The trade dependence between the two countries - greater in the case of Brazil, but the Chinese also need certain Brazilian products, such as soybeans - ensures the understanding between the two countries.

The relationship between Brazil and China has proven to be particularly pragmatic: neither Jair Bolsonaro has reviewed the link with the Asian country as he promised before becoming president (in his first year in office he has not only kept Brazil in the BRICS but even made a highly publicized official trip to Beijing), nor has Xi Jinping punished his partner for having accused him of mismanaging the coronavirus pandemic, as has happened with other countries. The convenience of mutual trade relations, revalued by the trade war between China and the US and by the present world crisis, has prevailed.

▲ Jair Bolsonaro and Xi Jinping in Beijing in October 2019 [Planalto Palace].

article / Túlio Dias de Assis

After years of criticizing the "perverse communist government of Beijing", Jair Bolsonaro surprised at the end of last October with a state visit to the Forbidden City, which he himself specially publicized on social networks. On that trip he gave Xi Jinping the jersey of the Club de Regatas do Flamengo (the soccer team that at that time represented Brazil in the Libertadores Cup, which he would end up winning) and expressed his total conviction of being in a capitalist country. In November he hosted a BRICS summit in Brasilia.

Bolsonaro's policy toward China had already begun to change since shortly after acceding to the presidency in January 2019, in contrast to his anti-China messages during the election campaign.

In fact, diplomatic relations between the two countries date back to the time of the military board of which Bolsonaro sample so proud. In 1974, Brazil recognized the People's Republic of China as the only China, thus allowing, despite being unaware of it at the time, the creation of a huge trade link between the two nations of continental proportions. Since then, as China's openness to China progressed, relations between China and Brazil have been increasing, so that for almost a decade now China has been Brazil's main trading partner . China's dependence on Brazil is also remarkable in relation to some products, such as soybeans, although for the Chinese Brazil is the twentieth trading partner , since logically they are economies of very different sizes.

When in 1978 Deng Xiaoping decided to open up Chinese Economics to the rest of the world, Chinese GDP was close to $150 billion, 75% of Brazil's, which was already over $200 billion. Four decades later, in 2018, Brazilian GDP was $1.8 trillion and Chinese GDP was $13.6 trillion.

Soybeans and swine

Brazil's greatest commercial and even political rapprochement with China occurred during the presidency of Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva, during which the BRICS was formed, a club that helped create a greater level of economic and diplomatic proximity between member countries. This rapprochement led China to become Brazil's leading trading partner in terms of exports and imports. Brazil's sales to China almost double exports to the US.

Although trade with Brazil represents less than 4% of the total value of goods imported by China annually, the South American country continues to be an important trading partner for the People's Republic, due to the fact that the main product imported from Brazil is soybeans, one of the usual per diem expenses instructions for a large part of the Chinese population. More than half of the soybeans imported by China come from Brazil and the trend is to increase, mainly due to the trade war with the USA - the second main exporter of soybeans to China -, thus making Brazil practically the breadbasket of the Middle Kingdom. China is the destination of more than 70% of Brazilian soybean production.

Dependence on China, from the Brazilian consumer's perspective, was accentuated at the end of 2019 due to an exorbitant rise in the price of meat. The average between the different Brazilian states hovered between 30% and 40% compared to previous months. Producers were able to substantially increase their profits in the short term, but the popular classes openly protested the uncontrolled price of a product very present in the usual per diem expenses of the average Brazilian. The rise in prices was due to a combination of factors, among them an outbreak of swine fever that devastated a large part of Chinese production. Faced with a shortage of supply in its domestic market, China was forced to diversify its suppliers, and being in the midst of a trade war with the USA, China had no choice but to turn to the Brazilian agricultural potential, one of the few capable of meeting the great Chinese demand for meat. During this period - a brief one, as it gradually returned to the previous status - Brazil obtained a certain coercive power over the Asian giant.

