June 15, 2021

WORKING PAPER / Jon Paris Oses, Jokin de Carlos Sola and Túlio Dias de Assis

ABSTRACT

South Korea finds itself in the middle of the geopolitical ambitions of regional giants, while at the same time addressing their own conflictive relationship with their northern counterpart. Because of that, a global and also a peninsular overview of their characteristics from an international relations perspective has been analyzed, with the objective in mind of identifying the main dynamics and driving factors that strategically influence South Korea in the present times with an eye into the future. Pursuing that analysis, a global perspective and an inter-Korean perspective were suitable to better address the main issues, with special attention to the influence of the two big powers in relation with Seoul, the US and China, as well as the constant uncertainty North Korea generates in the relations between both Koreas. Findings regarding key aspects such as the US military presence in South Korean soil, or the possibility of a Korean reunification suggest the primacy of continuity and controlled stability for the next ten years, as the stakes are too high for the actors involved to take high-risk high-benefit decisions. The main conclusions follow the same direction, with stagnation as present condition South Korea will have to find its way, always with the inter-Korean relations in mind, if it wants to survive and develop its own path under the shadow of two giants.

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First US-China high-level meeting of the Biden era to be held in Alaska on March 18, 2021 [State Department].

essay / Ramon Barba

President Joe Biden is cautiously building his Indo-Pacific policy, seeking to build an alliance with India on which to build an order to counter the rise of China. Following his entrance the White House, Biden has kept the focus on this region, albeit with a different approach than the Trump Administration. While it is true that the main goal is still to contain China and defend free trade, Washington is opting for a multilateral approach that gives greater prominence to QUAD[1] and takes special care of the relationship with India. As the standard-bearer of the free world and democracy, the Biden Administration aims to renew US leadership in the world and particularly in this crucial region. However, although the relationship with India is at a good moment, especially in view of the signature thescholarship agreement [2] reached at the end of the Trump Administration, the interaction between the two countries is far from consolidating an alliance.

The new US presidency is faced with a very complicated puzzle to solve in the Indo-Pacific, the main players being China and India. In general, we find that, of the three powers, only Beijing has been able to successfully manage the post-Pandemic status [3], while Delhi and Washington continue to face both a health and economic crisis. All this may affect the relationship between India and the United States, especially in terms of trade[4], however, and despite the fact that Biden has not yet demonstrated what his strategy in the region will be, it seems that the relationship between the two powers is set to grow[5]. However, although the United States wants to pursue a policy of multilateral alliances and deepen its relationship with India, the Biden Administration will have to take into account several difficulties before being able to speak of an alliance as such.

Biden started to act in this direction from the very beginning. First of all there was the February meeting of QUAD[6], which some consider a mini NATO[7] for Asia, at which issues relating to vaccine distribution in Asia (aiming to distribute one billion doses by 2022), freedom of navigation in the region's seas, denuclearization of North Korea and democracy in Myanmar were discussed. In addition, the UK seems to be showing increased interest in the region and in this dialogue group . On the other hand, in mid-March there was a meeting in Alaska[8] between the Chinese and US diplomacy (headed respectively by Yang Jiechi, director the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, and Antony Blinken, Secretary of State), in which both countries strongly reproached each other's policies. Washington remains firm in its interests, although open to a certain partnership with Beijing, while China insists on rejecting any interference in what it considers its internal affairs. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Biden seems to be willing to organize a summit of democracies[9] in his first year in office.

Following contacts that also took place in Alaska between the Chinese and US defense chiefs, Austin Lloyd[10], head of the Pentagon, visited India to stress the importance of Indo-US cooperation. In addition, early April saw the participation of France in the La Pérouse[11] naval maneuvers in the Bay of Bengal, giving rise to the possibility of a QUAD-plus in which, in addition to the four original powers, other countries would also take part.

The Indo-Pacific, let us remember, is the present and the future of international relations due to its economic importance (its main players, India, China and the USA represent 45% of the world's GDP), demographic (hosting 65% of the population of the entire globe) and, as we will see throughout this article, geopolitical[12].

U.S.-China-India relations

The Biden Administration seems to be continuing the line followed by Trump, since the objectives have not changed. What has changed is the approach to the object of the issue, which in this case is none other than the containment of China and freedom of navigation in the region, albeit on the basis of a strong commitment to multilateralism. As George Washington's new successor said at his inauguration[13], the United States wants to resume its leadership, but in a different way from that of the previous Administration; that is, through a strong policy of alliances, moral leadership and a strong defense of values such as dignity, human rights and the rule of law.

The new presidency sees China as a rival to be reckoned with[14], as does the Trump Administration, but it does not see this as a zero-sum game, since, while openly declaring itself to be against Xi's actions, it opens the door to dialogue[15] on issues such as climate change or healthcare. In general, in line with what has been seen in New tensions in Asia Pacific[16], the United States is committed to multilateralism that seeks to reduce tension. It should be remembered that the United States advocates the defense of free navigation and the rule of law, as well as democracy in a region in which its influence is being eroded by the growing weight of China.

A good understanding of the state of US-China-India relations goes back to 2005[17], when everything seemed to be going well. As far as the Sino-Indian relationship was concerned, the two nations had resolved their disputes over the 1998 nuclear tests; moreover, their presence in regional forums was growing and it seemed that the issue of cross-border disputes was beginning to be settled. For its part, the United States enjoyed good trade relations with both countries. However, changing patterns in global Economics , driven by the rise of China, the 2008 financial crisis in the United States and India's inability to maintain its growth rate upset this balance. Donald Trump's tightening attitude contributed to this. However, some argue that the breakdown of the post-Cold War order in the Asia Pacific began with the Obama Administration's "pivot to Asia"[18]. To this must be added the minor frictions China has had with both nations.

Briefly, it is worth mentioning that there are border problems between India and China[19] that have been flaring up again since 2013. In turn, India is opposed to Chinese hegemony; it does not want to be subjugated by Beijing and is clearly committed to multilateralism. Finally, there are problems with regard to maritime dominance because the Strait of Malacca is at the limit of its capacity. In addition, Delhi claims the Adaman and Nicobar Islands on the Malacca access route as its own. Moreover, as India is now far below China's military and economic power[20] - the balance between the two powers in 1980 has been broken - it is trying to hinder Beijing in order to contain it.

