essay / Jairo Císcar Ruiz [English version].

In recent months, the open trade hostilities between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China have dominated the main general headlines and specialized economic publications around the world. The so-called "trade war" between these two superpowers is nothing more than the successive escalation of the imposition of tariffs and special levies on original products and manufactured goods from the countries in confrontation. This, in economic figures, means that the US imposed in 2018 special tariffs on US$250 billion of imported Chinese products (out of a total of US$539 billion), while China for its part imposed tariffs on 110 out of US$120 billion of US import products [1]. These tariffs meant an increase of US$3 billion in additional taxes for American consumers and businesses. This analysis is therefore intended to explain and show the position and future of the European Union in this trade war in a general way.

This small reminder of the figures illustrates the magnitude of the challenge to global Economics posed by this clash between the world's two economic locomotives. It is not China that is paying the tariffs, as Trump literally said on May 9 during a meeting with journalists [2], but the reality is much more complex, and, evidently, as in the case of the inclusion of Huawei in the trade blacklist (and therefore the prohibition to purchase any item on US soil, whether hardware or software, without a prior agreement with the Administration), which may affect more than 1.200 American companies and hundreds of millions of customers globally, according to the BBC [3], the economic war may soon start to be a great burden for Economics globally. On June 2, Pierre Moscovici, European Commissioner for Economic Affairs, predicted that if the confrontation continues, both China and the USA could lose between 5 and 6 tenths of GDP, stressing in particular that "protectionism is the main threat to world growth" [4].

As can be inferred from Moscovici's words, the trade war is not only of concern to the countries directly involved in it, but is closely followed by other actors in international politics, especially the European Union.The European Union is the largest Single Market in the world, this being one of the premises and fundamental pillars of the EU's very existence. But it is no longer focused on internal trade, but is one of the major trading powers for exports and imports, being one of the main voices advocating healthy trade relations that are of mutual benefit to the different economic actors at global and regional level. This openness to business means that 30% of the EU's GDP comes from foreign trade and makes it the main player when it comes to doing import and export business. To illustrate briefly, agreement to data from the European Commission [5] in the last year (May 2018-April 2019), the EU made imports worth €2,022 billion (a growth of 7%) and exported 4% more, with a total of €1,987 billion. The trade balance is therefore a negative balance of €35 billion, which, due to the large import/export Issue and the nominal GDP of the EU (taking the figure of 18.8 trillion euros) is only 0.18% of the EU's total GDP. The USA was the main place of export from the EU, while China was the first place of import. These data are revealing and interesting: an important part of EU Economics depends on business with these two countries and a bad performance of their Economics could weigh down the EU member countries' own.

Another figure that illustrates the importance of the EU in subject of trade is that of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In 2018, 52% of global FDI came from countries within the European Union and the EU received 38.5% of total investment worldwide, leading in both indicators. Therefore, it can be said that the current trade war can pose a serious problem for the future European Economics , but, as we will see below, the Union can emerge strengthened and even benefit from this status if it manages to mediate well between the difficulties, businesses and strategies of the two countries. But let us first look at the EU's relations with both the US and China.

The US-EU relationship has traditionally been (albeit with ups and downs) the strongest in the international sphere. The United States is the European Union's main ally in defense, politics, Economics and diplomacy, and vice versa. They share the economic, political and cultural model , as well as the main world collective defense organization, NATO. However, in the so-called transatlantic relationship, there have always been clashes, accentuated in the recent times of the Obama Administration and usual with Trump. With the current Administration, not only have there been reproaches to the EU within NATO (regarding the failure of member countries to invest the required budget ; shared criticism with the United Kingdom), but a full-fledged tariff war has begun.

In barely two years we have gone from the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) negotiations, the announced basis for trade in the 21st century that finally failed in the final stages of Obama's term in the White House, to the current status extreme protectionism of the USA and the EU's response. Particularly illustrative is the succession of events that have taken place in the last year: at the stroke of Twitter, in March 2018 the US unilaterally imposed global tariffs on steel (25%) and aluminum (10%) to protect American industry [6]. These tariffs did not only affect China, they also inflicted great damage on companies in European countries such as Germany. Tariffs of 25% on European vehicles were also in the air. After a harsh climate of mutual reproaches, on July 25, Jean Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, announced with Trump an agreement to lower tariffs on agricultural products and services, and the US committed itself to review the imposition of metallurgical tariffs on the EU, as well as to support within the World Trade Organization the European calls for a reform of Intellectual Property laws, which China does not respect [7]. However, after the reiteration of the transatlantic friendship and Trump's advertisement of "we are moving towards zero tariffs" [8], soon the clattering of the cash registers began again. In April of this year, on April 9, Trump announced on Twitter the imposition of tariffs on the EU worth US$11 billion for the EU's support to Airbusskill of the American companies Boeing, Lockheed Martin...), blowing up the principle of agreement of July last year. The EU, for its part, threatened to impose tariffs of €19 billion for US state support to Boeing. As can be seen, the EU, despite its traditional conciliatory role and often subjugated to the US, has decided to fight back and not to allow any more outbursts of tone from the American side. The latest threat, in mid-July, is against French wine (and due to the European mechanism, against all wines of European origin, including Spanish wines). This threat has been described as "ridiculous" [9], since the USA consumes more wine than it produces (it is the world's largest consumer) and therefore the available supply could be considerably reduced.

