[Parag Khanna, The Future is Asian. Simon & Schuster. New York, 2019. 433 p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

Parag Khanna's book may be greeted with suspicion at the entrance because of the apparent axiomatic nature of its degree scroll. However, the blunt assertion on the cover is softened when one begins to read the pages inside. The thesis of the work is that the world is in a process of asianizationnot of chinizationMoreover, this process is presented as another coat of paint on the planet, not as a color that will be clearly predominant or definitive.

It is possible that the discussion of whether the United States is in decline and will be replaced by China as the preeminent superpower prevents seeing other parallel developments. Those watching Beijing's rise in the world order, writes Khanna, "have often been paralyzed by two views: either China will devour the world or it is on the verge of collapse. Neither is correct." "The future is Asian, even for China," he asserts.

Khanna believes that the world is moving towards a multipolar order, something that is also true in Asia, even if China's size often dazzles.

It is possible that this judgment is influenced by the author's Indian origin and also by his time living in the United States, but he offers figures to support his words. Of the 5 billion people living in Asia, 3.5 billion are not Chinese (70%): China, therefore, has only a third of Asia's population; it also accounts for slightly less than half of its GDP. Other data: half of the investments leaving the continent are non-Chinese, and more than half of foreign investments go to Asian countries other than China. Asia, therefore, "is more than China plus".

It is not just a question of size, but of wills. "A China-led Asia is no more acceptable to most Asians than the notion of a U.S.-led West is to Europeans," says Khanna. He rejects the idea that, because of China's power, Asia is heading toward a kind of tributary system like the one ruled in other centuries from Beijing. He points out that this system did not go beyond the Far East and was based mainly on trade.

The author reassures those who fear Chinese expansionism: "China has never been an indestructible superpower presiding over all of Asia like a colossus". Thus, he warns that while Europe's geographical characteristics have historically led many countries to fear the hegemony of a single power, in the case of Asia its geography makes it "inherently multipolar", as natural barriers absorb friction. In fact, the clashes that have taken place between China and India, China and Vietnam or India and Pakistan have ended in stalemates. "Whereas in Europe wars have occurred when there is a convergence in power between rivals, in Asia wars have taken place when there is a perception of advantage over rivals. So the more powerful China's neighbors like Japan, India or Russia are, the less likelihood of conflict between them."

For Khanna, Asia will always be a region of distinct and autonomous civilizations, especially now that we are witnessing a revival of old empires. The geopolitical future of Asia will not be led by the United States or China: "Japan, South Korea, India, Russia, Indonesia, Australia, Iran and Saudi Arabia will never come together under a hegemonic umbrella or unite in a single pole of power".

There will not be, then, a chinization of the world, according to the author, and the Asianization that is taking place - a shift of the planet's specific weight towards the Indo-Pacific - should not be seen as a threat to those who live elsewhere. Just as there was a Europeanization of the world in the 19th century, and an Americanization in the 20th century, in the 21st century we are witnessing an Asianization. Khanna sees this as "the most recent sedimentation substrate in the geology of global civilization," and as a "layer" he does not assume that the world Withdrawal to what came before. "Being more Asian doesn't necessarily mean being less American or European," he says.

The book analyzes the weight and fit of different Asian countries in the continent. Of Russia, he says it is strategically closer to China today than at any time since its communist pact in the 1950s. Khanna believes that geography leads to this understanding, as it invites Canada to maintain good relations with the United States; he predicts that climate change will further open up the lands of Siberia, which will integrate them more with the rest of the Asian continent.

As for India and China's relationship, Khanna believes that both countries will have to accept each other as powers more normally. For example, despite India's reluctance towards China's Silk Road and India's own regional connectivity projects, in the end the two countries' preferred corridors "will overlap and even reinforce each other," ensuring that products from Asia's interior reach the Indian Ocean. "Geopolitical rivalries will only accelerate the Asianization of Asia," Khanna sentences.

In assessing the importance of Asia, the book includes Middle East oil. Technically, this region is part of the continent, but it is such a separate chapter with its own dynamics that it is difficult to see it as Asian territory. The same is true when Israel or Lebanon are label as such. It may give the impression that the author is lumping everything together to make the figures more impressive. He argues that the Middle East is becoming less and less dependent on Europe and the United States and is looking more to the East.