The United States has ideological frictions with China, due to the authoritarian nature of Xi Jinping's regime[21], and commercial frictions, in subject dispute[22] that Beijing intends to take advantage of to reduce US influence in the region. In the midst of this conflict is India, which supports the United States because, although it does not seem to want to be completely against China[23], it rejects a Chinese regional hegemony[24].

According to the latest CEBR report [25], China will overtake the United States as a world power in 2028, earlier than expected in previous projections, partly thanks to the way it has managed the coronavirus emergency: it was the only major country to avoid a crisis after the first wave. On the other hand, the United States has lost the battle against the pandemic; economic growth between 2022-2024 is expected to be 1.9% of GDP and to slow to 1.6% in the following years[26], while China, according to the report , will grow at 5.7% between 2021-2025[27].

For China, the pandemic has been a way of signaling its place in the world[28], a way of warning the United States that it is ready to take over as leader of the international community. To this can be added China's belligerent attitude in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as its hegemonic growth in the area and its trade projects with Africa and Europe. All of this has led to imbalances in the region that involve Washington's QUAD moves. Recall that, despite its waning role as a power, the United States is interested in freedom of navigation for both commercial and military reasons[29].

Thus, the Chinese economic boom has led to a worsening of the relationship between Washington and Beijing[30]. Moreover, although Biden is committed to cooperation on the pandemic and climate change, there is talk from some quarters of American politics of an inevitable competition between the two countries[31].

The Degree of alliance between the US and India

In line with the above, we can see that we are in a delicate situation after the change in the White House. January and February have been months of small movements on the part of the United States and India, which have not left China indifferent. Although the Sino-US relationship has benefited both sides since its inception (1979)[32], with trade between the two countries growing by 252% since then, the reality is that trust levels are now at rock bottom, having suspended more than 100 dialogue mechanisms between them. Therefore, although a conflict is not foreseen, an increase in tension is predicted since, far from being able to cooperate in broad fields, only slight and limited cooperation seems feasible at the moment. At the same time, let us recall that China is very much affected by the Malacca Dilemma[33], and is therefore seeking other access to the Indian Ocean, giving rise to territorial disputes with India, with whom it already has the territorial problem of Ladakh[34]. In the midst of this Thucydides Trap[35], in which China seems to threaten to overtake the United States, Washington has been moving closer to New Delhi.

Consequently, the two countries have been developing a strategic partnership [36], based essentially on security and defense, but which the United States is seeking to extend to other areas. It is true that Delhi's problems are in the Indian Ocean and Washington's in the Pacific; however, both have China[37] as a common denominator. Their relationship, moreover, is strongly marked by the already mentioned "tripartite crisis"[38] (health, economic and geopolitical).

Despite the intense cooperation between Washington and New Delhi, there are two different points of view regarding thispartnership. While the United States claims that India is a very important ally, with which it shares the same political system and an intense commercial relationship[39], India prefers a less strict alliance. Traditionally, Delhi has conveyed a policy of non-alignment[40] in international matters. In fact, although India does not want Chinese supremacy in the Indo-Pacific, neither does it wish to align itself directly against Beijing, with whom it shares more than 3,000 km of border. Nevertheless, Delhi sees a great need for cooperation with Washington on security and defense subject . In fact, some say that today India needs the US more than ever.

Although last February Washington began to review the US Global Posture Strategy, everything suggests that the Biden Administration will continue Trump's line regarding the partnership with India as a way of containing China. However, although Washington speaks of India as its ally, there is some reluctance on the part of Delhi, thus speaking of an alignment[41] rather than an alliance. Although the reality we are living in is far from that of the Cold War[42], this new containment[43] in which Delhi is sought as a base, support and standard, is materialized in the following:

i) Intense cooperation in security and defense subject .

Here there are different forums and agreements. Firstly, the aforementioned QUAD[44]. This new multilateral cooperation alliance that began to take shape in 2006[45] agreed at its March meeting to development its vaccine diplomacy, with India at the center, in order to counter the successful international campaign led by Beijing in this field. In fact, there was a commitment to spend 600 million to deliver 1 billion vaccines[46] by 2022. The idea is that Japan and the USA will finance the operation[47], while Australia will be in charge of logistics. However, India is committed to greater multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific, giving entrance to countries such as England and France[48], which already participated in the last Raisina Dialogues together with QUAD. The meeting also dealt with other issues such as the denuclearization of Korea, the restoration of democracy in Myanmar and climate change[49].

India seeks to contain China, but without provoking a direct confrontation with China[50]. In fact, Beijing has given the impression that if things go further, it is not only India that knows how to play Realpolitik. Let us recall that New Delhi will chair this year's meeting with the BRICS. Moreover, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will host joint military exercises between China and Pakistan, a country with a complex relationship with India.

On the other hand, during his March trip to India, the Pentagon chief[51] discussed with his counterpart Rajnath Singh increased military cooperation, as well as issues related to logistics, information exchange , possible opportunities for mutual attendance and the defense of free navigation. Lloyd said he did not frown upon Australia and Korea participating as permanent members in the Malabar exercises. Since 2008, trade in military subject between Delhi and Washington has totaled $21 billion[52]. In addition, $3,000 has recently been spent on drones and other aerial equipment for reconnaissance and surveillance missions.

A week after this meeting, two Indian and one US ship conducted a subject PASSEX maritime exercise[53] as a way to consolidate the synergies and interoperability achieved in last November's Malabar exercise.

In this context, a special accredited specialization should be made to the 2+2 dialogue platform and the aforementioned scholarship agreement basic exchange and cooperationagreement for cooperation in geospatial subject ). The former is a subject of meeting in which the Foreign and Defense Ministers of both countries meet every two years to discuss issues of interest to them. The most recent meeting took place in October 2020[54]. Not only was the scholarship agreed upon, but the United States reaffirmed its support for India with regard to its territorial problems with China. Other memoranda of understanding were also signed on nuclear energy and climate issues.

The scholarship, signed in October 2020 during the last months of the Trump Administration, makes it easier for India to better locate enemies, terrorists and other subject of threats coming from land or sea. This agreement is intended to consolidate the friendship between the two countries, as well as to help India outperform China technologically. This agreement concludes the "troika of foundational pacts" for deep security and defense cooperation between the two countries[55].

