uranga [ PDF version].
MAY 2021-Paraguay is on the rise on the drug trafficking map, as the largest producer of marijuana in South America and a distributor of cocaine from Peru and Bolivia. With an estimated cannabis cultivation area of almost 8,000 hectares and an annual production that can approach 30,000 tons, Paraguay exports this drug to Brazil and Argentina. The cocaine that passes through the country is destined for these two large neighbors and especially for Europe: in February 2021, German authorities intercepted a shipment of 16 tons of cocaine, the largest ever shipped from Paraguay, a finding that rose to 23 tons counting a shipment located two days earlier in Antwerp. Another 11 tons were found in the same port in early April.
Although, in the case of Paraguay, the most surprising development in the last year has been this leap in the capacity to generate large cocaine shipments, the rapid evolution of the international context in relation to marijuana - for example, the UN reclassified it in December 2020, noting its therapeutic potential - makes this other lucrative illicit trade particularly topical.
The growing legalization of the hemp leaf that is beginning to take place in some countries, generating its own productions (unlike coca, which due to its specific conditions is cultivated almost only in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, marijuana can be grown in different places, also in greenhouses) offers business perspectives to the farmers who today in Paraguay deal with its illegal cultivation, The Paraguayan mafia structure, which is of Brazilian origin, is not so much interested in marijuana as in Uruguay, the only nearby country that has legalized national production for open use, because Paraguayan marijuana would have to be sold more cheaply than Uruguayan marijuana in order to compete in Uruguay, the only nearby country that has legalized national production for open use. Mexico, which is the largest producer in the Americas, is in the process of decriminalizing its recreational use; Paraguay is not there yet, but the law approved in August 2020 to allow medicinal use, admits individual cultivation if there is a medical certificate .
Production and eradication
Marijuana production is linked to organized crime, which operates especially in the border areas with Brazil. According to figures provided by the National Anti-Drugadministrative office (SENAD), the largest operations against the cultivation of this drug take place in the department Amambay, whose capital, Juan Pedro Caballero, is the country's criminal center. That city is adjacent to the Brazilian border and shares an urban mass with the Brazilian town of Punta Porá. The adjacent department of Canindeyú, also bordering Brazil, is also home to extensive plantations.
In the decade 2009-2019, SENAD destroyed 9,838 hectares of marijuana plant cultivation in Amambay and 2,432 in Canindeyú, together representing around 90% of the 15,045 hectares eradicated nationwide. In 2019, the latest damage referenced by SENAD, authorities eradicated 1,468.5 hectares, the highest figure of the decade, which not only indicates an increase in the anti-narcotics effort, but also suggests an increase in the extensions cultivated.
Paraguay is estimated to have between 6,000 and 8,000 hectares with marijuana plants. An improved seed introduced a few years ago has made it possible to expand the usual two annual harvests to three or even four harvests, raising productivity to between two and three tons of marijuana herb per hectare, bringing total production to as much as 20,000 tons per year. These figures may have been underestimated, as SENAD has estimated that up to 30,000 tons of weed could have left the country in the last year.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) World Drug Report 2020 places Paraguay as the country with the largest marijuana seizures, at over 1,000 tons per year. The report also indicates that hemp resin production is minimal (1.1 tons in 2016) and that 77% of the marijuana generated in Paraguay is destined for the Brazilian market and 20% for the Argentine market.
In the Americas, Paraguay's production is second only to Mexico, which has an estimated 12,000 hectares of plantations, agreement to the US government's 2021 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). The cultivated area eradicated by Mexican authorities is also greater, although that effort has fallen in recent years (5,478 hectares in 2016, 4,193 in 2017 and 2,263 in 2018), as indicated by the UNODC report , which at the same time notes that some 200 tons of marijuana were seized in Mexico in 2018, compared to 400 in 2017.
Corruption
Paraguay is a fertile ground for the establishment of criminal networks. Its strategic position is a determining factor and a fundamental condition for organized crime to choose Paraguay as a hub for its criminal activities. Located between the Peru-Bolivia coca production centers and the growing markets of Argentina and especially Brazil, which are also the destination of Paraguayan marijuana, the country is a place of operations for mafias, especially Brazilian. The conditions of the Triple Border - the conurbation formed by Ciudad del Este (Paraguay), Foz de Iguaçú (Brazil) and Puerto Iguazú (Argentina) - also encourage smuggling, product counterfeiting and money laundering, as well as the financing of terrorist groups(such is the case of Hezbollah).
Economic factors also play a role. Economic and social marginalization is an element that these organized crime gangs use to recruit "employees. However, this factor can only partly explain the particular development of these networks. Its dimension depends fundamentally on the level of acceptance and tolerance of corruption. Paraguay has, in this sense, the ideal conditions for the development these networks. This is due to its high levels of state corruption, as indicated in the Corruption Perceptions Index.