It is still too early to see the real impact that the trade war is having on the US, beyond the 7.4% drop in US exports to China [10] and the damage that consumers are suffering, but the Nobel Prize winner in Economics Robert Schiller, in an interview for CNBC [11] and the president of the World Trade Organization, Roberto Azevedo, for the BBC, have already expressed their fears that if the status and protectionist policies continue as they are, we could be facing the biggest economic crisis since the end of World War II. It is difficult to elucidate what the future relationship between Europe and its main export partner , the US, will be like. All indications are that friction and escalation will continue if the US Administration does not decide to tone down its rhetoric and actions against free trade with Europe. Finally, it must be clear (and with the intention of lowering the sometimes excessively alarmist tone of the news) that between the threats (either by Twitter or spokespersons) from both sides and the actual imposition of tariffs (in the US after the relevant advertisement from the Office of the US Trade Representative; in the EU through the approval of the 28) there is a long way to go, and we must not confuse potential acts and facts. It is clear that despite the harsh tone, the negotiating teams on both sides of the Atlantic are still in contact and are trying to avoid as far as possible actions detrimental to both sides.

On the other hand, the relationship between China and Europe is frankly different from the one with the US. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (which Italy has formally joined) confirms China's bid to be the next leader in global Economics . Through this initiative, President Xi Jinping aims to redistribute and speed up trade flows to and from China by land and sea. To this end, the stability of South Asian countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan is vital, as is the ability to control vital maritime traffic points such as the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. The Asian "dragon" has an internal status that favors its growth (6.6% of its GDP in 2018 which, being the worst figure for 30 years, is still an overwhelming figure), as the relative efficiency of its authoritarian system and, especially, the great support of the State to companies boost its growth, as well as possessing the largest foreign currency reserves, especially dollars and euros, which allow a great stability of the country's Economics . The Chinese currency, the Renminbi, has been declared a world reservation currency by the IMF, which is another indicator of the good health that the Chinese Economics is expected to enjoy in the future.

For the EU, China is a competitor, but also a strategic partner and a negotiating partner [12]. China is the EU's main import partner , accounting for 20.2% of imports (€395 billion) and 10.5% of exports (€210 billion). The Issue of imports is such that, although the vast majority reach the European continent by sea, there is a railway connection that, under the BRI, links the entire Eurasian continent, from China's manufacturing capital, Yiwu, and the last stop at the southern tip of Europe, Madrid. Although some of the imports are still so-called "low-end" goods, i.e. products of basic manufacture and cheap unit price, since China's entrance the WTO in December 2001, the concept of material produced in China has changed radically: the great abundance of rare earths in Chinese territory, together with the progress in its industrialization and investment in new technologies (in which China is a leader) have meant that China is no longer thought of only as a mass producer of bazaars; on the contrary, the majority of EU imports from China were machinery and high-end, high-tech products (especially telecommunications and data processing equipment).

In the aforementioned press statement of the European Commission, China is warned to comply with the commitments made in the Kyoto Protocols and Paris Agreements regarding greenhouse gas emissions; and urges the Asian country to respect the dictates of the WTO, especially with subject to technology transfer, state subsidies and illegal practices such as dumping.

These aspects are vital for economic relations with China. At a time when most countries in the world signed or are part of the Paris Agreements for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, while the EU is making efforts to reduce its pollution (closing coal plants and mines; putting special taxes on energy obtained from non-renewable sources...), China, which totals 30% of global emissions, increased in 2018 by 3% its emissions. This, beyond the harmful effects for the climate, has industrial and economic benefits: while in Europe industries are narrowing their profit margins due to the rise in energy prices; China, which is fueled by coal, provides cheaper energy to its companies, which, without active restrictions, can produce more. An example of how the climate affects economic relations with China is the recent advertisement [13] by AcerlorMittal to reduce its total steel production in Europe by 3 million tons (out of 44 million tons of usual production) due to high electricity costs and increased imports from countries outside the EU (especially China) which, with overproduction, are lowering world prices. This internship, which is especially used in China, consists of flooding the market with an overproduction of a certain product (this overproduction is paid for with government subsidies) to lower prices. As of December 2018, in the last 3 years, the EU has had to impose more than 116 sanctions and anti-dumping measures against Chinese products [14]. Which sample that, despite the EU's attempts to negotiate on mutually satisfactory terms, China does not comply with the stipulations of the agreements with the EU and the WTO. Particularly thorny is the problem with government-controlled companies (a ban on 5G networks in Europe, controlled by Chinese providers, is being considered for security reasons), which have a virtual monopoly inside the country; and above all, the distorted reading of legality by the Chinese authorities, who try to use all possible mechanisms in their favor, making it difficult or hindering direct investment of foreign capital in their country, as well as imposing requirements (the need to have Chinese partners, etc.) that hinder the international expansion of small and medium-sized companies. However,

The biggest friction with the EU, however, is the forced transfer of technology to the government, especially by companies of strategic products such as hydrocarbons, pharmaceuticals and the automotive industry [15], imposed by laws and conditio sine qua non companies cannot land in the country. This creates a climate of unfair skill and direct attack on international trade laws. The direct investment of Chinese capital in critical industries and producers in the EU has caused voices to be raised calling for greater control and even vetoes on these investments in certain areas for Defense and Security issues. The lack of protection of intellectual rights or patents are also important points of complaint by the EU, which aims to create through diplomacy and international organizations a favorable climate for the promotion of equal trade relations between the two countries, as reflected in the various European guidelines and plans on topic.