Prior to this agreement, the LEMOA (Logistics exchange Memorandum of agreement ) was signed in 2016 and the COMCASAagreement Communications Compatibility and Securityagreement ) in 2018. The former allows both countries access to each other's instructions for supply and replenishment; the latter allows India to receive systems, information and encrypted communication to communicate with the United States. Both agreements affect land, sea and air forces[56].

ii) United for democracy

From Washington, special emphasis is placed on the fact that both powers are very similar, since they share the same political system, and it is emphasized with a certain grandiloquence that they are the oldest and the largest democracy ( issue terms of population)[57]. Because this presupposes the sharing of a series of values, Washington likes to speak of "likeminded partners"[58].

From the Brookings Institution think tank , Tanvi Mandan defends this idea of ideological bonding. The same system of government makes both countries see each other as natural allies, who think alike and also believe in the value of the rule of law. In fact, in all matters relating to the spread of democracy around the globe, there is strong cooperation between the two nations: for example, supporting democracy in Afghanistan or the Maldives, launching the US-India Global Democracy Initiative and providing legal and technical attendance on democratic issues to other countries. Finally, it should be noted that democracy and the values it entails have facilitated the exchange and flow of people from one country to another. As for the economic relationship between both countries, it becomes more viable, since both are open economies, they share a common language and their legal system has Anglo-Saxon roots.

iii) Growing economic cooperation

The United States is India's main trading partner , with whom it has a significant surplus[59]. Trade between the two has grown by 10% annually over the last decade, and in 2019 was $115 billion[60]. About 2,000 US companies are based in India, and about 200 Indian companies are based in the US[61]. Between the two there is a Mini-Trade Deal, believed to be signed shortly, which aims to deepen this economic relationship. In the context of the pandemic, everything related to the health field plays an important role[62]. In fact, despite the fact that both countries have recently adopted a protectionist attitude, the idea is to reach 500 billion dollars in trade[63].

Divergences, challenges and opportunities for India and the U.S. in the region

Briefly, between the leaders of both countries there are small frictions, opportunities and challenges to be nuanced in order to make this relationship a strong alliance. Among the points of conflict, we highlight India's purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia, which is against the CAATSA(Countering America's Adversaries tough Sanctions Act) [64], for which India may receive a sanction, although in the meeting between Sigh and Lloyd, the latter seemed to overlook the topic [65]. However, it remains to be seen what happens once the missiles arrive in Delhi. There are also minor divergences regarding freedom of expression, security and civil rights, and how to relate to non-democratic countries[66]. Among the challenges that both countries must take into account is the possible loss of support in some sectors of U.S. policy for the relationship with India. This is due to India's actions in Kashmir in August 2019, protection of religious freedom and attention to dissent. On the other hand, there has been no shortage of weakening of democratic norms, immigration restrictions and violence against Indian nationals[67].

Lastly, let us recall that both are facing a deep health and therefore economic crisis, the resolution of which will be decisive in relation to the competition with Beijing[68]. The crisis has affected the bilateral relationship since, although trade in services has remained stable (around 50 billion), trade in goods declined from 92 billion to 78 billion between 2019 and 2020, increasing the Indian trade deficit[69].

Finally, it is worth mentioning the opportunities. First, both countries can develop democratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific as well as in a rules-based international order[70]. In security and defense, there are also opportunities such as the entrance the UK and France as allies in the area, for example by trying to get both countries to enter the Malabar exercise or France to chair the Indian Ocean Naval Symposiumin 2022[71]. Although the medium-term trend is for cooperation between the United States and India, skill with Russia will be a growing threat[72], so cooperation between the United States, India and Europe is very important.

The possibility of cooperation in MDA (Maritime Warning Environment) and ASW (Anti Submarine Warfare) mechanisms is also opened, as the Indian Ocean is of general importance for several countries due to the value of its energy transport routes. The possibility of cooperation through the use of the US P-8 "Poseidon" aircraft is opened up. Despite the disputes over the Chagos Archipelago, India and the United States should take advantage of the agreements they have over islands such as Andaman or Diego Garcia for the conduct of these activities[73]. 73] Therefore, India should use regional bodies and work groups to cooperate with European countries and the United States.

Europe seems to be gaining increasing importance due to the possibility of entering the Indo-Pacific game through QUAD Plus. European countries are very much in favor of multilateralism, the defense of freedom of navigation and the role of rules in regulating it. While it is true that the EU has recently signed a trade treaty with China - the IAC - increasing the European presence in the region takes on greater importance, since Xi's authoritarianism and his actions in Tibet, Xinjiang, or central China are not to the liking of European countries[75].

Finally, it should be recalled that there are some voices that speak of a decline or weakening of globalization[76], especially after the coronavirus epidemic[77], so reviving multilateral exchanges through joint action becomes a challenge and an opportunity for both countries. In fact, it is believed that in the short term, protectionist tendencies, at least in the Sino-Indian relationship, will continue, despite the intense economic cooperation[78].

Conclusion

The geopolitical panorama of the Indo-Pacific is complex to say the least. Chinese expansionism clashes with the interests of the other major regional power, India, which, while avoiding confrontation with Beijing, takes a dim view of its neighbor's actions. In a bid for multilateralism, and with an eye on its regional waters, threatened by the Malacca Dilemma, India seems to be cooperating with the United States, but clinging to regional forums and groups to make its position clear, while seeming to open the door to European countries, whose interest in the region is growing, despite the recent trade agreement signed with China.

On the other hand, the United States is also threatened by Chinese expansionism and sees the moment of its rival's economic overtaking approaching, which the coronavirus crisis may even have brought forward to 2028. In order to avoid such status, the Biden Administration is betting on multilateralism at the regional level and is deepening its relationship with India, beyond the military aspect. Washington seems to have understood that US hegemony in the Indo-Pacific is far from being real, at least in the medium term, so that only a cooperative and integrating attitude is possible. On the other hand, in the midst of this supposed retreat from globalization, we see how Washington, together with India, and surely in the medium term with Europe, are defending the Western values that govern the international sphere, i.e. the defense of human rights, the rule of law and the value of democracy.