Huawei and credits

Brazil is in a status of extreme dependence on China in technological subject : more than 40% of Brazil's purchases from China are machinery, electronic devices or parts thereof. Already in the last decade, with the arrival of the smartphone and fiber optics revolution in Latin America, Brazil decided to bet more on Chinese technology, thus becoming one of the main international markets for the now controversial Huawei brand, which has come to dominate 35% of the Brazilian cell phone market. While the US and Europe were suspicious of Huawei and from the beginning placed limits on its markets, Brazil saw Chinese technology as a cheaper way to develop and never let itself be swayed by suspicions of Chinese government interference in privacy subject . Even several deputies of the PSL (former party to which Bolsonaro belonged) visited China in early 2020 to evaluate the possibility of acquiring Chinese facial recognition equipment to help state security forces in the fight against organized crime, a proposal that was ultimately rejected by the Parliament.

With the rise of the controversy about the risks of espionage that the use of the Chinese multinational's technology may pose, some voices have warned of the threat that Huawei's contracting may pose to many government agencies and offices: a couple of embassies and consulates, part of the infrastructure of the Chamber of Deputies, and even the headquarters of the Federal Prosecutor's Office and the Federal Justice in some federal states. Although given the lack of accusatory evidence against Huawei, little has been done by the government about it; only the cancellation of some purchases of Huawei devices has been given.

Brazil is the country that has received the second most public loans from China in Latin America: $28.9 billion (Venezuela is the first with $62.2 billion), spread over eleven loans between 2007 and 2017, of which nine come from the Chinese development Bank and two others from the Export-Import Bank of China. Despite being a high value, it represents a very small percentage of the Brazilian public debt, which already exceeds one trillion dollars. Most of the loans granted by Beijing have been earmarked for the construction of infrastructure for resource extraction. In addition, Chinese companies have invested in the construction of two ports in Brazil, one in São Luís (Maranhão State) and the other in Paranaguá (Paraná State).

Coronavirus rhetoric

Bolsonaro soon realized his dependence on China and opted for a policy of accommodation towards Beijing, far from his election campaign messages. Once again, then, Brazil was betting on pragmatism and moderation, as opposed to ideology and radicalism, in terms of Itamaraty (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) policy. Likewise, in the face of the instability caused by the US-China trade war and Trump's current weak position, Bolsonaro was demonstrating pragmatism by not closing himself off to high-potential trade partners because of his ideology, as was seen last November at the BRICS summit in Brasilia.

But sometimes a rhetoric emerges that is in line with the original thinking. In the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, Bolsonaro has copied Trump's anti-China narrative in some messages. A good example is the exchange of tweets that took place between Eduardo Bolsonaro, federal deputy and eldest son of the president, and the Chinese ambassador, Yang Wanming. The former compared the coronavirus to the Chernobyl accident, insinuating total irresponsibility, negligence and concealed information on the part of the Chinese Communist Party. The ambassador responded that the president's son "on his last trip to the US did not contract the coronavirus, but a mental virus", referring to his ideological proximity to Trump.

However, all this status seems to have calmed down after a call between the presidents of both countries, in which both reaffirmed their commitments, especially those of a commercial and financial nature. Also, once again Bolsonaro seems to follow Itamaraty's traditional line of neutrality, despite the constant insistence of his instructions to blame China for the current tragedy. It is clear that the economic dependence on China is still much stronger than the ideological principles of Bolsonaro's political base, however Trumpist it may be.

The success of several reforms is overshadowed by the impulsiveness and personal interests of a president with a deteriorated image.

▲ Jair Bolsonaro attends to the press in early January at the headquarters of the Ministry of Economics [Isac Nóbrega, PR].

ANALYSIS / Túlio Dias de Assis

One year ago, on January 1, 2019, a former Brazilian army captain, Jair Bolsonaro, climbed the steps of the Palácio do Planalto for the inauguration of his presidential mandate. He was the most controversial leader to assume Brazil's head of state and government since the presidency of the no less flamboyant populist Jânio Quadros in the 1960s. The more catastrophic ones announced the imminent end of the world's fourth largest democracy; the more deluded ones, that Brazil would take off and take its rightful place in the international arena. As was to be expected, neither extreme was right: Brazil continues to maintain the level of democracy of the last 30 years, without any military attempt , as some had feared; nor has Brazil become the world power that many Brazilians believe it is due to its exceptional territorial, population, cultural and political characteristics. As it usually happens, reality has been less simple than expected.