As we have seen, the trade war is not only limited to the US and China, but third parties are suffering from it and even actively participating in it. The question arises here: can the EU benefit in any way and avoid a new crisis? Despite the pessimistic mood, the EU can derive multiple benefits from this trade war if it manages to maneuver properly and avoid as far as possible further tariffs against its products and keeps the market open. If the trade war continues and the positions of the US and China harden, the EU, as a major partner of both, could benefit from a redistribution of trade flows. Thus, to avoid the loss due to tariffs, both China and the US could sell heavily taxed products to the European market, but especially import products from Europe. If an agreement is reached with the US to lift or minimize tariffs, the EU would find itself facing a huge market niche left by Chinese products vetoed or taxed in the US. The same in China, especially in the automotive sector, from which the EU could benefit by selling to the Chinese market. Alicia Garcia-Herrero, of the Belgian think tank Bruegel, states that the benefit for Europe will only be possible if it does not lean towards any of the contenders and remains economically neutral [16]. It also stresses, like the European Commission, that China must adopt measures to guarantee its reciprocity and market access, since the European Union still has a greater business and investment Issue with the USA, so that the Chinese offer should be highly attractive for European producers to consider directing products to China instead of the USA. The UN itself estimates at US$70 billion the benefits that could be absorbed by the EU thanks to the trade war [17]. Definitely, if the right measures are taken and the 28 draw up an adequate road map, the EU could benefit from this war, without forgetting that, as the EU itself advocates, coercive measures are not the solution to the trade problem, and hopes that, due to their ineffectiveness and damage caused to both consumers and producers, the tariff war will come to an end and, if differences persist, they will be resolved in the WTO Appellate Body or in the Permanent Court of Arbitration of the United Nations.

This trade war is a highly complex and nuanced topic ; this analysis has attempted to address many of the aspects, data and problems faced by the European Union in this trade war. It has been generally analyzed what the trade war consists of, as well as the relations between the EU, China and the USA. We are facing a gray future, with the possibility of multiple and quick turns (especially on the part of the US, as seen after the G20 summit in Osaka, after which it has allowed the sale of components to Huawei, but has not removed the company from its blacklist) and from which, if the requirements and conditions set out above are met, the EU will definitely benefit, not only economically, but if it remains united and making a common front, it will be an example of negotiation and economic freedom for the whole world.

REFERENCES

Thomas, D. (14-5-2019) Who loses in the China-US trade war. BBC. Retrieved from.

Blake, A. (9-5-2019) Trump's rambling, disappointing Q&A with reporters, annotated. The Washington Post. Retrieved from.

3. Huawei: US blacklist will harm billions of consumers (29-5-2019) BBC. Retrieved from

4. EU warns China and the US: a trade war would subtract 0.6 points of GDP(3-6-2019) El Confidencial. Retrieved from

5. European Union Trade Statistics. (18-6-2019) European Commission.Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/eu-position-in-world-trade/statistics/

6. Pozzi, S. (2-3-2018) Trump reaffirms protectionism by raising tariffs on imported steel and aluminum. El País (New York correspondent)Retrieved from.

7. Inchaurraga, I. G. (2013). China and GATT (1986-1994): Causes and consequences of the failure of a negotiation. Cizur Menor, Navarra: Aranzadi. pp. 204-230.

8. Tejero, M. (25-7-2018) EU-USagreement : "zero tariffs" on industrial goods; more soybeans and liquefied gas. El Confidencial. Retrieved from

9. Pardo,P. & Villaécija, R. (17-6-2019) Trump threatens Spanish wine. El Mundo. Retrieved from.

10. A quick guide to US-China Trade War (14-5-2019) BBC. Retrieved from

11. Rosenfeld, E. & Soong, M. (25-3-2018) Nobel-winner Robert Shiller warns of an 'economic crisis' from trade war threats. CNBC. Retrieved from.

12. EU reviews relations with China and proposes 10 actions(12-3-2019) European Commission- Press statement .

13. Asturias takes 23% of Arcelor's new EU production cut(6-5-2019) 5 Días Retrieved from.

14. Morales, R. (26-12-2018) EU increased 28.3% its antidumping measures in 3 years: WTO. El Economista Mexico. Retrieved from

15. Warning about forced technology transfer to Chinese government.(20-5-2019) Infobae. Retrieved from

16. García-Herrero, A.; Guardans, I. & Hamilton, C. (28-6-2018) Trade War Trinity: analysis of global consequences. Bruegellecture). Retrieved from.

17. European Union, the big beneficiary of the trade war between China and the U.S.(4-2-2019) UN News . Retrieved from

essay / Lucía Serrano Royo

Currently, some 60 million people are forcibly displaced in the world (Arenas-Hidalgo, 2017).[1] The figures become more significant if it is noted that more than 80% of migratory flows are directed to development countries, while only 20% have developed countries as their goal , which in turn have more means and wealth, and would be more suitable to receive these migratory flows.

In 2015, Europe welcomed 1.2 million people, which was an unprecedented magnitude since World War II. This status has led to an intense discussion on solidarity and responsibility among member states.

