Increasingly distant from the Alliance, Turkey is creating discomfort among its Western partners, but will hardly be invited to leave.

Its strategy in the Syrian conflict, its rapprochement with Russia with the acquisition of the S-400 anti-aircraft system and its desire for projection in the eastern Mediterranean, where it is damaging Greek interests, have in the last few years brought Ankara into continuous friction with NATO. But the Alliance is not in a position to do without Turkey. It is not only its valuable geographical status as a bridge between East and West, but without Turkey NATO would be less able geopolitically to act against terrorism or control refugee movements and would see its military defense capabilities as an alliance diminished.

▲ meeting between the presidents of Turkey and Russia in Istanbul in January 2020 [Presidency of Turkey].

article / Ángel Martos

Relations between the Atlantic Alliance and the Republic of Turkey are experiencing their most tense moment in recent history. Ankara's foreign policy has been in a constant state of flux due to the instability of its governments since the death of the Father of the Fatherland, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The Kemalist republic projected an image of Asia Minor very different from the one we know today: the secularism and westernization that characterized its bequest has been replaced by an authoritarianism with a moderate Islamic tinge (according to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself, President of the Republic and leader of the AKP training ).

This profound evolution has, of course, been reflected in the field of international relations. The doctrine of neo-Ottomanism has gained ground among its foreign policy makers. Turkey now seeks to exploit to the full its position as a bridge between Western and Eastern civilization, while gaining influence among its adjacent states and emerging as the stabilizer of the Middle East.

In this scenario, the main headache for Western statesmen is the substantial improvement of Anatolia's relations with the Russian Federation, NATO's archenemy. This improvement cannot be understood without recalling a series of events that have led Turkey to distance itself from the European continent: the lukewarm reaction of Western governments to the 2016 coup; the reluctance shown to the continuous requests for extradition of Fetulah Gülen's refugee followers in the EU and the US; Greece's refusal to extradite the military refugees after the coup; the European Commission's continuous condemnations towards Turkey's internal politics; and, above all, the truncated dream of Turkey's accession to the Union. This is why Turkey has decided to redefine its diplomacy to serve its own interests only, swinging between Russia's financial aid and that of NATO. The acquisition of the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft system or its recent operations in Northeastern Syria are examples of this.

The purchase of the aforementioned long-range anti-aircraft missile system is the subject of much controversy within NATO. Turkey's urgent need for them is obvious, as it faces potential ballistic missile threats from neighboring countries. But the choice of the Russian S-400 system, after several years of negotiations during which it was not possible to reach an agreement for the acquisition of the American Patriot system, has caused a real earthquake, to the point of questioning Turkey's continuity in the F-35 fifth-generation fighter program. Political considerations seem to have outweighed technical aspects in the adoption of this decision, since both systems are incompatible and, being strategic weapons systems, both from an operational and geopolitical point of view, their employment by a country of the Atlantic Alliance is problematic. What concerns the Alliance is the access the Kremlin may have to the organization's information through its radar technology.

The other event that leads us to question the future of Ankara's relations with NATO was the recent Turkish military operation in northern Syria. The Turkish army launched on October 9 an offensive against the Kurdish militias (YPG, which it considers terrorists) in northern Syria. attention the Kurdish people is the great point of dissension between the US and Turkey, since they are staunch allies of the superpower, but at the same time a political and security threat to the stability of Anatolia.

Ankara had been pressing the United States to establish a "security zone" penetrating Syrian territory and had repeatedly threatened to launch unilateral military action if Washington continued to stand in its way. In early October, the U.S. gave the go-ahead for the operation by ordering its military deployed in Syria to withdraw from the border zone. The Trump Administration thus abandoned the Kurds with whom it was fighting the Islamic State to their fate, giving Turkey a free hand for greater control of its border with Syria.

The next aspect that is essential to mention when describing the complex relations between Ankara and NATO is the ongoing geopolitical struggle between Greece and Turkey. Although both have been members of NATO since the 1950s, the relations between these two Eastern Mediterranean countries have always been characterized by the permanent tension that is perceived in them, and which therefore has some consequences on supranational military cooperation. It is worth mentioning here the three main contentions that have shaped, since the end of the 19th century, this bilateral confrontation: the sovereignty of the Dodecanese archipelago, that of present-day Cyprus, and the maritime dispute over the Aegean shelf. Such was the magnitude of the dispute that the Greek government went so far as to decree its withdrawal from NATO in 1974, although it later rejoined.

