Asia | World Order, Diplomacy and Governance | Essays

First high-level US-China meeting of the Biden era, to be held in Alaska on 18 March 2021 [State Department].


essay / Ramón Barba

President Joe Biden is cautiously building his Indo-Pacific policy, seeking to build an alliance with India on which to build an order to counter the rise of China. Following his entrance in the White House, Biden has kept the focus on this region, albeit with a different approach than the Trump Administration. While it is true that the main goal is still about containing China and defending free trade, Washington is opting for a multilateral approach that gives greater prominence to QUAD[1] and takes special care over relations with India. As a standard-bearer for the free world and democracy, the Biden Administration seeks to renew US leadership in the world and particularly in this critical region. However, although the relationship with India is at a good moment, especially given the signature of agreement scholarship[2] reached at the end of the Trump Administration, the interaction between the two countries is far from consolidating an alliance.

The new US presidency is faced with a very complicated puzzle to solve in the Indo-Pacific, with China and India as the main players. Generally speaking, of the three powers, only Beijing has successfully managed the post-pandemic status [3], while Delhi and Washington continue to face both a health and economic crisis. All of this may affect the India-US relationship, especially on trade[4], but although Biden has yet to demonstrate his strategy in the region, the relationship between the two powers looks set to go from strength to strength[5]. However, although the US wants to pursue a policy of multilateral alliances and deepen its relationship with India, the Biden administration will have to take into account a number of difficulties before it can talk about an alliance as such.

Biden began to move in this direction from the outset. First up was February's meeting of QUAD[6], which some see as a mini-NATO[7] for Asia, where issues of vaccine distribution in Asia (aiming to distribute one trillion doses by 2022), freedom of navigation in the region's seas, North Korea's denuclearisation and democracy in Myanmar were discussed. In addition, the UK seems to be taking a greater interest in the region and in this dialogue group . On the other hand, in mid-March there was a meeting in Alaska[8] between Chinese and US diplomats (led respectively by Yang Jiechi, director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, and Antony Blinken, Secretary of State), in which both countries harshly reproached each other's policies. Washington remains firm in its interests, although open to a certain partnership with Beijing, while China insists on rejecting any interference in what it considers to be its internal affairs. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Biden seems to be willing to organise a summit of democracies[9] in his first year in office.

Following contacts also in Alaska between the Chinese and US defence chiefs, Pentagon chief Austin Lloyd[10] visited India to stress the importance of Indo-US cooperation. In addition, early April saw France's participation in the La Pérouse[11] naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal, raising the possibility of a QUAD-plus involving not only the four original powers but also other countries.

The Indo-Pacific, remember, is the present and the future of the International Office due to its economic importance (its main actors, India, China and the USA, represent 45% of the world's GDP), demographic importance (it is home to 65% of the world's population) and, as we will see throughout this article, geopolitical importance[12].

US-China-India relations

The Biden administration seems to be continuing along the same lines as the Trump administration, as the objectives have not changed. What has changed is the approach to the subject matter, which in this case is none other than the containment of China and freedom of navigation in the region, albeit on the basis of a strong commitment to multilateralism. As George Washington's new successor said at his inauguration[13], the United States wants to resume its leadership, but in a different way from the previous Administration; that is, through a strong policy of alliances, moral leadership and a strong defence of values such as dignity, human rights and the rule of law.

The new presidency sees China as a rival to be reckoned with[14], as does the Trump Administration, but it does not see this as a zero-sum game, since, although it openly declares itself to be against Xi's actions, it opens the door to dialogue[15] on issues such as climate change or healthcare. Generally speaking, in line with what has been seen in New tensions in the Asia-Pacific[16], the United States is committed to a multilateralism that seeks to reduce tension. It should be remembered that the United States advocates the defence of free navigation and the rule of law, as well as democracy in a region in which its influence is being eroded by the growing weight of China.