The way in which this subject has been legislated in the European Union has given rise to irregularities in its application among the different States. This subject within the European Union system is a shared skill of the area of freedom, security and justice. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in its article 2.2 and 3 establishes that in these competences, it is the States that must legislate insofar as the Union does not exercise its skill This has led to a partial development and inequalities.

legislative development

The figure of refugees is reflected for the first time in an international document in the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and its 1967 protocol (UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency, 2017)[2]. Despite this breakthrough, the treatment of refugees was different in each member state, as their national policy was dealt with. Therefore, in an attempt to harmonize national policies, the Dublin agreement was signed in 1990. However, it was not until the Treaty of Amsterdam in May 1999 that the goal of creating an area of freedom, security and justice was established, treating the subject immigration and asylum as a shared skill . Already in October 1999, the European committee held a special session for the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice in the European Union, concluding with the need to create a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) (CIDOB, 2017)[3]. Finally, these policies on asylum become a common subject with the Lisbon Treaty and its development in the TFEU.

Currently, its raison d'être is set out in Article 67 et seq. of the TFEU, which states that the Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States. This area shall also guarantee the absence of controls on persons at internal borders. Furthermore, it is established that the EU will develop a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control (art 67.2 TFEU) based on solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards third-country nationals. But the area of freedom, security and justice is not a watertight compartment in the treaties, but has to be interpreted in the light of other sections.

This skill must be analyzed, on the one hand, under the framework free movement of persons within the European Union, and on the other hand, taking into account the financial field. With regard to the free movement of persons, article 77 TFEU must be applied, which calls on the Union to develop a policy ensuring the total absence of controls on persons at internal borders, while guaranteeing controls at external borders. To this end, the European Parliament and the committee, in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure , must establish a common policy on visas and other short-term residency program permits, controls and conditions under which third-country nationals may move freely within the Union. In the financial field, account must be taken of article 80 TFEU, which establishes the principle of solidarity in asylum, immigration and control policies, taking into account the fair distribution of responsibility among the Member States.

In addition, a fundamental aspect for the development of this subject has been the harmonization of the term refugee by the Union, defining it as third-country nationals or stateless persons who are outside their home country and are unwilling or unable to return to it due to a well-founded fear of being persecuted on account of their race, religion, nationality or opinion (Eur-ex.europa.eu, 2017)[4]. This is of particular importance because these are the characteristics necessary to acquire refugee status, which in turn is necessary to obtain asylum in the European Union.

status in Europe

Despite legislative development , the response in Europe to the humanitarian crisis following the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, together with the upsurge of conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea and Somalia, has been very ineffective, which has shaken the system.

The decision to grant or withdraw refugee status belongs to each State's internal authorities and may therefore differ from one State to another. What the European Union does is to guarantee common protection and ensure that asylum seekers have access to fair and efficient asylum procedures. This is why the EU tries to establish a coherent system for decision making in this respect by the Member States by developing rules on the entire asylum application process. In addition, in the event that the person does not meet the requirements for refugee status, but is in a sensitive status due to risk of serious harm in case of return to his or her country, he or she is entitled to subsidiary protection. The principle of non-refoulement applies to these persons, i.e. they have the right first and foremost not to be taken to a country where there is a risk to their lives.

The problem with this system is that Turkey and Lebanon alone host 10 times more refugees than the whole of Europe, which up to 2016 only processed 813,599 asylum applications. Specifically, Spain granted protection to 6,855 applicants, of which 6,215 were Syrians[5]; despite the increase compared to previous years, the figures were still the lowest in the European environment.

Many of the people who disembark in Greece or Italy set off again for the Balkans via Yugoslavia and Serbia to Hungary, in view of the poor management and precarious conditions they found in these host countries.

In an attempt to implement the principle of solidarity and cooperation, a series of quotas were established in 2015 to alleviate the humanitarian crisis and the pressure established in Greece and Italy. Member states were to share 120,000 asylum seekers, and all countries were to abide by it. The main stakeholder was Germany. Another mechanism that was created was a fund position the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, to meet the needs of refugees hosted in that country. The Commission earmarked a total amount of €2.2 billion, and budgeted €3 billion in 2016-2017[6].

Faced with this status , countries have reacted differently within the Union. In contrast to countries such as Germany, which is looking for a way to combat aging and population reduction in its state by entrance refugees, other member states are reluctant to implement the policies. Even in some EU countries, nationalist parties are gaining strength and support: in the Netherlands, Geert Wilders (Freedom Party); in France, Marine Le Pen (National Front); and in Germany, Frauke Petry (Alternative for Germany party). Although these parties are not the main political force in these countries, this reflects the dissatisfaction of part of the population with the entrance of refugees into the States. The case of the United Kingdom is also noteworthy, since one of the causes of Brexit was the desire to regain control over the entrance of immigrants into the country. In addition, the United Kingdom initially opted out of the quota system applied in the other Member States. As confirmed in her negotiations, Prime Minister Theresa May prioritizes the rejection of immigration over free trade in the EU.

Specific mechanisms for ESLJ development

The borders between the different countries of the Union have become blurred. With the Schengen border code and the Community code on visas, borders have been opened and integrated, thus allowing the free movement of people. The operation of these systems has required the establishment of common rules on the entrance of persons and the control of visas, since once the external border of the EU has been crossed, controls are minimal. Therefore, documentation checks vary depending on the places of origin of the recipients, with a more detailed control for non-EU citizens. Only exceptionally is there provision for the reintroduction of internal border controls (for a maximum period of thirty days), in the event of a serious threat to public order and internal security.

