[Bruno Maçães, Belt and Road. A Chinese World Order. Penguin. Gurgaon (India), 2019. 227p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

Having covered the moment of literature devoted to present the novelty of the Chinese New Silk Road project , Bruno Maçães leaves aside many of the specific concretions of the Chinese initiative to deal with its more geopolitical aspects. This is why Maçães uses the name Belt and Road throughout the book, instead of its acronyms - OBOR (One Belt, One Road) or the more recently used BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) - because he is not so much referring to the layout of the transport connections as to the new world order that Beijing wants to shape.

Through this economic integration, according to Maçães, China could project power over two thirds of the world, including Central and Eastern Europe, in a process of geographic cohesion of Eurasia to which this Portuguese politician and researcher has already dedicated his previous work.

Compared to other essays on the New Silk Road, this one focuses a lot on India (this is the case in its general content, but also in this review we have used a special edition dedicated to that country, with a particular introduction).

Maçães grants India the role of core topic in the Eurasia integration project . If India decides not to participate at all and, instead, to go for the alternative promoted by the United States, together with Japan and Australia, then the Chinese design will not reach the dimension desired by Beijing. "If India decides that life in the Western order will be better than under alternative arrangements, the Belt and Road will have difficulty achieving its original ambition," the author says.

Maçães believes, however, that the West is not all that attractive to the subcontinent. In that Western order, India can only aspire to a secondary role, while the rise of China "offers it the exciting possibility of a genuinely multipolar, rather than merely multilateral, world in which India can legitimately hope to become an autonomous center of geopolitical power," at least on a par with a declining Russia.

Despite these apparent advantages, India will not go all the way to either side, Maçães predicts. "It will never join the Belt and Road because it could only agree to join China in a project that was new. And it will never join a US initiative to rival the Belt and Road unless the US makes it less confrontational." So, "India will keep everyone waiting, but it will never make a decision on the Belt and Road".

Without Delhi's participation, or even more, with resistance from the Indian leadership, neither the US nor China's vision can be fully realized internship, Maçães continues to argue. Without India, Washington may be able to preserve its current model of alliances in Asia, but its ability to compete on the scale that the Belt and Road does would collapse; for its part, Beijing is realizing that it alone cannot provide the financial resources needed for the ambitious project.

Maçães warns that China has "ignored and disdained" India's positions and interests, which may end up being "a major miscalculation". He believes that China's impatience to start building infrastructure, because of the need to demonstrate that its initiative is a success, "may become the worst enemy".

He ventures that the Chinese may correct the shot. "It is likely - perhaps even inevitable - that the Belt and Road will grow increasingly decentralized, less China-centric," he says, commenting that in the end such a new Chinese order would not be so different from the structure of the existing Washington-led world order, where "the US insists on being recognized as the state at the apex of the hierarchy of international power" and leaves some autonomy to each regional power.

While Maçães places India in a non-aligned status plenary session of the Executive Council, he does foresee an unequivocal partnership between India and Japan. In his view it is a "symbiotic" relationship, in which India sees Japan as its first source of technology, while Japan sees the Indian navy as "an indispensable partner in its efforts to contain Chinese expansion and safeguard freedom of navigation" in the region's seas.

As for Europe, Maçães sees it in the difficult position "of not being able to oppose an international economic integration project , while being equally incapable of joining as a mere participant" in the Chinese initiative, in addition to the germ of division that the project has already introduced into the European Union.

From Bangladesh to Pakistan and Djibouti

Despite the differences indicated above, Maçães believes that the relationship between China and India can develop positively, even if there is some element of latent conflict, encouraged by a certain mutual distrust. The commercial linkage of two such immense markets and production centers will generate economic ties "called to dominate" world Economics by the middle of this century.

This movement of goods between the two countries will make Bangladesh and Myanmar the center of a major trade corridor.

