The risk of military use of the facility, fueled by confidentiality clauses, fuels discussion in Argentina and suspicions in Washington.

China's arrival on the far side of the Moon has highlighted Chinese space advances. For this new degree program, Beijing has a tracking and observation station in Patagonia, the first of its own territory. In Argentina there has been extensive discussion about possible unacknowledged purposes of these facilities and alleged secret clauses negotiated at the time by the Kirchner Administration. The government of Mauricio Macri guarantees the peaceful uses of the station, but the controversy has not ceased.

▲ Chinese space station in the Argentine province of Neuquén [Casa Rosada].

article / Naomi Moreno Cosgrove

After years of gradual economic penetration, which has led it to become the leading trading partner of several South American countries and a major lender and investor throughout the region, China's incursion into Latin America is no longer silent. The influence achieved in several nations - for example, it acquires almost 90% of the oil exported by Ecuador and its credits have been essential for the subsistence of Venezuela or certain Brazilian public companies - means that China's activities are attracting special attention and its expansion is becoming increasingly clear.

China's growing power in Latin America is especially observed by the United States, although its own neglect of the region, sometimes presented as a consequence of its shift towards Asia, has contributed to national governments seeking other reference letter partners to meet its needs reference letter

Already suspicious of this growing Chinese presence in the American continent, any activity in strategic fields, such as security, arouses particular suspicion in Washington. This has also been the case with moves made by Moscow, such as the siting of a station for the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema or GLONASS) in Managua (Nicaragua). The secrecy surrounding the operation of the facilities has caused mistrust among the population itself, raising suspicions as to whether their use is really intended only to provide a higher quality of the Russian navigation system or whether there is the possibility of strategic exploitation by the Russian aerospace defense forces.

Negotiation

Suspicions about the so-called Far Space Station, the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA) station in Patagonia, in the province of Neuquén, stem from entrance fact that it was negotiated at a time of particular disadvantage for Argentina, due to the financial weakness of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's government and its need for urgent credits. When Argentina was out of the international credit markets for having defaulted on the payment of close to 100 billion dollars in bonds, the Asian country was a blessing for the then president.

In 2009, in the midst of the financial crisis, China sent representatives to the Latin American country to discuss an issue that had little to do with currency fluctuations: Beijing's space interests. This was due to China's desire to have a center in the other hemisphere of the globe that could support its space activity, such as the expedition to the far side of the Moon.

After months of negotiation under great discretion, the Chinese government and the government of the province of Neuquén signed an agreement in November 2012, whereby China obtained the right to use the land - rent-free - for fifty years. The technical agreement was signed by China's state-owned satellite safety and control business (CLTC) and Argentina's National Commission for Space Activities (CONAE).

Enormous in size, the larger of the two circular antennas - it is twelve stories high, weighs 450 tons and has a large diameter - and visible from a great distance due to its location in the middle of a desert plain, the station soon became an ideal target for controversy and suspicion. The fear that, in addition to the declared civilian use, it might also have a military use and be used to gather information by intercepting communications in that part of South America, fueled the controversy.

After becoming Argentine president in 2015, Mauricio Macri entrusted then Foreign Minister Susana Malcorra and the Argentine ambassador in Beijing, Diego Guelar, with the task of negotiating that the agreement should include the specification that the station would only be used for peaceful purposes, something the Chinese accepted.

In spite of everything, the discussion about the risks and benefits of the Chinese base is still alive in the Argentine public opinion. Politicians of the civil service examination in Neuquén consider that "it is shameful to renounce sovereignty in your own country", as Congresswoman Betty Kreitman said when provincial legislators learned about the project.

Beyond Argentina's borders, White House officials have called the project a "Trojan Horse," reflecting U.S. concern about the initiative, according to sources quoted by The New York Times. Even apart from any strategic dispute with the United States, some Latin American leaders have doubts and regrets about the ties established with China, as they are concerned that previous governments have subjected their countries to excessive dependence on the Asian power.

Confidentiality

The main questioning of the Chinese base, then, has to do with its eventual military use and with the possible existence of secret clauses. The latter have been the main cause of international suspicion, since Macri himself came to validate the existence of these clauses, when they became a weapon against the Kirchner government, and promised to reveal them when he became president, something he has not done. However, the Argentine space authorities themselves deny any secret section .

Perhaps the misunderstanding can be found in the fact that the contract signed between the Chinese CLTC and the Argentine CONAE states that "both parties will maintain confidentiality regarding technology, activities and monitoring programs, control and dataacquisition". Although confidentiality with respect to third parties in relation to technology is a common internship , in this case it contributes to public distrust.

