First US-China high-level meeting of the Biden era to be held in Alaska on March 18, 2021 [State Department].

 

essay / Ramon Barba

President Joe Biden is cautiously building his Indo-Pacific policy, seeking to build an alliance with India on which to build an order to counter the rise of China. Following his entrance the White House, Biden has kept the focus on this region, albeit with a different approach than the Trump Administration. While it is true that the main goal is still to contain China and defend free trade, Washington is opting for a multilateral approach that gives greater prominence to QUAD[1] and takes special care of the relationship with India. As the standard-bearer of the free world and democracy, the Biden Administration aims to renew US leadership in the world and particularly in this crucial region. However, although the relationship with India is at a good moment, especially in view of the signature thescholarship agreement [2] reached at the end of the Trump Administration, the interaction between the two countries is far from consolidating an alliance.

The new US presidency is faced with a very complicated puzzle to solve in the Indo-Pacific, the main players being China and India. In general, we find that, of the three powers, only Beijing has been able to successfully manage the post-Pandemic status [3], while Delhi and Washington continue to face both a health and economic crisis. All this may affect the relationship between India and the United States, especially in terms of trade[4], however, and despite the fact that Biden has not yet demonstrated what his strategy in the region will be, it seems that the relationship between the two powers is set to grow[5]. However, although the United States wants to pursue a policy of multilateral alliances and deepen its relationship with India, the Biden Administration will have to take into account several difficulties before being able to speak of an alliance as such.

Biden started to act in this direction from the very beginning. First of all there was the February meeting of QUAD[6], which some consider a mini NATO[7] for Asia, at which issues relating to vaccine distribution in Asia (aiming to distribute one billion doses by 2022), freedom of navigation in the region's seas, denuclearization of North Korea and democracy in Myanmar were discussed. In addition, the UK seems to be showing increased interest in the region and in this dialogue group . On the other hand, in mid-March there was a meeting in Alaska[8] between the Chinese and US diplomacy (headed respectively by Yang Jiechi, director the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, and Antony Blinken, Secretary of State), in which both countries strongly reproached each other's policies. Washington remains firm in its interests, although open to a certain partnership with Beijing, while China insists on rejecting any interference in what it considers its internal affairs. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Biden seems to be willing to organize a summit of democracies[9] in his first year in office.

Following contacts that also took place in Alaska between the Chinese and US defense chiefs, Austin Lloyd[10], head of the Pentagon, visited India to stress the importance of Indo-US cooperation. In addition, early April saw the participation of France in the La Pérouse[11] naval maneuvers in the Bay of Bengal, giving rise to the possibility of a QUAD-plus in which, in addition to the four original powers, other countries would also take part.

The Indo-Pacific, let us remember, is the present and the future of international relations due to its economic importance (its main players, India, China and the USA represent 45% of the world's GDP), demographic (hosting 65% of the population of the entire globe) and, as we will see throughout this article, geopolitical[12].

U.S.-China-India relations

The Biden Administration seems to be continuing the line followed by Trump, since the objectives have not changed. What has changed is the approach to the object of the issue, which in this case is none other than the containment of China and freedom of navigation in the region, albeit on the basis of a strong commitment to multilateralism. As George Washington's new successor said at his inauguration[13], the United States wants to resume its leadership, but in a different way from that of the previous Administration; that is, through a strong policy of alliances, moral leadership and a strong defense of values such as dignity, human rights and the rule of law.

The new presidency sees China as a rival to be reckoned with[14], as does the Trump Administration, but it does not see this as a zero-sum game, since, while openly declaring itself to be against Xi's actions, it opens the door to dialogue[15] on issues such as climate change or healthcare. In general, in line with what has been seen in New tensions in Asia Pacific[16], the United States is committed to multilateralism that seeks to reduce tension. It should be remembered that the United States advocates the defense of free navigation and the rule of law, as well as democracy in a region in which its influence is being eroded by the growing weight of China.

A good understanding of the state of US-China-India relations goes back to 2005[17], when everything seemed to be going well. As far as the Sino-Indian relationship was concerned, the two nations had resolved their disputes over the 1998 nuclear tests; moreover, their presence in regional forums was growing and it seemed that the issue of cross-border disputes was beginning to be settled. For its part, the United States enjoyed good trade relations with both countries. However, changing patterns in global Economics , driven by the rise of China, the 2008 financial crisis in the United States and India's inability to maintain its growth rate upset this balance. Donald Trump's tightening attitude contributed to this. However, some argue that the breakdown of the post-Cold War order in the Asia Pacific began with the Obama Administration's "pivot to Asia"[18]. To this must be added the minor frictions China has had with both nations.

Briefly, it is worth mentioning that there are border problems between India and China[19] that have been flaring up again since 2013. In turn, India is opposed to Chinese hegemony; it does not want to be subjugated by Beijing and is clearly committed to multilateralism. Finally, there are problems with regard to maritime dominance because the Strait of Malacca is at the limit of its capacity. In addition, Delhi claims the Adaman and Nicobar Islands on the Malacca access route as its own. Moreover, as India is now far below China's military and economic power[20] - the balance between the two powers in 1980 has been broken - it is trying to hinder Beijing in order to contain it.

The United States has ideological frictions with China, due to the authoritarian nature of Xi Jinping's regime[21], and commercial frictions, in subject dispute[22] that Beijing intends to take advantage of to reduce US influence in the region. In the midst of this conflict is India, which supports the United States because, although it does not seem to want to be completely against China[23], it rejects a Chinese regional hegemony[24].

According to the latest CEBR report [25], China will overtake the United States as a world power in 2028, earlier than expected in previous projections, partly thanks to the way it has managed the coronavirus emergency: it was the only major country to avoid a crisis after the first wave. On the other hand, the United States has lost the battle against the pandemic; economic growth between 2022-2024 is expected to be 1.9% of GDP and to slow to 1.6% in the following years[26], while China, according to the report , will grow at 5.7% between 2021-2025[27].

For China, the pandemic has been a way of signaling its place in the world[28], a way of warning the United States that it is ready to take over as leader of the international community. To this can be added China's belligerent attitude in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as its hegemonic growth in the area and its trade projects with Africa and Europe. All of this has led to imbalances in the region that involve Washington's QUAD moves. Recall that, despite its waning role as a power, the United States is interested in freedom of navigation for both commercial and military reasons[29].

Thus, the Chinese economic boom has led to a worsening of the relationship between Washington and Beijing[30]. Moreover, although Biden is committed to cooperation on the pandemic and climate change, there is talk from some quarters of American politics of an inevitable competition between the two countries[31].

The Degree of alliance between the US and India

In line with the above, we can see that we are in a delicate situation after the change in the White House. January and February have been months of small movements on the part of the United States and India, which have not left China indifferent. Although the Sino-US relationship has benefited both sides since its inception (1979)[32], with trade between the two countries growing by 252% since then, the reality is that trust levels are now at rock bottom, having suspended more than 100 dialogue mechanisms between them. Therefore, although a conflict is not foreseen, an increase in tension is predicted since, far from being able to cooperate in broad fields, only slight and limited cooperation seems feasible at the moment. At the same time, let us recall that China is very much affected by the Malacca Dilemma[33], and is therefore seeking other access to the Indian Ocean, giving rise to territorial disputes with India, with whom it already has the territorial problem of Ladakh[34]. In the midst of this Thucydides Trap[35], in which China seems to threaten to overtake the United States, Washington has been moving closer to New Delhi.

Consequently, the two countries have been developing a strategic partnership [36], based essentially on security and defense, but which the United States is seeking to extend to other areas. It is true that Delhi's problems are in the Indian Ocean and Washington's in the Pacific; however, both have China[37] as a common denominator. Their relationship, moreover, is strongly marked by the already mentioned "tripartite crisis"[38] (health, economic and geopolitical).

Despite the intense cooperation between Washington and New Delhi, there are two different points of view regarding thispartnership. While the United States claims that India is a very important ally, with which it shares the same political system and an intense commercial relationship[39], India prefers a less strict alliance. Traditionally, Delhi has conveyed a policy of non-alignment[40] in international matters. In fact, although India does not want Chinese supremacy in the Indo-Pacific, neither does it wish to align itself directly against Beijing, with whom it shares more than 3,000 km of border. Nevertheless, Delhi sees a great need for cooperation with Washington on security and defense subject . In fact, some say that today India needs the US more than ever.

Although last February Washington began to review the US Global Posture Strategy, everything suggests that the Biden Administration will continue Trump's line regarding the partnership with India as a way of containing China. However, although Washington speaks of India as its ally, there is some reluctance on the part of Delhi, thus speaking of an alignment[41] rather than an alliance. Although the reality we are living in is far from that of the Cold War[42], this new containment[43] in which Delhi is sought as a base, support and standard, is materialized in the following:

i) Intense cooperation in security and defense subject .

Here there are different forums and agreements. Firstly, the aforementioned QUAD[44]. This new multilateral cooperation alliance that began to take shape in 2006[45] agreed at its March meeting to development its vaccine diplomacy, with India at the center, in order to counter the successful international campaign led by Beijing in this field. In fact, there was a commitment to spend 600 million to deliver 1 billion vaccines[46] by 2022. The idea is that Japan and the USA will finance the operation[47], while Australia will be in charge of logistics. However, India is committed to greater multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific, giving entrance to countries such as England and France[48], which already participated in the last Raisina Dialogues together with QUAD. The meeting also dealt with other issues such as the denuclearization of Korea, the restoration of democracy in Myanmar and climate change[49].

India seeks to contain China, but without provoking a direct confrontation with China[50]. In fact, Beijing has given the impression that if things go further, it is not only India that knows how to play Realpolitik. Let us recall that New Delhi will chair this year's meeting with the BRICS. Moreover, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will host joint military exercises between China and Pakistan, a country with a complex relationship with India.

On the other hand, during his March trip to India, the Pentagon chief[51] discussed with his counterpart Rajnath Singh increased military cooperation, as well as issues related to logistics, information exchange , possible opportunities for mutual attendance and the defense of free navigation. Lloyd said he did not frown upon Australia and Korea participating as permanent members in the Malabar exercises. Since 2008, trade in military subject between Delhi and Washington has totaled $21 billion[52]. In addition, $3,000 has recently been spent on drones and other aerial equipment for reconnaissance and surveillance missions.

A week after this meeting, two Indian and one US ship conducted a subject PASSEX maritime exercise[53] as a way to consolidate the synergies and interoperability achieved in last November's Malabar exercise.

In this context, a special accredited specialization should be made to the 2+2 dialogue platform and the aforementioned scholarship agreement basic exchange and cooperationagreement for cooperation in geospatial subject ). The former is a subject of meeting in which the Foreign and Defense Ministers of both countries meet every two years to discuss issues of interest to them. The most recent meeting took place in October 2020[54]. Not only was the scholarship agreed upon, but the United States reaffirmed its support for India with regard to its territorial problems with China. Other memoranda of understanding were also signed on nuclear energy and climate issues.

The scholarship, signed in October 2020 during the last months of the Trump Administration, makes it easier for India to better locate enemies, terrorists and other subject of threats coming from land or sea. This agreement is intended to consolidate the friendship between the two countries, as well as to help India outperform China technologically. This agreement concludes the "troika of foundational pacts" for deep security and defense cooperation between the two countries[55].

Prior to this agreement, the LEMOA (Logistics exchange Memorandum of agreement ) was signed in 2016 and the COMCASAagreement Communications Compatibility and Securityagreement ) in 2018. The former allows both countries access to each other's instructions for supply and replenishment; the latter allows India to receive systems, information and encrypted communication to communicate with the United States. Both agreements affect land, sea and air forces[56].

ii) United for democracy

From Washington, special emphasis is placed on the fact that both powers are very similar, since they share the same political system, and it is emphasized with a certain grandiloquence that they are the oldest and the largest democracy ( issue terms of population)[57]. Because this presupposes the sharing of a series of values, Washington likes to speak of "likeminded partners"[58].

From the Brookings Institution think tank , Tanvi Mandan defends this idea of ideological bonding. The same system of government makes both countries see each other as natural allies, who think alike and also believe in the value of the rule of law. In fact, in all matters relating to the spread of democracy around the globe, there is strong cooperation between the two nations: for example, supporting democracy in Afghanistan or the Maldives, launching the US-India Global Democracy Initiative and providing legal and technical attendance on democratic issues to other countries. Finally, it should be noted that democracy and the values it entails have facilitated the exchange and flow of people from one country to another. As for the economic relationship between both countries, it becomes more viable, since both are open economies, they share a common language and their legal system has Anglo-Saxon roots.

iii) Growing economic cooperation

The United States is India's main trading partner , with whom it has a significant surplus[59]. Trade between the two has grown by 10% annually over the last decade, and in 2019 was $115 billion[60]. About 2,000 US companies are based in India, and about 200 Indian companies are based in the US[61]. Between the two there is a Mini-Trade Deal, believed to be signed shortly, which aims to deepen this economic relationship. In the context of the pandemic, everything related to the health field plays an important role[62]. In fact, despite the fact that both countries have recently adopted a protectionist attitude, the idea is to reach 500 billion dollars in trade[63].

Divergences, challenges and opportunities for India and the U.S. in the region

Briefly, between the leaders of both countries there are small frictions, opportunities and challenges to be nuanced in order to make this relationship a strong alliance. Among the points of conflict, we highlight India's purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia, which is against the CAATSA(Countering America's Adversaries tough Sanctions Act) [64], for which India may receive a sanction, although in the meeting between Sigh and Lloyd, the latter seemed to overlook the topic [65]. However, it remains to be seen what happens once the missiles arrive in Delhi. There are also minor divergences regarding freedom of expression, security and civil rights, and how to relate to non-democratic countries[66]. Among the challenges that both countries must take into account is the possible loss of support in some sectors of U.S. policy for the relationship with India. This is due to India's actions in Kashmir in August 2019, protection of religious freedom and attention to dissent. On the other hand, there has been no shortage of weakening of democratic norms, immigration restrictions and violence against Indian nationals[67].

Lastly, let us recall that both are facing a deep health and therefore economic crisis, the resolution of which will be decisive in relation to the competition with Beijing[68]. The crisis has affected the bilateral relationship since, although trade in services has remained stable (around 50 billion), trade in goods declined from 92 billion to 78 billion between 2019 and 2020, increasing the Indian trade deficit[69].

Finally, it is worth mentioning the opportunities. First, both countries can develop democratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific as well as in a rules-based international order[70]. In security and defense, there are also opportunities such as the entrance the UK and France as allies in the area, for example by trying to get both countries to enter the Malabar exercise or France to chair the Indian Ocean Naval Symposiumin 2022[71]. Although the medium-term trend is for cooperation between the United States and India, skill with Russia will be a growing threat[72], so cooperation between the United States, India and Europe is very important.

The possibility of cooperation in MDA (Maritime Warning Environment) and ASW (Anti Submarine Warfare) mechanisms is also opened, as the Indian Ocean is of general importance for several countries due to the value of its energy transport routes. The possibility of cooperation through the use of the US P-8 "Poseidon" aircraft is opened up. Despite the disputes over the Chagos Archipelago, India and the United States should take advantage of the agreements they have over islands such as Andaman or Diego Garcia for the conduct of these activities[73]. 73] Therefore, India should use regional bodies and work groups to cooperate with European countries and the United States.

Europe seems to be gaining increasing importance due to the possibility of entering the Indo-Pacific game through QUAD Plus. European countries are very much in favor of multilateralism, the defense of freedom of navigation and the role of rules in regulating it. While it is true that the EU has recently signed a trade treaty with China - the IAC - increasing the European presence in the region takes on greater importance, since Xi's authoritarianism and his actions in Tibet, Xinjiang, or central China are not to the liking of European countries[75].

Finally, it should be recalled that there are some voices that speak of a decline or weakening of globalization[76], especially after the coronavirus epidemic[77], so reviving multilateral exchanges through joint action becomes a challenge and an opportunity for both countries. In fact, it is believed that in the short term, protectionist tendencies, at least in the Sino-Indian relationship, will continue, despite the intense economic cooperation[78].

Conclusion

The geopolitical panorama of the Indo-Pacific is complex to say the least. Chinese expansionism clashes with the interests of the other major regional power, India, which, while avoiding confrontation with Beijing, takes a dim view of its neighbor's actions. In a bid for multilateralism, and with an eye on its regional waters, threatened by the Malacca Dilemma, India seems to be cooperating with the United States, but clinging to regional forums and groups to make its position clear, while seeming to open the door to European countries, whose interest in the region is growing, despite the recent trade agreement signed with China.

On the other hand, the United States is also threatened by Chinese expansionism and sees the moment of its rival's economic overtaking approaching, which the coronavirus crisis may even have brought forward to 2028. In order to avoid such status, the Biden Administration is betting on multilateralism at the regional level and is deepening its relationship with India, beyond the military aspect. Washington seems to have understood that US hegemony in the Indo-Pacific is far from being real, at least in the medium term, so that only a cooperative and integrating attitude is possible. On the other hand, in the midst of this supposed retreat from globalization, we see how Washington, together with India, and surely in the medium term with Europe, are defending the Western values that govern the international sphere, i.e. the defense of human rights, the rule of law and the value of democracy.

We are faced with two factors. On the one hand, India does not want to see an order imposed by any subject, neither American nor Chinese, hence its reluctance to confront Beijing directly and its preference to expand the QUAD. On the other hand, the United States seems to perceive that it is at a delicate moment, since its competition with China goes beyond the mere substitution of one power for another. Washington is still a traditional power which, for its presence in the Indo-Pacific, has relied above all on military power, while China has based the extension of its influence on the establishment of strong trade relations that go beyond the belligerent logic of the Cold War. Hence the United States is trying to form a front with India and its European allies that goes beyond military cooperation.

 

REFERENCES 

[1] The QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) is a dialogue group formed by the United States, India, Japan and Australia. Its members share a common vision on the security of the Indo-Pacific region contrary to that of China; they advocate multilateralism and freedom of navigation in the region.

[2] scholarship (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement). Treaty signed by India and the United States in October 2019 to improve security in the Indo-Pacific region. Its goal is the exchange of tracking, tracing and intelligence systems.

[3]Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective." Chinawatch. Connecting Thinkers ... http://www.chinawatch.cn/a/202102/05/WS60349146a310acc46eb43e2d.html,(accessed February 5, 2021),

[4] Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating and Rebalancing Ties," in Tanvi Madan, "India And The Biden Administration: Consolidating And Rebalancing Ties,". German Marshal Found of the United States. https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2021/02/11/india-and-biden-administration-consolidating-and-rebalancing-ties,(accessed February 11, 2021).

[5]Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake,diary 2021: A Blueprint For U.S.-Europe-India Cooperation," US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security. GMF India Trilateral Forum. Pg:1. https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2021/02/16/us-india-cooperation-indo-pacific-security, (accessed February 16, 2021).

[6] "'QUAD' Leaders Pledge New Cooperation on China, COVID-19, Climate." Aljazeera.com. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/12/quad-leaders-pledge-new-cooperation-on-china-covid-19-climate (accessed March 2021).

[7] Mereyem Hafidi, "Biden Renews 'QUAD' Alliance Despite Pressure From Beijing." Atalayar. https://atalayar.com/content/biden-renueva-la-alianza-de-%E2%80%98QUAD%E2%80%99-pesar-de-las-presiones-de-pek%C3%ADn.(accessed February 2021).

[8] "`Grandstanding`: US, China trade rebukes in testy talks." Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/19/us-china-top-diplomats-trade-rebukes-in-testy-first-talks (accessed, March 2021).

[9] Joseph R. Biden, "Why America Must Lead Again." Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again (accessed February, 2021).

[10] Maria Siow. "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind." South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3126091/india-receives-us-defence-secretary-lloyd-austin-china-its-mind.(accessed March 19, 2021).

[11] Seeram Chaulia, "France and sailing toward the 'QUAD-plus'". The New Indian Express. https://www. newindianexpress.com/opinions/2021/apr/06/france-and-sailing-toward-the-QUAD-plus-2286408.html (accessed, April 4, 2021).

[12] Juan Luis López Aranguren. "Indo-Pacific: The new order without China at the center." The Indo-Pacific as a new global geopolitical axis. Global Affairs Journal. Pg.:2. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/indo-pacifico-el-nuevo-orden-sin-china-en-el-centro?_33_redirect=%2Fen%2Fweb%2Fglobal-affairs%2Fpublicaciones%2Finformes.(accessed, April 2021).

[13] Biden, "Remarks By President Biden On America's Place In The World | The White House"...