We are faced with two factors. On the one hand, India does not want to see an order imposed by any subject, neither American nor Chinese, hence its reluctance to confront Beijing directly and its preference to expand the QUAD. On the other hand, the United States seems to perceive that it is at a delicate moment, since its competition with China goes beyond the mere substitution of one power for another. Washington is still a traditional power which, for its presence in the Indo-Pacific, has relied above all on military power, while China has based the extension of its influence on the establishment of strong trade relations that go beyond the belligerent logic of the Cold War. Hence the United States is trying to form a front with India and its European allies that goes beyond military cooperation.

REFERENCES 

[1] The QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) is a dialogue group formed by the United States, India, Japan and Australia. Its members share a common vision on the security of the Indo-Pacific region contrary to that of China; they advocate multilateralism and freedom of navigation in the region.

[2] scholarship (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement). Treaty signed by India and the United States in October 2019 to improve security in the Indo-Pacific region. Its goal is the exchange of tracking, tracing and intelligence systems.

[3]Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective." Chinawatch. Connecting Thinkers ... http://www.chinawatch.cn/a/202102/05/WS60349146a310acc46eb43e2d.html,(accessed February 5, 2021),

[4] Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating and Rebalancing Ties," in Tanvi Madan, "India And The Biden Administration: Consolidating And Rebalancing Ties,". German Marshal Found of the United States. https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2021/02/11/india-and-biden-administration-consolidating-and-rebalancing-ties,(accessed February 11, 2021).

[5]Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake,diary 2021: A Blueprint For U.S.-Europe-India Cooperation," US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security. GMF India Trilateral Forum. Pg:1. https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2021/02/16/us-india-cooperation-indo-pacific-security, (accessed February 16, 2021).

[6] "'QUAD' Leaders Pledge New Cooperation on China, COVID-19, Climate." Aljazeera.com. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/12/quad-leaders-pledge-new-cooperation-on-china-covid-19-climate (accessed March 2021).

[7] Mereyem Hafidi, "Biden Renews 'QUAD' Alliance Despite Pressure From Beijing." Atalayar. https://atalayar.com/content/biden-renueva-la-alianza-de-%E2%80%98QUAD%E2%80%99-pesar-de-las-presiones-de-pek%C3%ADn.(accessed February 2021).

[8] "`Grandstanding`: US, China trade rebukes in testy talks." Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/19/us-china-top-diplomats-trade-rebukes-in-testy-first-talks (accessed, March 2021).

[9] Joseph R. Biden, "Why America Must Lead Again." Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again (accessed February, 2021).

[10] Maria Siow. "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind." South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3126091/india-receives-us-defence-secretary-lloyd-austin-china-its-mind.(accessed March 19, 2021).

[11] Seeram Chaulia, "France and sailing toward the 'QUAD-plus'". The New Indian Express. https://www. newindianexpress.com/opinions/2021/apr/06/france-and-sailing-toward-the-QUAD-plus-2286408.html (accessed, April 4, 2021).

[12] Juan Luis López Aranguren. "Indo-Pacific: The new order without China at the center." The Indo-Pacific as a new global geopolitical axis. Global Affairs Journal. Pg.:2. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/indo-pacifico-el-nuevo-orden-sin-china-en-el-centro?_33_redirect=%2Fen%2Fweb%2Fglobal-affairs%2Fpublicaciones%2Finformes.(accessed, April 2021).

[13] Biden, "Remarks By President Biden On America's Place In The World | The White House"...

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/

[14] Ibid.

[15] Derek Grossman, "Biden's China Reset Is Already On The Ropes." Nikkei Asia. https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Biden-s-China-reset-is-already-on-the-ropes.(accessed, March 14, 2021).

[16] Ramón Barba Castro, "New Tensions in Asia Pacific in a Scenario of Electoral Change." Global Affairs and Strategic Studies. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/nuevas-tensiones-en-asia-pacifico-en-un-escenario-de-cambio-electoral-en-eeuu.(accessed, April 2021).

[17] Sankaran Kalyanaraman, "Changing Pattern Of The China-India-US Triangle." Manohar Parrikar Institute For Defence Studies And Analyses. https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/changing-pattern-china-india-us-triangle-skalyanaram (accessed March 2021).

[18] Pang Zhongying, "Indo-Pacific Era Needs US-China Cooperation, Not Great Power Conflict." South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3125926/indo-pacific-needs-us-china-cooperation-not-conflict-QUAD (accessed March 19, 2021).

[19] Sankaran Kalayanamaran, "Changing Pattern of the China-India-US Triangle.

[20] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective."

[21] Joseph R. Biden, "Remarks By President Biden On America's Place In The World

[22]Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective.

[23] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind."

[24]Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating And Rebalancing Ties."

[25] CEBR (Centre for Economics and Business Research) is an organization dedicated to the analysis and economic forecasting of companies and organizations. link https://cebr.com/about-cebr/. This entity prepares every year agraduate report World Economic League Table¸in which it analyzes the positioning of each country of the Globe regarding the state of its Economics. The latest edition(World Economic League Table 2021), published on December 26, 2020, presents a prediction of the state of world Economics in 2035, in order to know who will be the main world economic powers (CEBR, "World Economic League Table 2021". Centre for Economics and Business Research (12th edition), https://cebr.com/reports/world-economic-league-table-2021/ (accessed March 2021).

[26] Ibid., 231.

[27] Ibid., 71.

[28] Vijay Gokhale, "China Doesn't Want a New World Order. It Wants This One." The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/opinion/china-america-united-nations.html(accessed April 2021).

[29] Mereyem Hafidi, "Biden renews `QUAD` alliance despite pressure from Beijing.

[30] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective."

[31] Ibid.

[32] Wang Huiyao, "More cooperation, less competition". Chinawatch. Connecting Thinkers. http://www.chinawatch.cn/a/202102/05/WS6034913ba310acc46eb43e28.html(accessed March 2021).

[33] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective."

[34]Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security." Page 5.

[35] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective."

[36] Ibid.

[37]Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security." Page 5.

[38] Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating And Rebalancing Ties."

[39] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship". Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/democracy-and-the-us-india-relationship/ (accessed March 2021)

[40] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind."