A good understanding of the state of US-China-India relations goes back to 2005[17], when everything seemed to be going well. As far as the Sino-Indian relationship was concerned, the two nations had resolved their disputes over the 1998 nuclear tests, their presence in regional fora was growing, and it seemed that the issue of cross-border disputes was beginning to be settled. For its part, the United States enjoyed good trade relations with both countries. However, shifting patterns in the global Economics , driven by the rise of China, the 2008 financial crisis in the US, and India's inability to maintain its growth rate upset this balance. Donald Trump's tightening stance contributed to this. However, some argue that the breakdown of the post-Cold War order in the Asia-Pacific began with the Obama administration's 'pivot to Asia'[18]. To this must be added the minor frictions China has had with both nations.

Briefly, it is worth mentioning that there are border problems between India and China[19] that have been flaring up again since 2013. India, in turn, is opposed to Chinese hegemony; it does not want to be subjugated by Beijing and is clearly committed to multilateralism. Finally, there are problems regarding maritime dominance because the Strait of Malacca is at capacity. Moreover, Delhi claims the Adaman and Nicobar Islands, on the Malacca access route, as its own. Moreover, as India is now well below China's military and economic power[20] - the balance that existed between the two powers in 1980 is broken - it is trying to hinder Beijing in order to contain it.

The United States has ideological subject friction with China, due to the authoritarian nature of Xi Jinping's regime[21], and commercial friction, in a dispute[22] that Beijing is trying to take advantage of to reduce US influence in the region. In the middle of this conflict is India, which supports the United States because, although it does not seem to want to be completely against China[23], it rejects a Chinese regional hegemony[24].

According to the CEBR's latest report [25], China will overtake the United States as a global power in 2028, earlier than previous projections, in part because of its handling of the coronavirus emergency: it was the only major country to avoid a crisis after the first wave. On the other hand, the US has lost the battle against the pandemic; economic growth between 2022-2024 is expected to be 1.9% of GDP and to slow to 1.6% in the following years[26], while China, according to report , is expected to grow at 5.7% between 2021-2025[27].

For China the pandemic has been a way of signalling its place in the world[28], a way of warning the United States that it is ready to take over as leader of the international community. This has been compounded by China's belligerent attitude in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as its hegemonic growth in the region and trade projects with Africa and Europe. All of this has led to imbalances in the region that implicate Washington's QUAD moves. Recall that, despite its declining role as a power, the US is interested in freedom of navigation for both commercial and military reasons[29].

China's economic rise has thus led to a worsening of the relationship between Washington and Beijing[30]. Moreover, while Biden is committed to cooperation on the pandemic and climate change, there is talk in some quarters of American politics of inevitable competition between the two countries[31].

The Degree of the US-India alliance

In line with the above, we can see that we are in a delicate situation after the change in the White House. January and February have been months of small moves by the US and India, which have not left China indifferent. Although the Sino-US relationship has benefited both sides since its inception (1979)[32], with trade between the two countries growing by 252% since then, the reality is that trust levels are now at rock bottom, with more than 100 dialogue mechanisms suspended between them. Therefore, although conflict is not foreseeable, tension is predicted to rise as, far from being able to cooperate in broad areas, only light and limited cooperation seems feasible at the moment. At the same time, it should be remembered that China is very much affected by the Malacca Dilemma[33], which is why it is seeking other access to the Indian Ocean, giving rise to territorial disputes with India, with whom it already has the territorial problem of Ladakh[34]. In the midst of this Thucydides Trap[35], in which China seems to threaten to overtake the United States, Washington has been moving closer to New Delhi.

Consequently, both countries have been developing a strategic partnership [36], based essentially on security and defence, but which the United States seeks to extend to other areas. It is true that Delhi's problems are in the Indian Ocean and Washington's in the Pacific; however, both have China[37] as a common denominator. Their relationship, moreover, is strongly marked by the aforementioned "tripartite crisis"[38 ] (health, economic and geopolitical).

Despite the intense cooperation between Washington and New Delhi, there are two different views on thispartnership. While the US claims that India is a very important ally, sharing the same political system and an intense trade relationship[39], India prefers a less strict alliance. Traditionally, Delhi has conveyed a policy of non-alignment[40] in international affairs. Indeed, while India does not want Chinese supremacy in the Indo-Pacific, neither does it want to align itself directly against Beijing, with whom it shares more than 3,000 km of border. Nonetheless, Delhi sees a great need for cooperation with Washington on subject security and defence. Indeed, some argue that India needs the US more than ever.