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/

[14] Ibid.

[15] Derek Grossman, "Biden's China Reset Is Already On The Ropes." Nikkei Asia. https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Biden-s-China-reset-is-already-on-the-ropes.(accessed, March 14, 2021).

[16] Ramón Barba Castro, "New Tensions in Asia Pacific in a Scenario of Electoral Change." Global Affairs and Strategic Studies. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/nuevas-tensiones-en-asia-pacifico-en-un-escenario-de-cambio-electoral-en-eeuu.(accessed, April 2021).

[17] Sankaran Kalyanaraman, "Changing Pattern Of The China-India-US Triangle." Manohar Parrikar Institute For Defence Studies And Analyses. https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/changing-pattern-china-india-us-triangle-skalyanaram (accessed March 2021).

[18] Pang Zhongying, "Indo-Pacific Era Needs US-China Cooperation, Not Great Power Conflict." South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3125926/indo-pacific-needs-us-china-cooperation-not-conflict-QUAD (accessed March 19, 2021).

[19] Sankaran Kalayanamaran, "Changing Pattern of the China-India-US Triangle.

[20] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective."

[21] Joseph R. Biden, "Remarks By President Biden On America's Place In The World

[22]Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective.

[23] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind."

[24]Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating And Rebalancing Ties."

[25] CEBR (Centre for Economics and Business Research) is an organization dedicated to the analysis and economic forecasting of companies and organizations. link https://cebr.com/about-cebr/. This entity prepares every year agraduate report World Economic League Table¸in which it analyzes the positioning of each country of the Globe regarding the state of its Economics. The latest edition(World Economic League Table 2021), published on December 26, 2020, presents a prediction of the state of world Economics in 2035, in order to know who will be the main world economic powers (CEBR, "World Economic League Table 2021". Centre for Economics and Business Research (12th edition), https://cebr.com/reports/world-economic-league-table-2021/ (accessed March 2021).

[26] Ibid., 231.

[27] Ibid., 71.

[28] Vijay Gokhale, "China Doesn't Want a New World Order. It Wants This One." The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/opinion/china-america-united-nations.html(accessed April 2021).

[29] Mereyem Hafidi, "Biden renews `QUAD` alliance despite pressure from Beijing.

[30] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective."

[31] Ibid.

[32] Wang Huiyao, "More cooperation, less competition". Chinawatch. Connecting Thinkers. http://www.chinawatch.cn/a/202102/05/WS6034913ba310acc46eb43e28.html(accessed March 2021).

[33] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective."

[34]Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security." Page 5.

[35] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective."

[36] Ibid.

[37]Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security." Page 5.

[38] Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating And Rebalancing Ties."

[39] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship". Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/democracy-and-the-us-india-relationship/ (accessed March 2021)

[40] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind."

[41] Bilal Kuchay, "India, US sign key military deal, symbolizing closer ties." Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/2/india-us-military-deal(accessed March 2021)

[42] Wang Huiyao, "More cooperation, less competition".

[43] Alex Lo, "India-the democratic economic giant that disappoints". South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3126342/india-democratic-economic-giant-disappoints(accessed March 21, 2021).

[44] Simone McCarthy, "QUAD summit: US, India, Australia and Japan counter China's 'vaccine diplomacy' with pledge to distribute a billion doses across Indo-Pacific." South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3125344/QUAD-summit-us-india-australia-and-japan-counter-chinas.(accessed, March 13, 2021).

[45]Mereyem Hafidi, "Biden renews `QUAD` alliance despite pressure from Beijing.

[46] Simone McCarthy, "QUAD summit: US, India, Australia and Japan counter China's 'vaccine diplomacy' with pledge to distribute a billion doses across Indo-Pacific."

[47] Aljazeera, "'QUAD' leaders pledge new cooperation on China, COVID-19, climate".

[48]Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security." Page 2.

[49]Simone McCarthy, "QUAD summit: US, India, Australia and Japan counter China's 'vaccine diplomacy' with pledge to distribute a billion doses across Indo-Pacific."

[50] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind".

[51] "US defense secretary Lloyd Austin says US considers India to be a great partner." Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/us-defense-secretary-lloyd-austin-says-us-considers-india-to-be-a-great-partner-101616317189411.html.(accessed, March 21, 2021)

[52] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind."

[53] The term PASSEX is an abbreviation of the English military jargon, it comes from Passing Exercise. It consists of taking advantage of the fact that a Marine unit is passing through a given area to deepen the military cooperation of the army of the area through which it is passing. As an example we find the news cited in this article: "India, US begin two-day naval exercise in eastern Indian Ocean region". The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-us-begin-two-day-naval-exercise-in-eastern-indian-ocean-region/articleshow/81735782.cms (accessed March 28, 2021).

[54] Annath Krishnan, Dinakar Peri, Kallol Bhattacherjee; India-U.S. 2+2 dialogue: U.S. to support India's defence of territory. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-us-22-dialogue-rajnath-singh-raises-chinas-action-in-ladakh/article32955117.ece.(accessed March 2021).

[55] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind."

[56] Ibid.

[57] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship".

[58] Hindustan Times, "US defense secretary Lloyd Austin says US considers India to be a great partner".

[59] "Committed to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/committed-to-achieving-goal-of-500-bn-in-bilateral-trade-with-us-ambassador-sandhu/articleshow/80878316.cms.(accessed, March 2021).

[60] Joe C. Mathew, "India-US mini trade deal: Low duty on medical devices; pact in final stages." Business Today. https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/india-us-mini-trade-deal-low-duty-on-medical-devices-pact-in-final-stages/story/413669.html.(Accessed, March 2021).

[61] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

[62] Joe C. Mathew, "India-US mini trade deal: Low duty on medical devices; pact in final stages".

[63] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

[64] Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security". Page 2.

[65] Hindustan Times "US defense secretary Lloyd Austin says US considers India to be a great partner".

[66] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship."

[67] Ibid.

[68] Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating and Rebalancing Ties.

[69] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

[70] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship."

[71] Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security." Page3.

[72] IBIDEM page 3

[73] IBIDEM. Page 6

[74] IBIDEM. Page 7

[75] Seeram Chaulia, "France and sailing toward the 'QUAD-plus'". The New Indian Express

[76] Elisabeth Mearns, Gary Parkinson; "With a pandemic, populism and protectionism, have we passed peak globalization?". China Global Television Network. https://newseu.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-28/With-a-pandemic-populism-and-protectionism-has-globalization-peaked--QOQMPg3ABO/index.html.(accessed, April 2021).

[77] Abraham Newman, Henry Farrel; "The New Age of Protectionism." Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2021-04-05/new-age-protectionism.(accessed April 5, 2021).

[78] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

IDF soldiers during a study tour as part of Sunday culture, at the Ramon Crater Visitor Center [IDF].

ESSAY / Jairo Císcar

The geopolitical reality that exists in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean is incredibly complex, and within it the Arab-Israeli conflict stands out. If we pay attention to History, we can see that it is by no means a new conflict (outside its form): it can be traced back to more than 3,100 years ago. It is a land that has been permanently disputed; despite being the vast majority of it desert and very hostile to humans, it has been coveted and settled by multiple peoples and civilizations. The disputed territory, which stretches across what today is Israel, Palestine, and parts of Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria practically coincides with historic Canaan, the Promised Land of the Jewish people. Since those days, the control and prevalence of human groups over the territory was linked to military superiority, as the conflict was always latent. The presence of military, violence and conflict has been a constant aspect of societies established in the area; and, with geography and history, is fundamental to understand the current conflict and the functioning of the Israeli society.

As we have said, a priori it does not have great reasons for a fierce fight for the territory, but the reality is different: the disputed area is one of the key places in the geostrategy of the western and eastern world. This thin strip, between the Tigris and Euphrates (the Fertile Crescent, considered the cradle of the first civilizations) and the mouth of the Nile, although it does not enjoy great water or natural resources, is an area of high strategic value: it acts as a bridge between Africa, Asia and the Mediterranean (with Europe by sea). It is also a sacred place for the three great monotheistic religions of the world, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the "Peoples of the Book", who group under their creeds more than half of the world's inhabitants. Thus, for millennia, the land of Israel has been abuzz with cultural and religious exchanges ... and of course, struggles for its control.

According to the Bible, the main para-historical account of these events, the first Israelites began to arrive in the Canaanite lands around 2000 BC, after God promised Abraham that land ".... To your descendants ..."[1] The massive arrival of Israelites would occur around 1400 BC, where they started a series of campaigns and expelled or assimilated the various Canaanite peoples such as the Philistines (of which the Palestinians claim to be descendants), until the Kingdoms of Israel and Judah finally united around the year 1000 BC under a monarchy that would come to dominate the region until their separation in 924 BC.

It is at this time that we can begin to speak of a people of Israel, who will inhabit this land uninterruptedly, under the rule of other great empires such as the Assyrian, the Babylonian, and the Macedonian, to finally end their existence under the Roman Empire. It is in 63 BC when Pompey conquered Jerusalem and occupied Judea, ending the freedom of the people of Israel. It will be in 70 AD, though, with the emperor Titus, when after a new Hebrew uprising the Second Temple of Jerusalem was razed, and the Diaspora of the Hebrew people began; that is, their emigration to other places across the East and West, living in small communities in which, suffering constant persecutions, they continued with their minds set on a future return to their "Promised Land". The population vacuum left by the Diaspora was then filled again by peoples present in the area, as well as by Arabs.

The current state of Israel

This review of the historical antiquity of the conflict is necessary because this is one with some very special characteristics: practically no other conflict is justified before such extremes by both parties with "sentimental" or dubious "legal" reasons.

The current state of Israel, founded in 1948 with the partition of the British Protectorate of Palestine, argues its existence in the need for a Jewish state that not only represents and welcomes such a community but also meets its own religious requirements, since in Judaism the Hebrew is spoken as the "chosen people of God", and Israel as its "Promised Land". So, being the state of Israel the direct heir of the ancient Hebrew people, it would become the legitimate occupier of the lands quoted in Genesis 15: 18-21. This is known as the concept of Greater Israel (see map)[2].

On the Palestinian side, they exhibit as their main argument thirteen centuries of Muslim rule (638-1920) over the region of Palestine, from the Orthodox caliphate to the Ottoman Empire. They claim that the Jewish presence in the region is primarily based on the massive immigration of Jews during the late 19th and 20th centuries, following the popularization of Zionism, as well as on the expulsion of more than 700,000 Palestinians before, during and after the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, a fact known as the Nakba[3], and of many other Palestinians and Muslims in general since the beginning of the conflict. Some also base their historical claim on their origin as descendants of the Philistines.

However, although these arguments are weak, beyond historical conjecture, the reality is, nonetheless, that these aspirations have been the ones that have provoked the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This properly begins in the early 20th century, with the rise of Zionism in response to the growing anti-Semitism in Europe, and the Arab refusal to see Jews settled in the area of Palestine. During the years of the British Mandate for Palestine (1920-1948) there were the first episodes of great violence between Jews and Palestinians. Small terrorist actions by the Arabs against Kibbutzim, which were contested by Zionist organizations, became the daily norm. This turned into a spiral of violence and assassinations, with brutal episodes such as the Buraq and Hebron revolts, which ended with some 200 Jews killed by Arabs, and some 120 Arabs killed by the British army.[4] The Palestinian people were killed in a spiral of violence and assassinations.

Another dark episode of this time was the complicit relations between the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Almin Al-Husseini, and the Nazi regime, united by a common diary regarding Jews. He had meetings with Adolf Hitler and gave them mutual support, as the extracts of their conversations collect[5]. But it will not be until the adoption of the "United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine" through Resolution 181 (II) of the General Assembly when the war broke out on a large scale.[6] The Jews accepted the plan, but the Arab League announced that, if it became effective, they would not hesitate to invade the territory.

And so, it was. On May 14, 1948, hours after the proclamation of the state of Israel by Ben-Gurion, Israel was invaded by a joint force of Egyptian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Syrian and Jordanian troops. In this way, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War began, beginning a period of war that has not stopped until today, almost 72 years later. Despite the multiple peace agreements reached (with Egypt and Jordan), the dozens of United Nations resolutions, and the Oslo Accords, which established the roadmap for achieving a lasting peace between Israel and Palestine, conflicts continue, and they have seriously affected the development of the societies and peoples of the region.

The Israel Defense Forces

Despite the difficulties suffered since the day of its independence, Israel has managed to establish itself as the only effective democracy in the region, with a strong rule of law and a welfare state. It has a Human Development Index of 0.906, considered very high; is an example in education and development, being the third country in the world with more university graduates over the total population (20%) and is a world leader in R&D in technology. Meanwhile, the countries around it face serious difficulties, and in the case of Palestine, great misery. One of the keys to Israel's success and survival is, without a doubt, its Army. Without it, it would not have been able to lay the foundations of the country that it is today, as it would have been devastated by neighboring countries from the first day of its independence.

It is not daring to say that Israeli society is one of the most militarized in the world. It is even difficult to distinguish between Israel as a country or Israel as an army. There is no doubt that the structure of the country is based on the Army and on the concept of "one people". The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) act as the backbone of society and we find an overwhelming part of the country's top officials who have served as active soldiers. The paradigmatic example are the current leaders of the two main Knesset parties: Benny Ganz (former Chief of Staff of the IDF) and Benjamin Netanyahu (a veteran of the special forces in the 1970s, and combat wounded).

This influence exerted by the Tzahal[7] in the country is fundamentally due to three reasons. The first is the reality of war. Although, as we have previously commented, Israel is a prosperous country and practically equal to the rest of the western world, it lives in a reality of permanent conflict, both inside and outside its borders. When it is not carrying out large anti-terrorist operations such as Operation "Protective Edge," carried out in Gaza in 2014, it is in an internal fight against attacks by lone wolves (especially bloody recent episodes of knife attacks on Israeli civilians and military) and against rocket and missile launches from the Gaza Strip. The Israeli population has become accustomed to the sound of missile alarms, and to seeing the "Iron Dome" anti-missile system in operation. It is common for all houses to have small air raid shelters, as well as in public buildings and schools. In them, students learn how to behave in the face of an attack and basic security measures. The vision of the Army on the street is something completely common, whether it be armored vehicles rolling through the streets, fighters flying over the sky, or platoons of soldiers getting on the public bus with their full equipment. At this point, we must not forget the suffering in which the Palestinian population constantly lives, as well as its harsh living conditions, motivated not only by the Israeli blockade, but also by living under the government of political parties such as Al-Fatah or Hamas. The reality of war is especially present in the territories under dispute with other countries: the Golan Heights in Syria and the so-called Palestinian Territories (the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip). Military operations and clashes with insurgents are practically daily in these areas.

This permanent tension and the reality of war not only affect the population indirectly, but also directly with compulsory military service. Israel is the developed country that spends the most defense budget according to its GDP and its population.[8] Today, Israel invests 4.3% of its GDP in defense (not counting investment in industry and military R&D).[9] In the early 1980s, it came to invest around 22%. Its army has 670,000 soldiers, of whom 170,000 are professionals, and 35.9% of its population (just over 3 million) are ready for combat. It is estimated that the country can carry out a general mobilization around 48-72 hours. Its military strength is based not only on its technological vanguard in terms of weapons systems such as the F-35 (and atomic arsenal), material, armored vehicles (like the Merkava MBT), but also on its compulsory military service system that keeps the majority of the population trained to defend its country. Israel has a unique military service in the western world, being compulsory for all those over 18 years of age, be they men or women. In the case of men, it lasts 32 months, while women remain under military discipline for 21 months, although those that are framed in combat units usually serve the same time as men. Military service has exceptions, such as Arabs who do not want to serve and ultra-Orthodox Jews. However, more and more Israeli Arabs serve in the armed forces, including in mixed units with Druze, Jews and Christians; the same goes for the ultra-orthodox, who are beginning to serve in units adapted to their religious needs. Citizens who complete military service remain in the reserve until they are 40 years old, although it is estimated that only a quarter of them do so actively.[10] The same goes for the ultra-orthodox, who are beginning to serve in units adapted to their religious needs.

Social cohesion

Israeli military service and, by extension, the Israeli Defense Forces are, therefore, the greatest factor of social cohesion in the country, above even religion. This is the second reason why the army influences Israel. The experience of a country protection service carried out by all generations creates great social cohesion. In the Israeli mindset, serving in the military, protecting your family and ensuring the survival of the state is one of the greatest aspirations in life. From the school, within the academic curriculum itself, the idea of patriotism and service to the nation is integrated. And right now, despite huge contrasts between the Jewish majority and minorities, it is also a tool for social integration for Arabs, Druze and Christians. Despite racism and general mistrust towards Arabs, if you serve in the Armed Forces, the reality changes completely: you are respected, you integrate more easily into social life, and your opportunities for work and study after the enlistment period have increased considerably. Mixed units, such as Unit 585 where Bedouins and Christian Arabs serve,[11] allow these minorities to continue to throw down barriers in Israeli society, although on many occasions they find rejection from their own communities.

Israelis residing abroad are also called to service, after which many permanently settle in the country. This enhances the sense of community even for Jews still in the Diaspora.

In short, the IDF creates a sense of duty and belonging to the homeland, whatever the origin, as well as a strong link with the armed forces (which is hardly seen in other western countries) and acceptance of the sacrifices that must be made in order to ensure the survival of the country.

The third and last reason, the most important one, and the one that summarizes the role that the Army has in society and in the country, is the reality that, as said above, the survival of the country depends on the Army. This is how the military occupation of territories beyond the borders established in 1948, the bombings in civilian areas, the elimination of individual objectives are justified by the population and the Government. After 3,000 years, and since 1948 perhaps more than ever, the Israeli people depend on weapons to create a protection zone around them, and after the persecution throughout the centuries culminating in the Holocaust and its return to the "Promised Land," neither the state nor the majority of the population are willing to yield in their security against countries or organizations that directly threaten the existence of Israel as a country. This is why despite the multiple truces and the will (political and real) to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, the country cannot afford to step back in terms of preparing its armed forces and lobbying.

Obviously, during the current Covid-19 pandemic, the Army is having a key role in the success of the country in fighting the virus. The current rate of vaccination (near 70 doses per 100 people) is boosted by the use of reserve medics from the Army, as well as the logistic experience and planning (among obviously many other factors). Also, they have provided thousands of contact tracers, and the construction of hundreds of vaccination posts, and dozens of quarantine facilities. Even could be arguable that the military training could play a role in coping with the harsh restrictions that were imposed in the country.

The State-Army-People trinity exemplifies the reality that Israel lives, where the Army has a fundamental (and difficult) role in society. It is difficult to foresee a change in reality in the near future, but without a doubt, the army will continue to have the leadership role that it has assumed, in different forms, for 3,000 years.

 

[1] Genesis 15:18 New International Version (NIV). 18: "On that day the Lord made a covenant with Abram and said, 'To your descendants I give this land, from the Wadi [a] of Egypt to the great river, the Euphrates'."

[2] Great Israel matches to previously mentioned Bible passage Gen. 15: 18-21.

[3] Independent, JS (2019, May 16). This is why Palestinians wave keys during the 'Day of Catastrophe'. Retrieved March 23, 2020, from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/nakba-day-catastrophe-palestinians-israel-benjamin-netanyahu-gaza-west-bank-hamas-a8346156.html

[4] Ross Stewart (2004). Causes and Consequences of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. London: Evan Brothers, Ltd., 2004.

[5] Record of the Conversation Between the Führer and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem on November 28, 1941, in Berlin, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. XIII, London , 1964, p. 881ff, in Walter Lacquer and Barry Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader, (NY: Facts on File, 1984), pp. 79-84. Retrieved from https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-mufti-and-the-f-uuml-hrer#2."Germany stood for uncompromising war against the Jews. That naturally included active opposition to the Jewish national home in Palestine. .... Germany would furnish positive and practical aid to the Arabs involved in the same struggle .... Germany's objective [is] ... solely the destruction of the Jewish element residing in the Arab sphere .... In that hour the Mufti would be the most authoritative spokesman for the Arab world. The Mufti thanked Hitler profusely. "

[6] United Nations General Assembly A / RES / 181 (II) of 29 November 1947.

[7] Tzahal is a Hebrew acronym used to refer to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).