[41] Bilal Kuchay, "India, US sign key military deal, symbolizing closer ties." Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/2/india-us-military-deal(accessed March 2021)

[42] Wang Huiyao, "More cooperation, less competition".

[43] Alex Lo, "India-the democratic economic giant that disappoints". South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3126342/india-democratic-economic-giant-disappoints(accessed March 21, 2021).

[44] Simone McCarthy, "QUAD summit: US, India, Australia and Japan counter China's 'vaccine diplomacy' with pledge to distribute a billion doses across Indo-Pacific." South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3125344/QUAD-summit-us-india-australia-and-japan-counter-chinas.(accessed, March 13, 2021).

[45]Mereyem Hafidi, "Biden renews `QUAD` alliance despite pressure from Beijing.

[46] Simone McCarthy, "QUAD summit: US, India, Australia and Japan counter China's 'vaccine diplomacy' with pledge to distribute a billion doses across Indo-Pacific."

[47] Aljazeera, "'QUAD' leaders pledge new cooperation on China, COVID-19, climate".

[48]Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security." Page 2.

[49]Simone McCarthy, "QUAD summit: US, India, Australia and Japan counter China's 'vaccine diplomacy' with pledge to distribute a billion doses across Indo-Pacific."

[50] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind".

[51] "US defense secretary Lloyd Austin says US considers India to be a great partner." Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/us-defense-secretary-lloyd-austin-says-us-considers-india-to-be-a-great-partner-101616317189411.html.(accessed, March 21, 2021)

[52] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind."

[53] The term PASSEX is an abbreviation of the English military jargon, it comes from Passing Exercise. It consists of taking advantage of the fact that a Marine unit is passing through a given area to deepen the military cooperation of the army of the area through which it is passing. As an example we find the news cited in this article: "India, US begin two-day naval exercise in eastern Indian Ocean region". The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-us-begin-two-day-naval-exercise-in-eastern-indian-ocean-region/articleshow/81735782.cms (accessed March 28, 2021).

[54] Annath Krishnan, Dinakar Peri, Kallol Bhattacherjee; India-U.S. 2+2 dialogue: U.S. to support India's defence of territory. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-us-22-dialogue-rajnath-singh-raises-chinas-action-in-ladakh/article32955117.ece.(accessed March 2021).

[55] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind."

[56] Ibid.

[57] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship".

[58] Hindustan Times, "US defense secretary Lloyd Austin says US considers India to be a great partner".

[59] "Committed to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/committed-to-achieving-goal-of-500-bn-in-bilateral-trade-with-us-ambassador-sandhu/articleshow/80878316.cms.(accessed, March 2021).

[60] Joe C. Mathew, "India-US mini trade deal: Low duty on medical devices; pact in final stages." Business Today. https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/india-us-mini-trade-deal-low-duty-on-medical-devices-pact-in-final-stages/story/413669.html.(Accessed, March 2021).

[61] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

[62] Joe C. Mathew, "India-US mini trade deal: Low duty on medical devices; pact in final stages".

[63] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

[64] Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security". Page 2.

[65] Hindustan Times "US defense secretary Lloyd Austin says US considers India to be a great partner".

[66] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship."

[67] Ibid.

[68] Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating and Rebalancing Ties.

[69] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

[70] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship."

[71] Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security." Page3.

[72] IBIDEM page 3

[73] IBIDEM. Page 6

[74] IBIDEM. Page 7

[75] Seeram Chaulia, "France and sailing toward the 'QUAD-plus'". The New Indian Express

[76] Elisabeth Mearns, Gary Parkinson; "With a pandemic, populism and protectionism, have we passed peak globalization?". China Global Television Network. https://newseu.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-28/With-a-pandemic-populism-and-protectionism-has-globalization-peaked--QOQMPg3ABO/index.html.(accessed, April 2021).

[77] Abraham Newman, Henry Farrel; "The New Age of Protectionism." Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2021-04-05/new-age-protectionism.(accessed April 5, 2021).

[78] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

[Michael J. Seth, A Concise History of Modern Korea. From the Late Nineteenth Century to the Present (Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), Volume 2, 356 pages]

REVIEW / Jimena Villacorta

Normally, when thinking about the Korean Peninsula, we emphasize on the divided region it is now, and how the Korean War (1950-1053) had a great impact on the two independent territories we have today, North and South Korea. We forget that it once was a culturally and ethnically homogenous nation, that because of its law, couldn't even trade with outsiders until the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876 which marked a turning point in Korean history as it ended isolation and allowed the Japanese insertion in the territory which had great effects on its economic and political order.

Michael J. Seth narrates the fascinating history of Korea from the end of the 19th century to the present. In this edition he updates his previous work, originally published ten years before, and he presents it as a "volume 2", because his latest years of research have produced a "volume 1", entitled A Concise History of Premodern Korea, which follows Korea's history from Antiquity through the nineteenth century.

From falling under Japanese imperialism and expansionism to its division after the Second World War, this book explores the economic, political and social issues that modern Korea has faced in the last decades. The author provides its readers a great resource for those seeking a general, yet detailed, history of this currently divided nation in eight chapters. The first two chapters focus on what happened before the Korean War and on how neighbors and other actors. Russia had great influence in the region until its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Consequently, Korea became a colony of Japan until the Allied Forces victory during the Second World War. Japanese rule is described as harsh and detrimental for Koreans as they intended to force their own culture and system in the territory. Although, in spite of its aggressiveness, the Japanese contributed to Korea's industrialization. Countries like China and the United States were also major players. From 1885 to 1894, China had a strong presence in the peninsula as the Chinese didn't want other powers to take over the territory.

