COMMENTARY / Luis Ángel Díaz Robredo*.

It may seem sarcastic to some, and even cruel, to hear that these circumstances of a global pandemic by COVID-19 are interesting times for social and individual psychology. And it may be even stranger to take these difficult times into account when establishing relations with the security and defence of states.

First of all, we must point out the obvious: the current circumstances are exceptional, as we have never before known a threat to health that has transcended such diverse and decisive areas as the global Economics , international politics, geo-strategy, industry, demography... Individuals and institutions were not prepared a few months ago and, even today, we are dealing with them with a certain degree of improvisation. The fees mortality and contagion rates have skyrocketed and the resources mobilised by the public administration are unknown to date. Without going any further, the Balmis operation -mission statement of support against the pandemic, organised and executed by the Ministry of Defence - has deployed 20,000 interventions, during 98 days of state of alarm and with a total of 188,713 military personnel mobilised.

In addition to the health work of disinfection, logistics and health support, there have been other tasks more typical of social control, such as the presence of the military in the streets and at critical points or reinforcement at borders. This work, which some people may find disconcerting due to its unusual nature of authority over the population itself, is justified by atypical group behaviour that we have observed since the beginning of the pandemic. Suffice it to cite a few Spanish examples that reflect how at certain times there has been behaviour that is not very logical for social imitation, such as the accumulation of basic necessities (food) or not so basic necessities (toilet paper) that emptied supermarket shelves for a few hours.

There have also been moments of lack of solidarity and even some social tension due to the fear of contagion against vulnerable groups, such as elderly people with COVID-19 who were transferred from one town to another and were booed by the neighbourhood that received them and had to be escorted by the police. Also, infrequently but equally negative and unsupportive, there have been cases in which some health workers suffered fear and rejection by their neighbours. And lately, the sanctioning and arrest of people who did not respect the rules of social distance and individual protection has been another common action of the authorities and State Security Forces and Corps. These events, which fortunately have been limited and dealt with quickly by the authorities, have been far outweighed by many other positive social behaviours of solidarity, altruism and generosity among citizens.

However, since national security must consider not only ideal scenarios but also situations with shortcomings or potential risks, these social variables must be taken into account when establishing a strategy.

Secondly, the flow of information has been a veritable tsunami of forces and interests that have overwhelmed the information capacities of entire societies, business groups and even individuals. Official media, private media, social networks and even anonymous groups with destabilising interests have competed in this game for citizens' attention. If this status has shown anything, it is that too much information can be as disabling as too little information, and that even the use of false, incomplete or somehow manipulated information makes us more susceptible to influence by the public.
This poses clear dangers to social stability, the operation of health services, the facilitation of organised crime and even the mental health of the population.

Thirdly and finally, we cannot forget that society and our institutions - including those related to security and defence - have their greatest weakness and strength based on the people who make them up. If there is one thing that the pandemic is putting at test it is the psychological strength of individuals due to the circumstance of uncertainty about the present and future, management fear of illness and death, and an innate need for attachment to social relationships. Our ability to cope with this new VUCA (Vulnerability, Uncertainty, Complexity, Ambiguity) scenario that affects each and every social and professional
social and professional environments requires a strong leadership style, adapted to this demanding status , authentic and based on group values. There is no unilateral solution today, except through the efforts of many. It is not empty words to affirm that the resilience of a society, of an Armed Forces or of a human group , is based on working together, fighting together, suffering together, with a cohesion and a team work properly trained.

That said, we can understand that psychological variables - at the individual and grouplevels - are at play in this pandemic status and that we can and should use the knowledge provided by Psychology as a serious science, adapted to real needs and in a constructive spirit, to plan the tactics and strategy of the current and future scenarios arising from Covid-19.

Undoubtedly, these are interesting times for psychology.

* Luis Ángel Díaz Robredo is a professor at Schoolof Educationand Psychology at the University of Navarra.

▲ VCR 8x8 programme [framework Romero/MDE].

COMMENTARY / Salvador Sánchez Tapia

After a gap of eight years since the publication of the last one in 2012, on 11 June, the President of the Government signed a new National Defence Directive (DDN), marking the beginning of a new Defence Planning cycle which, according to agreement as established by Defence Order 60/2015, must be valid for six years.

The essay of the DDN 20 is a laudable effort to bring National Defence up to date with the challenges of a complex strategic environment in continuous transformation. Its essay also offers an excellent opportunity to build along the way an intellectual community on this important issue, which will be fundamental throughout the cycle.

This article provides a preliminary analysis of the DDN 20, focusing on its most relevant aspects. In a first approximation, the official document follows the line, already enshrined in other Directives, of subsuming the essentially military concept of Defence within the broader concept of Security, which affects all the capabilities of the State. In this sense, the first difficulty that the DDN 20 has had to overcome is precisely the lack of a statutory document similar to the DDN, drafted at the level of National Security, to illuminate and guide it. To tell the truth, the void has not been total, since, as the DDN 20 states in its introduction, there is a National Security Strategy (NSS) which, although published in 2017, has served as reference letter in its elaboration, despite the evident lack of consistency between the strategic scenarios described in both documents.

In this respect, it is precisely worth noting the lack of specificity with which the new DDN defines the strategic scenario, compared to the somewhat greater specificity of the ESN. The DDN 20 draws a vague, almost generic scenario, applicable almost unchanged to any nation in the world, without reference to specific geographical areas; an accumulation of threats and risks to security with an impact on Defence, none of which appears to be more likely or more dangerous, and to which is added the recognition of changes in the international order that once again bring the possibility of major armed conflicts closer.

Such an approach makes it difficult to subsequently define defence objectives and guidelines for action and, perhaps for this reason, there are certain inconsistencies between the three parts of the document. It is striking that, although the document raises certificate, somewhat hastily, the possibility of the emergence of COVID-19, the possibility of a pandemic not being triggered is not considered in the description of the strategic scenario, something that, on the other hand, is included in ESN 17.

Along with the description of this scenario, the DDN 20 is interspersed with a series of considerations of a programmatic nature, which are in themselves positive and relevant, but which have little to do with what is to be expected in a document of this nature, designed to guide National Defence planning. In some cases, such as the promotion of the gender perspective, or the improvement of the quality of life of staff in its dimensions of improving living facilities, reconciling professional and family life, and reintegration into civilian life once the link with the Armed Forces has ended, the considerations are more typical of the Policy of staff of the department than of a DDN. In others, such as the obligation to respect local cultures in military operations, they seem more subject typical of the Royal Ordinances or another subject code of ethics.

Undoubtedly motivated by the COVID-19 emergency, and in view of the role that the Armed Forces have assumed during it, the DDN emphasises the importance of partnership missions with and in support of civilian authorities, something that is inherent to the Armed Forces, and establishes the specific goal of acquiring capabilities that allow for the partnership and support of these authorities in crisis and emergency situations.