[8] Newsroom (8th. June 2009). Arming Up: The world's biggest military spenders by population. 03-20-2020, by The Economist Retrieved from: https://www.economist.com/news/2009/06/08/arming-up

[9] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (nd). SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Retrieved March 21, 2020, from https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex

[10] Gross, JA (2016, May 30). Just a quarter of all eligible reservists serve in the IDF. Retrieved March 22, 2020, from https://www.timesofisrael.com/just-a-quarter-of-all-eligible-reservists-serve-in-the-idf/

[AHRONHEIM, A. ( 2020, January 12). Arab Christians and Bedouins in the IDF: Meet the members of Unit 585. Retrieved March 19, 2020, from https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/The-sky-is-the-limit-in-the- IDFs-unique-Unit-585-613948

Bahrain and UAE foreign ministers sign Abraham Accords with Israeli premier in September 2020 [White House].

essay / Lucas Martín Serrano

It is interesting to incorporate a touch of history to any subject of geopolitical analysis. History is a fundamental financial aid to understand the present. And most conflicts, problems, frictions or obstacles, whether between nations or public or private entities, always have an underlying historical background. Moreover, taken to the field of negotiation, regardless of its level, demonstrating a certain historical knowledge of the adversary is useful because, on the one hand, it is not only a sample interest and respect towards him, which will always put us in an advantageous position, but, on the other hand, any stumbling block or difficulty that appears has a good chance of having its historical counterpart, and precisely there we can find the way to a solution. The party that has a greater depth of knowledge will significantly increase the chances of a solution more favorable to its interests.

In ancient times, the territory now occupied by the United Arab Emirates was inhabited by Arab tribes, nomadic farmers, artisans and traders. The plundering of the merchant ships of European powers that sailed along its coasts, approaching them more than was advisable, was commonplace. And, in a way, a way of life for part of its inhabitants. It was in the 7th century when Islam settled in the local culture. Of the two currents that emerged after the disputes that took place after the death of the Prophet, it was the Sunni current that gained hegemony from the 11th century onwards.

In order to put an end to piracy and secure the maritime trade routes, the United Kingdom, from 1820, signature a peace treaty with the sheikhs of the area. In 1853 it went a step further and managed to sign another agreement by which the entire territory was placed under the military protectorate of the United Kingdom.

The area attracted the attention of powers such as Russia, France and Germany, and in 1892, to protect their interests, the agreement was signature guaranteeing the British a monopoly on trade and exports.

The area encompassing the present seven United Arab Emirates plus Qatar and Bahrain became known as the "Trucial States".

During World War I, the airfields and ports of the Gulf played an important role in the development the conflict in favor of the United Kingdom. At the end of World War II in 1945, the League of Arab States (Arab League) was created, formed by those who enjoyed some colonial independence. The organization attracted the attention of the Truce States.

In 1960, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was created, with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Venezuela as founders and headquartered in Vienna, Austria. The seven emirates, which would later form the United Arab Emirates, joined the organization in 1967.

Since 1968, nine emirates on the eastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula had begun negotiations to form a federal state. After the final withdrawal of British troops and after Bahrain and Qatar dissociated themselves from the process and gained independence separately, in 1971, six emirates became independent from the British Empire: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Qaywayn and Fujairah, forming the federation of the United Arab Emirates, with a legal system based on the 1971 constitution. Once consolidated, they joined the Arab League on June 12. The seventh emirate, Ras Al-Khaimah, joined the following year, with the emirates of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the capital, as the strongest components.

It was the beginning of the exploitation of the huge oil wells discovered years before that gave a total turnaround to the status. After the 1973 oil crisis, the Emirates began to accumulate enormous wealth, because OPEC members decided not to export any more oil to the countries that supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War.

Oil and tourism based on urban growth and technological development are the main sources of prosperity in the country today, and a very important fact from all points of view is that 80-85% of the UAE's population is currently immigrant.

current status

It has been especially during the last decade, and partly as a consequence of the events in the region since what became known as the Arab Spring, that the US has emerged as a regional power with the capacity to influence the area.

The main characteristic that can be attributed to this appearance on the international scene is the transformation of a conservative foreign policy, very much oriented towards "self-preservation", into a more open-minded one with a clear vocation not only to play a relevant role in the region, but also to influence it in order to protect its interests.

What can be considered as Abu Dhabi's main ambition is to become a major player capable of influencing the definition and establishment of governance Structures throughout the region according to its own model, securing and expanding trade routes, bringing its neighbors into it to create a sufficiently powerful economic node with the capacity to strengthen ties with the entire East African region and with Southeast Asia, in what seems another clear example of how the global geopolitical center is already definitively shifting towards the Asia-Pacific axis.

The Emirati model has been able to evolve to integrate a growing economic openness with a conservative political model and strong government whose main speech is built on the basis of a well-established and secure state. And all this combined with a great capacity as a service provider . And interestingly, the social model is relatively secular and liberal based by regional standards.

But a fundamental fact that cannot be forgotten is the outright rejection of any political or religious ideology that poses the slightest threat to the hegemony and supremacy of the State and its leaders.

It is Abu Dhabi, as the largest and most prosperous of the seven emirates, that exerts the most influence in setting the broad lines of both domestic and foreign policy. Indeed, the evolution of the model set by the UAE is firmly associated with Abu Dhabi's crown prince and de facto leader of the emirate, Mohamed bin Zayed (MbZ).

What cannot be lost sight of is that, although MbZ and his inner circle of trust share the same vision of the world and politics, his actions and decisions do not necessarily follow a pre-established plan. There is no basic doctrine with marked tactical and strategic objectives and the lines of work to be followed to achieve them.

Their way of carrying out the country strategy, if it can be called that, is based on a small group belonging to that inner circle, which puts on the table several options usually tactical and reactive to any problem or issue that arises to carry out. Based on these, the top leadership follows an ad hoc decision-making process that can lead to an excessive need for subsequent corrections and adjustments that in turn result in missed opportunities.

Threats - security status

Emirati authorities have a clear perception of what the main geostrategic threats to their development are: on the one hand, the Iranian-promoted transnational spread of Islamist political ideology and, on the other, the influence sought by the Muslim Brotherhood and its promoters and supporters, including Qatar and Turkey, is perceived as an existential threat to their vision of a more secular form of government, as well as to the stability of the current regional status quo, given that they can act as a catalyst for radicalism in the area.

However, Abu Dhabi has been much more belligerent in its speech against the Muslim Brotherhood and those who support them, while remaining cautious in its stance against Iran.

The recent agreement with the State of Israel has served to undermine the credibility of many of the traditional and deep-rooted clichés and at the same time has revealed the birth of a Jewish-Sunni bloc as a civil service examination to the belligerent and growing Shiite current led by Iran and its proxies, active in practically all the countries of the area and in all the regional conflicts.

This new status should serve the Western powers to confirm that in the Middle East region the vision of their own problems has changed and Iran and its particular way of exercising its foreign policy and defending its interests are now considered a much more destabilizing factor than the long-lasting Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The threat posed by Iran has acted as a catalyst in bringing together criteria while, in spite of everything, Israel is seen as an element that provides stability both militarily and economically.

The UAE-Israel Treaty

On September 15, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain formalized the normalization of their relations. This agreement means that four Arab states have now accepted Israel's right to exist, and this is undoubtedly a real diplomatic success.

The fact that it was precisely the UAE and Bahrain is no coincidence. Neither state has been involved in a direct war against Israel. And, if this characteristic is common to both states, Bahrain's relationship with Israel has been much more fluid than that of the UAE. This reality is supported by the Jewish community settled in Al-Qatif and its integration, which has translated into full and active participation in Bahrain's political life. This has helped to ensure that relations between Manama and Jerusalem have not been at all conflictive.

Despite being seen in the eyes of the general public as a novelty, the truth is that the recent agreement reached is the third "Peace Treaty" that the Hebrew country has signature with an Arab nation. However, it is the first that seems to be born with a sufficiently solid foundation to augur a new, much more stable and lasting status , in clear contrast to the relations resulting from the previous agreements with Egypt and Jordan, which were very limited to personal relations and in the field of security and conventional diplomacy.

The new agreement with Israel establishes a new partnership path that affects the entire Middle East, including substantially counterbalancing Iran's influence, fostering trade relations, tourism, partnership in military subject , intelligence sharing, cooperation in the health area and thus helping to position the UAE to lead Arab diplomacy in the region by offering a solid civil service examination to Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its Palestinian arm in Gaza, Hamas, and thus opening the door for other countries in the area to take steps in the same direction.

Israel's decision to fail the announced annexation under its sovereignty of certain areas of the West Bank is test that these moves in the region are much deeper and much more prepared and agreed in advance than can be imagined.

And this is precisely one of the major differences with previous agreements. The great expectation that has been created and the clear indications that other countries, including Saudi Arabia, will follow the UAE's lead.

In fact, a significant step has been taken in this direction, and it was something as simple as an Israeli "EI-Al" plane flying over Saudi airspace carrying as passengers a large issue of businessmen, official staff and investors on their way to the Emirates as a gesture of goodwill. And contrary to what might have been expected at other times, this did not have any repercussions in the Arab world, nor did it provoke any protest or demonstration against it subject

Places such as Amman, Beirut, Tunis and Rabat, where traditionally demonstrations against the Israeli "occupation" and similar accusations are usually large in terms of participation, remained completely calm on this occasion.

But if this fact has gone unnoticed by the general population, it has not gone unnoticed by the leaders of the Middle East powers and the violent organizations they use as proxies.

For those who aspire to follow in the UAE's footsteps and establish relations with Israel, this has served as a spur to reaffirm their decision, as the sense of unease or even danger emanating from the streets in the Arab world regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that such a move could provoke has diminished.

On the contrary, it has been a hard lesson for Iran and its proxies . Not only because the Palestinian cause, raised and put on the table for so long, has notably diminished its importance, but also because it has coincided in time with potestas in both Iraq and Lebanon in the complete opposite direction, that is, against Iran's interference in the internal affairs of both countries.

As a conclusion, it should be drawn that, although this absence of protests over the Israel-UAE agreement may seem surprising, it is nothing more than a clear sign of a long process of political maturation and evolution within the Arab world in general.

The population of the Middle East in general no longer aspires to a pan-Arabist, pan-Islamic unity, to the establishment of the Great Caliphate or, in the case of Iran or Turkey, to imperialist dreams that are a thing of the past. What the mass of the people and society really want is to improve their welfare, to have more and more attractive economic opportunities, to have a good educational system, to improve the levels of development in all areas, to have the rule of law, and for the rule of law to be equal for all in their respective countries.

The treaty that is the subject of this item fits perfectly within these aspirations and this mental outline . The masses who once took to the streets no longer believe that the Palestinian cause is worthy of more effort and attention than their own struggle to achieve a better future for their nations.

And, this is very important, despite the opacity of the ayatollahs' regime, in Iran, the population is less and less submissive to policies that lead the country to a series of permanent conflicts with no end in sight, which cause a waste of the country's resources to maintain them.

Just two days after the advertisement the peace agreement , the United Arab Emirates lifted the ban on telephone communication with Israel, with Hebrew Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi and his Emirati counterpart Abdullah binZayed symbolizing the opening of this new line of communication.

Almost immediately thereafter, a team from the Israeli Foreign Ministry traveled to Abu Dhabi to begin looking for possible sites for the future Israeli embassy headquarters.

A significant flow of investment from the UAE is being channeled to Israeli companies seeking new ways to treat COVID19 and to develop new tests to detect the disease. The increase in business deals between Israeli and Emirati companies has been almost immediate, and the "El-Al" company is already working to open a direct corridor between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi.

All this is favoring that, in view of the new status and new approaches, Morocco, Oman and other Arab countries are making moves to follow in the UAE's footsteps. Israel's attractiveness is only increasing, in a significant evolution from being the most hated country in the region to being the most desired partner .

However, one factor to consider is the impact in the US and Europe. In the West, in general, the Palestinian cause is gaining support mainly due to the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. Therefore, changes in relations with Israel are likely not only to fail to undermine that support, but to spur increased efforts to prevent normalization through disinformation campaigns spreading hatred of Israel.

Finally, the civil service examination by Turkey, Qatar and Iran was something that can be described as predictable, but it is also a clarifying element. The Iranian president has called the agreement a "grave mistake", while his Turkish counterpart has threatened to close the UAE embassy in Turkey. In both cases, the ultimate reason for this reaction is the same: the use of the Palestinian cause for the benefit of their own interests and, coincidentally, both are on this occasion coincidental, to distract public opinion from the difficult economic status that, for different reasons, the two countries are going through.

Regional policy

The most important and enduring element in the UAE's foreign and security policy is its strategic alliances with the US and Saudi Arabia. Although the UAE has followed a more independent line over the last decade, the developments and this new direction would not have been possible without the support of the US, on whose protection the small but wealthy and at the same time sparsely populated state relies, and on whom it can count when exporting its energy resources in the event of a conflict.

Even during the time of the Obama administration, when relations became strained due to the policy taken by the US in relation to the events of the "Arab Spring" and with respect to Iran, the strategic alliance between the two nations was maintained.

The clearly defined anti-Iranian policy of the government led by Donald Trump, equivalent to that of the UAE, facilitated a rapid improvement in relations once again, and the new US administration saw the Emirates as a fundamental pillar on which to base its policy in the Middle East. Thus, today, together with Israel and Saudi Arabia, the UAE is the main US ally in the region.

Unlike the US, Saudi Arabia became a strategic partner in the UAE's new regional policy during Obama's tenure. In fact, the two nations have maintained close ties since the birth of the Emirates in 1971, but the new young state naturally remained in the shadow of the other, more established nation, following the policies of its "big brother".

This status changed with the rise to power of Mohamed Bin Zayed who, since 2011, was determined to champion a political line of joint actions in the region that have ultimately been decisive. MbZ found his perfect counterpart in Saudi Prince Mohamed Bin Salman, who gradually, since 2015 was taking the reins as the visible head of Saudi Arabia's policy. To such an extent that in certain cases such as Yemen and Qatar, the UAE's leadership and drive seems to have been the binding force of joint regional policies.

Alliances

United States

The US role as an ally of the UAE dates back to the early 1980s, just after the Iranian revolution of 1979, which meant the loss of its most important ally in the region and the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war.

However, it was the 1990-1991 Gulf War that, with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, showed the UAE how vulnerable the small Gulf States were to military aggression by any of their powerful neighbors.

In order to ensure protection, and in the same way as other countries in the region, the UAE favored an increased US presence on its territory in the years following the war. This was concluded with a bilateral security agreement signed in July 1994. Under this agreement, the United States received access to the Emirates' air instructions and ports and, in return, undertook to protect the country from possible external aggression. What is interesting, and gives a measure of how the status has evolved, is that the agreement remained secret at Abu Dhabi's request because of the UAE's fear of possible criticism and protests both internally and from Iran.

Initially, the UAE was just another US ally in the Persian Gulf. However, its importance as a partner increased between 1990 and 2000, in part due to the port of Jebel Ali, which became the US Navy's most used base outside the country, and the Al Dhafra air base, a core topic facility for US activities in the region.

Moreover, since the end of the 1990s, the UAE began a process to show itself to its new ally as a reliable and more relevant partner , increasing the quantity and level of its cooperation. Following that line, Emirati military forces have participated in all major US operations in the Middle East, from the Gulf War in 1991 to Somalia in 1992, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan since 2002, Libya since 2011, and Syria (in the framework of the fight against Daesh) between 2014 and 2015. Only participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was avoided by the Emirates, and in a very vehement way. From this involvement, the UAE Armed Forces have gained a great deal of experience on the ground which has redounded to their effectiveness and professionalism.

This involvement in the not infrequently controversial US military actions in Arab countries has undoubtedly been a key element for the United States. Not only because of what it means from the point of view of image and narrative that at least one Muslim country supported them, but also because Abu Dhabi's contribution has not been limited to the military aspect. Humanitarian organizations have acted in parallel with the aim of gaining the support of the population wherever they have intervened by investing huge amounts of money. The clearest example is Afghanistan, where Emirates has spent millions of dollars on humanitarian and development projects to help stabilize the country, while providing a small contingent of special operations forces in the particularly dangerous southern part of the country since 2003. In addition, between 2012 and 2014 they expanded their deployment with six F16 aircraft to support air operations against the Taliban. Even when the US began its phased withdrawal after 2014, Emirati troops continued in Afghanistan.

Getting the UAE on board in the cause of fighting the jihadists was not a difficult task at all, as its leaders are particularly averse to any form of religious extremism that affects the political system within Islam. This is the main reason for its Air Force's involvement in the US-led coalition against Daesh in Syria between 2014 and 2015. To such an extent that, after the US aircraft, it was those from the UAE that carried out the most sorties against jihadist targets.

But the partnership was not limited to the US. Both Australia and France had the air instructions of the emirates at their disposal to carry out their operations.

Only the open break in hostilities and the UAE's involvement in the 2015 Yemen War reduced its involvement in the fight against Daesh.

But it has not all been easy. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 produced deep misgivings in the UAE, which considered it a grave mistake. Their fear was that such an intervention would end up increasing Iran's influence over Iraq, or lead to civil war, which would destabilize the whole region.

Fears were realized when in 2005 a Shiite coalition close to Iran won the elections in Iraq and war broke out, leaving the UAE with its hands tied to try to influence the status quo in any way. Their biggest concern then was that a premature withdrawal of all U.S. forces would further complicate the status.

The renewed relationship with the Trump administration has led to the signature a new security and cooperation agreement signed in 2017. In contrast to what happened in 1994, the contents of the agreement have been made public, and reference letter mainly to the presence of US troops on Emirati soil on a permanent basis. The agreement also covers the training of Emirati Armed Forces and the conduct of joint exercises on a regular basis.

Thanks to this agreement, the US presence in the Emirates is larger than ever. There are currently some 5,000 men deployed between the Al Dhafra air base, the port of Jebel Ali and some other small instructions or naval stations. At the aforementioned air base alone there are 3,500 men who, from there, operate from F-15, F-22 and F-35 fighter jets, in addition to reconnaissance aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

For its part, the UAE has continued to develop its own military capabilities by acquiring US-made material, mainly anti-aircraft systems ("Patriot" and THAAD) and fighter planes (110 F-16s). In addition, for a couple of years now, the UAE has shown great interest in acquiring the new F-35, although negotiations, not without some reluctance, are still ongoing.

Problems arose in 2018 for the supply of precision-guided munitions to both the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as both countries were using them in the Yemen War. The murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Kashoggi compounded the resistance from the US congress , forcing President Trump to use his veto power in order to maintain the supply. This gives a measure of how decisive the current administration's attitude towards both countries is.

Despite all the difficulties mentioned above, the current US administration has redoubled its efforts to support the UAE in its regional policies, as they are in line with US objectives.

The first goal has been to build an anti-Iran alliance among Middle Eastern states that includes the UAE as acore topic partner along with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This plan is fully in line with Abu Dhabi's aspiration to gain some leadership in the region, and is likely to prosper, as the UAE is likely to support the US in a solution to the Palestinian conflict that is quite in line with the Israeli proposal .

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is currently the UAE's most important ally in the region. Both states are financed by crude oil exports and both are equally wary of the expansionist ambitions of their powerful neighbors, especially Iran.

However, for a long time, despite this alliance, the UAE has feared that Saudi Arabia, using its unequal size in terms of population, military strength and oil production capacity, would try to maintain a hegemonic position in the Persian Gulf.

In 1981, the countries of the Persian Gulf seized the opportunity to create an alliance that excluded the then major regional powers. Thus, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE created the Cooperation committee for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC). This committee had a joint military force that never reached a significant size. The biggest test of the GCC's weakness and ineffectiveness was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait without any civil service examination by the supranational body.

As a result , the UAE relied on the US for its protection, the only country that was both willing and able to undertake the task of defending the small state against potential foreign aggression.

The consequence at the regional level is marked by the convergence of interests of Saudi Arabia and the UAE which, between 2011 and 2019, have pursued common regional political objectives relying if necessary on their military capabilities.

As an example, we have Bahrain's financial aid request to the GCC in 2011 when its rulers felt threatened by Shiite protest movements. However, its most relevant intervention was its support for the coup d'état in Egypt against President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013.

India

Socio-political and economic relations between the GCC members and India have always been very close, and have been based on the understanding that a secure and stable environment both politically and socially in the Persian Gulf environment and in the Indian subcontinent are critical factors for the development of the respective countries and their trans-regional ties.

From India's perspective, improving its technological and economic development goes hand in hand with New Delhi's ability to strengthen its partnerships around the world. In this regard, the Persian Gulf countries, and especially the UAE, are seen as a bridge to access knowledge, capabilities, resources and markets to enhance this development.