Although Washington began to review the US Global Posture Strategy last February, everything suggests that the Biden Administration will continue Trump's line on partnership with India as a way of containing China. However, while Washington speaks of India as its ally, Delhi is somewhat reticent, speaking of an alignment[41] rather than an alliance. Although the reality we live in is far from that of the Cold War[42], this new containment[43] in which Delhi is sought as a base, support and banner, is materialised in the following:

(i) Intensive cooperation on subject Security and Defence

There are different forums and agreements here. First, the aforementioned QUAD[44]. This new multilateral cooperation alliance that began to take shape in 2006[45] agreed at its March meeting on the development of its vaccine diplomacy, with India at the centre, in order to counteract Beijing's successful international campaign in this field. In fact, there was a commitment to spend 600 million to deliver 1 billion vaccines[46] by 2022. The idea is that Japan and the US will finance the operation[47], while Australia will provide the logistics. India, however, is committed to greater multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific, giving entrance to countries such as the UK and France[48], which already participated in the last Raisina Dialogues together with QUAD. Other issues such as the denuclearisation of Korea, the restoration of democracy in Myanmar and climate change were also discussed at meeting [49].

India seeks to contain China, but without provoking a direct confrontation with China[50]. In fact, Beijing has intimated that if things go further, it is not only India that knows how to play Realpolitik. Let us recall that New Delhi will chair this year's meeting with the BRICS. Moreover, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation will host joint military exercises between China and Pakistan, a country with a complex relationship with India.

On the other hand, during his March trip to India, the Pentagon chief[51] discussed with his counterpart Rajnath Singh increased military cooperation, as well as issues related to logistics, exchange information, possible opportunities for mutual attendance and the defence of free navigation. Lloyd said he did not object to Australia and Korea participating as permanent members in the Malabar exercises. Since 2008, military subject trade between Delhi and Washington has totalled $21 billion[52]. In addition, $3,000 has recently been spent on drones and other aerial equipment for reconnaissance and surveillance missions.

A week later this meeting, two Indian and one US ship conducted a maritime exercise of subject PASSEX[53] as a way of consolidating the synergies and interoperability achieved in last November's Malabar exercise.

accredited specialization subject In this context, a special mention should be made of the 2+2 dialogue platform and the aforementioned scholarship (agreement ) ( exchange and Basic and Cooperation for Geospatial Cooperation). The first is a subject of meeting in which the foreign and defence ministers of both countries meet every two years to discuss issues of interest to them. The most recent meeting took place in October 2020[54]. Not only was the scholarship agreed, but the US reaffirmed its support for India on its territorial issues with China. Other memoranda of understanding were also signed on nuclear energy and climate issues.

The scholarship, signed in October 2020 during the final months of the Trump administration, makes it easier for India to better track enemies, terrorists and other subject threats from land or sea. This agreement is intended to consolidate the friendship between the two countries, as well as help India outpace China technologically. This agreement concludes the "troika of foundational pacts" for deep security and defence cooperation between the two countries[55].

Prior to this agreement, the LEMOA (Memorandum of agreement for exchange Logistics) was signed in 2016, and in 2018 the COMCASA (agreement Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement) was signed. The former allows both countries access to each other's instructions for supply and replenishment; the latter allows India to receive systems, information and encrypted communication to communicate with the United States. Both agreements affect land, sea and air forces[56].

(ii) United for Democracy

Washington emphasises that the two powers are very similar, since they share the same political system, and it is emphasised with a certain grandiloquence that they are the oldest and the largest democracy (per issue inhabitants)[57]. Because this presupposes a shared set of values, Washington likes to speak of "likeminded partners"[58].

