Resumen:
The new mechanistic philosophy seeks to identify and explain the mechanisms of various phenomena, including their overall organization and the interactions between the individualized components. This paper argues that among the phenomena that can be approached within the new mechanistic framework are near-death experiences, which can be included within the vast range of experiences that are grouped under the category of religious experience. Such experiences involve a complex set of cognitive, affective, and behavioural processes. Since studying such experiences is far from methodologically simple, we try to show the feasibility of applying the mechanistic explanation to near-death experiences. While some scholars (such as Egil Asprem and Ann Taves) argue that mechanistic explanation can shed new light on the explanation of religion, we instead emphasize neglected limits of such an explanation, as well as its epistemic-methodological advantages in comparison with alternative explanatory models, especially the models proposed by Michael Marsh, Frederick S. Barrett and Roland R. Griffiths.