Underscoring the obstacle that corruption in Paraguay poses to the fight against drug trafficking, in January 2020 there was a mass escape from a prison in Pedro Juan Caballero of 75 inmates, mostly members of a Brazilian criminal gang known as the First Capital Command (CCP). The escape was facilitated by the collusion of officials and highlighted the impunity with which many of the drug traffickers operate.
Both are consolidating their start as producing countries, which represents an important qualitative leap despite the fact that production is still very limited.
° The first plantations were discovered in 2017 in Honduras and in 2018 in Guatemala; since then, more than 100 hectares of coca bush have been located.
° During 2020, Honduras eradicated 40 hectares of coca cultivation and Guatemala 19 hectares; in addition, almost twenty cocaine processing laboratories were destroyed.
° The extension of coca production into Central America is the work of Mexican cartels, which employ Colombian experts in locating the best areas for cultivation.
► Honduran anti-narcotics action in a coca plantation in October 2020 [Gov. of Honduras].
report SRA 2021 / Eduardo Villa Corta [ PDF version].
MAY 2021-Cocaine production has begun to spread to countries in Central America, which until recently were only transit points for cocaine coming mainly from Colombia, which is the world's largest producer, along with Peru and Bolivia.
The finding of laboratories for processing the drug in Honduras in 2009 already suggested the beginning of a change, confirmed by the location of coca bush crops themselves in 2017 in the same country and in 2018 in Guatemala. Since then, more than a hundred hectares have been located in both countries: those first two years some 50 hectares were counted together, a figure that was doubled in 2020 in what appears to be an acceleration of the process.
In any case, these are very small extensions, compared to those estimated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in its 2020 report for Colombia (around 180,000 hectares), Peru (almost 50,000) and Bolivia (around 25,000). In addition, the United States claims to have no record of cocaine generated in the Central American Northern Triangle entrance its territory.
Everything indicates that for now we are in a stage of experimentation or essay by Mexican cartels, which would be testing the aptitude of the terrain and climate of different areas and the quality of the product, with the financial aid of Colombian experts. Changes in the drug trafficking chain since most of the FARC left the illicit business in Colombia and the desire to reduce the complex logistics of transporting drugs to the United States explain these attempts in the Northern Triangle.
Honduras 
In Honduras, the location of crops has increased in the last two years. The latest International Narcotics Control Strategyreport (INCSR), dated March 2021, prepared by the US State department , includes official Honduran information accounting for the eradication in the first ten months of 2020 of 40 hectares of coca bushes. This represents an increase in the accounting of cultivation areas compared to previous years, which estimated the accumulation of 50 hectares throughout 2017 and 2018 in Honduras and Guatemala together.
The first evidence in Honduras that drug traffickers were not only using its territory as a transit point was the finding in 2009 in the province of Cortes of a laboratory for the transformation of coca leaves into cocaine hydrochloride. In ten years, twelve laboratories were discovered, and in 2020 alone the authorities proceeded to destroy at least eleven others, according to the INCSR. Although some had the capacity to produce up to 3.6 tons of cocaine per year, their facilities were rather "rudimentary," according to Honduran law enforcement agencies.
The existence of these laboratories led to the conclusion that at least since 2012 some amount of coca leaf could be growing in the country, but it was not until 2017 that a cultivated area was found, in the province of Orlando, with some 10,000 plants. In 2018, three other farms were located, one of which was 20 hectares. Cultivation and laboratory activity is not concentrated in a specific area, although half of the findings have been made in the aforementioned provinces of Orlando and Colon.
The last location reported, in a process of locating increasingly visible crops, was the one carried out by the National Anti-Drug Trafficking Directorate (DLCN) in March 2020, which corresponded to a field of about 4.2 hectares of cultivation and laboratory in the community of Nueva Santa Bárbara. In 2020, at least 15 coca fields were seized, with a total of 346,500 plants.
The DLCN estimates that Mexican cartels, such as those of Sinaloa and Jalisco, are behind this penetration, although they do not operate directly, with a deployment of armed individuals, but on several occasions through growers of Colombian origin, who know how to take care of the coca plant.
Recent convictions in the United States, such as that of the brother of Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez, have provided details of the drug trafficking corridor that is Honduras, but also the incipient homegrown production. As his trial exposed, Tony Hernandez, sentenced to life in prison in March 2021, had a direct relationship with a local cocaine laboratory .
Guatemala
In the case of Guatemala, the first finding of coca leaf cultivation took place in 2018. Although it was only one hectare in size, with 75,000 plants, it also meant the leap to incipient producer country. In addition to having been, like Honduras, a passageway for cocaine coming from Colombia, Guatemala had already distinguished itself for a moderate production of marijuana and for having begun to grow poppy, by extension of the activity of Mexican cartels involved in the heroin market, of which Mexico is the leading producer in the Americas. Now Guatemala, where narco-laboratories have also appeared, included coca among its illicit narcotics crops.
