Revistas
Revista:
TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY
ISSN:
0167-7411
Año:
2023
Vol.:
42
N°:
1
Págs.:
5 - 8
Revista:
REVUE THOMISTE
ISSN:
0035-4295
Año:
2023
Vol.:
123
N°:
4
Págs.:
565 - 604
Revista:
TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY
ISSN:
0167-7411
Año:
2023
Vol.:
42
N°:
1
Págs.:
141 - 162
Common-sense philosophers typically maintain that common-sense propositions have a certain kind of epistemic privilege that allows them to evade the threats of skepticism or radical revisionism. But why do they have this special privilege? In response to this question, the ¿Common-Sense Tradition¿ contains many different strands of arguments. In this paper, I will develop a strategy that combines two of these strands of arguments. First, the ¿Dynamic Argument¿ (or the ¿starting-point argument¿), inspired by Thomas Reid and Charles S. Peirce (but which will be strengthened with the help of Gilbert Harman¿s epistemology of belief revision). Second, G.E. Moore¿s ¿greater certainty argument¿ (interpreted along the lines of Soames¿ and Pollock¿s construal). This combined strategy, I will argue, is the strong core of Common-Sense Philosophy, and relies on extremely modest and widely held assumptions.
Revista:
THEOLOGICA
ISSN:
2593-0265
Año:
2022
Vol.:
6
N°:
2
Págs.:
174 - 205
The problem of the Trinity is often framed as a paradox between some propositions central to the doctrine of the Trinity that seem to be logically in tension with each other. However, a problem of Paradox presupposes that we have a sufficient understanding of the meanings of the propositions (otherwise we wouldn¿t even have any appearance of conflict between these meanings). My claim in this paper is that the main problem of the Trinity is more radical than a problem of Paradox: it¿s rather a problem of Meaninglessness, in the sense that the difficult challenge is to grasp a meaning for the central propositions of the doctrine (not to render logically compatible some meanings clearly grasped). I show how we can respond to the problem of Meaninglessness and how, once we have solved it, there is no need to try and dissolve the appearance of contradiction which constitutes the problem of Paradox. As far as the problem of Paradox goes, the solution adopted here is therefore a form of Mysterianism.
Revista:
PHILOSOPHIA
ISSN:
0048-3893
Año:
2021
Vol.:
49
Págs.:
71 - 93
When the meta-philosophies of Nominalism and Realism are compared, it is often said that Nominalism is motivated by a methodology of ontological economy, while Realism would be motivated by an appeal to Common Sense. In this paper, I argue that this association is misguided. After briefly comparing the meta-philosophy of Common Sense and the meta-philosophy of economy, I show that the core motivation in favour of Realism relies in fact in a principle of economy which violates the methodology of Common Sense. I conclude that Common Sense philosophers should endorse Nominalism (and more precisely Ostrich Nominalism).
Revista:
SYNTHESE
ISSN:
0039-7857
Año:
2021
Vol.:
198
N°:
SUPPL 18
Págs.:
4247 - 4276
There are three families of solutions to the traditional Amputation Paradox: Eliminativism, Contingent Identity Theories, and Theories of Coincident Entities. Theories of Coincident Entities challenge our common understanding of the relation between identity and parthood, since they accept that two things can be mereologically coincident without being identical. The contemporary discussion of the Amputation Paradox tends to mention only one theory of Coincident Entities, namely the Constitution View, which violates the mereological principle of Extensionality. But in fact, there is another theory, namely the Unique Part View, which violates another mereological principle (the Weak Supplementation Principle). In this paper, I argue that the contemporary focus on the Constitution View is unmotivated, at least when we are confronted with the Amputation Paradox, and that a balanced comparison of the two views (as solutions to this specific paradox) should favour the Unique Part View.
