Increasingly distant from the Alliance, Turkey is creating discomfort among its Western partners, but will hardly be invited to leave.

Its strategy in the Syrian conflict, its rapprochement with Russia with the acquisition of the S-400 anti-aircraft system and its desire for projection in the eastern Mediterranean, where it is damaging Greek interests, have in the last few years brought Ankara into continuous friction with NATO. But the Alliance is not in a position to do without Turkey. It is not only its valuable geographical status as a bridge between East and West, but without Turkey NATO would be less able geopolitically to act against terrorism or control refugee movements and would see its military defense capabilities as an alliance diminished.

▲ meeting between the presidents of Turkey and Russia in Istanbul in January 2020 [Presidency of Turkey].

article / Ángel Martos

Relations between the Atlantic Alliance and the Republic of Turkey are experiencing their most tense moment in recent history. Ankara's foreign policy has been in a constant state of flux due to the instability of its governments since the death of the Father of the Fatherland, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The Kemalist republic projected an image of Asia Minor very different from the one we know today: the secularism and westernization that characterized its bequest has been replaced by an authoritarianism with a moderate Islamic tinge (according to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself, President of the Republic and leader of the AKP training ).

This profound evolution has, of course, been reflected in the field of international relations. The doctrine of neo-Ottomanism has gained ground among its foreign policy makers. Turkey now seeks to exploit to the full its position as a bridge between Western and Eastern civilization, while gaining influence among its adjacent states and emerging as the stabilizer of the Middle East.

In this scenario, the main headache for Western statesmen is the substantial improvement of Anatolia's relations with the Russian Federation, NATO's archenemy. This improvement cannot be understood without recalling a series of events that have led Turkey to distance itself from the European continent: the lukewarm reaction of Western governments to the 2016 coup; the reluctance shown to the continuous requests for extradition of Fetulah Gülen's refugee followers in the EU and the US; Greece's refusal to extradite the military refugees after the coup; the European Commission's continuous condemnations towards Turkey's internal politics; and, above all, the truncated dream of Turkey's accession to the Union. This is why Turkey has decided to redefine its diplomacy to serve its own interests only, swinging between Russia's financial aid and that of NATO. The acquisition of the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft system or its recent operations in Northeastern Syria are examples of this.

The purchase of the aforementioned long-range anti-aircraft missile system is the subject of much controversy within NATO. Turkey's urgent need for them is obvious, as it faces potential ballistic missile threats from neighboring countries. But the choice of the Russian S-400 system, after several years of negotiations during which it was not possible to reach an agreement for the acquisition of the American Patriot system, has caused a real earthquake, to the point of questioning Turkey's continuity in the F-35 fifth-generation fighter program. Political considerations seem to have outweighed technical aspects in the adoption of this decision, since both systems are incompatible and, being strategic weapons systems, both from an operational and geopolitical point of view, their employment by a country of the Atlantic Alliance is problematic. What concerns the Alliance is the access the Kremlin may have to the organization's information through its radar technology.

The other event that leads us to question the future of Ankara's relations with NATO was the recent Turkish military operation in northern Syria. The Turkish army launched on October 9 an offensive against the Kurdish militias (YPG, which it considers terrorists) in northern Syria. attention the Kurdish people is the great point of dissension between the US and Turkey, since they are staunch allies of the superpower, but at the same time a political and security threat to the stability of Anatolia.

Ankara had been pressing the United States to establish a "security zone" penetrating Syrian territory and had repeatedly threatened to launch unilateral military action if Washington continued to stand in its way. In early October, the U.S. gave the go-ahead for the operation by ordering its military deployed in Syria to withdraw from the border zone. The Trump Administration thus abandoned the Kurds with whom it was fighting the Islamic State to their fate, giving Turkey a free hand for greater control of its border with Syria.

The next aspect that is essential to mention when describing the complex relations between Ankara and NATO is the ongoing geopolitical struggle between Greece and Turkey. Although both have been members of NATO since the 1950s, the relations between these two Eastern Mediterranean countries have always been characterized by the permanent tension that is perceived in them, and which therefore has some consequences on supranational military cooperation. It is worth mentioning here the three main contentions that have shaped, since the end of the 19th century, this bilateral confrontation: the sovereignty of the Dodecanese archipelago, that of present-day Cyprus, and the maritime dispute over the Aegean shelf. Such was the magnitude of the dispute that the Greek government went so far as to decree its withdrawal from NATO in 1974, although it later rejoined.

Although this Greek-Turkish conflict was at its height in the second half of the 20th century, there are many ethnic and historical aspects that make these two countries seem irreconcilable, except in historically punctual exceptions. This makes the eastern flank of the Mediterranean, given its proximity to such an unstable area as the Middle East, a constant source of concern for NATO leaders. While Greece has managed, following its transition to democracy, to emerge as a stable ally of the Alliance, Turkey has not followed the same path. This undoubtedly works against it both in domestic politics and in its aspirations for maritime sovereignty.

Historically, it is worth noting Turkey's growing role as an interregional mediator between the Middle East and the West. Perhaps in response to a strategy designed by Ahmet Davutoglu, who was Foreign Minister under the AKP government, Turkey wanted to distance itself from the US under Bush Jr. Its refusal to collaborate in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 won it certain sympathies in the region, which it has been able to use in countries as diverse as Iraq, Israel and Iran. However, over the years the Islamist government has spoken out several times against Zionism and the threat it poses to the stability of the region.

Its distancing from the European Union and its rapprochement with Russia in economic subject has also marked the image of the Turkish administration in the Alliance. Relations with Russia, despite having been marked by political disputes such as those of Kurdish and Chechen self-determination (antagonistically supported by both countries), remain afloat thanks to the hydrocarbon trade. The outlook is therefore more favorable to the Russian axis than to the American-Israeli one in the region. This, logically, undermines NATO's confidence in this "hinge" country, which is no longer interested in acting as such but as an independent and sovereign power pursuing its own interests, seeking support from the Alliance or from the East as it sample fit.

This departure from NATO's roadmap on the part of the Turkish government, together with a rapprochement in certain aspects with the Kremlin and the authoritarian drift of the country's presidency, is what has led analysts and international leaders to open the discussion about a possible expulsion of the Republic of Asia Minor from the Alliance. However, it is unlikely that the allies will decide to disregard Turkey's strategic importance. Its geographical status makes it a bridge country between East and West. Without Turkey, NATO would be less geopolitically able to act, for example, in terms of fighting terrorism or controlling refugee movements. Moreover, Turkey has the second largest military of all NATO states: an exclusion would severely affect its military defense capabilities as an alliance. On the other hand, Turkey's representations in NATO, while critical of NATO as has the Trump Administration on repeated occasions, have not expressed a clear desire to leave it unilaterally.