For its part, Pakistan, in addition to being a corridor for the exit to the Indian Ocean from western China, will be increasingly integrated into the Chinese production chain. In particular, it can supply raw materials and basic manufactures to the textile industry that China is developing in Xinjiang, its export gateway to Europe for goods that can optimize rail transport. The capital of that province, Urumqi, will become the fashion capital of Central Asia in the next decade, agreement to Maçães' forecast.

Another interesting observation is that the shrinking of Eurasia and the development of internal transport routes between the two extremes of the supercontinent may lead to the North Sea container ports (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hamburg) losing weight in the trade between Europe and China at the expense of a greater transit of those in the Mediterranean (Piraeus, in particular).

The author also ventures that Chinese infrastructure works in Cameroon and Nigeria can help facilitate connections between these countries and Doralé, the port that China manages in Djibouti, which, through these trans-African routes, could become "a serious rival" to the Suez Canal.

If in Djibouti China has its first, and for the moment only, military base outside its territory, it should be kept in mind that Beijing can give a possible military use to other ports whose management it has assumed. As Maçães reminds, China approved in 2016 a legal framework that obliges civilian companies to support military logistics operations requested by the Chinese Navy.

All these are aspects of a suggestive book that does not allow itself to be carried away by the determinism of China's rise, nor by an antagonistic vision that denies the possibility of a new world order. The work of a European who, although he served in the Portuguese Foreign Ministry as director General for Europe, is realistic about the weight of the EU in the design the world.

[Bruno Maçães, The Dawn of Eurasia. On the Trail of the New World Order. Allen Lane. Milton Keynes, 2018. 281 pp]

review / Emili J. Blasco

The discussion on the emergence of Eurasia as an increasingly compact reality, no longer as a mere geographical description that was conceptually a chimera, owes much to the contribution of Bruno Maçães; particularly to his book The Dawn of Eurasia, but also to his continuous proselytizing to different audiences. This Portuguese diplomat with research activity in Europe notes the consolidation of the Eurasian mass as a single continent (or supercontinent) to all intents and purposes.

"One of the reasons we have to start thinking about Eurasia is because this is how China is increasingly looking at the world (...) China is already living a Eurasian age," says Maçães. What is new about it, he says, "is not that there are such connections between continents, but that, for the first time, they work both ways. Only when the influence flows in both directions can we speak of an integrated space." The Silk Belt and Road Initiative, especially its overland route, sample that China is no longer looking only to the Pacific, but is also contemplating new routes to Europe.

Maçães urges Europe to adopt a Eurasian perspective, for three reasons: because Russia and China have one; because most of the big foreign policy issues of our time have to do with how Europe and Asia are connected (Ukraine, refugee crisis, energy and trade); and because all the security threats of the coming decades will play out in a Eurasian context. Maçães adds a final reason why Europe should become more actively involved in the Eurasian integration project : it is the way to combat the forces of disintegration that exist within Europe itself.

From the various considerations included in the book, some suggestive ideas could be highlighted. One is that Russia's historical identity problems, straddling Europe and Asia - to see itself as different from the Europeans and at the same time being attracted by the modernity of the West - are now being replicated in the East, where China is on its way to creating a second pole of economic growth and integration in the supercontinent. If Europe is one of the poles and Asia (China and the other successful countries of the Far East) the other, then what is Russia, if it does not fully respond to the European and Asian identities?

The Silk Belt and Road Initiative gives geopolitical importance to Central Asia, as Maçães reviews. Thus, China needs a clear dominance of Xinjiang, its westernmost province and the gateway to the Central Asian republics. The land route to Europe cannot exist without the Xinjinag segment, but at the same time the exhibition of this Uyghur-majority territory to trade and modernization could accentuate its separatist aspirations. Just northwest of Xinjiang is the ex-Soviet republic of Kazakhstan, a vast country of great agricultural value, where Chinese attempts to buy land are being viewed with high suspicion from its capital, Astana. Maçães estimates that if Russia were to try to reintegrate Kazakhstan into its sphere of influence, with the same vehemence it has done with Ukraine, "China would not stand aside."