Khanna is in a position to reasonably defend himself against most of the objections that can be made to his text. The most controversial, however, is the justification, close to defense, that he makes of technocracy as a system of government. Beyond the descriptive attitude of a model that in some countries has been the subject of significant economic and social development , Khanna even seems to endorse its moral superiority.

[Bruno Maçães, Belt and Road. A Chinese World Order. Penguin. Gurgaon (India), 2019. 227p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

Having covered the moment of literature devoted to present the novelty of the Chinese New Silk Road project , Bruno Maçães leaves aside many of the specific concretions of the Chinese initiative to deal with its more geopolitical aspects. This is why Maçães uses the name Belt and Road throughout the book, instead of its acronyms - OBOR (One Belt, One Road) or the more recently used BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) - because he is not so much referring to the layout of the transport connections as to the new world order that Beijing wants to shape.

Through this economic integration, according to Maçães, China could project power over two thirds of the world, including Central and Eastern Europe, in a process of geographic cohesion of Eurasia to which this Portuguese politician and researcher has already dedicated his previous work.

Compared to other essays on the New Silk Road, this one focuses a lot on India (this is the case in its general content, but also in this review we have used a special edition dedicated to that country, with a particular introduction).

Maçães grants India the role of core topic in the Eurasia integration project . If India decides not to participate at all and, instead, to go for the alternative promoted by the United States, together with Japan and Australia, then the Chinese design will not reach the dimension desired by Beijing. "If India decides that life in the Western order will be better than under alternative arrangements, the Belt and Road will have difficulty achieving its original ambition," the author says.

Maçães believes, however, that the West is not all that attractive to the subcontinent. In that Western order, India can only aspire to a secondary role, while the rise of China "offers it the exciting possibility of a genuinely multipolar, rather than merely multilateral, world in which India can legitimately hope to become an autonomous center of geopolitical power," at least on a par with a declining Russia.

Despite these apparent advantages, India will not go all the way to either side, Maçães predicts. "It will never join the Belt and Road because it could only agree to join China in a project that was new. And it will never join a US initiative to rival the Belt and Road unless the US makes it less confrontational." So, "India will keep everyone waiting, but it will never make a decision on the Belt and Road".

Without Delhi's participation, or even more, with resistance from the Indian leadership, neither the US nor China's vision can be fully realized internship, Maçães continues to argue. Without India, Washington may be able to preserve its current model of alliances in Asia, but its ability to compete on the scale that the Belt and Road does would collapse; for its part, Beijing is realizing that it alone cannot provide the financial resources needed for the ambitious project.

Maçães warns that China has "ignored and disdained" India's positions and interests, which may end up being "a major miscalculation". He believes that China's impatience to start building infrastructure, because of the need to demonstrate that its initiative is a success, "may become the worst enemy".

He ventures that the Chinese may correct the shot. "It is likely - perhaps even inevitable - that the Belt and Road will grow increasingly decentralized, less China-centric," he says, commenting that in the end such a new Chinese order would not be so different from the structure of the existing Washington-led world order, where "the US insists on being recognized as the state at the apex of the hierarchy of international power" and leaves some autonomy to each regional power.

While Maçães places India in a non-aligned status plenary session of the Executive Council, he does foresee an unequivocal partnership between India and Japan. In his view it is a "symbiotic" relationship, in which India sees Japan as its first source of technology, while Japan sees the Indian navy as "an indispensable partner in its efforts to contain Chinese expansion and safeguard freedom of navigation" in the region's seas.

As for Europe, Maçães sees it in the difficult position "of not being able to oppose an international economic integration project , while being equally incapable of joining as a mere participant" in the Chinese initiative, in addition to the germ of division that the project has already introduced into the European Union.

From Bangladesh to Pakistan and Djibouti

Despite the differences indicated above, Maçães believes that the relationship between China and India can develop positively, even if there is some element of latent conflict, encouraged by a certain mutual distrust. The commercial linkage of two such immense markets and production centers will generate economic ties "called to dominate" world Economics by the middle of this century.