In 2019, Guatemalan authorities made an effort to combat this activity. On September 4 of that year, they declared a 30-day state of siege in 22 municipalities in the north of the country. Police operations involved several seizures, especially in the Departments of Izabal, Alta Verapaz, Petén and Zacapa. Some 23 cultivation areas were located, eight of them in Izabal.
As a result of these findings, Interior Minister Enrique Degenhart admitted that Guatemala had become a cocaine-producing nation.
In the first ten months of 2020, 19 hectares of coca cultivation were eradicated and seven laboratories were destroyed, as indicated by the latest INCSR, specifying, in any case, that coca production in Guatemala has a "limited scale" (as in Honduras, but even below the neighboring country), at a distance from that recorded by the largest South American producers.
Increased role for gangs
Authorities in Honduras and Guatemala fear, due to increased drug production activity, that some areas of their countries will become the new "Medellin of Pablo Escobar". The existence of areas that are difficult to access and the lack of means to supervise and combat organized crime complicate counter-narcotics activities.
There is also a risk that the gangs or maras will gain even more power, entrenching or even aggravating the problem they pose. Because of their dominance of space, they have so far taken tolls for the passage of drugs throughout the territory, but with production in the Northern Triangle itself, they could also come to control the very origin of the drug, giving them the prerogatives of the cartels.
At the same time, international coordination against drug trafficking is complicated by the fact that it is more difficult to locate production centers and identify the actors involved in this activity.
High issue of murdered social leaders continues to dismay the country: 904 assassinations since the 2016 peace agreement
° In 2020, there were 24.3 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in Colombia, the leave figure since 1975, when there was a similar rate, and below that of other countries in the region.
° The homicide issue was 12,018 in 2020, following the progressive decline recorded since 2002, only openly broken in 2012, when 16,033 murders were committed.
° The programs of study conclude that there is a relationship between the demobilization of the FARC and the consistent decrease in the level of violence that the country is experiencing.
Religious ceremony in Dabeiba in February 2020, after recovering the remains of a man who disappeared in 2002 [JEP].
report SRA 2021 / Isabella Izquierdo [PDF version].
MAY 2021-Colombia is gradually reducing its levels of violence, at least in terms of the homicide rate, which in 2020 fell to 24.3 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, the leave figure since 1975. Although the drama of the murder of social leaders has overwhelmed Colombian society in the post-conflict management , the objectivity of the overall figures speaks of a reduction in violent deaths. This decrease has been sponsored in recent years by the withdrawal the FARC from the armed struggle and has presumably been favored in 2020 by the prolonged confinements established to face the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic.
The country closed 2020 with 12,018 homicides, the leave number in decades, less than half the number that occurred in the early 1990s, during the worst period of the armed conflict. At that time, the homicide issue was over 28,000 per year, or around 80 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Since then, with slight upturns in 2002 and 2012, Colombia has been reducing its levels of violence and today its homicide rate is far from the records being set by other countries in the region: although in some cases the health emergency has also helped to lower the figures, in 2020 the highest fees were those of Jamaica (46.5 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), Venezuela (45.6), Honduras (37.6), Trinidad and Tobago (28.2) and Mexico (27).
[In the case of Colombia, the authorities spoke at the end of 2020 of a rate of 23.79, although later homicide figures from the National Police and population data give as a result the calculation the 24.3 for which we have opted here).
Conflict and post-conflict
While ELN guerrillas remain active and several FARC dissidents continue to engage in criminal activities, around 8,000 former combatants were incorporated into civilian life as a result of the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC, which began negotiations in 2012 and was signed in 2016.
The years prior to the beginning of the contacts saw an increase in violence, and then a steady decrease since then, not only in violence related to the political conflict, but also in violence related to crime in general. When investigating homicide fees during the years of the peace talks with the FARC, the Criminal research Directorate and Interpol in Colombia showed a close relationship: when the armed confrontation increased or decreased, depending on the interests of the negotiators, the total number of homicides also increased or decreased. The good progress of the negotiation marked a dynamic of de-escalation of the armed conflict, with a reduction of 8.57% in the homicide rate between 2012 and 2015.
In 2017, already signed the Peace agreement , violence in Colombia reached its lowest numbers in 30 years, with 12,079 homicides and a rate of 25.02 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. However, in 2018 the trend varied slightly (12,130 homicides), something that was pronounced in 2019 (12,667), which alerted about the need to quickly implement conditions for the reintegration of ex-combatants, improve security in demilitarized zones and increase state presence in the territory.
The Institute of Legal Medicine concluded that the homicide figures of 2018 seemed to evidence a reactivation of the Colombian armed conflict. For its part, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights presented in 2019 a report evaluating the status of human rights in Colombia, with emphasis on the implementation of the contents of the Peace agreement : the highest homicide figures were in Antioquia, Cauca and Norte de Santander, where the clashes for the control of illicit economies were more violent.