Not only are the East Coast (European peninsula) and the West Coast (Pacific coast) moving closer together, but the connections between the two also improve logistical conditions in the interior of the supercontinent. This is precisely one of the objectives of the Silk Belt and Road Initiative: as Chinese companies have moved away from coastal business hubs to lower labor costs, they are moving further away from ports and therefore need better land connections, thus contributing to the shrinking of Eurasia.

A new north-south highway on the eastern edge of the EU aims to be the entrance to Europe for goods from China

Seven European countries have joined forces for the Via Carpatia project , a highway that will run from Lithuania to Romania and Greece, increasing the interconnectedness of the EU's eastern region. Its promoters envisage that this infrastructure will be integrated into the new Silk Road, as a gateway to Europe for goods arriving from China and the rest of Asia.

▲Polish highway section that will be part of the Via Carpatia project [Generalna Dyrekcja Dróg Krajowych i Autostrad Oddział w Rzeszowie].

article / Paula Ulibarrena

Via Carpatia is a European route; it is actually an ambitious interstate highway project that will link the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. The route will start in Lithuania, in the city of Kaunas; it will then continue through Poland, following the Bialystok-Lublin-Rzeszów route; it will then enter Slovakia to cover the Presov-Kosz section, and in Hungary it will run through Miskolc-Debrecen.

On the Romanian territory, the route will be divided in two directions, one towards the port of Constanta, on the Oradea-Arad-Timisoara-Lugoj-Deva-Sibiu-Pitesti-Bucarest-Constanta route, and the other entering Bulgaria through the future bridge over the Danube at Calafat-Vidin, with the possibility of extending the project to Greece, in the Mediterranean, at the southern border of the European Union.

The Via Carpatia project was launched C 2006, when the transport ministers of Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Hungary signed a joint declaration to extend the trans-European transport network by creating a route to connect these four states along a north-south axis. In 2010, the project was also joined by Romania, Bulgaria and Greece to extend the new route through their respective territories.

Andrzej Adamczyk, Poland's Minister of Public Works, said in May 2017 that the total route of such infrastructure in Poland, comprising 600 kilometers, will be completed by 2025. As he stated, Via Carpathia "will allow the full potential of the provinces it crosses to be developed, providing a boost for the poorer regions of eastern Poland and the economies of the area."

The purpose of the project is to promote the economic development of the region, providing facilities for the development of small and medium business and the creation of technology parks, which should contribute to the creation of employment and enhance research and innovation.

This initiative currently reinforces other policies that also goal to development infrastructures in Eastern Europe, such as the 3 Seas Initiative. But it also opens the door to other more ambitious projects, such as the 16+1 and the new Silk Road, both launched by the People's Republic of China.

Connection with China

The 16+1 mechanism is a Chinese initiative aimed at intensifying and expanding cooperation with 11 EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and 5 Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia) in the subject of investment, transport, finance, science, Education and culture. In the framework the initiative, China has defined three possible priority areas for economic cooperation: infrastructure, high technologies and green technologies.

The Riga Declaration, a document issued in November 2017 at the China-ECO summit, sets the roadmap for such cooperation. In the Latvian capital, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and the leaders of Central and Eastern European countries agreed to enhance internship cooperation and increase people-to-people exchanges. In particular, the leaders reaffirmed their desire to achieve effective connectivity between ports on the Adriatic, the Baltic and the Black Sea, through roads and the use of inland waterways.

"The Adriatic-Baltic-Black Sea port cooperation will be a new engine for China-ECO cooperation," said Chinese Academy of Social Sciences researcher Liu Zoukiu, who added that the combination of Chinese equipment, European technology and ECO markets will be a great model for cooperation between the Asian country and these 16 nations.

Trade between China and Central and Eastern European countries reached $56.2 billion in 2015, up 28 percent from 2010. Chinese investment in these 16 nations exceeded $5 billion, while in the opposite direction investment was $1.2 billion.