The management of the pandemic may have highlighted gaps in response capabilities, shortcomings in coordination instruments, etc., thereby opening a window of opportunity to make progress in this area and produce a more effective response in the future. Nonetheless, it is important to guard against the possibility, opened up by this DDN, of losing sight of the central tasks of the armed forces, to prevent an excessive focus on missions in support of the civilian population from ending up distorting their organisation, manning and training, thereby impairing the deterrence capacity of the armies and their combat operability.

The DDN also contains the customary reference letter, which is necessary to promote a true Defence Culture among Spaniards. The accredited specialization is justified by the role that the Ministry of Defence should play in this effort. However, it is not the defence sector that needs to be reminded of the importance of this issue. The impact of any effort to promote Defence Culture will be limited if it is not assumed as its own by other ministries Departments , as well as by all State administrations, being aware that it is not possible to generate a Defence Culture without a prior consensus at the national level on such essential issues as the objectives or values shared by all. It is perhaps on this aspect that the emphasis should be placed.

Perhaps the most controversial point of the DDN 20 is that of financing. Achieving the objectives set out in the document requires sustained financial investment over time to break the current ceiling of expense in defence. Maintaining the Armed Forces among the technological elite, substantially improving the quality of life of the professional staff -which begins with providing them with the equipment that best guarantees their survival and superiority on the battlefield-, reinforcing the capacity to support civilian authorities in emergency situations, strengthening intelligence and action capabilities in cyberspace, or meeting with guarantees the operational obligations derived from our active participation in international organisations, for which, moreover, a commitment has been made to strengthen them by up to 50% for a period of one year, is as necessary as it is costly.

The DDN 20 recognises this in its final paragraph when it states that the development of the document's guidelines will require the necessary funding. This statement, however, is little more than an acknowledgement of the obvious, and is not accompanied by any commitment or guarantee of funding. Bearing in mind the important commitments already signed by the Ministry with the pending Special Armaments Programmes, and in view of the economic-financial panorama that is on the horizon due to the effects of COVID-19, which has led the JEME to announce the arrival of a period of austerity for the Army, and which deserves to be listed among the main threats to national security, it seems difficult that the objectives of the DDN 20 can be covered in the terms it sets out. This is the real Achilles' heel of the document, which could make it little more than a dead letter.

In conclusion, the issuance of a new DDN is to be welcomed as an effort to update National Defence policy, even in the absence of a similar instrument that periodically articulates the level of Security Policy in which Defence Policy should be subsumed.

The emergence of COVID-19 seems to have overtaken the document, causing it to lose some of its validity and calling into question not only the will, but also the real capacity to achieve the ambitious goals it proposes. At least it is possible that the document may act, even in a limited way, as a kind of shield to protect the Defence sector against the scenario of scarce resources that Spain will undoubtedly experience in the coming years.

▲ Rice field terraces in Vietnam [Pixabay].

COMMENT / Eduardo Arbizu

The combination of a market Economics and an authoritarian regime dominated by the Communist Party of Vietnam (VCP) has led Vietnam, a country of over 90 million people, to become a key player in the future of Southeast Asia.

Today's Vietnam is the consequence of a confusing and contradictory process of change that has transformed not only the country's Economics but has also had a profound impact on social life, urban configuration, environment, domestic and foreign policies and whose final effects will be seen in the long term deadline.

An impressive economic turnaround

The transformation of the economic model in Vietnam derives formally from the decision taken at the VCP's sixth congress in December 1986 to open the country to the market Economics , but its roots lie earlier, in the economic crisis that followed the war, in the collapse of agricultural production that the radical implementation of a communist model brought about in 1979. This debacle forced the private trading of any surplus production that exceeded the targets set by the state for public land or enterprises. This kind of state capitalism paved the way for the liberalisation that followed the death of Stalinist leader Le Duan in 1986. The approval of the do-moi or renovation policy meant the withdrawal of planning and the choice for the free market. It was not an ideological decision but an instrumental one. work If the CP wanted to maintain control of the country it needed to generate one million jobs a year, guarantee food for 90 million people and reduce poverty.

It has been an economic and social success: per capita income has increased dramatically and the population below the poverty line has been reduced from 60% to 20%. The US embargo ended in 1993 and in 1997 the two countries signed a new agreement trade agreement. In 2007 Vietnam was admitted to the WTO. In this context of openness, more than 150,000 new businesses were set up under the new enterprise law and major international companies such as Clarks, Canon, Samsung and Intel set up production facilities in Vietnam.

The achievements of the process, however, should not hide its weaknesses: a state-controlled Economics through joint ventures and state-owned enterprises, a fragile rule of law, massive corruption, a web of families loyal to the VCP accumulating wealth and owning most private businesses, growing inequality and deep ecological degradation.

Agriculture has evolved from the sudden drop in production that followed communist collectivisation to the current status where Vietnam is the second largest exporter of rice in the world, a crop that accounts for 20% of its exports. The industrialisation of Economics has meant that agriculture, which used to account for 40% of GDP, is now only 20%. Livelihoods still depend on rice cultivation, still the main source of income for rural households, where half of the population lives. source . Rice exports are managed by a combination of free market and corrupt officialdom, with the negative consequences experienced in the speculative crisis of 2008. There has been an intense migration from the countryside to the big cities where wages are five times higher. The pressure for wealth is converting agricultural land into residential or industrial plots. Every year 10,000 new hectares are re-zoned. The transformation of the rural world is pushing away the old Structures that provided security, meaning and purpose and it remains to be seen how it affects future stability.

Social and environmental change

The construction of proletarian towns after the war, under the communist housing programme, has not prevented overcrowding and the continuation of communal life. Migrants continue to arrive in search of work, money and protection. Tons of industrial waste remains untreated; the rivers around Ho Chi Min City are biologically dead and pollution in Hanoi is well above internationally accepted levels. Problems such as prostitution, with more than 1% of women working in the illicit sex trade, or abandoned children on the streets are a reality. However, while doubling or tripling its urban population, Vietnam has managed these problems better than neighbouring countries, largely avoiding the ghost cities and their problems of crime, extreme poverty and drug addiction so common in the rest of Asia.

Commercial and urban dynamism is reflected in thousands of illegal street food shops and small businesses, pioneers of small-scale capitalism, which are now a tourist symbol of Vietnam. In cities full of young people who identify freedom with a polluting motorbike, youth rebels against years of communist austerity but not against family traditions.

Vietnam is a country where a natural wonder like Ha Long Bay, one of the country's iconic images, is simultaneously a tourist attraction and an environmental disaster. It is also one of the areas most exposed to the effects of climate change, due to its low altitude and reliance on agricultural production in the Mekong Delta and tourism. Respect for wildlife and the environment are issues of high priority for the authorities leave .

The VCP remains in control

There are issues that have not changed with the same intensity. Vietnam still lives under a "natural system of control", the deep surveillance system put in place by the communist regime to control the values and behaviour of its people. A system in which one in six Vietnamese ended up working in the security forces and which resulted in the control of "cultivated families", those who behave in accordance with the values set by the party. agreement . Although it has proven its effectiveness in crises such as avian flu and now partly in the Covid-19 crisis, the system is now controversial due to the spread of the internet and social networks and radical social changes that call for more freedom. Despite this control, corruption is widespread and damaging to the country's future.