In 2016, the hitherto bilateral relations between the two countries were formalized in a strategic cooperation agreement called CSP(Comprehensive Strategic Partnership).

For the UAE, India is a modern country, a political phenomenon independent of the West that maintains strong religious and traditional roots without renouncing its diversity. In a way, and with some reservations, it is a mirror for the UAE to look into.

The cooperation agreement is cross-cutting and covers issues as diverse as the fight against terrorism, exchange information and intelligence, measures to combat money laundering, cybersecurity, as well as cooperation on defense subject , financial aid and humanitarian financial aid , etc.

On the more economic side, the initiative includes concrete actions to facilitate trade and investment, with the UAE committing to a $75 billion goal to support the development of new generation infrastructure in India, especially railways, ports, roads, airports and industrial parks.

With regard to the energy sector, the agreement provides for the UAE's participation in the modernization of the oil sector in all its branches, taking into account the development of a strategic reservation .

Very significant is the part dealing with the development of technology for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, as well as cooperation in the aerospace sector including the joint development and launching of satellites, as well as the necessary ground control infrastructure and all necessary applications.

Today, India has growing and multifaceted socio-economic ties with both Israel and the Persian Gulf countries, and especially the UAE. The diaspora of Indian workers in the Persian Gulf accounts for annual remittances of nearly $50 billion. Trade relations bring in more than $150 billion to the Asian country's coffers, and almost two thirds of the country's hydrocarbon needs come from that region. It is therefore evident that the new status is viewed with special interest from this part of the world, assessing opportunities and possible threats.

Obviously, any agreement such as this one, which at least a priori implies more stability and a normalization of relations, will always be beneficial, but its weaknesses and the possible evolution of the status must also be taken into account.

Thus, from a geopolitical point of view, India has welcomed the re-establishment of relations between the UAE and Israel, as both are strategic partners.

The new scenario that is opening up between Israel and the GCC seems to bring closer a moderate and consistent solution to the Palestinian problem, making the work of Indian diplomacy much easier.

But we must be cautious, and especially in this part of the world, nothing is of one color. This hopeful agreement could have a perverse effect that could further polarize the jihadist sectors of the Arab world, pitting them even more against each other.

The possibility of the Persian Gulf region becoming the new battleground where Iranian and Israeli proxies clash cannot be completely ruled out, especially in those areas controlled by the Shiites. However, it is not a likely option for the time being.

But for India, managing the economic implications of the new treaty is even more important. With defense and security cooperation as key pillars, both sides are now beginning to contemplate the real economic potential that will be opened up by complementing their economies.

Reactions to the treaty: scenarios   

Faced with an event as relevant as the one described above, it is to be expected that there will be reactions in several directions, and depending on these, the evolution of the status may be different.

The actors that can play a relevant role in the different scenarios are the UAE and the new alliance, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Palestine and the Muslim Brotherhood.

It should not be forgotten that the background of this treaty is economic. If its development is successful, it will bring stability to a region that has long been punished by all subject of conflicts and confrontations and will lead to an exponential increase in commercial operations, transfer of technology and the opening of new routes and collaborations, mainly with Southeast Asia.

The role of the US will be decisive in any of the scenarios that may arise, but in any of them its position will be to minimize its physical presence and support the signatories of the treaty with political, economic and defense actions through the supply of military material.

The treaty has a strong economic component fixed on the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia. This is but one more sign of how the world's geopolitical center of gravity is shifting to the Asia-Pacific region and this is one of the main reasons for the unconditional support of the US.

Members of the UAE government have traditionally viewed more radical Islamist ideologies and policies as posing an existential threat to the country's core values. Both the Shiite sectarian regime in Iran and the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood group are seen as a constant threat to the stability of the region's powers.

For the UAE, these transnational movements are a catalyst for radicalism throughout the region.

In view of the above, the following scenarios are plausible:

Scenario 1

For the time being, the Palestinians are the ones whose interests will be most harmed by the new status . Prominent figures in Palestinian society, as well as senior officials of the Palestinian Authority, have considered the new treaty as a betrayal. As mentioned, the Palestinian issue is taking a back seat in the Arab world.

If, as is predicted, more countries join the new treaty in the coming months, the Palestinian Authority may try by all means to bring its claims and its struggle back to the forefront. To this end, it would count on the support of Iran and its proxies and Turkey. In this status, it would start by delegitimizing the governments of the countries that have aligned themselves with the UAE and Israel through a strong information campaign at all levels, with a massive use of social networks in order to mobilize the most sensitive and pro-Palestinian population. The goal would be to promote demonstrations and/or revolts that would create doubts in those who have not yet adhered to the pact. These doubts could lead to a change of decision or delay in new accessions, or these new candidates to join the treaty could increase the conditions related to the Palestinians in order to join it. This option is the most dangerous because of the possibility of generating dissension or internal discussions that could lead to an implosion of the pact.

A likely scenario of leave intensity can be considered.

Scenario 2

The position taken by Saudi Arabia is a core topic. And it will be decisive in gauging Iran's reaction. In the Middle East ecosystem, Iran is the power that has the most to lose from this new alliance. The struggle for hegemony within the Muslim world cannot be forgotten. And this struggle, which is also religious, as it pits Shiites and Sunnis against each other, has Iran and Saudi Arabia as its main protagonists.

Saudi Arabia is likely to join the treaty, but given the status, and in an attempt not to further tighten the rope with its main enemy, it may decide not to join the treaty, but to support it from outside with specific or bilateral agreements. Always with the rest of the Arab countries that are members of it, which would act as a bridge for its relations with Israel. It would be a way to wash its face and avoid the express recognition of the State of Israel or its direct relations with it. It is necessary to take into account the pockets of Shiite majority in the country, which could be encouraged by Iran.

However, in a worst-case scenario, Iran will react through its proxies, intensifying its activity in Yemen, trying to promote protests and revolts inside Saudi Arabia, reinforcing its support for Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon and even its militias in Iraq.

Support for the protests that have already taken place in Sudan will also be part of this campaign. Sudan is a very unstable country, with very weak power Structures that are unlikely to be able to quell high-intensity revolts.

The goal would be to inflame the region under the cover of support for the Palestinian people in order to dissuade further adherence to the treaty, as well as to undermine the effectiveness of the treaty, giving the image of instability and insecurity in the region. This will discourage potential investors from approaching the UAE attracted by the enormous economic possibilities it offers while keeping Saudi Arabia busy with its southern flank and its internal problems. Some action without a clear or recognized perpetrator against ships transiting the Gulf, as has already happened, or the boarding of any of them by Iranian forces under any subject of accusation or legal ruse, cannot be ruled out. Direct actions involving Iranian forces are not likely.

Turkey may become involved by providing weapons, technology and even mercenary fighters to any of the factions acting as Iran's proxy.

This scenario can be considered as possible and of average intensity.

Scenario 3

Iran needs either the governments or the population of the different countries of the Middle East to continue to see Israel as its main enemy and threat. Among other reasons, because it is a narrative of internal consumption that is recurrently used to divert the attention of its own population from other problems subject So far, the unifying element of this way of looking at Israel has been the Palestinian conflict. Therefore, it is likely that actions will be taken that will provoke a reaction from Israel. These actions may be within the State of Israel itself from Palestinian or Lebanese territory, always in the position of Iran's proxies. A provocation result in an Israeli attack on Arab territory, probably against Iran or Syria, cannot be ruled out. The ultimate goal would not be the Hebrew State but to undermine the treaty's instructions , to create social unrest among the signatories, to prevent Saudi Arabia's accession and to be able to use the Palestinian conflict in its own interests.

This is a possible and high intensity scenario. 

Conclusions

The emergence of the UAE as an emerging geopolitical power in the Middle East has been as surprising as it has been precipitous, since not so long ago international observers did not give much hope for the life of the new federation of small states that had just been born.

On the contrary, the UAE and Abu Dhabi, its largest and most prosperous emirate, in particular, has been increasing its position over the last decade, playing a decisive role in the region. To such an extent that, to this day, the UAE's actions are considered to have facilitated to some extent the changes we are witnessing.

Western politicians are generally dazzled by the perceived liberalism of the UAE and the ability of its elites to speak both literally and figuratively their own language. It is important that they become familiar with the UAE model in all its aspects and, what is the core topic, that they understand that Abu Dhabi expects to be treated by all as an equal. Dealing with the UAE in this way and considering it a robust and reliable partner also means sending them the message of a clear intention to support them.

One of the major consequences of this agreement may be to de-escalate the Palestinian conflict, if not end it, then permanently limit it. For generations, this conflict has been used by political and religious leaders throughout the Arab and Muslim world to distract their attention from other issues. It was an easy and readily available resource . But it is now recognized that it is a territorial dispute between two peoples, and future negotiations have no choice but to go down that road, putting the focus on the outdated Palestinian leadership.

There is the not inconsiderable possibility that the agreement reached could have a domino effect and drag other states in the area to follow in the footsteps of the UAE, which in some cases would only mean publicizing the de facto relations they already have with the State of Israel. In this regard, talks between the Omani foreign minister and his Israeli counterpart are known to have taken place just after the signature the treaty with the UAE.

Also, the Israeli Prime Minister held a meeting with Sudanese leader Abdel Fattah Burhan, which could be a sign of upcoming moves on that flank as well.

Although the leak had consequences for a high-ranking Sudanese official, the government did not deny the contacts. And all this was confirmed when the US, in advertisement of Sudan's forthcoming removal from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism, followed the agreement between Israel and Sudan to normalize their diplomatic relations.

For years, US policy has been to demilitarize its position in the Middle East; the cost of its presence has been very high compared to the benefits it brings, as well as generating some animosity. Both the US and other G8 members support the UAE as the economic leader in the region. This support provides them with the ideal position to deploy their economic interests in the region(commodities, research and development & investment). 

This position of US/UAE support (plus some G8 countries), strengthens the role of the Arab country in the region in political and military subject , and in a certain way allows its new allies and supporters to have some influence in organizations such as OPEC, GCC, Arab League) and in neighboring countries, but from a more Arab and less Western position.

Regarding the issue of the UAE's purchase of the F-35, it is undeniable that this issue makes Israel uncomfortable despite the change in relations. The main reason is the fear of an equalization in military capabilities that could be dangerous. However, this will not be an obstacle to progress in future peace agreements and in the development the peace agreement. Such a major operation would take years to materialize and by then, relations between Jerusalem and Abu Dhabi will have been consolidated. Moreover, it may even be welcomed by Israel, as it would strengthen its military capabilities vis-à-vis its main opponents in the region.

It is becoming increasingly apparent in the Arab world that Israel is too small to harbor imperialistic aspirations, in contrast to countries like Turkey and Iran, both of which formed former empires, and which seem intent on trying to restore what they once achieved or were.

Instead, Israel is increasingly seen as a strong, prosperous and dynamic enough country that cooperation with Jerusalem is a smart move that can provide benefits to both sides.

The agreement between Israel and the UAE may have been driven in part by their fear of Iran's advances and the danger it poses. But the benefits to them go far beyond that issue.

These extend to economic investment possibilities, finance, tourism and especially know-how sharing. The UAE can benefit from Israel's technological and scientific advantage just as Israel can profit from the UAE's position as a hub for international services and a key entrance the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia.

Regarding the entrance to the Indian subcontinent, it should be noted that for India the most important part of the agreement is to manage the economic side of the synergies caused by the agreement.

The UAE and Bahrain can become intermediaries for Israeli exports of both commodities and services to various parts of the world.

Israel has a strong defense, security and surveillance equipment industry. It is a leader in dryland farming, solar energy, horticulture, high-tech jewelry and pharmaceuticals.

Moreover, Israel has the capacity to provide highly skilled and semi-skilled labor to the GCC countries, especially if they come from the Sephardic and Mizrahim ethnic groups, many of whom speak Arabic. Even Israeli Arabs can find opportunities that help to further build ties and bridges that bridge the cultural divide.

Israel's incursion into the Gulf has the potential to influence the politico-economic architecture that India has been building for years, being, for example, one of the largest suppliers of workers, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals etc.

The largest customers in Dubai's real estate market, as well as the largest issue of tourists visiting the country, come from India. But in this changing scenario there is scope for three-way synergies, making India a major player in this.

The final conclusion that can be drawn by way of future evaluation is that this new relationship will undoubtedly be a model for other Sunni states to follow, transforming a region mired in 19th century conflicts into one of the power centers of the 21st century.

* Lieutenant Colonel of Infantry. Geopolitical Analyst

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acharya, Arabinda, "COVID-19: A Testing Time for UAE-India Relations? A Perspective from Abu Dhabi," Strategic Analysis, September 2020.

Arab Center for Research and Policy studies, "The Abraham Agreement: normalization of relations or announcement of an existing Emirati - Israeli alliance?". Qatar, August 2020.

Karsh, Ephraim, ed., "The Israel-UAE Peace: A Preliminary Assessment", Ramat Gan: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, cafeteria University, September 2020.

Salisbury, Peter, "Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy", The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme, London: July 2020.

Steinber, Guido, "Regional Powers, United Arab Emirates", German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, July 2020.

▲ Nicolás Maduro during a broadcasted speech [Gov. of Venezuela].

ESSAY / Isabelle León Graticola

It is no secret to anyone that Venezuela is going through the most convoluted economic and social crisis in its history, a crisis in which the creators have manipulated the existence of the people, degrading its integrity, and extinguishing everything that once characterized Venezuela.

The country holds a key geopolitical location that serves as a route for North America and the Caribbean to the rest of South America. Likewise, the country is endowed with abundant natural resources like natural gas, iron ore, diamonds, gold, and oil.1 Venezuela has the largest proven oil reserves in the world, with 302 billion barrels in January 2018, emanating an extremely rich country with astonishing potential.2 However, this crisis has not only hindered people's lives but has ironically dissipated the country's resources to consolidate the pillars of the regime to such an extent that today the government of Nicolás Maduro is importing oil from Iran. Inadequate policies that have weakened the society's sense of responsibility and nationalism, decreased foreign investment out of lack of trust, and annihilated the state-led oil production, therefore reinforcing the country's economic downfall and hyperinflation.

The Venezuelan government, headed by Nicolás Maduro, has managed its way to continue holding power despite accusations of corruption, crimes against humanity, and even drugs trafficking involvement. The perplexing partner and political crisis has created an unsustainable and violent context in which poorly informed people are manipulated by the government through speeches that take big significance on how society perceives the actual situation, as well as other countries' statements on the crisis. Up to this point, it has become difficult to understand what keeps bolstering this regime, but if the situation is analyzed from the nucleus, the well-orchestrated rhetoric of Chávez and his successor, Maduro, has contributed to support the ends and sustainment of the regime. 

Since Maduro reached power, poverty motivated violence has been rampant in Venezuela and insecurity has become a significant part of society's dynamics. Consequently, many protests against the government demanding for freedom and better living standards have taken place. Maduro's regime has been forced to employ tools such as fake news and hateful rhetoric to soften the anger of the people by manipulating them and brainwashing the armed forces to avoid uprisings. 

This article aims to analyze how Maduro's rhetoric has maintained a minority in the wrong side of history and a majority in constant battle by making erroneous accusations to third parties to justify the perturbed situation, while the government keeps enriching its wallet at the cost of the people and its smudged operations. Such feverish society gave rise to pure uncertainty, to a place where disinformation takes the form of a lethal weapon for the dangerous context in which it exists.

The background: Chávez's indoctrinated society

First, it is necessary to clarify that the focus of this article is merely on the rhetorical aspect as a pillar of the regime. However, when it comes to the background that has sustained Maduro's administration up to this day, there is a more complex reality, full of crime, death, manipulation, and corruption. Venezuela is an almost abnormal reality because, after more than twenty years, it is still tied to a group of people who have taken absolutely everything from it. From a man that portrayed nothing but hope for the poor, to one who has managed his way sticking to policies damaging to the very people they mean to help, and which, sooner or later, will make the regime collapse.

Hugo Chávez's presidency was characterized by a tremendous and persuasive oratory; he knew how to get to the people. Chávez's measures and campaigns were based on a psychological strategy that won him the admiration of the most impoverished classes of the country. Chávez arrived and gave importance and attention to the big mass of the population that previous governments had systematically neglected. People felt the time had come for them to have what they never had before. Filled with charisma and political mastery, his speeches always contained jokes, dances, and colloquial phrases that were considered indecent by the country's highest class and often misunderstood abroad.

Chávez always built a drastic separation between the ideals of the United States and Venezuela and looked for ways to antagonize the former with his rhetoric. He began to refer to George W. Bush as "Mr. Danger", an imperial literary character of one of the most famous Venezuelan novels, Doña Bárbara.3

Hugo Chávez is one of the most revolutionary characters in Venezuelan history, one who brought the convoluted situation that today perpetuates in the country. Chávez persecuted journalists and political opponents, expropriated lands, nationalized Venezuela's key industries such as telecommunications, electricity, and the refining processes of heavy crudes, and slowly degraded the society as the exercise of power was directed to hold complete control of Venezuela's internal dynamics.4

Chávez extended education and medical assistance to the least favored classes and improved the living conditions of the needy. This policy did nothing but create among these classes a culture of dependence on the government. Chávez's supporters or Chavistas were the pillars that buttressed the government, while the wealthy were cataloged as "squealing pigs" and "vampires. "5 The Chavistas admired Chavez's charismatic character and his constant gifts; he gave them fridges and TVs, gadgets that they could never afford on their own. He also constructed buildings, under the "mission statement Vivienda" initiative, to give people living in slums a 'proper' home. All of this was possible because the oil prices at the time were skyrocketing; he used the oil income to buy his support. The general standard of life, however, continued to be poor. The government knew what to give and how to manipulate to stay in power, and that is precisely what made Hugo Chávez so powerful and almost impossible to defeat despite strong opposition. 

Historically, the United States has opposed left-wing governments in Latin America, so Chávez condemned the US, by referring to them as an imperialist power, or the "Empire". He disgraced US leaders and actions and transferred that anti-imperialistic and anti-capitalist approach to the population, part of which supported him and was blindly loyal to the cause. Chávez's alliance with Cuba under Fidel Castro led to the supply of oil at cut-rate prices, all related to the desire of reducing US economic influence in South America. Chavez's populist initiatives were the tenets of his administration and controversial foreign policy. These, along with his rhetoric and opposition from the Venezuelan wealthy class, deeply polarized the society and gave rise to what Venezuela has today: a divided society that has suffered from the lack of basic necessities, disinformation, and integrity.

Currently, the spokesmen of the Government of Nicolás Maduro address citizens at all hours from public channels and social networks to stir up the disgruntlement of the population toward the external enemy.6 Despite the poorly prepared speeches, the lack of vocabulary, and the improper formulation of sentences, Maduro has kept the colloquial and unformal rhetoric that characterized Chávez, but has failed to draw the connection that the late president enjoyed. The anti-imperialist strategy has been maintained, and, as the justification of the crisis, it has become the epicenter of the regime's speech. Nicolás Maduro's rhetoric revolves around two words: the US and the "Patria", a word frequently used by Chávez.

The base of Maduro's rhetoric: the love for Chávez

Shortly before dying in March 2013, Hugo Chávez appointed Vice President Nicolás Maduro as his successor. Chávez's charisma and legacy are what somehow ensured him that Maduro would provide a smooth transition. After Chávez's passing, Maduro took advantage of the momentum and sentiment that the Chavistas revealed and ensured that if picked, he would follow the steps of his predecessor and would continue to strengthen the 'Bolivarian Revolution'. Along with the continuity with Chávez's legacy, the defense of Venezuelan sovereignty in front of the US, and the social equality became the key messages of his administration.7 Nevertheless, Maduro had little support from the elites and inherited a country that was already economically weak due to the downfall of the oil prices and corruption.

In Chávez's wake, Maduro appealed to the emotion of the audience. He strongly claimed that the people were there for the 'Comandante' and said that "his soul and his spirit was so strong that his body could not stand it anymore, and he was released and now through this universe expanding filling us with blessings and love". He knew what this meant for the people and a crying audience exclaimed "Chávez lives, the fight goes on".

Maduro filled his rhetoric with the love for Chávez. He acknowledged that the Chavistas worshipped him as if he was God and that for ideological reasons, support for Maduro was guaranteed. Nevertheless, others recognized that the situation in the country was not favorable and questioned Maduro's ability to fill the void left by Chávez. When Maduro took power, the country entered a period of reinforced economic decline accompanied by hyperinflation that nowadays exceeds 10 million percent.8 As it was previously stated, the conditions of poverty surpass anything seen before in the country, which is now on the brink of collapse.