The rest of the book emphasizes on the war and the consequences it had, tracing the different course both countries took becoming contrasting societies with different political and economic systems. The reason for the great differences between the two Koreas is the difference in governments and influences they had after the war, a war that stopped because of a ceasefire, as to date they haven't signed a peace treaty. Even if South Korea was under Syngman Rhee's authoritarian and corrupt regime tight after the Korean War, it soon became democratized and the country began to quickly advance in matter of technology and human development leaving North Korea out in the open under a totalitarian dictatorship lead by Kim Jong-un. However, after the separation of the two zones, Kim II-sung was the founder of the North in 1948 and his family dynasty has ruled the country since then. During this period, South Korea has had six republics, one revolution, two coups d'état, the transition to democratic elections and nineteen presidencies. In terms of economics, they went from having a very similar GDP at the beginning of the 1970s to very different outcomes. While South Korea has progressed rapidly, becoming one of the world's leading industrial producers, North Korea became stagnant due to its rigid state system. South Korea also has a high level of technological infrastructure. Moreover, North Korea became a nuclear power, which has been in its diary since the division. But as he explores the technical differences of both states, the author fails to elaborate in historical debates and controversies regarding both regions, but he emphasizes on the fact that after sixty years of division, there are still no signs or reunification. 

Without a doubt, it is interesting to learn about Korea's past colonial occupation and its division, but what I believe is the most captivating is to understand how North Korea and South Korea have evolved as two independent very different states because of the uniqueness and complexity of its history, while still sharing a strong sense of nationalism. As the author says, "No modern nation ever developed a more isolated and totalitarian society than North Korea, nor such an all-embracing family cult. No society moved more swiftly from extreme poverty to prosperity and from authoritarianism to democracy than South Korea."

Ships of the US, India and Japan in the Bay of Bengal during exercise Malabar 2017 [US Navy].

JOURNAL / Shahana Thankachan

[Document of 6 pages. Download PDF] [Document of 6 pages. Download PDF]

INTRODUCTION

There can be no objective and singular definition of the Indo-Pacific, one can only provide an Indian definition, a Japanese definition, a US definition, an ASEAN definition, etc. This is not to say that there are no common grounds in these definitions, there are as many commonalities as there are differences, and this is what makes this topic so hot and dynamic. The geopolitical reality of the Indo-Pacific perfectly represents a great power rivalry at the systemic level and also a perfect regional security complex. In this complex matrix, this paper will seek to focus on the Indo-Pacific from the perspective of India. While the term "Indo" in the Indo-Pacific does not mean India, it does refer to the Indian Ocean and India is the most important power in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, it is very important to fully understand the Indian perspective. The paper will begin by outlining the origin of the concept and thereafter the challenges in the Indian approach to the Indo-Pacific and the future prospects.

Chinese fortification on small disputed islands [CSIS satellite images].

JOURNAL / Fernando Delage

[8-page document. PDF download ].

INTRODUCTION

The idea of the "Indo-Pacific" has burst into the discussion on international relations in Asia. For a little over a decade now, various governments have been using the term as a framework of reference letter in which to formulate their foreign policy toward the region. If the then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe began to popularize the expression in 2007, Australia formally took it up in its 2013 Defense White Paper; a year in which the Indian government also resorted to the concept to define the regional environment. As US administrative assistant of State, Hillary Clinton similarly used the term in 2010, although it was as of late 2017, under the Trump administration, that it became the official designation of the region employed by Washington.

Although related, "Indo-Pacific" has two different connotations. It represents, on the one hand, a geographical reconceptualization of Asia; a readjustment of the map of the continent as a consequence of the growing interaction between the two oceans and the simultaneous rise of China and India. The idea is linked, on the other hand, to a strategy designed as a response to China's rise, whose most visible instrument is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), an informal group made up of the United States, Japan, India and Australia. This is why Beijing is wary of the term and prefers to continue to use "Asia-Pacific" to describe its neighborhood, even if its actions also respond to this new perspective: as the Australian analyst Rory Medcalf has pointed out, the Maritime Silk Road is nothing more than "the Indo-Pacific with Chinese characteristics".

The prominence of the major powers in the origin and use of the expression seems to have relegated the role of ASEAN and its member states. Despite their lesser economic and military weight, they are nevertheless not without relevance. In addition to being located at the intersection of the two oceans - Southeast Asia is, in fact, the center of the Indo-Pacific - disputes over the South China Sea place the subregion in the midst of the rivalry between China and the United States. While the former extends its influence through its economic diplomacy while unsettling neighboring states over their maritime claims, the Trump administration chose to directly oppose this increased Chinese economic and military power. ASEAN does not want to be caught up in the confrontation between Washington and Beijing, nor does it want to be marginalized in the ongoing reconfiguration of the regional structure. Its member states want to benefit from the opportunities for development provided by China, but they also want external support to act as a strategic counterweight to the People's Republic. Although these circumstances explain its reservations about a concept that puts its cohesion and identity as an organization at risk, ASEAN ended up adopting its own "Indo-Pacific Perspective" in 2019, an official document that reveals its efforts to maintain its independence.

Map of the skill area of the U.S. Pentagon's Indo-Pacific Command [USINDOPACOM].

JOURNAL / Juan Luis López Aranguren

[6-page document. PDF download ].

INTRODUCTION

The international tectonic shift that is taking place with the crystallization of the Indo-Pacific as a major global axis is not lost on the internationalists of the last 150 years. Already at the end of the 19th century, the naval historian and strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan predicted that "whoever dominates the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia and the fate of the world will be decided in its waters". Some time later, in 1924, Karl Haushofer predicted the coming of what he called "the Pacific Age." Later, Henry Kissinger asserted that one of the most dramatic global changes to occur in this century would be the shift of the center of gravity of international relations from the Atlantic to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. And it was in the 1980s, during the legendary meeting between Deng Xiaoping and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, that Deng declared that only when China, India and other neighboring nations cooperated could we speak of an "Asia-Pacific century".

In any case, historical experience indicates that unity and partnership between different social Structures (be they nations, ideologies or civilizations) can coexist with competitive relations between them, causing the scenario where they interact and compete to become one of the geopolitical axes of the planet. The Mediterranean was the point of union, communication and trade of the classical cultures to which its waters irrigated for millennia, but also a space of diplomatic competition and struggle for resources, influence and expansion of colonies, as described by Thucydides in his Peloponnesian War. Similarly, since the 15th century, the Atlantic was also the field of strategic competition in the progressive projection of the European whales or maritime powers towards America and West Africa, overlapping the political, economic, religious and cultural dimensions. And the 18th century witnessed the intense conflict in the Indian Ocean between France, the United Kingdom and the Indian Maratha Empire for the control of its waters and coasts.