Given that the CLTC depends on the Chinese People's Army, it is difficult to deny that the data it obtains will pass into the domain of the Defense hierarchy and end up having a military use, although not necessarily ordered to a warlike action. Experts also say that antennas and other equipment used in support of space missions, similar to those the Chinese have in Patagonia, are likely to increase China's information-gathering capabilities. "A giant antenna is like a huge vacuum cleaner. It sucks up signals, information, all subject of things," Dean Cheng, an expert on China's national security policy, was quoted as saying in the NYT.

▲Great Wall of China, near Jinshanling [Jakub Halin-Wikimedia Commons].

COMMENTARY / Paulina Briz Aceves

The Great Wall of China was completed after decades of successive efforts by different dynasties, not only as a defensive line, but also as a sign of the Chinese attitude towards the outside world. Although this wall currently has no use, other than as a tourist attraction, it has been an example for the creation of another great wall, which although not physical, has the same effects as the original: to isolate the Chinese community from the outside world and to protect itself from attacks against its sovereignty.

The "Great Firewall of China" - the government's online surveillance and censorship effort - monitors all traffic in Chinese cyberspace and allows authorities to both deny access to a variety of selected websites and disconnect all Chinese networks from the global Internet. In addition to the Great Firewall, the Chinese government has also created a domestic surveillance system called "Golden Shield," which is administered by the Ministry of Public Security and other government Departments and local agencies. The Chinese government understands how valuable and powerful technology, innovation and the Internet are, so it is cautious about information disseminated on Chinese soil, due to its constant fear of a possible challenge to the Communist Party and disruption of China's political order.

China's cyber policies and strategies are hardly known in the international world, but what is known is that China's network security priorities are motivated by the Communist Party's primary goal of staying in power. China's rulers understand that cyber is now fully integrated into society. Therefore, they consider that in order to maintain political stability they must keep an eye on their citizens and control them, leaving them in the shadows by censoring not only general information, but also sensitive issues such as the Tiananmenplace massacre or the Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong.

The filters that control what citizens see on the web have become more sophisticated. In addition, the government has employee about 100,000 people to monitor the Chinese Internet, to control information not only from the West, but even that generated in China itself. It is true that this meddling in the media has undoubtedly made the Chinese government assert its power over society, because it is clear that he who has the information definitely has the power.

The busy passage, decisive in the strategies of the two countries to counteract each other

The Strait of Malacca, a core topic for the connection between the northern part of the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific region, will be a thermometer for measuring the future balance of power between China and India. India is responding to the further expansion of Chinese maritime interests, which are forcing Beijing to pay close attention to Malacca, by advancing its positions towards the western mouth of the strait.

▲Map of the Indo-Pacific [US DoD].

article / Alejandro Puigrefagut [English version].

Maritime routes are the basis for trade and communication between more than 80% of the world's countries. This fact makes the natural geographic location of states of great strategic importance. A particularly important point for maritime traffic is the Strait of Malacca, a core topic for trade in the most populated region of the world.

The Strait of Malacca, which links the South China Sea with the Burma Sea en route to the Bay of Bengal, is the busiest commercial passage in the world and is therefore a strategic location. Approximately 60% of the world's maritime trade passes through this corridor that surrounds the western coast of the Malaysian peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, with more than 150 ships per day, and it is the main oil supply route for two of Asia's main consumers: the People's Republic of China and Japan. This geographical point is a core topic for the entire Indo-Pacific region, so ensuring the free movement of ships is strategic. This is why many states in the region, including China and the United States, see the protection of this passage as necessary in order to be able to supply themselves, export their goods and not be blocked by the control of a third country over this area.

With regard to China, it is not easy to imagine that a blockade of its supplies due to problems in the Strait of Malacca would happen. For this to happen, an armed conflict of extraordinary dimensions would have to be generated, leading to such a blockade by a subject that could control -and potentially interrupt- the passage to the other countries in the region. This potential risk, which today can only be generated by the US Navy, forces China to be alert and to develop sufficient military capabilities to protect what it considers its territories in the South China Sea and, by extension, the supply of vital resources that must necessarily cross the Strait of Malacca.

The Asian giant's positions and presence in the South China Sea and in the areas around the Strait of Malacca have increased in recent years in order to increase its influence over the states in the region. Moreover, in order to defend its oil and natural gas supplies (from the Persian Gulf), China has extended its presence as far as the Indian Ocean, although this is not enough. The reality is that in this area there is a great skill between two of the most influential Asian powers in the region: China and India. Due to the growing presence and influence of the People's Republic in the Indian Ocean, India has been forced to take proactive steps to enhance peace and stability in the region by mobilizing and expanding its presence from its east coast to the vicinity of the Strait in order to rebalance the regional balance of power. In this way, India can dominate the western access to the Strait and, consequently, have greater reaction time to maneuver in the Indian Ocean as well as in the Strait itself and even gain more agile access to the waters of the South China Sea.