Revista:
INTELLECTICA
ISSN:
0769-4113
Año:
2021
Vol.:
2
N°:
75
Págs.:
159 - 188
Une approche fréquente de la question du libre arbitre dans la philosophie contemporaine est constituée des deux idées suivantes : (i) le libre arbitre tel que nous l¿expérimentons est une illusion, et (ii) si nous devons faire place à une forme de liberté humaine dans un cadre naturaliste, ce ne peut être qu¿une liberté compatible avec la nécessité. D¿un point de vue historique, Spinoza est le premier philosophe qui ait défendu cette double approche du problème. Dans les débats contemporains, elle est représentée par un certain nombre de philosophes analytiques « compatibilistes », qui considèrent que les données des sciences ¿ en particulier des neurosciences ¿ en faveur d¿une forme de déterminisme nous obligent à abandonner la conception « incompatibiliste » (ou « libertarienne ») du libre arbitre. L¿article présent a pour but de resituer les récentes données déterministes des neurosciences dans le contexte du débat analytique entre compatibilistes et incompatibilistes. Ceci permettra de montrer comment et pourquoi certains auteurs (y compris l¿auteur de cet article) estiment que ces donnés scientifiques n¿ont pas totalement et définitivement réfuté la possibilité d¿une conception libertarienne et la fiabilité de notre expérience commune.
Revista:
KLESIS
ISSN:
1954-3050
Año:
2021
N°:
50
Págs.:
20 - 53
Revista:
ROCZNIKI FILOZOFICZNE
ISSN:
0035-7685
Año:
2021
Vol.:
69
N°:
3
Págs.:
163 - 214
One version of the Problem of Divine Hiddenness is about people who are looking for God and are distressed about not finding him. Having in mind such distressed God-seekers, Blaise Pascal imagined Jesus telling them the following: "Take comfort; you would not seek me if you had not found me". This is what I call the Pascalian Conditional of Hiddenness (PCH). In the first part of this paper, I argue that the PCH leads to a new interpretation of Pascal¿s own response to the problem, significantly different from Hick¿s or Schellenberg's interpretations of Pascal. In short: for any person who is distressed about not finding God, and who (for this reason) seriously considers the Argument from Hiddenness, the PCH would show that their own distress constitutes evidence that God is in fact not hidden to them (because this desire for God has been instigated in them by God himself). In the second part of the paper, I set aside the exegetical question and try to develop this original strategy as a contemporary response to one version of the Problem of Divine Hiddenness, which I call the "first-person problem". I argue that the PCH strategy offers a plausibly actual story to respond to the first-person problem. As a result, even if we need to complement the PCH strategy with other more traditional strategies (in order to respond to other versions of the problem), the PCH strategy should plausibly be part of the complete true story about Divine Hiddenness.
Revista:
ROCZNIKI FILOZOFICZNE
ISSN:
0035-7685
Año:
2020
Vol.:
68
N°:
3
Págs.:
71 - 109
Dariusz ¿ukasiewicz has investigated in depth the ¿Argument from Chance¿ which argues that the data revealing chance in the world are incompatible with Divine Providence. ¿ukasiewicz agrees that these data undermine the traditional model of Providence¿a fine-grained model in which every single detail is controlled by God¿but maintains that they are not incompatible with a coarse-grained model¿in which God leaves to chance many aspects of history (including some horrendous evils). Furthermore, ¿ukasiewicz provides independent reasons to prefer this coarse-grained model. Even though I agree that a maximally fine-grained model is undermined by the scientific data, I argue that this is no sufficient reason to adopt a model as coarse-grained as ¿ukasiewicz¿s. I propose a model of intermediate level of fine-grainedness which could avoid the drawbacks of both extremes, and seems to me to provide a more traditional approach to the problem of evil.