Furthermore, Venezuela went through two rounds of mass protests, in 2014 and 2018, that demanded freedom and change. Unfortunately, and as was expected from the government, thousands of violations of human rights were part of the demonstration's dynamics as brutal repression and the unjust imprisonment of demonstrators took place all along. Simultaneously, Maduro managed to call for rallies on the days of the major opposition's marches and retained the populist speech based on ideological arguments and emotional appeals among the minority of supporters to consolidate his power in Venezuela. Last year, in a regime rally on February 23rd, he condemned the elites as he explained that he was certain that from the bottom of his Chavista sentiment of loyalty to this battle, he was never going to be part of one. He stated that Venezuela will continue to be Patria for more many years to come. 

The ongoing crisis has forced many to survive rather than to live, but despite all, Maduro remains in control. Maduro has kept Chávez's anti-imperialist policy and has rejected any minimum support from the United States. The government takes advantage of the hunger and the vulnerable situation of its people and makes sure that it remains as the only source of food. It does not take responsibility and instead, blames the crisis on the 'economic war' that the US has imposed on Venezuela.9 When Juan Guaidó sworn himself the legitimate president, Maduro's supporters started raising firms in a campaign called "Hands off Venezuela", while the US was trying to get humanitarian assistance into Venezuela through the Colombian border in the name of Guaidó. 

In this sense, he explained in the same concentration speech that they were defending the national territory and the right to live freely and independently. Although it may seem ironic, because the government has killed hundreds of people with its police brutality and torture, this rhetoric is what has kept him the support of the hardcore revolutionary followers. The "Hands off Venezuela", was shouted and accompanied by the worst English pronunciation -that characterizes Maduro-, and followed with insults to Guaidó.

As Maduro yelled "puppet, clown, and beggar of imperialism and Donald Trump. If he is the President, where are the economic and social measures that he has applied for the people? It is a game to deceive and manipulate, it is a game that has failed, the coup d'état has failed" as the network audience shouted, "jail him, jail him!". He drew his speech to a hardcore anti-imperialist audience and firmly stated that the US intended to invade Venezuela and enslave it. Maduro finalized his speech by shouting "wave up the flag, up the Patria, for the people in defense of the Revolution".

Recently, the US State Department released a price for the capture of Maduro and his cabinet, not only for the crimes committed against the Venezuelan population, but also because of their involvement in a huge drug-trafficking network. With this, the regime's position has become more vulnerable and simultaneously pragmatic, but as tough actions were taken against possible threats and opposing figures, Maduro's rhetoric remains to deny its status and manipulating those that still support him. In another public speech, he stated that "Donald Trump's government, in an extravagant and extreme, vulgar, miserable action, launched a set of false accusations and like a racist cowboy of the 21st century, put a price on the heads of revolutionaries that are still willing to fight them". He one more time accused the US of being the main cause of the economic crisis of Venezuela.

Nicolás Maduro's speech has always been directed to the hardcore revolutionaries, those that worship Chávez since the beginning and who firmly believe in the socialist cause. Maduro has maintained his rhetoric despite the changes in the internal situation of the country; he has held an enduring method for antagonizing the opposition, the Venezuelan upper class, and the United States. On the other hand, regarding the strategic foreign allies, the regime openly gives declarations to support them, but again to somehow antagonize the United States. Indeed, this was the case of the US assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian top commander, in which government representatives attended the Iranian embassy to give the condolences in the name of the regime and swore to avenge Soleimani's death. The administration of Nicolás Maduro has no gray areas, everything is either black or white; the opposition, the upper class, the US, and the US-influenced countries are the enemies, and the rhetoric rarely leans toward a conciliatory message, rather has always revolved around these conflicting parties.

What is left

Twenty years have passed since the Chavismo arrived in the country. Nowadays, a passionate minority of the population keeps supporting Maduro. His regime continues to train armed groups to combat discontent headed by opposition leader Juan Guaidó. The Chavismo keeps being strong, but it has been fragmented by those who believe that the revolution ended at the moment Chávez died, and the ones that are convinced that supporting Maduro means being loyal to Chávez. In the case of Juan Guaidó, he keeps doing his efforts. He still has relative support and keeps being a source of hope. Nevertheless, many criticize the fact that he let again the people cool down. A close change is expected, but no one knows what the movements behind are. Meanwhile, the people will continue suffering and trying to survive.

Upon reflection, it can be noticed that Maduro's entire argumentation revolves around a confrontational rhetoric: the US and capitalism against Venezuela; Guaidó against the Patria; the elites against the Revolution.10 Far from recognizing the reality that the country faces and taking actions to improve it, this confrontational approach simply places the blame on those who have tried to bring a change in the internal dynamics of Venezuela. The regime has managed to construct a national united front against a common foreign enemy and to demonize the opposition.

Chávez and Maduro's rhetoric has followed a tangible objective: the Revolution. Maduro's regime up to this point is searching for a way to consolidate its power and sustain itself as the best way to elude a rather somber future in jail. This never-ending nightmare should have long ago collapsed due to the economic catastrophe, hyperinflation, political repression, human rights violations, and the lack of direction for Venezuela. Behind what maintains this structure there is nothing but the exercise of power and the almost absolute control of society. The Patria that they constantly speak of is running out of fuel to keep going. Nonetheless, the rhetorical deceptions of the Bolivarian revolution, which for two decades have appealed to the popular classes, settled in the collective mindset of the Chavismo and brought space for support in the Venezuelan society.

Chávez and Maduro's presidencies have been based on educating and changing the mindset of the population as they wanted; a population that is content with one box of food a month and which, unfortunately, hunts for the easy means to achieve its goals instead of fighting to improve its lot.

Today, the regime is fed on the memory of Hugo Chávez, on his promises, on his battle. As long as it keeps generating an illusion on the supporters, Maduro will appeal to it as a pillar of his administration and of the Revolution.

 

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Venezuela facts and figures. 2019, https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/171.htm. Accessed 28 Nov. 2019.

2. US Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis. Venezuela. Jan. 2019, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=VEN. Accessed 28 Nov. 2019.

3. Livingstone, G. (2013, March 10). The secret of Hugo Chavez's hold on his people. Retrieved March 17, 2020, from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/the-secret-of-hugo-chavezs-hold-on-his-people-8527832.html

4. El País. (2007, January 08). Chávez announces the nationalization of the electric service and telecommunications. Retrieved July 01, 2020, from https://elpais.com/internacional/2007/01/08/actualidad/1168210811_850215.html

5. The Guardian (2012, October 08). Hugo Chávez: A victory of enduring charisma and political mastery. Retrieved March 17, 2020, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/08/hugo-chavez-victory-political-venezuela

6. Twitter, F., & Miraflores, P. (2017, July 23). Maduro, his ministers and the corruption of language. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/07/22/opinion/1500746848_239358.html

7. Grainger, S. Hugo Chávez and Venezuela Confront his Succession. Dec. 2012. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20678634. Accessed 29 Nov. 2019.

8. Sánchez, V. Venezuela hyperinflation hits 10 million percent. 'Shock therapy' may be only chance to undo economic damage. Aug. 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/02/venezuela-inflation-at-10-million-percent-its-time-for-shock-therapy.html. Accessed 29 Nov. 2019.

9. TVVenezuela. CLAP boxes no longer have what to feed Venezuelans. youtube Sept. 2019. Accessed 30 Nov. 2019.

10. Delgado, A., & Herrero, J. (2019, February 12). Venezuela rhetorics on Twitter: Guaidó vs. Maduro. Retrieved March 18, 2020, from https://beersandpolitics.com/retoricas-de-venezuela-en-twitter-guaido-vs-maduro

▲ Members of Colombia's National Liberation Army [Voces de Colombia].

ESSAY / Angel Martos

Terrorism and transnational organized crime are some of the most relevant topics nowadays in international security. The former represents a traditional threat that has been present during most our recent history, especially since the second half of the twentieth century. International organized crime, on the other hand, has taken place throughout history in multiple ways. Examples can be found even in the pre-industrial era: In rural and coastal areas, where law enforcement was weaker, bandits and pirates all over the world made considerable profit from hijacking vehicles along trade routes and roads, demanding a payment or simply looting the goods that the merchants carried. The phenomenon has evolved into complex sets of interconnected criminal networks that operate globally and in organized way, sometimes even with the help of the authorities.

In this paper, the author will analyze the close interaction between terrorism and organized crime often dubbed the "crime-terror continuum". After explaining the main tenets of this theory, a case study will be presented. It is the network of relations that exists in Latin America which links terrorist groups with drug cartels. The evolution of some of these organizations into a hybrid comprising terrorist and criminal activity will also be studied.

Defining concepts

The crime-terror nexus is agreed to have been consolidated in the post-Cold War era. After the 9/11 attacks, the academic community began to analyze more deeply and thoroughly the threat that terrorism represented for international security. However, there is one specific topic that was not paid much attention until some years later: the financing of terrorist activity. Due to the decline of state sponsorship for terrorism, these groups have managed to look for funding by partnering with organized criminal groups or engaging in illicit activities themselves. Starting in the 1980s with what later came to be known as narco-terrorism, the use of organized crime by terrorist groups became mainstream in the 1990s. Taxing drug trade and credit-card fraud are the two most common sources of revenues for these groups (Makarenko, 2010).

The basic level of relationship that exists between two groups of such different nature is an alliance. Terrorists may look for different objectives when allying with organized crime groups. For example, they may seek expert knowledge (money-laundering, counterfeiting, bomb-making, etc.) or access to smuggling routes. Even if the alliances may seem to be only beneficial for terrorist groups, criminal networks benefit from the destabilizing effect terrorism has over political institutions, and from the additional effort law enforcement agencies need to do to combat terrorism, investing resources that will not be available to fight other crimes. Theirs is a symbiotic relation in which both actors win. A popular example in the international realm is the protection that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) offered to drug traders that smuggle cocaine from South America through West and North Africa towards Europe. During the last decade, the terrorist organization charged a fee on the shipments in exchange for its protection along the route (Vardy, 2009).

The convergence of organizations

Both types of organizations can converge into one up to the point that the resulting group can change its motives and objectives from one side to the other of the continuum, constituting a hybrid organization whose defining points and objectives blur. An organization of this nature could be both a criminal group with political motivations, and a terrorist group interested in criminal profits. The first one may for example be interested in getting involved in political processes and institutions or may use violence to gain a monopolized control over a lucrative economic sector.

Criminal and terrorist groups mutate to be able to carry out by themselves a wider range of activities (political and financial) while avoiding competitiveness, misunderstandings and threats to their internal security. This phenomenon was popularized after the 1990s, when criminal groups sought to manipulate the operational conditions of weak states, while terrorist groups sought to find new financial sources other than the declining state sponsors. A clear example of this can be found in the Italian Mafia during the 1990s. A series of deliberate bombing attacks were reported in key locations such as the Uffizi Galleries in Florence and the church of St. John Lateran in Rome. The target was not a specific enemy, but rather the public opinion and political authorities (the Anti-Mafia Commission) who received a warning for having passed legislation unfavorable to the interests of the criminal group. Another example far away from Europe and its traditional criminal groups can be found in Brazil. In the early 2000s, a newly elected government carried out a crackdown on several criminal organizations like the Red Commandthe Amigos dos Amigos, and the group Third Commandwhich reacted violently by unleashing brutal terrorist attacks on governmental buildings and police officers. These attacks gave the Administration no other choice but to give those groups back the immunity with which they had always operated in Rio de Janeiro.

On the other side of the relationship, terrorist organizations have also engaged in criminal activities, most notably illicit drug trade, in what has been a common pattern since the 1970s. Groups like the FARC, ETA, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), or Shining Path are among them. The PKK, for example, made most of its finances using its advantageous geographic location as well as the Balkan routes of entry into Europe to smuggle heroin from Asia into Europe. In yet another example, Hezbollah is said to protect heroin and cocaine laboratories in the Bekaa Valley, in Lebanon.

Drug trafficking is not the only activity used by terrorist groups. Other criminal activities serve the same purpose. For example, wholesale credit-card fraud all around Europe is used by Al Qaeda to gain profits (US$ 1 million a month). Furthermore, counterfeit products smuggling has been extensively used by paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland and Albanian extremist groups to finance their activities.

Sometimes, the fusion of both activities reaches a point where the political cause that once motivated the terrorist activity of a group ends or weakens, and instead of disbanding, it drifts toward the criminal side and morphs into an organized criminal association with no political motivations) that the convergence thesis identifies is the one of terrorist organizations that have ultimately maintained their political façade for legitimation purposes but that their real motivations and objectives have mutated into those of a criminal group. They are thus able to attract recruits via 2 sources, their political and their financial one. Abu SayyafThe Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and FARC are illustrative of this. Abu Sayyaf, originally founded to establish an Islamic republic in the territory comprising Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago (Philippines), is now dedicated exclusively to kidnapping and marijuana plantations. The former granted them US$ 20 million only in 2000. Colombian FARC, since the 1990s, has followed the same path: according to Paul Wilkinson, they have evolved from a revolutionary group that had state-wide support into a criminal guerrilla involved in protection of crops and laboratories, also acting as "middlemen" between farmers and cartels; kidnapping, and extortion. By the beginning of our century, they controlled 40 per cent of Colombia's territory and received an annual revenue of US$ 500 million (McDermott, 2003).

"Black hole states

The ultimate danger the convergence between criminal and terrorist groups may present is a situation where a weak or failed state becomes a safe haven for the operations of hybrid organizations like those described before. This is known as the "black hole" syndrome. Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Angola, Sierra Leone and North Korea are examples of states falling into this category. Other regions, such as the North-West Frontier Province in Pakistan, and others in Indonesia and Thailand in which the government presence is weak can also be considered as such.

Afghanistan has been considered a "black hole state" since at least the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989. Since the beginning of the civil war, the groups involved in it have sought to survive, oftentimes renouncing to their ideological foundations, by engaging in criminal activity such as the production and trafficking of opiates, arms or commodities across the border with Pakistan, together with warlords. The chaos that reigns in the country is a threat not only to the nation itself and its immediate neighbors, but also to the entire world.

The People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is, on the other hand, considered a criminal state. This is because it has engaged in transnational criminal activities since the 1970s, with its "Bureau 39", a government department that manages the whole criminal activity for creating hard currency (drug trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, privacy, etc.). This was proved when the Norwegian government expelled officials of the North Korean embassy in 1976 alleging that they were engaged in the smuggling of narcotics and unlicensed goods (Galeotti, 2001).

Another situation may arise where criminal and terrorist groups deliberately foster regional instability for their own economic benefits. In civil wars, these groups may run the tasks that a state's government would be supposed to run. It is the natural evolution of a territory in which a political criminal organization or a commercial terrorist group delegitimizes the state and replaces its activity. Examples of this situation are found in the Balkans, Caucasus, southern Thailand and Sierra Leone (Bangura, 1997).

In Sierra Leone, for example, it is now evident that the violence suffered in the 1990s during the rebellion of the Revolutionary United Forces (RUF) had nothing to do with politics or ideals - it was rather a struggle between the guerrilla and the government to crack down on the other party and reap the profits of illicit trade in diamonds. There was no appeal to the population or political discourse whatsoever. The "black hole" thesis illustrates how civil wars in our times are for the most part a legitimization for the private enrichment of the criminal parties involved and at the same time product of the desire of these parties for the war to never end.

The end of the Cold War saw a shift in the study of the nexus between crime and terrorism. During the previous period, it was a phenomenon only present in Latin America between insurgent groups and drug cartels. It was not until the emergence of Al Qaeda's highly networked and globally interconnected cells that governments realized the level of threat to international security that non-state actors could pose. As long as weak or failed states exist, the crime-terror nexus will be further enhanced. Moreover, the activity of these groups will be buttressed by effects of globalization such as the increase of open borders policies, immigration flows, international transportation infrastructure, and technological development. Policymakers do not pay enough attention to the criminal activities of both types of organizations. Rather than dealing with the political motivations of a group, what really makes the difference is to focus on its funding resources - credit-card frauds, smuggling, money laundering, etc.

The following section focuses on the crime-terror continuum that exists between illegal drug trade and terrorist networks. This phenomenon has emerged in many regions all around the world, but the case of Latin America, or the Andean region more specifically, represents the paradigm of the characteristics, dangers and opportunities of these situations.

NARCO-TERRORISM CASE STUDY:

When drug trafficking meets political violence

The concept of narco-terrorism was born in recent years as a result of the understanding of illicit drug trade and terrorism as two interconnected phenomena. Traditionally linked with Latin America, the concept can now be found in other parts of the world like, for example, the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan), or the Golden Triangle (Thailand, Laos and Myanmar).

There is no consensus on the convenience and accuracy of the term "narco-terrorism," if only because it may refer to different realities. One can think of narco-terrorism as the use of terrorist attacks by criminal organizations such as the Colombian Medellin Cartel to attain an immediate political goal. Or, from a different point of view, one can think of a terrorist organization engaging in illicit drug trade to raise funds for its activity. Briefly, according to Tamara Makarenko's Crime-Terror Continuum construct all organizations, no matter the type, could at some point move along this continuum depending on their activities and motivations; from the one extreme of a purely criminal organization, to the other of a purely political one, or even constituting a hybrid in the middle (Makarenko, 2010).

There is a general perception of a usual interaction between drug-trafficking and terrorist organizations. Here, it is necessary to distinguish between the cooperation of two organizations of each nature, and an organization carrying out activities under both domains. There are common similarities between the different organizations that can be highlighted to help policymaking more effective.

Both type of organizations cohabit in the same underground domain of society and share the common interest of remaining undiscovered by law enforcement authorities. Also, their transnational operations follow similar patterns. Their structure is vertical in the highest levels of the organization and turns horizontal in the lowest. Finally, the most sophisticated among them use a cell structure to reduce information sharing to the bare minimum to reduce the risk of the organization being unveiled if some of its members are arrested.

The main incentive for organizations to cooperate are tangible resources. Revenues from narcotics trafficking might be very helpful for terrorist organizations, while access to explosive material may benefit drug trade organizations. As an example, according to the Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2004, an estimated US$ 2.3 billion of the total revenue of global drug trade end up in the hands of organizations like Al Qaeda. Another example is the illegal market of weapons emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, field of interest of both types of networks. On the other hand, intangible resources are similar to tangible in usefulness but different in essence. Intangible resources that drug trafficking organizations possess and can be in the interests of terrorist ones are the expertise on methods and routes of transports, which could be used for terrorist to smuggle goods or people - drug corridors such as the Balkan route or the Northern route. On the other way around, terrorists can share the military tactics, know-how and skills to perpetrate attacks. Some common resources that can be used by both in their benefit are the extended networks and contacts (connections with corrupt officials, safe havens, money laundering facilities, etc.) A good example of the latter can be found in the hiring of ELN members by Pablo Escobar to construct car bombs.

The organizations are, as we have seen, often dependent on the same resources, communications, and even suppliers. This does not lead to cooperation, but rather to competition, even to conflict. Examples can be traced back to the 1980s in Peru when clashes erupted between drug traffickers and the terrorist Shining Pathand in Colombia when drug cartels and the FARC clashed for territorial matters. Even the protection of crops terrorists offer to drug traffickers is one of the main drivers of conflict, even if they do find common grounds of understanding most of the time; for example, in terms of government, revenue-motivated organizations are a threat to the state as they fight to weaken some parts of it such as law enforcement or jurisdiction, while politically-motivated ones wish not only to undermine the state but to radically change its structures to fit their ideological vision (state-run economy, religious-based society, etc.).

The terrorism and drug connection in the Andean Region

Nowhere has the use of illicit drug trade as a source of funds for terrorism been so developed as in the Andean Region (Steinitz, 2002). Leftist groups such as FARC and Peruvian Shining Pathas well as right-wing paramilitary organizations such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) are involved in this activity. At the beginning, the engagement between terrorists and drug traffickers was limited only to fees imposed by the former on the latter in exchange for the protection of crops, labs and shipments. Later, FARC and AUC have further expanded this engagement and are now involved in the early stages of the traffic itself - the main substance being cocaine, and the main reward money and arms from the drug syndicates. The terrorist cells can therefore be considered a hybrid of political and criminal groups. The following paragraphs will further analyze each case.