Effect of Covid
Post-conflict measures and the arrival of the pandemic, with its movement restrictions, again led to a drop in homicides in 2020. In the period from March 20 to August 17, 2020, when the strictest confinements were in place, daily homicides per municipality fell, on average, by 16% from their pre-social distancing trend. In the weeks of total quarantine, the daily homicide issue even fell by about 40% from the pre-quarantine trend. From June 2020 onwards, the homicide issue returned to pre-quarantine trends. Crime dropped during the first months due to the fear of contagion, but quickly returned to the usual figures, especially in terms of robberies and thefts, when the economic status worsened and the need for food increased among the poor population. However, because of what happened in the first semester of the year, Colombia closed 2020 with the leave homicide ratein the last 46 years.
A clear negative of 2020, however, was the continuation of violence directed against social leaders and ex-combatants. Last year 297 local leaders were killed, bringing the total number of social actors killed from 2016 to February 2021 to 904. In the same period, 276 former guerrillas were killed, most of them involved in appearances before the Special Jurisdiction for Peace.
Federal prosecutors charge El Salvador gang leaders with crimes against national security
° The US continues to classify gangs as a criminal organization, not as a terrorist group , but in the last year has come to consider some of their leaders as terrorists.
° The department Justice considers the connection between the decisions made by the MS-13 leadership from Salvadoran prisons and crimes committed in the U.S. to be proven.
In the past five years, U.S. courts have convicted 504 gang members, 73 of whom received life sentences.
► Mara inmates in Salvadoran prisons, April 2020 [Gov. of El Salvador].
report SRA 2021 / Xabier Ramos Garzón [ PDF version].
MAY 2021-U.S. authorities have in the past year taken a significant leap in their reaction to the violence of the main Latino street gang, the Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13. For the first time, federal prosecutors filed terrorism charges against the gang's leaders, opening the door to a review of the classification of MS-13, which has been considered an international criminal organization in the United States since 2012 and could be designated a terrorist group , as is already the case in El Salvador.
The Justice department s focus on violence with a Central American connection, however, may have been due to the Trump Administration's prioritization of the fight against illegal immigration. It is unknown at this time whether the Biden Administration, which has less interest in criminalizing immigration, will insist on the category of terrorism. However, police and judicial pressure on gang members responsible for crimes on U.S. soil does not appear to be abating for the time being.
Tax offensive
In July 2020, the U.S. department Justice released terrorism charges against Armando Eliú Melgar Díaz, alias Gangster Blue, sealed since the previous May in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The charges included conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, committing cross-border acts of terrorism, financing terrorist actions and conducting narcoterrorism operations. Melgar had lived in Virginia, with some absences, between 2003 and 2016, when he was deported. In November 2018, he was arrested and imprisoned in El Salvador. Prosecutors believe that from that country he directed MS-13 criminal action on the East Coast: he apparently ordered and approved murders, oversaw drug trafficking businesses, and collected money for local cliques or organizations.
Having opened the way for terrorism charges, which carry heavier penalties, against leaders who allegedly ordered the commission of crimes from El Salvador, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York proceeded a few months later with the broadest and most far-reaching indictment against the MS-13 and its command and control structure in the history of the United States, alleging crimes "against national security. Thus, in January 2021, the U.S. Attorney's Office made public an indictment, secretly formalized the previous month, with accusations against fourteen MS-13 leaders, all of them members of the gang's Ranfla Nacional or leadership, which was headed, according to the Public Ministry, by Borromeo Enrique Henríquez, a.k.a. Diablito de Hollywood. Eleven of them are in Salvadoran prisons and three are fugitives. The charges were similar to those brought against Melgar, although the indictment does not provide details on specific actions. The crimes of different cliques of the MS-19 are attributed to them because, as part of its leadership, they were ultimately responsible for ordering the commission of many of the crimes. According to the prosecutor when announcing the case, "MS-13 is the manager of a wave of death and violence that has terrorized communities, leaving neighborhoods awash in bloodshed". The US proceeded to prepare the respective extradition requests.
In addition to these two cases, which would fit into a conceptual framework that appears to seek to prosecute the figure of terrorist group leadership (despite the fact that terrorist status has not been applied by the United States to any gang, nor is there consensus on a narrow centralization of criminal decision-making), several prosecutions were launched in 2020 against MS-13 members for crimes strictly related to murder, kidnapping, drug trafficking, weapons possession, and other organized crime activities. On the same day in July 2020 that the Melgar indictment was announced, the Eastern District Court of New York filed a case against eight members of the organization, and the District Court of Nevada filed a case against thirteen others; in August, the Eastern District of Virginia proceeded to arrest eleven more individuals associated with the gang.
These actions showed a commitment to make effective the investigations that had recently intensified, at the end of a presidential mandate that had made the fight against gangs one of the priorities of the Justice department . Precisely at the end of 2020, this department published a report taking stock of the "efforts" carried out in this field between 2016 and 2020, graduate "Large Scale Response". The report, which estimates that there are about 10,000 members of different gangs in the U.S., counts that in that period charges were filed in U.S. courts against 749 gang members; of them, 74% were in the country illegally, 8% were U.S. citizens and 3% were legal residents. These prosecutions led to the conviction of at least 504 individuals, of whom 37 received life sentences.
