Comment
I.- The issues raised.
In the context of the challenge to Article 30.1(b) of the Third Nation agreement , a nationwide collective bargaining agreement for the contact center sector (Official State Gazette, June 9, 2023), three issues have arisen regarding the effective exercise of the caregiver leave provided for in Article 37.3(b) of the Labor Code:
i. The date on which the leave is to begin (start of the leave).
ii. Whether or not it is feasible to establish a maximum period for using the permit (time frame for use).
iii. Continuous or intermittent use of the permit (method of use).
The “ discussion ” (Ten-Day Caregiver Leave) was established because the relevant provision requires that caregiver leave be taken “continuously within ten calendar days, counted from and including the first business day for the employee on which the triggering event occurs.”
II. What We Already Knew: The Date on Which the Leave May Begin.
Regarding the point in time from which the leave may begin, the Social Affairs conference room t of the National Court concludes that the provision in the collective bargaining agreement (“counted from the first workday for the employee on which the triggering event occurs, inclusive”) is contrary to the provisions of Art. 37.3(b) of the Labor Code (ET), as it links the start of the leave exclusively to the triggering event in question.
It reaches this conclusion by applying the doctrine already established by the Fourth Chamber of the Supreme Court ( conference room IV) in its recent Supreme Court Decision No. 126/2026, dated February 4 (Case No. 251/2024):
“With regard to the first of the provisions, the ruling of the Supreme Court in its judgment of February 4, 2026, is fully applicable (Case No. 251/2024) is fully applicable, insofar as it specifically addresses the starting point from which the leave provided for in Article article 37.3(b) of the Labor Code may begin, interpreting and concluding that the commencement of this leave, given its nature, cannot be linked to the moment of the triggering event, given that “from the nature and purpose of the leave in question, it follows that linking its commencement to the event that gives rise to it would clearly imply a devaluation of its protective potential, by preventing, as has already been stated, adequate planning of the attendance for the person in need of it,” such that “the family care leave referred to in Art. 37.3 b) of the ET, cannot be administered in such a way that their commencement is necessarily tied to the event on which they depend, without thereby leaving room for a rational allocation that allows for planned and more effective attendance of the person in need, depending on the prevailing circumstances."
III. — The new features: the time frame (flexible vs. fixed) and the method (intermittent vs. continuous) of using the permit.
Since the literal wording of Article 37.3(b) of the Workers’ Statute (ET) contains no provisions on this matter, the Labor Chamber of the National Court ( conference room ) finds that the provisions set forth in the collective bargaining agreement (namely, taking the leave “continuously” and “within ten calendar days”)—which give rise to the following two issues—unjustifiably restrict the right to take caregiver leave. Consequently, these provisions must also be declared unlawful. Specifically, with regard exclusively to the question of whether or not a fixed maximum time period for taking the leave may be established, the National Court holds that,
“The Supreme Court ruling of February 4, 2026 (Case No. 251/2024) is directly applicable, given that, since it has already been established that the start date cannot be linked to the date of the triggering event, the same reasons set forth above must lead to the conclusion that it is not possible to link the leave to a specific time period.”
To this, along with an analysis of the controversy regarding the manner (continuous or alternating) in which the leave is taken, it adds the following as a result of a purposive and contextual interpretation of Article 37.3(b) of the Workers' Statute:
“In light of the foregoing interpretive criteria, we consider that establishing both a time frame for taking the leave and a requirement for continuous use may undermine the purpose of the leave—which is none other than the care of a family member—and disregard the interests of the person in need of care, since this need for care may well extend beyond the established ten-day period; thus, while the underlying circumstance persists, the use of the leave is rigidly limited to a specific timeframe without any business rationale apparent to justify this restrictive configuration of its use, or it may require care on an alternating rather than continuous basis, such that the imposition of a continuous arrangement could become an insurmountable obstacle to the genuine and effective planning of care and support for the person giving rise to the grounds for the leave. We are therefore faced with two provisions that, from a strictly legal perspective— article , Article 37.3(b) of the ET—are contrary to law.”
IV. Conclusions.
While keeping in mind that we are dealing with the resolution of a specific dispute challenging a particular provision of the agreement—and pending the Supreme Court’s ruling on the matter—the following conclusions can be drawn from the National Court’s ruling:
First: The start date of leave for caregivers cannot be conventionally tied exclusively to the moment the triggering event occurs; it may begin at a later time as long as the triggering event in question continues to exist.
Second: The actual use of caregivers’ leave cannot be limited by convention to a maximum time period; rather, it may be taken for as long as the qualifying event in question continues to exist.
Third: Caregiver leave cannot be taken exclusively on a continuous basis; it may be taken on an alternating basis (in segments, if preferred) as long as the qualifying event in question continues to exist.