Tanvi Mandan of the Brookings Institution think tank Tanvi Mandan defends this idea of ideological bonding. The same system of government means that the two countries see each other as natural allies, who think alike and also believe in the value of the rule of law. In fact, in all matters relating to the spread of democracy around the globe, there is strong cooperation between the two nations: for example, supporting democracy in Afghanistan or the Maldives, launching the US-India Global Democracy Initiative, and providing legal and technical assistance on democratic issues to other countries at attendance . Finally, it is worth noting that democracy and its associated values have facilitated the exchange and flow of people from one country to another. As for the economic relationship between the two countries, it has become more viable, given that they are both open economies, share a common language and their legal system has Anglo-Saxon roots.

iii) Growing economic cooperation

partner The United States is India's main trading partner, with which it has a significant surplus[59]. Trade between the two has grown by 10% annually over the last decade, and in 2019 was $115 billion[60]. Around 2,000 US companies are based in India, and some 200 Indian companies are based in the US[61]. There is a Mini-Trade Deal between the two, believed to be signed soon, which aims to deepen this economic relationship. In the context of the pandemic, everything related to the health sector plays an important role[62]. 62] In fact, despite the fact that both countries have recently adopted a protectionist attitude, the idea is to achieve $500 billion in trade.

Divergences, challenges and opportunities for India and the US in the region

Briefly, between the leaders of the two countries there are minor frictions, opportunities and challenges to be nuanced in order to make this relationship a strong alliance. Among the sticking points is India's purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia, which is against CAATSA(Countering America's Adversaries trhough Sanctions Act) [64], for which India may receive a sanction, although in the meeting between Sigh and Lloyd, Lloyd seemed to overlook topic [65]. However, it remains to be seen what happens once the missiles arrive in Delhi. There are also minor divergences on freedom of expression, security and civil rights, and how to engage with non-democratic countries[66]. Among the challenges that both countries must take into account is the possible loss of support in some quarters of US policy for the relationship with India. This is due to India's actions in Kashmir in August 2019, the protection of religious freedom and attention to dissent. On the other hand, there has been no shortage of weakening of democratic norms, immigration restrictions and violence against Indians[67].

Lastly, let us remember that both are facing a profound health and therefore economic crisis, the resolution of which will be decisive in relation to competition with Beijing[68]. The crisis has affected the bilateral relationship since, although trade in services has remained stable (around 50 billion), trade in goods declined from 92 to 78 billion between 2019 and 2020, increasing India's trade deficit[69].

Finally, it is worth mentioning the opportunities. First, both countries can develop democratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific as well as in a rules-based international order[70]. In security and defence, there are also opportunities such as the UK and France's entrance as allies in the region, for example by seeking both countries' entry into the Malabar exercise or France's chairmanship of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposiumin 2022[71]. Although the medium-term trend deadline is for cooperation between the US and India, skill with Russia will be a growing threat[72], so cooperation between the US, India and Europe is very important.

It also opens up the possibility of cooperation in MDA (Maritime Warning Environment) and ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) mechanisms, as the Indian Ocean is of general importance to several countries due to the value of its energy transport routes. The possibility of cooperation through the use of the US P-8 "Poseidon" aircraft is opened up. Despite disputes over the Chagos archipelago, India and the US should take advantage of the agreements they have over islands such as the Andaman and Diego Garcia to carry out these activities[73]. Therefore, India should use the regional bodies and groups of work to cooperate with European countries and the US[74].

Europe seems to be gaining increasing importance because of the possibility of entering the Indo-Pacific game through QUAD Plus. European countries are very much in favour of multilateralism, defending freedom of navigation and the role of rules in regulating it. While it is true that the EU has recently signed a trade agreement with China - the IAC - increasing the European presence in the region takes on greater importance, as Xi's authoritarianism and his actions in Tibet, Xinjiang, or central China are not to the liking of European countries[75].

Lastly, it is worth remembering that there are some voices that speak of a decline or weakening of globalisation[76], especially after the coronavirus epidemic[77], so reviving multilateral exchanges through joint action becomes a challenge and an opportunity for both countries. In fact, it is believed that protectionist tendencies, at least in the Sino-Indian relationship, will continue in the short term deadline , despite intense economic cooperation[78].


The geopolitical landscape in the Indo-Pacific is complex to say the least. Chinese expansionism clashes with the interests of the other major regional power, India, which, while avoiding confrontation with Beijing, takes a dim view of its neighbour's actions. In a bid for multilateralism, and with its sights set on its regional waters, threatened by the Malacca Dilemma, India seems to be cooperating with the United States, but sticking to regional forums and groups to make its position clear, while seeming to open the door to European countries, whose interest in the region is growing, despite the recent trade agreement signed with China.