The attorney general also opened the procedure to apply for the death penalty for two defendants involved in crimes that had a special social resonance. They are Alexi Sáenz, who is accused of seven murders, almost all using a machete or a baseball bat, and Elmer Zelaya, accused of coordinating the stabbing of two young people; most of the victims were teenagers. This extreme violence was highlighted by Donald Trump at various times during his term in office and he referred to it last July when the aforementioned terrorism cases were announced. He called the gang members "monsters who murder children," and indicated that US authorities would not rest until "every member of MS-13" was brought to justice.
For its part, the FBI has formed Transnational Anti-Gang Units (TAG) with security forces from several Central American countries, which since 2016 have been responsible for hundreds of arrests and have assisted in the extradition to the US of 68 defendants, 35 from Guatemala, 20 from Honduras and 13 from El Salvador.
Trajectory
Barack Obama's 2011 provisions empowering the consideration of gangs as international criminal organizations, in the framework of a new National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, were used by the Treasurydepartment in 2012 to apply that consideration to MS-13. In 2017, the department of Justice resorted to the same categorization as the basis for the "war on gangs" launched by Trump. In the congress itself, the dangerousness and incidence of gangs was already highlighted in 2018, in actions decided from El Salvador.
In 2019, Attorney General William Barr traveled to El Salvador, where he gathered information from authorities in the country, whose Supreme Court had already designated the maras as a terrorist group in 2015. Alleged evidence of the chain of command, which connects the orders for assassinations and other crimes given from Salvadoran prisons and their execution in the United States, would have supported the 2020 decision to open terrorism cases against gang members in U.S. federal courts.
This change in the subject of the crime may be a core topic in the future of the fight against gangs as it offers a series of advantages, since there is no statute of limitations on terrorism charges and these have harsher penalties associated with them. International laws also provide greater leeway for countries fighting terrorism, so cooperation between countries could be greatly increased; in fact, the fact that the charges are homologous in the United States and El Salvador could speed up extradition requests.
However, the move is not Exempt controversy. In the same way that international drug trafficking charges against the gang members have been of little use, since they do not properly constitute a transnational drug cartel, it remains to be seen how effective it would be to invoke terrorism charges in this case, given that the maras, at least in the United States, do not have the variety of traits of a terrorist organization: there is certainly not the element of wanting to be a political actor. In any case, as Steven Dudley, co-director of Insight Crime and author of MS-13: The Making of America's Most Notorious Gang, has said, the US government's decision to charge the visible leaders of MS-13 in El Salvador with terrorism "may be a sign of how poorly they understand this gang or how well they understand their judicial system."
USSOUTHCOM chief's appearance on Capitol Hill raises annual Degree Alert to Chinese influence and U.S. pushback
° In his last appearance, Admiral Craig Faller warned that the US "is losing its positional advantage' and called for "immediate action to reverse this trend".
° In recent years, the Southern Command speech to congress has highlighted the penetration of China, Russia and Iran, hand in hand with Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua.
° The analysis of the Pentagon chief's interventions in the region sample the Maduro regime's increasing involvement in criminal activities.
► visit of the head of the U.S. Southern Command to Montevideo in April 2021 [SouthCom].
report SRA 2021 / Diego Diamanti [ PDF version].
MAY 2021-The United States Southern Command -the military structure, within the US Armed Forces, which is responsible for Latin America and the Caribbean- has been progressively raising the alarm about the growing influence of Russia and above all China in the Western Hemisphere, to the detriment of the US position. This, combined with the threat coming from organized crime organizations, especially involved in drug trafficking, led the head of USSOUTHCOM, Admiral Craig Faller, to confess in March to feeling "an incredible sense of urgency": "the hemisphere in which we live is under attack", he said in his annual appearance before the US congress , dedicated to analyzing the threats and opportunities presented by the region in terms of security.
In his third "posture statement" to congress since heading Southern Command, Faller warned that the United States is losing its "edge" in the hemisphere and argued that "immediate action is needed to reverse the trend." Analyzing his 2019 and 2020 speeches, as well as the 2018 speech of his predecessor, Admiral Kurt Tidd, there is a worsening perception of the rivalry with China. Increasingly, the reference letter to the Chinese threat is more explicit and occupies more space. What was first seen as an economic influence, through increased trade and credit allocation, is now presented as more global and strategically more dangerous. According to Faller, China is seeking "to establish a global logistics and infrastructure base in our hemisphere to project and sustain military power at greater distances.