Peru's Shining Path

Shining Path (SL) started to operate in the Huallaga Valley, a strong Peruvian coca region, several years after its foundation, in 1980. Peru was at the time the world's first producer of coca leaf. The plant was then processed into coca paste and transported to Colombian laboratories by traffickers. Arguably, the desire for profit from the coca business rather than for political influence was the ultimate motive for Shining Path's expansion into the region. SL protected the crops and taxed the production and transportation of coca paste: the 1991 document "Economic Balance of the Shining Path" shows that the group charged US$ 3,000-7,000 per flight leaving Huallaga. Taxes were also levied in exchange for a service that the group provided the coca growers: negotiating favorable prices with the traffickers. In the late 1980s, SL's annual income from the business was estimated at US$ 15-100 million (McClintock, 1998).

The Peruvian government's fight against SL represents a milestone in the fight against the terrorism-crime nexus. Lima set up a political-military command which focused on combating terrorism while ignoring drugs, because a reasonable percentage of the Peruvian population eked out a living by working in the coca fields. The government also avoided using the police as they were seen as highly corruptible. They succeeded in gaining the support of peasant growers and traffickers of Huallaga Valley, a valuable source of intelligence to use against SL. The latter finally left the Valley.

But it was not a final victory. Due to the vacuum SL left, the now more powerful traffickers reduced the prices paid for the coca leaf. SL was no longer there to act as an intermediary in defense of peasants and minor traffickers, so thanks to the new lower prices, the cocaine market experienced a boom. The military deployed in the area started to accept bribes in exchange for their laissez-faire attitude, becoming increasingly corrupted. President Fujimori in 1996 carried out a strategy of interdiction of the flights that departed from the Valley carrying coca paste to Colombia, causing the traffickers and farmers to flee and the coca leaf price to fall notably. However, this environment did not last long, and the country is experiencing a rise in drug trade and terrorist subversive activities.

The Colombian nexus expands

The collapse of the Soviet Union and an economic crisis in Cuba diminished the amount of aid that the FARC could receive. After the government's crackdown, with the help of Washington, of the Medellin and Cali cartels, the drug business in Colombia was seized by numerous smaller networks. There was not any significant reduction of the cocaine flow into the United States. The FARC benefited greatly from the neighboring states' actions, gaining privileged access to drug money. Peru under Fujimori had cracked down on the coca paste transports, and Bolivia's government had also put under strict surveillance its domestic drug cultivation. This elimination of competitors caused a doubling of coca production in Colombia between 1995 and 2000. Moreover, opium poppy cultivation also grew significantly and gained relevance in the US' East-coast market. The FARC also benefited from this opportunity.

According to the Colombian government, in 1998 the terrorist groups earned US$ 551 million from drug, US$ 311 million from extortion, and US$ 236 million from kidnapping. So much so that the organization has been able to pay higher salaries to its recruits than the Colombian army pays its soldiers. By 2000, the FARC had an estimated 15,000-20,000 recruits in more than 70 fronts, de facto controlling 1/3 of the nation's territory. Most of the criminal-derived money in the country comes nowadays from taxation and protection of the drug business. According to the Colombian Military, more than half both the FARC's fronts were involved in the collection of funds by the beginning of the 2000s decade, compared to 40% approx. of AUC fronts (Rebasa and Chalk, 1999).

The situation that was created in both scenarios required created a chaos in which the drug cartels, the cultivation syndicates and the terrorist organizations were the strongest actors. This makes it a very unstable environment for the peoples that lived in the territories under criminal/terrorist control. The tactics of law enforcement agents and government, in these cases, need to be carefully planned, so that multilateral counter-drug/counter-terrorist strategies can satisfactorily address threats existing at multiple dimensions. In the following section, the author will review some key aspects of the policies carried out by the US government in this domain.

The "War on Drugs" and the "War on Terror".

Since 9/11, policies considering both threats as being intertwined have become more and more popular. The separation of counter terrorism and counter-narcotics has faded significantly. Although in the Tashkent Conferences of 1999-2000 the necessary link between both was already mentioned, the milestone of cooperative policies is the Resolution 1373 of the UN Security Council (Björnehed, 2006). In it, emphasis is given to the close connection between terrorism and all kinds of organized crime, and therefore coordination at national, regional and global level is said to be necessary. War on drugs and war on terror should no longer be two separate plans of action.

The effectiveness of a policy that wishes to undermine the threat of illicit drug trade and terrorism is to a high degree dependent on successful intelligence gathering. Information about networks, suspects, shipments, projects, etc. benefits agencies fighting drug trafficking as well as those fighting terrorism, since the resources are most of the times shared. Narco-terrorism nexus is also present in legal acts, with the aim of blocking loopholes in law enforcement efforts. Examples are the Victory Act and the Patriot Act, passed in the US. Recognizing the natural link and cooperation between drug trade and terrorism leads to security analysts developing more holistic theories for policymakers to implement more accurate and useful measures.

However, there are many aspects in which illicit drug trade and terrorist activity differ, and so do the measures that should be taken against them. An example of a failure to understand this point can be found in Afghanistan, where the Taliban in 2000 set a ban on poppy cultivation which resulted in a strong increase of its price, this being a victory for traffickers since the trade did not stop. Another idea to have in mind is that strategies of a war on drugs differ greatly depending on the nature of the country: whether it is solely a consumer like the UK or a producer and consumer like Tajikistan. In regard to terrorism, the measures adopted to undermine it (diplomacy, foreign aid, democratization, etc.) may have minimal effect on the fight against drug trade.

Sometimes, the risk of unifying counter-policies is leaving some areas in which cooperation is not present unattended. Certain areas are suitable for a comprehensive approach such as intelligence gathering, law enforcement and security devices, while others such as drug rehabilitation are not mutually beneficial. Not distinguishing the different motivations and goals among organizations can lead to a failed homogenous policy.

CONCLUSIONS:

Multilevel threats demand multilevel solutions

Terrorism has traditionally been considered a threat to national and international security, while illicit drug trade a threat to human security. This perception derives from the effects of drugs in a consumer country, although war on drugs policies are usually aimed at supplier ones. Although it was already constituting a threat to regional stability during the twentieth century, it was not considered a crucial political issue until 9/11 attacks, when the cooperative link between criminal and terrorist organizations became evident. An example of unequal attention paid to both threats can be found in US's Plan Colombia in 2000: one of the main advocators of the legislation stated that the primary focus was on counter-drug, so the United States would not engage with Colombian counterinsurgency efforts (Vaicius, Ingrid and Isacson, 2003).The same type of failure was also seen in Afghanistan but in the opposite way, when the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) completely neglected any action against drug traffickers, the trade or the production itself.

The merging of drug trafficking and terrorism as two overlapping threats have encouraged authorities to develop common policies of intelligence gathering and law enforcement. The similarities between organizations engaged in each activity are the main reason for this. However, the differences between them are also relevant, and should be taken into consideration for the counter policies to be accurate enough.

Evidence of a substantial link between terrorists and criminals has been proved all along our recent history. Around the world, leaders of mafias and terrorist commanders have oftentimes worked together when they felt that their objectives were close, if not similar. When cohabitating in the outlaw world, groups tend to offer each other help, usually in exchange for something. This is part of human behavior. Added to the phenomenon of globalization, lines tend to be blurred for international security authorities, and thus for the survival of organizations acting transnationally.

The consequences can be noticed especially in Latin America, and more specifically in organizations such as the FARC. We can no longer tell what are the specific objectives and the motivations that pushed youngsters to flee towards the mountains to learn to shoot and fabricate bombs. Is it a political aspiration? Or is it rather an economic necessity? The reason why we cannot answer this question without leaving aside a substantial part of the explanation is the evolution of the once terrorist organization into a hybrid group that moves all along the crime-terror continuum.

The ideas of Makarenko, Björnehed and Steinitz have helped the international community in its duty to protect its societies. It cannot be expected for affected societies to live in peace if the competent authorities try to tackle its structural security issues only through the counter-terrorist approach or through the organized crime lens. The hybrid threats that the world is suffering in the twenty-first century demand hybrid solutions.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY .

Bangura, Y. (1997) 'Understanding the political and cultural dynamics of the sierra leone war', Africa Development, vol. 22, no. 3/4 [Accessed 10 April 2020].

Björnehed, E., 2006. Narco-Terrorism: The Merger Of The War On Drugs And The War On Terror. [online] Taylor & Francis. Available at [Accessed 10 April 2020].

Galeotti, M. (2001) 'Criminalisation of the DPRK', Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 13, no. 3 (March) [Accessed 10 April 2020].

Makarenko, T., 2010. The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing The Interplay Between Transnational Organised Crime And Terrorism. [online] Taylor & Francis. Available at [Accessed 3 April 2020].

McClintock, C. Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN and Peru's Shining Path (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 341 [Accessed 10 April 2020].

McDermott, J. (2003) 'Financing insurgents in Colombia', Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 15, no. 2.

(February) [Accessed 10 April 2020].

Mutschke, R., (2000) 'The threat posed by organised crime, international drug trafficking and terrorism', written testimony to the General Secretariat Hearing of the Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime (13 December) [Accessed 14 June 2020].

Rebasa and Chalk, pp. 32-33; "To Turn the Heroin Tide," Washington Post, February 22, 1999, p. A9; "Colombian Paramilitary Chief Shows Face," Associated Press, March 2, 2000.

Steinitz, M., 2002. The Terrorism And Drug Connection In Latin America'S Andean Region. [online] Brian Loveman, San Diego State University. Available at [Accessed 10 April 2020].

Vaicius, Ingrid and Isacson, Adam "'The War on Drugs' meets the 'War on Terror' " (CIP International Policy Report February 2003) p. 13.

Vardy, N., 2009. Al-Qaeda's New Business Model: Cocaine And Human Trafficking. [online] Forbes. Available at [Accessed 14 June 2020].

▲ The British Raj in 1909 showing Muslim majority areas in green

ESSAY / Victoria Paternina and Claudia Plasencia

Pakistan's partition from India in 1947 marked the beginning of a long road of various territorial disputes, causing different effects in the region. The geopolitics of Pakistan with India are often linked when considering their shared history; and in fact, it makes sense if we take the perspective of Kashmir as the prominent issue that Islamabad has to deal with. However, neither the history nor the present of Pakistan can be reduced to New Delhi and their common regional conflict over the Line of Control that divides Kashmir.

The turbulent and mistrustful relations between India and Pakistan go beyond Kashmir, with the region of Punjab divided in two sides and no common ground between New Delhi and Islamabad. In the same way, the bitter ties between Islamabad and a third country are not exclusively with India. Once part of Pakistan, Bangladesh has a deeply rooted hatred relationship with Islamabad since their split in 1971. Looking beyond Kashmir, Punjab and Bangladesh show a distinct aspect of the territorial disputes of the past and present-day Pakistan. Islamabad has a say in these issues that seem to go unnoticed due to the fact that they stand in the shadow of Kashmir.

This essay tries to shed light on other events that have a solid weight on Pakistan's geopolitics as well as to make clear that the country is worthy of attention not only from New Delhi's perspective but also from their own Pakistani view. In that way, this paper is divided in two different topics that we believe are important in order to understand Pakistan and its role in the region. Punjab and Bangladesh: the two shoved under the rug by Kashmir.

Punjab

The tale of territorial disputes is rooted deeply in Pakistan and Indian relations; the common mistake is to believe that New Delhi and Islamabad only fight over Kashmir. If the longstanding dispute over Kashmir has raised the independence claims of its citizens, Punjab is not far from that. On the edge of the partition, Punjab was another region in which territorial lines were difficult to apply. They finally decided to divide the territory in two sides; the western for Pakistan and the eastern for India. However, this issue automatically brought problems since the majority of Punjabis were neither Hindus nor Muslims but rather Sikhs. Currently, the division of Punjab is still in force. Despite the situation in Pakistan Punjab remains calm due to the lack of Sikhs as most of them left the territory or died in the partition. The context in India Punjab is completely different as riots and violence are common in the eastern side due to the wide majority of Sikhs that find no common ground with Hindus and believe that India has occupied its territory. Independence claims have been strengthened throughout the years on many occasions, supported by the Pakistani ISI in order to destabilize India. Furthermore, the rise of the nationalist Indian movement is worsening the situation for Punjabis who are realizing how their rights are getting marginalized in the eyes of Modi's government.

Nonetheless, the question of Punjabi independence is only a matter of the Indian side. The Pakistan-held Punjab is a crucial province of the country in which the wide majority are Muslims. The separation of Punjab from Islamabad would not be conceived since it would be devastating. For Pakistan, it would mean the loss of 72 million inhabitants; damaging the union and stability of the country. All of this taking into account that Punjab represents a strong pillar for the national economy since it is the place where the Indus river - one of the most important ones - flows. It can be said that there is no room for independence of the Pakistani side, nor for a rapprochement between both parts of the former Punjab region. They have lost their main community ties. Besides, the disagreements are between New Delhi and Eastern Punjab, so Islamabad has nothing to do here. According to that, the only likely long-term possibility would be the independence of the Indian side of the Punjab due to the growth of the hatred against New Delhi. Additionally, there are many Sikhs living abroad in UK or Canada who support the independence of Punjab into a new country "Khalistan" strengthening the movement into an international concern. Nevertheless, the achievement of this point would probably increase the violence in Punjab, and in case they would become independent it would be at the expense of many deaths.

There is a last point that must be taken into account when referring to India-Pakistan turbulent territorial relations. This is the case of the longstanding conflict over water resources in which both countries have been increasing tensions periodically. Considering that there is a scarcity of water resources and a high demand of that public good, it is easy to realize that two enemies that share those resources are going to fight for them. Furthermore, if they both are mainly agrarian countries, the interest of the water would be even harder as it is the case of Pakistan and India. However, for more than five decades both Islamabad and New Delhi have maintained the Indus Waters Treaty that regulates the consumption of the common waters. It divides the six rivers that flow over Pakistan and India in two sides. The three western ones for Pakistan, and the other three of the eastern part for India. Nevertheless, it does not mean that India could not make any use of the Pakistani ones or vice versa; they are allowed to use them in non-consumptive terms such as irrigation, but not for storage or building infrastructures[1]. This is where the problem is. India is seemed to have violated those terms by constructing a dam in the area of the Pakistani Indus river in order to use the water as a diplomatic weapon against Islamabad.

This term has been used as an Indian strategy to condemn the violence of Pakistan-based groups against India undermining in that way the economy of Pakistan which is highly dependent on water resources. Nevertheless, it is hard to think that New Delhi would violate one of the milestones treaties in its bilateral relations with Pakistan. Firstly, because it could escalate their already existent tensions with Pakistan that would transform into an increase of the violence against India. Islamabad's reaction would not be friendly, and although terrorist activities follow political causes, any excuse is valid to lead to an attack. Secondly, because it would bring a bad international image for PM Modi as the UN and other countries would condemn New Delhi of having breached a treaty as well as leaving thousands of people without access to water. Thirdly, they should consider that rivers are originated in the Tibet, China, and a bad movement would mean a reaction from Beijing diverting the water towards Pakistan[2]. Finally, India does not have enough infrastructure to use the additional water available. It is better for both New Delhi and Islamabad to maintain the issue over water resources under a formal treaty considering their mutual mistrust and common clashes. Nevertheless, it would be better for them to renew the Indus Waters Treaty in order to include new aspects that were not foreseen when it was drafted as well as to preserve the economic security of both countries.

Bangladesh

Punjab is a territory obligated to be divided in two between India and Pakistan, yet Bangladesh separated itself completely from Pakistan and finds itself in the middle of India. Bangladesh, once part of Pakistan, after a tumultuous war, separated into its own country. While India did not explicitly intervene with Bangladesh and Pakistan's split, it did promote the hatred between the two for its own diary and to increase in power. The scarring aspect of the split of Bangladesh from Pakistan is the bloody war and genocide that took place, something that the Bengali people still have not overcome to this day. The people of Bangladesh are seeking an apology from Pakistan, something that does not look like it is going to come anytime soon.

Pakistan and Bangladesh share a bitter past with one another as prior to 1971, they were one country which separated into two as a result of a bloody war and emerging political differences. Since 1971 up to today, India and the Awami league have worked to maintain this hatred between Bangladesh and Pakistan through propagandist programs and different techniques. For example, they set up a war museum, documentaries and films in order to boast more the self-proclamation of superiority on behalf of India against Bangladesh and Pakistan. India and the Awami League ignore the fact that they have committed atrocities against the Bengali people and that in large part they are responsible for the breakup between Pakistan and Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) worked to improve relations with Pakistan under the governments of Ziaur Rahman, Begum Khaldia Zia, and Hossain Mohammad Ershad in Bangladesh, who had maintained distance from India. Five Pakistani heads of government have visited Bangladesh since 1980, along with signing trade and cultural agreements to improve relations between the two nations.[3] While an alliance between Pakistan and Bangladesh against India is not a realistic scenario, what is important for Pakistan and Bangladesh for the next decade to come is attempt to put their past behind them in order to steer clear of India and develop mutually beneficial relations to help improve their economies. For example, a possible scenario for improving Pakistan and Bangladesh relations could be to join the CPEC to better take advantage of the trade opportunities offered within South Asia, West Asia, Central Asia, and China and Russia.[4] The CPEC will be a key player in this process.

Despite decades of improving trade and military links, especially as a defense against Indian supremacy in the region, the two countries continue to be divided by the question of genocide. Bangladesh wants Pakistan to recognize the genocide and its atrocities and teach them as a part of its history. However, Pakistan has refused to do so and has even referred to militant leader executed for war crimes as being killed for his loyalty to Pakistan.[5] Bangladesh is a country with a long history of genocide.

Even though India supported Bangladesh in its independence from Pakistan, Bangladesh thinks that India is self-serving and that they change ideas depending on their own convenience.[6] An alliance of Pakistan and Bangladesh, even though it is against a common enemy, India, is not realistic given the information recently provided. India is a country that yes, even though they helped Bangladesh against Pakistan, they are always going to look out for themselves, especially in search to be the central power in the region. India sees still a lot of potential for their power in the coming decades. Indian PM Narendra Modi is very keen on making strategic choices for the country to transform and increase its global leadership position.[7] India's strategy for the next few years has been to make the right choices for the future.

The hostile relations between Pakistan and India find their peak in its longstanding conflict over Kashmir, but Punjab and Bangladesh must not be put in the shadow. The further directions of both PM Imran Khan and PM Modi could have consequences that would alter the interests of Punjab and Bangladesh as different actors in the international order. In the case of Punjab their mutual feelings of mistrust could challenge the instability of a region far from being calm. It is true that independence claims is not an issue for Pakistan itself since both Islamabad and Pakistan-held Punjab would lose in that scenario, and they both know it. Nonetheless, Indian Punjabis' reality is different. They have crucial problems within New Delhi, again as a historical matter of identity and ethnicity that is still present nowadays. Sikhs have not found common ground with Hindus yet and it does not seem that it will happen in a near future. In fact, tensions are increasing, posing a threat for two nations with their views on Kashmir rather than on Punjab. In the case of Bangladesh, its relations with Pakistan did not have a great start. Bangladesh gained freedom with help from India and remained under its influence. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh took a long time to adjust to the shock of separation and their new reality, with India in between them.

In conclusion, Punjab and Bangladesh tend to be the less important territorial issues, and not a priority neither for Islamabad nor for New Delhi that are more engaged in Kashmir. However, considering the magnitude of both disputes, we should appreciate how the Sikhs in the Indian-held territory of Punjab as well as the Bengali people deserve the same rights as the Kashmiris to be heard and to have these territorial disputes settled once and for all.

BIBLIOGRAPHY .

Ayres, Alyssa. "India: a 'Major Power' Still below Its Potential." Lowy Institute, July 24, 2018.

Iftikhar, Momin. "Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations." The Nation. The Nation, December 15, 2018.

"Indus Water Treaty: Everything You Need to Know". ClearIAS.

Muhammad Hanif, Col. "Keeping India out of Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations." Daily Times, March 6, 2018.

Sami, Shafi. "Pakistan Bangladesh Relations In the Changing International Environment." JSTOR. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 2017.

Shakoor, Farzana. "Pakistan Bangladesh Relations Survey." JSTOR. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 2017.

 

▲ Revolutionary Guard commandos naval exercises in the Strait of Hormuz in 2015 [Wikipedia].

essay / Ana Salas Cuevas

The Islamic Republic of Iran, also known as Persia, is a country of great geopolitical importance. It is a regional power not only because of its strategic location, but also because of its large hydrocarbon resources, which make Iran the fourth country in proven oil reserves and the first in gas reserves[1].

Thus, we are talking about one of the most important countries in the world for three fundamental reasons. The first, mentioned above: its immense oil and gas reserves. Secondly, because Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, which is the key to the entrance and exit of the Persian Gulf and through which most of the hydrocarbon exports of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain pass[2]. Finally, for the nuclear program in which it has invested so many years[3].