Economics

Among the most attractive aspects of Bolsonaro's candidacy to the public during the election campaign was the promise of economic recovery under the administration of Chicago Boy minister Paulo Guedes. In order to fulfill that purpose, as soon as he took office, Bolsonaro unified the former Ministries of Finance, Planning, development and management, Industry, work and Foreign Trade and Services under the Ministry of Economics, all under the command of the liberal Guedes. A person who became a sort of "superminister" manager of the entire economic diary of the new government.

From the outset, Guedes made it clear that he would do his utmost to lift the barriers of Brazilian trade protectionism, a doctrine adopted in varying Degree by every government for more than half a century. In order to deploy his crusade against statism and protectionism, Guedes has encouraged during this year the bilateral commercial rapprochement to several strategic allies, which, "unlike previous governments, will not be chosen based on ideological criteria", according to Bolsonaro. Already in January there was the advertisement a Novo Brasil at the World Economic Forum in Davos, defined by greater openness, zero tolerance to corruption and strengthening of Latin America as a regional bloc.

Trade

Despite his support for economic openness, Bolsonaro's team has never been overly favorable to trade with Mercosur -his regional multilateral trade bloc-, with Guedes even stating that it was a burden for Brazil, as he considered it an ideological rather than an economic alliance. However, this aversion to Mercosur, and mainly to Argentina, seems to have ended after the signature the Mercosur-EU tradeagreement , given that the potential trade Issue that would be generated with this pact would be enormously beneficial for Brazilian agricultural and livestock producers. An agreement was also signed with the countries of the European Free Trade area (EFTA), comprising Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.

Of these two agreements, the most controversial has been the one signed with the European Union, mainly due to the high levels of rejection in some Member States such as France, Ireland or Austria, as it is seen as a possible risk to the Common Agricultural Policy. On the other hand, some other countries were critical alleging Bolsonaro's environmental policy, since the agreement was signed during the summer, which coincided with the time of the fires in the Amazon. As a result, several member states have still not ratified the treaty and the Austrian parliament has voted against it.

However, the fact that multilateral trade relations do not seem to have advanced much, due to the obstacles imposed by Europe, has not prevented Brazil from expanding its commercial activity. Contrary to what one would think, due to the ideological closeness with Donald Trump and his foreign policy, the rapprochement in economic subject has not been with the US, but with the antagonistic Asian giant. In this process, Bolsonaro's trip to Beijing stands out, where he showed himself open to Chinese trade, despite his previous less favorable statements in this regard. During the visit , the proposal for a free trade agreement with China, which has yet to be approved by the Mercosur summit, and several minor agreements, including one on agricultural trade, came up.

This sudden Chinese interest in increasing agricultural imports from Brazil is due to the increase in demand for meat in China, caused mainly by the swine fever epidemic that devastated domestic production. This has led to an immediate rise in the price of beef and pork in Brazil, up to 30% in some cuts in little more than a month, which has distorted the domestic market, since meat, mainly beef, is usually very present in the average Brazilian's usual per diem expenses .

Public accounts

With regard to the country's internal accounts, the approval of the pension reform(Reforma da Previdência), which initially had a markedly liberal character, with the intention of eliminating privileges and disproportionate pensions for high-level public officials, stands out. However, several modifications during its passage through the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate meant that the savings for the public treasury were slightly less than Guedes had envisaged. All in all, it is a great advance considering that the pension system had a deficit of R$195 billion (about US$47 billion) in 2018. This deficit is due to the fact that Brazil had one of the systems with the highest benefits and the fewest demands in the world, as there were not few who retired at 55 years of age receiving 70% of the original salary.

This measure, together with several other adjustments in the public accounts, including the freezing of some ministerial expenditures, reduced the public deficit by US$ 138,218 million in January (6.67% of GDP) to US$ 97,680 million in November (5.91% of GDP), the leave figure since the economic recession began five years ago. Among other relevant data is the decrease in the Central Bank's base interest rate to a historic low of 4.5%, while the unemployment rate went from 12% to 11.2%.

As a result of the above, Brazilian GDP has increased by 1.1%, a timid but promising figure considering the huge recession from which Brazil has just emerged. Growth forecasts for 2020 vary between 2.3% and 3% of GDP, depending on the approval of the long-awaited tax and management assistant reforms.