On the other hand, the United States is also threatened by Chinese expansionism and sees the moment of its rival's economic overtaking approaching, which the coronavirus crisis may even have brought forward to 2028. In order to avoid this status, the Biden Administration has opted for multilateralism at the regional level and is deepening its relationship with India, beyond the military aspect. Washington seems to have understood that US hegemony in the Indo-Pacific is far from being real, at least in the medium term deadline, so that only a cooperative and integrating attitude can be adopted. On the other hand, in the midst of this supposed retreat from globalisation, we see how Washington, together with India, and probably halfway through deadline with Europe, are defending the Western values that govern the international sphere, i.e. the defence of human rights, the rule of law and the value of democracy.

There are two factors at play here. On the one hand, India does not want to see an order imposed by any subject, either American or Chinese, hence its reluctance to confront Beijing directly and its preference to expand the QUAD. On the other hand, the United States seems to perceive that it is at a delicate moment, as its competition with China goes beyond the mere substitution of one power for another. Washington is still a traditional power that, for its presence in the Indo-Pacific, has relied primarily on military power, while China has based the extension of its influence on the establishment of strong trade relations that go beyond the belligerent logic of the Cold War. Hence, the United States is seeking to form a front with India and its European allies that goes beyond military cooperation.



[1] The QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) is a dialogue group formed by the United States, India, Japan and Australia. Its members share a common vision of Indo-Pacific security that runs counter to China's; they advocate multilateralism and freedom of navigation in the region.

[2] scholarship (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement). Treaty signed by India and the United States in October 2019 to improve security in the Indo-Pacific region. Its goal is the exchange of tracking, tracing and intelligence systems.

[3]Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective". Chinawatch. Connecting Thinkers... http://www.,(accessed 5 February 2021),

[4] Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating and Rebalancing Ties," in Tanvi Madan, "India And The Biden Administration: Consolidating And Rebalancing Ties",. German Marshal Found of the United States.,(accessed 11 February 2021).

[5]DarshanaBaruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "diary 2021: A Blueprint For U.S.-Europe-India Cooperation", US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security. GMF India Trilateral Forum. Pg:1., (accessed 16 February 2021).

[6] "'QUAD' Leaders Pledge New Cooperation on China, COVID-19, Climate". (accessed March 2021).

[7] Mereyem Hafidi, "Biden Renews 'QUAD' Alliance Despite Pressure From Beijing". Atalayar. February 2021).

[8] "`Grandstanding`: US, China trade rebukes in testy talks". Aljazeera. (accessed March 2021).

[9] Joseph R. Biden, "Why America Must Lead Again". Foreign Affairs. (accessed February, 2021).

[10] Maria Siow. "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind". South China Morning Post. 19 March 2021).

[11] Seeram Chaulia, "France and sailing toward the 'QUAD-plus'". The New Indian Express. https://www. (accessed April 4, 2021).

[12] Juan Luis López Aranguren. "Indo-Pacific: The new order without China at the centre. The Indo-Pacific as a new global geopolitical axis. Global Affairs Journal. P.:2. April 2021).

[13] Biden, "Remarks By President Biden On America's Place In The World | The White House...".

[14] Ibid.

[15] Derek Grossman, 'Biden's China Reset Is Already On The Ropes'. Nikkei Asia. 14 March 2021).

[16] Ramón Barba Castro, 'New tensions in the Asia-Pacific in a scenario of electoral change'. Global Affairs and Strategic Studies., April 2021).

[17] Sankaran Kalyanaraman, "Changing Pattern Of The China-India-US Triangle". Manohar Parrikar Institute For Defence Studies And Analyses. (accessed March 2021).

[18] Pang Zhongying, 'Indo-Pacific Era Needs US-China Cooperation, Not Great Power Conflict'. South China Morning Post. (accessed 19 March 2021).

[19] Sankaran Kalayanamaran, "Changing Pattern of the China-India-US Triangle".

[20] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective".

[21] Joseph R. Biden, "Remarks By President Biden On America's Place In The World

[22]Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective".

[23] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind".

[24]Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating And Rebalancing Ties".