The Iranian republic is based on the principles of Shiite Islam, although there is great ethnic diversity in its society. It is therefore essential to take into account the great "strength of Iranian nationalism" in order to understand its politics. By appealing to its dominant position over other countries, the Iranian nationalist movement aims to influence public opinion. Nationalism has been building for more than 120 years, since the Tobacco Boycott of 1891[4] was a direct response to outside intervention and pressure, and today aims to achieve hegemony in the region. Iran's foreign and domestic policies are a clear expression of this movement[5].

Byproxy agent(proxy armies)

War by proxy is a model of warfare in which a country makes use of third parties to fight or influence in a given territory, instead of confronting each other directly. As David Daoud points out, in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Syria, "Tehran has perfected the art of gradually conquering a country without replacing its flag"[6]. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) is directly involved in this task, training or militarily favoring the forces of other countries.

The GRI was born with the Islamic Revolution led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in order to maintain the achievements of the movement[7]. It is one of the main political and social actors in the country. It has great capacity to influence national political debates and decisions. It is also the owner of numerous companies in the country, which guarantees it a source its own financing and reinforces its character as an internal power. It constitutes a body independent of the armed forces, and the appointment of its senior officers depends directly on the Leader of the Revolution. Among its objectives is the struggle against imperialism, and it expressly commits itself to try to rescue Jerusalem in order to return it to the Palestinians[8]. Their importance is crucial to the regime, and any attack on these bodies represents a direct threat to the Iranian government[9].

Iran's relationship with the Muslim countries around it is marked by two main facts: on the one hand, its Shiite status; on the other, the preeminence it achieved in the past in the region[10]. 10] Thanks to the fact that its external action is supported by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, Iran has managed to establish strong links with political and religious groups throughout the Middle East. From there, Iran takes advantage of different resources to strengthen its influence in different countries. Firstly, by using soft power tools. Thus, among other actions, it has participated in the reconstruction of mosques and schools in countries such as Lebanon and Iraq[11]. 11] In Yemen, it has provided logistical and economic aid to the Houthi movement. In 2006, it was involved in the reconstruction of southern Beirut.

However, the methods used by these forces reach other extremes, moving to more intrusive mechanisms(hard power). For example, following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Iran has been establishing a foothold there for three decades, with Hezbollah as a proxy, taking advantage of complaints about the disenfranchisement of the Shiite community. This line of action has enabled Tehran to promote its Islamic Revolution abroad[12].

In Iraq, the GRI sought to destabilize Iraq internally by supporting Shiite factions such as the Badr organization during the Iranian-Iraqi war of the 1980s. Iran, on the other hand, involved the GRI in Saddam Hussein's uprising in the early 1990s. Through this subject of influences and embodying the proxy army paradigm, Iran has been establishing very direct influences over these places. Even in Syria, this elite Iranian corps has great influence, supporting the Al Assad government and the Shiite militias fighting alongside it.

For its part, Saudi Arabia accuses Iran and its Guard of supplying weapons in Yemen to the Houthis (a movement that defends the Shiite minority), generating an important escalation of tension between the two countries[13].

The GRI is thus consolidating its position as one of the most important factors on the Middle East scene, driving the struggle between two opposing camps. However, it is not the only one. Thus, we find a "cold war" scenario, which ends up transcending and becoming an international focus. On the one hand, Iran, supported by powers such as Russia and China. On the other, Saudi Arabia, supported by the US. This conflict is developing, to a large extent, in an unconventional manner, through proxy armies such as Hezbollah and the Shiite militias in Iraq, Syria and Yemen[14].

Causes of a confrontation

Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran have spread throughout the Middle East (and beyond), creating two well-defined camps in the Middle East, both with claims to hegemony in the area.

To interpret this scenario and better understand its civil service examination , it is important, first of all, to distinguish between two opposing ideological currents: Shiism and Sunnism (Wahhabism). Wahhabism is an extreme right-wing Muslim religious tendency of the Sunni branch, which today is the majority religion in Saudi Arabia. Shiism, as previously mentioned, is the current on which the Republic of Iran is based. However, as we shall see, the struggle developing between Iran and Saudi Arabia is political, not religious; it is based more on ambition for power than on religion.

Secondly, the control of oil traffic is another cause of this rivalry. To understand this reason, it is worth bearing in mind the strategic position that the countries of the Middle East play on the global map, as they are home to the world's largest hydrocarbon reserves. A large issue of contemporary struggles are in fact due to the interference of the major powers in the region in an attempt to play a role in these territories. Thus, for example, the Sykes-Picot agreement [15] of 1916 for the sharing of European influence continues to condition current events. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran, as we have been saying, have a special role in these confrontations, for the reasons described above.

Under these considerations, it is important to point out, thirdly, the involvement of external powers such as the United States in these tensions.

The effects of the Arab Springs have weakened many countries in the region. Not so Saudi Arabia and Iran, which in recent decades have sought to consolidate their position as regional powers, largely thanks to the support provided by their oil production and large oil reserves. The differences between the two countries are reflected in the way they try to shape the region and in the different interests they seek to achieve. In addition to the ethnic differences between Iran (Persians) and Saudi Arabia (Arabs), their alignment on the international scene is also opposite. Wahhabism presents itself as anti-American, but the Saudi government is aware of its need for US support, and the two countries maintain a reciprocal convenience, with oil as a base. The same is not true of Iran.

Iran and the US were close allies until 1979. The Islamic Revolution changed everything and since then, with the US embassy hostage crisis in Tehran as a particularly dramatic initial moment, tensions between the two countries have been frequent. The diplomatic confrontation has become acute again with President Donald Trump's decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in 2015 for Iran's nuclear non-proliferation, with the consequent resumption of economic sanctions towards Iran. In addition, in April 2019, the United States placed the Revolutionary Guard on its list of terrorist organizations[16], holding Iran responsible for financing and promote terrorism as a government tool [17].

On one side, then, is the Saudi side, supported by the US and, within the region, by the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain and Israel. On the other side, Iran and its allies in Palestine, Lebanon (pro-Shiite side) and recently Qatar, to which could be added Syria and Iraq (Shiite militias). Tensions increased after the death of Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. In the latter camp we could highlight the international support of China or Russia, but little by little we can observe a distancing of relations between Iran and Russia.

When speaking of the struggle for hegemony in the control of oil traffic, it is essential to mention the Strait of Hormuz, the crucial geographical point of this conflict, where both powers are directly confronted. This strait is a strategic zone located between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Some 40% of the world's oil passes through it[18]. Control of these waters is obviously decisive in the confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as for any of the members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries of the Middle East (OPEC) in the region: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait.

One of the objectives of the economic sanctions imposed by Washington on Iran is to reduce its exports in order to favor Saudi Arabia, its major regional ally. To this end, the U.S. Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain, is tasked with protecting commercial shipping in this area.

The Strait of Hormuz "is the escape valve used by Iran to relieve the pressure exerted from outside the Gulf" [19]. From here, Iran tries to react to the economic sanctions imposed by the US and other powers; this is what gives it a greater voice on the international scene, as it has the capacity to block the strategic passage. Recently there have been attacks on oil tankers from Saudi Arabia and other countries[20], something that causes great economic and military destabilization in each new episode[21].  

In the final, the skill between Iran and Saudi Arabia has an effect not only regionally but also globally. The conflicts that could break out in this area are increasingly reminiscent of a well-known Cold War, both in terms of the methods on the battlefront (and the incidence of proxy armies on this front), and the attention it requires for the rest of the world, which is perhaps more dependent on this result than it is aware of.

Conclusions

For several years now, a regional confrontation has been consolidating that also involves the major powers. This struggle transcends the borders of the Middle East, similar to the status unleashed during the Cold War. Its main agents are the proxy armies, which promote struggles through non-state actors and unconventional warfare methods, constantly destabilizing relations between states, as well as within states themselves.

To avoid the fighting in Hormuz, countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have tried to transport oil by other routes, for example by building pipelines. This tap is held by Syria, through which the pipelines must pass in order to reach Europe). After all, the Syrian war can be seen from many perspectives, but there is no doubt that one of the reasons for the meddling of extra-regional powers is the economic interest in the Syrian coast.

From 2015 until now, Yemen's hushed civil war is being fought. At stake are strategic issues such as the control of the Mandeb Strait. Behind this terrible war against the Houthis(proxies), there is a latent fear that the latter will take control of access to the Red Sea. In this sea and near the strait is Djibouti, where the great powers have installed military instructions for better control over the area.

The most affected power is Iran, which sees its Economics weakened by constant economic sanctions. The status affects a population oppressed both by the government itself and by international pressure. The government itself ends up misinforming the society, causing a great distrust towards the authorities. This generates a growing political instability, which manifests itself in frequent protests.

The regime has publicized these demonstrations as protests against US actions, such as the assassination of General Soleimani, without mentioning that many of these revolts are due to the great dissatisfaction of the civilian population with the serious measures taken by Ayatollah Khamenei, who is more focused on seeking hegemony in the area than on solving internal problems.

Thus, it is often difficult to realize the implication of these confrontations for the majority of the world. Indeed, the use of proxy armies should not distract us from the fact of the real involvement of the major powers of the West and the East (in true Cold War fashion). Nor should the alleged motives for keeping these fronts open distract us from the true incidence of what is really at stake: nothing less than global Economics .

Logo of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence organization. It depicts Pakistan's national animal, Markhor, eating a snake [Wikipedia].

ESSAY / Manuel Lamela

Jihadism continues to be one of the main threats Pakistan faces. Its impact on Pakistani society at the political, economic and social levels is evident, it continues to be the source of greatest uncertainty, which acts as a barrier to any company that is interested in investing in the Asian country. Although the situation concerning terrorist attacks on national soil has improved, jihadism is an endemic problem in the region and medium-term prospects are not positive. The atmosphere of extreme volatility and insistence that is breathed does not help in generating confidence. If we add to this the general idea that Pakistan's institutions are not very strong due to their close links with certain radical groups, the result is a not very optimistic scenario. In this essay, we will deal with the current situation of jihadism in Pakistan, offering a multidisciplinary approach that helps to situate itself in the complicated reality that the country is experiencing.

 

 

 

1. Jihadism in the region, a risk assessment

Through this graph, we will analyze the probability and impact of various risk factors concerning jihadist activity in the region. All factors refer to hypothetical situations that may develop in the short or medium term. The increase in jihadist activity in the region will depend on how many of these predictions are fulfilled.

Risk Factors:

A1: US-Taliban treaty fails, creating more instability in the region. If the United States is not able to make a proper exit from Afghanistan, we may find ourselves in a similar situation to that experienced during the 1990s. Such a scenario will once again plunge the region into a fierce civil war between government forces and Taliban groups. The proposed scenario becomes increasingly plausible if we look at the recent American actions regarding foreign policy.

A2: Pakistan two-head strategy facing terrorism collapse. Pakistan's strategy in dealing with jihadism is extremely risky, it's collapse would lead to a schism in the way the Asian state deals with its most immediate challenges. The chances of this strategy failing in the medium term are considerably high due to its structure, which makes it unsustainable over the time.

R3: Violations of the LoC by the two sides in the conflict. Given the frequency with which these events occur, their impact is residual, but it must be taken into account that it in an environment of high tension and other factors, continuous violations of the LoC may be the spark that leads to an increase in terrorist attacks in the region.

R4: Agreement between the afghan Taliban and the government. Despite the recent agreement between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Albduallah, it seems unlikely that he will be able to reach a lasting settlement with the Taliban, given the latter's pretensions. If it is true that if it happens, the agreement will have a great impact that will even transcend Afghan borders.

R5: Afghan Taliban make a coup d'état to the afghan government. In relation to the previous point, despite the pact between the government and the opposition, it seems likely that instability will continue to exist in the country, so a coup attempt by the Taliban seems more likely than a peaceful solution in the medium or long term.

R6: U.S. Democrat party wins the 2020 elections. Broadly speaking, both Republican and Democratic parties are betting on focusing their efforts on containing the growth of their great rival, China.

R7: U.S. withdraw its troops from Afghanistan regarding the result of the peace process. This is closely related to the previous point as it responds to a basic geopolitical issue.

R8: New agreement between India and Pakistan regarding the LoC. If produced, this would bring both states closer together and help reduce jihadist attacks in the Kashmir region. However, if we look at recent events, such a possibility seems distant at present.

 

 

2. The ties between the ISI and the Taliban and other radical groups

Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been accused on many occasions of being closely linked to various radical groups; for example, they have recently been involved with the radicalization of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh[1]. Although Islamabad continues strongly denying such accusations, reality shows us that cooperation between the ISI and various terrorist organizations has been fundamental to their proliferation and settlement both on national territory and in the neighboring states of India and Afghanistan. The West has not been able to fully understand the nature of this relationship and its link to terrorism. The various complaints to the ISI have been loaded with different arguments of different kinds, lacking in unity and coherence. Unlike popular opinion, this analysis will point to the confused and undefined Pakistani nationalism as the main cause of this close relationship.

The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, together with the Intelligence Bureau and the Military Intelligence, constitute the intelligence services of the Pakistani State, the most important of which is the ISI. ISI can be described as the intellectual core and center of gravity of the army. Its broad functions are the protection of Pakistan's national security and the promotion and defense of Pakistan's interests abroad. Despite the image created around the ISI, in general terms its activities and functions are based on the same "values" as other intelligence agencies such as the MI6, the CIA, etc. They all operate under the common ideal of protecting national interests, the essential foundation of intelligence centers without which they are worthless. We must rationalize their actions on the ground, move away from inquisitive accusations and try to observe what are the ideals that move the group, their connection with the government of Islamabad and the Pakistani society in general.

The Afghan Taliban

To understand the idiosyncrasy of the ISI we must go back to the war in Afghanistan[2], it is from this moment that the center begins to build an image of itself, independent of the rest of the armed forces. From the ISI we can see the victory of the Mujahideen on Afghan territory as their own, a great achievement that shapes their thinking and vision. But this understanding does not emerge in isolation and independently, as most Pakistani society views the Afghan Taliban as legitimate warriors and defenders of an honorable cause[3]. The Mujahideen victory over the USSR was a real turning point in Pakistani history, the foundation of modern Pakistani nationalism begins from this point. The year 1989 gave rise to a social catharsis from which the ISI was not excluded.

Along with this ideological component, it is also important to highlight the strategic aspect; we are dealing with a question of nationalism, of defending patriotic interests. Since the emergence of the Taliban, Pakistan has not hesitated to support them for major strategic reasons, as there has always been a fear that an unstable Afghanistan would end up being controlled directly or indirectly by India, an encirclement strategy[4]. Faced with this dangerous scenario, the Taliban are Islamabad's only asset on the ground. It is for this reason, and not only for religious commitment, that this bond is produced, although over time it is strengthened and expanded. Therefore, at first, it is Pakistani nationalism and its foreign interests that are the cause of this situation, it seeks to influence neighboring Afghanistan to make the situation as beneficial as possible for Pakistan. Later on, when we discuss the situation of the Taliban on the national territory, we will address the issue of Pakistani nationalism and how its weak construction causes great problems for the state itself. But on Afghan territory, from what has been explained above, we can conclude that this relationship will continue shortly, it does not seem likely that this will change unless there are great changes of impossible prediction. The ISI will continue to have a significant influence on these groups and will continue its covert operations to promote and defend the Taliban, although it should be noted that the peace treaty between the Taliban and the US[5] is an important factor to take into account, this issue will be developed once the situation of the Taliban at the internal level is explained.

2.2. The Pakistani Taliban (Al-Qaeda[6] and the TTP)

The Taliban groups operating in Pakistan are an extension of those operating in neighboring Afghanistan. They belong to the same terrorist network and seek similar objectives, differentiated only by the place of action. Despite this obvious similarity, from Islamabad and increasingly from the whole of Pakistani society, the two groups are observed in a completely different way. On the one hand, as we said earlier, for most Pakistanis, the Afghan Taliban are fighting a legitimate and just war, that of liberating the region from foreign rule. However, groups operating in Pakistan are considered enemies of the state and the people. Although there was some support among the popular classes, especially in the Pashtun regions, this support has gradually been lost due to the multitude of atrocities against the civilian population that have recently been committed. The attack carried out by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)[7] in the Army Public School in Peshawar in the year 2014 generated a great stir in society, turning it against these radical groups. This duality marks Pakistan's strategy in dealing with terrorism both globally and internationally. While acting as an accomplice and protector of these groups in Afghanistan, he pursues his counterparts on their territory. We have to say that the operations carried out by the armed forces have been effective, especially the Zarb-e-Azb operation carried out in 2014 in North Waziristan, where the ISI played a fundamental role in identifying and classifying the different objectives. The position of the TTP in the region has been decimated, leaving it quite weakened. As can be seen in this scenario, there is no support at the institutional level from the ISI[8], as they are involved in the fight against these radical organizations. However, on an individual level if these informal links appear. This informal network is favored by the tribal character of Pakistani society, it can appear in different forms but often draw on ties of Kinship, friendship or social obligation[9]. Due to the nature of this type of relationship, it is impossible to know to what extent the ISI's activity is conditioned and how many of its members are linked to Taliban groups. However, we would like to point out that these unions are informal and individual and not institutional, which provides a certain degree of security and control, at least for the time being, the situation may vary greatly due to the lack of transparency.

2.3. ISI and the radical groups that operate in Kashmir

Another part of the board is made up of the radical groups that focus their terrorist attention on the conflict with India over control of Kashmir, the most important of which are: Lashkar-e-Taiba (Let) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Both groups have committed real atrocities over the past decades, the most notorious being the one committed by LeT in the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008. There are numerous testimonies, in particular, that of the American citizen David Haedy, which point to the cooperation of the ISI in carrying out the aforementioned attack.[10]

Recently, Hafiz Saeed, founder of Let and intellectual planner of the bloody attack, was arrested. The news generated some turmoil both locally and internationally and opened the discussion as to whether Pakistan had finally decided to act against the radical groups operating in Kashmir. We are once again faced with a complex situation, although the arrest shows a certain amount of willpower, it is no more than a way of making up for the situation and relaxing international pressure. The above coincides with the FATF's[11] assessment of Pakistan's status within the institution, which is of great importance for the short-term future of the country's economy. Beyond rhetoric, there is no convincing evidence that suggests that Pakistan has made a move against those groups. The link and support provided by the ISI in this situation are again closely linked to strategic and ideological issues. Since its foundation, Pakistani foreign policy has revolved around India[12], as we saw on the Afghan stage. Pakistani nationalism is based on the maxim that India and the Hindus are the greatest threat to the future of the state. Given the significance of the conflict for Pakistani society, there has been no hesitation in using radical groups to gain advantages on the ground. From Pakistan perspective, it is considered that this group of terrorists are an essential asset when it comes to putting pressure on India and avoiding the complete loss of the territory, they are used as a negotiating tool and a brake on Indian interests in the region.

As we can see, the core between the ISI and certain terrorist groups is based on deep-seated nationalism, which has led both members of the ISI and society, in general, to identify with the ideas of certain radical groups. They have benefited from the situation by bringing together a huge amount of power, becoming a threat to the state itself. The latter has compromised the government of Pakistan, sometimes leaving it with little room for maneuver. The immense infrastructure and capacity of influence that Let has thanks to its charitable arm Jamaat-ud-Dawa, formed with re-localized terrorists, is a clear example of the latter. A revolt led by this group could put Islamabad in a serious predicament, so the actions taken both in Kashmir and internally to try to avoid the situation should be measured very well. The existing cooperation between the ISI and these radical groups is compromised by the development of the conflict in Kashmir, which may increase or decrease depending on the situation. What is certain, because of the above, is that it will not go unnoticed and will continue to play a key role in the future. These relationships, this two-way game could drag Pakistan soon into an internal conflict, which could compromise its very existence as a nation.

▲ Gurdwara Darbar Sahib Kartarpur, also called Kartarpur Sahib, is a Sikh holy place in Kartarpur, in the Pakistani Punjab [Wikimedia Commons].

ESSAY / Pablo Viana

Punjab region has been part of India until the year 1947, when the Punjab province of British India was divided in two parts, East Punjab (India) and West Punjab (Pakistan) due to religious reasons. After the division a lot of internal violence occurred, and many people were displaced.