The VCP is still in power. Retaining its Leninist roots, it is now an elitist and intelligent organisation in search of its own survival. A new mandarinate that has evolved from a centralised power present in all aspects of public and social life to a fragile and partial control; from a "petty legal system", where decisions were taken directly by the VCP and their compliance with the law was irrelevant, to a "State based on Law", where rules are the tool to supervise entrepreneurs and investors, allowing them to create wealth and employment but simultaneously comply with the VCP's expectations. Similarly, the party controls the legislature, the courts and indirectly the press, media and news coverage, which prevents Vietnam from being considered a truly free country.

Life has been difficult and lonely for those few who tried to oppose the regime and promote real democracy. The name of the Catholic priest Father Ly and his followers, brutally repressed, tried and convicted in March 2007, once the country was admitted to the WTO, casts a shadow over the hope for a transition to effective political freedom.

Foreign policy and the future

Vietnam's foreign policy seeks to strike a balance in its relations with two main actors: the US and China, counterbalanced by a set of alliances with third countries. Overcoming war wounds and establishing trusting cooperation on subject security is the goal of the policy of rapprochement with the US, which is already a significant investor in the country. The special relationship with China, the largest importer of Vietnamese goods, an industrial giant and Asia's largest military, is the other axis of its policy despite long-standing territorial disputes.

The overexploited environment, inequality, elite entrenchment and, above all, uncertainty about the evolution of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the political system are aspects that are weighing on the outlook. However, a young and well-educated population, as well as the inflow of foreign investment, are reasons for optimism about further liberalisation of the country, including political liberalisation.

▲ Crossroads in Minneapolis where George Floyd was stopped by local police [Fibonacci Blue].

COMMENTARY / Salvador Sánchez Tapia [Brigadier General (Res.)].

In a controversial public statement on 2 June, US President Donald Trump threatened to deploy armed forces units to contain riots sparked by the death of African-American George Floyd at the hands of a police officer in Minnesota, and to maintain law and order if they escalate in violence.

Regardless of the seriousness of the event, and beyond the fact that the incident has been politicised and is being employee used as a platform for expressing rejection of Trump's presidency, the possibility raised by the president poses an almost unprecedented challenge to civil-military relations in the United States.

For reasons rooted in its pre-independence past, the United States maintains a certain caution against the possibility that armed forces can be used domestically against citizens by whoever holds power. For this reason, when the Founding Fathers drafted the Constitution, while authorising the congress to organise and maintain armies, they explicitly limited their funding to a maximum of two years.

Against this backdrop, and against the background of the tension between the Federation and the states, American legislation has tried to limit the employment of the Armed Forces in domestic tasks. Thus, since 1878, the Posse Comitatus Since 1878, for example, the Armed Forces Act has limited the possibility of using them to carry out law and order missions that the states, including the National Guard, are responsible for carrying out with their own resources.

One of the exceptions to this rule is the Insurrection Act of 1807, invoked precisely by President Trump as an argument in favour of the legality of a possible decision by employment. This is despite the fact that this law is restrictive in spirit, as it requires the cooperation of the states in its application, and because it is designed for extreme cases in which the states are unable, or unwilling, to maintain order, circumstances that do not seem applicable to the case at hand.

The controversial nature of advertisement is attested to by the fact that voices as authoritative and so little inclined to publicly break its neutrality as that of Lieutenant General (ret.) James Mattis, Secretary of Defence of the Trump Administration until his premature removal in December 2018, or Lieutenant General (ret.) Martin Dempsey, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 2011 and 2015, have spoken out against it. ) Martin Dempsey, head of the board Chiefs of Staff between 2011 and 2015, have spoken out against this employment, joining the statements made by former presidents as disparate as George W. Bush and Barack Obama, or those of the Secretary of Defence himself, Mark Esper, whose position against the possibility of using the Armed Forces in this status has recently been made clear.

The presidential advertisement has opened up a crisis in the usually stable US civil-military relations (CMR). Beyond the scope of the United States, the profound question, which affects the very core of CMR in a democratic state, is none other than whether or not it is appropriate to use the armed forces in public order or, in a broader sense, domestic tasks, and the risks associated with such a decision.

In the 1990s, Michael C. Desch, one of the leading authorities in the field of CMR, identified the correlation between the missions entrusted to the armed forces by a state and the quality of its civil-military relations, concluding that foreign-oriented military missions are the most conducive to healthy CMR, while non-military domestic missions are likely to generate various CMR pathologies.

Generally speaking, the existence of armed forces in any state is primarily motivated by the need to protect the state against any threat from outside. employment In order to carry out such a high task with guarantees, armies are equipped and trained for the lethal use of force, unlike police forces, which are equipped and trained for a minimal and gradual use of force, which only becomes lethal in the most extreme, exceptional cases. In the first case, it is a matter of confronting an armed enemy intent on destroying one's own forces. In the second, force is used to confront citizens who may, in some cases, use violence, but who remain, after all, compatriots.

When military forces are employed in tasks of this nature, there is always a risk that they will produce a response in accordance with their training, which may be excessive in a law and order scenario. The consequences, in such a case, can be very negative. In the worst case, and above all other considerations, the employment may result in a perhaps avoidable loss of life. Moreover, from the CMR's point of view, the soldiers that the nation submission has for its external defence could become, in the eyes of the public, the enemies of those they are supposed to defend.

The damage this can do to civil-military relations, to national defence and to the quality of a state's democracy is difficult to measure, but it can be intuited if one considers that, in a democratic system, the armed forces cannot live without the support of their fellow citizens, who see them as a beneficial force for the nation and to whose members they extend their recognition as its loyal and selfless servants.

The abuse of employment of the armed forces in domestic tasks can also deteriorate their already complex preparation, weakening them for the execution of the missions for which they were conceived. It may also end up conditioning their organisation and equipment to the detriment, once again, of their essential tasks.

On the other hand, and although today we are far from such a scenario, this employment could gradually lead to a progressive expansion of the tasks of the Armed Forces, which would extend their control over purely civilian activities and see their range of tasks increasingly broadened, displacing other agencies in their execution, which could, undesirably, atrophy.

In such a scenario, the military institution could cease to be perceived as a disinterested actor and come to be seen as a competitor with particular interests, and with a capacity for control that it could use to its own advantage, even if this were at odds with the nation's interest. Such a status would, over time, lead hand in hand to the politicisation of the armed forces, from which would follow another damage to WRCs that is difficult to quantify.

Decisions such as President Trump's may ultimately place members of the armed forces in the grave moral dilemma of using force against their fellow citizens, or disobeying the president's orders. Because of its seriousness, therefore, the decision to commit the armed forces to such tasks should be taken exceptionally and after careful consideration.