The change of Administration has not brought about any change in this worsening perception of the risks being generated in Latin America. Although Joe Biden's presidency has meant a change in the tone maintained by his predecessor, hostility towards Beijing and the desire to closely monitor other authoritarian regimes such as Russia or Venezuela remain. Hence, the "posture statement" presented this year by the head of the Southern Command is consistent with previous ones in pointing to the growing activity of Russia and China in the region (and of Iran, in coordination with Hezbollah), as well as their partnership with Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua, countries that Faller called "malign regional state actors".
The use of Cuba
One of the constant threats that is repeated and that is gradually increasing is the economic diplomacy strategy implemented by China in several countries of the region: how Beijing incorporates these countries into its international trade network through loans and investments, sometimes integrating them into the New Silk Road initiative. The 2018 statement did not mention the issue of Latin American nations participating in the initiative; the 2019 statement counted 16, and the 2020 statement spoke of 19, indicating a clear trend that China is gradually increasing its activities and influence in the hemisphere. The 2020 strategy also said that 25 of the 31 countries in the region have Chinese infrastructure projects, which, as the head of the Southern Command expressly points out, could be used in the future to support Chinese military interests. Added to all this is the COVID-19 crisis, which China has taken advantage of to increase its regional influence thanks to the potential of health material and vaccines.
Venezuela occupies a prominent place in the last four statements. Over the years, the situation progressively worsens and the Southern Command's stance towards the Maduro regime hardens: it goes from not calling it illegitimate to calling it illegitimate, and then openly accuses it of being involved in drug trafficking activities. It underlines its close military collaboration with Russia and with Colombian narco-terrorist groups - the ELN and FARC dissidents - which it hosts on its territory.
Another aspect that is reiterated is the emphasis on Cuba's destabilizing role: how Havana interferes in internal affairs in Venezuela and Nicaragua, instructing those oppressive regimes on how to repress opposition movements and demonstrations, sometimes sending its own agents to fulfill that repressive function. The strategy also discusses how Russia uses Cuba as a base for its intelligence operations against the United States and to project its power in the region.
The Southern Command's statements are in line with the concerns expressed in the Strategicframework for the Western Hemisphere, prepared by the National Security committee in 2020. Although the Trump Administration will have to formulate its own strategic plan for the region, no substantial changes can be expected, given that there is the same interest in restoring democracy for Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba; in promote transparency and fighting corruption; in combating illicit activities, such as drug and human trafficking; and in addressing the growing Chinese presence in the region.
With oil production at a record low, the Maduro regime has turned to the precious metal to pay for Tehran's services.
° With no more credits from China or Russia, Caracas consolidated in 2020 the reborn relationship with the Iranians, who are in charge of trying to reactivate the country's paralyzed refineries.
° In the last year, cargo ships dispatched by Iran have brought to the Caribbean nation more than 5 million barrels of gasoline, as well as products for its Megasis supermarket.
° The involvement of entities related to the Revolutionary Guard, declared a terrorist group by Washington, makes any gesture towards the Biden Administration difficult.
► Venezuelan Vice President and Iranian Vice Minister of Industry inaugurate Megasis supermarket in Caracas, July 2020 [Gov. of Venezuela].
report SRA 2021 / María Victoria Andarcia [ PDF version].
MAY 2021-Venezuela's relationship with extra-Hemispheric powers has been characterized in the last year and a half by the resumption of the close ties with Iran already seen during the presidencies of Hugo Chávez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. With the financing possibilities provided by China (it has not granted credits to Caracas since 2016) and Russia (its oil interest in Venezuela, through Rosneft, was particularly constrained in 2019 by the Trump Administration's sanctions on Pdvsa's business) exhausted, Nicolás Maduro's regime knocked again on Iran's door.
And Teheran, once again encircled by US sanctions, as was the case during the Ahmadinejad era, has once again seen in the alliance with Venezuela the opportunity to stand up to Washington, while at the same time obtaining some economic return in times of great need: shipments of gold, worth at least 500 million dollars, according to Bloomberg, would have left Venezuela in 2020 as payment for the services rendered by Iran. If the credits from China or Russia were in exchange for oil, now the Chavista regime must also get its hands on gold, since the production of the state-owned PDVSA was at historic lows, with 362,000 barrels per day in the third quarter of the year (Chávez took over the company with a production of 3.2 million barrels per day).
The change of partners was symbolized in February 2020 with the arrival of Iranian technicians to start up the Armuy refinery, abandoned the previous month by Russian experts. The lack of investment had led to the neglect of the maintenance of the country's refineries, which was causing major gasoline shortages and long lines at service stations. Iranian attendance would barely manage to improve refinery status , and Tehran had to make up for this inefficiency by sending gasoline freighters. Likewise, food shortages offered another avenue of relief for Tehran, which also dispatched ships with foodstuffs.