At the same time, India's growing closeness to the South China Sea is viewed with concern in Beijing, and some analysts even see India as a threat in the event of a hypothetical conflict between the two regional powers and India blocking the Strait and, therefore, China's access to certain raw materials and other resources. For this reason, over the past three years China has carried out various military maneuvers jointly with third states in the Strait of Malacca, especially with Malaysia. During the first exercises in the area, the Ministry of Defense of the People's Republic of China concluded that bilateral relations with Malaysia in terms of security and defense cooperation were strengthened and that "joint response capability to security threats was enhanced". Moreover, for China the protection of the Strait is a priority because of its great strategic value and because countries such as the US and Japan also wish to control it.

[Graham Allison, Destined for War. Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Boston, 2017. 364 pages]

review / Emili J. Blasco [English version].

It is what has been called the Thucydides trap: the dilemma faced by a hegemonic power and a rising power that threatens that hegemony. Is war inevitable? When Thucydides narrated the Peloponnesian War, he wrote of the inevitability for dominant Sparta and rising Athens to think of armed confrontation as a means of settling the conflict.

That these two Greek polis necessarily thought of war, and eventually came to it, does not mean that they had no other options. History has shown that there are: when Wilhelmine Germany threatened to overtake Britain's naval strength, the attempted sorpasso (accompanied by various circumstances) led to World War I, but when Portugal was overtaken by Spain in overseas possessions in the 16th century, or when the United States replaced Britain as the world's leading power in the late 19th century, the handover was peaceful.

The call for Washington and Beijing to do all they can to avoid falling into the trap described by the Greek historian is made by Graham Allison in Destined for War. Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? The founding Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government reviews in his book several historical precedents. The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs of the same University, of which Allison is director, has researched these precedents in a program called Thucydides's Trap.

This concept is defined by Allison as "the strong structural stress caused when an emerging power threatens to unseat a reigning power. In such a status, not only extraordinary or unexpected events, but even ordinary hotspots of tension in international affairs can trigger large-scale conflicts".

This structural stress is produced by the clash of two profound sensitivities: the emerging power syndrome ("the reinforced sense that an emerging state has of itself, its interests and its right to recognition and respect"), and its inverse image, the reigning power syndrome ("the established power exhibits a heightened sense of fear and insecurity as it faces signs of decline").

Alongside the syndromes both rival powers also experience a security dilemma: "a rising power may disregard the fear and insecurity of a leading state because it knows that it itself is well-intentioned. Meanwhile, its opponent misinterprets even positive initiatives, taking them as excessively demanding or even threatening".

The use of military force

Allison starts from the fact that China is already catching up with the US as a power. It has done so in terms of its Economics Issue (China has already surpassed the U.S. in Purchasing Power Parity) and in relation to some aspects of military strength (a Rand Corporation report predicted that in 2017 China would have "advantage" or "rough parity" in 6 of 9 areas of conventional capability. The author's assumption is that China will soon be in a position to wrest the scepter of major superpower from the United States. Faced with this status, how will both countries react?

In the case of China, its millennial perspective will probably lead it to an attitude of patience, provided that there is some small progress in its purpose to increase its specific world weight. Since 1949, China has resorted to force in only three out of 33 territorial disputes. In those cases, China's leaders waged war - limited wars, conceived as notice to their opponents - despite the fact that the enemy was equal or greater, urged on by a domestic unrest status .

For Allison, "as long as events in the South China Sea generally move in China's favor, it seems unlikely that China will use military force. But if trends in the correlation of power were to turn against it, particularly at a time of domestic political instability, China would initiate a limited military conflict against an even larger and more powerful state such as the United States.

For its part, the United States can opt for several strategies, according to Allison: adapt to the new reality, undermine Chinese power (trade war, encourage provincial separatism), negotiate a lasting peace and redefine the relationship. The author does not give a firm committee , but seems to suggest that Washington should move between the last two options.

He recalls how Great Britain realized that it could not compete with the United States in the Western Hemisphere, and how this led to a partnership between the two countries, which became evident in the First and Second World Wars. This would have to involve accepting that the South China Sea is an area of Chinese influence. And this is not out of mere condescension, but because the United States is proceeding with a real clarification of its vital interests.

Despite its positive tone, Destined for War is one of the essays of the American establishment that most openly announces the end of the American era and the passing of the baton to China (it does not seem to envision a multipolar or bipolar world, but rather the primacy of the Asian power). It is also one of those that places less emphasis - certainly less than it should - on the strengths of the United States and the problems that could undermine China's coronation.