[Richard Nephew, The Art of Sanctions. A View from the Field. Columbia University Press. Chichester. New York, 2018. 216 p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

International sanctions often arouse lively discussion between those who defend them as a legitimate instrument of state-to-state interaction and those who consider that their application has had little effect other than to increase the suffering of entire populations through no fault of their own.

When asked if these sanctions, which may be of various kinds but are mainly economic in nature, are of any use, Richard Nephew answers that it depends. And this is not an evasion, but rather a defense of his own tools by a mechanic of U.S. diplomacy (Nephew was director for Iran at the National Security committee and deputy coordinator for sanctions at the State department ): "Sanctions do not fail or succeed. Rather, sanctions help or fail to achieve the desired end result of a sanctioning state (...) Tools can only perform well when they are employed with the right strategy; you can't accuse the saw if it fails to do the work of a screwdriver".

Nephew is not a theorist of sanctions, but a "practitioner"; the content of his book comes from experience ("A view from the field" is the subtitle of the book). This experience makes him convinced of the usefulness of these measures, provided they are applied in an appropriate manner. He basically gives the example of two cases: that of Iraq, where the sanctions did not achieve the desired goal due to a bad approach to international pressure, which finally led to war in 2003, and that of Iran, where the regime of punitive measures on the Islamic Republic had its effect and in 2015 an agreement was signed to curb the Iranian nuclear program.

An active participant in the Iran sanctions architecture, Nephew expands especially on the case of negotiations with Tehran, after first touching briefly on the Iraq chapter. From all this he draws conclusions and presents his own decalogues on how sanctions should be approached if they are to be effective. In the last pages he tries to advise how to conduct a new sanctions package on Iran, to control its missile program and contain its activity abroad through proxies, but without breaking the agreement reached (JCPOA) as the Trump Administration has done; how to manage the pressure on Russia in relation to Ukraine; and how to confront the attitude of North Korea. It does not address other situations that the discussion on sanctions is well aware of, such as Trump's harshness towards Cuba, in the framework a decades-long embargo that has not produced changes on the island, or the encirclement of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela.

Rules for successful sanctioning

Nephew's main conclusion is that " knowledge of one's opponent, his tolerances and his vulnerabilities, is the most important predictor of the chances of success of a strategy that focuses on sanctions (...) In fact, for sanctions to work, one really must know the enemy better than the enemy knows himself".

That is what, in his opinion, went wrong in Iraq. The sanctions were certainly effective, in that they prevented Saddam Hussein from returning to a program of weapons of mass destruction, but they did not prevent a war. This was because they did not take into account the psychology of the leader, who was willing to endure any subject of suffering -which he passed on to the population, without fearing that they might take power away from him- rather than admit that he did not have the powerful arsenal that supposedly made him one of the regional leaders. The international community did not understand how important it was for him to maintain this simulation, in his claim to credibility and prestige, above the pressure of any sanctions package.

There were other shortcomings in the Iraqi process, according to Nephew: maximum sanctions were applied from the beginning, with no room for an incremental policy, and over time there was a shift in the goal from wanting to avoid rearmament of the regime to a change of the regime itself (even if Saddam Hussein had accepted the conditions that were set, Washington would not have accepted his continuity in power).

These mistakes led to a better understanding of the mechanisms at play, which were refined in the attention with Iran. Nephew points out that a good understanding of the country targeted by possible sanctions must take into account its political institutions, macroeconomic and financial system, trade relations, cultural values, recent history, demographics and the population's access to external sources of information. This will make it possible to identify the vulnerabilities and the threshold of pain that the government of the day is willing to absorb. Then both the sanctions and the assumptions themselves must be continually recalibrated, following a well-defined strategy. It is also important that the State targeted by the sanctions is clearly presented with the conditions necessary for the pressure to be lifted, framework of a negotiation with clear terms. Finally, there must be a willingness to help the State under pressure to get out of a labyrinth whose exit it may not perceive, or even to accept lower objectives if they are also a reasonable result .

The author states that the three most common causes of failure of a sanctions regime are: falling short, going too far, and confusing objectives. These labels can easily be applied to past processes, but it is not so easy to fix the steps of coercive diplomacy of this subject in ongoing conflicts or conflicts that may occur in the future.

Thus, Nephew himself would not have full guarantees of success with the sanctions he suggests for a new negotiation with Iran in order to limit its missile program and its actions through groups such as Hezbollah. At odds with the Trump Administration, he would have preferred to maintain the 2015 nuclear program agreement (known by its acronym JCPOA) and the consequent lifting of the previously implemented sanctions regime, in order to move on to different sanctions seeking that other goal. It remains to be seen how useful Trump's move will be, but it is difficult to believe that Tehran will give up these other actions because of pressure that would not be so international in any case (China and Russia only lent themselves to a front against Iran because Iran's becoming a nuclear power was at stake).