Security

Another reason that led the controversial reservation captain to the presidency was Brazil's historic crime problem. Just as Bolsonaro came up with a strong name to tackle the economic status , for security he recruited Sergio Moro, a former federal judge known for his indispensable role in Operação Lava Jato, Brazil's largest anti-corruption operation that led to the imprisonment of former President Lula himself. With the goal of fighting corruption, reducing criminality and dynamiting the power of organized crime, Moro was put in charge of a merger of Departments, the new Ministry of Justice and Public Security.

In general, the result has been quite positive, with adecrease in the issue of violent crimes. Thus, there has been a 22% reduction in the case of homicides, which is one of the most worrying indicators in Brazil, since it is the country with the highest absolute issue of homicides in the world per year.

Among the factors that explain this drop in violent crime, the most important is the greater integration between the different state security force institutions (federal, state and municipal). The transfer of gang leaders to prisons with a higher level of isolation, thus preventing their possible communication with other members of organized crime, has also played a role. Another element has been the recent"anti-crime pack", which consists of a series of laws and reforms to the penal code to give more power to state security forces, in addition to establishing harsher penalties for violent crime, organized crime and corruption.

In addition to these advances, there has also been an increase in the number of accidental deaths in police operations. Some cases have echoed in public opinion, such as that of an artist who ended up shot in his car when the police mistook him for a drug trafficker, or those of children killed by stray bullets in shootouts between drug gangs and security forces. This, together with controversial statements by the head of state on the matter, has fueled criticism by most of the civil service examination and several human rights NGOs.

Social policy and infrastructure

In terms of social policies, the past year has been far from the apocalyptic dystopia that was expected (due to Bolsonaro's previous attitude in relation to homosexuals, Afro-Brazilians and women), although it has not been as remarkable as in the previously mentioned sections. There has been no progress in core topic areas, but neither have there been notable changes in terms of social policy with respect to 2018. For example, the emblematic social program Bolsa Família, created during the Lula government and which helped greatly in reducing extreme poverty, has not been cancelled.

Starting with Education, at the end of 2019 Brazil was ranked with one of the lowest scores in the PISA report , a fact that the Minister of Education, Abraham Weintraub, blamed on the "progressive MarxistEducation of previous administrations". As a result of the failure of the regular public system, and even the lack of security of some schools, the government has openly promoted the construction of new civic-military Education centers by state governments. In this subject of center, students receive an Education based on military values while the officers themselves provide protection in these public spaces. It should be noted that the existing centers are among the highest ranked in Brazil in subject of educational quality. However, this is not without controversy, as there are many who consider that this is not an adequate solution, as it may end up educating from a militaristic perspective.

In health subject , the most noteworthy event this year has been the end of the health cooperation program with Cuba, Mais Médicos. This agreement was initiated in 2013, during Dilma Rousseff's mandate, and its goal was to provide greater and more extensive universal medical attendance through the hiring of several doctors 'exported' by the Castro government. The program was criticized because the Cuban doctors only received 25% of the salary provided by the Brazilian government and the remaining 75% was retained by Havana. Bolsonaro broke the agreement, thus causing vacancies in health staff that could be filled in a short time. Cuban professionals were given the opportunity to remain in Brazil under political asylum if they revalidated their degree program in medicine in the Brazilian system. This incident has not brought about a relevant change in the precarious national health system; the only consequence of all this has been the deterioration of relations with Cuba.

Despite not making great progress on the social front, the Bolsonaro administration has made improvements in national logistics infrastructure. Under the command of military officer Tarcisio Gomes de Freitas, the Ministry of Infrastructure has stood out for its ability to conclude works not completed by previous governments. This led to a notable difference in the issue and quality of operational roads, railroads and airports compared to the previous year. Among the sources of financing for new works is the reopening of a common fund established in 2017 between Brazilian and Chinese financial entities, worth US$100 billion.

Bolsonaro with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during an official visit to New Delhi in late January [Alan Santos, PR].