Since the control of external borders depends on the States where they are located, systems such as Frontex 2004 have been created, based on the ad hoc Border Control Centers established in 1999, which provides financial aid to States in the control of the EU's external borders, mainly to those countries suffering great migratory pressures (Frontex.europa.eu, 2017) [7]. The Internal Security Fund, a financial support system emerged in 2014 and aimed at reinforcing external borders and visas, has also been created.

Another active mechanism is the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), to strengthen the cooperation of EU countries, where member states should theoretically allocate 20% of the available resources[8]. For its implementation, the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) was established (2014-2020) necessary to promote the effectiveness of the management of migration flows. In addition, an asylum policy for the European Union has been established in the CEAS, which includes a directive on asylum procedures and a directive on reception conditions. The Dublin Regulation, in agreement with the Geneva Convention, is integrated into this system. It is a fundamental mechanism and although this system has been simplified, unified and clarified, it has caused more controversy in refugee subject . It was established to streamline the asylum application process in the 32 countries that apply the Regulation. Under this law, only one country is manager of the examination of your application: the country that takes the refugee's fingerprints, i.e. the country where he or she first arrived and applied for international protection. This works regardless of whether the person travels or applies for asylum in another country; the competent country is the one in which the refugee was first fingerprinted. This system relies on EURODAC, as it is a central system that financial aid EU member states in determining the country manager examining an asylum application by comparing fingerprints.

The European committee on Refugees and Exiles has highlighted the two main problems of this system: on the one hand, it leads refugees to travel clandestinely and dangerously until they reach their destination country, in order to avoid being fingerprinted by a country other than the one in which they want to settle. On the other hand, Greece and Italy, which are the main destinations of migrant flows, cannot cope with the burden this system imposes on them to process the masses of people arriving on their territory in search of protection.

Cases before the EU Court of Justice

The Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled on various aspects relating to immigration and the treatment of refugees by the Member States. On some occasions the Court has remained steadfast in the application of the homogeneous rules and regulations of the Union, while in other cases the Court has left the matter to the discretion of the different Member States. 

The court ruled in favor of a joint action in the case of a third country national (Mr. El Dridi) who illegally entered Italy without a residency program permit. On May 8, 2004 the Prefect of Turin issued a decree of expulsion against him. The CJEU (CJEU, 28 April 2011)[9] ruled that despite the fact that an immigrant is in illegal status and remains in the territory of that Member State without just cause, even with the concurrence of an infringement of an order to leave that territory within a certain time limit, the State cannot impose a prison sentence, since following the Directive 2008/115, they exclude the penal skill of the Member States in the field of illegal immigration and irregular status . Thus, the States must adjust their legislation to ensure the respect of the Union law.

On the other hand, the court leaves it up to the States to decide to send back to a third country an immigrant who has applied for international protection on its territory, if it considers that this country meets the criteria of a "safe third country". Even the court ruled (CJEU, December 10, 2013) [10]that, in order to streamline the processing of asylum applications and to avoid obstruction of the system, the Member State retains its prerogative in exercising the right to grant asylum regardless of which Member State is the manager the examination of an application. This School leaves a large margin of appreciation to the States. The homogeneity in this case is only appreciated in the case of systematic deficiencies of the asylum procedure and of the conditions of reception of asylum seekers in that State, or degrading treatment.

For a more active attitude

The European Union has established a multitude of mechanisms, and has the skill to implement them, but its passivity and the reluctant attitude of the Member States in welcoming refugees call into question the unity of the European Union system and the freedom of movement that characterizes the EU itself. The status it faces is complex, as there is a humanitarian crisis arising from the flow of migrants in need of financial aid at its borders. Meanwhile, the States are passive and even opposed to improving the system, to the point that some States have proposed the restoration of internal border controls (El Español, 2017).[11] This status has been caused mainly by a lack of effective control over their borders within the Union, and on the other hand by a society that is sample of the opening of borders due to insecurity.

The refugee crisis is a real problem and closing the borders will not make the problem go away. This is why European countries should adopt a common and active approach. The earmarking of funds serves as a financial aid in this humanitarian crisis, but it is not the only solution. One of the main unresolved problems is the status of people in refugee camps, who are in precarious conditions and should be received in a dignified manner. The Union should react more actively to these situations, making use of its skill in the subject asylum and mass influxes of migrants, as set out in Article 78 TFEU c).

This status remains one of the main objectives for the European Union diary as the White Paper establishes the reinforcement of the Migration diary , actions on the refugee crisis and aspects on the population crisis in Europe. It advocates for an increase in immigration policies and protection of legal immigration, while combating illegal immigration, helping both immigrants and the European population (European Commission, 2014) [12]. Despite these positive plans and perspectives, it is necessary to take into account the delicate status of the EU internally, with cases such as the withdrawal of a state with power within the Union (the Brexit), which could lead to a diversion in the efforts of community policies, leaving aside crucial issues, such as the status refugees.

essay / Marianna McMillan [English version].