It is difficult to determine whether President Trump's advertisement was merely a product of his temperament or whether, on the contrary, it contained a real intention to use the armed forces in the unrest sweeping the country, in a decision that has not occurred since 1992. In any case, the President, and those advising him, must assess the damage that could be done to civil-military relations and, therefore, to the American democratic system. This is without forgetting, moreover, the responsibility that rests on America's shoulders in the face of the reality that a part of humanity looks to the country as a reference letter and model to imitate.

COMMENT / Carlos Jalil

Covid-19 has forced many states to take extraordinary measures to protect the welfare of their citizens. This includes the suspension of certain human rights on grounds of public emergency. Rights such as freedom of movement, freedom of expression, freedom of meeting and privacy are affected by state responses to the pandemic. We therefore ask: Do states unduly affect freedom of expression when combating fake news? Do they unduly restrict our freedom of movement and meeting or even deprive us of our liberty? Do they infringe on our right to privacy with new tracking apps? Is this justified?

To protect public health, human rights treaties allow states to adopt measures that may restrict rights. article agreement 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provide that in situations of public emergency that threaten the life of the nation, states may take measures and derogate from their treaty obligations. Similarly, article 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), allows states parties to fail to derogate from their obligations in emergency situations that threaten the independence or security of the nation.

During the pandemic, some states have declared a state of emergency and, because of the impossibility of respecting certain rights, have derogated from their obligations. However, derogations are subject to requirements. General Comment 29 on States of Emergency of the UN Human Rights committee sets out six conditions for derogations, which are similar in the above-mentioned treaties: (1) official proclamation of a state of emergency and public emergency threatening the life of the nation; (2) proportionality required by the requirements of the status in terms of duration, geographical coverage and substantive basis; (3) non-discrimination (however the ECHR does not include this condition); (4) conformity with other international law obligations; (5) formal notification of the derogation to the respective treaty bodies (these must include full information on the measures, their reasons and documentation of laws adopted); and (6) prohibition of derogation from non-derogable rights.

The last condition is particularly important. The aforementioned treaties (ICCPR, ECHR and ACHR) explicitly set out the rights that cannot be derogated from. These, also called absolute rights, include, inter alia: right to life, prohibition of slavery and servitude, principle of legality and retroactivity of law, and freedom of conscience and religion.

However, derogations are not always necessary. There are rights that, on the contrary, are not absolute and have the inherent possibility of being limited, for which it is not necessary for a state to derogate from its treaty obligations. This means that the state, for public health reasons, may limit certain non-absolute rights without the need to give notice of derogation. These non-absolute rights are: the right to freedom of movement and meeting, freedom of expression, the right to liberty staff and privacy. Specifically, the right to freedom of movement and association is subject to limitations on grounds of national security, public order and health, or the rights and freedoms of others. The right to freedom of expression may be limited by respect for the rights or reputation of others and by the protection of national security, public order and public health. And the rights to freedom of expression staff and privacy may be subject to reasonable limitations in accordance with the provisions of human rights treaties.

Despite these possibilities, countries such as Latvia, Estonia, Argentina and Ecuador, which have officially declared a state of emergency, have resorted to derogation. Consequently, they have justified Covid-19 as an emergency threatening the life of the nation, notifying the United Nations, the Organisation of American States and Europe's committee of the derogation from their international obligations under the aforementioned treaties. In contrast, most states adopting extraordinary measures have not proceeded with such derogation, based on the inherent limitations of these rights. Among them are Italy and Spain, countries seriously affected, which have not derogated, but have applied limitations.

This is an interesting phenomenon because it demonstrates the differences in states' interpretations of international human rights law, also subject to their national legislatures. There is clearly a risk that states applying limitations abuse the state of emergency and violate human rights. It may therefore be that some states interpret derogations as reflecting their commitment to the rule of law and the principle of legality. However, human rights bodies are also likely to find the measures adopted by states that have not derogated consistent with the status pandemic. Excluding, in both cases, situations of torture, excessive use of force and other circumstances affecting absolute rights.

In the aftermath of the pandemic, courts and tribunals are likely to decide whether the measures adopted were necessary. But in the meantime, states should consider that extraordinary measures adopted should be temporary, in line with appropriate health conditions and within framework of the law.

Members of the Armed Forces setting up a pavilion at Ifema for the treatment of Covid-19 [Defence].

COMMENTARY / Salvador Sánchez Tapia*

The Spanish government's declaration of a state of alarm on 15 March as an instrument to fight the spread of COVID 19 has brought with it the not very usual image of soldiers of the Armed Forces (FAS) operating in major cities and roads throughout Spain to cooperate in the fight against the virus.

For most Spaniards, the presence of military units carrying out their missions on public roads is a rarity to which they are not accustomed, with the exception of the relatively frequent activity of the Military Emergency Unit (UME) in support of civil society, which is well known to a public that, in general, values it very positively.

Apart from these performances, it can be said that the image of uniformed soldiers working directly in front of the public is not a common one. This subject of support is not, however, a novelty, and responds to a long tradition of social attendance lent by the military institution to its fellow citizens when called upon to do so.

Several elements in our recent history have contributed to producing what seems to be a certain distancing between Spaniards and their Armed Forces. These include the shift in the Armed Forces' missions abroad with the birth of the democratic regime in 1975; the long years of the fight against ETA terrorism, which led Spain's soldiers to hide their military status from the public in order to safeguard their security; the progressive reduction in the size of the Armed Forces, which eliminated many of the provincial garrisons maintained by the Armies; and the end of military service, which ended up making the Armed Forces unknown to their citizens.

This detachment, if it has existed or does exist, has been one-way, for even at times when the military institution may have been most overlooked, soldiers have remained close to their fellow citizens, from whom they come, and whom they serve, supporting them in the most difficult situations. Numerous examples testify to the military's long record of service to the citizenry. To corroborate this statement, it is sufficient to cite cases such as the military support in the floods in Valencia in 1957; Operation "Alazán", carried out in 1981 in support of the State Security Forces and Corps in their fight against ETA terrorism, sealing the Franco-Spanish border; Operation "Centinela Gallego", in which Army units have been monitoring the Galician mountains for years to prevent forest fires; the fight against the spread of camalote in the Guadiana River; and the construction of mobile bridges in numerous towns throughout Spain, such as Montblanc, to restore communications after violent meteorological phenomena had interrupted them.

On this occasion, it was the declaration of the state of alarm that brought the Armed Forces to the forefront of public attention. Given the novelty of this intervention, it seems appropriate, at this point, to make a reference letter to the rationale behind the decision of employment of the military instrument, and to explain what can and cannot be expected from the actions of the Armed Forces in this subject situation.

The coronavirus pandemic sample clearly demonstrates the reality that the security challenges facing modern societies require a cooperative response multidisciplinary, in which all the forces of society participate, contributing their particular capabilities to produce the synergy required to solve a crisis. The Armed Forces cannot remain outside this effort, and must act on an equal footing with other public and private actors. At times, when the crisis is of a military nature, they will do so by leading the effort; at others, they will assume a support function for other actors, which they will carry out without seeking any leading role subject .

In the specific case of this crisis, the contribution of the Armed Forces to the effort by deploying resources responds not merely to an intention to graphically capture this reality, but also to the recognition that the crisis will be long, that it will require the cooperation of all, and that the solution requires the contribution of resources beyond the ordinary ones.