Environment

One of the areas most feared to be harmed by Jair Bolsonaro's administration was environmental policy. Such concern was heightened by the controversial fires in the Amazon during July and August. To begin with, the Ministry of the Environment, like all the others, was affected by Paulo Guedes' austerity policies, in order to balance the public accounts, although according to Minister Ricardo Salles himself, it was the one that suffered the least from the budget cut. As a result, at the beginning of the drought period in the Amazon, forest protection was compromised.

Seeing the 278% increase in deforestation during the month of July, Bolsonaro reacted impulsively and fired the director of the National Institute of Space Research (INPE), accusing him of favoring civil service examination and conspiring against him. The status caused the departure of the Amazon Protection Fund from Germany and Norway, the two largest contributors, which was met with criticism from Bolsonaro, who also accused the NGOs of being the cause of the fires. Finally, under international pressure, Bolsonaro finally reacted and decided to send the army to fight the flames, a goal he achieved in just under a month, reaching the leave number on record in October.

In the end, the annual total ended up exceeding the previous year's figure by 30%, but still within the average of the last two decades. However, the damage to the national image was already done. Bolsonaro, thanks to his rivalry with the media, his vehement eagerness to defend "national sovereignty" and his lack of restraint when speaking, had managed to be considered the culprit of a distorted catastrophe.

Additionally, at the end of the year, one more controversy hit the Bolsonaro administration: the mysterious oil spill on the northeast coast of Brazil. Thousands of kilometers of beaches were affected and still to this day there is no official culprit for the crime. There were several hypotheses on the matter; the most accepted one, which was also supported by the government, was that the spill came from an illegal shipment of Venezuelan oil trying to circumvent the trade blockade imposed on Maduro's regime. According to analyses carried out by the Universidade da Bahia, the structure of the oil was indeed very similar to that of crude oil from Venezuelan fields.

Foreign policy

In foreign policy Bolsonaro may distinguish himself rhetorically from his predecessors, but not in terms of his actions. Although in that area he would like to apply his ideology, he himself has accepted that it is not possible to do so. In the face of the strength and interests of state institutions, such as the diplomatic tradition of Itamaraty (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Brazilian foreign policy has remained as pragmatic and neutral as in all previous governments of democracy, thus avoiding the closing of doors for ideological reasons.

A good example of Brazilian pragmatism is the economic rapprochement with China, despite Bolsonaro's rejection of communist ideology. Although this does not mean that he has distanced himself from his quasi-natural ally in terms of ideology, Donald Trump. However, the relationship with the US has been of a different nature, as there has been greater proximity in international cooperation and security. The US pushed for the designation of Brazil as a strategic partner of NATO, reached an agreement for the use of the Alcântara space base, very close to the Equator, and supports Brazil's entrance the OECD.

However, in the economic sphere, there does not seem to be such closeness, and there have even been certain frictions. One of them was Trump's threat to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum from Brazil and Argentina, which he finally withdrew, although the damage to trade relations and the São Paulo and Buenos Aires stock exchanges was already done. Some analysts even point out that the lack of US reciprocity in economic subject , as well as the rejection by some EU members of the agreement with Mercosur, was what pushed Bolsonaro to seek a compensatory relationship with the BRICS, whose 2019 summit took place in Brasilia.

Another peculiar point of Bolsonaro's foreign policy has been his position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which once again sample the inconsistency between rhetoric and action. During the election campaign Bolsonaro promised on several occasions the transfer of the Brazilian embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem, something that so far has not happened and there has only been the transfer of an economic office. Bolsonaro probably feared trade reprisals from Arab countries, to whom Brazil exports products, mostly meat products, worth almost 12 billion dollars. Prudence in this matter even earned him the signature several agreements with Persian Gulf countries.

Despite the above, there has been one aspect of foreign policy in which Bolsonaro did manage to impose his ideology against the "historical pragmatism" of the Itamaraty, and this is the Latin American sphere. Brazil ceased to be the giant that in theory remains neutral to support, timidly, the so-called Socialism of the 21st Century during the governments of Lula and Dilma, and now coordinate with the governments of the other political side.