I. Introduction

On March 31, 2016, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini presented the new cultural diplomacy platform, whose goal is to enhance visibility and understanding towards the Union through intercultural dialogue. The fact that all influential actors are committed to this platform (from a vertical, bottom-up perspective), makes us reconsider three factors of the EU: (1) the context in which it operates; (2) the internal constraints it has to address; and (3) the foreign policy to which it aspires. However, the EU wants to give a single cultural image, with a single voice and coherent with its policies; that is why, first and foremost, the EU must defend its motto "unity in diversity". This motto means the integration of national cultures in other countries, without this integration jeopardizing the different national identities of the member states. Consequently, in its status as an international actor and regional organization, the EU is lacking when it comes to intercultural dialogue and negotiation between identities (European External Action Service, 2017). It must therefore strive in both the one and the other (intercultural dialogue and the negotiation between identities) to address threats to European security such as terrorism, cyber insecurity, energy insecurity or identity ambiguity.

The goal of this analysis is, on the one hand, to understand the importance of culture as an instrument of soft power, and on the other hand, to reflect on the influence of culture as a theoretical foundation of the new European cultural platform.

II. Unity in diversity through the New Platform for Cultural Diplomacy

If the European Union aspires to be a liberal order founded on cooperation, then to what extent can the EU be globally influential? What is undeniable is that it lacks a single voice and a coherent common foreign policy.

The fact that the EU lacks a single voice is the result of the course of integration throughout history, an integration that has been based more on diversity than on equality. On the other hand, the statement on the incoherence of the common foreign policy reference letter to all those cases in which, faced with a coordination problem, what was agreed in the Maastricht Treaty 1992 takes precedence (Banús, 2015: 103-105 and Art. 6, TFEU): the competences may be of the member states, of the EU or may be shared competences.

As a consequence of the acceleration of globalization, the increase of non-traditional security threats (international terrorism, energy vulnerability, irregular migration flows, cyber threats or climate change) the idea of a common foreign policy between member states and the EU is challenged. Such threats demand not only a new security paradigm, but also a new paradigm of coexistence. This paradigm shift would allow the EU to have a greater capacity to reduce radicalization and to steer coexistence towards the needs of civil societies (see European Commission, 2016). By way of illustration about the new paradigm, we can name the promotion of narratives of a shared cultural heritage that financial aid to the regional integration process. However, at the same time that initiatives such as the above are being implemented, skepticism towards immigrants is growing and narratives contrary to the community narrative projected by the EU are being promoted. These institutional and structural constraints - diversity and shared competences - reflect the dynamics of the cultural landscape and its unintended consequences within the EU. They also give a vision of the European project as a process of integration (unity in diversity) and European identity as a single voice. Therefore, the EU as an international actor and as a regional organization, based on unity in diversity, has a need to establish an intercultural dialogue and a negotiation of shared identities from within its organization (EEAS, 2017). This would serve not only to establish favorable conditions for Brussels policies, but also as an instrument or means for the EU to counter non-traditional and external threats, such as terrorism, populist narratives, cyber threats, energy insecurity and identity ambiguity.

Regarding the difficulty in distinguishing internal constraints and external threats, Federica Mogherini established the New Platform for Cultural Diplomacy (NPC) in 2016.

In goal to clarify the terminology used above, 'cultural diplomacy' is understood as a "balance of power" according to the realist approach and as a "reflexive balance" from a conceptual approach (Triandafyllidou and Szucs, 2017). On the one hand, the realist approach understands cultural diplomacy as a subject of dialogue that serves to advance and protect national interests abroad (e.g., joint European cultural events or bilateral programs, such as film festivals, support for the strengthening of Tunisia's cultural sector, the creation of European cultural houses, the Culture and Creativity program, Communication and Culture for development in the Southern Mediterranean region, and the NPC). On the other hand, the conceptual approach , more reflective, understands cultural diplomacy as a policy in itself. It promotes the potential of the synergies of culture for sustainable social and economic development through individuals (e.g. cultural exchanges such as Erasmus Plus, the development and Cooperation Instrument and its sub-programs, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the ENI Cross Border Cooperation and the Civil Society Facility). The application of cultural diplomacy to the EU seeks to have global visibility and influence, and on the other hand, it seeks to promote economic growth and social cohesion through civil societies (Trobbiani, 2017: 3-5).

Despite being funded by the Partnership Instrument (PI), which goal to foster visibility and understanding of the EU, the NPC is a balance between the realist approach and the conceptual approach of cultural diplomacy (European Commission, 2016b). Consequently, it is a resilience strategy that responds to a new reality (resilience is understood in terms of inclusiveness, prosperity and security of society). In this reality, non-traditional security threats have emerged and in which there has been a change in the position of citizens, who have gone from being independent observers, to active participants demanding a constructive dialogue involving all stakeholders: national governments, international organizations and civil societies (Higgot, 2017:6-8 and EU, 2016).

The 2016 Global Strategy seeks pluralism, coexistence and respect for "deepening work in Education, culture and youth" (EU, 2016). In other words, the platform invests in creative Structures , such as think tanks, cultural institutes or local artists, to preserve a cultural identity, advance economic prosperity and enhance soft power.

In seeking global understanding and visibility, one sees how the EU's interest in international cultural relations (ICR) and cultural diplomacy (CD) has grown. This, in turn, reflects the EU's internal need for a single voice and a common foreign policy. This effort demonstrates the fundamental role of culture in soft power, thus creating a connection between culture and external power. Perhaps the more appropriate question is: to what extent can Mogherini's NCP turn culture into a tool of soft power? And are the strategies-ICR and NCP-an effective communication and coordination model in the face of internal and external security threats, or will it inevitably undermine its narrative of unity in diversity?

