Resumen: The notion of habit learning in Neuroscience implies the automation of 5
an action, which thus discharges consciousness from the supervision of its perfor- 6
mance and eventually restricts flexibility. It has also been assumed that habit 7
learning is against free will, as it has been suggested for pathological conditions 8
such as obsessive-compulsive disorder. This point of view, which might be contro- 9
versial with other notions of habituation, could be an interesting context to analyze 10
at what extent human actions emerge from free will and are consciously carried out. 11
The well-known experiments performed by Benjamin Libet and replicated by 12
others have led some scientists to deny the concept of free will in the human 13
being. However, we think that these experiments posit further questions that should 14
be tackled from a broader point of view. For example: does the readiness potential 15
univocally point to the initiation of any kind of action? Can it be also found in non- 16
deterministic novel actions? Is it causally related to the action, or is it just a ¿mental 17
rehearsal¿ of the action to come? In this contribution, we will try to make a note on 18
these topics in order to explain the neuroscientific concept of habit learning and to 19
relate it to free will in a broader and more philosophical interdisciplinary framework.