The main mission of the Armed Forces is the military defence of Spain against external threats. From this mission derives its organisation, its preparation, its dimensions, and the equipment and armament that equips it, optimised, within the possibilities of the Nation's human and material resources, and from agreement with the will of the Spanish people, to respond to the demands of this mission, which is its true raison d'être [1].

This does not mean that armies cannot and should not carry out other missions, which they will carry out to the best of their abilities. agreement In fact, from a legal point of view, military participation in the coronavirus crisis is reasonable if one takes into account that, according to the Organic Law on National Defence, one of the missions of the armed forces is to "preserve, together with State institutions and public administrations, the security and well-being of citizens in cases of serious risk, catastrophe, calamity or other public needs, in accordance with the provisions of current legislation" [2].

The Royal Decree declaring the state of alarm leaves no doubt as to the legislator's intention to involve the Armed Forces in the resolution of the crisis, since Article 4 establishes the Minister of Defence as one of the competent authorities delegated by the President of the Government for the coordinated management of the crisis, and because it specifically and explicitly empowers these authorities to require the action of the Armed Forces in tasks that guarantee the effective fulfilment of the measures included in the decree [3].

By virtue of the provisions of the Law of the Military degree program , when a state of alarm is declared, the members of the Armed Forces are invested as "agents of the authority" with regard to the tasks set out in the decree of declaration, which brings them closer to the functions of subject police. agreement Specifically, and in accordance with Article 5.2 of the decree, this status empowers them to "carry out checks on people, goods, vehicles, premises and establishments that are necessary to verify and, where appropriate, prevent the services and activities suspended in this royal decree from being carried out, except for those expressly exempted". To this end, "they may issue the necessary orders and prohibitions and fail the activities or services being carried out".

Having defined framework , it should also be considered that employment of the Armed Forces requires a minimum familiarity with the military organisation, as well as with its capabilities and limitations. While it is true that the SAF offers a wide range of possibilities for action, it is necessary to be aware that there are tasks for which it is not capable, and that the use of these capabilities must be in accordance with its specific possibilities and procedures employment.

This reality, together with the imperative need for the employment of military resources to be coordinated with all the actors involved in resolving the crisis, justifies the presence of the Chief of Defence Staff (JEMAD) -who is also the advisor of the President of the Government and the Minister of Defence at subject operational- in the Situation Committee that the Royal Decree declaring the state of alarm has set up in support of the Government.

The first and most important capacity with which the military institution contributes to the resolution of the crisis is that which resides in the people who serve in uniform. The Armed Forces place at the disposal of the Nation not only the power of their numbers but, above all, the imponderable strength of their values, placed at the service of the common good: the generous submission , the spirit of sacrifice, the work teamwork, the sense of duty, and so many others that are so necessary at times like these, and which mean that the Armed Forces can be entrusted with those missions that entail the greatest risk and fatigue, safe in the knowledge that they will do their utmost to carry them out.

In the realm of the unquantifiable, there is also the not inconsiderable capacity for planning operations that the armed forces have at all levels, from the strategic to the tactical, including the operational. The General Staffs of the three armies, and those of their subordinate units, have enormous potential for organising, coordinating and planning complex operations, which, if used, is extremely useful.

The diversity and versatility of a large part of the Armed Forces' material resources makes them particularly useful in circumstances such as the current one. Among the catalogue of possibilities are some as varied as the transport, both of staff and of equipment, supplies, merchandise, material, or any urgent or essential item, over any distance and by air, sea or land, especially if it has to be done to remote or difficult to reach places; support for the construction of shelters, hospitals, or any other facilities with the means of castramation of the Army Engineers, who can also carry out specialised work to improve communications, or to ensure the supply of water, electricity, or other services; health and epidemiological support to the civilian population with staff specialised doctors and nurses; the attendance in the distribution and even packaging of food for large groups; the execution of security and protection tasks for essential or particularly sensitive installations, such as energy production and distribution plants; the surveillance and control of compliance with the terms of the state of alarm by land, sea and air, either with staff, or with conventional or remotely manned means; support for large-scale disinfection operations; the production of medicines or means of health protection; communications support; the provision of essential services such as control of airspace, inter-city public transport or public transport within major cities; etc. The list could be extended almost ad infinitum.

The realisation of the enormous amount of possible support, together with the magnitude of the pandemic itself, and the consideration of the fact that military capabilities are sized to meet the needs arising from the most likely operational scenarios, and not for a massive support scenario such as the one we are now facing, suggest that, in this case, the needs far exceed the possibilities of the Armed Forces and that, without proper planning, the institution could be totally consumed in the development of these noble tasks.

This would be very laudable, but it would anchor the entire National Defence capability in a task other than the military defence of Spain, rendering the armed forces incapable of dealing with the tasks that, it is reasonable to argue, are the raison d'être of the armed forces, and which must continue to be addressed, even in the midst of a pandemic. Beyond that, they would also be unable to sustain the operational efforts that the government has decided that the armed forces should carry out abroad, some of which could be reconsidered.

The aforementioned limitations make it advisable to measure the effort required of the Armed Forces - also because they must sustain it over an apparently long period of time - which must be provided with selective criteria, with the Armed Forces acting in application of the principle of subsidiarity, when there are no civilian agencies, public or private, capable of providing support, or when the support is of a risky, dangerous or arduous nature that makes the use of military resources advisable. employment .

With the exception of the EMU, the Armed Forces are not specifically equipped, organised or trained for the subject tasks of an emergency such as the current one. In some cases, military capabilities are directly applicable in a situation such as the coronavirus. In others, however, the provision of support cannot be immediate and requires a minimum period of adaptation, reprogramming, and training to ensure that military capabilities are applied in a manner appropriate to the nature of an operational environment with which the soldier may be unfamiliar. For example, it is not appropriate to simply employ a unit trained for high-intensity combat in emergency or humanitarian support roles without first making the transition [4].

In this adaptation time, it is always necessary to include the response time that the units must have between missions to recover, reorganise, maintain the material in operational conditions. fill in the resources consumed, plan the new mission, move between scenarios employment, etc. Even if they are in a high availability situation and their response time is reduced to a minimum, it will never be zero if they have already been used.

The employment of the Armed Forces in this subject of tasks must always be carried out with a criterion of strict temporality. If this does not happen and the armies perpetuate their missions of support to the civilian population, there is a possibility that they will progressively expand their tasks, atrophying the development of civilian agencies that could and should preferably carry them out, and becoming their competitors; that they may, in the process, neglect their core tasks - to the point of reorganising, equipping, and training only for their civilian support dimension; and that they may compromise the neutrality and selfless servant character that citizens demand of their armed forces and hold them in such high regard. As soon as the situation allows, the Armed Forces, with the exception of the UME, it is understood, should return to their usual framework of action.