III. Culture and Soft Power

The change in the concept of security requires revisiting the concept of soft power. In this case, cultural diplomacy must be understood in terms of soft power, and soft power must be understood in terms of attractiveness and influence. Soft power, agreement to Joseph Nye's notion of persuasion, arises from "intangible power resources": "such as culture, ideology and institutions" (Nye, 1992:150-170).

The EU as a product of cultural dialogues is a civil power, a normative power and a soft power. The EU's persuasive power depends on its legitimacy and credibility in its institutions (EU, 2016a and Michalski, 2005:124-141). For this reason, coherence between the identity the EU wishes to display and the practices it will follow is fundamental to the projection of itself as a credible international actor. This coherence will be necessary if the EU is to fulfill its goal of "strengthening unity in diversity". Otherwise, its liberal values would be contradicted and populist prejudices against the EU would be solidified. Therefore, internal legitimacy and credibility as sources of soft power ultimately depend written request the consistency between the EU's narrative identity and the democratic values reflected in its practices (EU, 2016).

Cultural diplomacy responds to incoherence by demanding reflection, on the one hand, and enhancing that identity, on the other. For example, optimizing Europe's image through the European Neighborhood and association Instrument (ENPI) communication program helps to promote specific geopolitical interests, creating more durable conditions for cooperation with countries such as Algeria, Libya and Syria to the south, and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to the east. This is relevant in relation to what Nye coined as "co-optive power": "the ability of a country to manage a status in such a way that other countries develop certain preferences or define their interests in agreement with its own" (Nye, 1990:168). Soft power applied to culture can function indirectly or directly. It works indirectly when it is independent of government control (e.g., popular culture) and directly through cultural diplomacy (e.g., PCN). Foreign policy actors can act as advocates for domestic culture, both consciously (e.g., politicians) and unconsciously (e.g., local artists). In doing so they serve as agents for other countries or channels of soft power.

IV. Culture and foreign policy

Considering soft power as an emergence of culture, values and national policies, we can affirm that culture is both a foundation and a resource of foreign policy (Liland, 1993:8). Foreign policy, in turn, operates within the cultural framework of any society that interacts at the international level. Therefore, a European cultural context capable of influencing globally is necessary (e.g., the difference in accession negotiations between Croatia and Turkey and the attractiveness of economic integration or the ability to adjust human rights policies). Culture is in turn a resource, as the cultural exchange empowers the EU. This new capacity of the EU allows it to learn new popular attitudes, feelings and images that are capable of influencing foreign policy, domestic politics and social life (Liland, 1993:9-14 and Walt, 1998). Another function to highlight of culture is that of information dissemination and its ability to elicit favorable opinions in the foreign nation (Liland, 1993:12-13).

Thus, cultural diplomacy is at the forefront of European foreign policy; however, this does not mean that the use of culture can replace traditional foreign policy objectives - geography, power, security, politics and economics - but rather that the use of culture serves to support and legitimize them. In other words, culture is not the primary agent in the foreign policy process, but is the rationale that reinforces, contradicts, or explains its content - thus, Wilson's idealism in the 1920s can be linked to a domestic culture of "manifest destiny" (Liland, 1993 and Kim, 2011:6).

V. Conclusions

The purpose of this article has been to highlight the importance of culture in relation to soft power and foreign policy, as a theoretical foundation for understanding the logic of the EU's new Cultural Diplomacy platform. By identifying the role of culture as a fundamental part of social cohesion within the EU, we can conclude that culture has made the EU a more influential global actor. Culture, likewise, has been identified as a source soft power and as an instrument of foreign policy. But the sources of soft power -culture, political values and foreign policy- depend on three factors: (1) a favorable context; (2) credibility in values and internship, and (3) the perception of legitimacy and moral authority (see Nye, 2006). The EU has to first legitimize itself as a coherent actor with moral authority in order to be able to deal effectively with its existential crisis (European Union, 2016a:9 and Tuomioja, 2009).

To do so, the EU must overcome its institutional and structural limits by collectively confronting its non-traditional external security threats. This requires a strategy of resistance in which the EU is not identified as a threat to national identity, but as a cultural, economic and legislative entity.

This article has discussed various issues related to culture, soft power, EU foreign policy and its internal dynamics; however, it has not analyzed in depth the impact of a "uniform cultural system" and how foreign policy can influence the culture of a society. Culture is not an end in itself, nor are intercultural dialogues and the development of cultural diplomacy.

The Union must avoid the risk of evolving into a dehumanizing bureaucratic structure that favors a standard culture to counter its internal constraints and non-traditional external security threats. According to Vaclav Havel, the EU can avoid this phenomenon by supporting cultural institutions that work for plurality and freedom of culture. These institutions are fundamental to preserving the national identity and traditions of each nation. In other words, culture should be subsidized to better accommodate its plurality and freedom as is the case with national heritages, libraries, museums and public archives - or the witnesses of our past (Havel, 1992).

As a final and historical reflection, cultural diplomacy promotes shared narratives about cultural identities. To do otherwise would not only solidify populist rhetoric and internal prejudices against the Union, but would also make cultural totalitarianism, or worse, cultural relativism, endemic. To aspire to a "uniform system of culture" through an agreed European narrative would be to negotiate away pluralism and freedom and, consequently, contradict firstly the nature of culture and, secondly, the liberal values on which the Union was founded.