[25] CEBR (Centre for Economics and Business Research) is an organisation dedicated to the economic analysis and forecasting of companies and organisations. link Every year, this organisation produces an annual report graduate World Economic League Table¸which analyses the position of each country in the world in terms of the state of its Economics. The latest edition(World Economic League Table 2021), published on 26 December 2020, presents a prediction of the state of the world's Economics in 2035, in order to know who will be the world's leading economic powers. (CEBR, "World Economic League Table 2021". Centre for Economics and Business Research (12th edition), (accessed March 2021).

[26] Ibid., 231.

[27] Ibid., 71.

[28] Vijay Gokhale, "China Doesn't Want a New World Order. It Wants This One". The New York Times. April 2021).

[29] Mereyem Hafidi, "Biden renews 'QUAD' alliance despite pressure from Beijing.

[30] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective".

[31] Ibid.

[32] Wang Huiyao, "More cooperation, less competition". Chinawatch. Connecting Thinkers. March 2021).

[33] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective".

[34] DarshanaBaruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security". Page 5.

[35] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective".

[36] Ibid.

[37] DarshanaBaruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security". Page 5.

[38] Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating And Rebalancing Ties".

[39] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship". Brookings. (accessed March 2021)

[40] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind".

[41] Bilal Kuchay, "India, US sign key military deal, symbolizing closer ties". Aljazeera. March 2021)

[42] Wang Huiyao, "More cooperation, less competition".

[43] Alex Lo, "India-the democratic economic giant that disappoints". South China Morning Post. 21 March 2021).

[44] Simone McCarthy, "QUAD summit: US, India, Australia and Japan counter China's 'vaccine diplomacy' with pledge to distribute a billion doses across Indo-Pacific". South China Morning Post. 13 March 2021).

[45] MereyemHafidi, "Biden renews 'QUAD' alliance despite pressure from Beijing.

[46] Simone McCarthy, "QUAD summit: US, India, Australia and Japan counter China's 'vaccine diplomacy' with pledge to distribute a billion doses across Indo-Pacific".

[47] Aljazeera, "'QUAD' leaders pledge new cooperation on China, COVID-19, climate".

[48]DarshanaBaruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security". Page 2.

[49]Simone McCarthy, "QUAD summit: US, India, Australia and Japan counter China's 'vaccine diplomacy' with pledge to distribute a billion doses across Indo-Pacific".

[50] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind".

[51] "US defense secretary Lloyd Austin says US considers India to be a great partner". Hindustan Times. 21 March 2021).

[52] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind".

[53] The term PASSEX is an abbreviation of the English military jargon, which stands for Passing Exercise. It consists of taking advantage of the fact that a Marine unit is passing through a given area to deepen military cooperation with the army of the area through which it is passing. An example of this is the news item cited in this article article: "India, US begin two-day naval exercise in eastern Indian Ocean region". The Economic Times. (accessed 28 March 2021).

[54] Annath Krishnan, Dinakar Peri, Kallol Bhattacherjee; India-U.S. 2+2 dialogue: U.S. to support India's defence of territory. The Hindu., March 2021)

[55] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind".

[56] Ibid.

[57] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship".

[58] Hindustan Times, "US defense secretary Lloyd Austin says US considers India to be a great partner".

[59] "Committed to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".The Economic Times. March 2021).

[60] Joe C. Mathew, "India-US mini trade deal: Low duty on medical devices; pact in final stages". Business Today. March 2021).

[61] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

[62] Joe C. Mathew, "India-US mini trade deal: Low duty on medical devices; pact in final stages".

[63] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

[64] Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security". Page 2.

[65] "Hindustan Times "US defense secretary Lloyd Austin says US considers India to be a great partner".

[66] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship".

[67] Ibid.

[68] Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating and Rebalancing Ties".

[69] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

[70] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship".

[71] Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security". Page3.

[72] IBIDEM p.3

[73] IBIDEM. Page 6

[74] IBIDEM. Page 7

[75] Seeram Chaulia, "France and sailing toward the 'QUAD-plus'". The New Indian Express

[76] Elisabeth Mearns, Gary Parkinson; "With a pandemic, populism and protectionism, have we passed peak globalization?". China Global Television Network. April 2021).

[77] Abraham Newman, Henry Farrel; "The New Age of Protectionism". Foreign Affairs. 5 April 2021).

[78] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

More blog entries