This movement of goods between the two countries will make Bangladesh and Myanmar the center of a major trade corridor.

For its part, Pakistan, in addition to being a corridor for the exit to the Indian Ocean from western China, will be increasingly integrated into the Chinese production chain. In particular, it can supply raw materials and basic manufactures to the textile industry that China is developing in Xinjiang, its export gateway to Europe for goods that can optimize rail transport. The capital of that province, Urumqi, will become the fashion capital of Central Asia in the next decade, agreement to Maçães' forecast.

Another interesting observation is that the shrinking of Eurasia and the development of internal transport routes between the two extremes of the supercontinent may lead to the North Sea container ports (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hamburg) losing weight in the trade between Europe and China at the expense of a greater transit of those in the Mediterranean (Piraeus, in particular).

The author also ventures that Chinese infrastructure works in Cameroon and Nigeria can help facilitate connections between these countries and Doralé, the port that China manages in Djibouti, which, through these trans-African routes, could become "a serious rival" to the Suez Canal.

If in Djibouti China has its first, and for the moment only, military base outside its territory, it should be kept in mind that Beijing can give a possible military use to other ports whose management it has assumed. As Maçães reminds, China approved in 2016 a legal framework that obliges civilian companies to support military logistics operations requested by the Chinese Navy.

All these are aspects of a suggestive book that does not allow itself to be carried away by the determinism of China's rise, nor by an antagonistic vision that denies the possibility of a new world order. The work of a European who, although he served in the Portuguese Foreign Ministry as director General for Europe, is realistic about the weight of the EU in the design the world.

This crucial shipping lane faces hard power pressures from both states as they yearn for naval control of contested waters

A thermometer to measure the future balance of power between China and India will be the Strait of Malacca, the key bottleneck that connects the northern Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific region. India is advancing positions towards the western mouth of the Strait in order to challenge the expansion of Chinese maritime interests, which pay greater attention to Malacca.

▲Map of the Indo-Pacific region [US DoD].   

ARTICLE / Alejandro Puigrefagut [English version] [Spanish version].

Maritime routes are the basis of trade and communication between more than 80% of the countries of the world. This fact makes the natural geographic location of the States a great strategic feature. An especially important point for maritime traffic is the Strait of Malacca, key for trade in the region with the largest population on the planet.

The Strait of Malacca, which connects the South China Sea with the Burma Sea on its way to the Bay of Bengal, is the busiest commercial crossing in the world and, therefore, is a strategic place. Through this corridor that surrounds the western coast of the Malay peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, approximately 60% of the world's maritime trade transits, exceeding one hundred and fifty ships per day and is the main source of oil supply for two of the main Asian consumers; the People's Republic of China and Japan. This geographical point is key for the entire Indo Pacific region, thus ensuring the free movement of ships becomes strategic. That is why many States in the region, including China and the United States, see the need for protection of this passage in order to be able to supply themselves, export their merchandise and not be blocked by the control of a third country over this area.

In relation to China it is not easy to think that a blockade of its supply due to problems in the Strait of Malacca will happen. In order for this to happen, an armed conflict of great dimensions would have to be generated, propitiating this blockade by a subject that could control - and potentially interrupt - the passage towards the other countries of the region. This potential risk, which today can only be generated by the United States Navy, forces China to be alert and have to develop sufficient military capabilities to protect what it considers its territories in the South China Sea and, by extension, the supply of vital resources that must necessarily cross the Strait of Malacca.

The positions and presence of the Asian giant in the South China Sea and in the areas adjacent to the Strait of Malacca have increased during the last years, in order to increase its influence on the States of the region. Moreover, to defend its oil and natural gas supplies (from the Persian Gulf), China has extended its presence to the Indian Ocean, although this is not enough. The reality is that in this area there is a great competition between two of the Asian powers with more influence in the region: China and India. Due to the increasing presence and influence of the People's Republic in the Indian Ocean, India has been forced to take proactive measures to improve peace and stability in the region, mobilizing and expanding its presence from its east coast towards the Strait, in order to rebalance the regional power. With this, India can dominate the western access to the Strait and, therefore, have a longer reaction time to maneuver in the Indian Ocean as in the Strait itself and, even, access to the waters of the South China Sea more agilely.

