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Ankara is implementing a strategic plan for the control of the three maritime zones surrounding the country

Parade of members of the Turkish Naval Force [Nérostrateur].

▲ Parade of members of the Turkish Naval Force [Nérostrateur].

ANALYSIS / Lucas Martín*.

Several actions carried out by Turkey in recent times indicate the implementation of the so-called "Blue Homeland" doctrine.

Among the various facts to be taken into account we can take as an initial element the agreement signed with one of the two contenders vying for power in Libya, the GNA to be more precise.

Through it, the GNA de facto handed over control of Libyan territorial waters to Turkey while establishing a maritime corridor for Ankara in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.

The importance of having de facto control of these waters is not only the enormous volume of maritime traffic that passes through them, but also the fact that they contain strategic natural gas reserves and are also a transit area for several gas pipelines that supply Europe.

If we add this treaty to Turkey's movements in the Mediterranean, the Aegean, as well as its involvement in the conflicts in Syria and Libya, we see that they are but different but complementary parts of an ambitious plan meticulously drawn up by Ankara for some years now to gain maritime control of the Eastern Mediterranean and adjacent areas. The ultimate aim of this plan would be to grant Turkey economic and energy independence to ensure the country's growth in all areas.

"Mavi Vatam" - Blue Homeland

The so-called "Gerasimov Doctrine", which theorizes on the evolution of war conflicts and provides guidelines for action in the current framework , is well known. But much less known is that a country like Turkey developed its own doctrine almost two decades ago, trying to draw the necessary geostrategic movements to reach some basic objectives for the development of the Turkish nation and to achieve its leading role in the international concert.

The father of the plan is Admiral Cem Gurdeniz, and it was first exposed in 2006 under the name "Blue Homeland Doctrine".

The admiral bases his theory on three pillars, which would take a long time to discuss in detail. However, and for the case at hand, it is interesting to dwell at least briefly on the second pillar. Under this, Gurdeniz defines what he considers to be the areas of maritime jurisdiction that belong to Turkey and which he values as vital for its survival and development. These encompass areas of the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. By defining these he establishes the territorial waters, the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

agreement The admiral himself recognizes that the problem is far from being in the Black Sea, where an agreement was reached with the extinct Soviet Union to establish the limits of the continental shelf in 1978 and later, in 1987, the EEZ. Moreover, after the demise of the USSR, agreements were reached with Georgia, Bulgaria and Ukraine.

The issue is centered on the Mediterranean and the Aegean. Precisely the current epicenter of events.

The current established limits, EEZ agreements, etc., have been imposed on Turkey by the European Union, according to our protagonist, who considers them particularly burdensome as far as the Greek area and Cyprus are concerned. Turkey focuses on the EU the responsibility to prevent in a certain way the Turkish development , which is interesting when Turkey itself has tried to become part of the Union.

The axis on which Turkish actions have been pivoting in recent times is defiance. And this is again to be found in the admiral's own words, who states that the "Blue Homeland" "notoriously challenges and defies the current map".

But despite what it may seem, this is not the final goal of the "Mavi Vatam" doctrine. This challenge is the way to achieve its true end, and this is none other than to achieve control and consolidation of the three maritime areas surrounding the country in order to exert its influence both regionally and internationally, gaining the energy resources necessary to sustain Turkey's economic and demographic growth without having to depend on third countries.

But as is rule in these matters, history always plays a key role, and this time is no different.

The Turks continue to view as an affront the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923, which circumscribes the country to its current borders and limits. This invalidated the much more beneficial Treaty of Sèvres, signed by the Ottoman Empire after the First World War.

In Lausanne, the fragmentation of the empire was dictated de facto, defining not only the borders of Turkey, but also those of Greece and Bulgaria, concluding Turkish sovereignty over the Dodecanese islands, Cyprus, Egypt, Sudan, Syria and Iraq. Kurdistan ceased to be a unit, being divided among several countries, and Armenia was divided between Turkey and the USSR. The conditions limited the Turks' ability to act, placing the country under the umbrella of the Western powers, status which has been maintained for almost 100 years since signature.

In order to understand the current status it is necessary to take into account a series of factors and circumstances that constitute the basis for it.

During the Cold War period and with the existence of the communist bloc and its military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, the Western protective umbrella over Turkey became more of a necessity forced by circumstances than an imposition. The geostrategic status of the Ottoman country gave it a vital importance for both blocs, and in the event that hostilities broke out it would be one of the first territories to suffer the consequences. As a living example of this geostrategic core topic , it is worth recalling the role played by the American instructions equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles located on Turkish soil in the negotiations to de-escalate what later became known as the "Cuban missile crisis".

But from the distant 1960s to the present, the world has changed completely. The balances of power have shifted, and events since the beginning of the 21st century, and especially during the last decade, have led today's leaders to believe that their time has come.

At the time, the fall of the communist bloc and the period of Russia's weakness began to lay the groundwork instructions for an idea deeply rooted in today's Turkey whose main thrust is that the protective umbrella of the West is no longer so necessary (it cannot be forgotten that this umbrella was also seen in some ways as a corset).