[Amil Saikal, Iran Rising: The survival and Future of the Islamic Republic. Princeton University Press. Princeton, 2019. 344 p.]

review / Ignacio Urbasos Arbeloa

Since its constitution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been a conflictive actor, isolated and misunderstood by the international community and, to a greater extent, by its regional neighbors. Its origin, revolutionary in character and antagonistic to the Shah's pro-Western model , completely changed the geopolitics of the Middle East and the role of the US in the region. Both the Hostage Crisis and the bloody war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq left deep wounds in Iran's foreign relations. More than 40 years after the Revolution, the country remains in a dynamic that makes the normalization of its international relations impossible, always under the threat of armed conflict or economic sanctions. In this book, Amin Saikal describes in depth the ideological and political nature of the Ayatollahs' regime with the intention of generating a better understanding of the motivations and factors that explain their behavior.

The first chapters develop the concept of governance devised by Ayatollah Imam Khomeini, known as Velayat-E Faqih or Governance of the Guardian of Islam. A model defended by a non-majority faction of the revolution that managed to impose itself by the charisma of its leader and the enormous repression on the rest of the political groups. The political system resulting from the 1978 Revolution tries to confluence the Shiite teachings of Islam and a representative model with institutions such as the Majlis (parliament) or the President that to some extent simulates Western liberal democracy. This model is unique and has never been imitated despite the efforts of the Islamic Republic to export it to the rest of the Muslim world.

In the internship, the system has proven to subject Iranian politics to schizophrenia, with a constant struggle between the power of the clerics -Supreme Leader and committee of Guardians- versus the executive and legislative power elected through elections. This tension, dubbed as Jihadi-Itjihadi (conservatism-flexibility) by Khomeini himself, has result be a resounding failure. The lack of clarity in the roles that religious groups play in the system results in unlimited power to repress and eliminate political opponents, as the house arrest of Khatami or Moussaoui demonstrates. This struggle generates duplicities at all levels with the omnipresence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) in the armed forces, intelligence, social services and public enterprises. The lack of political transparency generates corruption and inefficiencies that hinder the development of an Economics that does not lack the human capital and natural resources to prosper.

Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the evolution of the system after the death of leader Khomeini in 1988 and the end of the war against Iraq. This new context allowed new ideas to entrance the Iranian political discussion . The controversial appointment of the ultraconservative Ali Khamenei in 1989 as the new Supreme Leader meant reinforcing authoritarianism and the rigidity of religious power, but now without the undisputed leadership exercised by Khomeini. The presidency of Rafsanjani, a pragmatic conservative, marked the beginning of a trend within Iran that advocated normalizing the country's international relations.

However, it was Khatami who, since 1997, bet on a reconversion of the system towards a real democracy respecting Human Rights. His staff bid to improve relations with the US failed when it was met with excessive distrust on the part of the Bush Administration. Not even Iran's exemplary response to the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York with an official condemnation of the attack and even a minute's silence observed by 60,000 people in Tehran on September 13, 2001 was enough for G.W. Bush to reconsider Iran as a part of the United States. Bush to reconsider Iran as part of the famous Axis of Evil that it constituted along with Syria, North Korea and Sudan. Despite achieving an average economic growth of 5% of GDP under his presidency, the lack of reciprocity from the international community created a complete rift between the reformist president and the conservative faction led by the Supreme Leader.

The period from 2005 to 2013 was marked by the presidency of the ultra-conservative Ahmadinejad, who ended without Khamenei's confidence after failing in economic subject and bringing Iran to the brink of armed conflict. During this period the IRGC grew to dominate a large part of the ministries and 70% of Iran's GDP. His controversial reelection in 2009 with accusations of fraud by the civil service examination generated the green movement, the largest protests since 1979, which were harshly repressed.

Rouhani's arrival in 2013 could have been a historic occasion by aligning for the first time since 1988 the vision of a moderate president with that of the Supreme Leader. Rouhani, a pragmatic moderate, assumed the position with the goals of improving the living conditions of Iranians, reconciling relations with the West, increasing minority rights and relaxing control over society. In foreign policy subject , the Supreme Leader assumed the need to reach an agreement on the nuclear program knowing that, in its absence, an economic improvement in Iran would be very difficult. The JCPOA, although imperfect, allowed for a rapprochement between the West and Iran. The arrival of Donald Trump blew up the agreement and with it the harmony between Supreme Leader Khamenei and Rouhani, who now faces a growing conservative civil service examination as he considers his foreign policy a failure.

For the author, it is essential to understand the battle between elected institutions and religious institutions. Iranian politics works like a pendulum between the dominance of conservative factions protected by the religious and reformist factions boosted by elections. If benefits are offered to reformist moderates when they are in power, the chances of bringing about political change in Iran are greater than if conservatives are treated as harshly, argues Amin Saikal in the fourth and fifth chapters. Moreover, there is a correlation between those who know the West and those who do not. Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, the main representatives of the hardliners, have never visited Europe or the USA, while Rouhani, Khatami or Sharif are fluent in English and Western culture.

With a population under 30 years of age accounting for 50% of the total and a growing modernization of society in Tehran, the demands for reforms seem unstoppable. According to Amin Saikal, an intransigent policy with Iran when there is a willingness to open up only generates mistrust and reinforces the most conservative positions. Trump's policy with Iran, he concludes, demonstrates a lack of knowledge and understanding of its society and political system.