Experts from international institutions such as the World Bank, Oxford University and King's College London have discussed poverty and development at framework of a scientific meeting organized in Madrid by the Navarra Center for International Development (NCID) of the University of Navarra and the Ramón Areces Foundation. Institute for Culture and Society of the University of Navarra and the Ramón Areces Foundation.

The afternoon sessions began with the lecture 'Nutrition and nutritional status of Indians over two decades', given by Alessandro Tarozzi, from the Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

From agreement with researcher, the lack of reliable information on environmental hazard is often a constraint core topic to avoid risky behavior in countries at development. The existence of private markets may be important if households cannot rely on the public sector to provide information, but wages can severely limit demand, especially among the poor.

With these considerations in mind, a work was conductedin Bangladesh, where well water is often naturally contaminated with low doses of arsenic. These wells are a primary source source of drinking water for millions of households. Reporting this contamination has been shown to be effective in getting households to use other, safer nearby sources. However, the status of millions of wells is unknown and there is no well-established market for testing.

The study, conducted in 123 villages, sold tests to check the status of wells and assessed the impact on demand and how the purchase of such tests results in risk-reducing behaviors. Information about the drinking water contamination status of the well itself, purchases at group, informational banners, and tariffs requiring payment only for the "good news"-only at lower prices-doubled the fraction of households that stopped drinking water from contaminated wells.

This was followed by Pramila Krishnan, University of Oxford, who presented discussion paper 'Transport Costs and Variety in Consumer Goods'. She presented a work related to the development market in remote areas, focusing on how distance constrains the choices consumers can make.

Professor Kri shnan's team designed amodel of skill monopolistic among traders moving goods from market towns to rural areas. The model allows for village heterogeneity in terms of market size and income distribution. An increase in transportation costs reduces consumer welfare: it means lower incomes for farm households and higher prices for manufactures, and distance reduces choice.

The model was tested using the data of a survey designed for stores and consumers in rural villages in Ethiopia. Reduced transportation costs, larger market size, and greater inequality were found to dramatically increase the variety available in village stores and markets. Poverty measures do not account for spatial variation in the variety of goods available. The results suggest, therefore, that the level of poverty and the rate at which poverty declines are underestimated.

The next speaker was Amrita Dhillon, King's College London (UK), position . She spoke on 'Exposing corruption: does electoral competition mean discipline for political candidates'.

According to the researcher, in countries at development with weak institutions there is implicitly a heavy reliance on elections to establish accountability regulations and reduce corruption. The article presented showed that electoral discipline can be ineffective in reducing corruption when the skill among politicians is too high or too leave.

First, a simple game-theoretic model was constructed to capture the effect of electoral skill on corruption. It was shown that, in equilibrium, corruption has a U-shaped relationship with electoral skill . If the election is safe for candidate (leave skill ) or if it is extremely weak (high skill) then corruption is higher. For intermediate levels of skill, corruption is lower. It was also predicted that when there are different types of corruption, corruption increases among politicians that voters care less about, regardless of skill.

This model was tested with auditeddata of diversions from a large public program in Indian villages during 2006-10 and village committee chief elections in 2006. To a large extent, the theoretical results that skill has a nonlinear effect on corruption and that the impact of electoral skill varies depending on whether the fraud comes from the public or private component of service delivery were largely confirmed. Overall, it suggests that there is no sound basis for excessive confidence that elections serve as a way to impose discipline on politicians.

The final session of the workshop was by Nishith Prakash of the University of Connecticut (USA), who spoke on 'Dopoliticians charged with crimes affect economic performance? Evidence from India'.

The recent increase in the issue of indicted politicians elected to state assemblies has caused a lot of furor in India. However, the implications of their elections to state legislatures on economic performance are unknown.

Using a regression discontinuity design and satellite images showing electric lights on at night at the constituency level, the results suggest that the cost of electing impeached politicians on measures of economic activity is quite large. The election of indicted candidates was found to lead to approximately 5% lower GDP growth per year on average. These estimated costs increase for candidates with serious indictments, multiple indictments, and financial crime indictments.

A lecture open to the general public took place in the late afternoon. It was given by Stefan Dercon, Professor at Oxford and Chief Economist at department of development International of the British Government. He discussed the implications of public officials implementing public policy having a bias.

From agreement with the specialist, there is a dearth of programs of study on the biases of public policy professionals: the public officials who prepare and implement policies on behalf of elected candidates.

In the work presented by Professor Dercon, experiments were conducted on a group of new civil servants, which showed that policy professionals can fall into decision-making traps - such as hidden costs or prioritizing their ideological positions - despite explicitly having the mission statement of promote unbiased and evidence-based decisions. From agreement with Professor Dercon, these findings are relevant to policy professionals and their superiors in governments and large organizations, as well as to citizens themselves.