Gasoline and food
The Venezuelan-Iranian relationship, which without being completely eliminated had been reduced during the presidency of Hassan Rohani, as the latter focused on the international negotiation of the nuclear agreement to be reached in 2015 (known as JCPOA), was resumed throughout 2019. In April of that year, the controversial Iranian airline Mahan Air received operating permits in Venezuela to cover the Tehran-Caracas route. Although the airline has not marketed the air route, it has chartered several flights to Venezuela despite the closure of territorial airspace ordered by Maduro due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Mahan Air's operations served to transport Iranian technicians who were to be employed in efforts to restart gasoline production at the refineries of the Paraguaná complex, as well as material necessary for these tasks.
These and other steps would have been prepared by the Iranian embassy in Venezuela, which since December 2019 has been headed by Hojatollah Soltani, someone known for "mixing Iran's foreign policy with the activities" of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), according to researcher Joseph Humire. He believes that Mahan Air would have made about forty flights in the first half of 2020.
Similarly, Iran has been sending multiple fuel tankers to Venezuela to address gasoline shortages. The first shipment arrived in a flotilla of tankers that, in defiance of U.S. sanctions, entered Venezuelan waters between May 24 and 31, carrying a combined 1.5 million barrels of gasoline. In June another vessel arrived with an estimated 300,000 barrels, and three others brought 820,000 barrels between September 28 and October 4. Between December 2020 and January 2021 another flotilla would have carried 2.3 million barrels. To this total of at least 5 million barrels of gasoline should be added the arrival of 2.1 million barrels of condensate to be used as a diluent for Venezuelan extra-heavy oil.
In addition to fuel, Iran has also sent medical supplies and food to help combat the humanitarian emergency suffered by the country. Thus, it is important to highlight the opening of the Megasis supermarket, which is linked to the Revolutionary Guard, the Iranian military corps that the Trump Administration included in the Catalog of terrorist groups. The retail establishment sells products of brands owned by the Iranian military, such as Delnoosh and Varamin, which are two of the subsidiaries of the Ekta company, allegedly created as a social security trust for Iranian military veterans. The Ekta supermarket chain is subordinate to the Iranian Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces Logistics, an entity sanctioned by the United States for its role in the development of ballistic missiles.
Gold and Saab
This activity is of concern to the United States. An Atlantic Council report details how Iranian-backed networks prop up the Maduro regime. Venezuelan oil minister Tareck El Aissami has been identified as the core topic the illicit network . He allegedly agreed with Tehran to import Iranian fuel in exchange for Venezuelan gold. agreement to the above-mentioned Bloomberg information, the Venezuelan Government had delivered to Iran, until April 2020, around nine tons of gold with a value of approximately 500 million dollars, in exchange for its attendance in the reactivation of the refineries. The gold was apparently transported in Mahan Air flights to Teheran.
The negotiations may have involved the Colombian-born businessman Alex Saab, who already centralized a good part of the food imports carried out by the Chavista regime under the Clap program and was getting involved in the Iranian gasoline supplies. Saab was arrested in June 2020 in Cape Verde when his private plane was being refueled on an apparent flight to Tehran. Requested to Interpol by the United States as Maduro's main front man, the extradition process is still open.
The entities participating in many of these exchanges are sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control for their connection to the IRGC. The IRGC's ability to operate in Venezuela is due to the reach of the Hezbollah support network , an organization designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union. Hezbollah has managed to infiltrate Venezuela's Lebanese expatriate communities, giving Iran a foothold to grow its influence in the region. These links make it difficult for Caracas to make any gesture that might be attempted to facilitate any de-escalation by the new Biden Administration of the sanctions applied by Washington.
Beijing is no longer just a trading partner and credit provider for infrastructure: it is catching up with the West in pharmaceutical and healthcare provider excellence.
° Only Peru, Chile and Argentina have contracted more Chinese and Russian doses; in Brazil and Mexico, doses from the USA and Europe predominate, as in the rest of the countries in the region.
° Huawei wins entry into Brazilian 5G tender in exchange for vaccines; Beijing offers them to Paraguay if it abandons its recognition of Taiwan
° In addition to clinical trials in several countries in the second half of 2020, Argentina and Mexico will produce or package Sputnik V starting in June.
► Arrival of a shipment of Sputnik V vaccines to Venezuela in February 2021 [Miraflores Palace].
report SRA 2021 / Emili J. Blasco [ PDF version].
MAY 2021-Vaccination in Latin America is being done substantially with preparations developed in the United States and Europe, although media attention has favored doses from China and Russia. The particular vaccine diplomacy carried out over the last few months by Beijing and Moscow -which with public funds have promoted the export of injections, ahead of the needs of their own inhabitants- has certainly been active and has managed to give the impression of a greater influence than in reality, with the promise of volumes of supplies which have rarely been delivered on time.
When, from June onwards, with a large part of the American population already immunized, the Biden Administration turns its attention to providing vaccines to the region, the imbalance in favor of formulas from "Western" laboratories - also basically used in the United Nations Covax system stockpiles - will be even greater. However, the development the health crisis over the last year will have served to consolidate the footing of China and Russia in Latin America.