Most notable is his enmity with Nicolás Maduro, as well as with former President Evo Morales, whose request to pass through Brazilian territory was openly denied by Bolsonaro. There has also been a distancing with respect to the returned Peronism in Argentina, with the absence of Bolsonaro and of any high Brazilian representative in the inauguration ceremony of Kirchner's Alberto Fernandez. In the same context are the approaches to Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay and Colombia, as well as to the new provisional government of Bolivia, with which Bolsonaro sees more similarities. With them he has promoted the creation of PROSUR as opposed to the former UNASUR controlled by the Bolivarian left. Even and all, despite having adopted a more ideological policy in the region, Brazil continues to maintain diplomatic cordiality since, although its leader takes liberal conservatism to extremes in his rhetoric, his policies in the region hardly differ from the rest of the right-wing governments.

Bolsonaro

In general, as has been exposed, in its first year the Bolsonaro administration has obtained positive results, highlighting mainly its progress in the areas of security and Economics. However, while the work of various ministers improves the perception of the administration, Bolsonaro himself does not seem to be making a particularly positive contribution. Throughout the year, he has generated controversies over unimportant issues, which have accentuated his previous enmity with most of the press.

Because of this, the president's public image has gradually deteriorated. At the end of 2019, his popularity was 30%, compared to the 57.5% with which he began the year. That contrasts with the percentage of approval that members of his government have, especially Sergio Moro, who has managed to remain immovably above 50%. In addition, his son Flavio, who is a senator, has come under investigation for a possible corruption case, in a process that the president has sought to prevent. Bolsonaro also caused a scandal in the middle of the year when he tried to appoint his son Eduardo as ambassador to Washington, being accused of nepotism. To the tensions in his own party, which led to a rupture, must be added the poor rapport between Bolsonaro and the presidents of both chambers of the fractured National congress , both investigated in conveniently stalled anti-corruption operations.

Impeachment?

All this chaos caused by the president gives the impression of a Bolsonaro who goes against the current of his own government. The apparent success of the reforms already carried out ends up being tainted by the impulsiveness and personal interests of the man who once defended the impersonality of the State, which ends up causing the deterioration of his political image. In addition, there is the recent release of former president Lula, which entails the risk of the unification of the civil service examination, depending on how moderate the speech he adopts. This being the case, it is possible that the headless but efficient Bolsonaro government will not find it easy to stay in power until the end of its term. It should be remembered that the hand of the Brazilian congress does not usually tremble when it comes to impeachments; see that in little more than three decades there have already been two.

The possibility that Bolsonaro's government may seek to label the Landless Movement as terrorists for forcibly occupying farms reopens a historic controversy.

When Brazil passed its first anti-terrorism legislation around the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, the initiative was seen as an example to be followed by other Latin American countries, until then generally unfamiliar with a phenomenon that since 9/11 had become pre-eminent in many other parts of the world. However, the possibility that, with the political momentum of Jair Bolsonaro, some social movement, such as the Landless Movement, may be labeled as terrorist, revives old fears of the Brazilian left and accentuates social polarization.

Flag of the Movimento Dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST)

article / Túlio Dias de Assis

At the last Berlin Film Festival, the famous Brazilian actor and filmmaker Wagner Moura presented a somewhat controversial film, "Marighella". The film portrays the life of a character from recent Brazilian history, loved by some and hated by others: Carlos Marighella, leader of the Ação Libertadora Nacional. This organization was a revolutionary guerrilla manager of several attacks against the dictatorial military regime that ruled Brazil between 1964 and 1985. For this reason, the film provoked very different reactions: for some, it is the just exaltation of an authentic martyr of the anti-fascist struggle; for others, it is an apology for armed guerrilla terrorism. This small ideological dispute about "Marighella", although it may seem insignificant, is a reflection of an old wound in Brazilian politics that is reopened every time the country discussion the need for anti-terrorist legislation.

The concept of anti-terrorism legislation is something that has taken hold in many parts of the world, especially in the West after 9/11. However, this notion is not as common in Latin America, probably due to the infrequency of attacks of this subject suffered by the region. However, the lack of attacks does not imply that there is no presence of such movements in American countries; in fact, several of them are known to be "safe havens" for such organizations, as is the case in the Triple Frontier, the contact zone between the borders of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. What is happening in this area is largely due to the lack of direct and effective legislation against organized terrorism by national governments.