The consolidation of this idea has coincided with a period of great economic and demographic growth in the Ottoman country, with forecasts of reaching 90 million inhabitants by 2030. Both parameters have great economic implications, as they imply an increase B in the country's energy needs. If these needs are not met, it will not be possible to sustain this population growth or to match it with an adequate industrial development .

The basis of the essential industrial development is energy independence. It is one of the factors core topic that can allow the different projects to go ahead. At present, energy needs are covered by supplies from third countries. The main exporters of energy resources to Turkey are Russia, Iran, Iraq and Libya. This external dependence is one of the reasons for the spectacular development of Turkey's military capabilities in recent years and its direct involvement in various unstable scenarios: keeping the energy supply uninterrupted. And therein lies one of the main reasons for the interventions in northern Syria, northern Iraq, or Libya.

However, this is not the only reason for such interventions; there are other political motivations, commitments that force Turkey to take sides in one way or another. The Kurdish problem, worthy in itself of a monographic paper, is one of them.

But despite possible political motivations, in the "Blue Homeland Doctrine" the main focus is the need to achieve energy independence. For this it is necessary to take control of the necessary energy resources and achieve freedom of action in this field.

Two are the spheres he defines to achieve this goal. The first would consist of the establishment of a security area and immediate control of the seas surrounding the country: the Mediterranean, the Aegean and the Black Sea. The second, of a strategic nature, extends to the Red Sea, the Caspian Sea and the Arabian Sea, including the Persian Gulf.

 

 

Turkish dominance of the maritime space indicated includes control over the gas and oil reserves in those waters. This position of maritime dominance is reinforced through the establishment of alliances with the countries in the area, providing them with support, establishing instructions military on their territory and providing military material and training to their armies, thus ensuring their support. This is a fact, and Turkey already has instructions in Somalia, Sudan, Libya and Qatar, countries to which it supplies weapons systems of its own manufacture and with which it has military agreements of various kinds.

An aside should be made at this point. These moves are not welcomed by all the countries in the region, some of which see their current position and their own aspirations for growth in power and influence in the region threatened. The existence of a dominant regional power does not usually leave much room for maneuver. And it is also important to quote at this point other words of the father of the "Blue Homeland" doctrine: "Turkey does not need any ally to protect the Homeland. The Homeland is the Homeland. Our continental shelf is our homeland and we have to protect it".

However, he claims that in the future relations between Italy, Tunisia, Libya and Turkey will be the main axis of the Mediterranean. He deliberately leaves out countries such as France, Greece and Spain.

area Traditionally, the Turkish Naval Force's usual area of operations was the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Aegean. However, it has recently extended its area of operation to the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, and even operates in close partnership with Pakistan.

This strategic vision, centered on the control of the sea, apart from the reasons previously mentioned regarding the control of energy resources, can be explained by Turkey's conviction that its special orography, very abrupt, already offers a natural and dissuasive defense against any aggression by land.

Moreover, the "Blue Homeland" doctrine is based on the assumption that Turkey must be an eminently maritime power. It is, therefore, a realistic doctrine of self-defense of the maritime areas that rightfully belong to Turkey, in order to protect them with an eye to future generations.

Therefore, the maritime borders, which extend over three different seas, are so far perceived as the weak point of the nation. And that is precisely what is in the process of transformation.

This point of view has its historical roots in the former Ottoman Empire, to which Admiral Cem Gürdeniz refers reference letter on numerous occasions in his writings. It was the one that led Erdogan, shortly after coming to power, to initiate a comprehensive program of development and modernization of his Naval Force known as "Milgem". In this project , heavy investments have been made all over subject, and no effort has been spared, because in order to achieve the development of armed forces, especially in its maritime aspect, that will sustain the goal of establishing itself as a regional and international power, it is core topic an independent technological development of the Turkish industry.

In recent years, the Turkish defense industry has undergone a spectacular evolution, demonstrating the effectiveness of its developments in the Libyan, Syrian and, more currently, in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Great emphasis has been placed on the development of warships, unmanned aerial systems (UAVs) and advanced weapons systems of high quality. Especially the chapter on UAVs is particularly significant, and should be the subject of an in-depth study, including from the national point of view in Spain.

Again, here we find two clearly defined intentions. On the one hand, to reach a leading technological level in its armed forces to support the achievement of the objectives previously mentioned, and on the other hand, to position itself as reference letter in the field of arms exports, to achieve income and to be able to influence the countries of its interest and their policies in the same way as the United States, China and Russia do.

More specifically, the framework "Milgem" program has built four anti-submarine corvettes, one intelligence gathering vessel, four surface warfare frigates and four anti-aircraft frigates. The program also includes four state-of-the-art corvettes for the Pakistan Navy as a way of exporting its advances, enhancing the already close partnership relationship between the two countries and, of course, obtaining economic benefits for the arms industry.