That moment has not yet arrived. The end of the crisis is not yet in sight, and we Spaniards must be prepared for a long battle against COVID 19. In this struggle, citizens can be convinced that their Armed Forces, and all those who make them up, will be at their side, attending to their needs, sharing in their hardships, participating in their grief. When the virus has been defeated, they will rejoice with them and, in silence, they will return naturally to their duties, without waiting for applause, with the intimate satisfaction of having done their duty in the service of their compatriots.

* Brigadier General (R)

[1] An exception to this is the EMU, a unit specially organised to carry out tasks in support of the civilian population.

[2] A separate issue from this work, and which would be the subject of a more in-depth analysis, is that the aforementioned Organic Law 5/2005 introduces a change, extending them, of the constitutional missions that Article 8 of the Magna Carta imposes on the Armed Forces.

[3] Royal Decree 463/2020 of 14 March.

[4] Consider, for example, the differences between providing a facility protection service in an Area of Operations, in an environment that may be hostile, and which is subject to certain Rules of Engagement (ROE), and providing it in a nuclear power plant on National Territory in a circumstance such as the present one. As can be easily understood, the response cannot be the same, and employing an individual trained for the former in the latter requires some adaptation.

staff UNHCR building a tent for Venezuelan refugees in the Colombian city of Cúcuta [UNHCR].

COMMENTARY / Paula Ulibarrena

Restrictive measures imposed by states to try to contain the coronavirus epidemic mean that millions of people are no longer able to go to work or work from home. But not everyone can stop working or switch to teleworking. There are self-employed people, small businesses, neighbourhood shops, street traders or street vendors, and freelance artists who live practically from day to day. For them, and for many others who have no or reduced income, expenses will continue to mount: utility bills, rents, mortgages, school fees and, of course, food and medicine.

All these social impacts of the coronavirus crisis are already beginning to be questioned by those living in the "red zone" of the epidemic. In Italy, for example, some political groups have demanded that aid should not go to large companies, but to this group of precarious workers or needy families, and are demanding a "basic quarantine income".

Similar approaches are emerging in other parts of the world and have even led some leaders to anticipate the demands of the population. In France, Emmanuel Macron announced that the government will take over the loans, and suspended the payment of rents, taxes and electricity, gas and water bills. In the United States, Donald Trump's government announced that cheques will be sent to each family to cover the costs or risks involved in the pandemic.

In other major crises the state has come to the rescue of large companies and banks. Now there are calls for public resources to be devoted to rescuing those most in need.

In any crisis, it is the most disadvantaged who suffer the most. Today, there are more than 126 million people in the world in need of humanitarian assistance, including 70 million forcibly displaced people. attendance . Within these groups, we are beginning to see the first cases of infection (Ninive-Iraq IDP camp, Somalia, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Sudan, Venezuela report ), the cases in Burkina Faso are particularly illustrative of the challenge of responding in a context where medical care is limited. Malian refugees who were once displaced to Burkina Faso are being forced to return to Mali, and ongoing violence inhibits humanitarian and medical access to affected populations.

Many refugee camps suffer from inadequate hygiene and sanitation facilities, creating conditions conducive to the spread of disease. Official response plans in the US, South Korea, China and Europe require social distancing, which is physically impossible in many IDP camps and in the crowded urban contexts in which many forcibly displaced people live. Jan Egeland, director general of the Norwegian Refugee Agency committee , warned that COVID-19 could "decimate refugee communities". 

Jacob Kurtzer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington warns that national policies of isolation in reaction to the spread of COVID-19 also have negative consequences for people facing humanitarian emergencies. Thus the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration have announced the end of refugee resettlement programmes, as some host governments have halted refugee entrance and imposed travel restrictions as part of their official response.

Compounding these challenges is the reality that humanitarian funding, which can barely meet global demand, may be affected as donor states feel they must focus such funds on the Covid-19 response at this time.

On the other side of the coin, the coronavirus could provide an opportunity to de-escalate some armed conflicts. For example, the EU has order ceased hostilities and stopped military transfers in Libya to allow authorities to focus on responding to the health emergency. The Islamic State has posted repeated messages on its Al-Naba information bulletin calling on fighters not to travel to Europe and to reduce attacks while concentrating on staying free of the virus. 

Kurtzer suggests that this is an opportunity to reflect on the nature of humanitarian work abroad and ensure that it is not overlooked. Interestingly, developed countries face real medical vulnerability, indeed Médecins Sans Frontières has opened facilities in four locations in Italy. Cooperating with trusted humanitarian organisations at the national level will be vital to respond to the needs of the population and at the same time develop a greater understanding of the vital work they perform in humanitarian settings abroad.

▲ Night view of Shanghai [Pixabay].

COMMENT / Jimena Puga

China's new Foreign Investment Law, which came into force on 1 January 2020, aims to accelerate the country's economic policy reforms to open up the domestic market and remove obstacles and contradictions of the previous law, goal as its main objective. As stated by the President of the People's Republic statement , the new rule aims to build a market based on stability, transparency, predictability and fair skill for foreign investors. Moreover, the Chinese authorities claim that this new law represents a fundamental part of the state's policy to open up to the world and attract more foreign direct investment.

The draft of the rule, drafted in 2015, created high expectations among Chinese reformers and foreign investors for a change in the country's foreign investment policy regime. And its publication in 2019, the year at the end of which the US and PRC presidents agreed to a hiatus in the trade war in which they are both engaged, signalled a breakthrough in this change.

However, the reality is different. Beijing's stance on foreign investment remains significantly different compared to the conception of investment in the international arena, but parts of the reformist sector of society know that the government cannot afford to miss the opportunity for improvement after the gradual slowdown of domestic investment in the Chinese market over the last decade.

On the contrary, and taking into account the image that the Middle Kingdom has sought to project to the world since the opening of the regime, it might be thought that President Xi Jinping and the leaders of the Communist Party would have seized the opportunity to give a facelift to a new policy that, in comparison with the labyrinthine and previous law, would be systematic and perceived in a more friendly way by investor countries, as a means to revive the declining rates of economic progress. The Asian power's new approach to the free market is therefore a smokescreen based on the establishment of protocols that vaguely define the limits of the rights enjoyed by foreign investors.

As a complement to the content of the foreign investment law, the regulation highlights its promotion and protection and details the necessary measures to ensure its effective implementation. It promotes investment by protecting the rights and interests of investors, standardising the administration of foreign investment, improving the environment for business establishments, as well as promoting the advancement of market opening with a broader scope.

Specifically, the precept stipulates that foreign-invested enterprises shall enjoy the same favourable policies as domestic companies. In addition, it details measures to protect business confidentiality and improve the mechanism for presentation of suggestions from foreign firms to the authorities.

It also sets out and clarifies the implementation of a negative listing mechanism for foreign investment access and details the registration and notification system for this subject of investments. Finally, it also regulates the investment policies for companies established in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and the legal responsibilities for violations of these regulations.