Revista:
DIOGENE
ISSN:
0419-1633
Año:
2018
Vol.:
1 - 2
N°:
261 - 262
Págs.:
54 - 87
Cet article tente d¿établir un diagnostic épistémologique du phénomène contemporain de développement des théories complotistes. Il part de la critique de deux approches du phénomène. L¿approche « hyper-critique » consiste à dire que le développement du complotisme manifeste un manque « d¿esprit critique », et prescrit donc comme thérapie d¿enseigner aux élèves à ne rien croire sans l¿avoir vérifié soi-même. Je réponds que cette stratégie « individualiste épistémique » est inefficace voire contre-productive, car une étude des discours conspirationnistes révèle que le conspirationnisme se nourrit précisément d¿une rhétorique individualiste. La seconde approche que je rejette consiste à nier l¿existence de tout phénomène problématique de « théories du complot ». Cette approche s¿appuie essentiellement sur la difficulté qu¿il y a à définir précisément ce qu¿est l¿état d¿esprit conspirationniste. Je réponds en définissant le conspirationnisme comme une exacerbation de l¿individualisme épistémique, c¿est-à-dire l¿incapacité à distinguer les sources testimoniales fiables des sources testimoniales non fiables.
Revista:
SYNTHESE
ISSN:
0039-7857
Año:
2018
Vol.:
195
N°:
11
Págs.:
4703 - 4731
Descartes¿s Evil Demon argument has been the subject of many reconstructions in recent analytic debates. Some have proposed a reconstruction with a principle of Infallibility, others with a principle of Closure of Knowledge, others with more original principles. In this paper, I propose a new reconstruction, which relies on the combination of two principles, namely the Meta-Coherence principle (defended by Huemer) and the principle of Closure of Justification (best defended by Hawthorne). I argue that the argument construed in this way is the best interpretation of what is really at play in the Evil Demon intuition, and also that this argument is dialectically much stronger than previous reconstructions. If this is right, then the ¿Closure plus Meta-Coherence¿ argument is what anti-sceptics should really be attacking.
Revista:
THEOLOGICA
ISSN:
2593-0265
Año:
2017
Vol.:
1
N°:
1
Págs.:
1 - 3
Revista:
PHILOSOPHIA SCIENTIAE - STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
ISSN:
1281-2463
Año:
2017
Vol.:
21
N°:
3
Págs.:
5 - 37
Dans cet article, je discute l¿épistémologie de Pascal Engel, en particulier sa stratégie de réponse aux arguments sceptiques dans Va Savoir !. Après avoir présenté de manière synthétique (section 1) les grands axes de cette stratégie (c¿est-à-dire la stratégie du « mooréanisme internaliste »), je reviens avec plus d¿attention sur deux éléments de cette stratégie avec lesquels je suis en désaccord : (i) le rejet par Engel de tout principe de réflexivité épistémique, et (ii) le rejet par Engel d¿une défense « forte » du sens commun. Je défends qu¿un certain principe de réflexivité (à savoir le principe de Méta-Cohérence, défendu par Michael Huemer) ne peut pas être raisonnablement rejeté (section 2) ; puis je montre que l¿épistémologie d¿Engel ne permet pas d¿apporter une réponse satisfaisante au défi sceptique que pose le principe de Méta-Cohérence (section 3). Enfin, je soutiens que la seule manière de répondre de manière satisfaisante à ce défi est de recourir (comme Reid, mais pas comme Moore, Lemos ou Engel) à une défense « forte » du sens commun, c¿est-à-dire à une stratégie dans laquelle les propositions de sens commun sont justifiées parce qu¿elles sont de sens commun (section 4).
Revista:
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
ISSN:
0031-8116
Año:
2014
Vol.:
168
N°:
3
Págs.:
645 - 663
Any philosopher who defends Free Will should have an answer to the epistemological question: "how do we know that we have such a capacity?" A traditional answer to this question is that we have some form of introspective access to our own Free Will. In recent times though, many philosophers have considered any such introspectionist theory as so obviously wrong that it hardly needs discussion, especially when Free Will is understood in libertarian terms. One of the rare objections to appear as an explicit argument was proposed by van Inwagen in his Essay on Free Will. In this paper, I address van Inwagen's anti-introspection argument; I argue that it is both inconsistent with his overall treatment of the Existence Question (namely, with his defence of the existence of Free Will from reflections about morality), and inconclusive in itself (at least for anyone not ready to endorse general scepticism about perception). In passing, I give a clarification of the notion of Introspection, in the case of Freedom, that also sets a more favourable stage for the evaluation of further objections.