To date, only Peru, Chile and Argentina have contracted more vaccines from China (CanSino, Sinopharm and Sinovac) and Russia (Sputnik V) than from the United States and Europe (AstraZeneca, J&J, Moderna and Pfizer). In the case of Peru, of the 116 million doses committed, 51 correspond to European and/or US laboratories, 45 million to Chinese laboratories and 20 million to Russian laboratories. In the case of Chile, of the 79.8 million doses, 18 million are from the first group, while 61.8 million are Chinese. As far as Argentina is concerned, of the 62.4 million doses reserved, 22.4 million are "Western", 10 million Russian and 30 million Chinese. These are data from AS/COA, which keeps a detailed account of various aspects of the evolution of the health crisis in Latin America.
As for the two largest countries in the region, the preference for US and European formulas is notorious. Of the 661.4 million doses contracted by Brazil, 481.4 million have this origin, compared to 100 million Chinese doses and 80 million Sputnik V (moreover, it is not clear that the latter will actually arrive, given the recent rejection of their authorization by Brazilian regulators). Of the 310.8 million contracted by Mexico, 219.8 million are "Western" vaccines, 67 million are Chinese vaccines and 24 million are Sputnik V vaccines.
Tables: reproduction of AS/COA, onlinedatabase , information as of March 31, 2021.
Testing and production
Vaccines from China and Russia were not unknown in Latin American public opinion, since in the second half of 2020 they were frequently in the news as a result of clinical trials carried out in some countries. South America was of particular interest to the world's leading laboratories, as it hosted a high incidence of the epidemic together with a certain medical development that allowed serious monitoring of the efficacy of the preparations, compatible with a level of economic need that facilitated having thousands of volunteers for the trials. This made the region the center of the world's clinical trials of the main anti-Covid-19 vaccines, with Brazil being the epicenter of the degree program in experimentation. In addition to trials conducted by Johnson & Johnson in six countries, and by Pfizer and Moderna in two, Sputnik V was tested in three (Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela) and in two by Sinovac (Brazil and Chile) and Sinopharm (Argentina and Peru).
Experimentation, however, was due to private agreements between laboratories, which hardly required the involvement of the health or political authorities of the country in question. The commitment of certain governments to the Chinese and Russian vaccines came with the purchase negotiations and then with their subsequent authorization for use, a last step that has not always taken place. A further alliance in the case of Sputnik V has been Argentina's project to produce the Russian preparation in its territory as from June, for its own vaccination and distribution to neighboring countries, as well as that of Mexico for the packaging of the doses, also as from June. Argentina was the first country to register and approve Sputnik V, using information it has since shared with other countries in the region. Mexico's move has been interpreted as a way of pressuring the United States to liberalize the export of its vaccines as soon as possible.
China has also exerted pressure on some South American countries. It has taken advantage of Brazil's dire need for vaccines to force Jair Bolsonaro's government to allow Huawei to bid for the Brazilian 5G network , despite having initially vetoed the Chinese business . Likewise, Beijing seems to have promised vaccines to Paraguay in exchange for the country ceasing to recognize Taiwan. In addition, the Chinese government averaged last year a credit of one billion dollars for the acquisition of medical equipment, as the head of the US Southern Command has warned, drawing attention to China's use of the crisis to achieve greater penetration in the hemisphere.
Consolidation
Whatever the final map of the application of each preparation in the vaccination process, what is certain is that above all Beijing, but in some way also Moscow, has achieved an important victory, even though its vaccines may be far behind in the total issue of doses injected in Latin America. In a region accustomed to identifying the United States and Europe with scientific capacity and high medical and pharmaceutical development , for the first time China is no longer seen as the source of cheap and unsophisticated products, but on a par in terms of research and health efficacy. Beyond Beijing's successful management of the pandemic, which can be relativized considering the authoritarian nature of its political system, China emerges as a leading country, capable of achieving a vaccine as quickly as the West and, to a certain extent, comparable to it. Russia's image is somewhat inferior, but Sputnik V allows consolidating Russia's "return" to a position of reference letter that it had absolutely lost in recent decades.
As a result of the emergence of Covid-19, in the collective Latin American imagination, China is no longer just a factor of trade, infrastructure construction and credit granting for the development of these infrastructures, but has established its penetration as a power with full dimensions, also with regard to a central element in the lives of individuals, such as overcoming the pandemic.
Latin American countries have suffered the health and economic crisis of the coronavirus like no other region in the world. With 8.2% of the world's population, by October 2020 it accounted for 28% of global Covid-19 positive cases and 34% of deaths. The worsening of the status in countries such as India may have changed these percentages somewhat, but the region has maintained important hotspots of infection, such as Brazil, followed by Mexico and Peru. To cope with this status, Latin America receives two-thirds of the IMF's global financial aid because of the pandemic: the region has 17 million more poor people and will not recover its previous per capita income until 2025, later than the rest of the world.