From a strictly legal point of view, article 2 of the precept defines the concept of foreign investment as "the activity of investing directly or indirectly carried out by foreign natural persons, companies or other organisations", and also contemplates four circumstances that are considered part of this investment subject :

• Who establishes a business in the territory of China either alone or with another investor

• Whoever acquires participations, shares... or other rights and interests of a business in the territory of China

• Who invests in any new project in China, either alone or with another investor

• Whoever invests in any other manner stipulated by law, administrative regulations or provisions of the State committee

The term "business foreign investment" refers to a business incorporated in Chinese territory under Chinese law and with all or part of its investment financed from a foreign investor.

However, as mentioned above, despite the important innovations of this law, many questions remain unanswered. For example, it does not specify what indirect investment is. Nor does it specify the scope of "foreign natural person": what about Chinese who acquire another nationality, and what about foreigners who acquire Chinese citizenship? Moreover, the legislator also fails to clarify whether investment from Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan will be considered foreign investment.

Articles 4 and 28 of the new law state that China will adopt the management system of pre-establishment of national treatment (a principle that guarantees foreign investors and their investments access to markets without disadvantages, and thus on the same terms as domestic investors). And the Negative List system for foreign investment, which consists of special administrative measures for foreign investment access to certain fields. In other words, the government will treat all foreign investments outside the Negative List as domestic.

This Negative List system was first tested in the Shanghai SEZ and expanded across the country in 2018. Both article 4 and 28 clarify that the new Negative List will be promulgated prior to agreement of the committee of State. This means that neither ministers nor local governments will be able to place restrictions on foreign investment. What's missing? If investors want access to the sectors restricted under the Negative List, they must receive authorisation from the Ministry of Commerce, a procedure that the legislator does not include in rules and regulations.

On the other hand, Articles 34 and 37 of the new law establish the system of communication on the establishment of new investments for management and their organisation.

From agreement with these points, foreign investors are obliged to communicate all relevant information to the trading department regulated by the business Registration System or the business Credit Information System advertising . Penalties for non-compliance are also set out in these articles. But once again, in this field there is a lack of requirements as to how and what content is required for the communication of information to the department trading system.

This new turn in economic policy translates, once again, into a strategy by which Beijing aims to project itself on the international stage as a powerful and innovative economic power, trying to hide the slowdown in its domestic market and the damage suffered from the trade war against Washington. However, given the loopholes analysed in the aforementioned articles and their vague and ambiguous wording, foreign companies will have to wait to determine what this reform actually entails after its implementation at internship.

▲ Qasem Soleimani receives a decoration from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in early 2019 [Khamenei's Office]

COMMENT* / Salvador Sánchez Tapia

The death in Iraq of General Qasem Soleimani, head of the Iranian Quds force, at the hands of a US drone is one more link in the process of growing deterioration of the already bad relations between the United States and Iran, the latest chapter of which has been experienced since 2018, the year in which President Trump decided to break the so-called "agreement (JCPOA) signed with Iran in 2015 by the Obama administration and the other members of the G5+1.

The attack on Soleimani, carried out in retaliation for the death of a US contractor in an attack apparently launched by the Iraqi Shiite militia Kataib Hezbollah on the US K1 base in Kirkuk on 27 December, has marked a qualitative change in the situation in the country. subject response that the U.S. is accustomed to give to incidents of this kind. subject for, for the first time, the goal It's been a stop manager of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Immediately after the assassination, during the funeral for the deceased general, Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, announced in somewhat apocalyptic terms that the attack would not go unanswered, and that it would come directly from Iranian hands, not through proxies. It came, in fact, on the night of January 8 in the form of a massive missile attack on two instructions U.S. military personnel stationed in western Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. Contradicting Iranian statements that the bombings had killed some 80 Americans, the U.S. administration was quick to assert that there had been no casualties. leave because of the attacks.

In the aftermath of this new attack, the world held its breath waiting for an escalation by Washington. However, President Trump's statements on January 8 seemed to defuse tensions by arguing that the absence of U.S. casualties was indicative of an Iranian attempt to de-escalate. The U.S. will not respond militarily, although it has announced its intention to tighten the economic sanctions regime until the country changes its attitude. With this, the risk of an open war in the region seems averted, at least momentarily.

Are we affected by the tension between the United States and Iran?

Obviously, yes, and in several ways. First of all, we cannot ignore the fact that several European countries, including Spain, maintain significant military contingents deployed in the region, operating within the framework of NATO, the United Nations and the European Union in missions such as "Inherent Resolve" in Iraq, "Resolute Support" in Afghanistan, UNIFIL in Lebanon, "Active Fence" in Turkey, etc. or "Atalanta" in the Horn of Africa.

In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan in particular, the Spanish troops deployed in the aforementioned missions work closely partnership with other NATO allies, including the United States. Although in principle Spanish soldiers – or, for that matter, those of the other NATO nations – are not in the crosshairs of Iranian responses, specifically directed against North America and its interests, there is no doubt that any attack by Iran on American units could collaterally affect the contingents of other nations operating with them. if only for a matter of mere geographical proximity.

Less likely is that Iran would attempt a response against any non-U.S. contingent through one of its proxies in the region. This would be the case, for example, of Hezbollah in Lebanon, a country in which Spain maintains a significant contingent whose security could be affected if it group, either on its own initiative, or at the behest of Iran, attempts to attack any UNIFIL unit or facility. This option, as we say, is considered unlikely because of the negative impact it would have on the international community in general, and because of the proximity to Israel of the deployment of UNIFIL.

The escalation has led to an increase in the alert level and a reinforcement of U.S. troops in the region. If the increase in tension were to continue, it would not be out of the question that Washington could come to some sort of agreement. subject It could appeal to the support of its partners and allies, either with troops or resources. It is difficult to determine at what time and under what conditions such a situation might occur application, for what purpose and, very importantly, what response Europe would give to it, taking into account the concern with which the Old Continent observes an escalation in which it is not interested, and the state of relative coldness that relations between the United States and Europe are going through.

As a result of the assassination, Iran has made public its intention to dissociate itself completely from the provisions of the agreement that I was still watching. In other words, he says he feels free to continue his nuclear program. Undoubtedly, this last nail in the coffin of the JCPOA may lead to an open degree program nuclear power in the region with negative consequences for regional security, but also for European security. The rise of the issue From our point of view, the collapse of nuclear powers is, in itself and from our point of view, bad news.

Finally, and as a side effect of the escalation, the price of a barrel of oil is beginning to show a disturbing upward trend. If there are no corrective measures by increasing production from other countries, the trend could continue. There is no need to dwell on what the increase in the price of oil means for the economy. Economics and, of course, for the national one.

Russia and China in the crisis

Russia is making efforts to replace the United States as the leading power in the region and to present North America as a leading power. partner unreliable, which abandons its allies in difficulty. The escalation of the crisis could have a negative impact on this effort, delaying it or, in the worst case, ending it if, in the end, the United States were to reverse its policy of gradual derailing withdrawal in the Middle East due to an increase in tension with Iran. Russian rhetoric will be anti-Washington. In the end, however, it will do nothing to increase the tension between the United States and Iran, and it will, probably, keep it within a tolerable level or decrease.