In the last written request, the seas and oceans are the vector that allows terrestrial powers to expand and project their strong or soft power beyond the limitations of their territorial scope. The sea thus becomes the realm where the tree of possibilities of nations is maximized. Ian Morris already explained this by pointing out that the reason why Europe had become a global power from the 15th century onwards, expanding its civilization all over the planet, was precisely that Europe was a peninsula of peninsulas, and this offered easy access to the sea for any idea, product, military force and revolution to be exported and imported. The sea has been, therefore, an accelerator of social evolution in those civilizations that had the strategic advantage of easy access to it. Therefore, approaching the future evolution of global dynamics from a maritime rather than a terrestrial perspective may be more practical in defining possible future scenarios. This leads us to the conclusion that it is perhaps more appropriate to speak of an Indo-Pacific Era rather than an Asian land century, as these oceans resemble a canvas where old and new, regional and global, collectivist and individualist, powers vie for the projection of their interests, spheres of influence and identities to global reach.

Xi and Trump during the U.S. president's only visit to China, in 2017 [White House].

JOURNAL / Florentino Portero

[10-page document. download in PDF] [10-page document. download in PDF].

INTRODUCTION

The West admired Deng Xiaoping and understood that China, the millenary empire, was entering a new stage that would have to be carefully followed, for whatever path was finally chosen, the resulting China would determine the evolution of the planet as a whole.

The Central Empire had not known or wanted to understand the historical dimension of the First Industrial Revolution and thus entered an impasse with no other way out than international humiliation and the end of its political regime. Japan experienced similar circumstances, but was able to react. Thanks to the Meiji Revolution, it changed its strategy and tried to understand and adapt to the new circumstances. China would end up suffering the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the imposition of humiliating conditions by the Western powers. Finally, the Empire was overthrown, giving way to a civil war that would be complicated by World War II and the Japanese attempt to impose itself as a reference letter power in the Far East. In that complex process of decomposition and reconstruction of a deeply rooted political culture, China lost the opportunity to understand and join the Second Industrial Revolution.

The victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the civil war put an end to the process of decomposition and ushered in a new period in its history. Once again a strong power, in this case a totalitarian one, was imposed in Beijing, which rebuilt and endowed the state with great energy. The new rulers, with Mao Zedong at their head, tried to impose an alien culture, transforming many of the characteristic elements of the old Empire. It was a great attempt at social engineering, which led to a widespread loss of freedom and poverty, while corruption permeated the various layers of the party. China was back, endowed with a strong state and a cohesive leadership willing to assume great responsibilities. However, ideology won out over realism and China lost the Third Industrial Revolution, depriving its people of welfare and its Economics of a viable development model .

Map of the Japanese vision of the Free and Open Pacific [MoFA].

JOURNAL / Carmen Tirado Robles

[8-page document. PDF download ].

INTRODUCTION

The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept is said to date back to the article by Indian naval officer Captain Gurpreet Khurana, who first wrote about this geopolitical concept in early 2007, in a graduate paper "Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation". At that time, the free and open Indo-Pacific was primarily a geographical concept describing the maritime space stretching from the East African and West Asian littorals, across the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific Ocean to the East Asian coasts. At the same time, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe presented his foreign policy plan based on democratic values from which he proposed "I will engage in strategic dialogues at the leader's level with countries that share fundamental values such as Australia and India, with a view to widening the circle of free societies in Asia as well as in the world", which together with the consolidation of relations with the United States ("The times demanded that Japan shift to proactive diplomacy based on new thinking. I will demonstrate the 'Japan-U.S. Alliance for Asia and the World' even further, and to promote diplomacy that will actively contribute to stalwart solidarity in Asia"), creates the concept of Quadrilateral or Quad, as opposed to a Sino-centric view of Asia.

The idea of the Quad joins the FOIP when Abe, in August 2007, in his speech to the Indian Parliament, based on the "Confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans" and "dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and prosperity" of Asia's largest geographical region and later, already in his second term, presented at the VI Tokyo lecture on African development , which took place in Nairobi (Kenya) on August 27, 2016 (TICAD VI), the new geopolitical framework of the Indo-Pacific.

[Alyssa Ayres, Our Time Has Come. How India Is Making Its Place in the World (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2020) 360 pgs].

review / Alejandro Puigrefagut

A progressively rising India wants to occupy a prominent place among the global powers. In recent decades, discussions about India's global rise and place in the world have been on the rise, sometimes in a context of possible alliances to counter China's excessive dominance.

Alyssa Ayres, an expert on India, Pakistan and South Asia at the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, reflects well, through her book Our Time Has Come. How India Is Making Its Place in the World, the role played by this democracy at the international level, the obstacles it continues to face and the implications of its rise for the United States and other countries in the Indo-Pacific region, such as Pakistan and China. It is fair to say that India's economic expansion has placed it among the world's leading emerging powers, but now it wants to move forward and gain a place among the global powers.

For a full understanding of India's global role, the author analyzes its internal political, economic and social realities. India is the world's largest democracy, thus encompassing a wide range of national and regional parties advocating radically disparate policies. This creates complications in reaching agreements that benefit a large part of the population. In addition, other factors that complicate the relationship between the population are social division and religion. To begin with, India has a serious problem of social division caused by the distinction between social classes, or castes, some of which continue to have an important weight in decision making. Likewise, the religious question takes on a prominent role due to the large number of religions that coexist in the Indian territory; however, the Hindu and Muslim majority are the ones that mark the political diary .

Ayres highlights two characteristics that shape India's position in the world today: India's own perception of itself as a development country and its abstention from global entanglements. According to the author, despite India's emergence as one of the world's largest economies, it continues to have a domestic perception of itself as a country doomed to always be among the development nations. As a result, domestic economic policies slow down and hinder international ambitions and are thus in continuous conflict. On the other hand, India has historically stayed out of major global issues and international blocs with its policy of non-alignment.

Our Times Has Come, while defending India's high position in the international system, also highlights the major challenges India faces for not having abandoned its old policies. Firstly, Economics is still certainly protectionist and there is no clear consensus on the new inputs that a more open market Economics could bring. Second, India continues to struggle with the bequest of its non-alignment foreign policy and remains ambivalent about how it should exercise its power in multilateral institutions. And third, India remains overly protective of its autonomy, and thus seeks to shape its international interactions on Indian terms. Hence, India tends to move cautiously and deliberately in the international sphere.