In the case of Brazil, as in some of its neighboring countries, the lack of anti-terrorism legislation is due to the historical fear on the part of left-wing parties of its possible use against social movements of a certain aggressive nature. In Brazil, this was already reflected in the political transition of the late 1980s, when there was a clear protest by the PT(Partido dos Trabalhadores), then under the leadership of Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva, against any attempt to introduce the anti-terrorist concept into legislation. Curiously, the 1988 Federal Constitution itself mentions the word "terrorism" twice: first, as something to be rejected in Brazilian foreign policy, and second, as one of the unforgivable crimes against the Federation. In spite of this, no attempt to define this crime was successful, and although after the 9/11 attacks discussions about a possible law were resumed, the labor left - already during Lula's presidency - continued to justify its refusal by invoking the persecution carried out by the military board the dictatorship. It should be noted that former President Dilma Rousseff herself was imprisoned for being part of the VAR-Palmares(Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária Palmares), an extreme left-wing revolutionary group that was part of the civil service examination armed civil service examination the regime.

Terrorist threat at the Olympic Games

During the PT mandates (2003-2016) there was no subject of legislative initiative by the Government on the topic; moreover, any other project that came from the Legislative, whether it was the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies, was blocked by the Executive. Often the Government also justified its position by alluding to a supposed "neutrality", hiding behind the desire not to get involved in external conflicts. This attitude would lead to several fugitives accused of participating or collaborating in attacks in other countries taking refuge in Brazil. However, in mid-2015, as the start of the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro approached, the risk of a possible attack in the face of such an important event was assessed. This, together with pressure from the right wing in congress (bear in mind that Rousseff won the 2014 elections with a very narrow margin of less than 1%), led the petista government to ask parliament to draft a concise definition of terrorism and other related crimes, such as those related to financing. Finally, the first Brazilian anti-terrorism law was signed by Rousseff in March 2016. Although this is the "official" version of this process, there are many who argue that the real reason for the implementation of the law was the pressure exerted by the FATFgroup Financial Action Task Force against Money Laundering, created by the G8), since this entity had threatened to include Brazil in the list of non-cooperative countries against terrorism.

The Brazilian anti-terrorism law was effective, as it served as a legal framework for the so-called Operação Hardware. Through this operation, the Brazilian Federal Police managed to arrest several suspects of a DAESH branch operating in Brazil, who were planning to carry out an attack during the Rio Olympics. Federal judge Marcos Josegrei da Silva convicted eight suspects of membership of an Islamic terrorist group , in the first such subject in Brazilian history. The judge's decision was quite controversial at the time, largely due to Brazilian society's unfamiliarity with this subject of risk. As a result, many Brazilians, including part of the press, criticized the "disproportionality" with which the defendants were treated.

Bolsonarist Momentum

Since then, Brazil has come to be considered as a sort of example among South American countries in the fight against terrorism. However, it does not seem that the status quo maintained during the end of the Rousseff administration and the short term of Temer will remain intact for long. This is due to the fiery discussion stirred up by the Bolsonarista right wing, which advocates that the criminal activities of several far-left groups, especially the MST(Movimento Dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra), be classified as terrorism. The MST is the largest agrarian social movement, Marxist in nature, and is known nationally for its occupations of land that the group considers "useless or underutilized" in order to "put it to better use". The ineffectiveness of the State in stopping the invasions of private property carried out by the MST has been recurrently denounced in congress, especially during the PT government years, without major consequences. However, now that the right wing has greater weight, the discussion has come back to life and not a few deputies have already mentioned their intention to seek to denounce the Landless Movement as a terrorist organization. Bolsonaro himself has been a fierce advocate of outlawing the MST.

At the same time that the current Minister of Justice, Sergio Moro, announces the possibility of the creation of an anti-terrorist intelligence system, following the model of his U.S. counterpart, and the congress discussion the expansion of the current list of terrorist organizations to include groups such as Hezbollah, other Brazilian politicians have decided to initiate in the Senate a proposal for legislation to criminalize the actions of the MST. If approved, this initiative would make real the fear that the left has invoked all these years. After all, this is not the best way to fulfill the promise of "governing for all". Moreover, such a disproportionate measure for this subject of activities would only increase the already intense political polarization present today in Brazilian society: it would be tantamount to rubbing salt in an old wound, one that seemed to be about to heal.