East and West Punjab

The partition of Punjab proved to be one of the most violent, brutal, savage debasements in the history of humankind. The undivided Punjab, of which West Punjab forms a major region today, was home to a large minority population of Punjabi Sikhs and Hindus unto 1947 apart from the Muslim majority[1]. This minority population of Punjabi Sikhs called for the creation of a new state in the 1970s, with the name of Khalistan, but it was detained by India, sending troops to stop the militants. Terrorist attacks against the Sikh majority emerged, by those who did not accept the creation of the state of Khalistan and wished to stay in India.

The Sikh population is the dominant religious ethnicity in East Punjab (58%) followed by the Hindu (39%). Sikhism and Islamism are both monotheistic religions, they do believe on the same concept of God, although it is different on each religion. Sikhism was developed during the 16th and 17th century in the context of conflict in between Hinduism and Islamism. It is important to mention Sikhism if we talk about Punjab, as its origins were in Punjab, but most important in recent times, is that the Guru Nanak Dev[2] was buried in Pakistani territory. Four kilometers from the international border the Sikh shrine was conceded to Pakistan at the time of British India's Partition in 1947. For followers of Sikhism this new border that cut through Punjab proved especially problematic. Sikhs overwhelmingly chose India over the newly formed Pakistan as the state that would best protect their interests (there are an estimated 50,000 Sikhs living in Pakistan today, compared to the 24 million in India). However, in making this choice, Sikhs became isolated from several holy sites, creating a religious disconnection that has proved a constant spiritual and emotional dilemma for the community[3].

In order to let the Sikhist population visit the Gurdwara Darbar Sahib[4], the Kartarpur Corridor was created in November 2019. However, there is an incessant suspicion in between India and Pakistan that question Pakistan motives. Although it seems like a generous move work of the Pakistani government, there is a clear perception that Pakistan is engaged in an act of deception[5]. Thus, although this scenario might seem at first beneficial for the rapprochement of East and West Punjab, it is not at all. Pakistan is involved in a rhetorical policy which could end up worsening its relations with India.

The division of Punjab in 1947 was like the division of Pakistan and India on that same year. Territorial disputes have been an issue that defines very well India-Pakistan relations since the independence. In the case of Punjab, there has not been a territorial discussion. The division was clear and has been respected ever since. Why would Pakistan and/or India be willing to unify Punjab? There is no reason. East and West Punjab represent two different nations and three religions. If we think about reunifying Pakistan and India, the conclusion is the same (although more dramatic); too many discrepancies and recent unrest to think about bringing back together the nations. However, if the Kartarpur Corridor could be placed out of bonds for the territorial disputes between Pakistan and India (e.g. Kashmir), Islamabad and New Delhi could use this situation as a model to find out which are the pressure points and trying to find a path for identifying common solutions. In order to achieve this, there should be a clear behavior by both parties of cooperation. Sadly, in recent times both Pakistan and India have discrepancies regarding many topics and suspicious behaviours that clearly show that they won't be interested in complicating more the situation in Punjab searching for unification. The riots of 1947 left a terrific era on the region and now that both sides are established and no major disputes have emerged (except for Sikh nationalism), the situation should and will most likely remain as it is.

The Indus Water Treaty

The Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960 after nine years of negotiations between India and Pakistan with the help of the World Bank, which is also a signatory. Seen as one of the most successful international treaties, it has survived frequent tensions, including conflict, and has provided a framework for irrigation and hydropower development for more than half a century. The Treaty basically provides a mechanism for exchange of information and cooperation between Pakistan and India regarding the use of their rivers. This mechanism is well known as the Permanent Indus Commission. The Treaty also sets forth distinct procedures to handle issues which may arise: "questions" are handled by the Commission; "differences" are to be resolved by a Neutral Expert; and "disputes" are to be referred to a seven-member arbitral tribunal called the "Court of Arbitration." As a signatory to the Treaty, the World Bank's role is limited and procedural[6].    

Since 1948, India has been confident on the fact that East Punjab and the acceding states have a prior and superior claim to the rivers flowing through their territory. This leaves West Punjab in disadvantage regarding water resources, as East Punjab can access the highest sections of the rivers. Even under a unified control designed to ensure equitable distribution of water, in years of low river flow cultivators on tail distributaries always tended to accuse those on the upper reaches of taking an undue amount of the water, and after partition any temporary shortage, whatever the cause, could easily be attributed to political motives. It was therefore wise of Pakistan-indeed it became imperative-to cut the new feeder from the Ravi for this area and thus become independent of distributaries in East Punjab[7]. The Treaty acknowledges the control of the eastern rivers to India, and to the western rivers to Pakistan.

The main issue of water distribution in between East and West Punjab is then a matter of geography. Even though West Punjab covers more territory than East Punjab, and the water flow of West Punjab is almost three times the water flow of East Punjab rivers, the Indus Water Treaty gives the following advantage to India: since Pakistan rivers receive much more water flow from India, the treaty allowed India to use western rivers water for limited irrigation use and unlimited use for power generation, domestic, industrial and non-consumptive uses such as navigation, floating of property, fish culture and this is where the disputes mainly came from, as Pakistan has objected all Indian hydro-electric projects on western rivers irrespective of size and layout.

It is worth mentioning that with the World Bank mediating the Treaty in between India and Pakistan, the water access will not be curtailed, and since the ratification of the Treaty, India and Pakistan have not engaged in any water wars. Although there have been many tensions the disputes have been via legal procedures, but they haven't caused any major cause for conflict. Today, both countries are strengthening their relationship, and the scenario is not likely to get worse, it is actually the opposite, and the Indus Water Treaty is one of the few livelihoods of the relationship. If the tensions do not cease, the World Bank should consider the possibility of amending the treaty, obviously if both Pakistan and India are willing to cooperate, although with the current environment, a renegotiation of the treaty would probably bring more complications. There is no shred of evidence that India has violated the Indus Water Treaty or that it is stealing Pakistan's water[8], although Pakistan does blame India for breaching the treaty, as shown before. This is pointed out by Hindu politicians as an attempt by Pakistan to divert the attention of its own public from the real issues of gross mismanagement of water resources[9].

Pakistan has a more hostile attitude regarding water distribution, trying to find a way to impeach India, meanwhile India focuses on the development of hydro-electric projects. India won't stop providing water to the West Punjab, as the treaty is still in force and is fulfilled by both parties. Pakistan should reconsider its role and its benefits received thanks to the treaty and meditate about the constant pressure towards India, as pushing over the limit could mean a more hostile activity carried out by India, which in the worst case scenario (although not likely to happen) could mean a breakdown of the treaty.

▲ Attack in Kashmir linked to groups of Pakistani origin [tweeted by @ANI].

ESSAY / Isabel Calderas [Ignacio Lucas as research assistant].

There is a myriad of security concerns regarding external factors when it comes to Pakistan: India, Afghanistan, the Saudi Arabia-Iran split and the United States, to name a few. However, there are also two main concerns that come from within: jihadism and organized crime. They are interconnected but differ in many ways. The latter is frequently overlooked to focus on the former, but both have the capacity of affecting the country, internally and externally, as the effectiveness of dealing with them impacts the perception the international community has of Pakistan. While internally disrupting, these problems also have international reach, as such groups often export their activities, adversely affecting at a global scale. Therefore, international actors put so much pressure on Pakistan to control them. Historically, there has been much scepticism over the government's ability, or even willingness to solve these risks. We will examine both problems separately, identifying the impact they have on the national and international arena, as well as the government's approach to dealing with either and the future risks they entail.

1. JIHADISM

Pakistan's education system has become a central part of the country's radicalization phenomenon[1], in the materialization of madrassas. These schools, which teach a more puritanical version of Islam than had traditionally been practiced in Pakistan, have been directly linked to the rise of jihadist groups[2]. Saudi Arabia, who has always had very close relations with Pakistan, played a key role in their development, by funding the Ahl-e-Hadith and Deobandi madrassas since the 1970s. The Iranian revolution bolstered the Saudi's imperative to control Sunnism in Pakistan, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave them the vehicle to do so[3]. In these schools, which teach a biased view of the world, students display low tolerance for minorities and are more likely to turn to jihadism.

Saudi and American funding of madrassas during the Soviet occupation helped the Pakistani army's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), become more powerful, as they channelled millions of dollars to them, a lot of which went into the madrassas which sent mujahedeen fighters to fight for their cause[4]. The Taliban's origins can also be traced to these, as the militia was raised mainly from Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Saudi-funded madrassas[5].

Madrassas are especially popular in the poorer provinces of the country, where parents send their children to them for several non-religious reasons. First, because the Qur'an is written in Arabic and madrassas teach this language[6]. The dire situation of many families forces millions of Pakistanis to migrate to neighboring, oil-rich Arabic-speaking countries, from where they send remittances home to help support their families. Secondly, the public-school system in Pakistan is weak, often failing to teach basic reading skills[7], something the madrassas do teach.

Partly in response to the international pressure[8] it has been under to fight terrorism within its territory; Pakistan has tried to reform the madrassas. The government has stated its intention to bring madrassas under the umbrella of the education ministry, financing these schools by allocating cash otherwise destined to fund anti-terrorism security operations[9]. It plans to add subjects like science to the curriculum, to lessen the focus on Islamic teachings. However, this faces several challenges, among which the resistance from the teachers and clerical authorities who run the madrassas outstands[10].

Before moving on to the prominent radical groups in Pakistan, we would like to make a brief summary on a different cause of radicalization: the unintended effect of the drone strategy adopted by the United States.

The United States has increasingly chosen to target its radical enemies in Pakistan through the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), which can be highly effective in neutralizing objectives, but also pose a series of risks, like the killing of innocent civilians that are in the neighboring area. This American strategy, which Pakistan has publicly criticized, has fomented anti-American sentiment among the Pakistanis, at a ratio on average of every person killed resulting in the radicalization of several more people[11]. The growing unpopularity of drone strikes has further weakened relations between both governments, but shows no signs of changing in the future, if recent attacks carried by the U.S. are any indication. Pakistan's efforts to de-radicalize its population will continue to be undermined by the U.S. drone strikes[12].

Pakistan's anti-terrorism strategy is linked to its geostrategic and regional interests, especially dealing with its eastern and western neighbors[13]. There are many radical groups operating within their territory, and the government's strategy towards them shifts depending on their goal[14]. Groups like the Afghan Taliban, who target foreign invasions in their own country, and Al Qaeda, whose jihad against the West is on a global scale, have been allowed to use Pakistani territory to coordinate operations and take refuge. Their strategy is quite different for Pakistani Taliban group, Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) who, despite being allied with the Afghan Taliban, has a different goal: to oust the Pakistani government and impose Sharia law[15]. Most of the military's campaigns aimed at cracking down on radicals have been targeted at weakening groups affiliated with TTP. Lastly, there are those groups with whom some branches of the Pakistani government directly collaborate with.

Pakistan has been known to use jihadi organizations to advance its security objectives through proxy conflicts. Pakistan's policy of waging war through terrorist groups is planned, coordinated, and conducted by the Pakistani Army, specifically the ISI[16] who, as previously mentioned, plays a vital role in running the State.

Although this has been a longstanding cause of tension between the Pakistani and the American governments, the U.S. has made no progress in persuading or compelling the Pakistani military to sever ties with the radical groups[17], even though the Pakistani government has stated that it has, over the past year, 'fought and eradicated the menace of terrorism from its soil' by carrying out arrests, seizing property and freezing bank accounts of groups proscribed by the United States and the United Nations[18]. Their actions have been enough to keep them off the FATF's blacklist for financing terrorism and money laundering[19], which would prevent them from getting financing, but concerns remain about ISI's involvement with radical groups, the future of the relations between them, the overall activity of these groups from within Pakistani territory, and the risk of a future attack to its neighbors.

We will use two of Pakistan's main proxy groups, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, to analyze the feasibility of an attack in the near future.

1.1. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)

Created to support the resistance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, LeT now focuses on the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Kashmir, the highest priorities for the Pakistani military's foreign policy. The Ahl-e-Hadith group is led by its founder, Hafiz Saeed. Its headquarters are in Punjab. Unlike its counterparts, it is a well-organized, unified, and hierarchical organization, which has become highly institutionalized in the last thirty years. As a result, it has not suffered any major losses or any fractures since its inception[20].

Since the Mumbai attacks in 2008 (which also involved ISI), for which LeT were responsible, its close relationship with the military has defined the group's operations, most noticeably by restraining their actions in India, which reflects both the Pakistani military's desire to avoid international pressure and conflict with their neighbor and the group's capability to contain its members. The group has calibrated its activities, although it possesses the capability to expand its violence. Its outlets for violence have been Afghanistan and Kashmir, which align with the Pakistani military's diary: to bring Afghanistan under Pakistan's sphere of influence while keeping India off-balance in Kashmir[21]. The recent U.S.-Taliban deal in Afghanistan and militarization of Kashmir by India may change this. LeT has benefited handsomely for its loyalty, receiving unparalleled protection, patronage, and privilege from the military. However, after twelve years of restraint, Lashkar undoubtedly faces pressures from within its ranks to strike against India again, especially now that Narendra Modi is prime minister.

1.2. Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM)

The Deobandi organization, led by its founder Masood Azhar, has had close bonds with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban since they came into light in 2000. With the commencement of the war on terror in Afghanistan, JeM reciprocated by launching an attack on the Indian Parliament on December 2001, in cooperation with LeT. However, it ignored the Pakistani military's will in 2019 when it launched the Pulwama attack, after which the government of Pakistan launched a countrywide crackdown on them, taking leaders and members into preventive custody[22].

Risk assessment

Although it has gone rogue before, Jaish-e-Muhammad has been weakened by the recent government's crackdown. What remains of the group, consolidated under Masood Azhar, has repaired ties with the military. Although JeM has demonstrated it still possesses formidable capability in Indian Kashmir, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba represents the main concern for an attack on India in the near future.

Lashkar has been both the most reliable and loyal of all the proxy groups and has also proven it does not take major action without prior approval from the ISI, which could become a problem. Pakistan has adopted a policy of maintaining plausible deniability for any attacks in order to avoid international pressure after 9/11, thus LeT's close ties with the military make it more likely that its actions will provoke a war between the two countries.

The United States has tried for several years to get Pakistan to stop using proxies. There are several scenarios in which Lashkar would break from the Pakistani state (or vice versa), but they are farfetched and beyond foreign influence: a) a change in Pakistan's security calculus, b) a resolution on Kashmir, c) a shift in Lashkar's responsiveness and d) a major Lashkar attack in the West[23].

a) A change in Pakistan's security calculus is the least likely, as the India-centric understanding of Pakistan's interests and circumstances is deeply embedded in the psyche of the security establishment[24].

b) A resolution on Kashmir would trouble Lashkar, who seeks full unification of all Kashmir with Pakistan, which would not be the outcome of a negotiated resolution. More so, Modi's recent decision regarding article 370 puts this possibility even further into the future.

c) A shift in Lashkar responsiveness would be caused by the internal pressures to perform another attack, after more than a decade of abiding by the security establishment's will. If perceived as too powerful of insufficiently responsive, ISI would most likely seek to dismantle the group, as they did with Jaish-e-Muhammad, by focusing on the rogue elements and leaving Lashkar smaller but more responsive. This presents a threat, as the group would not allow itself to be simply dismantled but would probably resist to the point of becoming hostile[25].

d) The last option, a major Lashkar attack in the West, is also unlikely, as the group has not undertaken any major attack without perceived greenlight from ISI.

This does not mean that an attack from LeT can be ruled out. ISI could allow the group to carry out an attack if, in the absence of a better reason, it feels that the pressure from within the group will start causing dissent and fractures, just like it happened in 2008. It is in ISI's best interest that Lashkar remains a strong, united ally. Knowing this, it is important to note that a large-scale attack in India by Lashkar is arguably the most likely trigger to a full-blown conflict between the two nations. Even a smaller-scale attack has the potential of provoking India, especially under Modi.

If such an attack where to happen, India would not be expected to display a weak-kneed gesture, as PM Modi's policy is that of a tough and powerful approach in defense vis-à-vis both Pakistan and China. This has already been made evident by its retaliation for the Fidayeen attack at Uri brigade headquarters by Jaish-e-Muhammad in 2016[26]. It has now become evident that if Pakistan continues to harbour terrorist groups against India as its strategic assets, there will be no military restraint by India as long as Modi is in power, who will respond with massive retaliation. In its fragile economic condition, Pakistan will not be able to sustain a long-drawn war effort[27].

On the other hand, Afghanistan, which has been the other focus of Pakistan's proxy groups, is now undergoing a process which could result in a major organizational shift. The Taliban insurgent movement has been able survive this long due to the sanctuary and support provided by Pakistan[28]. Furthermore, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba's participation in the Afghan insurgency furthered the Pakistani military's goal of having a friendly, anti-India partner on its western border[29]. The development and outcome of the intra-Afghan talks will determine the continued use of proxies in the country. However, we can realistically assume that, at least in the near future, radical groups will maintain some degree of activity in Afghanistan.

It is highly unlikely that the Pakistani intelligence establishment will stop engaging with radical groups, as it sees in them a very useful strategic tool for achieving its security goals. However, Pakistan's plausible deniability approach will come into question, as its close ties with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba make it increasingly hard for it to deny involvement in its acts with any credibility. Regarding India, any kind of offensive from this group could result in a large-scale conflict. This is precisely the most likely scenario to occur, as Modi's history with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and their twelve-year-long "hiatus" from impactful attacks could propel the organization to take action that will impact the whole region.

2. DRUG TRAFFICKING

Drug trafficking constitutes an important problem for Pakistan. It originates in Afghanistan, from where thousands of tonnes are smuggled out every year, using Pakistan as a passageway to provide the world with heroin and opioids[30]. The following concept map has been elaborated with information from diverse sources[31] to present the different aspects of the problem aimed to better comprehend the complex situation.

 

 

Afghanistan, one of the world's largest heroin producers, has supplied up to 60% and 80% of the U.S. and European markets, respectively. The landlocked country takes advantage of its blurred border line, and the remoteness and inaccessibility of the sparsely populated bordering regions with Pakistan, using it as a conduit to send its drugs globally. The Pakistani government is under a lot of pressure from the international community to fight and minimize drug trafficking from its territory.

Pakistan feels a special kind of pressure from the European Union, as its GSP+ status could be affected if it does not control this problem. The GSP+ is dependent on the implementation of 27 international conventions related to human rights, labour rights, protection of the environment and good governance, including the UN Convention on Fighting Illegal Drugs[32]. Pakistan was granted GSP+ status in 2014 and has shown commitment to maintaining ratifications and meeting reporting obligations to the UN Treaty bodies[33]. However, one of the aspects of the scheme is its "temporary withdrawal and safeguard" measure, which means the preferences can be immediately withdrawn if the country is unable to control drug trafficking effectively[34]. This has not been the case, and the EU has recognized Pakistan's efforts in the fight on drugs; the UN has also removed it from the list of cannabis resin production countries[35]. Anti-corruption frameworks have been strengthened, along with legislation review and awareness building, but they have been advised that better coordination between law enforcement agencies is needed[36].

The GSP+ status is very important to Pakistan, as the European Union is their first trade partner, absorbing over a third of their total exports in 2018, followed by the U.S., China and Afghanistan[37]. The Union can use this as leverage to obtain concessions from Pakistan. However, the approach they have taken so far has been of collaboration in many areas, including transnational organized crime, money laundering and counter-narcotics[38]. In this sense, the EU ambassador to Pakistan recently stated that the new Strategic Engagement Plan of 2019 would "further boost their relations in diverse fields"[39].

Even with combined efforts, eradicating the drug trafficking problem in Pakistan has proven to be very difficult. This is because production of the drug is not done in its territory, and even if border patrols are strengthened, it will be very hard to stop drugs from coming in from its neighbor if the Afghan government doesn't take appropriate measures themselves.

 

 

A "5 whys" exercise has led us to understand that the root cause of the problem is the fact that most farmers in Afghanistan are too poor to turn to different crops. A nearly two decade war has ravaged the country's land, leaving opium crops, which are cheaper and easier to maintain, as the only option for most farmers in this agrarian nation. A substantial investment in the country's agriculture to produce more economic options would be needed if any serious advance is expected to be made in stopping illegal drug trafficking. These investments will have to be a joint effort of the international community, and funding for the government will also be necessary, if stability is to be reached. Unless this is done, opium will likely remain entangled in the rural economy, the Taliban insurgency, and the government corruption whose sum is the Afghan conundrum.[40]. And as long as this does not happen, it is highly unlikely that Pakistan will be able to make any substantial progress in its effort to fight illicit drugs.