On the other hand, the book emphasizes the relationship between India and the United States. The interaction between the two countries differs from their relations with other states because New Delhi, while seeking a closer strategic and economic relationship with the US, does not want to be subject to the obligations inherent in this alliance, but rather to acquire authority without having to bow to Washington.

Ayres emphasizes the need to reform global governance to create a specific space for New Delhi. His recommendations include support for India's membership in the UN Security committee and other institutions that establish the global economic and security diary . It is clear that India, as a rising power, should be better understood and appreciated on its own terms. In other words, New Delhi should acquire a more pivotal role in the international arena and take some leadership to avoid being squeezed by its direct competitors at the regional and global level.

The pages of Our Times Has Come provide several years of first-hand knowledge and study of India's foreign policy, showing its complexities and the major characteristics that shape it. Scholar Alyssa Ayres, through this book, offers us an essential analysis to understand what India is, but, above all, what it wants to become.

[Rory Medcalf, Indo-Pacific Empire. China and the Contest for the World's Pivotal Region (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020) 310 pp].

review / Salvador Sánchez Tapia

In 2016, Prime Minister Abe of Japan and his Indian counterpart, Narendra Modi, took a trip on the bullet train linking Tokyo to Kobe to visualize the birth of a new era of bilateral cooperation. On the basis of this anecdote, Rory Medcalf proposes to the reader a reconceptualization of the most dynamic region of the globe that leaves behind the one that, due to the American influence, has predominated for some time under the denomination "Asia-Pacific", and which does not reflect a broader geopolitical reality.

The degree scroll of the book is somewhat misleading, as it seems to allude to an eventual world domination exercised from the Indo-Pacific region, and the struggle of China and the United States for it. This is not what the book offers.

For Medcalf, an Australian who has spent many years working in his country's foreign service, "Indo-Pacific" is an alternative geopolitical concept that encompasses a vast and eminently maritime region comprising the Pacific and Indian Oceans, through which most of the world's maritime trade flows, as well as the coastal territories connected by both seas. At the center of this immense and diverse space are Australia, acting as a sort of vertebral hinge, and the area of Southeast Asia comprising the Strait of Malacca, a vital maritime passage.

The proposed geopolitical approach serves as an argument for articulating a regional response to China's growing and increasingly threatening power that does not involve confrontation or submissive capitulation. In the author's words, it is an attempt, made from a liberal point of view, to counter China's desire to capitalize on the region in its favor.

In this sense, Medcalf's proposal is for the region's middle powers - India, Australia, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, etc. - to achieve greater coordination in order to design a future that takes into account China's legitimate interests, but in which these powers effectively balance Beijing's power. The future of the region must be designed with China, but not imposed by China. Nor by the United States, which is nonetheless recognized as a core topic in the region, and whose support the author is counting on to flesh out the idea.

The argument of the book follows a chronological script in which there are three clearly differentiated parts: past, present and future. The first of these sets out the historical reasons for considering the Indo-Pacific as a region in its own right, and sample the shortcomings of the "Asia-Pacific" vision.

The present block is descriptive in nature and briefly presentation the main players in the Indo-Pacific scenario, China's growing military power, and how China is using it to return, reminiscent of the time of Chinese navigator Zheng He, to the Indian Ocean, now an arena of geoeconomic and geopolitical confrontation, as well as a core topic of Chinese economic growth as a route for the resources the country needs, and as a maritime part of the global project of the new Silk Road.

As for the future, Medcalf offers his proposal for the region, based on a geopolitical outline in which Australia, of course, occupies a central place. On a scale ranging from cooperation to conflict, through coexistence, competition and confrontation, the author argues for the coexistence of the players on the Indo-Pacific chessboard with China, and proposes actions in the three areas of promoting development in the countries most vulnerable to Chinese influence -extortion, in some cases; Deterrence, in which the United States will continue to play a central role, but which cannot be based exclusively on its nuclear power, but rather on the growth of the military capabilities of the countries of the region; and diplomacy, exercised at various levels -bilateral, multilateral and "minilateral"- to generate mutual trust and establish norms to avoid an escalation towards confrontation and even conflict.

These three instruments must be accompanied by the internship two principles: solidarity and resilience. The former seeks a greater capacity to manage China's rise in a way that promotes a balance between the balance of power and rapprochement, avoiding the extremes of containment and accommodation to the giant's designs. On the other hand, the region's states are becoming more resistant to China's power and more capable of recovering from its negative effects.

There is no doubt that this geopolitical approach , which follows in the wake of Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" policy, is made from a distinctly Australian perspective and that, consciously or not, it enhances the role of this continent-nation, and serves its particular interests in defining its place in the world and maintaining a secure and stable environment in the face of an increasingly threatening China.

While recognizing this motivation, which is a logical consequence of the application of the old concepts of realism, the proposal vision is not without merit. For one thing, it allows us to conceptualize China in a way that captures the interest in the Indian Ocean as integral to China's view of itself in relation to the world. For another, it serves as a wake-up call, both to the many Asian middle powers and to the small Pacific island states, about the Chinese threat, offering the manna of an alternative to conflict or uncritical submission to the Chinese giant. Finally, it incorporates -at least conceptually- the United States, together with India and Japan, into a multinational effort capable, because of the economic and demographic weight of the participants, of balancing China's power.

If the intention of the concept is to foster awareness in the region of the need to balance China's power, then it can be argued that the overly Australian-centric proposal completely omits China's land dimension, and the desirability of incorporating into that balance other regional middle powers that, while not among the maritime powers, share with them the fear of China's growing power. Similarly, although the riparian nations of Africa and the Americas may be thought to form an integral part of the entity defined by the Indo-Pacific basins, they are conspicuously absent from the geopolitical design , with the exception of the United States and Russia. References to Africa are very rare; Central and South America are simply unnamed.

It is, in final, an interesting work that addresses an important global issue from a novel, realistic and thoughtful perspective, without falling into doomsday scenarios, but rather opening a door to a somewhat hopeful future in which a dominant China, whose power, it is argued, may already have reached its peak, may give rise to the flourishing of a shared space at the heart of a reconnected world in a way that the ancient navigators could not even have imagined.