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essay / Celia Olivar Gil [English version].

The global context continues to pose new challenges to European collective action subject development, the most important of which is migration from the Southern Mediterranean and the difficulty of articulating a well-articulated joint reaction. Aware of the urgency of the status, the European Union is trying to offer a new and ambitious response in the form of the New Consensus on development (hereafter 'Consensus') which also coincides with the review of the Millennium development Goals by the United Nations.

The Consensus is a 'framework for action' to promote the integration and coherence of the development cooperation of the European Union and its member states. This framework calls for the adoption of the necessary changes to ensure that both EU and national legislation complies with the 2030 diary for Sustainable development proposal by the United Nations and with the Paris agreement on climate change.

The Consensus maintains the eradication of poverty as its main goal , but includes a novel vision, proposing that poverty be addressed from a triple economic, social and environmental perspective. In addition to the eradication of poverty, the Consensus aims to achieve the 2030 diary , and to this end articulates its five pillars: population, planet, prosperity, peace and cooperation. To this articulation, the Consensus adds some novel and cross-cutting elements, which are: emphasis on youth (meeting the basic needs of young people such as employment); gender equality; good governance (achieving a rule of law that guarantees human rights, promoting the creation of transparent institutions, participatory decision-making and independent and impartial courts); mobilization and migration; sustainable energy and climate change; Investment and trade; innovative engagement with the most advanced development countries (creating new partnerships with these countries to implement the 2030 diary here); mobilization and use of domestic resources (effective and efficient use of resources through the "raise more, spend better" initiative).

In order to achieve all the initiatives and objectives set out above, the application of the Consensus extends to both the policies of the European Union and those of all its member states. In addition, it emphasizes that the Consensus should also be applied in new, more tailored and more multilateral partnerships involving civil society and greater participation of partner countries. The means of implementation combine traditional financial aid with more innovative forms of financing for development, such as private sector investments and mobilization of additional domestic resources for development. In terms of follow-up, the new consensus will have a regular monitoring mechanism, including accountability through the European Parliament and national parliaments and reporting obligations.

Initial assessments of the new consensus agree that it is a good synthesis of international development concerns. However, it raises some criticisms regarding its effective capacity to address these concerns.

First of all, as the Overseas Development Institute points out, it is not a real strategic plan, but a set of unconnected priorities. For it to be a real strategy, the roles of the Commission and the member states would need to be determined, thematic, sectoral and geographic priorities defined (the seventeen Sustainable development Goals (SDGs) contained in the 2030 diary are treated with equal importance), and new European institutions built or existing ones (such as the International Climate Fund) used to coordinate national funds more effectively. Likewise, the Consensus should determine the form and content of cooperation with average income countries, establishing horizontal, vertical and sectoral coordination. At the same time, this coordination would require the establishment of a division of tasks within the EU to achieve a better use of resources.

Secondly, agreement to James Mackie (head of the learning and quality department of the European Center for development), it is difficult to see who is being targeted and what exactly they are demanding. The fact that the geographic and sectoral priorities remain undetermined leaves the Degree of commitment of the member states uncertain and, if there is commitment, it will be tactical rather than explicit.

The third criticism is related to its implementation. Although the consensus is ambitious in its objectives, it lacks an adequate institutional framework and an efficient mechanism to implement its new proposals. Moreover, it gives the private sector a very important role, without providing it with transparency in cases of human rights abuses or environmental damage, as Marta Latek, researcher at the EPRS (European Parliamentary Research Service), explained

In terms of its objectives, many influential actors such as CARE (the international development confederation) agree that it focuses too much on migration control and does not prioritize the needs of the poor. This can be seen in the fact that both the cooperation framework with other non-EU countries and the external investment plan prioritize the EU's security and trade interests before helping the population out of poverty.

A fifth criticism reference letter to the political dimension. The new Consensus should integrate a holistic as well as a sustainable security concept to connect the problems of stability and democracy with those of security in EU foreign affairs. A holistic concept of development means a vision of lasting sustainability, encompassing aspects such as the condition of sustainability, social justice or democracy (Critique according to Henökl, Thomas and Niels Keijzer of the German Development Institute).

Finally, as far as financing is concerned, the European Parliament continues to ask member states to donate 0.7% of their annual budget to development cooperation. Since very few of them are able to provide this 0.7%, the consensus is that private sector participation via the European External Investment Plan is important.

In conclusion, this document reflects the needs of the current global context but requires a series of changes in order to be fully effective and a true strategy. These changes are necessary to prevent the Consensus from remaining only theoretical.

REFERENCES

Q&A: New European Consensus on development http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1505_es.pdf 

New European Consensus on development: EU and Member States sign joint strategy to eradicate poverty: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1503_es.htm

The proposed new European Consensus on Development Has the European Commission got it right? https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11263.pdf

New European consensus on development Will it be fit for purpose? http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599434/EPRS_BRI(2017)599434_EN.pdf

Seven critical questions for review of 'European Consensus on Development ' https://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/opinion/sevencritical-questions-for-review-of-european-consensus-on-development/

The Future of the "European Consensus on Development" average

European Union Development Policy: Collective Action in Times of Global Transformation and Domestic Crisis http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dpr.12189/full