Similarly, 33 new landing barges capable of transporting both troops and armored vehicles have been delivered to the Turkish Naval Force. The development and improvement of Turkey's amphibious assault capabilities are a factor to be taken into account in a hypothetical increase in tension with Greece, especially with regard to claims over the islands located to the east of the country and its waters.

The development of the naval warfare capabilities is completed with the manufacture of six new submarines of invoice German built under licence of HDW in Turkey itself, namely of the model U-214. These new submersibles are equipped with an AIP system that allows them to remain for long periods without surfacing, and join the ten that the Ottoman country operated so far.

This is one of the most significant data from the point of view of its destabilizing capacity. Until now it has been Greece that has maintained a certain technological superiority in this field. But the entrance in service of the new Turkish units significantly changes the direction of the balance. The submarines, in addition to serving as perfect intelligence gathering platforms, especially in the SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) and COMINT (Communications Intelligence) disciplines, are excellent deterrent weapons, capable of denying an entire fleet access to an extensive area.

The most significant element of the pretentious Turkish program is an amphibious assault ship (LHD) called "Anadolu". This ship, with very similar characteristics to the "Juan Carlos I" operated by the Spanish Navy, is a qualitative leap in terms of the capabilities it provides, as it can not only transport landing barges, but also operate different types of helicopters, UAVs and, if necessary, vertical take-off combat aircraft from its deck.

Currently, the only such aircraft compatible with the ship is the American F-35 B, which is the vertical take-off and landing (VSTOL) variant. Turkey was among the nations that had decided to acquire this fighter aircraft, although in its A version, which is the standard version for the Air Force, the submission of whose first units had already been scheduled.

But the Ankara government's decision to acquire state-of-the-art Russian anti-aircraft equipment, such as the S-400 system, has led the United States to veto its continuation in the F-35 B acquisition program. In fact, the first aircraft destined for the Ottoman country have been sold to the USAF. In any case, Turkey's intention was not to acquire the VSTOL version, which leaves in the air its real intention as to which aircraft will equip the ship.

The project will be completed with the construction of a second amphibious assault ship, the "Trakya". The possession of two units of this subject provides the Turkish naval force with capabilities far superior to those of its neighbors in the region, granting it the ability to project its amphibious force in strategic operations and in two scenarios simultaneously.

The real value of these capabilities is not the operative itself, but the deterrent capability it represents.

Turkey's involvement in the conflicts in Syria and Libya has provided the Turkish Armed Forces, and within these its naval units, with an enormous and valuable combat experience that has been of great use for update and improving its doctrine and operational capabilities. This, together with the high quality of training its units, the quality of their equipment and the technological and armament development described, are the three pillars necessary for the implementation of the "Blue Homeland" doctrine. The great unknown is how the other regional powers, directly affected by the progress of this strategic plan, will react.

By way of conclusion, it can be said that the interests are multiple and often crossed, and affect not only the countries bordering this area of the Mediterranean, but also powers such as Russia and France and international organizations such as NATO.

Incidents have already occurred between nations that were supposed to be allies, even leading France to withdraw from the NATO operation in the Mediterranean due to the problem between a French and a Turkish frigate, and resulting in an attack on Turkish positions by "Rafale" aircraft from instructions in the United Arab Emirates, but whose nationality remains unclear.

status There is no doubt that the Turkish attitude, and the implementation of its plan, puts the Atlantic Alliance in a weak position, as one of the reasons behind the plan is Turkey's perception that it no longer needs the protection of the Western umbrella for the defense of its interests.

On the other hand, Turkey is playing with the trump card of holding the key to the door of entrance to the torrent of immigrants from Syria, Libya, Somalia and Eritrea to the European Union. And it will use it as a means of pressure against any reaction or positioning of Europe against its interests.

The Eastern Mediterranean has regained the leading role in world geopolitics that it had in the 16th century, only this time we have new powers such as Russia that also claim their space and their need for a permanent and strong presence in that area. We cannot ignore the relationship that this Russian need has with the Crimean conflict and the strategic need to be able to control in a certain way both sides of the Bosporus and to ensure the exit of the Black Sea fleet to the Mediterranean.

All these economic, energy and political interests are creating a very complicated status where the "internal" conflicts in Syria and Libya also come together, creating an over-presence of military units, combatants, private military companies, weapons systems, aircraft, UAVs, etc. that at any moment, and due to any unexpected error, can lead to an incident that, however slight, can have unforeseeable and irreparable consequences.

* The author is a lieutenant colonel of Infantry and Geopolitical Analyst.

 

REFERENCES

Kasapoglu, 'The Blue Homeland': Turkey's largest naval drill. Anadolu Agency 27 February.

SETA Security Sadar Turkey's geopolitical landscape in 2020

Kara Harp Okulu Bilim Dergisi, "An assesment of eastern mediterranean maritime boundary delimitation agreement between Turkey and Libya" Science Journal of Turkish Military Academy Haziran /June 2020.

Eyal Pinko, "Turkey's Maritime Strategy Ambitions: The Blue Homeland Doctrine (Mavi Vatan)" Research Institute for European and American Studies(www.rieas.gr) April 2020.

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