Capítulos de libros
Libro:
Connaissance philosophique et connaissance des essences
Lugar de Edición:
Paris
Editorial:
Collège de France
Año:
2023
Págs.:
68 - 108
Libro:
Phénoménologie de l'action. Perspectives contemporaines sur l'agentivité et le sujet
Editorial:
Brill
Año:
2023
Págs.:
172 - 185
In the Free Will controversy, Libertarians traditionally claim that we experience our actions as having no cause besides ourselves, or more precisely no determining event-cause. But other philosophers, like Spinoza, have doubted that we had such an experience, or even that we could have such an experience; all we have (or can have), according to Spinozists, is an absence of experience of the determining cause, not an experience of an absence of a determining cause. In this paper, I argue that we can and do have a phenomenology of the absence of determining cause. First, I rebut the traditional Spinozist arguments to the effect that such an experience is impossible. Second, I provide a positive model, according to which this experience is not only possible, but is an actual experience, derivative upon two more fundamental experiences that we quite uncontroversially have. In the third section, I respond to some objections.
Libro:
La métaphysique du temps: perspectives contemporaines
Lugar de Edición:
Paris
Editorial:
Collège de France
Año:
2021
Págs.:
34 - 64
Dans le débat entre présentistes et éternalistes, il n¿est pas rare d¿entendre les premiers se prévaloir du soutien des intuitions du Sens Commun, et présenter ces intuitions comme un argument ou une raison (parfois la principale raison) d¿accepter le présentisme. C¿est par exemple l¿argument développé par Dean Zimmerman (2007). On peut résumer ainsi l¿argument : Argument présentiste par le Sens Commun (1) La conception du temps offerte par le sens commun est présentiste.
Libro:
Les principes métaphysiques
Lugar de Edición:
Paris
Editorial:
Collège de France
Año:
2020
Págs.:
5 - 13
Libro:
Les principes métaphysiques
Editorial:
Collège de France
Año:
2020
Págs.:
58 - 79
Libro:
Le libre arbitre: Perspectives contemporaines
Lugar de Edición:
Paris
Editorial:
Collège de France
Año:
2017
Págs.:
5 - 10
Libro:
Heaven and philosophy
Editorial:
Lexington Books
Año:
2017
Págs.:
45 - 76
According to a traditional Christian doctrine, the soul of the person continues to exist in a disembodied state between bodily death and bodily resurrection. This doctrine places theoretical constraints on a Christian metaphysics of the human person (the nature of her body and her soul). In this paper, I consider seven different philosophical anthropologies and try to adjudicate which one is the more suited to account for the doctrine of the Intermediate State. I argue that a kind of "Compound Dualism" is the best candidate.
Libro:
Le libre arbitre: perspectives contemporaines
Lugar de Edición:
Paris
Editorial:
Collège de France
Año:
2017
Págs.:
70 - 95
Libro:
La connaissance et ses raisons
Lugar de Edición:
Paris
Editorial:
Collège de France
Año:
2016
Págs.:
86 - 98
Nacionales y Regionales
Título:
Providencia y libertad en los modelos del teísmo clásico y del teísmo analítico
Código de expediente:
PID2021-122633NB-I00
Investigador principal:
Agustín Ignacio Echavarría Anavitarte, Jean-Baptiste Francois Marie Guillon
Financiador:
MINISTERIO DE CIENCIA, INNOVACIÓN Y UNIVERSIDADES
Convocatoria:
FIMA 2021 MCIU AEI GENERACION CONOCIMIENTO
Fecha de inicio:
01/09/2022
Fecha fin:
31/08/2025
Importe concedido:
41.382,00€
Otros fondos:
Fondos FEDER