Although this Greek-Turkish conflict was at its height in the second half of the 20th century, there are many ethnic and historical aspects that make these two countries seem irreconcilable, except in historically punctual exceptions. This makes the eastern flank of the Mediterranean, given its proximity to such an unstable area as the Middle East, a constant source of concern for NATO leaders. While Greece has managed, following its transition to democracy, to emerge as a stable ally of the Alliance, Turkey has not followed the same path. This undoubtedly works against it both in domestic politics and in its aspirations for maritime sovereignty.

Historically, it is worth noting Turkey's growing role as an interregional mediator between the Middle East and the West. Perhaps in response to a strategy designed by Ahmet Davutoglu, who was Foreign Minister under the AKP government, Turkey wanted to distance itself from the US under Bush Jr. Its refusal to collaborate in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 won it certain sympathies in the region, which it has been able to use in countries as diverse as Iraq, Israel and Iran. However, over the years the Islamist government has spoken out several times against Zionism and the threat it poses to the stability of the region.

Its distancing from the European Union and its rapprochement with Russia in economic subject has also marked the image of the Turkish administration in the Alliance. Relations with Russia, despite having been marked by political disputes such as those of Kurdish and Chechen self-determination (antagonistically supported by both countries), remain afloat thanks to the hydrocarbon trade. The outlook is therefore more favorable to the Russian axis than to the American-Israeli one in the region. This, logically, undermines NATO's confidence in this "hinge" country, which is no longer interested in acting as such but as an independent and sovereign power pursuing its own interests, seeking support from the Alliance or from the East as it sample fit.

This departure from NATO's roadmap on the part of the Turkish government, together with a rapprochement in certain aspects with the Kremlin and the authoritarian drift of the country's presidency, is what has led analysts and international leaders to open the discussion about a possible expulsion of the Republic of Asia Minor from the Alliance. However, it is unlikely that the allies will decide to disregard Turkey's strategic importance. Its geographical status makes it a bridge country between East and West. Without Turkey, NATO would be less geopolitically able to act, for example, in terms of fighting terrorism or controlling refugee movements. Moreover, Turkey has the second largest military of all NATO states: an exclusion would severely affect its military defense capabilities as an alliance. On the other hand, Turkey's representations in NATO, while critical of NATO as has the Trump Administration on repeated occasions, have not expressed a clear desire to leave it unilaterally.

Moscow continues militarization of the peninsula to prevent other forces from entering the region

Since the turn of the century, Russia had been losing economic, political and military influence in several Black Sea littoral countries; the seizure of Crimea attempted to correct the status. The Kremlin has just deployed a new missile group on the peninsula, in the framework of a long-term rearmament program that seeks to ensure that operationally the Black Sea is a Russian 'lake'.

▲Putin in Sevastopol during the 2014 celebration of the victory in World War II [Kremlin].

article / Vitaliy Stepanyuk

"The bear will not ask anyone's permission." This was the allegory used by Russian President Vladimir Putin, at a meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club in October 2014, to reflect that Russia will not seek anyone's permission when pursuing its national interests and those of its people.

These words were pronounced a few months after the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula. The process of change of government had been initiated and troops had been mobilized to the newly incorporated territory, making any subject Ukrainian intervention to regain their land impossible. Approximately four years later, the militarization of the peninsula continues its course by the Russian Federation.

Thus, the deployment of a new defense system in Crimea has just become known, an action justified by Moscow as a measure to protect the airspace over the Russian-Ukrainian border, and also to deal with continued threatening activity on the border, arising mainly from the presence of NATO.

Since the occupation of Crimea, the Kremlin has initiated a long-term rearmament program to achieve a zone (A2/AD) that would prevent other forces from accessing the region. This zone would limit the freedom of both air and ground maneuver for potential invaders. Together with other missile systems in Armenia, Krasnodar and elsewhere, this establishes a truly comprehensive anti-access zone. The establishment of advanced defense systems, the update of radars, the modernization of the Black Sea Fleet and the deployment of fighter aircraft are some of the initiatives undertaken to create such a blockade zone against any outside advance. In the coming years, six new attack submarines and six new surface ships are planned to be added to that Fleet, which could operate beyond the Black Sea, even supporting military operations in Syria.