Russia is not so much a staunch ally of Iran as one of convenience. Iran is a competitor of Russia for influence in the region – particularly in Syria – and may seek to negatively influence Islamism in the Russian Federation. On the other hand, Russia is not enthusiastic about the idea of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.

China's stance is conditioned by its heavy dependence on the steady flow of oil from the Middle East. For this reason, it has no interest in the instability that this increase in tension entails. It is expected to act as an element of moderator, seeking to use the crisis as an opportunity to increase its influence in the region. China is not interested per se in becoming the arbiter of security in the region, but it is interested in a stable, trade-friendly region.

The project "One Belt, One Road" is another reason why China will try to keep the crisis within acceptable limits. The Middle East is an element core topic in the project recreation of a sort of new Silk Road. An open war between the U.S. and Iran could adversely affect the country. project.

In summary, neither Russia nor China are interested in an escalation between the United States and Iran that could lead to an open war between the two nations that would jeopardize oil supplies, in the case of China, and the establishment as the main international power in the region, in the case of Russia. Both will try to temper the Iranian response, even if, at the level of statements, they speak out against the assassination of Soleimani.

* This text extends a previous comment made by the author to El Confidencial Digital.

With the agreement reached between the EU and Johnson and the polls favorable to Johnson in the December 12 election, a possible end to Brexit is in sight.

▲ Installation against Brexit, during a protest in Manchester in 2017 [Robert Mandel, Wikimedia Commons].

COMMENT / Pablo Gurbindo

Since June 23, 2016, the date on which the referendum on the United Kingdom remaining in the European Union was held, the British exit has overshadowed any other topic, such as the momentous past European elections, and has caused the British political spectrum to split between those who support remaining and those who support leaving.

 The "Brexit" has also taken two prime ministers by surprise: David Cameron, after the referendum, and his successor, Theresa May, who left the position after failing to get her agreement reached with the EU to be C by the British Parliament. And it may be her successor, Boris Johnson, the controversial former Mayor of London who campaigned for the vote to leave the Union, who manages to lead his country out of these more than three years of uncertainty.

Johnson's arrival at 10 Downing Street caused great concern in European capitals. From the outset, he stated that he would get his country out of the European Union, with or without agreement , before October 31. And, in September, he did not hesitate to temporarily fail the Parliament so that the civil service examination could not veto a possible exit without agreement. This closure was declared illegal by the Supreme Court and the civil service examination managed to ensure that the hypothetical exit without agreement could only be agreed by Parliament. Despite all this, negotiations in Brussels did not stop and, on October 17, it was announced that an agreement had been reached. agreement.

The agreement reached is, to a large extent, similar to the one reached with Theresa May. The main change has been the Irish "safeguard", the section most criticized at the time by the civil service examination and by the hardest wing of the "Tories". This measure implied that, if the European Union and the United Kingdom did not reach a agreement by 2020, Northern Ireland would remain in the single market and the customs union, while the rest of the United Kingdom would leave.

This system provoked a great rejection, especially in the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). On this Northern Irish Unionist party, May and still Johnson, depended and depend to be able to approve the agreement in the British Parliament. This concern about the new border between the two Irelands responds to the risk it poses to the Good Friday Agreements. Thanks to these agreements, peace was restored to Northern Ireland, which in the last century was at loggerheads between Catholic groups, who advocated unification with Ireland, and Protestant unionists, who advocated maintaining ties with the United Kingdom. The breakdown of these agreements could lead to the return of violence to the island.

agreement reached

This new agreement on Northern Ireland, proposed by Johnson, is based on three main elements, as indicated by the European Union's Brexit negotiator, Frenchman Michel Barnier:

(1) Northern Ireland will continue to comply with certain EU customs rules, especially those related to goods and products. But, in order to avoid any subject border with Ireland, checks will only be carried out on goods arriving at Northern Irish ports. These checks will be carried out by the British in compliance with EU rules.

(2) However, it will continue to be part of the British Customs Union, so any trade agreement reached by the United Kingdom after Brexit will include Northern Ireland. The problem is that these two elements conflict: Northern Ireland would be part of the British customs unions as well as the EU customs unions. In order to solve the problem that this "customs bicephaly" could produce, products from third countries - which will not then move to another country in the common market - will be taxed at UK rates. However, if the products are likely to enter the common market, the UK authorities will apply the EU tariffs.

(3) Finally, the agreement with Johnson will be a permanent agreement unless the Northern Ireland Assembly decides otherwise. The agreement enables this body to vote on whether to maintain or abandon the agreed status once four years have elapsed since the protocol comes into force. In the event that they ratify the agreement it will be extended by four or eight years, depending on whether it is a simple majority or whether it has majority support (with the support of the Protestant and Catholic communities). Otherwise, European laws will continue to apply for two more years, during which time the EU and the UK will have to reach a new agreement.

Extension and call for elections

After the advertisement of the agreement reached, the most complicated part remained: ratifying it in the British Parliament, and in record time, since the deadline was October 31. Johnson was forced by Parliament to ask Brussels for an extension until January 31, 2020, contrary to his wishes to keep his promise to leave on October 31. This request was not without controversy as Johnson sent two letters: one asking for the extension, which he did not sign, and another signed in which he expressed that he would see the extension as a "mistake" and that it would be "deeply corrosive" to his country.

On October 29, the European committee accepted the extension to January 31, 2020 to allow time for the ratification of the agreement Exit. The United Kingdom could leave the Union earlier, on December 1, 2019 (a date that has already passed) or on January 1, 2020 in the event of ratification of the support by both parties. This extension was unanimously approved by the 27, despite France's reluctance. France argued that this long extension should be granted only if there was certainty that there would be elections in the United Kingdom; otherwise, they advocated a shorter technical extension, to allow time to ratify the agreement Exit.

To carry out the Brexit, Johnson, faced with "parliamentary obstructionism" called for early elections to change the arithmetic of Parliament and to be able to approve the agreement reached with the EU. This call was rejected twice by Jeremy Corbyn's Labour Party, the main party of the civil service examination. But after learning that the European committee accepted the extension, it supported the call.

Conclusion

With elections scheduled for next December 12, the wind seems to be blowing in Johnson's favor. The polls favor him with a percentage of 40% of the vote. Far behind, Labour, with 29%, would lose support to Jo Swinson's Liberal Democrat Party, which would rise to 15% (from 7.4% in the previous election). This rise of the "Lib Dems" would be mainly due to their strong support for remaining in the EU, unlike Corbyn, who has maintained a neutral position despite the fact that 70% of Labour voters support remaining. On the other hand, the Conservative majority would allow the "Tories" to stop depending on the DUP to achieve sufficient parliamentary majorities.

As if that were not enough, the leader of the Brexit Party, Nigel Farage, has announced that in order to facilitate a Conservative majority, his party will not stand in the constituencies where the Conservative Party won in the previous elections. In order to ensure the exit of the United Kingdom from the Union and to avoid a new referendum.

If these polls come true Johnson would get his long-awaited majority to be able to approve the exit.

After more than three years, a plausible end to Brexit is in sight.