The data also show that the issue of freight train lines between China and Europe has risen to 39 since connections began in 2011. 16 Chinese cities regularly operate these convoys to a dozen European cities. Precisely Beijing's interest in the CEE countries lies in the fact that they are Europe's gateway to the new Silk Road.

The European Gateway to the New Silk Road

The 21st Century Silk Road, which the Chinese government has dubbed One Belt One Road (OBOR), is not an institution with clearly defined rules, but rather a strategic vision: it alludes to the ancient Silk Road, the commercial and cultural link between East and West for more than two millennia. The new route aims to be a connectivity network composed of maritime and overland economic corridors linking China and the rest of Asia with the Middle East, Europe and Africa. In this way, OBOR contact continents, oceans, regions, countries, cities, international and regional organizations.

The new diplomatic language appears as a seductive tool of Chinese soft power, exported through the routes of trade and diplomacy that reach the gates of Europe. Evoking the historical framework of harmonious coexistence and mutual cultural enrichment, Chinese officialdom defines the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" as fundamental values of OBOR: (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) mutual agreement of non-aggression; (3) mutual agreement of non-intervention in internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; (5) peaceful coexistence.

China seeks to diversify its trade routes and partners, opening up new consumer markets. At the same time, it is securing supplies of energy and raw materials. Finally, it is expanding its logistics structure and building a China-centric trade network .

Beijing created in 2014 a state investment fund, the Silk Road Fund, with a capital of US$40 billion, earmarked for One Belt, One Road investments. China insists that such financial institutions are not intended to replace existing ones, but to complement and collaborate with them in a spirit of inclusiveness and mutual benefit. However, voices from the United States and the European Union have raised some fears.

U.S. and U.S. suspicions

U.S. analysts speak of the Chinese European Century (and warn that as investment and trade with Europe grows, so will Beijing's influence on European policies. In fact, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) already has funds of $100 billion, or 50% of the World Bank's capital.

The 16+1 platform was launched to the chagrin of the EU, which was not consulted on the matter beforehand. Brussels observes a dependency status on the part of some of the continent's poorest countries, caused by a trade asymmetry in favor of China: trains arrive in Warsaw with tons of Chinese products, but return half-empty. The creation of infrastructures and new production and distribution centers for Chinese products sometimes progresses beyond the control of the EU. Consequently, EU legislative compliance and even European unity itself may be affected. 

For the most part, the national interests of European countries seem to be dominated by the pure logic of Economics and lack strategic vision. They have so far made a common and coordinated EU policy towards OBOR impossible. In the absence of unity, Europe is throwing stones at itself and ironically applying to itself the effective "divide and rule" strategy described by the Chinese philosopher Sunzi 2,500 years ago. 

New international order

The international order is changing: OBOR, which in paternalistic embrace now encompasses almost all European countries, is presenting itself as the Chinese alternative to the Western model that had hitherto dominated the world.

The US is being replaced as the world's leading Economics and losing its political hegemony to the rise of China. This is demonstrated by the reactions of Washington's most faithful allies in Europe, London and Berlin, in joining the OBOR initiative without great hesitation and despite US warnings.

China proposes to create together with Europe a new international economic and financial order. The most notorious milestone of this close partnership is the Chinese injection of up to €10 billion into the EFSI, a decision agreed between Beijing and Brussels in April 2016, making China the largest investor in the so-called Juncker Plan. Together, they can generate economic growth and employment creation by building and modernizing infrastructure networks that improve intra-European connectivity. This can facilitate the opening up of European products and services for export to new markets and improve their entrance conditions to China's own market. Europe can benefit from improved connectivity with other hitherto remote regions.

One Belt-One Road' project aims to consolidate China's rise as a superpower

The ambitious initiative launched by Xi Jinping to connect China with the rest of the Eurasian continent may prove costly and difficult. But unlike the overland route through the Central Asian republics, the sea route may not take long to become a reality on certain stretches, as China has already built some ports on part of the route.