Moving away from the old satellites

The increase in NATO troops and their presence in countries bordering Russia is seen by Russia as a threat to its security. Countries such as Poland, where NATO mobilized in January 2017 about 3.500 soldiers, and others such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary see the deployment necessary in view of the status occurred in Ukraine and Russian military exercises near their borders: a clear example is Zapad 2017, a set of strategic and military exercises carried out jointly by Russian and Belarusian troops, in Belarus, in the Kaliningrad Oblast and along the entire northern strip bordering NATO countries.

Looking back over the recent history of the last 20 years, we can see how Russia has been losing economic, political and military influence over the territories bordering the Black Sea since the beginning of the century. Thus, in Georgia (2004) and Ukraine (2005), more pro-Russian presidents were replaced by more pro-Western ones. In addition, Bulgaria and Romania had become members of NATO, while Georgia and Ukraine were working on it.

Operations in the Black Sea area

Threatened by this status, Russia decided to do everything possible to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from becoming NATO members, while at the same time developing strategies to remove the remaining states from NATO's influence.

With the invasion of Georgia in 2008, the Kremlin showed its determination to contain NATO, maintaining to this day a military B in various regions of that country. The same happened in Ukraine after the flight of former President Viktor Yanukovych, when Russia invaded Crimea in March 2014. In this way, it secured control over the naval base of its Black Sea Fleet located in Sevastopol (Crimea). It also militarily supports pro-Russian separatists in the war in Eastern Ukraine, destabilizing the country.

In other countries bordering the Black Sea, Russia has acted differently. In the case of Bulgaria and Romania, the only countries bordering the Black Sea that are members of the European Union, Russian influence prevails in supporting pro-Russian political parties and establishing strong business ties subject However, Romania is another of the regions that constitute a challenge to Russian foreign policy, due to its impetus in defending NATO's presence in the Black Sea.

In the case of Turkey, which unlike several of the countries mentioned above was not part of the USSR or the Soviet bloc, the Kremlin has supported the authoritarianism carried out by the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, seeking mainly two basic objectives: to disassociate Turkey from NATO, to which it has belonged almost since its inception (1952), and to ensure its friendship with the country that exercises control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, which allow access to the Mediterranean Sea. If Turkey were to close the straits, the Russian fleet would be isolated and unable to exert its influence beyond the Black Sea. This could happen if Turkey and Russia were to find themselves at odds with each other in a conflict. In such a case, as the second strongest military power in the region, Turkey could be a clear threat to isolated Russian troops. On the other hand, the relationship with Turkey presents numerous challenges for Moscow: one example is the disagreement over the Syrian conflict, where Turkey opposes the Assad regime, while Russia supports it. 

Importance of the Black Sea

In the final, Russia seeks to consolidate its influence and dominance over the Black Sea. This is mainly due to some essential characteristics: firstly, this sea is an important strategic point, as it would allow access to the various adjoining territories; secondly, control over ports and trade routes would give the power to obstruct trade and energy supplies (it is a territory crossed by a multitude of energy transport pipelines); finally, Russia could greatly influence regions that share a common history with Russia, infringing on its relationship with NATO.

Immediate challenge

In conclusion, it is interesting to understand that the main challenge facing Russia is to maintain the status quo, according to Yuval Weber, a professor at Harvard University. To do so, Russia has to be able to maintain the separatist group in the Ukrainian war, until the Kiev government falls and can then engage in talks with a possible puppet government that accepts a solution on Russian terms. However, maintaining such a state of affairs implies having to deal simultaneously with international intervention and Russia's own weak internal economic status , where there is growing social dissatisfaction regarding wages, cutbacks in services, poverty in some regions, among other problems.

Both Russia's internal and external status , as well as that of its territories of influence, are contingent on the results of the upcoming Russian presidential elections, which will be held on March 18, 2018. The World Cup is not the only thing at stake.