At the same time, this growing approximation of India to the South China Sea, is observed with concern in Beijing, and even, some analysts see India as a threat if an hypothetical case of a war between the two regional powers could occur and India were to block the Strait and, therefore, China's access to certain raw materials and other resources. For this reason, China has carried out various military maneuvers in the past three years together with third States in the Strait of Malacca, especially with Malaysia. During the first exercises in the area, the Ministry of Defence of the People's Republic of China concluded that bilateral relations with Malaysia were strengthened in terms of cooperation in security and defense and that "increase the capacity to jointly respond to real security threats and safeguard regional maritime security." In addition, for China, the protection of the Strait is a priority because of its great strategic value and because countries like the US or Japan also want to control it.

The busy passage, decisive in the strategies of the two countries to counteract each other

The Strait of Malacca, a core topic for the connection between the northern part of the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific region, will be a thermometer for measuring the future balance of power between China and India. India is responding to the further expansion of Chinese maritime interests, which are forcing Beijing to pay close attention to Malacca, by advancing its positions towards the western mouth of the strait.

▲Map of the Indo-Pacific [US DoD].

article / Alejandro Puigrefagut [English version].

Maritime routes are the basis for trade and communication between more than 80% of the world's countries. This fact makes the natural geographic location of states of great strategic importance. A particularly important point for maritime traffic is the Strait of Malacca, a core topic for trade in the most populated region of the world.

The Strait of Malacca, which links the South China Sea with the Burma Sea en route to the Bay of Bengal, is the busiest commercial passage in the world and is therefore a strategic location. Approximately 60% of the world's maritime trade passes through this corridor that surrounds the western coast of the Malaysian peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, with more than 150 ships per day, and it is the main oil supply route for two of Asia's main consumers: the People's Republic of China and Japan. This geographical point is a core topic for the entire Indo-Pacific region, so ensuring the free movement of ships is strategic. This is why many states in the region, including China and the United States, see the protection of this passage as necessary in order to be able to supply themselves, export their goods and not be blocked by the control of a third country over this area.

With regard to China, it is not easy to imagine that a blockade of its supplies due to problems in the Strait of Malacca would happen. For this to happen, an armed conflict of extraordinary dimensions would have to be generated, leading to such a blockade by a subject that could control -and potentially interrupt- the passage to the other countries in the region. This potential risk, which today can only be generated by the US Navy, forces China to be alert and to develop sufficient military capabilities to protect what it considers its territories in the South China Sea and, by extension, the supply of vital resources that must necessarily cross the Strait of Malacca.

The Asian giant's positions and presence in the South China Sea and in the areas around the Strait of Malacca have increased in recent years in order to increase its influence over the states in the region. Moreover, in order to defend its oil and natural gas supplies (from the Persian Gulf), China has extended its presence as far as the Indian Ocean, although this is not enough. The reality is that in this area there is a great skill between two of the most influential Asian powers in the region: China and India. Due to the growing presence and influence of the People's Republic in the Indian Ocean, India has been forced to take proactive steps to enhance peace and stability in the region by mobilizing and expanding its presence from its east coast to the vicinity of the Strait in order to rebalance the regional balance of power. In this way, India can dominate the western access to the Strait and, consequently, have greater reaction time to maneuver in the Indian Ocean as well as in the Strait itself and even gain more agile access to the waters of the South China Sea.

At the same time, India's growing closeness to the South China Sea is viewed with concern in Beijing, and some analysts even see India as a threat in the event of a hypothetical conflict between the two regional powers and India blocking the Strait and, therefore, China's access to certain raw materials and other resources. For this reason, over the past three years China has carried out various military maneuvers jointly with third states in the Strait of Malacca, especially with Malaysia. During the first exercises in the area, the Ministry of Defense of the People's Republic of China concluded that bilateral relations with Malaysia in terms of security and defense cooperation were strengthened and that "joint response capability to security threats was enhanced". Moreover, for China the protection of the Strait is a priority because of its great strategic value and because countries such as the US and Japan also wish to control it.