▲The land and sea lanes of the Chinese initiative [yourfreetemplates].

article / Jimena Puga Gómez [English version].

Following Chinese President Xi Jinping's 2013 speech on the revitalization of the ancient Silk Road, the initiative that started out as just an idea has become the Beijing government's biggest economic challenge: a revolution that, if carried out, will change the Asian continent's passenger, freight and hydrocarbon transport infrastructure, as well as high-tech. Dubbed OBOR-OneBelt-One Road, the plan is intended to be the core topic of China's rise as a regional superpower.

The OBOR initiative is a grand plan to redesign China's strategic environment, project Beijing's economic power, secure the communist country's access to energy and mineral supplies, and boost economic growth in the west of the People's Republic. OBOR seeks to achieve these goals by fostering greater and faster connectivity between China and Europe through intermediate points in Central, West and South Asia, as well as with Russia.

For its part, the maritime route that will form one of the core topic of the OBOR initiative, also known as the Silk Road of the 21st century, counts on the fact that seven of the ten largest ports in the world are in China and, as is well known, these infrastructures make the Asian giant an important exporter of port management services. 

The Eastbound Maritime Silk Road will start in Fujian province and pass through Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan, before heading south to the Strait of Malacca. From Kuala Lumpur, the Route will continue to Kolkata and Colombo, then cross the rest of the Indian Ocean towards Nairobi. From there, it will travel along the Horn of Africa, seeking to cross the strategic Gulf of Aden until it reaches the Red Sea. Beijing's plan aims to create sufficient infrastructure to enable Chinese ships to safely reach the Mediterranean after sailing through the Suez Canal. But the ambition of the People's Republic does not stop at the gates of the European Union, since China wants to reach Athens by sailing the Aegean and from there to Venice, where it will look for land routes that will make it possible to move its goods throughout the Union. Chinese investment has focused, among other things, on the port of Piraeus, with a new logistics center, and on the development of a network of logistics infrastructures through the Balkans and Hungary.

The South Pacific has also been included in this strategic map of routes devised in Beijing. Thus, the maritime Silk Road has two routes. The first, as mentioned above, originates on the east coast of China and, via the South China Sea, aims to establish strategic control of the Spratley Islands, the Strait of Malacca and the entire Indo-Pacific area, including the Bay of Bengal, in order to reach the heart of Europe. The second sea route will also cross the South China Sea to direct its ships to the coastal ports of the South Pacific. With this, China would also control the routes of the essential raw materials that come from Latin American countries.

Although this is a long-term economic project , the Chinese government has already begun the construction of certain infrastructures and the necessary negotiations with various countries. A clear example is Germany. The European Union is China's largest trading partner , while the People's Republic is the Union's second-largest provider . Germany, for sample , not only enjoys an excellent reputation as a reliable partner for China, but is also regarded as "Europe's trade gateway". test of this is that, at a meeting in Duisburg, the world's largest inland port and an important transport and logistics hub in Europe, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed to Germany "to work together to realize the ambitious project of the revival of the economic belt of the new Silk Road of the 21st century". Germany and China are currently connected by the Chongqing-Xinjiang-Duisburg international railroad line.

The ports built by China at Hambantota and Colombo in Sri Lanka; the China-Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone in Egypt; Kazakhstan's negotiation of the right to clear its imports and exports through the Chinese port of Lianyungang; and a new alliance between ports in China and Malaysia are additional examples of China's ability to leverage its newfound skill as a port modernizer and manager to support its strategy.

The New Silk Road initiative is a project that will require multi-billion dollar investments in order to build smooth, safe and efficient transport infrastructures. The effects of this economic network ensure benefits not only for China, the leader of the OBOR initiative, but also for all the countries affected by it. However, the financing of the project is still an unknown quantity that should be clarified.